

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND SIXTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 4 April 1985, at 10.30 a.m.

President:

Mr. K. Vidas

(Yugoslavia)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. B. OULD-ROUIS
Mr. A. BELAID
Mr. H. RABEHI

Argentina: Mr. R. GARCIA MORITAN

Australia: Mr. R. BUTLER
Mr. R. ROWE
Ms. J. COURTNEY
Ms. S. FREEMAN

Belgium: Mr. M. DEPASSE

Brazil: Mr. C.A. de SOUZA e SILVA
Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. K. TELLALOV
Mr. V. BOJILOV
Mr. H. HALATCHEV
Mr. R. DEYANOV
Mr. P. POPTCHEV
Mr. N. MIKHAILOV

Burma: U MAUNG MAUNG GYI
U HLA MYINT

Canada: Mr. A. BEESLEY
Mr. R. ROCHON

China: Mr. QIAN JIADONG
Ms. WANG ZHIYUN
Mr. LIU ZHONGREN
Mr. SHI JICHENG
Mr. SHI JINKUN
Mr. LIN CHENG
Mr. PAN JUSHENG
Mr. YU ZHONGZHOU
Mr. LI BENSONG

Cuba: Mr. C. LECHUGA HEVIA
Mr. P. NUNEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia: Mr. M. VEJVODA
Mr. A. CIMA
Mr. J. BAJGAR

Egypt: Mr. M. BADR
Mr. F. MONIB

Ethiopia: Mr. F. YOHANNES

France: Mr. F. de la GORCE
Mr. H. RENIE

German Democratic Republic: Mr. H. ROSE
Mr. W. KRUTZSCH
Mr. L. MUELLER
Mr. F. SAYATZ

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. H. WEGENER
Mr. M. GERDTS
Mr. W-N. GERMANN

Hungary: Mr. F. GAJDA
Mr. T. TOTH

India: Mr. M. DUBEY
Mr. S. KANT SHARMA
Mr. J. PRASAD

Indonesia: Mr. S. SUTOWARDOYO
Mr. F. QASIM

Islamic Republic of Iran: Mr. N. KAZEMI KAMYAB
Mr. F.S. SIRJANI

Italy: Mr. M. ALESSI
Mr. F. PIAGGESI
Mr. M. PAVESE
Mr. R. DI CARLO

Japan: Mr. R. IMAI
Mr. T. KAWAKITA
Mr. M. SATO
Mr. T. ISHIGURI
Mr. I. AKIYAMA

Kenya: Mr. P.N. MWAURA

Mexico: Mr. P. MACEDO RIBA

Mongolia: Mr. S-O. BOLD

Morocco: Mr. O. HILALE

Netherlands: Mr. R.W. VAN SCHAIK
Mr. R.J. AKKERMAN
Mr. J. RAMAKER

Nigeria: Mr. O.O. GEORGE
Mr. C.V. UDEDIBIA

Pakistan: Mr. M. AHMAD

Peru: Mr. J. GONZALES TERRONES

Poland: Mr. S. TURBANSKI
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ
Mr. J. RYCHLAK

Romania: Mr. P. BALOIU
Mr. A. POPESCU

Sri Lanka: Mr. J. DHANAPALA
Mr. P. KARIYAWASAM

Sweden: Mr. R. EKEUS
Mr. L-E. WINGREN
Mrs. E. BONNIER
Mr. H. BERGLUND
Mrs. A.M. LAU

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. A.M. SHMATOV
Mr. L.A. NAUMOV
Mr. A.N. KASHIRIN
Mr. G.V. BERDENNIKOV
Mr. I.N. SCHERBAK
Mr. E.N. GOLOVKO
Mr. A.P. KOUTEPOV
Mr. O.V. KUZMIN

United Kingdom:

Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE
Mr. R.J.S. EDIS
Mr. D.A. SLINN
Mr. J.F. GORDON

United States of America:

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Mr. B. MORTON

Venezuela:

Mr. E. TER HORST
Mr. O. GARCIA

Yugoslavia:

Mr. K. VIDAS
Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC
Ms. D. STEPANOVIC
Mr. D. MINIE

Zaire:

Mr. O. MONSHEMVULA

Chairman, Ad Hoc Group of Scientific
Experts to Consider International
Co-operative Measures to Detect
and Identify Seismic Events:

Mr. O. DAHIMAN

Secretary-General of the Conference on
Disarmament and Personal
Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. M. KOMATINA

Deputy Secretary-General of the
Conference on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 306th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

The Conference continues today its consideration of item 4 of its agenda, entitled "Chemical Weapons". However, in conformity with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

In accordance with the calendar of meetings to be held during this week, the Conference should hold today an informal meeting to consider some pending questions. We have received a request from a non-member to participate in the work of the Conference. That request has been circulated today by the secretariat and we should take it up at the informal meeting. You will also recall that a number of non-members, already invited to participate in our work, had indicated their interest in following the work of the Ad Hoc Committee just established under item 5 on the agenda, in the event that it would be set up. The relevant draft decisions will be made available by the secretariat for consideration shortly.

We shall also consider today the appointment of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons.

The Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events will also introduce the Progress Report of the Group, as contained in document CD/583. I hope that members wishing to comment on that Report will do so at an early stage, since we will need to adopt the recommendation contained in it with regard to the dates for the next session of the Ad Hoc Group, envisaged between 15-19 July 1985. I intend to put before the Conference that recommendation at our plenary meeting on Thursday, 11 April.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Czechoslovakia, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, India and Canada. Also inscribed to speak is the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, and the representatives of the United States of America and Japan.

I now give the floor to the representative of Czechoslovakia, Ambassador Vejvoda.

Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia): Mr. President, I welcome you, the representative of socialist Yugoslavia, with which my country has been bound for years in brotherly friendship relations, to the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for the closing month of the spring part of our session. I wish you luck in solving the remaining organizational questions and, as co-ordinator of the group of socialist countries for the month, I pledge you the full support of the socialist countries in your endeavour. Your predecessor, Ambassador Taylhardat of Venezuela, has already left Geneva, but we will remember his skilful efforts which enabled us to establish the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space during his tenure.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

The problem of non-militarization of outer space is precisely the item on which I am going to speak today. Like many speakers before me, I would also like to stress the urgency and importance we attach to this question. It is indeed one of the central issues of disarmament talks, which was fully confirmed by the relevant United Nations General Assembly resolution. We therefore welcome the fact that the prevention of an arms race in outer space has also been included on the agenda of the bilateral Soviet-American talks which started a couple of weeks ago in this city. Our approach to this question is determined by the fact, that in recent years sharply increased the real danger of various systems of space weapons leading to the saturation of outer space with weapons capable of destroying objects both in outer space and on the Earth.

Ever since this item was inscribed on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament we supported the idea that this Conference should start negotiations on specific measures which would effectively prevent the spread of an arms race into space. For this reason we have always supported and, together with other socialist countries, proposed the establishment of an ad hoc committee with an appropriate, negotiating mandate. We continue to maintain that a subsidiary body with such a mandate could most effectively deal with the problem in question.

Last Friday we finally established the Ad Hoc Committee for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The mandate it was accorded is not considered completely satisfactory by the group of socialist countries or by the Group of 21. But in order to explore all possibilities to move forward these two groups again, and not for the first time, demonstrated a constructive and flexible approach. We would like to hope that if all delegations displayed a similar attitude, the work of the Ad Hoc Committee could bring some positive results.

The specific contents and programme of the Ad Hoc Committee's work will, certainly, have to be agreed by all participants. But it seems quite obvious that to some extent we will have to continue the same type of activity we have been engaged in for some time in the plenary. Indeed, going through the records one finds a great number of statements evaluating the existing treaties which put certain barriers to the spread of arms into space. One could conclude that a general concordance of views was achieved on what the positive aspects of these treaties are. Existing loopholes were also pointed out. We welcome the fact that practically all statements agree that further measures are necessary.

We would not think that the adopted mandate calls on us to simply point out abstractly what has not been covered by the existing instruments. It would be appropriate to look, albeit preliminary, at what would be the most suitable way of solving the remaining problems. As an example I could give the question of the prohibition of the use of force against targets in space and from space against the Earth. None of the existing treaties contains a comprehensive prohibition of the use of force which we, and hopefully others as well, consider desirable. Should we

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then limit ourselves to simply discovering this fact? We can do better by also examining what would be the best way, in view of the existing treaties, to put an effective ban on the use of force in the relevant field.

In accordance with the adopted mandate the Ad Hoc Committee should pay due attention to the existing proposals related to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. In this connection my delegation would like to stress the importance it attaches to the Soviet draft treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from space against the Earth submitted to the thirty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly and last year to the Conference on Disarmament as document CD/476. Its provisions suggest a feasible and comprehensive solution to the problem of the use of force in outer space and from space against the Earth. It proposes to prohibit the testing, deployment or use of any space-based weapons for the destruction of objects on the Earth, in the atmosphere or in outer space, and to avoid interference with space objects of other States. It also contains provisions for not testing or creating new anti-satellite systems and destroying any existing anti-satellite systems, as well as not testing or using manned spacecraft for military, including anti-satellite, purposes.

Some confidence-building measures have also been proposed, for example, by France. My delegation would be willing to look at them in the Ad Hoc Committee. But we consider that confidence-building measures in each field should assist the relevant legal instruments. Thus, more specific consideration of confidence-building will be possible as we move towards a more structured discussion on possible new agreements related to outer space.

The Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space should not delay unduly the commencement of its substantive work. We can hardly expect much to be achieved during the spring part of the session. But at least the organizational framework of the Committee's work should be set up so that we do not have to lose much time on the procedure in summer.

In connection with the efforts to prevent the militarization of outer space, time is indeed a decisive factor. In view of the fast development of space technology it may well happen that several years from now we shall be speaking not about the prevention but about the cessation of the arms race in outer space. We would prefer very much to avoid such a modification of one of our priority items. A large number of delegations expressed serious concern in view of the so-called Strategic Defence Initiative of the United States. We fully share this concern. Let me stress that we do not evaluate developments in the arms build-up by declared intentions and even less by the outright distortion of facts. Rather, we evaluate objectively their possible consequences. Ambassador Lowitz in his statement of 19 March tries to convince us that the SDI will not only bring no harm to international security, but will contribute to the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons

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everywhere. However, we cannot by any stretch of imagination share his conclusion. The problem is that we do not see the SDI in terms of the "open floodgates of creativity" but in the real world and in relation to the whole panoply of the American offensive potential.

