

United Nations  
**GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY**

FIFTEENTH SESSION

Official Records

**FIRST COMMITTEE, 1099th  
MEETING**

Wednesday, 2 November 1960,  
at 10.50 a.m.



**NEW YORK**

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Chairman: Sir Claude COREA (Ceylon).

**AGENDA ITEMS 67, 86, 69 AND 73**

Disarmament and the situation with regard to the fulfilment of General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV) of 20 November 1959 on the question of disarmament (A/4463, A/4503, A/4505, A/4509, A/C.1/L.249, A/C.1/L.250, A/C.1/L.251, A/C.1/L.252/Rev.1, A/C.1/L.254) (continued)

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**GENERAL DEBATE (continued)**

1. Mr. SIK (Hungary) said that general and complete disarmament was the only reasonable solution open to mankind. It was true that in achieving that goal there would be many obstacles to be surmounted. Nevertheless, the present evolution of the world favoured such general and complete disarmament, for there were forces at work that might instil in the peoples a degree of social awareness capable of eliminating war for ever. The Soviet proposal for general and complete disarmament was gaining an increasing hold on men's minds; although the Western Powers had refused to use that expression at the preceding session, they no longer hesitated to mention it at the current session. Governments and peoples now recognized that it was no longer sufficient to look to a relaxation of tension, the cessation of the armaments race and disarmament in the usual meaning of the term; the only way to avoid a nuclear

catastrophe was to achieve general and complete disarmament. Accordingly, the Soviet programme represented the only possible solution, which sooner or later would have to be accepted.

2. If the General Assembly was to be able to advance the cause of general and complete disarmament, the representatives of the Western Powers, and particularly of the United States, must be prepared to discuss and accept a proposal having as its objective general and complete disarmament and setting forth the means and principles to be adopted in attaining that objective. In so doing, the Western Powers would enable the Assembly to recreate the pre-conditions necessary for negotiations. It was not the responsibility of the Committee to take up in detail the various elements of an agreement on general and complete disarmament. However, it should mark out the line the negotiations should take and specify the measures to be taken in achieving the objective, the principles that should govern those measures, the methods of controlling their application, and the new arrangements which should be made with a view to maintaining international peace and security when disarmament was already in progress. If the Western Powers were ready to co-operate with the other members of the Committee in working out a draft resolution along those lines, then there would be cause for initiating new direct negotiations on the basis of that draft.

3. The representatives of the Asian, African and Latin American countries had strongly urged the initiation of direct negotiations. But it was not enough for the Western Powers to declare themselves ready to negotiate. Of course, such a statement on their part seemed to indicate a change in attitude, considering that in 1957 the United States had blocked discussions on disarmament by obliging the General Assembly to enlarge the Disarmament Commission so that the numerical superiority of the military allies of the United States would have made any useful discussion impossible, and that the United States Government had previously opposed proposals for negotiations by laying down prior political conditions which amounted to interference in the internal affairs of the socialist countries. However, the Western Powers must also give the negotiations some point by showing proof that they were really prepared to discuss general and complete disarmament with a view to reaching a compromise agreement. For the Government of the United States had discredited the method of negotiations by committing acts of strategic military espionage at the very moment when negotiations on general and complete disarmament were in progress, and by declaring that those activities were an integral part of its foreign policy. It was obvious that such activities could be taken as preparations for a surprise attack by guided missiles, and were incompatible with the sincere conduct of negotiations. A further point was that the United States Government

only spoke of disarmament in United Nations bodies, but never mentioned it in its official statements outside the United Nations. What was more, American military experts had stated in several publications that the United States could not accept any sort of disarmament programme; and official and semi-official statements were made by persons in posts of responsibility to reassure the public concerning the effects of a possible nuclear war, while Government spokesmen made statements about the resumption of nuclear weapons tests.

