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Chairman : Mr. Finn MOE (Norway).

Methods which might be used to maintain and strengthen international peace and security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter : report of the Collective Measures Committee (A/1891, A/C.1/676/Rev.1 and A/C.1/688) (continued)

[Item 18]*

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. GARSON (Canada) said that his delegation, which was one of the sponsors of the revised joint draft resolution on the report of the Collective Measures Committee, wished to make a number of observations on behalf of Canada alone.
2. The revised joint draft resolution (A/C.1/676/Rev.1) incorporated the amendment proposed by Chile, Colombia and Mexico (A/C.1/689) and the final paragraph proposed by the Arab States (A/C.1/690). It was undoubtedly of some value to specify quite clearly that no measure would be taken on the territory of any State without its formal consent.
3. The Committee's work had been strongly attacked by Mr. Vyshinsky. The draft resolution, which would authorize the Collective Measures Committee to complete its work, represented a modest and unprovocative step towards the realization of collective security through the United Nations. The many misunderstandings which had seemed to arise in connexion with the Committee's practical aim might have obscured to some extent the precise nature of the objectives, which remained those of the Charter itself.
4. The time had come for stocktaking and for a general review of the detailed work which the General Assembly had assigned to the Collective Measures Committee. The aim, which was identical with that of the United Nations itself, was to maintain international peace and security. It was in accordance with that guiding principle that the attempt to find methods for the peaceful settlement of disputes had assumed first place in the construction of the collective security system. It was essential that peace

should be based not on the strength of any country or group of countries, but on the impartial and universal foundations of the United Nations itself. Once achieved, that "United Nations peace" should be extended until it covered the whole "area of collective will".

5. To be effective, that collective will must express itself whenever confronted with a concrete case of aggression. That was why the example of United Nations action in Korea would always mark a major step forward along the road to collective security. In addition, Members of the United Nations must at least examine in concert what might have to be done in the future to resist every possible form of aggression.

6. The Committee's proposals went no further than that. Mr. Vyshinsky presumed that some kind of obligation was being concealed from and would bind those who voted for the draft resolution, but everything had been clearly stated and the Committee was being called upon to make its decision on the text of the report and nothing more.

7. Having stated what the United Nations had done, it might be of some use to say what it had not done. The Committee had not built up any aggressive alliance between a few States; it had not drafted any military plans and its members had not committed governments to any obligations beyond the general aims enumerated in the United Nations Charter. No plan against any preconceived enemy had ever been contemplated.

8. It might be noted, however, that for the sake of greater security governments could work at the same time in the United Nations and in certain regional organizations. Canadian policy distinguished quite clearly between the two methods: one was based solely on principles and possible courses of action which could be applied only in concrete cases of aggression and then only by governmental decisions following a United Nations recommendation, while the other was expressed in terms of military planning. As Mr. Pearson had already said at the 449th meeting, efforts to build defensive strength through collective action on a regional basis were only a second best forced on us by the dangers and fears of the international situation. Such a "second best" aimed at regional security, was the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Before the attack on Korea, when that treaty was not in existence

* Indicates the item number on the General Assembly Agenda.

collective security had been non-existent. The failure of the policy applied in the period from 1920 to 1930 had shown that collective security was essential if the world was to survive the dangers of the present epoch.

9. Those who believed that Canada was the satellite of any State were very much mistaken, as an examination of the Canadian delegation's votes in the Collective Measures Committee would readily show. Canada had more useful things to do than to prepare a war; but it was compelled by the lessons of experience to participate in the international effort to achieve collective security.

10. The obligation to work for the maintenance of peace was in any event stated as the first of the Charter's purposes, although its implementation had been prevented by certain of those who had solemnly signed the Charter.