The Defence Minister of France, Charles Hernu, at the Defence Seminar in Munich, said, that, "the strongest probability is still that the deployment of defensive systems would relaunch an offensive arms race". The United States is very quick in its "response" to its own defensive programme. It is not relying only on the existing offensive arms, but it is building new offensive arms such as MX missiles, Trident-2 and cruise missiles with a high strike accuracy. And still newer and even more penetrating offensive weapons are planned. Funds will be sharply increased for the so-called Advanced Strategic Missile Systems programme. Its aim is to render impossible defence against the United States nuclear missiles through the use of advanced decoys, zig-zagging warheads and other devices. This programme fully supports the conclusion of many military experts that, as defensive systems are developed, offensive systems will be developed to circumvent them. Funds are increased regularly for these new, more penetrating offensive weapons. This fiscal year they were accorded 98 million dollars, next fiscal year it will be 174 million and still the following year 216 million dollars. Most of the increase would be used for advanced "penetration aids" to help United States missiles reach their targets. Whatever may be the declared intentions, there is only one objective conclusion: one cannot build defensive systems and at the same time expect a reduction in offensive weapons.

It is not entirely unjustified that the SDI is commonly referred to as "Star Wars" concept. Though it may fulfil some defensive functions, its main impact and consequence is of an aggressive nature. The real danger of this approach is that although the SDI cannot be regarded as an effective means against a massive first strike, it may create illusions about possible defence against retaliatory strike. Since military experts in Pentagon must also be aware of this, missile defence will most probably encourage first-strike strategic policies.

While investing billions of dollars in the SDI, United States officials keep on asserting that it is limited only to research. But one has to wonder where the research starts and where it ends. The idea of strategic defence did not appear in March 1983. According to Rocketdyne's Vice-President of advanced programmes, R.D. Paster, "Rocketdyne has been involved in technology in that area for over 10 years". One cannot see in isolation the accelerated efforts to develop and put into practice laser and other directed energy weapons which were not only studied, but tested as well. In May and June 1983 the United States Air Force tested a laser weapon. At a test site in California, placed on board a C-135 aircraft, it succeeded in destroying navigational systems of five Sidewinder anti-aircraft missiles. On 10 June last year, at an altitude of 160 km above the Pacific, an ICBM warhead was intercepted, for the first time, by a missile. Did this test have no relation to the SDI programme whatsoever?

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In defending the need for the SDI, United States officials argue that the Soviet Union is devoting large resources to its own defensive programmes. But as we all know such United States estimates are usually highly overestimated, as was the case, confirmed even by authoritative American sources, with the so-called "window of vulnerability" that Trident-2 and cruise missiles were designed to overcome. It would be interesting to know the ratio of this overestimation "Made in the USA" justifying the need for the SDI.

There are many other disquieting aspects of this programme. One of them is the inevitable extensive computerization. Finally, the defensive response would be out of human hands. According to military experts, the response would be activated by computer before the United States commanders even knew that something happened, which might easily be an error of the computer system.

Much has been said in the United States about the non-nuclear nature of the strategic defence programme. We have heard these words. But will they not be forgotten if, as one may suppose, American researchers come to the conclusion that X-ray lasers are most suitable for the purpose of the system while other options are less adequate? Where is the guarantee that eventually hundreds of atomic bombs would not be stationed in low orbit over the Soviet Union or any other country? We consider that the best guarantee would be not to develop a system which may once bring such a temptation to military planners.

As often happens in some western countries, political considerations and genuine security needs are not the only criteria for deciding on military programmes. The military-industrial complex with its own interests, having nothing in common with the vital interests of the peoples of western countries, also has its say. In the case of the SDI its representatives are well-known. They are Rockwell International Corp., TRW Corp., and Boeing Corp., working on lasers; Grumman Corp., dealing with the space-based radars; Martin Marietta Corp., with its vintage missile interceptors; and the computer companies, IBM and Honeywell and many others. All these companies know only too well that the readiness of the United States Government to spend tens of billions of dollars on the SDI just in the next few years will bring them huge profits. They are not concerned with the possible tragic consequences of their activity. But the international community, and all realistic and responsible politicians, cannot afford this "luxury". We expect the Conference on Disarmament, as a multilateral body on disarmament negotiations, to bring its contribution to the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Czechoslovakia for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President, and I give now the floor to the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Issraelyan.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian):
Mr. Chairman, first of all, allow me to address you as Comrade Chairman. The fact is that already in the days of Karl Marx communists of all countries, regardless of their nationality, addressed each other as comrade. The Soviet delegation takes particular pleasure in welcoming you, the representative of the friendly Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. I think that it is deeply symbolic that today, on the threshold of the fortieth anniversary of the victory over fascism, the work of the Conference on Disarmament is being directed by the representative of a country that made a significant contribution to achieving that historical victory. Throughout the war the peoples of Yugoslavia and the peoples of the Soviet Union fought heroically against the aggressors and paid a very high price for their freedom. I wish to greet you, Comrade President, as a participant in the heroic struggle of Yugoslavia for national independence against the fascist occupiers. This is particularly gratifying to me as a person who took part in the Great Patriotic War. I wish you success in the performance of your responsible duties and hope that under your leadership it will be possible to move forward in the work of the Conference on Disarmament.

Today, we wish to consider in detail the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons, which has a special place in the work of the Conference on Disarmament. World-wide public opinion expects the Conference to resolve this issue as early as possible. The activities of the Conference on Disarmament are ever more closely associated in the minds of many with the chemical weapons negotiations. No one would deny that much has been done in this area over the past years. The beginning of intensive negotiations this year on banning chemical weapons under the guidance of the Committee Chairman Ambassador Stanislaw Turbanski is also a source of satisfaction.

Nevertheless, we remain concerned at the slow pace of the negotiations. The talks continue year after year and there are still no tangible results, no radical breakthrough. Some of the parties, as if frightened by the possibility of the negotiations being successfully completed and the convention signed, come out from time to time with deliberately unacceptable and, I would say, extremist proposals.

In spite of all these serious complications resulting from the position of certain parties, the Soviet Union still believes in the possibility of solving this urgent problem and continues to make efforts towards concluding a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons on terms acceptable to all the negotiating parties.

For more than half a century, ever since the signing of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, and up to the present day, the Soviet Union has been following a consistent, unswerving course aimed at drawing up and signing a convention which would ban chemical weapons completely and for all time while posing no risks to the security, economic or any other interests of any State taking part in the negotiations.

It may be of some interest to the members of this Conference that as early as 1928 the Soviet delegation to the Preparatory Commission for the General Conference on Disarmament introduced a proposal to supplement the 1925 Geneva Protocol with a new one containing, in particular, the following provisions: all the means and devices serving the purposes of chemical warfare, namely all asphyxiating gases used for military purposes as well as all devices for the diffusion of such gases, in particular gas-throwers, spray devices, balloons, flame-throwers and other devices in service with troops, as well as stored in depots or in the process of production, were to be destroyed. Furthermore, it was proposed that industrial facilities producing chemical weapons should immediately stop their production.

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Had those proposals of the Soviet Union been accepted by the other parties to the negotiations, chemical weapons would have long since been eliminated and there would be no need for the difficult and protracted discussions we are presently engaged in on this issue.

What is today the main obstacle, the main hindrance to the progress of chemical-weapon negotiations? Apparently, the continuing efforts by some of the parties to impose their own approaches and their own selfish perceptions on others. This attitude is utterly unsound. We are convinced that in the search for mutually acceptable solutions, in particular to key problems, one should bear in mind the specific political, economic and defence interests of each party, as well as remember the historical experience of every nation and people. I wish particularly to stress this. Some, and namely the Soviet Union, which has lost dozens of millions of lives as a result of foreign intervention and aggression, have been taught by the hard experience of their history to be especially cautious about various proposals calling for "openness", "publicity", unlimited verification and other dubious ideas. Meanwhile others, who have not had to go through the same ordeals as our people has, are proceeding mainly from the "experience" of petty suspicions, trumped up and blown out of all proportion by their own propaganda.

We were recently told in this chamber that, and I quote, "anyone with nothing to hide can agree to specific verification measures". This is probably true, provided that the one applying such measures acts in good faith and without ulterior motives. But given our historical experience, can we rest assured that such will always be the case?

The distinctive feature of Soviet proposals is precisely that we are not trying to force on others provisions which might impair their national security or inhibit their economy. Let us look, for instance, at the Soviet Union's approach to the question of chemicals used for permitted purposes.

This approach would spare the civilian, commercial chemical industry the considerable burden of intrusive outside verification procedures which would otherwise have extended virtually to each individual enterprise. At the same time, for the purposes of the convention, we feel obliged to propose several specific restrictions on the operations of chemical industries. We are suggesting that the production of supertoxic lethal chemicals should be restricted, as well as that of one particular class of substances which poses the greatest threat while having almost no peaceful uses -- namely the methyl-phosphorus compounds. Such restrictions could not do any significant damage to any party to the future convention. We would like to recall in this connection that limitations on the production of certain chemicals are not completely unusual. It is common knowledge that pesticides are not nearly as dangerous to humans as are supertoxic lethal chemicals. Yet the production of some pesticides is actually subject to definite restrictions.

Indeed, do the peaceful branches of chemical industry in fact depend on supertoxic lethal chemicals as greatly as is sometimes portrayed by certain delegations? Would it not be wiser to consider including in the convention a provision allowing for such amendments with regard to supertoxic lethal chemicals and methyl-phosphorus compounds as may be required in view of scientific and technological developments and industrial needs in the future?

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The other approach, which is not ours, is that of extending verification to all chemical industries, which would, in our view, be unpracticable and could most adversely affect the economic activities of States.

This has been only further proved to us by the Working Papers of the United Kingdom (CD/514 and CD/575) which reveal under close scrutiny that their authors would like to make hundreds and even thousands of different chemicals subject to all kinds of rigorous monitoring, which would be all-embracing rather than focused on the most dangerous technological stages of production. Now is this actually feasible?

One might properly ask what would be less burdening for the chemical industry -- a certain number of reasonable restrictions or an expensive across-the-board monitoring whose implications for the economic and other interests of States might prove to be far from benign?

