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MEETING**

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Chairman: Sir Claude COREA (Ceylon).

**AGENDA ITEMS 67, 86, 69 AND 73**

Disarmament and the situation with regard to the fulfilment of General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV) of 20 November 1959 on the question of disarmament (A/4463, A/4503, A/4505, A/4509, A/C.1/L.249, A/C.1/L.250, A/C.1/L.251, A/C.1/L.252/Rev.1, A/C.1/L.254 and Add.1) (continued)

Report of the Disarmament Commission (A/4463, A/4500, A/C.1/L.250, A/C.1/L.251, A/C.1/L.252/Rev.1) (continued)

Suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests (A/4414, A/C.1/L.252/Rev.1, A/C.1/L.254 and Add.1) (continued)

Prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons (A/4434, A/C.1/L.252/Rev.1, A/C.1/L.253/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1, A/C.1/L.254 and Add.1) (continued)

**GENERAL DEBATE (continued)**

1. Mr. CHRISTIANSEN (Denmark) noted that all delegations were in agreement that the goal sought was general and complete disarmament. At the 875th plenary meeting of the General Assembly the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Denmark had suggested a means of breaking the present deadlock and paving the way for a resumption of talks, namely, to enlarge the membership of the negotiating body by including countries which did not belong to any bloc and could thus act in some measure as mediators. So far as substantive measures of disarmament were concerned, the Committee should not be too ambitious for the moment. The draft resolutions already submitted indicated that there was a broader area of agreement than might appear from what some of the speakers had said. Nevertheless, there remained certain differences of opinion. The proposal to change the structure of the Secretariat would obviously not

command the support of a sufficient number of delegations. The question of increasing the membership of the Security Council was before the Special Political Committee. In point of fact, those reorganization proposals were bound up with the question of creating an international police force, which would be essential in a disarmed world. The problems connected with the relationship of such a force with the Security Council and the Secretary-General would call for consideration by the Disarmament Commission as well as for expert advice.

2. It was meaningless to make a distinction between "control of armaments" and "control of disarmament", for the only way to verify a reduction in armed forces or armaments was to take stock of the remainder. The basic purpose of control was to create confidence by assuring all parties concerned that disarmament was actually taking place. The problem of foreign bases would be solved automatically by disarmament.

3. It had been maintained that control of armaments and armed forces would constitute a form of espionage. In reality, control would have to be global in nature, which would mean the setting up of extensive control machinery and the participation of China. Every State would be subject to control by a body in which a number of States, including the one that was being controlled, were represented. Far from being a form of espionage, such control would render espionage superfluous and thereby remove a major cause of friction.

4. His delegation had approached the debate at the current session with some apprehension, since it realized that the disarmament discussions in the United Nations, like those in the League of Nations, were widely regarded as representing nothing but empty words. It was the Committee's duty to ensure that that was not the case. It would therefore be a grave mistake to break off negotiations. The Soviet draft resolution (A/C.1/L.249) and that of Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States (A/C.1/L.250) had several points in common and aimed at the same goal. Consequently, there should be no objection to the Mexican representative's suggestion (1099th meeting) that those two draft resolutions should not be put to the vote. What the Committee should seek was not a majority for one side or the other but a meeting of minds. In that connexion, his delegation supported the ideas set forth by the Canadian representative at the 1098th meeting.

5. Mr. SHUKAIRY (Saudi Arabia) said that the key to the problem of disarmament was the approach adopted to it. In contrast to the situation at the fourteenth session, the present debate was taking place in an unfavourable atmosphere, owing, *inter alia*, to the failure of the Geneva Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament and the fact that the United States and Soviet positions were diametrically

opposed in principle and far apart in detail. A fact to be noted, however, was the rising influence of the non-aligned nations and their resistance to pressure of any kind. Saudi Arabia, which pursued a policy of positive neutrality incompatible with the existence of foreign bases, was determined to follow whatever course appeared to it best calculated to promote a solution of the disarmament problem.

