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**FIRST COMMITTEE, 1104th
 MEETING**

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Chairman: Sir Claude COREA (Ceylon).

AGENDA ITEMS 67, 86, 69 AND 73

Disarmament and the situation with regard to the fulfilment of General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV) of 20 November 1959 on the question of disarmament (A/4463, A/4503, A/4505, A/4509, A/C.1/L.249, A/C.1/L.250, A/C.1/L.251, A/C.1/L.252/Rev.1, A/C.1/L.254 and Add.1) (continued)

Report of the Disarmament Commission (A/4463, A/4500, A/C.1/L.250, A/C.1/L.251, A/C.1/L.252/Rev.1) (continued)

Suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests (A/4414, A/C.1/L.252/Rev.1, A/C.1/L.254 and Add.1) (continued)

Prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons (A/4434, A/C.1/L.252/Rev.1, A/C.1/L.253/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1, A/C.1/L.254 and Add.1) (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

In the absence of the Chairman, Mr. Kurka (Czechoslovakia), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

1. Mr. SULAIMAN (Iraq) said that although his country did not possess modern means of destruction, it would nevertheless share in the catastrophic consequences of a nuclear war since in the modern world all wars tended to become general. There was, as the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom had pointed out in the General Assembly (877th plenary meeting), a strange contrast between the dramatic achievements of modern science and the failures of modern statesmanship. If modern man did not adjust the balance, he might doom himself to extermination. In discussing disarmament, the Committee was in reality discussing the problem of war and peace.

2. History had proved that the theory that peace could be maintained through armaments was without foundation. Under present conditions, in which the United States and the Soviet Union would employ their entire resources in the event of a war, the Assembly should decide whether it was prepared to bear the responsibility of inaction or whether it would at least take an initial step towards the achievement of peace through general and complete disarmament. The time element was of primary importance, as the Prime Minister of India had rightly pointed out in the General Assembly (882nd plenary meeting). Although it was true that the fate of mankind lay mainly in the hands of two great Powers, the small and uncommitted countries could contribute to a solution of the problem by expressing the requirements of the millions who aspired to peace and prosperity and by supporting all endeavours to strengthen peace.

3. Iraq believed that military alliances and the alignment of the countries of the world with one side or another would only aggravate the already dangerous international situation. His delegation therefore strongly urged that the neutrality of Asian and African countries should be respected and shared the views on that subject expressed by a number of speakers.

4. As the President of Yugoslavia had pointed out at the 868th plenary meeting of the Assembly, the creation of the necessary international atmosphere for the initiation of disarmament was also hampered by certain unsolved international problems. Among those unsolved problems Mr. Sulaiman mentioned the war of liberation in Algeria and the outstanding problem of Palestine. Unfortunately the main obstacle to an agreement on disarmament was the crisis of confidence between East and West. Any forms of verification, control and inspection eventually adopted might prove useless so long as suspicion and fear prevailed between the two blocs. If the two sides whole-heartedly accepted the principle of peaceful coexistence it might be possible to establish the necessary confidence.

5. General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV) was an important first step in the direction of disarmament. Unfortunately the favourable situation existing at the fourteenth session had not continued. The Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament had been broken off and the question had once again come before the General Assembly in an atmosphere of crisis which, it was to be hoped, would not persist.

6. In principle his delegation supported the Soviet draft resolution (A/C.1/L.249), which offered a more comprehensive and complete plan for total disarmament than the draft resolution submitted by Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States (A/C.1/L.250); however, it did not believe that the mere adoption of a resolution would provide a practical solution to the

problem. In his delegation's opinion the representatives of the uncommitted nations could and should play a useful part in bringing about a basic agreement between the parties concerned. He fully associated himself with the suggestions made by the representative of India (1094th meeting) and the representative of the United Arab Republic (1095th meeting) that the Assembly should give precise directives and enunciate principles which would enable negotiations to be resumed. By submitting a draft resolution to that effect which would be acceptable to the two groups, the uncommitted countries could offer a means of breaking the present deadlock, which could only lead to an intensification of the cold war and the acceleration of the arms race.

7. It should be possible for the Assembly to bring about the resumption of negotiations since the two parties both desired disarmament and their positions seemed to be similar on many points. The major difference related to the question of international control and inspection but in view of the statement by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Khrushchev, that the Soviet Union was ready to accept any system of control proposed by the United States as part of a treaty on disarmament, his delegation sincerely hoped that the two parties would reach an understanding on that question.

8. The problem of disarmament should be referred back to the Ten-Nation Committee or to some other body acceptable to both sides, which would operate in accordance with certain directives to be given by the Assembly. With regard to the suggestions that had recently been made in that connexion, Iraq strongly supported the idea of active participation by the representatives of uncommitted countries in any future negotiating body and believed that they would assist the parties in reaching an agreement. Such a body should, however, work within the framework of the United Nations and submit its report to the Disarmament Commission and to the General Assembly.

9. His delegation believed that the proposals on the appointment of experts embodied in the United Kingdom draft resolution (A/C.1/L.251) should be considered by the negotiating body. However, as the representative of Yugoslavia had pointed out (1089th meeting), disarmament was primarily a political problem, and in the absence of agreement at the political level between the parties concerned, technical advice would be of little help.

