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Chairman: Mr. Franz MATSCH (Austria).

**AGENDA ITEM 70**

**General and complete disarmament (A/4218, A/4219, A/C.1/818, A/C.1/820, A/C.1/821, A/C.1/L.234) (continued)**

**GENERAL DEBATE (continued) AND CONSIDERATION  
OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION (A/C.1/L.234)**

1. The CHAIRMAN announced that the Committee had before it a draft resolution (A/C.1/L.234) submitted by all the eighty-two Member States. That unanimity augured well for the success of the deliberations of the ten-Power disarmament committee.

2. Mr. ALEMAYEHOU (Ethiopia) said that his country, as one of the many small countries striving to develop their resources in peace in order to raise their people's standard of living, deplored the armaments race, which was affecting all countries both large and small. If the small countries had the right to concern themselves with the highly technical and complex question of disarmament, one reason was that, lacking the means of producing nuclear weapons, they were, unlike the great Powers, unable to protect themselves against modern war.

3. Since its foundation, the United Nations had done admirable work, particularly in regard to the advance of the non-self-governing peoples towards independence, technical assistance to under-developed countries, and certain political fields. In the field of disarmament, however, the United Nations had hitherto contented itself with playing the role of observer in the negotiations and all it had done was to discuss, each year, the reports of the great Powers and tell them to settle their quarrels between themselves. Such methods of direct negotiation could be applied in matters which were of interest only to the contending parties; but in the present case ideological, political and economic differences, aggravated by fear and suspicion, had driven the contending parties into an unprecedented armaments race, so that a mere proposal by one side might be regarded by the other as an ultimatum and the acceptance of a proposal might be interpreted as submission. The United Nations must accordingly play a more constructive part and formulate, on disarmament, a declaration of principles which would be supported by world opinion and could therefore not be ignored by the great Powers. Secondly, the United Nations could ask the great Powers to agree to the inclusion, in the task of preparing the Disarmament

Commission's draft agreement, of a given number of neutral countries that were not involved in the armaments race and would therefore be in a position to see matters objectively. The present relaxation of world tension should facilitate such a step. Never had the great Powers seemed more disposed to reach an agreement on disarmament than now. At the 1027th meeting the United States representative had enumerated a number of points on which agreement had already been reached in the negotiations for the cessation of nuclear weapons tests; and a ten-Power disarmament committee on a basis of parity had also been established. Moreover, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, Mr. Khrushchev, had presented to the General Assembly at its 799th plenary meeting a plan (A/4219) for general and complete disarmament which had aroused world-wide interest and the essential principles of which were not, it seemed, contested. The United Kingdom representative had stated (1029th meeting) that the plan (A/C.1/820) presented by his country at the 798th plenary meeting had the same implications and objective as that of the Soviet Union. Finally, the United States representative had assured the Soviet delegation that his country would spare no effort to attain the objective sought by the Soviet plan.

4. With regard to that Soviet plan, the time limit of four years for general and complete disarmament was admittedly short, but it must be recognized that a time limit was necessary. Once the principle of fixing a time limit had been accepted, that time limit could be fixed either by the General Assembly or by some other organ. The Soviet plan had been subjected to another criticism: some delegations had maintained that the elimination of armaments would not help much in the abolition of war so long as differences of opinion existed. His delegation found it difficult to subscribe to that view. In the first place, the armaments race, particularly in the field of nuclear and thermo-nuclear armaments and guided missiles, had in itself become a political question, perhaps the most important of all; it was heightening international tension and might lead the world to the most disastrous war of all time. There was no doubt, therefore, that the elimination of armaments would help to create confidence among nations and, as the representative of Australia had said (1032nd meeting), to promote conditions for peaceful coexistence. In the second place, to suggest that disarmament should wait until ideological, political, economic and social differences had disappeared was tantamount to saying that there should be no disarmament at all, for there would always be differences of views.

5. The other plan for general disarmament, submitted by the United Kingdom, differed from the Soviet plan in certain respects. Firstly, it made no provision for a time limit, although the fixing of a time limit would certainly seem calculated to expedite negotiations and the conclusion of an agreement. Secondly, the first stage seemed to be confined to the collection and study of military information as a basis for the ultimate limitation of the armaments and armed forces

of a number of Member States. That procedure, which undoubtedly had its merits, would also have its disadvantages, as the collection and study of the information in question would not only consume much time but would also, possibly, be a source of friction among the Powers concerned, before the actual negotiations could start. With that reservation, the United Kingdom plan was worthy of praise and should be carefully considered along with the other plans presented by various delegations, including that of France (A/C.1/821).