4. If the method of negotiation was to be rehabilitated, therefore, the Western Powers would have to accept as a basis of discussion the Soviet draft resolution (A/C.1/L.249) or any other similar proposal; in that way, the United States would prove that it was ready to negotiate on the substance of the problem, not with the intention of gaining time for the preparation of a surprise attack, but truly in order to achieve the goal of general and complete disarmament. However, the Western proposals were concerned not with disarmament, but in fact with general and complete control. There was nothing to guarantee that the strategic data obtained by means of control as conceived by the United States delegation would not be used to prepare an act of aggression. On the other hand, the Soviet Union favoured a genuinely effective system of control which would in fact eliminate the danger of any act of provocation. Thus, the draft resolution submitted by Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States (A/C.1/L.250), which was obviously unacceptable, could have no other effect than to hinder negotiations. Similarly, the objective of the United Kingdom proposal (A/C.1/L.251) for the appointment of experts to study systems of inspection and control seemed to be, not the conclusion of an agreement on disarmament, but the procurement and verification of information. It should be recalled, moreover, that the United Kingdom proposal merely repeated the terms of the suggestion made by the American military theoretician Henry A. Kissinger in the July issue of *Foreign Affairs*.<sup>1/</sup>

5. Clearly, therefore, in present circumstances the prior condition for any progress was to rehabilitate the method of negotiation. To achieve that purpose the Western Powers would have to refrain from using the relaxation brought about in the atmosphere of negotiations for purposes of further military preparation. The delegations which urged negotiations should help to create an atmosphere in which discussions could achieve the aim of general and complete disarmament under suitable international control.

6. U THANT (Burma) said that none of the statements made so far indicated any agreement between East and West, either on the substance of the proposals or the procedure for negotiations. Nevertheless, it was important to bring about a resumption of the negotiations; and in that regard, the Committee's deliberations should be guided by the spirit of resolution 1495 (XV) which had been unanimously adopted by the General Assembly on 17 October 1960.

7. One of the difficulties arose from the fact that it was almost impossible for a country to criticize the policy of another country without laying itself open to a charge of bias. The Burmese delegation, how-

ever, rejected the view that States fell into two categories, one of peace-loving States and the other of warmongers. The present deadlock in disarmament negotiations could be broken only by banishing the obsession of fear of the adversary; in addition, it had to be realized that the experience of the past no longer held good in the thermo-nuclear age. Yet, although history did not repeat itself, international relations were still characterized by fear psychosis. At Munich in 1938, Mr. Chamberlain, seeking to avoid the mistakes of 1914, had made even worse ones; eighteen years later, another Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Sir Anthony Eden, believing that a repetition of the policy of appeasement would be disastrous, had adopted an even more disastrous policy on the Suez question. It was also an obsession—the fear of encirclement and of aggression which dated back to 1919—that determined Soviet policy. As for the United States, its policy was still marked by fear of a surprise attack like that on Pearl Harbor in 1941 which had plunged the United States against its will into the Second World War. That was why the United States had sent air fleets carrying hydrogen bombs towards "the potential foe" on the mere evidence of a radar screen. Yet the Soviet Union was no more interested than the United States in setting off a nuclear war which would be catastrophic for all mankind, including the Soviet Union. In those circumstances, the precautionary measures taken by the United States hardly seemed wise, for they raised the risk of accidental war. Similarly, the gigantic nuclear armaments race was also based on the obsession of history repeating itself. It was time to put an end to that obsession.

8. The discussion seemed to show that the difficulties impeding the progress of disarmament were not of a scientific or technical nature, but were political and psychological: consequently, the proposed discussions by technical experts, though they would be essential in settling technical problems, should not serve as a pretext for putting off political negotiations. The two sides were in agreement on a significant number of points: for example, the need for general and complete disarmament under effective international control, by definite stages and within a fixed period of time, respect for the principle of balance at every stage, and the establishment of an international control body and an international force under the United Nations.

