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CONTENTS

	Page
<i>Agenda item 26:</i>	
<i>The Korean question: report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (continued)</i>	
<i>General debate (continued) and consideration of the draft resolution.</i>	189

Chairman: Mr. Franz MATSCH (Austria).

AGENDA ITEM 26

The Korean question: report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (A/4187, A/C.1/822, A/C.1/823, A/C.1/L.245) (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE (continued) AND CONSIDERATION OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION (A/C.1/L.245)

1. The CHAIRMAN drew the attention of the members of the Committee to the draft resolution submitted by fourteen States (A/C.1/L.245).
2. Sir Pierson DIXON (United Kingdom) expressed his delegation's appreciation to UNCURK for the invaluable work it had done in preparing its current report (A/4187).
3. The position of the General Assembly in regard to the Korean question was simple. The Assembly had laid down certain principles for the settlement of the problem and had restated them in its resolution 1264 (XIII), which emphasized the continued determination of the United Nations to bring about by peaceful means the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Korea under a representative form of government, and the full restoration of peace and security in the area. Those principles still seemed to provide the best basis for a just settlement.
4. The withdrawal of Chinese troops from Korea was certainly welcome, and it was to be hoped that conditions would improve to such an extent that the forces of the United Nations Command might also be removed. But it was scarcely reasonable to criticize the United Nations Command for retaining its troops in the absence of an agreement reached on the basis of the principles enunciated. The nations which composed the Command were maintaining forces in Korea not for reasons of national interest, but merely to assist in the carrying out of the principles laid down by the United Nations.
5. It was apparent from diplomatic correspondence exchanged between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the United Kingdom Government, acting on behalf of the countries contributing troops to the Command, that the communist side was not prepared to accept those basic principles. So far, the stage of discussing a procedure for carrying out those principles had not yet been reached. When the time

came, however, the countries composing the United Nations Command would not be found inflexible on details of procedure. However they would stand firm on the question of principle, and it was to be hoped that the communist authorities would reconsider their attitude.

6. While it was hard to be optimistic about an early solution to the Korean problem, it should be remembered that the people of Korea, bound together by ancient ties of nationhood and culture, had a right to an enduring peace based on unity and independence. The United Nations, being the custodian of that basic right, could not agree to sacrifice it in the face of seemingly fruitless negotiations, but should patiently reaffirm its determination to uphold it.

7. Mr. NAUDE (Union of South Africa) recalled that the Union of South Africa, acting in the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations, had responded to the Security Council's appeal in 1950 for assistance in repelling the aggression against South Korea.^{1/} While South Africa had not participated in the councils held to discuss a settlement of the Korean question, it nevertheless felt bound to urge all those concerned to promote the two objectives of the United Nations in Korea, namely to bring about by peaceful means the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Korea under a representative form of government, and to restore international peace and security in the area.

8. It was indeed sad that after so many years the Korean question was still on the Committee's agenda. It appeared from the UNCURK report that no substantial progress had been made towards unification. Had Korea as a whole been permitted to express its wishes, that political problem would now have been removed. The General Assembly could only reaffirm the objectives it had laid down and emphasize that they should be achieved by peaceful means. Only genuinely free elections could ensure their achievement. Nor could the fanciful contention of the Peking authorities that the United Nations had been a belligerent in the dispute be accepted without calling in question the very purpose for which the Organization had been established. In the face of the assertion that no satisfactory answer had been given to the question of the withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea, it could only be pointed out that the vast majority of the United Nations forces had left the country some time before. Moreover, to insist on the withdrawal of the remainder of those forces across the Pacific or to other areas remote from Korea was scarcely reasonable in view of the fact that the Chinese forces had withdrawn only across the Yalu River and that no satisfactory arrangements had been reached for a settlement of the country's future.

^{1/} Official Records of the Security Council, Fifth Year, Supplement for June, July and August 1950 document S/1543.

9. It was to be hoped that the time was opportune for making a further effort to attain the United Nations objectives in Korea. Much had been said about the new spirit arising out of exchanges of visits between leading statesmen and it so happened that those who were most active in pointing out the potentialities of such discussions were those who had the primary responsibility for the Korean problem. They might consider that the solution of that problem would serve as a demonstration of the manner in which the new spirit could be translated into action.