11. The establishment of the Collective Measures Committee under the resolution 377 (V) entitled "Uniting for peace" was in line with this striving for security. In passing, it should be noted that, contrary to the Polish representative's supposition, the role of the Security Council would by no means be eliminated. It was only when the Security Council's operation was paralysed by the veto that its collective security functions would be partially assumed by the General Assembly, as was clearly shown by paragraph 18 and the end of paragraph 19 of the introduction to the report.

12. The Soviet Union delegation regarded the "Uniting for peace" resolution and also the entire work accomplished by the Collective Measures Committee as something unacceptable and illegal. It seemed strange, in those circumstances, that the USSR should have agreed to participate, as it had done in 1951, in the Peace Observation Commission, set up under the "Uniting for peace" resolution as an integral part of the machinery of collective measures.

13. If that view of the Soviet Union's attitude was inaccurate, and it was ready seriously to discuss an amendment to the Charter which would not leave the United Nations completely powerless in the face of aggression, there would be cause for satisfaction all round. But if such was not the case, the only recourse would seem to be to permit the General Assembly to act quite legally in cases where the Security Council found itself unable to do so.

14. In addition to that general obligation to enable the United Nations to fulfil its task, the Collective Measures Committee had invoked two other principles, which it had not itself formulated but which underlay the co-operative effort initiated under the Charter.

15. First, collective security had to be operated on a universal basis, both with respect to the methods employed and to the participation of States. The aim was not to establish security that was collective for all with the exception of one or another State. Nor was the aim to institute collective security action to be undertaken by a small group of States only, which alone would bear the burden of all.

16. Secondly, a collective security system had to be impartial. It should not be directed against one or more States, nor should it exclude any State. However, as the Brazilian representative had said, every State, by the very fact of participating in United Nations collective measures, tacitly undertook not to commit aggression itself. Such a concept perhaps made participation in the collective measures envisaged more difficult for some States than for others. Nevertheless, the door stood wide open to all, and if those who had thus far refused to share in the work

were to change their minds, their collaboration would be welcomed.

17. The Soviet Union had not always had its present negative attitude towards collective security. Thus, in 1930, Mr. Litvinov, as Soviet Union representative to the League of Nations, had been an ardent advocate of that very type of security. Like all other measures of that kind, Mr. Litvinov's proposals involved commitments to use force, if necessary, in order to prevent aggression. History showed that public opinion in the free countries so detested war that those countries were always reluctant to enter into undertakings involving the possible use of armed force, even though that was essential for the maintenance of peace. The abandonment by his own government of Mr. Litvinov's concept of collective security, and the partition of Poland which followed, had led the Soviet Union into the most cruel trial which it, or perhaps any other country, had ever had to endure. What would Mr. Litvinov have thought of the draft resolution submitted by the USSR to refer the study of collective measures to the exclusive authority of the Security Council, that is, to the discretion of any one of the great Powers?

18. Mr. Garson would not discuss further the draft resolution introduced by Mr. Vyshinsky at the 478th meeting. The proposal relating to Korea contained in its last part, of the operative part, would be better taken under item 4 or 5 of the First Committee's agenda. In addition, lest there be any room for misunderstanding, he explained that his delegation had no objection to the Security Council's deciding at any time to hold periodic meetings in order to discuss anything that seemed to it advisable. However the decision in the matter lay with the Security Council and with it alone.

19. Recalling the reasons which had impelled his delegation to give the most serious consideration to the problem of collective security by United Nations action, the representative of Canada said the aim was not to conspire against anybody, but, quite on the contrary, to check aggression in any form by the use of collective action. That object would be attained only by a combined effort, before a concrete situation developed, to consider the ways in which the governments represented in the United Nations could work together to halt any attempt at aggression which might occur.

20. In addition to the principles of universality and impartiality already mentioned, there existed another reason which had induced the Collective Measures Committee to keep its studies more or less general in character: detailed decisions were bound to vary with the circumstances. In any case, the General Assembly could do no more than recommend a line of action by Member States. It could not call upon them to act as could the Security Council. That meant that United Nations recommendations could become effective only by governmental action, and it was with governments that the final responsibility really lay.