9. On the other hand, there was disagreement on four points. First, the USSR wanted a treaty under which the parties would pledge themselves to take the measures provided for at each stage, before the details of inspection and control had been agreed upon, whereas the West wanted agreement simultaneously on disarmament and control. Secondly, the Soviet Union considered that control at each stage should be such as was needed to verify that the agreed disarmament measures had been taken, whereas the West considered that control should also provide confirmation that retained arms and armed forces did not exceed the agreed level. Thirdly, the USSR wished to add five uncommitted African and Asian countries to the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament, while the West would prefer the appointment of impartial persons as officers of the Committee. Finally, the Soviet Union proposed that the structure of the United Nations should be reorganized forthwith,

<sup>1/</sup> See Henry A. Kissinger, "Arms Control, Inspection and Surprise Attack", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 38, No. 4, July 1960, p. 557.

while the West did not appear to feel that such a reorganization was immediately necessary.

10. The crux of the problem was that in the opinion of the USSR control measures would provide the West with useful information, after which they might evade any real agreement on disarmament, while the Western Powers were apprehensive of taking such steps as the abolition of foreign bases, only to find themselves subsequently involved in interminable negotiations on control. Burma, which had no foreign bases on its territory and was not a party to any military alliance, had no desire to criticize countries which were receiving military aid or had given foreign Powers the right to have military bases on their territory, for it wished to refrain from any intervention in the internal affairs of other countries. It felt, however, that the Soviet proposal for the liquidation of foreign bases at the very first stage might unduly prolong the negotiations at the expense of progress in other fields. It would be wiser to relegate that measure to the second stage. On the other hand, the Soviet proposal for the prohibition of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons was very sensible; it reflected both the suggestion made by France at the fourteenth session (A/C.1/821) that disarmament should begin with the means of delivery, and the United Kingdom view that the launching of nuclear weapons into outer space should be banned at the first stage. In addition, it accepted the need for an international police force to supervise disarmament measures; that was perhaps the most important concession made by the Soviet Union.

11. Turning to the question of the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests, he recalled the hopes that had been raised by the progress of negotiations at the Geneva Conference on that question. Unfortunately, the problem of underground tests had prevented the conclusion of an agreement. The main difficulty was the duration of the moratorium on undetectable underground tests; the United States had not stated its position on that subject, although the USSR had suggested a moratorium of four to five years. When, on 7 May 1960, the White House had announced that the United States intended to resume underground tests in order to perfect detection systems, the Soviet Union had protested and stated that it considered itself also free to resume tests. Unfortunately, the failure of the Summit Conference had had an adverse effect on the negotiations. The Burmese delegation considered that the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests had produced noteworthy progress, and that the General Assembly should do everything possible at its current session to help to bring about an agreement between the nuclear Powers. As in the past, it felt that the nuclear Powers should come to an agreement on the complete cessation of tests, under effective international control, and should refrain from carrying out any nuclear tests pending such agreement.

12. His delegation reserved the right to comment at a later stage on the draft resolutions before the Committee.

13. Mr. WADSWORTH (United States of America) pointed out, in reply to the representative of Burma, that on 28 September, at Geneva, the United States delegation had put before the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests a counter-proposal providing for a two-year moratorium to be

followed by a three-month review period; in other words, a total moratorium of some twenty-seven months.

14. Mr. PADILLA NERVO (Mexico), referring to his statement at the 1086th meeting, said he was convinced that the Western Powers, like the Soviet Union, sincerely and eagerly wanted disarmament. It could not be otherwise, considering that the modern weapons of destruction chosen by States to protect their security constituted the greatest danger to that security.