10. A debt of appreciation was owed to UNCURK and to the UNCURK Committee in Seoul. The Commission had an exacting task which was further complicated by the division of the country, but it was approaching that task with both wisdom and discretion. It had observed that the prospects of the economic viability of the peninsula would be greatly improved by unification and it was accordingly to be wished every success in its task, not only of ensuring the independence of the Republic of Korea, but also of building up an economic basis for a unified Korea.

11. The Union of South Africa had co-sponsored the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.245) in the hope that it would promote the attainment of the United Nations objectives in Korea.

12. Mr. TUGARINOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) observed that the General Assembly was having to discuss a report of UNCURK for the ninth time. It was clear, however, that UNCURK existed, not to promote the reunification of Korea, but as a convenient cloak for activities designed to deepen the division of the country and to maintain tension in the Far East. In fact, UNCURK, far from contributing to the country's reunification, had done everything possible to create an impasse.

13. It was no accident that every year the same resolutions were imposed on the United Nations providing for unilateral measures to settle the Korean problem.

14. Contrary to the will of the Korean people, continuous attempts were being made to force upon the Democratic People's Republic of Korea so-called free elections under United Nations control, that is, basically under the control of countries which had waged war against that Republic and had helped to maintain the occupation of the country with foreign troops. The Korean people and the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea were thus presented with an ultimatum—either they agreed to the establishment in North Korea of the reactionary order imposed by foreign forces in the South, or Korea remained divided. However, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had repeatedly stated that it would not agree to jeopardize its independence, freedom and hard-won achievements. Unquestionably, those unrealistic demands were made with a view, not to promoting the reunification of Korea, but to keeping the country divided. The fact that a decision to invite only the representatives of South Korea to participate in the discussions had been imposed upon the First Committee showed that certain Western countries were unwilling to take account of the will of the Korean people. The United States had made it quite clear that it had no intention of altering its rigid position.

15. The issue of ultimatums to the Korean people could serve no useful purpose and the maintenance

of the deadlock in Korea was clearly convenient to certain circles which had no wish to relax international tensions or take into account the interest of the people concerned.

16. The attacks made by the representative of the United States against the Soviet Union, the Chinese People's Republic and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea could carry little weight because the record of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries showed them to have been consistent champions of the cause of peace and peaceful co-operation. Guided by the universally recognized principle of respect for the sovereign rights and territorial integrity of all States, irrespective of their size, the Soviet Union firmly maintained that the restoration of Korea's national unity was primarily a matter for the Koreans themselves. Before the Korean question could be discussed realistically it was first necessary to take account of the existence of two separate States in Korea. Not only did those separate States exist, but both had gained international recognition as reflected in the establishment of diplomatic, cultural and trade relations with various other countries.

17. The fact that the United States and the United Kingdom did not recognize the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was irrelevant. For many years they had affected not to recognize the Soviet Union. Just as they now maintained normal diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, so they would eventually adopt a realistic attitude in respect of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The assertion that an invitation to a representative of that Republic to participate in the debate in the First Committee would give it a status it did not possess was entirely incorrect as the existence of that Republic was generally recognized and its economic achievements were well known.

18. However, in the absence of a representative of that Republic, and in view of certain inaccurate statements that had been made, the true facts of the economic and social conditions prevailing in North Korea should be mentioned. In a short time it had been transformed from a backward colony to a growing industrial and agrarian State. In 1958 industrial production had been more than four times higher than in 1944; the gross production of grain had doubled since 1946 and it was significant that the per caput production of grain in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was more than twice that of South Korea which, up to 1945, had been the granary for the whole of Korea. Only a free people working in its own national interests could be capable of such outstanding achievements. Radical measures had been taken to raise levels of living and to develop genuine democracy. Workers' housing had been developed on a vast scale and unemployment was non-existent in North Korea. Compulsory secondary education had been introduced in 1958 and free medical care had been extended to all medical institutions.

19. In South Korea, However, which was entirely dependent on foreign aid, the economy was deteriorating. The number of factories had decreased by 56 per cent as compared to 1953 and, according to the South Korean periodical Industry and Economy, there were more than 6 million unemployed or semi-employed. In the light of those facts, the encouraging description of the economic situation in South Korea given by the United States representative (1061st meeting) was

surprising. Even the report of UNCURK acknowledged the existence of inflation in South Korea and the fact that the country's economy was unbalanced.