6. The Ethiopian delegation had always believed that control and supervision were an essential part of disarmament; it might be necessary to maintain them after the achievement of total disarmament, until the nations of the world had learned to settle their differences by peaceful and legal means rather than by force of arms. The question whether disarmament should precede control or vice versa should not arise, as the two were inseparable. In that connexion, it was encouraging to note that East and West had now begun to speak the same language: both had categorically stated that disarmament, partial or total, must be internationally controlled.

7. Finally, the representative of the United States had asked who would maintain world order in the event of total disarmament, and what kind of law would govern the conduct of the human race. The USSR representative had said (1026th meeting) that every violation of the disarmament treaty would be dealt with by the Security Council or by the Assembly, according to the powers conferred on those organs. In a totally disarmed world, the question of the settlement of disputes and the enforcement of such settlement would be very important. Strong judicial and law-enforcement organs would be essential elements in the structure of the new world order, but it did not seem necessary to establish new ones when those of the United Nations, if their powers were increased from their present level and adapted to the new situation, could serve the same purpose.

8. Since its main objective was to achieve disarmament and peace in the world, Ethiopia would support any procedure which, in the opinion of the majority of members of the Committee would best attain that end. It was in that spirit that it had joined all the other Members of the United Nations in sponsoring draft resolution A/C.1/L.234.

9. Mr. SASTROAMIDJOJO (Indonesia) stated that whereas in the past the main concern had been the ending of the armaments race, today thoughts were turned to the problems which might arise in international relations when security was no longer based on the employment of armed force. It might seem strange to fear the olive branch at a time when nations were brandishing nuclear weapons; yet those new fears about the future were also an indication of a new hope in the present. Such perplexing questions affecting international order in a disarmed world would not arise if there were not, now, a real prospect of general and complete disarmament.

10. He recalled the statement which he had made during the thirteenth session at the Committee's 957th meeting, and noted that a year later the stage of practical accomplishment had still not been reached. The time which had elapsed had nevertheless been put to good use. There had been renewed contacts among the great Powers, agreement had been reached on certain points, mutual concessions had been made and the

favourable atmosphere of a year before had improved still further.

11. Among the factors contributing to that welcome trend, mention should be made of the agreements reached by the three great Powers which had taken part in the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests. As the United States representative had said, considerable progress had been made in the drafting of a treaty to bring nuclear tests to an end under a system of international control.

12. Secondly, the four great Powers had agreed to establish a ten-Power disarmament committee. That achievement, after a stalemate of two years, represented real progress.

13. Thirdly, in the first week of the present session, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR had made a proposal for general and complete disarmament. The proposals made in 1953 at the eighth session of the General Assembly by the President of the United States, Mr. Eisenhower (470th plenary meeting) had been implemented within five years by the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency. It must be hoped that the ideas put forward by Mr. Khrushchev would be given practical effect with the same enthusiasm and determination.

14. Fourthly, agreements had been reached as a result of person-to-person contacts between the President of the United States and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR who, in their communiqué to the Press of 27 September 1959, had recognized that the question of general disarmament was the most important one facing the world today and had announced that both Governments would make every effort to achieve a constructive solution. Moreover, the two statesmen had agreed that all outstanding international questions should be settled, not by the application of force, but by peaceful means through negotiation. In the same context, the twelve Powers concerned with Antarctica had undertaken to preserve it as a demilitarized region.

15. Fifthly, there was a trend towards mutual concessions and a reconciling of positions between the United States and the Soviet Union: while the Soviet Union had moved considerably closer to the Western position with regard to the stages of disarmament, the United States had agreed to extend discussion of the question of the prevention of surprise attack to its political aspects.

16. Lastly, there were the agreements on procedure and principle which had been reached during the present debate. As to procedure, it seemed to be the Committee's unanimous view that the task of the new ten-Power disarmament committee should be to examine in detail the proposals of the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, and any others which might be submitted to it. As a matter of principle, every speaker had recognized the need to achieve general and complete disarmament under international control. There was also general willingness to reject the concept of "all or nothing" and to proceed with limited steps for the lessening of international tension.