10. If it should prove impossible to reach agreement on the conduct of negotiations, his delegation would support any proposal for a resumed session of the General Assembly early in 1961. In view of the immense destructive power accumulated in stockpiles of atomic and hydrogen weapons, members of the Committee should forget their ideological differences and join together in a genuine effort to save mankind and establish lasting peace through general and complete disarmament. Furthermore, without the participation of China, no disarmament negotiations could be successful.

Sir Claude Corea (Ceylon) took the Chair.

11. Mr. SHAHA (Nepal) said that the prospects for success had been very bright at the previous session. The establishment of the Ten-Nation Committee, the fruitful negotiations under way in the Conference on

the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests at Geneva, and the prospect of a summit conference had aroused high hopes. Now there was once again a deadlock. The Disarmament Commission had referred the problem to the General Assembly, and it was the First Committee's duty to help the East and the West to resume negotiations.

12. One of the main difficulties appeared to be the question of priority in dealing with the various disarmament measures. It was recognized that disarmament must be carried out in stages, but, while it was agreed that time was pressing, there was a difference of opinion as to whether a rigid time-limit should be set for the completion of disarmament. At the same time, the two sides agreed in principle that an international control organization should be set up within the framework of the United Nations. The differences between East and West did not seem irreconcilable; the present deadlock was therefore surprising, especially in view of the fact that the two sides had repeatedly expressed their desire to disarm. The suspension of negotiations was particularly unfortunate because the resumption of negotiations after a break tended to create new difficulties.

13. The question whether there should be control without disarmament or disarmament without control was not a new one, and it had, in a sense, already been settled. In the prevailing atmosphere of tension and distrust between East and West, an effective system of international control and verification was clearly essential. Furthermore, while no phase of disarmament should give either side a military advantage, appropriate controls should be applied in each phase.

14. Nevertheless, since no system of control could be foolproof, every effort must be made to improve the state of international relations and create at least a modicum of that feeling of confidence which was so essential.

15. The settlement of certain political questions, such as the representation of China in the United Nations, prior to the achievement of agreement on disarmament would be a step in the right direction. Agreements on partial disarmament would also be useful. The proposals to set up denuclearized zones in Eastern Europe, the Western Pacific and South-East Asia, and to divert increasing quantities of enriched uranium to peaceful uses, would certainly contribute to the success of negotiations.

16. Noting the threat which technological and scientific advances posed to collective security and world peace, he emphasized the danger of an accidental outbreak of war, which would exist until the stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction were destroyed and the testing of such weapons was prohibited. Only a determined effort on the part of all nations to translate into reality the concept of a world without war could ensure the survival of mankind.

17. It had repeatedly been pointed out that there would be no victors in a nuclear war; yet the arms race was continuing, even though experience had shown that arms races invariably led to war. In the face of that danger, the small nations, which through no fault of their own would suffer perhaps even more than the major Powers in the event of war, could not stand idly by. It was their duty, as members of the

international community, to bring moral pressure to bear on the great Powers to settle their differences. The Committee should therefore seek to provide general directives to guide the great Powers in their future negotiations, although it must be recognized that such directives would be useful only if they were acceptable to the two parties principally concerned. The discussions in the Disarmament Commission and at the fifteenth session of the General Assembly would have served no purpose if they did not bring about at least the resumption of disarmament negotiations. His delegation welcomed the suggestions made in that regard by the chairman of the Indian delegation and earnestly hoped that they would be followed.

18. With regard to the machinery for conducting the negotiations, it would be helpful if non-nuclear Powers broadly representing the various areas of the world, and uncommitted countries in particular, were given an opportunity to make a contribution; his delegation would support any suggestion along those lines which was acceptable to the parties principally concerned.

19. Progress had been made in the negotiations on the suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests; the main differences now related to the number of on-site inspections to be permitted and the composition of the control commission. It was to be hoped that the two sides would be able to reach an agreement through patient negotiation. The question of the feasibility of detecting underground tests should not be used as a pretext for the resumption of nuclear tests, which would spoil the atmosphere for future negotiations. Prevention of the wider dissemination

of nuclear weapons, while not actually a disarmament measure, would reduce the risk of an accidental outbreak of war and prevent nuclear weapons from falling into the hands of countries or Governments which lacked a proper sense of responsibility. His delegation would therefore support the draft resolution submitted by Ireland (A/C.1/L.253/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1).

20. The adoption of resolutions by an overwhelming majority would accomplish nothing unless they were acceptable to the two parties principally concerned. The results of a vote sometimes proved illusory and hindered rather than helped negotiations. His delegation agreed with the Mexican delegation that resolutions which were not acceptable to the two sides should not even be put to the vote in the Committee but should be referred to the Disarmament Commission.

21. A suspension of negotiations could sometimes have a salutary effect by enabling the parties concerned to re-examine their positions. However, it could also prove catastrophic, as in the case of the suspension of disarmament negotiations in 1934. In the present-day world, time was a vital factor, for the speed of scientific and technological progress, which was constantly outpacing the development of social and sociological thinking, was such that if disarmament was not achieved within the foreseeable future it might never be achieved at all.

The meeting rose at 4.5 p.m.