15. If the break-down of the disarmament talks was in fact due to mutual distrust, it should be pointed out that that distrust arose, above all, from fear of being left at a temporary military disadvantage while disarmament was taking place. Contrary to what had been supposed in the past, differences in political and social systems were not the main obstacle to a disarmament agreement. Some Latin American countries, for example, devoted more than 25 per cent of their national budget to defence. Considering their limited financial resources, such expenditure was comparable to that of the great Powers; yet the countries in question had similar political and social systems and were linked by history and tradition. The conclusion was that the solution to the problem of disarmament, whether regional or universal, must be found in equitable arrangements for gradual measures of controlled disarmament which would not place either side at a military disadvantage.

16. The problem was not insoluble, provided that certain basic minimum propositions which were now universally agreed to were borne in mind: (1) disarmament must be affected in stages, and in an agreed order; (2) the measures to be taken at each stage must be carried out within a fixed time; (3) at each stage, the various measures of disarmament must be properly balanced, so that neither party should be placed at a disadvantage; (4) there must be neither disarmament without control nor control without disarmament, and the extent of control must be proportionate to the extent of the disarmament measures at each stage; (5) disarmament measures and control measures must take effect simultaneously; (6) progressive measures of disarmament and control must lead to the goal of general and complete disarmament; (7) when the goal of general and complete disarmament had been reached, there would have to be international machinery for the maintenance of international peace and security, machinery providing all States with adequate assurance of impartiality and respect for the legitimate interests of all countries. Universal acceptance of those propositions would be a firm basis for further negotiations.

17. The Western draft resolution (A/C.1/L.250) and the Soviet draft resolution (A/C.1/L.249) both revealed a common desire to ensure that the balance should not at any moment be disturbed. The Western Powers' insistence on guarantees that control was working effectively at each stage before passing to the next stage was justified, especially in view of the fact that new technical discoveries might later radically change the picture originally accepted by all parties. On the other hand, it was easy to understand the reluctance of the USSR to accept partial measures of disarmament without being sure that the subsequent measures—which might compensate for

any loss of balance occasioned by earlier measures—would be put into effect.

18. To illustrate the situation, he said that the United Nations building, for instance, had not been constructed in one operation, but by stages, within specified time-limits. None of the stages of construction could have been conceived in isolation. All the stages had had to be conceived as part of a logical and complete plan, approved in advance; the foundations had not been laid without exact knowledge of what would be done at later stages. The builders had had to take into account the number of floors, the weight of the superstructure, and so forth. At each stage of construction, on the other hand, they had been able to check the progress of the works and decide, in the light of technical progress, to what extent the general plan should be modified before the work was continued.

19. His delegation believed that the same applied to disarmament. Although it was not essential to conclude a treaty immediately, the need for agreement in advance on certain fundamental guiding principles of a programme of general and complete disarmament could hardly be denied. It seemed unlikely that agreement could be reached on partial and isolated measures if uncertainty prevailed with regard to the later stages and to the adoption of additional measures as a result of later negotiations. That did not mean, even if agreement was reached at the outset, that progress from one stage to another must be automatic. The initial agreement would have to lay down the procedure and the guarantees required for the transition from each stage to the next. It would have to provide that the application of each new disarmament measure and each new control measure would begin only when the preceding phase had been completed to the satisfaction of all parties. In other words, progress from one stage to the next on the road to general and complete disarmament would depend on the control organs functioning effectively and on the agreement of all parties that the previous stage has been completed. On the question of control, technical studies would have to be carried through, fully and in accordance with the principles agreed between the parties, within the framework of the general disarmament programme.

20. The Mexican delegation had formulated some suggestions which it wished to put before the Committee.

21. First, so far, the countries which had not taken part in the direct discussions, i.e. those which belonged to neither camp, had had no opportunity of proposing solutions; they had not been invited to do so. Yet, while it was true that that task was primarily the responsibility of the major military Powers, other States might also have something important to say. The fact that they had been kept out of the negotiations throughout the fifteen years of their duration was one of the most regrettable aspects of the disarmament negotiations, for the small and medium-sized Powers might have many ideas and solutions to suggest, besides being a factor for moderation and conciliation. It would accordingly be desirable to assign to the Disarmament Commission, in which all Member States were represented, the task of determining precisely and speedily—within, say, three months—the areas of agreement and disagreement existing between the two parties, and recommending

solutions which might bridge the gap between the two opposite conceptions of the process of disarmament and control, from the beginning to the final goal of general and complete disarmament.