Another question which demands a very cautious, balanced and responsible approach is that of the elimination, dismantling or conversion of chemical-weapon production facilities. Everyone will probably agree that toxic chemicals, including ones intended for chemical-weapon purposes, are obtained in the chemical industry as a result of several production stages, each having a different technological set up. One of these is the final technological stage in the production of supertoxic lethal chemicals or key components of binary systems. What, then, should be the object of practical interest from the viewpoint of drawing up the convention? Should the entire facility be eliminated, or would it be more appropriate to eliminate only the part responsible for the final technological stage? The answer to this seems obvious.

The reluctance of certain negotiating parties to accommodate the positions of others and the desire to impose one's own unilateral approach explain why the question of destroying chemical-weapon stockpiles has not yet been resolved at the negotiations. The main thing that remains to be done here is, in our view, to agree on a procedure for destroying the stockpiles of chemical weapons that would not offer unilateral military advantages to anyone at any stage of the destruction. We are prepared to examine all kinds of proposals submitted during the negotiations, including the working proposal by one of the delegations to alternate the destruction of the more dangerous weapon stockpiles with that of less dangerous weapons, thereby taking account of such factors as the increase in mutual trust between States as stocks are destroyed, the capacity maintained during that time for adequate reaction to possible convention violations by parties or non-parties, and so forth.

Throughout the long history of international negotiations, the partners in any talks have first established agreed baselines and criteria and only then proceeded to formulating specific definitions on their basis. This has also been the case with the talks on banning chemical weapons. Toxicity criteria have been defined with utmost precision on the basis of objective factors, a tentative

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definition of key precursors has been provided, work has been done on certain other provisions of the future convention. And now after several years of strenuous negotiating efforts, it is suggested that we should give up objective criteria and replace them with such purely subjective categories as, for example, the notion of "risk" presented by various chemicals. I repeat, this is a subjective concept. It will mean one thing to one State and something else to another State. And it will certainly be very hard to reach agreement on this basis. This kind of approach actually turns the question of key precursors upside down. It is our firm conviction that the first thing to do is to define the criteria and have them agreed upon, and only then, based on those criteria, should a list of key precursors be drawn up. We believe that a technical solution to this problem has already evolved and that it should now be set out as a draft clause for the future convention.

This would open the way to drawing up the list of key precursors as such. Arguments to the effect that certain individual precursors may fail to meet all the established criteria do not stand up to criticism. We presume that exceptions to the general rule, where they are truly necessary, could be dealt with under the convention. Recently we were offered a "new" approach, presented as an important "concession", according to which criteria would be formulated parallel to the drawing up of lists. But this takes us nowhere. The question of criteria will arise whenever another key precursor is added to the list. Therefore criteria should be defined and agreed upon in advance.

The question of the key precursors that can be used to produce binary chemical weapons is of course a separate one. The Soviet delegation suggests that for the purposes of the convention such key precursors be referred to as key components of binary chemical systems, since not all key precursors are suitable for that role in view of the particular thermodynamic requirements of a binary system.

During the negotiations some delegations suggest totally different régimes to be adopted for the very same chemicals. While for protective purposes supertoxic lethal chemicals could be produced only at a small-scale specialized facility in quantities up to one tonne per year and subject to the most stringent international control, their production for other permitted purposes would be allowed anywhere and in unlimited quantities. A convention based on such proposals, while eliminating the present industrial base for chemical-weapons production, could end up establishing all the prerequisites for the creation of a new, more advanced and sophisticated one. We cannot accept such a double standard for ensuring the non-production of chemical weapons. This must not be allowed. The Soviet delegation believes that a study of Finland's proposal on possible versions of the small-scale facility could be of some use in dealing with this issue.

Proposals from other delegations aimed at finding mutually acceptable solutions receive our careful consideration. This applies in particular to the proposals of France concerning the production of supertoxic lethal chemicals, classification of facilities and determination of their respective régimes, and solution of the binary weapons problem, as well as proposals by the delegation of China and by other delegations.

The elaboration of principles and arrangements for challenge inspection to clarify ambiguous situations has been and remains one of our most formidable tasks. No one is suggesting, as the United States delegation is trying to make it appear, that challenge inspection should not be conducted unless there is a proved violation

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of the convention. At least this is not our position. What we do believe is that challenge inspection requires a particular sense of responsibility and political realism on the part of States. It must be understood that compliance with the convention will be based primarily on the goodwill of the States parties to it, on their wish for a peaceful world less burdened by arms race, and on their desire to eliminate the very means of waging chemical war. It will also be based on the fact that States, which usually set a high value on their political prestige, will not allow it to be damaged through their own fault.

This is the only approach that can help us place challenge inspection in a proper perspective within the convention and correctly formulate the relevant provisions without eroding the very purpose of such inspection or undermining the sovereign rights of States. It should be well understood in Washington that efforts to make challenge inspection mandatory and automatic will only waste our time in working out the convention. Our response to such proposals is unambiguously negative.

In this connection I would like to make the following point of principle which does not concern only the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. As is well known, the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament indicates that the form and the terms of verification provided for in any particular agreement depend on the purposes, the scope and the nature of that agreement. Applied to the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons which is now being drawn up, this obviously means that the form and the terms of verification must be such as to reliably ascertain whether the convention is being complied with, on the one hand, and not to go beyond its scope, on the other. Hence we cannot but object to forms of verification that could be used for purposes beyond those of the convention.

Prohibition of chemical weapons by no means requires such things as providing access to facilities which produce the types of weapons not affected by the agreement in question. It is therefore only natural that if we are to approach the task of banning chemical weapons seriously, verification procedures have to be drawn up that could not be abused to interfere in the activities of States not covered by the convention which bans one specific type of weapon of mass destruction.

We have repeatedly emphasized that general and complete verification can be discussed only at the stage of general and complete disarmament, whereas attempts to impose general and complete verification as part of a limited agreement banning one specific, although important, type of weapon of mass destruction -- namely chemical weapons -- is to raise artificial obstacles in the way of working out such an agreement.

In conclusion I would like to reiterate that the Soviet delegation stands ready to continue serious and constructive negotiations with a view to the earliest conclusion of a convention banning chemical weapons. As is well known, we were among those who advanced the proposal to make a more rational use of our time for negotiations and we remain firmly committed to the Conference decision or recommendation at its previous session to hold an extended session of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons in the autumn of 1985.

For the USSR, the prohibition of chemical weapons has been and remains a priority task set out in the most important documents of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and of the Soviet Government. The Soviet delegation will do everything in its power to solve this task as rapidly as possible.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

I now give the floor to the representative of India, Ambassador Dubey.

Mr. DUBEY (India): Mr. President, please allow me, at the outset, to express the sincere gratification of my delegation in seeing you preside over the work of the Conference on Disarmament during this month of April. Yugoslavia and India have enjoyed the closest and friendliest of relations in the comity of nations. The relations between our two countries have been reinforced and imparted a new dimension in no small measure by our deep involvement in and abiding commitment to the objectives of the Non-Aligned Movement. Our Movement has attached great importance to the objective of disarmament, with special emphasis on the urgent task of preventing nuclear war and halting the nuclear arms race. Yugoslavia's contributions to the principles and objectives of the Non-Aligned Movement, including that of disarmament, are well known. With you at the helms of affairs, we expect the Conference on Disarmament to make significant progress in its work during this month. We have great confidence in your outstanding abilities as a diplomat and long and rich experience in multilateral negotiations. I would like to assure you of the fullest co-operation of the Indian delegation in the performance of the duties of your high office.

I would also like to avail of this opportunity to express the sincere appreciation of my delegation for the work done by your predecessor, Ambassador Adolfo Taylhardat of Venezuela. There could not have been a better tribute to the success of his presidency than the fact that his closing address at the Conference followed a decision to set up, for the first time, an Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space.

I shall devote my statement today to item 3 of the agenda of the Conference, that is, Prevention of Nuclear War. A number of important statements have been made on this agenda item during the past few weeks. Some of the statements, particularly from the distinguished representatives of Western countries, deserve our commendation for the candour with which their authors presented the points of view of their Governments on this crucial question. It is a different matter that we do not share these views which are generally the reiteration of their past rigid positions. For example, we have been told once again about the importance that they attach to the doctrine of nuclear deterrence for ensuring their national security and preserving world peace. We have also heard that the issue of the prevention of nuclear war cannot be discussed in isolation from that of prevention of war in general.

These and other arguments advanced by these representatives have remained unaltered in spite of some of the recent developments of crucial significance, such as the almost universal endorsement, including by the Governments of these countries, of the findings on nuclear winter and the admission, at the highest policy-making levels in some of these countries, of the fact that deterrence based on offensive nuclear weapons is neither viable nor desirable and, therefore, needs to be either bolstered up or replaced by the development of defensive weapons. It is also a sad fact that while these arguments are being advanced, the question of taking urgent effective action for averting the threat of the extinction of the human race remains by and large unattended.

The whole problem has become intractable because of the incompatibility between the basic character of the present-day nuclear arsenals as doomsday machines and their wrongly perceived utility in the eyes of those who possess them as a means of maintaining what is referred to as "stable peace and international security". It is needless to say that the vast majority of mankind and nations of the world,

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as many as 130 or so are totally unable to see this utility and are often bewildered when this aspect of the nuclear arsenals is sought to be driven home. These nations, and the millions of citizens in the nuclear-weapon States themselves, are able only to see how inexorably the escalating nuclear-arms race fuelled by this faith in the utility of nuclear weapons has brought the world to the brink of a nuclear catastrophe.

The persistent refusal of some nuclear-weapon Powers to deal with the threat of a nuclear war unless all wars can be stopped, implies a threat to the world that it will be policed with the ultimate weapon of terror. It is a warning to all countries of the world to stop their quarrels if they want to avert the nuclear threat and survive. This is also a remarkably ingenious way of formulating the problem in such a way that its mere formulation succeeds in disposing of it without imposing any obligations for solving it.

With its indomitable will to live and enrich life, mankind has survived, through the millennia, many wars. Wars, want and privation are no stranger to human history. What is frightening is the threat implicit in the security doctrine of these nuclear-weapon States that they retain the option to destroy the whole world if other nations do not eliminate conflicts and tensions. We have not, of course, been able to create a harmonious and tension-free world, for which efforts must continue. But to say, as is implicit in the strategy of nuclear deterrence, that disharmony, tension and conflicts can ultimately lead to global annihilation, is indeed frightening, to say the least.

