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Chairman: Mr. Franz MATSCH (Austria).

AGENDA ITEM 70

General and complete disarmament (A/4218, A/4219; A/C.1/818, A/C.1/820, A/C.1/821) (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. ESIN (Turkey) said it was encouraging to note in the debate a general and intense desire to find a realistic remedy to the gravest threat at present hanging over mankind, the arms race. But much remained to be done before general disarmament could be achieved. His delegation hoped that the resolution which was apparently being drafted by the Powers that held the key to the disarmament problem might be the forerunner of progress in that direction. He reserved the right to comment on that subject later.

2. Turkey was convinced that a stable peace could be based only on security and that the sole means of ensuring security was to achieve general and controlled disarmament supplemented by effective safeguards for the maintenance of world peace. It had therefore always been an enthusiastic supporter of collective security and collective responsibility in the maintenance of peace. Moreover, the Turkish people were impatiently awaiting the moment when they could cast off the burden of military defence expenditures and devote all their resources to raising their levels of living and to social and cultural progress. On that point, his delegation was certainly in agreement with the Soviet delegation.

3. Any agreement on which a reliable system of disarmament could be built would have to strike a judicious balance between measures of disarmament and measures of control. Whether disarmament was complete or partial, immediate or long-range, supervision, inspection and control were essential. The parties concerned should apply themselves to determining the type and the proper degree of control, its proper distribution in time and space and its application in accordance with the disarmament measures adopted.

4. The idea of general and complete disarmament had already inspired several proposals both in the United Nations and the League of Nations, in particular the French-United Kingdom plan submitted to the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission in 1954.^{1/} The most recent discussions, however, in particular those in the Sub-Committee in 1957, had been devoted principally to partial disarmament, as the views put forward had been so completely incompatible with each

^{1/}See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for April, May and June 1954*, document DC/53, annex 9.

other and the international situation so unfavourable that it had been hoped that progress in that field might facilitate later consideration of a more general plan. His delegation believed that it was desirable to consider an over-all plan for general and complete disarmament, if the plan provided for progress by stages designed gradually to increase confidence. As the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs had explained in the General Assembly (809th plenary meeting), Turkey would examine any disarmament proposal in the light of four considerations: the need to provide for clearly defined successive stages; the adoption of effective and adequate control measures for each stage; the need to provide for reductions in both nuclear weapons and conventional armaments, in order to ensure balanced disarmament; the conclusion of arrangements designed effectively to guarantee peace and security.

5. There was certainly a correlation between disarmament and the settlement of the major questions that were the principal source of existing tensions. Progress in the two fields would accordingly have to be parallel, as it would be dangerous to make a plan for partial or complete disarmament every stage of which would be carried into effect without any substantial progress being made in the settlement of political disputes. Such a plan could be of practical value only if confidence was restored. Moreover, the continuation of tension would make it impossible to set up an adequate system to prevent aggression and maintain peace, without which disarmament would merely serve to increase insecurity.

6. His delegation agreed with the Soviet representative that there could be no control without disarmament, but it was equally true that there could be no disarmament without control, because control was the only guarantee against a disturbance of the balance of power that was the existing basis for peace. For that reason the foundations must be laid for an international control and inspection organization in the initial stages of disarmament.

7. Disarmament could be achieved only in stages. But, whereas the United Kingdom plan (A/C.1/820) proposed effective control measures for each stage and contained constructive suggestions for the organization of a general system of control and inspection, the Soviet plan (A/4219), while mentioning the problem of control, did not specify the measures to be adopted at each stage. With regard to the suggestion that the Soviet plan might be adopted in principle before any agreement was reached on methods of control, he did not see what use that could be, as the effective value of the plan would depend on control. Moreover, the Soviet plan referred to the disbandment of all armed forces at the end of the second stage, but provided for nuclear disarmament only at the third and last stage, whereas the United Kingdom plan provided for the cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes and the reduction of stocks of nuclear weapons in the second stage.