20. As for the political situation in South Korea, the United States representative had claimed that that area enjoyed civil liberties which were non-existent in North Korea. Yet in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea there was no trace of the deprivation of rights and arbitrary rule which prevailed in South Korea. Even the UNCURK report admitted that the task of developing the institutions of representative government in South Korea had been a difficult one and it mentioned protests against restrictive Government action and violations of freedom of the Press.

21. However different the course of development of the two Korean States, the fact of their separate existence had to be taken into account in considering the question of unification. Moreover, the matter could be discussed only with the participation of the representatives of both Korean sides and could be settled only with their mutual consent and not by coercion.

22. There was reason to hope that the South Korean leadership realized that nothing could be achieved by the use of violence. In a recent statement, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Khrushchev, had expressed the view that the United States was not seeking a military conflict in the area and he had indicated that favourable conditions were developing for the definitive settlement of the Korean question. The first step in that direction should be to eliminate the main obstacles in the way of reunification. For that reason the Soviet Union fully supported the demand of the Korean people and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, that foreign troops should be withdrawn.

23. In February 1958, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had made proposals for the country's peaceful unification (A/3865, para. 9). As a result of that initiative, all the units of the Chinese People's Volunteers had been withdrawn from North Korea. If that example were followed by the United States, an important step would be taken towards the country's unification. On 27 October 1959, the Supreme National Assembly of the Republic had made an appeal to all countries of the world calling for the withdrawal of all American troops from Korea and proposing the country's unification by means of free elections. That appeal pointed the way to a realistic solution of the Korean question taking fully into account the national interests of the Korean people and of world peace. As Mr. Khrushchev had pointed out, as soon as foreign troops were withdrawn from Korea and there was no longer any outside intervention in Korean affairs, the North and the South would gradually come together. If troops were not withdrawn, the necessary atmosphere of confidence and co-operation could not be created. In recent years the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had made repeated proposals for mutual co-operation between the two States. The proposed contacts between political and trade organizations as well as between private persons would have contributed substantially to improving the situation in Korea. Unfortunately, the South Korean authorities had invariably turned down those proposals.

24. By adopting one-sided and arbitrary decisions, the United Nations could only aggravate the situation and consolidate the division of Korea. At the thirteenth session of the General Assembly a number of delega-

tions, including that of Canada, had expressed doubts concerning the realism of such a policy and had stated that a solution could be found only by a process of conciliation and negotiation. The Soviet delegation felt it essential to draw the Committee's attention to the memorandum submitted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (A/C.1/823) which pointed out that the Korean question should be settled by the Korean people on a peaceful and democratic basis without foreign intervention. The Soviet delegation appealed to all members to advocate just measures for settling the Korean problem in the interests of the Korean people. A first step should be the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the peninsula. Furthermore, the cause of the unification of Korea could only gain from the abolition of UNCURK, whose activities were at variance with its stated task.

25. Mr. ARTHAYUKTI (Thailand) noted with satisfaction the progress and promising developments recorded in the past year in the Republic of Korea. It was clear from the report that co-operation between the Republic of Korea and the United Nations had borne fruit. The new Republic had achieved both economic expansion and political and social stability, and its status had become firmly established through increasing diplomatic representation abroad. As one of the countries which enjoyed diplomatic ties with the Republic of Korea, Thailand was increasingly convinced of its willingness to uphold the purposes and principles of the Charter and trusted that it would play an increasing role in international affairs. Accordingly the Thai delegation welcomed the presence of a representative of the Republic of Korea in the Committee and had co-sponsored the draft resolution which expressed the United Nations determination to restore international peace and security in the area. It also hoped that, in view of the present relaxation of international tension, the North Korean authorities might reconsider their position and co-operate with the United Nations towards the early realization of a unified and democratic Korea.

26. Mr. BUSNIAK (Czechoslovakia) said that the main obstacle to a solution of the Korean problem was the obstructionist policy of the United States, which had blocked agreement at the Korean Political Conference, held at Geneva in 1954. Each year, since the ninth session of the General Assembly, the United States and the countries that supported it had imposed upon the Assembly resolutions which merely repeated the principles of the Declaration by the Sixteen (A/2786, annex), adopted by the sixteen States which had participated in the aggressive war against the Korean people. The resolutions represented an attempt to impose the will of the United States on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. He protested against the Committee's refusal to invite representatives of that Republic to take part in the present debate.