There is no doubt that all of us here are against all wars -- conventional or nuclear. So far as India is concerned, nothing is more repugnant to our national ethos and tradition than nations waging war against each other. It was one of our kings, Ashoka, who as early as the fourth century B.C., gave up warfare as a means of statecraft or foreign policy.

However, to say that the question of the prevention of nuclear war cannot be discussed without discussing conventional wars does not reflect a serious approach to dealing with this critical issue on our agenda. If we carry this insistence to its logical conclusion, then we would not be sitting in this Conference and discussing separately -- without bringing in the consideration of all wars and the fundamental motives and causes of wars -- the subject of banning chemical weapons or radiological weapons. We, therefore, cannot avoid the conclusion that this insistence to lump all wars together or to talk about the prevention of all wars under the heading "prevention of nuclear war" is simply a means of diverting attention from the threat of nuclear war.

The attitude which seeks to lump conventional and nuclear wars together is an extension to our present times of crisis posed by the threat of nuclear war, of the military doctrines prevailing before the advent of nuclear weapons. The doctrine of nuclear deterrence espoused by the nuclear-weapon States is a carry-over of the war-winning strategies of the previous hundred years or so followed by the industrialized countries of the North. Clausewitz has defined this war-winning strategy as a pursuit of prowess by endlessly escalating war, through the application of science and technology, until final victory comes. This strategy was followed right through the Second World War. The bombing of civilians during the war, in London and in other towns of the United Kingdom and the retaliation on a far greater scale by the bombing of Hamburg, Dresden and other German cities, were the latest examples before the advent of nuclear weapons, of the pursuit of this goal of victory through escalation.

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What has brought us to the present predicament of imminent threat of nuclear holocaust, is that there has been no change in this war-winning strategy even after the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States. On the subjective side, the same military strategy has continued; but on the objective side, the very advent of nuclear weapons has radically transformed the nature of war. Thus, since 1945, an apocalyptical discontinuity has developed between the professed intentions of military strategists and the objective reality of their weapon performance. To cite just one example of this discontinuity, it is well known that when the first atom bombs were dropped over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, no one had known that they could kill also by radiation. More recently, when the consequences of nuclear war were considered, only the effects of blast, heat, immediate and prolonged radiation effects and depletion of the ozone layer that protects earth from excessive ultra-violet radiation were taken into account. But the effects on climate of hundreds of millions of tons of dust and soot that would be produced by thousands of explosions were overlooked. The latter factor was taken into account only in the nuclear-winter findings which, in the beginning, provoked scepticism and utter disbelief among the policy-makers of some of the nuclear-weapon States and their allies and subsequently a vociferous rejection of this hypothesis on the ground of a series of tenuous and pseudo-scientific arguments. Now, even these nations have accepted the findings on nuclear winter. However, the arguments we have heard in the debate on this subject, in justification of waging nuclear war in national self-defence, clearly indicate that the acceptance of the findings on nuclear winter has had no effect on the security doctrine of these nuclear-weapon Powers and their allies. The nuclear-winter findings clearly demonstrate the utter futility of all strategies for the use of nuclear weapons. The believers of the doctrine of deterrence have always tried not to be distracted by discussion of the horrible consequences of nuclear war. Their consistent effort has been, first, to dismiss these consequences on the alleged grounds that they are exaggerated or ill-founded and subsequently, when it becomes impossible for them to ignore the scientific validity of these consequences, to shrug off the whole issue by stating: "so what?"

The war-winning strategies of the pre-1945 period had built into them strong elements of cruelty and utter disregard for the life of others and the rest of mankind. We can very well imagine what would be the consequences if the same strategies, and the attitude underlying them, are extended to a period of crisis created by the threat of nuclear war.

It is astonishing to see how, over the past 40 years, the military theories and strategic doctrines of the major military alliance have failed to cope with and deliberately ignored the consequences of nuclear weapons.

In such a perspective, the inability derived from these military strategies and security doctrines, to distinguish between nuclear weapons and other means of warfare, would appear to be naive and at the same time, deliberate. It is naive because it does not want to believe that nuclear weapons are not militarily useable as a piece of artillery is. It is deliberate because the believer of this strategy and doctrine deliberately tries to blur the line between nuclear weapons and other means of warfare, in order not to abandon his quest for making nuclear weapons militarily useable. It is this latter process which has fuelled the nuclear-arms race so far. With each successive addition to the family of nuclear-weapon systems, the military strategist has sought to make nuclear war winnable by increasing the range of his missiles (so that distance can protect him), by increasing yield and accuracy (so that he can control collateral damage) and by increasing speed (for surprise and to ensure that consequences of counter-attacks are minimized). The feverish pace with which the

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so-called third generation nuclear weapons are being developed is the continuation of the same process. With the latest venture into the Star Wars weapon systems, this quest for military usability of nuclear weapons seeks out the ultimate chimera, i.e. immunity from counter-attack.

Nuclear weapons have been credited with having preserved peace during the last 40 years. However, the history of this period testifies just to the contrary. The last 40 years have been a period full of tension, strife and active conflagration. During this period, each of the existing nuclear-weapon Powers has gone to war at different times — separately and, on some occasions, jointly. Of the 130 or so armed conflicts in the post-war period which were cited in the debate on this item the other day, the developed States of the North were involved in 60 per cent of them through covert or overt interventions, and almost all of these conflicts were fuelled by the major Powers. Some of these wars were proxy wars where millions of the hapless people of the South were killed. The fact that most of these wars were fought outside the main theatre of Great Power confrontation does not in any way absolve these Powers of the responsibility for these wars. And even though there has not been a major war between the two alliances in Europe, the manner in which their troops are arranged and the readiness with which their nuclear forces are poised to strike is hardly a matter of reassurance or congratulations for them or for the rest of the world. In what way, then, has the possession of nuclear weapons inspired a responsible behaviour on the part of the nuclear Powers and their allies? What redeeming features has it imparted to the crisis-prone international situation since 1945?

The fact is that the nuclear-arms race and the doctrine underpinning it not only has not succeeded in preventing wars but has brought mankind to the precipice of ultimate destruction. Here, I would like to quote from a recently published article by a British scholar of Cambridge University, Professor D.B. Gallie: "Unlike Everest, the nuclear peril is not simply there, it is getting rapidly nearer here and only a historical vision of this titanic advance can convey this vital difference."

In the statements made by the distinguished representatives of some of the Western countries, an account has been given of what in their view are the measures they are already taking for the prevention of nuclear war. In this, no doubt, the pride of place has been given to nuclear-arms-limitation agreements between the two super-Powers. In our view, such agreements have very little to do with prevention of nuclear war. In saying so, we do not wish in any manner to detract from the significance of the current bilateral negotiations between the two super-Powers. Even if these negotiations succeed only in restoring a climate of good relations between the two super-Powers, it cannot but have a positive fallout for all of us. Moreover, if these negotiations can really attain their ultimate objective of "preventing an arms race in space and to terminate it on Earth, ultimately to eliminate nuclear weapons everywhere", the whole world will have reasons to be eternally grateful to these Powers. However, direct measures for the prevention of nuclear war are not on the agenda of these negotiations. Moreover, so long as these negotiations are conducted within the framework of the self-same strategic stability, so long as the option of waging nuclear wars is retained, and no international regulation prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons is acceptable, these negotiations cannot in any way avert the threat of nuclear holocaust overhanging the fate of mankind. While entertaining best hopes for the future, we cannot forget our past experience that the previous arms-control agreements have resulted in the

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multiplication of nuclear delivery vehicles and warheads in the possession of the two super-Powers. For example, between 1968 and 1985, nuclear warheads in the possession of the two super-Powers increased by three times in one case and 12 times in the other case.

During the past 100 years or so, a number of conventions have been devised by the international community with a view to humanizing warfare. The Declaration of St. Petersburg of 1868, the Hague Convention of 1907, the Geneva Convention of 1949 and its Additional Protocols of 1977, are examples of these legal instruments. Some of the objectives of these Conventions and Protocols are: firstly, to limit the right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy; secondly, avoidance of the use of weapons which cause unnecessary suffering; thirdly, special protection to civilians not engaged in war; and fourthly, not permitting the use of means which may cause the death of large populations in neutral countries.

It is significant that the nuclear-weapon Powers have categorically sought to exclude nuclear weapons from the application of these conventions. For example, at the 1975 session of the Diplomatic Conference on the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Convention, the representative of the United States stated: "An acceptable rule of law designed to be applicable to the use of weapons of mass destruction would, almost certainly, provide little or no protection in conventional wars. Conversely, rules such as the ones on which we are working in this Conference are designed for conventional warfare and would not fit well in the context of the use of weapons of mass destruction". The representative of the United Kingdom, while signing the Additional Protocols, stated that the Protocols "were not intended to have any effect on and do not regulate or prohibit the use of nuclear weapons". The question arises as to how a State or a military alliance can continue to treat both conventional and nuclear weapons in the same category when it concerns use of force or prevention of war and yet make a distinction between these two categories of weapons when it concerns obligations to be assumed under international instruments incorporating laws of war?

I am encouraged to find from the statements made by the distinguished representatives of the Western countries that they are prepared to consider seriously the item on the prevention of nuclear war. The distinguished representative of the Federal Republic of Germany in his statement to the Conference on Disarmament on 7 February 1985 stated that "The overriding significance which we attribute to the topic gives rise to our hope that a fruitful and substantive work process on the agenda item can be embarked upon in 1985." The distinguished representative of the United States in his statement said: "For our part, we stand ready to participate seriously in further examination of all aspects of this important question in our Conference and elsewhere". These representatives have at the same time insisted that in any consideration of this agenda item they want all the views to be taken into account and explored fully without attaching any inter-se priority between them. This was precisely what the Group of 21 had suggested in its mandate for an ad hoc committee to consider this item. While explaining the position of the Group of 21, in my statement of 26 April 1984, I had made it absolutely clear that our objective was to examine all aspects -- legal, political, technical, military -- of each of the proposals before the Conference and each of the approaches to this problem without attaching any inter-se priority between them. I cannot see why that mandate could not form the basis for the consideration of this item this year.