8. The French representative had also raised the important point of vehicles for the delivery of nuclear explosives (1030th and 1033rd meetings), which might form the subject of a technical investigation that would make possible a new approach to the interdependent elements of disarmament. In any case, if balanced disarmament was to be achieved, the reduction of nuclear weapons and vehicles, together with the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes should be simultaneous with the reduction of conventional forces and weapons.

9. Finally, the Soviet plan contained no specific suggestion as to measures for the maintenance of international peace and security on the completion of disarmament or on the achievement of substantial reductions. General and complete disarmament would not eliminate disparities in manpower and industrial potential, and it was obvious that in order to compensate for the destruction of the existing balance, an effective system would have to be organized for the maintenance of peace. Consideration should therefore be given at the present stage to the establishment of an international police force, the conclusion of international agreements laying down principles for its operation, and measures for the safeguarding of peace by some prompt and effective machinery. On that point, his delegation was in agreement with the view expressed by the Italian representative (1031st meeting). It also thought that the machinery for control ought not to be subject to the veto. Furthermore, in any system of partial or general disarmament and at each of the successive stages, all regional factors in the maintenance of security would have to be taken into account. The Soviet and United Kingdom proposals, and all the other suggestions which had been made, were worthy of more detailed study and it was to be hoped that the debates of the ten-Power disarmament committee would clear up some of those points which remained obscure.

10. Despite the importance of the question of general and complete disarmament, there should be no relaxation of efforts to achieve in the meantime concrete results in certain more restricted fields, such as the suspension of nuclear weapons tests and the adoption of measures to prevent surprise attacks. The conclusion of a treaty for the cessation of nuclear weapons tests, with provision for control and inspection, would reduce the danger of atomic radiation and would also be a first step towards controlled disarmament. The elimination of the danger of surprise attack would also create an atmosphere of greater confidence, which would have a beneficial influence on disarmament negotiations. The United States representative had stated (1027th meeting) in that connexion that his Government was ready to participate in a conference of experts to determine the technical measures required to avoid surprise attacks and to consider the political aspects of that question simultaneously with its technical aspects. He hoped that that constructive proposal would be accepted.

11. In view of the high level at which the debate had been kept, he would refrain from replying to certain allegations which had been made against his country. The debate could naturally only be of a general and preliminary nature, but a more detailed exchange of views in the United Nations would be possible after the discussions of the ten-Power disarmament committee. In that connexion, he supported the United Kingdom delegation's suggestion (1029th meeting) that

the Secretary-General should be represented in that committee's discussions. As Chairman of the Disarmament Commission, Mr. Padilla Nervo would seem the person most suitable for that function. Lastly, the United Nations should, as the United States representative had suggested, study problems relating to the measures required to guarantee peace and security as progress was made towards disarmament.

12. Mr. FAWZI (United Arab Republic) noted that some heartening advances had recently been made in the matter of disarmament: the recent progress at Geneva towards the permanent and universal cessation of nuclear tests and the control thereof; the temporary cessation of such tests by the great Powers, which would, he hoped, become permanent and universally observed, so that the tests in the Sahara contemplated by France would not take place; the agreement reached at Geneva between the Foreign Ministers of France, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States to resume the disarmament negotiations, which had been suspended since 1957; the agreement between the four Foreign Ministers on the establishment of the ten-Power disarmament committee, whose meeting should, in his delegation's view, be attended by an authoritative representative of the United Nations; the linking of that committee's work with that of the Disarmament Commission, which was composed of all the States Members of the United Nations and through which the Organization discharged its responsibilities with regard to disarmament; the statement made by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Khrushchev, before the General Assembly (799th plenary meeting), urging general and complete disarmament, and the proposal submitted by the Soviet delegation on that subject; the joint communiqué issued on 27 September 1959 by the President of the United States, Mr. Eisenhower, and Mr. Khrushchev, in which they had declared that general disarmament was the most important problem facing the world, and that both Governments would make every effort to achieve a constructive solution to that problem; the various proposals and views submitted to the Assembly at its present session, which would, he hoped, culminate in the adoption of an appropriate resolution.