6. The United Kingdom had proposed, in its draft resolution (A/C.1/L.251), that the problem should be approached from the technical standpoint and that experts should therefore be appointed to study the capabilities and limitations of the systems of inspection and control. However, the United Kingdom representative had stated himself that his country had first-hand scientific and technical knowledge regarding the vehicles required for delivering nuclear weapons. It might therefore be asked why technical disarmament negotiations were necessary, particularly since the delegations participating in disarmament negotiations always included experts on every aspect of disarmament. The United Kingdom proposal merely complicated the problem further, and the United Kingdom would do better to abandon its intention of dispersing its bombers and its nuclear weapons among the countries of Asia and Africa for the purpose of protecting them against surprise attack. It was also to be feared that the experts would fail to reach agreement and would inevitably come to the extremely dangerous conclusion that the establishment of control was not technically feasible. It was noteworthy in that connexion that the United States, by contrast, felt that the main obstacle to inspection did not stem from technical factors but from political willingness to submit to control.

7. The United Kingdom representative had said (1089th meeting) that it would be impossible to bring about total disarmament in four years or even in forty if any approach but his was adopted. However, it was precisely his method that might prevent disarmament from ever being achieved. The international community had been wrestling with the problem for forty years and, despite numerous efforts at negotiation, the only result had been rearmament, accompanied by the added dangers of nuclear weapons and space flight. Furthermore, the United Nations now confronted the same dilemma as the League of Nations with respect to such matters as control and verification. Indeed, whereas the League of Nations had recognized, in Article 8 of its Covenant, that the maintenance of peace required "the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations", the Members of the United Nations had not yet agreed on a formula. Similarly, the League of Nations bodies which had dealt with the problem had at least succeeded in working out draft agreements, while the corresponding United Nations bodies had not yet accomplished anything. In 1930, agreement had been reached in the League of Nations on a draft convention, prepared by the Preparatory Commission of the Disarmament Conference, embodying five main points with regard to disarmament. And as early as 1924, the countries of the world had given a favourable reception to a draft protocol for the pacific settlement of international disputes which unfortunately had not been supported by the United Kingdom. In any event, while the League of Nations had achieved certain results,

the United Nations, after fifteen years of effort and study in both plenary and smaller committees, had been unable to translate a single principle into action.

8. Although there were many points of agreement between the three-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.250) and the Soviet draft (A/C.1/L.249), the views of the two sides remained very far apart. The position taken by the United States and the United Kingdom was extremely disquieting in that it gave rise to the question of whether disarmament would ever take place. The United Kingdom representative had said (1089th meeting) that the next war would inevitably become a nuclear war within a year at most, whatever agreements might have been concluded in time of peace with a view to eliminating that possibility. If nuclear war was inevitable, however, there would be no point in discussing the disarmament problem, in adopting the United Kingdom draft resolution or any other proposal, or in resuming negotiations.

9. According to the United States representative, the difficulties with regard to disarmament did not derive from technical, scientific, military or economic factors but from deep-seated differences in purpose between the Soviet Union and the United States and from their mutual distrust. It was possible for countries to pursue different objectives provided that they sought to harmonize them by peaceful means only. However, the President of the United States, Mr. Eisenhower, had stated at the 868th plenary meeting of the General Assembly that it was a contradiction to maintain a society in which a military move could be taken in complete secrecy and at the same time to profess a desire to reduce the risk of war through arms control. Embodying that statement in a draft resolution meant rendering disarmament impossible. That was what had been done in paragraph 2 (f) of the three-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.250), which called for the achievement of a secure, free and "open" world. The United Nations had accepted the principle that every society was free to decide how it should be constituted. The United Nations could not, except by war, attempt to bring about an open society in any country whose people preferred to have a closed society.