21. That did not detract from the importance of the pioneer work done by the Committee, and the Canadian delegation was in favour of the Committee's continuing its work for another year.

22. It was to be noted that in actual fact the United Nations was ahead of the measure of agreement reached in the report. That was shown by the attitude adopted by the United Nations in the face of aggression in Korea, which proved that, even in a case where no prior agreement existed, the United Nations had been able, when faced

with a concrete situation, to go further than some Member governments had been willing to do when the question had arisen in an abstract form.

23. To those who feared a possible abuse of the collective measures which the United Nations might take, the best reply lay in a study of the very nature of democracy. To convince a democratic State of the need to think of its own safety and to accept the heavy burden of its own defence at the expense of plans for economic betterment had always been most difficult. If that burden, which was very severe for some, could be more widely and equitably shared, that should be done. Thanks to the democratic structure of the United Nations the proposed collective measures could not do otherwise than increase the Organization's contribution to solving the fundamental problem of security.

24. Mr. BEBLER (Yugoslavia) intimated that since his delegation was a co-sponsor of the draft resolution and one of the authors of the report of the Collective Measures Committee, he considered it his duty to present his Government's views on that subject.

25. Yugoslavia believed that in the present situation of the world, shaken as it was by expansionist, that is, aggressive tendencies, efforts were required to establish an effective system of collective security.

26. However, a system of collective security was in itself incapable of creating peace, although it could make an effective contribution to it; such a system was a warning to a potential aggressor of the international sanctions he would incur. Nevertheless, the first duty of the United Nations should be to reach a peaceful settlement of differences, by means of direct discussions between the parties involved, conciliation and mediation. The United Nations work on the mechanism of collective security should in no case be allowed to weaken its activity in the direction he had just indicated, nor its efforts at universality.

27. Efforts had been made to gain currency for the view that those two tasks, armed collective security and the peaceful composition of differences, were incompatible. That was by no means the case. The search for peaceful solutions itself demanded the creation of obstacles barring the way to aggressive tendencies. The two tasks were complementary and not contradictory.

28. Mr. Vyshinsky, the principal supporter of the view that the two were incompatible, had recently contended that the Collective Measures Committee was merely preparing an aggressive war against the Soviet Union. Instead of the collective security system now being developed, he offered his theory that an understanding between the great Powers must be the basis of world peace. It was however very hard to see how peace could be preserved on a basis that did not exist. The absence of any understanding between the great Powers did not mean however that the cause of peace was lost; it continued to be the basic responsibility of the United Nations.

29. There had been a time when Soviet diplomats represented by Mr. Litvinov, had defended collective security. Why did they now regard other principles, such as that of the right of veto, as more important? Whatever the answer might be, it was clear from the speeches heard that in the Soviet view the great Powers alone had the right to take decisions regarding the security of States. Thanks to the right of veto, they would be able to allow or not to allow a local war. They would even be able to engage in a war which suited their purpose and thus to control the destinies of the smaller nations.

30. The Soviet draft resolution proposing the convening of a periodic meeting of the Security Council had to be considered in the light of that obvious desire. He recalled that the Yugoslav delegation in February 1950 had itself proposed the convening of a meeting of the Security Council at which Member States would have been represented by their Ministers for Foreign Affairs. At that time, the Soviet delegation had not been in favour of the proposal; it was even refusing to attend the regular meetings of the Council and when, at the time of the aggression in Korea, the Council had been faced by the greatest problem in its history, the Soviet delegation had been absent. Later it had voted for the removal of the question of Korea from the Security Council's agenda. In the circumstances it was difficult to accept the suggestion that, in order to safeguard peace, mankind should pin its hopes on the Security Council alone, while the United Nations as a whole would simply cease to concern itself with the problems of collective security.