17. But the most important factor consisted, perhaps, in the statements made to the Committee on the question of control: not only should there be effective and comprehensive control over general and complete disarmament, but each step in disarmament should be implemented under adequate control. In that connexion

he recalled the statements made by the representatives of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States.

18. It was true that, even with those assurances, the details of control had still to be elaborated and agreed upon. But that was equally true of the proposals on disarmament. It was to be hoped that the details would be worked out at the forthcoming negotiations and that common principles would be translated into concrete agreements.

19. Doubtless the road still to be travelled would be a hard one; but if the darker side of the picture were to be emphasized, on the pretext that the peoples should not be lulled by false hopes, there would be a real danger of creating in the world an attitude of resignation with regard to disarmament. Hence the United Nations should, rather, do everything possible to emphasize the wide areas of agreement.

20. As for security and the preservation of freedom in a world bereft of the instruments of war, the Soviet proposals were revolutionary in their scope and it was doubtless that fact which created fears and hesitations. In former times a similar reception had been given to the idea of eliminating poverty, which had created grave doubts in the minds of men. Such thoughts had almost wholly vanished now, and all men of good will acknowledged the enormous benefits accruing from a raising of living standards.

21. Would it not likewise be possible to learn to renounce reliance upon armed force and to see solely the benefits of living in an era of confidence and mutual good will? Would it not be saner to risk living totally disarmed than to continue to live armed to the teeth in mutual fear and distrust?

22. It had been argued that the elimination of armaments would not do away with aggressive intentions or inequality in relationships between States. There was no need to eliminate such inequality. What was necessary was to grow out of the habit of thinking in old-fashioned terms of a balance of power and to attempt, instead, to create conditions under which there could be a free play of forces without any threat to the well-being of any nation. That was the peaceful basis underlying the operations of the United Nations, composed, as it was, of large and small nations.

23. So far as aggressive intentions were concerned the mere elimination of modern weapons would certainly not remove them, but it did constitute the first step in that direction. There could be no pacification of minds so long as it remained the proclaimed and practised policy of nations to rely on weapons for their security. To cure themselves of the disease of war, the nations must first divest themselves of the means of waging war.

24. Agreements on disarmament would promote confidence; the growth of mutual confidence and co-operation would, in turn, help to remove the sources of international tension; disarmament agreements would make it possible to effect tremendous savings, which could be used to promote well-being throughout the world; and finally, the energies of man could be devoted exclusively to constructive activities. Even if—as was likely—ideological, political or economic differences still appeared, they would be resolved in quite another way if all the nations were disarmed and their peoples were animated by feelings of good will rather than by suspicion and hostility.

25. What would be most damaging to progress on disarmament would be the resurrection of bygone issues. His delegation therefore regretted suggestions made with regard to the so-called hierarchy of disarmament operations. It was necessary to seek every way of bringing about a total prohibition of the weapons of mass destruction as speedily as possible. For many years the relative importance of banning nuclear weapons as against reducing conventional armaments and forces had been a subject of controversy. It now seemed that, in what had been described by the United Kingdom representative as a major change, the Soviet Union had shifted its position to meet the concept of balanced disarmament advocated by the West. In view of that development, it was to be regretted that a proposal had been put forward which would reopen the entire issue. The representative of France had proposed at the 1030th meeting that priority should be given to the destruction of vehicles for nuclear material because the development of nuclear devices had reduced the importance of conventional weapons and of the number of armed forces. But would that not merely serve to restore the importance of conventional weapons and forces and to change again the technique of warfare? Was not such a proposal incompatible with the idea of balanced disarmament? It was difficult to see how a disarmament programme could then be carried out in stages over four years or even over a longer period.

26. As regards the time limit proposed by the Soviet Union for general and complete disarmament, it might perhaps be better to leave the target date open on the understanding that disarmament must be carried out within the shortest possible time and on a continuous stage-by-stage basis. Continuity of progress on disarmament was necessary for the growth of confidence and the relaxation of international tension. That end would also be further advanced by the utilization of savings from disarmament for the development of the less developed countries. A healthier international atmosphere would surely result if every measure of disarmament were matched with a step towards enlarging current programmes of economic and social development.