10. The representative of the United States had also stated (1086th meeting) that only patient and probably prolonged negotiations could point the way to disarmament. But science and technology had so radically changed the character of war that the United Nations might well amend the first line of its Charter and announce its determination to save succeeding generations not from "the scourge of war" but from extinction. In such circumstances the United States position was unacceptable. The very minimum required was that negotiations should lead to general and complete disarmament.

11. If the Soviet delegation withdrew from the debate there would be no question of disarmament, which was inconceivable without the participation of both sides, no matter what resolutions might be adopted by the General Assembly. It was therefore important to find a formula whereby the present debate could continue and negotiations could be resumed. If it was impossible for the First Committee to adopt a resolution unanimously, it would be preferable to leave the question on one side, possibly until the end of the session, in the hope that back-stage talks would bring about an agreement between the great Powers on a

suitable basis for a resumption of negotiations. With regard to the Soviet proposal concerning the Secretariat and the Security Council, he agreed that it had become necessary to revise the composition of the Security Council so that the African and Asian nations, now constituting almost half of the United Nations membership, would be equitably represented. The question of the Secretariat had, however, arisen in the wake of the Congo crisis. Yet the Secretary-General could not be held responsible for the deterioration of the situation in that country. On the contrary, it was necessary to remember that it was he who had undertaken the strenuous task of assembling the United Nations Force and had pressed hard for the withdrawal of Belgian troops. It was also necessary to remember the firm stand he had taken in carrying out the resolutions of the General Assembly during the Suez crisis. In any event, the issue did not relate to the Secretary-General personally but to the institution he represented. In the view of Saudi Arabia, the interests of authority, discipline and responsibility demanded that there should be only one Secretary-General.

12. While the technical, military and political aspects of disarmament were no doubt important in their own way, the main concern at the present time was to ensure the survival of the human race. With that approach, a solution in three stages might be envisaged. The first stage would involve the maintenance of the status quo and a truce in the arms race, which was a prerequisite for the success of the other two stages, since it was essential to halt the unequal competition between negotiations and rearmament. The second stage would be the elimination of all means of mass destruction as the all-important objective necessary for survival, and the third stage would be the reduction of military forces and armaments to the level necessary for national and international security. The three stages would, of course, be balanced and effectively controlled, and would be clearly defined in a disarmament treaty. Once confidence was restored, disarmament could begin.

13. One method of facilitating negotiations would be to expand the Ten-Nation Committee, with Mr. Padilla Nervo as Chairman, to include a certain number of neutral countries whose presence would have a moderating and stabilizing effect. It would also be possible to convene a special session of the General Assembly to consolidate a victory or to break any deadlock in negotiations. The United Nations might, as a further step, invite the new President of the United States to arrange a meeting with the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on a new basis.

14. Mr. ORMSBY-GORE (United Kingdom), exercising his right of reply, said that he would like to correct certain misconceptions regarding his statement at the 1089th meeting which the representative of Saudi Arabia appeared to have formed. First of all it was not merely his own view that if war broke out, it would almost certainly become a nuclear war within a year, whatever agreements were concluded in time of peace. Indeed that opinion had been expressed by experts from the Soviet Union, India, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. Moreover, he had not said that, for that reason, war was inevitable, but rather that it was dangerous to allow the peoples of the world to believe that another war

would not be nuclear, and that consequently war must be avoided at all cost.

15. The representative of Saudi Arabia had questioned the usefulness of the technical talks proposed in the United Kingdom draft resolution (A/C.1/L.251). But what had encouraged his delegation to submit that proposal had been the success of the Conference of Experts to Study the Possibility of Detecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on the Suspension of Nuclear Tests, held at Geneva in the summer of 1958, in which the Soviet Union, the United States of America and the United Kingdom had been able to reach agreement on the technical machinery necessary to provide an effective control system for the cessation of nuclear tests. It was quite wrong to suggest that such technical talks were doomed to failure; far from creating a division of opinion between the parties, they would enable negotiations to be based on techniques agreed between them.