31. The Yugoslav delegation was convinced that the General Assembly had chosen the right course when it set up the Collective Measures Committee in 1950. The goal of a lasting peace would be secured by strengthening the democratic character of the United Nations and by the development of the solidarity of all peoples prepared to struggle against the danger of a new war by strengthening the collective security system.

32. The report did not put forward any rigid scheme. It was merely the provisional result of the study of the principal political, economic and military aspects of the collective security system. Inevitably, the delegations represented on the Committee had approached those problems from different angles. The differences of opinion which had been revealed had been reconciled by compromise solutions and the report thus represented a more or less successful synthesis of divergent conceptions. It followed that the point of view of no delegation had been embodied in full. Nevertheless, with all its weaknesses, the report was a real contribution to the development of an effective collective security system.

33. Noting some of the characteristics of the report, he pointed out that it was not based on definite experience of the past and still less on hypothetical future events. The overall plan was laid down in a general but not an abstract manner. The proposed system was strictly within the framework of the United Nations. In the event of collective military action, it was provided not only that the competent organ of the United Nations should determine the main objectives and collective policy but also that it should exercise its influence in each phase of the action. Collective military measures could be taken only when the Security Council or, failing the Council, the General Assembly had found that a breach of the peace existed. That attitude must be considered in the light of the resolution 378 (V) adopted, on the proposal of the Yugoslav delegation, by the General Assembly at its last session. That decision laid down the duties of States in the event of conflict and in particular their obligation to propose an immediate ceasefire. The attitude adopted by States in such a situation would provide a clear indication of the responsibility of each of them.

34. It was impossible to overstress the principle stated in paragraph 10 of the conclusions (Chapter V) of the report: "Above all, the success of any collective security effort depends upon the will and determination of individual States, which taken together constitute the organized strength of the international community of nations".

35. Finally, special attention had been devoted to the safeguarding of the rights of States directly interested in the conflict. The report specified that the immediate objective would be to assist the victim of aggression to defend its territorial integrity and political independence.

36. In spite of the labours of the Collective Measures Committee, many problems within its terms of reference remained to be dealt with. The Yugoslav delegation accordingly approved the proposal to continue the Committee for another year.

37. The joint draft resolution (A/C.1/676 Rev.1), of which Yugoslavia was one of the sponsors, was strictly within the framework of the Charter and of the General Assembly resolution 377 (V) entitled "Uniting for peace". The Yugoslav delegation believed that it would be adopted by a substantial majority.

38. Mr. QUEVEDO (Ecuador) recalled that at the fifth session of the Assembly at the time of the adoption of the resolution "Uniting for peace", his delegation, together with a number of others, had explained why that resolution was not a violation of the Charter. As the eleven-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/676/Rev.1) represented a first step in the implementation of resolution 377 (V), approved by the General Assembly at its fifth session, it would be sufficient to recall the arguments put forward at that time to prove that neither the report of the Collective Measures Committee nor the eleven-Power resolution was contrary to the Charter. Furthermore, neither of them conflicted with Chapter IV of the Charter, nor weakened the powers of the Security Council; they operated in cases where the Council failed to carry out its duty. It was therefore quite in order for the majority of Member States to want to build up an effective security system; they wanted to have an insurance policy against aggression. But they must know beforehand exactly what it would cost and, as it was a question of Assembly resolutions and Members respected their moral as well as their other obligations, they must know what those obligations were. They also wanted collective security to be effective, whenever and wherever aggression occurred or whatever State committed it.

39. The expansion of totalitarian régimes and the growth in military power of certain States in eastern Europe and Asia had made it essential to build up a collective security system designed for the constructive purposes of preserving peace, ensuring mutual defence and safeguarding the political independence and territorial integrity of States. His delegation supported the system because it had no aggressive intentions. Only States harbouring aggressive intentions could be hampered by the establishment of collective security measures.

40. Ecuador had always been of the opinion that a collective security system was necessary; that was why it had participated to the best of its ability in the common effort against aggression in Korea by despatching food supplies. It was obvious, however, that such a system must conform to the provisions of the Charter and of international treaties, especially regional treaties, and to the current legislation of participating States; it must also take into account the military and economic resources at the disposal of each Member State.