In this context, the extraordinary precondition laid down by these countries, of drawing up a programme of work and establishing a scheme of priorities for the

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discussion of different proposals, cannot but frustrate our effort by making the entire process of setting up a framework of discussing this issue highly contentious. We will then be discussing indefinitely what to discuss rather than concrete and practical measures for preventing nuclear war. We fail to see why a detailed programme of work should be necessary when the mandate we were on the verge of agreeing upon last year did not preclude the discussion of any proposal. We also do not understand why the Western group should launch upon an exercise of presenting itemized lists of proposals when these have already been tabled as documents on the Conference on Disarmament and when these can be best taken up by the body that may be set up to consider this item. The only conclusion that we can derive is that this move is designed to make the discussion on what to discuss an end in itself, and thereby project a semblance of activity while making the whole process so contentious as to prevent the Conference from coming to grips with the real issues.

Any objective assessment of the course of negotiations on this item in 1984 would establish that the Group of 21 showed the maximum possible flexibility in an effort to begin a serious discussion. We are prepared to approach the subject in the same spirit and with the same flexibility this year also. But we find it difficult to cope with the changing positions of the Western group. Last year, most of these countries had accepted the establishment of an ad hoc committee subject to an agreement being found on its mandate. This year, they are going back on this agreement and suggesting a different format for discussion. Last year, we were told that before we start negotiating, we must explore and identify the negotiating issues. In deference to this position of the Western group, we accepted a non-negotiating mandate for the proposed ad hoc committee. This year, we are not only being asked to change the institutional framework for discussion but also being told that before we explore and identify the negotiating issues, we must agree upon what we are going to discuss. Is this really a serious and sincere approach to considering this vital question of the prevention of nuclear war?

We also do not share the view expressed by some Western countries that the purpose of the discussion is just to contribute to a better understanding of the subject. We would wish to make it clear that the objective in considering this subject is to negotiate agreement or agreements on urgent and practical measures for preventing nuclear war. Anything less than that will amount to devaluing this only negotiating forum on disarmament matters in the world and abdicating our responsibility for devising urgent measures for saving mankind from nuclear holocaust.

War, as Clausewitz said, is a veritable chameleon which assumes many colours. This was true of the wars before the advent of nuclear weapons. The threat of nuclear war does not evoke the image of a chameleon but that of the hood of a cobra -- dark and deadly. Let us, therefore, directly and squarely deal with this issue rather than beating about the bush. As our Prime Minister, Shri Rajiv Gandhi, said in his statement at the Six-Nation Summit on nuclear disarmament, "Let us work to strengthen humanity's faith in itself and its capacity to conquer the peril which has come out of its own technology".

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of India for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

I now give the floor to the representative of Canada, Ambassador Beesley...

Mr. BEESLEY (Canada): Mr. President, quite clearly, in the light of the relatively non-controversial statement I had intended to deliver, I am speaking at a rather bad time. But, nonetheless, I do congratulate you personally on your assumption of the presidency and I warmly welcome the new Secretary-General of the Conference, Ambassador Komatina, because I have not done so formally before this time. I should also like to thank the preceding Presidents, Ambassador Taylhardat and Ambassador Lowitz, for having skilfully directed the work of our Conference; and I do not use those words in the usual fashion, I mean them most sincerely. It is a particular pleasure, Mr. President, for me to be speaking today under your presidency, because we have been friends and colleagues of very long standing, and I hope I may say even comrades in arms control, and it is a second and additional pleasure that you represent a country with which Canada has had such close and friendly relations.

On an issue I had not intended to touch on, I think I understand the sincerity of the statement we have heard and the reference to the victory over Nazism. This was a struggle in which my country participated from the outset, and I hope my motives will not be misunderstood if I say that we believed that we entered that conflict by a deliberately independent decision of the Canadian Government in the very first few days of that conflict to defend the territorial integrity and political independence of a country, Poland itself; and I know that Ambassador Turbanski will not misunderstand my motives in saying that, so I think it may be relevant to recall past wars in determining why we should be attempting to avoid them through our efforts.

I should also mention that obviously no country can even understand or comprehend the losses suffered by the USSR, which were so great, so much greater than those of others; but it would be wrong to assume that we are all unaware of the kind of suffering that that war could create. Many Canadian families, including my own, lost heavily. I had a brother wounded, a brother killed, my sister in the services, and I was to be next when the war ended, thank God; so I say that, not in reply to Ambassador Issraelyan, but to associate myself with him in his total rejection of that kind of war or any other.

The new Canadian Government elected last September has placed a high priority on arms control and disarmament. In a series of public statements, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney has made it clear that "there is no cause more urgent or more necessary ... than to contribute to the reduction of the threat of war and to further the cause of peace". He pointed out what no one in this Conference needs to know that progress will be "a slow and arduous process", but emphasized that "there can be no let-up in our efforts to reduce the threat of war. No matter how frustrating or difficult, negotiations must be pursued".

Later, at a meeting between Prime Minister Mulroney and President Reagan in Quebec City on 18 March, the two leaders said: "We seek a more stable world, with greatly reduced levels of nuclear arms". In light of the statement we have just heard on the prevention of nuclear war, it may be relevant to note that they agreed that "significant, equitable, durable and verifiable arms control measures can play a role in strengthening strategic stability, maintaining our security at a lower level of force and armament, and reducing the risk of war -- both nuclear and conventional." But they also affirmed their determination, and this has direct relevance to our work, to "work to gain agreement on effective measures in the international negotiations in Vienna, Geneva and Stockholm" and in the process to bring about significant arms reduction between East and West.

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Similarly, in a speech at the thirty-ninth session of the United Nations General Assembly, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, stated that: "Canada, for its part, is determined to continue to play a leading role in the search for peace and disarmament.", and we genuinely believe that, in spite of references to Western States that might suggest something different. More specifically, he added: "We shall seek, through concrete and realistic steps, progress toward a comprehensive test ban treaty. We shall encourage super-Power and multilateral discussion on all outer space weapons, and shall commission further studies on how a space weapons ban might be verified. We shall work for the success of next year's Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference" a point to which I shall return, "in order to prevent the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons." He added: "We shall continue to press for a verifiable convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons.", and this is the policy framework within which the Canadian delegation approaches this Conference. We have firm instructions to do everything that will make it possible for the Conference on Disarmament to get on with its substantive work, and cease haggling over procedural issues. That is also a point to which I shall return.

The fundamental priorities of the Canadian Government in arms control and disarmament outside this Conference are: to contribute to progress in the nuclear arms talks between the United States and the Soviet Union; and to ensure the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Within the Conference on Disarmament, our major priorities are: a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty; preventing an arms race in outer space; and the early conclusion of a convention on chemical weapons.

While pursuing these objectives, the Canadian Government is committed also to moving forward on other arms control subjects in the Conference on Disarmament, including in particular: the prevention of nuclear war; and a treaty on radiological weapons.

Many representatives who have spoken before me during the session, and I am speaking late, have made one or more of the following three points: they have stressed the importance of the Conference on Disarmament as the only existing multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament; they have noted with regret that the Conference on Disarmament and its predecessor, the Committee on Disarmament, have not achieved a single agreement in six years, going on seven, and that the negotiating process needs to be invigorated; a point raised this morning by the distinguished representative of the USSR, my friend and colleague, Ambassador Issraelyan; and they have expressed the hope that the bilateral talks between the United States of America and the USSR would give new life to the Conference on Disarmament.

No one denies that all delegations to this Conference are extremely busy. Our schedule of meetings is so intensive that it is difficult for many delegates to attend them all. But how much progress are we making? In other statements in the past, I have emphasized as others have that the mere process is, of itself, important, but I have also said that we must not confuse process with progress.

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If the Conference process is as important as we say it is, and this was asked again this morning, why are we still mired in procedural discussions on most issues, at the expense of substantive work directed towards achieving the results we, and those we represent, should expect from this forum? Again, in previous statements, I have expressed the view that the key is to concentrate first on determining the common ground on difficult issues, and then seek to expand it, rather than concentrate so much on the issues which divide us, as we so often do. It may be recalled that in an extempore statement in plenary on 3 July 1984 I quoted from no less an authority than Grotius, the father of international law, and precisely this point: he gave this advice, according to a recently discovered seventeenth century document: "instead of talking about things that separate us we should concentrate on what binds us together." We continue to think that this is good advice. I recognize of course that the common ground very often comprises a lowest common denominator, but even so, if it permits forward movement in our work we should accept it, but as a first step on a long road towards achieving our ultimate common goal.

Now, many have expressed the hope that the United States-USSR bilateral negotiations would have a positive spill-over effect in this multilateral forum -- that they might infuse this forum with new life. Until last week, that had not happened on most issues.

However, we did finally achieve an important breakthrough, in agreeing on 29 March on a mandate on outer space, after two years of discussion. I should like to refer to that event, not only because of its intrinsic importance, but because it could serve as an example for us on other issues.

Turning to outer space, the mandate proposed may not include all that everyone here would wish, and I am sure that is the case; it may even be regarded by some as the least common denominator. Nevertheless, it not only permits but calls for substantive action from this Conference. As pointed out in my statement on 29 March, it is a realistic mandate in that it is exploratory at this stage, but it nevertheless should not be regarded as a narrow or restrictive one as it provides the basis for immediate concrete work. If this Conference is to play a positive role in moving forward on the sensitive and important issue of outer space, surely the time has come to begin serious work on the basis of this agreed mandate.

As pointed out in my statement on 29 March, the consensus on the outer space mandate reflects great credit on all the members of the Conference on Disarmament, indeed, on the Conference itself, but particularly on the major space Powers. I believe we have succeeded in resolving this important procedural question, which had been outstanding for so long, because of a conscious attempt to determine the area of existing common ground, and to respond flexibly in doing so with a view to expanding it as we go along.

As a first step, Canada already has in train a study on relevant aspects of international law and existing treaties and agreements applicable to outer space. This is a subject which should, in our view, be addressed immediately under the proposed mandate. We are fully prepared to share the results of our research, and we hope that our study might help to get the work of the Conference on Disarmament started quickly.

On the vital issue of a nuclear test ban, Canada advocated the re-establishment of a subsidiary body to expedite and crystalize efforts to resolve the problems relating to the practical aspects of verification and compliance.