22. Secondly, as the Mexican delegation had consistently argued since 1951, majority decisions taken on fundamental questions of disarmament were not only useless but harmful. In particular, the present political climate was scarcely propitious for decisions of that kind. It would therefore be useful for the General Assembly to postpone the substantive decision for a few months, until the political climate was more favourable and States which had not yet taken a direct part in the negotiations had had the opportunity to make their contribution and to attempt to reconcile the divergent views.

23. Thirdly, the main jurisdiction over disarmament negotiations should be centralized in a plenary body of the United Nations such as the Disarmament Commission. The main negotiating committee and any technical bodies set up should therefore report to the Disarmament Commission.

24. Fourthly, the negotiating body on disarmament should be set up on a permanent basis. The negotiations had been broken off several times, and it had been necessary to wait for the next session of the General Assembly, and sometimes longer, to put the negotiating machinery into operation again. Almost every year there was a new discussion on the composition and terms of reference of the negotiating body. The solution of the problem was too urgent to allow such vacillation to continue.

25. Fifthly, the principal negotiating body should include, besides the two parties, a certain number of countries which had not so far taken a direct part in the negotiations.

26. Lastly, the Disarmament Commission should encourage related activities such as study of the disarmament problem not only from the functional but also from the regional point of view. Apart from the economic repercussions of disarmament, it was possible and necessary to study, in certain regions having their own special characteristics, such as Africa, Asia and Latin America, the allocation of resources freed by disarmament to economic development. Study could also be given to the possible setting up of "areas of law" of the kind referred to by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ireland at the 1096th meeting.

27. If, before drawing up the draft resolutions before the First Committee, the parties concerned had waited until the small and medium-sized Powers had expressed their ideas and formulated their views, they would now have been able to submit texts taking into account the most important suggestions put forward during the debate, suggestions which would thus have served a useful purpose.

28. Under the circumstances, a vote on the draft resolutions that had been submitted would not solve the problem; it would tend only to increase the rigidity of the respective positions and would be nothing but a profession of political faith. The First Committee ought not, therefore, to vote on the draft resolutions, which reflected antagonistic views. If it was impossible, in the very short time at the disposal of the First Committee at the current session, for all

the small and medium-sized Powers to formulate a series of directives which would be acceptable to the two groups of armed Powers and might serve as a starting point for an immediate resumption of negotiations, that effort should be continued in the Disarmament Commission, in which the ninety-nine Member States were represented. The Commission would submit to the great Powers, within a fixed period, recommendations and suggestions aimed at facilitating a prompt resumption of negotiations. Draft resolutions now before the Committee which were not supported by both parties would not be put to the vote, but would be referred to the Disarmament Commission.

29. With regard to items 69 and 73 of the Assembly's agenda, the Mexican delegation thought that it would be useful for the First Committee to continue its efforts to prevent further nuclear weapons tests and to prevent the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons. Those two aspects of the armaments race involved extremely grave dangers both in the immediate and the more distant future.

30. Mr. DE LEQUERICA (Spain) stressed the feeling of helplessness experienced by countries which had neither nuclear weapons nor large quantities of conventional weapons when they endeavoured to counteract the bellicose tendencies of mankind. It was frightening to see the day grow nearer when there would be weapons of mass destruction in the hands of medium-sized Powers; indeed, it had recently been announced at Bonn that a very simple method of producing uranium-235 had been discovered. It would be as difficult to prevent the spread of those techniques as it had been when a similar problem had arisen in the fourteenth century in connexion with gunpowder. Moreover, it was impossible to restore confidence between the two blocs; the only safety was in "organized mistrust", i.e. the establishment of satisfactory controls and guarantees, and even in the supervision of those to whom the control had been entrusted.