13. Although those steps were perhaps not yet sufficient to meet all the hopes of mankind, they constituted a notable gain, which should be maintained and strengthened. In the realization that peace was the only possible choice, the whole world had acclaimed the efforts of the leaders of various States, who had given prominence to disarmament in their conversations and some of whom had even suggested that the approaching summit conference would have disarmament as the sole item on its agenda. Moreover, the trend was for recrimination to give way to constructive discussion.

14. There should, however, be no illusions as to the immensity of the difficulties that remained to be surmounted. An agreement, or agreements, would have to be concluded which dealt with all aspects of disarmament—nuclear, thermo-nuclear, conventional and biological weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction—prohibited the use of outer space or the Antarctic for other than peaceful purposes, and provided for the destruction of stockpiles of atomic weapons.

15. Consideration should also be given to the internal and external security needs of States and to the balance of power between States; the parallelism and the link,

on which some delegations insisted, between the prohibition of nuclear weapons, the destruction of stockpiles, the reduction of conventional armaments, and the abolition of foreign bases; provision for the prevention of surprise attack; the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of maintaining complete control of disarmament in the case of some types of weapons, particularly conventional weapons and means of biological warfare; the lingering mutual suspicion between States, which was not necessarily hostile, but, to some extent, the logical outcome of the right of self-defence and self-preservation; the difficulty of establishing a link between disarmament and the setting up of machinery for the maintenance of world peace and security as envisaged in the Charter of the United Nations. All those difficulties should not, however, give rise to discouragement, but should rather be a spur to redoubled effort and resourcefulness.

16. His delegation had noted with satisfaction the emphasis that had been placed on the importance of world economic development and co-operation in relation to disarmament. Article 26 of the Charter provided for disarmament arrangements and advocated the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources. That constructive tendency was taking the place of the appalling wastefulness of armaments, which had resulted in a deadlock.

17. Suspicion, intimidation, ambitions of aggrandizement at the expense of the independence, interests and dignity of others could not properly serve the purpose of disarmament and peace. Disarmament and peace could be assured in a world prepared to accept the realities of science, of evolution, of ever-shrinking distances, of the interdependence of interests, and of unlimited possibilities for the human race.

18. Mr. LORIDAN (Belgium) considered it redundant to describe disarmament as "general and complete", since the implication of completeness was contained in the idea of disarmament. Although the Soviet plan would retain certain armed contingents, its outstanding feature was its sensational nature and the speed with which disarmament was to be put into effect. The proposal amounted to a veritable disarmament race. His Government wondered, as did the French and other Governments, whether the Soviet plan did not err on the side of over-optimism. While Belgium was ready to go as far and as rapidly as possible along the road to disarmament, he doubted whether it had suddenly become quite such an easy road to travel. Nevertheless there was every reason for satisfaction with the recent turn of events. After two years the problem had got out of a rut; it was being considered in a more favourable international atmosphere and the Powers mainly concerned had expressed their anxiety to achieve success and were preparing to approach it in a constructive spirit.

19. It was unanimously agreed that the ultimate goal was disarmament: the way of achieving it was where differences of opinion arose. In the first place disarmament must be essentially a key to security and it therefore had to be a balanced and controlled process. But even if agreement could be reached on those principles, their technical application was incredibly complex. Thus, with respect to the achievement of balance, the French representative had proposed (A/C.1/821) that there should first be "measures prohibiting first the development and then the manufacture and the possession of all vehicles for the delivery of

nuclear devices", which would compensate for the fact that it was impossible to control stocks. At the eighth session of the General Assembly, President Eisenhower had proposed (470th plenary meeting) that the nuclear Powers should transfer certain quantities of fissionable material to an international agency which would use it for peaceful purposes. The Netherlands representative, while stressing the importance of disarmament in the sphere of conventional armed forces, had regretted that the Soviet plan had made no provision for disarmament in nuclear weapons until the third stage (1031st meeting).