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This, as we see it, is a first step towards accelerating progress toward a treaty. Even in the absence of an agreed mandate, it is important to note that the international seismic-data exchange exercise last fall is an example of an undramatic event which, when results are analysed, can contribute to real progress towards a nuclear test ban treaty. This experiment was conducted with a genuine spirit of co-operation among more than 30 countries. It produced a considerable amount of useful information which will allow the seismic group to further refine the seismic data exchange procedures described in its earlier reports to the Conference on Disarmament. The seismic group began its assessment of this experiment last week and has identified a significant amount of work yet to be done to complete the evaluation. This work and that on other issues of verification and compliance must, we suggest, continue, whatever the procedural decisions we make.

At the United Nations General Assembly we supported -- and indeed co-sponsored -- a resolution urging the Conference on Disarmament to take steps for the establishment as soon as possible of an international seismic monitoring network to monitor nuclear explosions and to determine the capabilities of such a network for monitoring compliance with a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. Such a proposal goes to the heart of the disagreement we know of, as to whether a test ban could be verified. The resolution also urged the Conference on Disarmament to initiate detailed investigation of other measures to monitor and verify compliance with such a treaty, including an international network to monitor atmospheric radioactivity.

Our expectation is that some further progress on these important questions is possible at this very session. However, the problem of a nuclear test ban will not be solved if we simply stop there. For Canada, the achievement of a comprehensive test-ban treaty remains a fundamental Canadian objective. That is why the General Assembly resolution which we co-sponsored urged the Conference on Disarmament to re-establish at the beginning of its 1985 session an ad hoc committee to resume immediately its substantive work relating to a comprehensive test ban, -- but including now the issue of scope as well as those of verification and compliance, -- with a view to negotiation of a treaty. Thus the draft mandate for an ad hoc subsidiary body on a nuclear test ban as proposed by Canada and other Western delegations (CD/521) would significantly widen the nuclear test ban mandates already agreed to in 1982 and 1983, by including the issue of scope. Here too, an attempt has been made, however modestly, to expand, the area of common ground, and this is an example of an issue on which we can build and expand upon what was already accepted earlier, through a series of incremental realistic steps. Now, some may argue that even such an expanded mandate is unacceptable because it represents the lowest common denominator or even less. But we have to start somewhere, we do operate on the basis of consensus, if we are to progress toward a comprehensive test ban. I wonder, had we done so last year, whether we might now be a little closer to our objective of a total test ban.

Nearly a year ago in this chamber, I expressed Canada's support for a step-by-step approach to a nuclear test ban, both on procedure and substance: but let us first agree on a mandate. We should then seek to establish a common understanding on one crucial area, which is for many a pre-condition to further progress, namely the effectiveness of existing means of verifying an agreement. We are aware, for instance, that views differ on whether existing technology is adequate to detect

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nuclear testing, but setting up an ad hoc committee would help us to determine whether or not this is the case. Then we can move on to the next agreed priority area. Clearly, negotiations must be our objective -- certainly that is the Canadian position -- but the necessary foundation for concrete negotiations can and should first be laid. This is the process we have followed in our work on chemical weapons with some measure of success. It is also the process we have now agreed to which I hope we follow, on outer space. On this issue, that process may require flexibility from some delegations, but if it could be accepted as the minimal common ground, we can begin work immediately.

Turning to chemical weapons, it is only appropriate that I dwell for a few moments on that subject, since this is the period set aside in the first part of the 1985 session specifically for discussion in plenary of this issue.

The Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons has done intensive work during the 1984 session under the very able chairmanship of Ambassador Rolf Ekéus and has not only clarified many points but focused attention on the basic framework of a future agreement, and I would like to express my personal gratitude to him, as well as that of my Government.

Ambassador Turbanski is already showing our wisdom in selecting him as successor to Ambassador Ekéus. He has lost no time in setting the course of the chemical weapons negotiations for the 1985 session. As a result, I would hope that, by making full use of our time, we might at least come close to completing our work during the 1985 session. It is a pretty tall order, I realize. Work in the three working groups is, however, progressing rather slowly, and there seems to be a worrisome tendency, which I do not level at any one group or any one delegation, to utilize the time in restating old positions and covering old ground. What we think that we must strive to do is to pinpoint those issues on which we agree and then work on those key issues which remain to be resolved, rather than continue to devote attention to somewhat less important issues in ever greater detail. We must in other words avoid creating inflexibility by our own working methods.

Clearly, we are at a stage in the negotiations where we must address certain critical issues related to verification. To delegations opposed to a discussion of the conceptual aspects of verification in isolation from concrete issues, let me say that we see too little indication of much willingness to come to grips by one means or another with the essential requirement of verification. For example, agreement must be found on procedures for the inspection of stockpile and production sites upon declaration at entry into force of the convention, which implies agreement on the principle of such inspection. How else can we be assured that the production sites are sealed and no longer active until they are destroyed? While the concept of continuous inspection during the destruction of existing chemical weapons has been generally accepted, similar agreement has eluded us on monitoring the destruction of the means of production. The issue of challenge verification must be addressed objectively, and I have listened with great interest to the important statement just delivered by the distinguished representative of the USSR which touched on that very issue. I think that what are needed are proposals, and we know that the United States delegation has taken the initiative in putting forward proposals outlining its views in detail on these issues. Without directing criticism at other delegations, we do

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

think that those who see matters differently should be prepared to table their own proposals on possible alternative approaches, updated proposals from earlier ones if necessary, so that the process of real negotiation may move forward. The first step obviously is to address the issues, and this does now seem to be occurring; but the second, I would hope, would be the tabling of relevant proposals or counter-proposals, bearing in mind the present state of negotiations.

On a separate and seemingly procedural matter, Ambassador Turbanski, as directed in the report of last year's ad hoc committee on chemical weapons, has already held consultations on the subject of the extension of work into the autumn and even possibly the early part of 1986. My delegation is prepared to agree to increase the time devoted to this subject during the year, as we have been urged to do in United Nations General Assembly resolution 39/65C. In spite of the obvious difficulties, and they are really considerable for many delegations, we would be prepared to carry on work on the convention anytime between the regular sessions of the Conference on Disarmament. Indeed how can we do less when reports continue to appear of the actual use of chemical weapons? I am going to personalize for a moment again, to say that I know something about the effects of chemical weapons because my own father suffered from them in the First World War: so many of us come to this Conference with personal convictions as well as national positions. It seems to me that the renewed use of these dreadful weapons long after we all believed they had been outlawed adds ever-increasing urgency to our work.

I have emphasized in the past our concerns about the danger of proliferation of chemical weapons, and have pointed out that this proliferation would inevitably exacerbate regional tensions and lead to new dimensions in regional arms competition. This proliferation is now fact and no longer mere theory.

Any war produces horrible results, but the use of chemical weapons greatly heightens the human suffering entailed. It represents a totally unacceptable escalation of any conflict. It is moreover, as I have just pointed out, a violation of international law in the form of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. For this reason, Canada, in agreement with many other countries, has imposed controls on the export of certain chemicals which could be useful in the production of highly toxic chemical warfare agents. We recognize that this is far from adequate in closing off the many routes to production of all of the known chemical warfare agents. That overriding goal can only be achieved through a verifiable ban on all chemical weapons.

It is important, of course, to bear in mind that work on a prohibition of use in this forum and in the context of a future chemical weapons convention does not in any way detract from the status or obligations of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. Last year when I acted in a personal capacity as friend of the Chairman, Rolf Ekéus, on the prohibition of use issue, this was a point often made to me by other delegations privately as well as during the informal discussions at which I presided. At the same time, it is essential to preserve the full force and effect of the Geneva Protocol by precise formulations which take into account the legitimate apprehensions of delegations about the possible loopholes created by imprecise language.

If I may, I would like to draw attention to one other aspect of the informal discussions which I have just mentioned. As we are all aware, the 1983 report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons (CD/416) provides an outline of various

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ways in which the basic prohibition of use might be dealt in a future convention. Annex I to the Report of the Conference on Disarmament to the General Assembly of the United Nations (CD/539) attempts to re-arrange these options in draft treaty language. These documents, and the interventions of many delegations during the informal discussions I have mentioned, have made us all much more aware of the complexities of the formulation of the prohibition of use issue and of its interrelationship with other elements of the future convention.

It is a matter of some gratification that some momentum has been developing behind the view that the formulation of the prohibition of use should be kept as simple and as unencumbered as possible by any qualifying statements or reservations. Of course, it is recognized that such an approach shifts part of the burden to other sections of the convention, such as those dealing with definitions and permitted activities. It might of course reasonably be argued that that is where such matters belong. I certainly do not wish to expand upon these issues at this time, however I would like to reiterate a point that I have made several times informally. Such progress as we have made on these questions has occurred precisely because we have sought to determine, through very informal process, the nature and extent of the area of possible common ground, as well as the areas of possible flexibility, and then have sought to clarify, define and gradually expand this area of common ground. Clearly, in order to do so, on this or any other issue, it is necessary to avoid freezing or formalizing our positions to the point where we back ourselves into opposing corners. Admittedly the question of the precise formulation of the absolute prohibition of use, and I mention this for illustrative purposes, and the question of the relationship between the convention and the 1925 Geneva Protocol, can both finally be resolved only when we are in a position to determine how other related issues are to be settled. Well then, how can we proceed without getting involved in a circular process?

I suggest that the process we should adopt not only on this issue is that we try to reach agreement in principle on a formulation, such as the short form on use, on a contingent basis, on the express understanding that the interrelated issues will be addressed one by one, with a view to reaching further agreements of principle on each of these issues. Final approval of the treaty language on each point could await agreement on the entire package. This approach could be followed on other parts of the treaty, and I suggest on other subjects. Let us therefore continue to sound each other out informally as possible in order to determine whether there may exist common ground and the areas of flexibility and then seek to expand it, leaving final texts open, if necessary, on interrelated issues. If we could follow this process and apply our experience to other questions on chemical weapons and elsewhere, I think we could make more success than might otherwise be possible.

Turning to the question of the prevention of nuclear war, this is another issue where the Conference on Disarmament would gain enormously if we concentrate our efforts in the first instance on identifying the common ground, and then moving on towards our shared objective. No one would deny, for example, that on this crucial issue, a highly objective point of departure constituting such common ground is the Charter of the United Nations.