41. As regards obligations assumed under the Charter, his delegation thought that Chapter VII and Article 53 made those quite clear. Treaties concluded between the American Republics also defined the obligations of the parties with regard to collective security and territorial defence in that area of the world. As far as Ecuador was concerned, its constitution and laws likewise defined the requirements to be fulfilled by the Government when

assuming international commitments and carrying out certain kinds of military and economic action. Lastly, in March 1951, at the Fourth Meeting of Consultation of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American States, those States, of which Ecuador was one, had referred to the General Assembly resolution 377 (V) entitled "Uniting for peace", reiterated their faith in the United Nations and given their interpretation of their fundamental obligations in connexion with the maintenance of collective security.

42. The revised eleven-Power draft resolution did not impose any new obligations upon Members and further, that any new obligation arising subsequently as a consequence of the adoption of a system of collective security must first be examined by the different States in relation to their other obligations and their constitutional limitations and requirements. The contribution of the participants to the collective security system should also be made commensurate with their resources.

43. In the event of conflict, it was obvious that all States would have to face considerable economic difficulties. During the Second World War, Ecuador, along with other States, had accepted great economic sacrifices and had also contributed to paying for the war by fixing the prices of her raw materials and by certain agreements for the stabilization of foreign exchange. That proved that small countries should support the cause of peace and should make efforts to strengthen collective security, which was designed to prevent wars, because they stood to lose everything and gain nothing by a general war.

44. The planning of a system of collective measures gave rise to complex problems and required serious study. That was why the Committee should proceed with its work. It had already done much and reference should be made to its achievements when the time came for the Security Council or the General Assembly to put collective security into practice. He associated himself with speakers who had paid such a well-deserved tribute to Mr. Muniz, the Chairman of the Committee, and expressed the hope that the Committee's labours would be crowned with success.

45. His delegation would vote in favour of the revised eleven-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/676/Rev.1). It was especially glad that the amendments submitted by Chile, Colombia and Mexico (A/C.1/689) and the amendment put forward by the Arab States (A/C.1/690) had been accepted by the sponsors of the draft resolution. He wished to point out that an error in translation in the eighth paragraph of the preamble to the draft resolution gave the Spanish text a different sense from the English and French texts. The Spanish text corresponded to the amendment submitted by Chile, Colombia and Mexico. His delegation thought that the Spanish text was better and therefore proposed the deletion from the eighth paragraph of the preamble of the words "can and should".

46. It would also vote in favour of the amendment put forward by Colombia and Chile (A/C.1/692) to the effect that paragraph 6 of the operative part would be replaced, because that amendment expressed the ideas which his delegation had maintained in the General Assembly since 14 November 1951¹; it considered that the amendment brought out better the relationship between collective security and regional arrangements, did not misinterpret them, was more in accordance with their organization and nature and at the same time made it easier for each country to contribute to them.

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 344th meeting.

47. His delegation reserved the right to speak later in explanation of its position with regard to the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/688) and the amendments submitted by the Arab States (A/C.1/691) to that draft resolution and, if there were no further amendments, intended to ask for a vote on the USSR draft resolution paragraph by paragraph.

48. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) associated himself with previous speakers in paying tribute to the work of the Collective Measures Committee.

49. The United Nations had entrusted the Security Council with the chief responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. To that end, it had stipulated that the decisions of the Council must be taken by a majority of seven members including the five permanent members. Further, under Article 43 of the Charter, the Council was to organize an international armed force. Unfortunately those two conditions had not been fulfilled. Since that time, the division of the world into two blocs of States had been unhappily reflected in the United Nations.