16. The representative of Saudi Arabia had stated that in the time of the League of Nations the States had agreed to reduce their forces to those which were needed for internal security and the maintenance of international peace, whereas the United Nations had not yet arrived at an agreed formula in that respect. That was hardly a fair statement of the position, since the two plans submitted by the United States and the Soviet Union respectively envisaged a world in which that formula would apply.

17. Moreover he had never stated, as suggested by the representative of Saudi Arabia, that any plan other than that proposed by the United Kingdom would take forty years to implement. He had simply pointed out that no proposal under which not a single disarmament measure could be undertaken before agreement had been reached on general and complete disarmament would bring about disarmament in four years or even perhaps in forty years. He understood that the Soviet Union now shared the view that it was advisable to agree upon certain measures of disarmament as soon as all could accept their being put into effect immediately.

18. Mr. SOSA-RODRIGUEZ (Venezuela) said that disarmament was a crucial problem, on the solution of which the future of mankind—and perhaps the settlement of other international problems—depended. The fact that no solution had yet been reached did not imply that disarmament was not technically feasible, but only that the necessary confidence was lacking. A tragic vicious circle was involved, armaments engendering mistrust and mistrust resulting in an intensification of the armaments race. The undoubted advantages that a solution of the problem would have for mankind were generally realized and it was that realization which had led to the unanimous adoption of three resolutions: General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV), the resolution recently adopted by the Disarmament Commission (DC/182/Corr.1), and General Assembly resolution 1495 (XV). It was therefore the Committee's duty to deal with the question in substance. It must not be content with vague declarations of good intentions or confine itself to expressing hopes that negotiations would be resumed; it must establish directives. The speeches, proposals, counter-proposals and draft resolutions submitted at the Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva had not been as fruitless as they might at first sight appear. Increasingly definite con-

cepts had emerged on which there was an agreement in principle, namely, that the final objective was general and complete disarmament; that that objective could be achieved fairly rapidly—in four to seven years; that the process of disarmament should be progressive, controlled and balanced; that it was urgent to reach agreement on the suspension of nuclear tests; that the use of outer space must be limited to peaceful purposes; and that an international police force must be established. Moreover, there was general agreement that disarmament must be carried out within the next few years or it would never be achieved, since the development of weapons and their increasingly wide dissemination would soon render the problem insoluble.

19. To judge by the draft resolutions in documents A/C.1/L.249 and A/C.1/L.250, there were certain similarities and points in common between the views on general and complete disarmament held by the Soviet Union and the Western Powers. The differences of opinion, which could be removed by negotiations, mainly related to the methods to be adopted to achieve the final objective: the Soviet Union was pressing for a general treaty while the Western Powers preferred to proceed by means of partial agreements; the Soviet Union believed that technical studies should follow political agreement and not precede it as the Western Powers wished; finally, the parties were not in agreement on the measures to be taken at each stage, on the order in which measures should be taken, or on the composition, powers and operational methods of the control body.

20. In the circumstances it was the duty of the Committee to make a synthesis of the measures proposed and to formulate directives in the light of the fundamental principles already accepted. It might at the same time decide to set up a negotiating body including a certain number of States which were not associated with the great Powers in military pacts, or to establish an ad hoc committee for the purpose of bringing the two sides together and thus making it possible to resume negotiations. Where the question of a treaty was concerned, a compromise between the two points of view might be achieved by requesting the Powers to draw up a document covering the whole programme of disarmament and by indicating clearly that the measures planned for one stage would not begin before the programme scheduled for the preceding stage had been duly completed and controlled by the accepted procedure. He agreed with the representative of Mexico that no purpose would be served by voting on draft resolutions that were not supported by both sides.

21. With regard to nuclear tests, he felt that they constituted a threat to mankind in themselves, since they increased the amount of radio-activity and endangered the health of present and future generations. For that reason, his delegation opposed the renewal of nuclear tests and the dissemination of nuclear weapons, and considered that nuclear testing was too important a subject to be subordinated to the consideration of other aspects of disarmament.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.