20. As far as control was concerned, his Government regarded it as essential, since it was the only means of creating the initial confidence which presumably was lacking. A process of controlled disarmament would set up a chain reaction: control—confidence—disarmament. Thus control would become more detailed at each stage and would be associated with more radical disarmament measures. It must be synchronized with disarmament measures and it must be effective. As the Soviet delegation had stressed (1030th meeting), control was not an end in itself but it was essential for the apparatus of control to be able to function efficiently when the first disarmament measures were carried into effect. The form of control should be suited to the measures to which it was applied and it should also be reciprocal and impartial.

21. While control had so far been a stumbling-block to disarmament, it was nevertheless also the cornerstone. His delegation had studied the Soviet proposal carefully, particularly from the more general standpoint of control. It would observe only that the provisions on control in the plan were very general in nature and not altogether free of a certain vagueness. The representative of the Soviet Union had indeed said (1033rd meeting) that control would give rise to difficulties only in the case of partial disarmament and that general and complete disarmament would settle the question of control. However, even "general and complete" disarmament could only be carried out in stages, and however short they might be, they approximated the successive stages of partial disarmament where the Soviet delegation admitted real control difficulties existed.

22. He was pleased that the Soviet delegation accepted the need for control at the various stages of disarmament. Since, as the USSR representative had said, the functions and powers of an international control body should be related to the nature of the disarmament measures to be implemented, it was to be hoped that a system of effective control could be put into operation in concrete instances. In any case, it was for the experts to find technical solutions acceptable to all. The results already achieved at the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests were encouraging in that respect.

23. Disarmament should not be regarded as a cure for all ills. It did not in itself guarantee the security of all States. As the Belgian representative had stated at the 809th plenary meeting, by the sheer weight of their population and economies the great Powers could constitute a threat. Besides, the most ambitious plans did not envisage disarmament in a form which was really general and complete since they provided for the retention of military contingents for purposes of internal security. The police forces of large countries, however much they might be cut down, would still con-

stitute a danger to small countries, whose police forces would be insignificant. For that reason, once disarmament had been achieved, the United Nations should have a police force at its disposal in the same way as a national police force was a necessity in countries in which the citizens were not armed.

24. Once unanimous agreement had been reached on the goal—comprehensive disarmament—the various plans proposed would give rise to technical problems which the First Committee was not in a position to handle. It would therefore have to confine itself to adopting a procedural resolution referring all the proposals or suggestions made to the ten-Power disarmament committee together with the observations and comments made in the course of the discussion. Further, the ultimate responsibility of the United Nations should be reaffirmed and the link that existed between the United Nations and the committee in Geneva should perhaps be more clearly defined. The ten-Power committee did in fact include the States which had the main responsibility in the task of disarmament, but in the event of universal disarmament, there would still be the same need for co-operation among States, including those which were not Members of the United Nations. The link which now existed between the United Nations and the ten-Power committee was defined in the resolution which the Disarmament Commission had adopted on 10 September 1959 (A/4209). It had been proposed that there should be a closer form of association. The United Kingdom had suggested that a representative of the Secretary-General should be appointed and other suggestions had been made. A United Nations representative could not, however, take an effective part in its work. He could only be an observer or a liaison officer and it might be ill-advised to modify a procedure established outside the United Nations.

25. Mr. THORS (Iceland) felt that no vote or resolution by the First Committee could solve the problem of the reduction of armaments; the solution lay in gradually restoring mutual trust between the great Powers. However, even with a more favourable atmosphere in international relations, each step towards reduction of armaments had to be coupled with simultaneous steps towards increasing control. No great Power would weaken its military position unless it was assured that a potential adversary was simultaneously doing the same.

26. For the small and medium-sized nations, any reduction in armaments would be welcome, for the maintenance of armed forces and military equipment entailed enormous expenditure, although it was virtually useless in view of the gigantic nuclear and conventional armaments maintained by the great Powers. Most people everywhere were agreed that the sums spent for military purposes could be better employed to benefit the people. Iceland had no armed forces, and the question might therefore seem simple; but every Member of the United Nations had responsibilities and obligations under the Charter, and in the face of danger of a conflagration which might reach all parts of the globe, all men were citizens of the world.