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

But, the prevention of nuclear war requires all States to do their utmost to ensure that war is no longer viewed as an instrument for settling international disputes. As I have pointed out the Charter of the United Nations prohibits the use and the threat of the use of force. I have listened with interest to the important statement of the distinguished representative of India, who shares our concern about the dangers that nuclear arms present: the dangers, indeed, of the extinguishing of the human race. We continue to believe that the prevention of nuclear war must be a major priority of arms control and disarmament measures, but we continue also to believe that it cannot and should not be considered in isolation for reasons that I will come back to. At the United Nations General Assembly, Canada joined with other delegations in outlining some of the measures that we believe might serve the broader purpose of preventing war in the nuclear age. We think these ideas merit serious consideration and would like to pursue them further in this chamber, hear reactions from other delegations, listen to their views, and respond to them. My delegation would like the Conference on Disarmament to establish an appropriate framework during the course of this session so that we may have a more in-depth consideration of this subject.

But even more fundamental, whatever organizational framework is adopted, it must, in our view, be clearly understood and agreed that any country or group of countries at the Conference on Disarmament should be completely free to raise or discuss under this agenda item any issue it considers relevant. For example, we pose no objection to a discussion of nuclear deterrence; equally so, I do not see how we could exclude a discussion of conventional warfare, precisely because of the danger, but surely no one would deny that conventional warfare could trigger the holocaust of nuclear warfare. Moreover, if nuclear deterrence or conventional deterrence are seen in the context of self-defence, as suggested by the distinguished representative of India, in the view of other countries this might further illuminate our discussion. Let us at least discuss and ponder it. In the meantime, we think we would be well advised to recall that all five major Powers possess nuclear weapons, and even India is listed by Sweden each year amongst the States that did conduct a nuclear explosion. Now, we do not for a moment question India's peaceful intentions concerning its own explosive device. We do question whether the intentions of others should be raised in this forum. We are aware that there is no scientific or technical basis for differentiating between peaceful and non-peaceful explosions -- nonetheless, we do not question the motives of India. It follows, however, that we do not look kindly upon having our motives questioned by broad phrases such as "Western Countries", "Western Group", etc. In so far as Canada is concerned, whatever our defence arrangements may be, we had the technology at the end of the Second World War and we renounced it, and we opted to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty. That is a subject I am prepared to return to, but I do not think it appropriate.

Now if we cannot agree on this relatively modest area of common ground, namely, that we are each free to discuss any issue at the beginning of the process, then I really do not hold much hope for the future of this item, in spite of its potential importance.

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

As a contribution to this process, Canada lends its support to the general approach outlined in the Federal Republic of Germany's Working Paper CD/578, not as a final or exclusive list of issues to be discussed, not as a demand that everyone else accept the programme approach, but rather as indicative of the kind of approach we could consider. It comprises, as we see it, a helpful contribution to our deliberations, as stated by Ambassador Wegener, the suggested list remains open for modification and amendment. If other delegations or groups of delegations can adopt similar or complementary or even divergent approaches, then we could collectively lay the basis for a constructive dialogue, without necessarily focusing on the kind of detailed approach criticized by the distinguished representative of India. If we were to approach our work in that fashion I think we could look forward to some serious action. In any event, we think it possible for us to do so and we think the time has come to get on with it.

On radiological weapons: since 1980, Canada has urged the Conference on Disarmament, on the basis of the agreed 1979 United States/USSR drafts, to conclude a treaty on radiological weapons. We are aware, however, that there is considerable reticence on the part of some Conference members to proceed solely on the basis of that proposal. A year ago I emphasized the advantages of coming to grips with the radiological weapons issue, a subject which has been with the international community since 1948, and I suggested that we should all review our respective positions with the objective of approving that draft treaty.

Now, both the United States and the USSR delegations have expressed at this session their desire to achieve an early agreement. My own delegation would support an early consensus on the draft treaty on which United States/USSR agreement has already been reached. We would, however, at the same time, actively support parallel attempts to develop a formula to meet the serious apprehensions that have been expressed regarding attacks on nuclear powered electricity generating stations. Many delegations have stressed the importance they attach to this issue, and it cannot be ignored.

I should like to mention some of the positive effects on the credibility of the Conference for example of reaching an agreement on radiological weapons. Moreover, the resolution of this problem could be extremely useful in terms of "walking" the Conference on Disarmament through the process of reaching an agreement, (something on which we have not had much recent experience). Such an agreement whatever its intrinsic importance, could also help to reinvigorate the institution. The merits of getting the issue "off the table" speak for themselves. Once again, if we could reach agreement quickly on the issue on which there is already agreement -- the common ground -- we could agree to do serious work in the area where views are still divided? Perhaps we could agree on a linkage between the two questions while defraying the decision on the appropriateness of an integrated approach until later in the negotiations, but in the mean time I do not understand why we cannot do anything at all on the subject.

During the period between the 1984 and 1985 sessions of the Conference on Disarmament, the Department of External Affairs in Ottawa undertook a review and assessment of the radiological weapons negotiating process. I hope we shall be able to contribute some of our observations as the 1985 session progresses. Meanwhile, a two-volume compendium of verbatim records of the Conference on Disarmament and Working Papers submitted to this Conference, which had been developed initially as

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

a convenience during the review process in Ottawa, has been reproduced by the Canadian Government and sent to Geneva for circulation as a basic document within the Ad Hoc Committee for those who want it. I will therefore be providing copies to the secretariat in sufficient number for distribution to each delegation.

Now, returning to the negotiating process: I think everyone here is fully aware that the Conference on Disarmament must work on many different subjects at one and the same time, since views differ as to their relative importance and on the degree to which they are ripe for solution. We are aware that, in practice, some areas of work are actually more advanced than others and that progress is not uniform. Nevertheless, when one hears of the possibility of progress during this session toward the achievement of a convention on chemical weapons, it would be disturbing if this were viewed as the only subject in which we can make progress. Admittedly, progress on other crucial issues may be linked or seen to be linked to the bilateral negotiations between the two major Powers. We do not accept however that the Conference on Disarmament must mark time while we await the outcome of those bilateral talks. We are convinced that our multilateral efforts can and should complement those bilateral efforts.

It is our firm view that with some better working methods and a willingness to accept sensible accommodations of interests -- not compromises on matters of principle, but genuine reconciliations and accommodations -- we should be able to agree not only to a realistic and practical mandate for an ad hoc committee on a nuclear test ban, as well as on a procedural framework to proceed with substantial discussion on the prevention of nuclear war, but also to achieve concrete progress on a comprehensive convention on chemical weapons and even to conclude a limited agreement on radiological weapons.

I have referred again to the importance of not confusing process with progress. The Conference on Disarmament and its predecessor body have not produced an arms-control agreement in six years. This year will see the fortieth anniversary session of the United Nations. Surely it is time to do better. It is particularly important to do so in view of the imminence of the Third Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Canada for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

Distinguished delegates, we have exhausted the time available to us this morning. As there are three more speakers listed to take the floor today, I intend now to suspend the plenary meeting and to resume it this afternoon at 3 p.m. precisely. We will then listen to them and immediately afterwards we will convene the informal meeting scheduled for today to consider the matters that I mentioned earlier.

Subsequently, the plenary meeting will be resumed in order to formalize any agreements that might be reached at the informal meeting. If I see no objection, the plenary meeting is suspended.

The meeting was suspended at 12.50 p.m. and resumed at 3.00 p.m.

The PRESIDENT: The 306th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed.

We shall now listen to those speakers inscribed to take the floor this afternoon.

I now give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, Dr. Ola Dahlman.

Mr. DAHLMAN (Sweden): Mr. President, I appreciate the opportunity to address this distinguished Conference to report to you on the results of the recent work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events and to introduce to you document CD/583, containing a progress report of our latest meeting.

The Group met from 25 to 29 March 1985 and experts and representatives from 22 countries and a representative from the World Meteorological Organization attended the session.

The Group has since its beginning attracted broad participation from countries members of the Conference, as well as non-members. As of this meeting, China joined the Group as a member.

The purpose of the meeting last week was to review the results so far available from the technical test organized by the Group last year.

As you may recall, the Group agreed at its summer meeting of 1984 to conduct a technical test concerning the exchange and analysis of so-called Level I seismic data, e.g. basic parameters of detected seismic signals. Detailed plans were worked out and presented to you in document CD/534.

The purposes of the test as agreed upon were: firstly, to test procedures for extracting Level I parameters at seismic stations; secondly, to develop and test procedures, with the World Meteorological Organization, for the regular transmission of Level I data from temporary national facilities to experimental international data centres, usually called EIDCs, including procedures for requesting and retransmitting lost or garbled messages; and thirdly, to test proposed procedures at experimental international data centres for receipt and archiving of Level I data and for compilation and distribution over the WMO/GTS of event bulletins and parameters based on this Level I data.

The technical test was conducted as planned in the autumn of 1984 and covered seismic observations from 15 October through 14 December. The preparation of event bulletins at EIDCs and the transmission of these analysed data to participating countries continued until 15 January 1985.

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

According to the original plan for the technical test submitted to the Conference on Disarmament prior to the experiment, 27 countries had agreed to take part. Following the appeal for wider participation in the test, contained in the Group's progress report on its eighteenth session (CD/535), as approved by the Conference on Disarmament on 21 August, 11 additional countries indicated their interest in participating. In all, 79 seismograph stations in 38 countries were due to contribute data. It has however not yet been confirmed that all countries and all stations actually participated and contributed data over the WMO/GTS.

At three EIDCs in Moscow, Stockholm and Washington, the reported data was collected and analysed. Due to the uncertainty on actual participation, data from some stations were not used at all the EIDCs. Event bulletins, containing the results of the analyses, were regularly transmitted from these Centres to the participating countries.

The experiment engaged not only seismological institutions around the globe but also meteorological institutions in many countries and the World Meteorological Organization communication channels globally. The Group has during this experiment, as in its previous work, enjoyed an excellent co-operation with the World Meteorological Organization.

The experiment involved a lot of work; I would guess that at many places the workload was considerably larger than expected before the test. The successful conduct of the test would have been impossible without the dedicated effort of many individuals at seismological institutions, at World Meteorological Organization connections and at the EIDCs. We also witnessed during the test a co-operative spirit among the participants and a willingness to overcome any difficulty that arose. The successful efforts by the co-ordinator of the test, Dr. P. McGregor of Australia, should also be acknowledged in this context.

I regard the test to have been successful both in the sense that it was possible to conduct the actual experiment essentially as planned and because of the experience we have acquired during the test, which will significantly contribute to further development of scientific and technical aspects of the global system envisaged by the Group.