27. His delegation was gratified at the agreement achieved between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union on the draft resolution of which Indonesia was one of the sponsors. It noted with satisfaction that the text provided for the transmission of the various proposals on disarmament and the records of the First Committee's meetings to the United Nations Disarmament Commission and to the ten-Power disarmament committee, for thorough consideration. Such a procedure was a reaffirmation of the ultimate responsibility of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. It was to be hoped that it would help to strengthen the Disarmament Commission.

28. Mr. KISELEV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) whole-heartedly supported the draft resolution which had been introduced the preceding day by the Soviet Union and the United States and of which the Byelorussian SSR was one of the sponsors. The peoples of the world expected the United Nations to take practical measures to solve the disarmament problem as soon as possible. Thousands of telegrams and letters were received by the United Nations from all countries, from various organizations and from private individuals, demanding a halt to the armaments race and the prohibition of all weapons of mass destruction.

29. Mr. Khrushchev had submitted to the General Assembly the USSR proposal on general and complete disarmament, which the Byelorussian people had welcomed with great satisfaction. The First Committee should study it carefully and bring the positions of the various States closer together. Of course, the universal desire to put an end to the armaments race and to establish confidence and peaceful co-operation among all States was displeasing to those circles which sought to prevent a real relaxation of international tension. They therefore sought to minimize the practical value of the USSR plan by calling it propaganda, a piece of utopianism, or a political and psychological manoeuvre designed to reduce the vigilance of the West. At the same time, they claimed that the question of control was simply side-stepped. Fortunately, most of the speakers had approved of the USSR proposal; they saw in it a realistic and constructive means of solving the problem and had stressed the economic and cultural progress that could be achieved by a world freed of the burden of armaments once and for all. In particular, the representatives of the United Kingdom and France, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Denmark (809th plenary meeting), had recognized the possibilities offered by Mr. Khrushchev's plan. It was to be hoped that the members of the ten-Power committee would confirm by deeds the sincerity of their intentions during the future discussions.

30. In that respect, the small countries had an important role to play, for, as pointed out among others by the representatives of Cambodia (1028th meeting), Liberia (1032nd meeting), Afghanistan (1034th meeting) and Ethiopia, disarmament concerned them as much as it did the great Powers. Only the end of the cold war would enable them to raise their levels of living rapidly and develop their economies. Those countries should therefore exert their influence over the discussions within the ten-Power committee, all the more because some States apparently had not yet entirely renounced certain outmoded opinions.

31. At the 1027th meeting, the United States representative, in seeking to justify the position of his Government, had attributed the lack of progress towards a solution of the problem to the alleged intransigence of the USSR. He had repeated time and again that control and inspection should precede general and complete disarmament. The Soviet Union had always held that disarmament should be accompanied by effective international control. However, there first had to be something to control. The United States view could only give rise to endless discussions on the details of control, while the frantic armaments race went on. The assertion that the USSR, while calling for general disarmament, advocated only partial control was false. It was precisely because, as Mr. Lodge had pointed out, there could not be 100 per cent disarmament with 10 per cent control that stages of control should be instituted, corresponding to agreed stages of disarmament. Control would be entrusted to an international body composed of representatives of all States; that body would have recourse to a variety of methods, including aerial photography. The Netherlands representative had asserted (1031st meeting) that he considered the USSR plan lacked clarity and made no provision for effective control except at the end of the disarmament process. In fact, the Soviet Union proposed, for each phase, control and inspection measures closely related and corresponding to the disarmament measures taken. But it was opposed to

control without disarmament. In any case, the establishment of an international control body should be discussed in the light of the decisions which the ten-Power committee would take on the execution of a disarmament plan by stages.

32. The United Kingdom plan contained several good ideas and the ten-Power committee could usefully examine it. Unfortunately, it provided no time limits for the various stages of disarmament and made no mention of foreign military bases, which must be dismantled. Furthermore, it accepted the possibility that stocks of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction might remain; such a possibility must not be allowed. Similarly, there could be no question of complete disarmament without the liquidation of military staffs, military academies and institutions.

33. No delegation could be expected to take up a position without a thorough examination of the proposed plans, but the problem of disarmament urgently required a solution, a fact which the French representative appeared to ignore. Specific measures should therefore be taken without delay in order to restore confidence. In that respect, France's statement (1030th meeting) that it would reject no disarmament plan without examination was encouraging.