27. It was clear from the United States representative's statement at the previous meeting that the United States had no intention of altering its policy on the Korean question. South Korea was being turned into a United States atomic and rocket base and was being used to threaten the peace and security of Asia. In order to justify its violation of the Armistice Agreement^{2/} and its continued maintenance of armed forces

^{2/} Official Records of the Security Council, Eighth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1953, document S/3079, appendix A.

in South Korea, the United States had concocted an imaginary threat of aggression by the People's Republic of China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

28. The proposals of 5 February 1958 of the Democratic People's Republic (A/3865, para. 9), calling for the simultaneous withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea, the holding of all-Korean elections under the supervision of neutral countries, broad contacts between North and South Korea, and the greatest possible reduction of the armed forces of both parts of the country, showed which side was genuinely seeking a peaceful solution of the Korean problem. The Chinese People's Volunteers had completed their withdrawal from Korean territory on 26 October 1958 and the Democratic People's Republic had unilaterally reduced the strength of its armed forces by 80,000 men, but the United States Government and the puppet Government of Syngman Rhee had rejected the proposals of the Democratic People's Republic. Since 1954, the United States and the South Korean Governments had systematically violated the Armistice Agreement by bringing in war materials, including nuclear weapons and rockets, and strengthening the South Korean armed forces. In order to conceal its activities, the United States had, since the conclusion of the Armistice Agreement, restricted the control and inspection operations of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in South Korea and, in 1956, had expelled the Commission's inspection group from South Korea. In 1957, the United States had (A/3631) unilaterally declared its intention not to observe paragraph 13 (d) of the Armistice Agreement, which prohibited the introduction of modern military equipment into Korea. His delegation, representing a Government which was a member of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, protested against the violation of the Armistice Agreement by the United States and urged that the Commission should be permitted to continue its work.

29. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea had recently given further evidence of its desire for peace by endorsing the Soviet proposal to create an "atom-free" zone in the Far East and the Pacific area; on the other hand, the South Korean régime continued to speak of unifying Korea by force and was urging the United States to provide the South Korean armed forces with nuclear weapons and rockets. In October 1959, the Supreme National Assembly of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had appealed to the parliaments of all countries to support the peaceful unification of Korea. In 1958 and 1959, the Democratic People's Republic had offered to provide material assistance to orphans and unemployed persons in South Korea or to admit them to North Korea, to provide an education for 3,000 South Korean students, to permit South Korean fishermen to engage in fishing operations along the east coast of North Korea, to conclude an agreement permitting persons in one part of Korea to visit relatives in the other part, and to establish economic and cultural relations with the South; however, all its proposals had been rejected by the Syngman Rhee Government and the United States.

30. The economic situation in South Korea was disastrous, with 70 per cent of the national budget earmarked for military purposes and the police. According to data published in the South Korean periodical *Industry and Economy*, unemployment had

reached almost 6.5 million during the present year. Inflation was rampant. Official data showed a foreign trade deficit of more than \$US 30 million for 1958. Industrial production, which by 1958 had reached scarcely 50 per cent of the pre-war level, was falling steadily because of the militarization of the South Korean economy and the increasing importation of United States goods. The total grain yield in 1957 had been 40 per cent lower than in the years of the Japanese occupation. Those facts were deliberately concealed by the report of the so-called United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea. In addition, the arbitrary measures recently employed to secure adoption of the so-called National Security Law had shown the undemocratic nature of the South Korean régime.

31. In the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Government was striving to develop the national economy and raise the people's standard of living. Industrial production had been four times as high in 1958 as in 1949, and agricultural production had been 1.4 times as high. Unemployment did not exist, and the real income of workers and peasants was steadily increasing. Compulsory seven-year secondary education had been introduced, and preparations were under way to inaugurate compulsory technical education for secondary-school graduates.

32. At a time when there was a noticeable improvement in international relations, cold war methods should not be employed to delay the unification of Korea. Unification could be achieved only through negotiation among the Koreans themselves and not through the use of force. The participation of representatives of both German States at the recent Foreign Ministers' Conference at Geneva served as a precedent in that respect. However, as Mr. Khrushchev had stated before the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on 31 October 1959, the main prerequisite for unification was the immediate withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from South Korea. The National Assembly of the Czechoslovak Republic had taken the same position on 19 November in replying to the appeal of the Supreme National Assembly of the Korean Democratic People's Republic. Instead of acting as an instrument for imposing the views of a particular group of States, the United Nations should take an objective position on the Korean question with a view to fulfilling the Korean people's desire for national unity and easing international tension.