50. There were two possible reactions to that state of affairs. The first would be a revision of the United Nations Charter. That had been impossible, because the five permanent members of the United Nations had opposed it. The second possible method would be the adoption of temporary measures until such time as agreement was reached by the great Powers. In that connexion it might be recalled that at the fifth session Iraq and Syria had proposed that the five permanent members should hold a meeting to settle their disputes. That proposal had been adopted unanimously, by the General Assembly (resolution 377 C [V]) but it had as yet produced no results. It still stood, however, and it would be well if the States concerned remembered it.

51. In the meanwhile, the General Assembly could not remain inactive, since the majority of Members were seeking to safeguard themselves by a collective security system, which was not intended to replace the system under which the Security Council took the leading part, but rather to function alongside that system if the Council were prevented from taking action. Articles 10 and 51 of the Charter authorized the Assembly to take such action.

52. It was true, as the USSR representative had pointed out, that the provisions of the Charter must not be violated. The establishment of the proposed system of collective security was not a violation of the provisions of the Charter, while resolution 181 (II) on the partition of Palestine adopted by the General Assembly in 1947 was a flagrant contravention of it. It was interesting to note that in his book *The Law of the United Nations* Professor Kelsen mentioned the contention of the representatives of Cuba, Iraq, Pakistan and Syria that the General Assembly was not competent to partition Palestine, and agreed that that contention was legally correct. His delegation had pointed out at the time that the partition of Palestine was a violation of Arab rights. When the resolution had been adopted, hundreds of thousands of Palestinian Arabs had been obliged to flee to escape the massacre organized in Palestine before the British mandate had expired.

53. At the previous meeting the delegation of Israel had accused the Arab States of following an aggressive and hostile policy. It was true that the Arab States were hostile to those who did not respect the most elementary rights of the Arabs in Palestine. The Arab States were opposed to aggression, not to justice, as the representative of Israel had tried to demonstrate. The latter had also alleged that the Arab League was not a regional body but had a racial and religious character. It was idle to

refute such an accusation. It was sufficient to note that the Arab League had been established before the United Nations and that its general purposes were the same. Its character was neither racial nor religious, since its membership included both Christians and Moslems. The State of Israel, on the other hand, was a racial and religious State, which practised discrimination even among the Jews themselves. Thus the *New York Times* of 20 November 1951 had reported that fifty Indian Jews were engaged in a sit-down strike at Tel Aviv in the hope of returning to India, because, amongst other reasons, they were being subjected to discrimination as "blacks". Contrary to the allegations of the delegate of Israel, the Egyptian troops in Palestine were not foreign troops, since they were protecting the Arabs from extermination; it was the troops of Israel, which consisted of Poles, Romanians and others, that had nothing in common with the inhabitants of Palestine. That was why his delegation would support the reservation made at a previous meeting by the representative of Lebanon, to the effect that his country could not in any way participate in a collective security system in which the State of Israel was also participating.

54. In view of the fact that the collective security measures proposed in the Collective Measures Committee's report were a palliative rather than a cure, and that the most essential point was to improve relations between States, to provide assistance to under-developed countries and to promote co-operation among peoples to help them to defend themselves, the delegation of Iraq would support the eleven-Power draft resolution, together with the amendment submitted by Chile, Colombia and Mexico (A/C.1/689). It was happy to see that the amendments which it had proposed jointly with the other Arab States (A/C.1/690) had been accepted by the sponsors of the draft resolution. His delegation had also submitted, jointly with other States, an amendment (A/C.1/691) to the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/688), since it thought that the Collective Measures Committee should be suspended for one year. It was not, however, opposed in principle to paragraph 2 of the USSR draft resolution.

55. The revised eleven-Power draft resolution was calculated to safeguard peace. Its implementation might well relax international tension. It should be added that the participation of the USSR in the proposed system would be the best guarantee of the maintenance of peace.

56. Mr. MUNOZ (Argentina) thought that the Collective Measures Committee had done good work and congratulated its chairman upon it.