34. His delegation agreed with the French representative that the First Committee should seek in every proposal that which all could accept and that which could be improved or modified to make it acceptable to each. It was, however, regrettable that Mr. Moch had not concluded that one of the first generally acceptable decisions would be to prohibit nuclear weapons of mass destruction. He proposed, on the contrary, that priority should be given to the prohibition of means of delivery, whereas the real danger lay in nuclear weapons, military bases and stockpiles, which Mr. Moch did not mention. In opposition to the French representative's view, his delegation maintained that it was possible to control stockpiles of nuclear weapons.

35. If there was a serious intention to restore confidence, what interpretation was to be put on the establishment in Turkey of military bases directed against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries or the investment of United States capital in the war industries of West Germany?

36. Representatives of several Western Powers had emphasized the scientific and technical difficulties in the way of establishing control over the cessation of nuclear weapons tests and had blamed the Soviet Union for the delay in solving that problem. In spite of the differences of view revealed at the Geneva Conference on the subject, it was to be hoped that in the present atmosphere of relaxed tension, the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union would reach an agreement on the cessation of tests for all time. In that connexion it was regrettable that the Governor of the State of New York had seen fit to suggest to the United States Government that underground explosions should be resumed.

37. Good relations between the United States and the Soviet Union were essential for the solution of the various international problems. In 1959 progress had been made in that direction and his delegation hoped that it would be continued in the future. In a world in which men were performing new miracles every day, the establishment of a lasting peace, the cessation of the cold war and the halting of the armaments race would open up brilliant prospects for mankind.

38. The implementation of the USSR programme would rule out armed force as a means of settling disputes between States. It would make possible the economic development of the world for the benefit of all mankind, by placing vast resources at the service of peace. It would lead to an increase in international trade and enable the under-developed countries to obtain the technical assistance they needed. States could then devote their efforts to the struggle against the enemies of man, such as disease, hunger, poverty and illiteracy. In that connexion, he recalled that at the current session his delegation had proposed (A/4233) the inclusion in the agenda of an item entitled "International encouragement of scientific research into the control of cancerous diseases" (item 71). The Soviet Union had been untiring in its endeavours to achieve disarmament. In addition to the many constructive proposals it had submitted to each session of the General Assembly, it had unilaterally put into effect specific disarmament measures in its territory. Even now, if the Western Powers were not ready to accept general and complete disarmament, the Soviet Union was prepared to come to an understanding with them on partial measures. As all the conditions enabling a solution to be found were now present, his delegation hoped that the ten-Power committee would, with patience, wisdom and good will, succeed in working out a disarmament agreement.

39. Mr. WEI (China) regretted that the proposals concerning disarmament which in the past fourteen years had been adopted by the overwhelming majority of the General Assembly, had not been accepted by the Soviet Union, for if they had been, there would be no arms race today. However, it was the duty of the organs of the United Nations concerned with disarmament to continue their efforts. His delegation would welcome any proposal concerning general or partial disarmament or even some initial step, if it could bring about real progress towards genuine disarmament. The French suggestions, in particular, deserved careful consideration, in view of the importance of preventing surprise attacks.

40. In order to appraise the proposals properly, certain vital details were necessary, particularly with regard to international control of disarmament. Thus, it had to be ascertained whether the measures of control acceptable to all the parties were adequate and effective. The Soviet delegation had spoken of control only in general terms. Moreover, it had never accepted adequate and effective measures in that field, and it was doubtful that its position had changed, for its latest proposal appeared to indicate that it still wished to make control subject to the veto in the Security Council. The attitude of the Soviet Union at the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests served to confirm those doubts. It was to be hoped that an agreement on control of nuclear tests would lead to the adoption of effective disarmament measures.

41. In 1955, the Soviet Union had acknowledged in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission that fissionable materials and stockpiles of nuclear weapons were beyond the reach of effective international control, and that, in an atmosphere of distrust any agreement on control would only create a false sense of security.<sup>1/</sup> It now claimed that its latest proposal would remove all obstacles in the way of control and, furthermore, that the implementation of its programme should

not be dependent on the solution of still outstanding international problems. It might be asked whether the Soviet Union had discovered any scientific method to ensure effective international control of stockpiles of nuclear weapons.

42. To create an atmosphere of confidence, it was necessary to establish a system of collective security. The Charter of the United Nations provided that, when necessary, armed forces could be made available to the Security Council by the Member States. The Soviet Union, however, made no provision for the establishment of an international force which would ensure the maintenance of peace once national forces had been disbanded.