33. His delegation would vote against the fourteen-Power draft resolution, which would merely serve to maintain the present abnormal situation; it would also vote against extending the mandate of UNCURK.

34. Mr. TINAUD (France) noted that the recent exchange of correspondence between the People's Republic of China and the United Kingdom, acting on behalf of the countries which had contributed forces to the United Nations Command in Korea, had shown that the communist authorities were continuing to refuse to co-operate with the United Nations in bringing about a peaceful and democratic solution of the Korean problem. In reply to the last note delivered to Peking on 4 December 1958, restating the objectives of the United Nations as set forth in General Assembly resolution 1264 (XIII), the communist authorities had merely repeated their earlier arguments designed to prolong a situation contrary to the wishes of the Korean people.

35. The communist authorities continued to demand the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea as a pre-condition for elections. While that argument might appear persuasive at first glance, it could not withstand serious scrutiny because no valid analogy could be drawn between the withdrawal of communist troops to a point only several dozen kilometres from the Korean border and the withdrawal of troops of the United Nations Command to bases situated several thousand kilometres across the seas. Moreover, that false analogy also tended to place on a footing of equality the forces of the aggressor and those of the United Nations, whose mission was to ensure the restoration of peace and the reunification of Korea as a genuinely independent State. The communist argument was nothing more than a dilatory tactic intended to prevent elections, the essential prerequisite for reunification. Those elections should obviously be held in a uniform manner in both parts of Korea under safeguards which would ensure their regularity. In the absence of a satisfactory agreement on the methods of holding elections, a withdrawal of United Nations Command forces would again expose the people of Korea to the most serious disappointments.

36. Unfortunately, no progress had been made towards a solution of the impasse reached in Korea in the past year. The last report of UNCURK confirmed that fact. Nevertheless, the United Nations should not at any cost abandon its obligations towards the Korean people, and the Committee should continue to reaffirm its principles and objectives. Those objectives were to bring about by peaceful means the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Korea under a representative form of government constituted through free elections in both parts of the country. The draft resolution (A/C.1/L.245) accomplished that purpose and France had accordingly co-sponsored it. He hoped that it would contribute to a rapid and satisfactory solution of the Korean question.

37. Mr. ZARUBA (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that for years the United Nations had been taking essentially illegal decisions on the Korean question and disregarding the real interests of the Korean people; the result had been to perpetuate the partition of Korea and maintain the dangerous state of tension in that country.

38. Because of its hostility to the social system prevailing in North Korea, the United States had sponsored all kinds of discriminatory measures against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and had sought to extend the authority of the reactionary Syngman Rhee régime to the entire country. The progress achieved in North Korea in creating a better life for the people was clearly shown in the memorandum submitted by the Democratic People's Republic (A/C.1/823).

39. The latest UNCURK report, like the previous ones, attempted to slander the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and to whitewash the undemocratic Syngman Rhee régime. The United States representative's statement had been of a similar tenor; however, he had confined himself to generalities, since the facts did not bear out his favourable portrayal of the situation in South Korea. The South Korean economy was in a state of grave crisis, and, according to The Wall Street Journal, was maintained only by United States subsidies. Unemployment and inflation were wide-spread. Furthermore, the undemocratic charac-

ter of the Syngman Rhee régime had been described by other representatives and in document A/C.1/823.

40. The objective of the United States in Korea was to transform the entire country into a military base to be used against other States. It was for that reason that the United States was equipping the South Korean armies with atomic weapons, rockets and other modern weapons, that it refused to withdraw its troops from South Korea, and that it sought to prevent the solution of the Korean problem by the Korean people itself. The United States and its supporters had rejected the proposals submitted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea at the Korean Political Conference. Subsequent proposals of the Democratic People's Republic had called for the convening of an international conference on the Korean question, a reduction in the armed forces of both North and South Korea, and broad contacts between representatives of North and South Korean political parties and social organizations, or a joint session of the supreme legislative organs of the two States for the purpose of discussing the peaceful unification of the country. On 5 February 1958, the Democratic People's Republic had proposed that all foreign armed forces should be withdrawn from the country, following which free all-Korean elections would be held and negotiations would be opened on the establishment of economic and cultural ties between the North and South. However, all the proposals referred to had been rejected by the United States.