27. At the 820th plenary meeting, his delegation had suggested that, after the discussion in the Assembly, the disarmament question as a whole should be referred to the ten-Power committee. It was to be hoped that that committee would submit constructive reports to

the United Nations Disarmament Commission, which would no doubt place sound and acceptable proposals before the General Assembly in 1960 for final approval. That was the procedure to be followed if the United Nations was to shoulder the responsibility for the solution of the whole matter in accordance with the Charter. Of course, the United Nations should welcome any outside negotiations designed to reduce armaments and enhance peaceful relations between nations, although the final agreement should be achieved under its aegis.

28. Following the proposal submitted by the USSR and the statements made by the Secretary of State of the United States (797th plenary meeting) and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom (798th plenary meeting), it was appropriate for the disarmament problem to be discussed in the First Committee on a broad basis with due regard to all suggestions and remarks presented by the great Powers. No agreement on any international reduction of armaments could be reached without their initiative and approval. Since all other nations seemed anxious to reduce their armaments, there was no danger of the United Nations unanimously accepting a proportionate reduction in armaments binding upon every nation. Hence the prospect for an early summit conference where, it was hoped, the leaders of the great nations would begin to reduce their armaments, was to be welcomed. The views which emerged would guide the work of the ten-Power committee and would subsequently contribute to the progress made by the Disarmament Commission. It might therefore be unfortunate if the summit conference were unduly delayed.

29. The current debate had brought out the importance of the negotiations that had already taken place and also the general desire to bring to a successful conclusion the work of the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests and to reopen at an early date the negotiations on safeguards against surprise attacks, particularly now that some of the obstacles had been removed. The fact that it had taken a whole year to reach agreement on the preamble and seventeen articles of a treaty banning nuclear tests proved that the road to general and complete disarmament was an arduous one, but it was better to proceed cautiously, step by step, safeguarded by mutual control, security and trust, towards the ultimate realization of a better and happier world.

30. The proposals of Mr. Khrushchev should be welcomed as an expression of a desire on the part of the Soviet Union and as a goal to be sought by all nations. But before that goal could be reached many intermediary measures and many precautions had to be taken.

31. If disarmament became a reality, changes in the Charter of the United Nations might have to be considered, since its basic principles at present were rooted in the assumption of the existence of great military Powers; in particular, the provisions concerning the veto and the sphere of action of the Security Council as compared with the responsibilities of the General Assembly might have to be changed. But good will and understanding would undoubtedly make it possible to bring that task to a successful conclusion.

32. Furthermore, consideration would have to be given to the establishment of an international police force to safeguard international law. The role of the

International Court of Justice would also have to be greatly strengthened and its decisions would have to become binding on all the nations of the world. Again, the extent to which each nation could maintain an internal police force without becoming a threat to other nations would have to be determined. There were many other problems to be settled, and even if general and complete disarmament was achieved one day, that would not entirely remove all the difficulties. Human relations and peace between nations would continue to be endangered if threats of aggression, plans of aggrandizement, subversion, mass movements and the use of force were still to be feared. In addition to disarmament, men needed the inspiration of the highest ideals of religion. Not only weapons, but also the pursuit of injustice and wrongdoing would have to be eliminated. Men would have to learn, as was stated in the Charter, "to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours".

33. In the meantime, it was to be hoped that the current debate would be helpful to the ten-Power disarmament committee and that it could be concluded by the adoption of a resolution acceptable to all.

34. Mr. SCHMIDT (Brazil) referred to the suggestion to allow Mr. Padilla Nervo, Chairman of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, to follow the proceedings of the ten-Power committee. He thought that the best course would be to invite the Committee and the Secretary-General to remain in contact with Mr. Padilla Nervo throughout the proceedings of the committee. Thus, the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission would be kept continuously informed of the Geneva deliberations. That would facilitate the Commission's work when it began to study the reports submitted to it by the ten-Power committee.

The meeting rose at 12.15 p.m.