57. The draft resolution (A/C.1/676/Rev.1), submitted by eleven of the fourteen members of the Committee, aimed at the creation of a system of collective security in accordance with the purposes of the United Nations Charter. The Argentine delegation would therefore vote in favour of paragraph 1 of its operative part, which took note of the report and conclusions of the Collective Measures Committee.

58. In the prevailing international climate, however, the Argentine delegation felt that paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the draft resolution placed too much emphasis on enforcement action and military sanctions. Despite the worthy intentions of the authors, those provisions might increase tension. In the spirit of its international and peace-loving traditions, Argentina had consistently endeavoured to settle its quarrels by pacific means. Thus its recent contribution to the United Nations effort in Korea had been in the form of shipments of food.

59. Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter dealt with collective action to combat aggression. It provided for stages and preliminary measures in an effort to stress the need to seek peaceful settlements. If aggression was to be put down quickly, it was unwise to define *a priori* how that was to be done for that would increase prevailing tension and add nothing new.

60. Contrary to what was claimed, it was not the absence of the USSR from the Security Council which had made possible United Nations collective action in Korea, but rather the prompt and resolute decision of another member of the Council, a decision which was justified in any case in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence and had enjoyed the moral support of the majority of Member States.

61. Sections A and B of the General Assembly resolution 377 A (V) entitled "Uniting for peace" which dealt respectively with calling the General Assembly into special session and the establishment of the Peace Observation Commission provided a satisfactory procedure for coping with the situation resulting from any future aggression.

62. When the Charter had been drawn up in San Francisco, it had been based on agreement among the five Great Powers. Subsequently, the abuse of the right of veto had led the small States to attempt to circumscribe that right. Their efforts had failed, so that in the present circumstances the great Powers bore a special responsibility for collective security. Accordingly, if it was true that the General Assembly was to seek additional methods, it was hard to admit Article 43 of the Charter could be invoked by analogy.

63. By virtue of the foregoing, the Argentine delegation would abstain in the vote on paragraphs 2 to 5 of the operative part of the eleven-Power draft resolution.

64. The Argentine delegation considered that paragraph 6 of the eleven-Power draft resolution was unnecessary because, in accordance with Article 52 of the Charter, regional arrangements dealt with matters susceptible of regional action, their object being the settlement of local disputes.

65. Paragraph 7 of the eleven-Power draft resolution was merely an invitation to non-Member States, for obligations

could not be imposed on States unless they were granted the corresponding rights.

66. The Argentine delegation would vote for paragraphs 8 and 9 of the draft resolution on the understanding that the Collective Measures Committee would take into account the discussions which had taken place in the First Committee. It would naturally vote for paragraph 10.

67. It reserved the right to explain its position on the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/688) and on the amendment submitted by the Arab States (A/C.1/691).

68. In connexion with section E of the resolution 377 (A) entitled "Uniting for peace", he observed that real peace could be brought about only by setting up a system of collective security and creating economic stability and social progress throughout the world.

69. Mr. RAFAEL (Israel), speaking on a point of order, remarked that several representatives of Arab countries had alluded to the Palestine problem in the course of the discussion. In order not to interrupt the proper conduct of the business of the First Committee, the Israel delegation intended to reply to those remarks and more particularly to the provocative statements of the representative of Iraq during the debate on the Palestine question in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee. He reminded the representative of Iraq, however, that Israel had recently taken in 100,000 Iraqi Jews who had been the victims of discrimination in their country of origin. He hoped that the Arab States would receive in the same way the Arab refugees who had left Israel as a result of Arab aggression.

70. Mr. C. MALIK (Lebanon) noted that the representative of Israel had not raised a point of order but had given a reply. He was surprised that the Chairman had not interrupted him.

71. The CHAIRMAN agreed with the representative of Lebanon that the Israel representative's statement had not been, strictly speaking, a point of order. He had not objected, however, because he had felt it was useful to clarify the point in order to forestall any reference to the Palestine question in the Committee's discussion.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.