41. From the very start, the United Nations, acting under United States pressure, had taken a biased position on the Korean question; the illegal resolutions repeatedly imposed upon the United Nations had enabled the United States to continue its occupation of South Korea. The United Nations must break with past practice and take action to bring about the withdrawal of United States and other foreign troops from South Korea, so that the Korean question could be settled by the Korean people itself.

42. Mr. PLIMSOLL (Australia) said that it would be an injustice to the Korean people if the interest of the United Nations in its future were permitted to wane. So long as their country remained divided, the Koreans could not live free from outside interference, could not preserve their traditions and culture, and could not create decent living standards. There was a tremendous urge on the part of the population on both sides of the 38th parallel to bring about the reunification of the country.

43. In assessing the situation in Korea, several vital facts should be borne in mind. It should be remembered, for example, that the South Koreans had been indisputably the victims of aggression in 1950. The United Nations Commission on Korea had reported that, only a few days before the attack had been launched, the South Korean forces were so disposed that they were in no condition to launch an offensive and their reaction to the impact of the attack had proved beyond doubt that they were unprepared for it.^{3/} Indeed, they had been beaten back and would have gone down without United Nations assistance.

44. The second fact to be taken into account was the overwhelming measure of popular support there had been for the forces resisting aggression and for the

^{3/} See Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, Supplement No. 16, annex 4.

Government of the Republic of Korea. When the outcome of the fighting had been in doubt and the South Korean armies had scattered, the soldiers had not surrendered and gone over to the other side; instead they had made their way back to rejoin their forces. The determination of the South Korean people to resist aggression had continued during the period of North Korean occupation, as had their support of the Government of the Republic of Korea. Over 2 million refugees had filtered down to the southern part of the country from the North. These circumstances should be borne in mind in examining to what extent the Government of the Republic of Korea had the right to speak for the people of South Korea.

45. A third vital fact was that the United Nations had come into Korea in 1950 to assist the victims of aggression. The United Nations forces were there in response to a request from a lawfully constituted government, in response to a call by competent organs of the United Nations, and in pursuance of the Charter obligations of the Powers which had contributed forces. Since the United Nations had first participated in the Korean question, it had done its utmost to be fair to both sides and to avoid freezing positions if anything could be done to keep them fluid and open to solution. When the Korean question first came before the United Nations in 1947, at its second session, Korea had been divided by the two authorities which occupied it militarily. The United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea representing all shades of political opinion had been established (resolution 112 B (II)) to investigate the situation in both parts of the country and to set up a unified government responsive to the whole population. The USSR had refused to co-operate with the Commission and the Ukrainian SSR had refused to serve on it, so that from the beginning the United Nations' approach had been impeded by the refusal of one element to participate. The Temporary Commission, which had eventually gone to Korea, had delayed as long as possible the organization of any permanent régime in the hope that one acceptable to both sides might be agreed upon. Indeed, the Temporary Commission had sought further instructions from the Interim Committee of the General Assembly before it had proceeded to supervise the establishment of a South Korean government. Finally, the Government of the Republic of Korea had been established in 1948 as a result of elections supervised by the United Nations. The United Nations Commission on Korea had remained in the country to observe the operation of the new régime, which had been recognized by the General Assembly (resolution 195 (III)).

46. The attack by the North Koreans in 1950 had been a wanton act of aggression. Yet, even then, the United Nations had made every effort to prevent a hardening of positions which would prevent the two sides from getting together. The United Nations Interim Committee on Korea, meeting in New York before UNCURK had set out for Korea, had attempted to arrange a political reconciliation and also to work out conditions and arrange talks which could give guarantees to the neighbouring countries of the area that Korea would not be a threat to them. None of those efforts had been accepted. Indeed, some who had rejected them at the time might now regret their actions. It was clear from the past record of the United Nations in Korea and from its status there that its purpose was not to defend one social system against another or one Power group against another;

its purpose was and continued to be to give the Korean people a government responsive to its wishes.