43. According to the USSR plan, the destruction of nuclear weapons and missiles would take place only in the third stage of the programme. By the end of the second stage therefore, the atomic Powers would have in their possession the most powerful weapons extant, while the other countries would be completely disarmed. It would be difficult to accept disarmament of that type. To sum up, the actual worth of the Soviet proposal remained to be discovered.

44. The United Kingdom proposal, on the other hand, was much more business-like. Like the plan for comprehensive disarmament submitted by France and the United Kingdom, which his delegation had supported, it sought to bring about progressive, balanced and controlled disarmament and was thus a very good basis for the consideration of a plan for comprehensive disarmament.

45. Despite the complexity of the problem, it was the duty of the General Assembly to continue its efforts to attain that which all peoples desired: a disarmed world with peace, security and prosperity for all.

46. Mr. LOURIE (Israel) noted that the feature which distinguished the current discussion from those of earlier years was the acute awareness by all countries of the danger of total destruction stemming from man's own technological achievements. There was a new awareness of the urgent need for practical action. In that connexion, the impression of good will on the part of the Powers involved offered hope for progress in the further negotiations now envisaged. In view of the limited results obtained so far, it was essential to take a real first step, and that now seemed possible.

47. As the Netherlands representative had pointed out, the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests represented a marginal approach to the subject of disarmament. However, an agreement on that point could be of extreme importance, even if it did not deal with underground explosions, the detection of which involved difficulties that had not yet been overcome. First, it could lead to a change in attitude with regard to the entire disarmament problem. Secondly, it would be the first general disarmament agreement incorporating a system of true international control. Thirdly, it would mean an end to the danger, however hypothetical, from radiation released by nuclear explosions. Moreover, an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests might ultimately lead to a halt in the production of nuclear weapons in general. Lastly, it would appear that, of all arrangements involving the international control of armaments, those concerned with the cessation of nuclear tests would be the simplest to work out and implement.

<sup>1/</sup>See Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for April to December 1955, document DC/71, annex 15, pp. 23-24.

48. The establishment of the ten-Power disarmament committee should not be allowed to delay the negotiations already initiated on the halting of nuclear tests. However, his delegation welcomed the establishment of that body, which had the advantage of being smaller than the First Committee. The ten-Power committee should continue in permanent session, reflecting the world's continuous concern with the problem. It should also periodically submit all its conclusions to the United Nations Disarmament Commission. In that connexion, the suggestion that the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission, whose experience and ability were well known, should be kept informed of the committee's proceedings had great merit.

49. Until 1955, discussions at the United Nations had been concerned with total disarmament, which obviously required adequate inspection. During the past three years, however, the great Powers had recognized that, in the present state of scientific knowledge, it was not possible to establish an inspection system which would reveal the existence of secret stocks of nuclear weapons. They had concluded that partial measures were all that could be achieved. The USSR and United Kingdom proposals, however, again raised the question of general and complete disarmament. If these were new scientific achievements making effective control possible, everyone should rejoice. As the French representative had pointed out, the question of the feasibility of the control of nuclear weapons and stocks of fissionable materials remained of crucial

importance in any scheme of comprehensive disarmament. In any case, it was vital that the Powers concerned should without delay reach agreement, as a first step, on any partial aspect of disarmament that could be effectively controlled. Only in that way could the armaments race be brought to a halt. It was therefore gratifying to note that, while aiming at a total disarmament programme, the great Powers showed an interest in partial solutions. It was also encouraging that the United States had indicated that it was prepared to discuss the political as well as the technical aspects of the question of surprise attack. Those elements could serve as the basis for the work of the Committee, which should also give careful attention to the original and thought-provoking considerations put forward by the French representative.

50. Pending general and complete disarmament, the possibility of working out appropriately guaranteed regional schemes for limitation and of reaffirming a renunciation of war, was not to be ignored. Israel held itself ready, as it had done in the past, to co-operate to the full in any discussions of that kind with a view to reducing, and, if possible, eliminating the crushing burden of armaments in the Middle East.

51. The joint draft resolution was only procedural in character, but its adoption, which he hoped would be unanimous, would augur well for progress on the substantive questions.

The meeting rose at 1.5 p.m.