31. Spain was not neutral; it belonged whole-heartedly to the Western group. Besides the sincerely neutral countries, there was a certain neutralism which aimed at seeking out greater weaknesses in those who were defending order and civilization than among the representatives of Soviet aggression. Divided Germany was a good example of the colonialist policy from which the modern world was suffering. The Western countries could not be expected to conclude hasty agreements without sufficient guarantees for the maintenance of civilization. The Western Powers had to be faithful to their aims, and consequently to make use of diplomacy. They could not be required to agree to peace at any price.

32. That clear attitude, in conformity with Spain's tradition of realism, was surely the most effective one. Some of the draft resolutions submitted to the Committee seemed well designed to bring about the desired harmony, and it was to be hoped that representatives would agree on a moderate but positive formula. The Soviet draft resolution (A/C.1/L.249) reflected a rigid attitude, concerned exclusively with the elaboration of a general treaty and ignoring the possibility of adopting partial measures which might reduce tension. There was more justification in the attitude of the three Western Powers which had spon-

sored the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.250; while not losing sight of the ultimate objective, general and complete disarmament, they advocated partial measures in the fields in which agreement might be most easily achieved. Moreover, the Soviet proposals did not always adhere to the principle of balance. The elimination of bases, together with the restriction of warships and military aircraft to within national territorial limits, would leave defenceless several Western States which did not form a geographical bloc as did the countries which had signed the Warsaw Treaty.<sup>2/</sup> The representative of Burma had underlined that point of view.

33. It was not clear from the wording of the Soviet draft resolution that control was to apply to all the engagements entered into within the framework of the disarmament agreement. There would have to be an assurance, as the three Western Powers had envisaged, that the elements that were withdrawn on one side would not be reintroduced on another side into the armed forces or the arsenals. The paragraph relating to changes in the structure of the United Nations would make the adoption of the Soviet text particularly difficult. It would almost seem as if it had been included in order to ensure rejection of the draft resolution. By contrast, the general aims mentioned in operative paragraph 2 of the three-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.250) were entirely acceptable, as were the principles laid down in paragraph 3 of that document. The recommendation made in paragraph 4, that negotiations should be renewed as soon as possible, was entirely justified. Owing to the complexity of the problem, talks would have to take place in a small body; moreover, the talks would correspond to the wishes of the Member States: besides General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV), a more recent resolution of the Disarmament Commission (DC/182/Corr.1) had recommended that the Powers concerned should enter into such negotiations. His delegation believed that progress was possible. In fact, the positions had drawn closer together: both parties agreed that general and complete disarmament was the objective, both recognized that it was necessary to proceed by stages within definite periods of time and respecting the principle of balance; they were also agreed that the destruction of vehicles for the delivery of nuclear weapons should be provided for in the first stage.

34. The United Kingdom proposal (A/C.1/L.251), though stated in rather bald terms, was very far-sighted. Technical studies could not hinder political negotiations, and the technical aspects of the problem of disarmament and control were too important not to be borne in mind. Another proposal merited attention: that put forward by the representative of Canada (1086th meeting), concerning the establishment of a special committee composed of a small number of States—to be chosen, perhaps, from among the countries which had never participated in the work of small disarmament bodies—which would enable the deliberations to be continued. Lastly, the representative of Mexico also had just made some interesting suggestions, which the Spanish delegation would examine later.

35. Christians regarded man as a creature vitiated by original sin, who could not be expected to achieve

<sup>2/</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 219, 1955, No. 2962.

perfect solutions. A remedy had to be sought, as the United Kingdom draft resolution and the three-Power one had attempted to do, for the inevitable human weaknesses. The drafts would have to be improved, the technical details studied and the conversations

pursued. A provisional good might result from them, as had happened several times in the course of history. And, perhaps, hope would one day be reborn.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.