47. The First Committee should also bear in mind the record of co-operation between the independent Government of the Republic of Korea and the United Nations and its various organs in Korea over the years. The United Nations had been able to observe freely conditions in South Korea and to report fully on them. While there had been times when the Government did not approve the actions or plans of United Nations bodies, it had never attempted to prevent them from carrying out their functions as they saw them. Moreover, the Government had showed itself responsive to United Nations representations. In contrast, the North Korean authorities had never permitted United Nations personnel to enter their territory and had steadfastly refused to co-operate with the Organization.

48. Another significant feature of the present situation in Korea was the extent of democratic practices and institutions in the Republic of Korea. The wide public criticism in South Korea of the Government, the various demonstrations of political opposition to it, and the electoral successes of some opposition candidates indicated a degree of democracy and a large measure of political freedom; indeed, they were signs of health in the political life of South Korea. That did not imply that Australia supported all the actions of the Government of the Republic of Korea or all the events occurring in the southern part of the country. Neither the United Nations nor any Member State was under any obligation to express views regarding that situation; the Korean people were the judges of it.

49. The United Nations had received for the current year, as it had during the past few years, a documented report from UNCURK on the situation in South Korea. The Australian delegation expressed its thanks for those reports. The presence of United Nations organs in Korea was a manifestation of continued United Nations interest in the Korean people and could contribute to the political, social and economic development of the country.

50. The fourteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.245), which Australia had co-sponsored, reaffirmed in its operative paragraph 1 the United Nations objectives in Korea: the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Korea under a representative form of government, stating that unification should take place by peaceful means—not as a result of resort to force; and the restoration of international peace and security in the area, which meant that, apart from anything else, the United Nations wanted a unified Korea to be a State which would not constitute a threat to any neighbouring country. A practical approach to a solution of the Korean question was imperative, and Australia was confident that the complexities of the problem could be worked out in discussions when conditions for profitable negotiation were created.

51. Mr. COOPER (Liberia) pointed out that it was paradoxical for the North Korean authorities to insist on participating in the debate on the Korean question. They had charged the United Nations with yielding to the pressure of United States imperialism; they had branded the Organization as an aggressor, a belligerent, a puppet; they had asserted that the United Nations had consistently taken a unilateral view of the Korean

problem and had lost its moral authority in respect of a peaceful settlement. In the circumstances, the only conclusion to be drawn from their eagerness to appear before the Committee was that those charges were intended to conceal their unprovoked attack on South Korea and that they were seeking to use the United Nations for propaganda purposes. Moreover, the North Korean authorities attributed to the "United States imperialists" all the evils that had befallen the people of Korea. They cynically alleged that the economic and financial aid provided by the United States had been intended to destroy and plunder the national industry and the rural economy of Korea. They argued that the United States imperialists had carried out separate elections in South Korea in 1948 and, under the protection of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea, had used police pressure to establish the puppet Government of Syngman Rhee. However, it was a known fact that the elections in South Korea had been held under United Nations supervision with the participation of a very large proportion of the electorate and that they had resulted in the establishment of the Government of the Republic of Korea. The North Koreans attempted to demonstrate, by manipulating the figures representing the proportion of the electorate which had taken part in elections in both parts of Korea, that the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea represented the entire Korean people. That assertion was patently untenable.

52. The withdrawal of all foreign forces from North and South Korea, upon which the North Koreans were

insisting as a pre-condition for reunification, would give the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and its supporters a free hand to unify Korea, not by general elections, but by force of arms, and all the sacrifices made by the United Nations forces in Korea in defence of a democratic Korean government would have proved vain. The North Koreans had also suggested unification under neutral nations' supervision. In their view, however, the only neutral nations were those which condoned their aggression in Korea. In fact, if, as they alleged, the United Nations had been an instrument of aggression against them, then the only neutral States must be communist States.

53. It was inevitable that the Republic of Korea, in view of the artificial division of the country and the damage caused by the Korean conflict, should be concerned about subversion and possibly renewed attack. In order to devise methods to combat subversion, the National Assembly had undertaken the revision of the security law. It had immediately been charged by the North Korean Government with infringing civil liberties. Yet, all States on the brink of war or under its threat had found it necessary to enact laws for their protection even at the expense of individual liberties. The Government of the Republic of Korea had been justified.

54. Liberia would vote in favour of the fourteen-Power draft resolution because it regarded it as the most practical solution of the Korean problem.

The meeting rose at 6 p.m.