The test has been a considerable undertaking. It is difficult to give you an adequate description but a few figures may illustrate the size of this global co-operation. In all, some 20,000 seismic signals have been analysed at participating stations and more than 150,000 parameters have been extracted from these signals. This data has been reported over the WMO/GTS and more than 4,000 messages have been exchanged globally. As a result of the analysis at the EIDCs, around 1,000 seismic events were detected and located using the reported data.

Messages also reflected the realities of life, as illustrated, for example, by this message coming from a European seismological station. "Station out of operation as of 14 December at 00.00 UT, seismometer stolen."

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

A large amount of information and experience on all aspects of the technical test has been collected and compiled by the Group and will be reflected in its forthcoming report. National experiences from the test were presented at our meeting in some 50 national working documents, containing more than 1,000 pages. To analyse and evaluate these results and to draw over-all conclusions from them will be a substantial undertaking.

The Group has agreed on an outline for a report to the Conference on Disarmament on the results of the test. Work towards a first draft of such a report has been initiated during our recent meeting by our study groups' convenors and co-convenors and the Group's scientific secretary, Dr. Frode Ringdahl of Norway. The Group has, as always, enjoyed the eminent services provided by the secretariat and we are impressed by the way it handles our very technical material.

As the final analysis of these extensive results will need further work, I cannot at this point share with you any detailed conclusions from the test but can only point at areas where the test will widen our experiences.

At the seismological stations experience has been gained on the workload and the technical procedures for extracting Level I data. Automatic and interactive processes, that is when man and computer work closely together, have been tested at some places to extract and report a large number of parameters. The procedures for reporting large sequences of local seismic events has also been tested.

The test will provide experiences of the widespread use of the WMO/GTS and its capability of handling the volume of seismic messages transmitted. It will also provide experience on the important connections between the temporary national facilities, that is, where the seismic messages are formed, and the national World Meteorological Organization centres, where they are inserted in the Global Telecommunication System. The test will further provide experience on the problem of non-receipt of messages on the WMO/GTS and the extent to which it was alleviated by retransmission procedures.

This test was also the first in which established procedures for International Data Centres were tested in practice and it is therefore of particular interest. Before firm conclusions can be drawn, the results from the three EIDCs at Moscow, Stockholm and Washington must be compared. Such a comparison will also provide results on the usefulness of the bulletin reconciliation procedures in reducing the differences in the output bulletins of the EIDCs. We also found during this experiment, as has been experienced in earlier similar cases, that a number of the observations reported from individual stations could not be associated with located seismic events as reported by the EIDCs. This is one of the problems we would have to further analyse.

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

The Group also discussed the schedule for its further work. It envisages continuing its work towards compiling a comprehensive report to the Conference on Disarmament on the technical test. The Group agreed that all participants should submit material for the report to the Study Group Convenors and Co-Convenors before 1 May 1985. By 1 June, the Convenors should then transmit draft chapters to the scientific secretary to be compiled into a draft report which should be available at the time of the next meeting of the Group.

The Group suggests that its next session, subject to approval by the Conference on Disarmament, should be convened from 15 to 19 July 1985.

This concludes my introduction of the progress report (CD/583) of the Group of Scientific Experts, and I will try to answer any questions that distinguished members of the Conference might have.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events for his statement.

I now give the floor to the representative of the United States of America, Mr. Barthelemy.

Mr. BARTHELEMY (United States of America): Mr. President, since this is the first time the United States delegation has taken the floor this month, we wish to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of our Conference. Yugoslavia has long had an active, respected and independent voice in international political and disarmament affairs, and we assure you of our co-operation in the discharge of your responsibilities. My delegation also wishes to pay tribute to the patience and perseverance of our distinguished colleague from Venezuela, Ambassador Taylhardat, who presided over the past month of our deliberations.

My delegation has listened with interest to the remarks of Dr. Dahlman, the distinguished Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, in introducing the nineteenth progress report of the Group in document CD/585. Through you, Mr. President, we would like to express our appreciation to Dr. Dahlman, to the Scientific Secretary, Dr. Ringdahl of Norway, and to the entire Group of Scientific Experts for their continuing very valuable work, in particular, the outstanding achievement represented by the technical test that the Group of Scientific Experts carried out during the past year.

Special thanks and appreciation are due to Mr. Peter McGregor of Australia for his expert management of the intricacies of organizing this complex and broad undertaking. We also want to thank the Australian delegation to the Conference on Disarmament for hosting the informal working consultations that took place the week prior to the nineteenth session. Those who participated in these consultations

(Mr. Barthelemy, United States)

contributed significantly to the progress the entire Group made. Finally, we are indebted to the World Meteorological Organization, without whose continuing assistance the technical test would not have been possible.

During the past week, the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts began the preparation of their report on the results of the technical test. Patient and determined efforts by it were required to develop the objectives and procedures for the technical test, to carry out the test on time, and to begin analysis of the results. We are certain that the Conference on Disarmament will benefit from these efforts. Not the least of the benefits of this effort is the continued excellent co-operation that the Group enjoyed, co-operation which, as my delegation pointed out in its statement on 21 August last, must continue.

The United States, along with many other nations, has committed significant resources in support of the work of the Group of Scientific Experts. It has done so because of the important contribution that the efforts of the Group of Scientific Experts make to our own work under agenda item one, nuclear test ban.

We need to develop the technical capabilities and understanding that support the international exchange of seismic data, an exchange that is necessary for the global monitoring of the underground environment under a future nuclear test ban. In this endeavour, the Group of Scientific Experts has been, and continues to be, a unique resource. The technical test is clear testimony to the fact that the Group is continuing to make significant progress in drawing on the talents of the global seismic community to develop procedures for data collection, exchange and processing.

The 1984 technical test was planned by the Group of Scientific Experts to provide experience in handling and exchanging seismic data on an international basis. Its aim was to develop and test procedures for regular transmission of so-called Level I data over the global telecommunication system of the World Meteorological Organization. This exercise allowed tests of procedures for extracting Level I parameters at the national level. These were, in turn, transmitted to the Experimental International Data Centres and reprocessed for preparation of seismic event bulletins, testing the procedures for both communications and event bulletin preparation.

How well did the technical test succeed in carrying out these fundamental tasks? My delegation is encouraged to learn that the Group of Scientific Experts is proceeding with a thorough evaluation of the technical test that will provide us with a completed answer to this question. A remarkable amount of information in national reports has been contributed in support of this evaluation -- some 1,000 pages of documents, as Dr. Dahlman reported. We are also pleased to note the large number of additional countries that have taken part in the test. We believe that this increased level of participation will provide a more realistic assessment of the capabilities for international seismic data exchange. In this connection, we note the contribution to the technical test made by France in providing seismic data, and the participation of China in the 19th meeting of the Group of Scientific Experts. We look forward to increased co-operation from them in the Group and would welcome additional participants from the global seismic community.

(Mr. Barthelemy, United States)

My delegation looks forward to receiving the full report of the results of the technical test and to reviewing the conclusions the Group of Scientific Experts will draw from it. The United States is prepared to work diligently toward this end. It is disappointing, therefore, to learn that the Group will again be able to meet for only one week this summer, as it was constrained to do this spring. We understand that the experts from the Soviet Union were unwilling to agree to the normal two-week session. The unavoidable consequence will be a delay in the completion of the Group's report, a delay which is regrettable in light of the importance we all attach to receiving a thorough and complete report in a timely fashion.

My delegation also regrets that there were participants in the technical test who evidently elected not to report seismic data originating from nuclear explosions. We need to recall, in this regard, that the purpose of an eventual operational data exchange system is to provide participants with the capability to detect and identify seismic events. A number of nuclear explosions took place during the data collection period, and signals from these seismic events were widely recorded and reported. The technical test was conducted under procedures that were agreed upon by the Group of Scientific Experts prior to the test. A failure to report all seismic signals that would have been observed at a seismic station is, consequently, difficult to understand. In addition, seismic signals originating from nuclear explosions that had been reported by other participating countries were not processed by the Experimental International Data Centre operated by the Soviet Union during the test. This failure is disquieting and, unfortunately, raises questions about the value of undertakings by the Soviet Union, not only in this matter but in larger matters as well.

Despite such disappointments, the preliminary results of the Ad Hoc Group's technical test are encouraging. Not only was a large amount of data exchanged and processed, but matters requiring future, concentrated work to improve the performance of a global exchange were identified. We shall therefore eagerly await the Group of Scientific Experts' report of its analysis, and particularly its recommendations for further work to enhance the performance of a global seismic data exchange system.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the United States of America for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

I now give the floor to the representative of Japan, Ambassador Imai.

Mr. IMAI (Japan): Mr. President, as we are already in the early part of the third month of the spring part of the Conference's session, let me congratulate you, Ambassador Vidas, on your assumption of the office of the presidency for April. I believe that this is particularly the time when the original spirit and ideal of disarmament within the non-aligned movement can make a timely and positive contribution to the shaping of global disarmament policies, particularly on those subjects we have to deal with here in the Conference on Disarmament. We trust that under your guidance, the Conference will make substantial progress in its work. I wish also to take this opportunity to express our sincere appreciation to the outgoing President, Ambassador Taylhardat, for the skilful manner in which he guided the work of the Conference in the month of March.

We have received today the progress report of the nineteenth session of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. I must say that the report has been presented in a most useful and thought-provoking manner, and if the man/machine interface was one of the points referred to regarding data transmission, I am sure the experts/CD interface probably was very adequately covered by the report. We certainly welcome the submission of this report and I would like, through you, Mr. President, to express the appreciation of my delegation to the experts for their outstanding work and in particular to Dr. Dahlman, its Chairman, for his report and of course for his leadership.

According to the progress report, we understand that the technical test which was conducted from 15 October to 14 December 1984 has produced very useful and interesting results and provided information about seismic data transmission. My delegation, as the one which took the initiative in formulating the arrangement with the World Meteorological Organization for the regular use of the GTS, is much pleased to see the great number of seismograph stations and countries which participated in this exercise and produced results. We wish to take this opportunity to express our appreciation through you Mr. President, to the WMO for the co-operation which the Ad Hoc Group has enjoyed during the test. We also appreciate the considerable efforts expended by Dr. McGregor of Australia on the over-all co-ordination of the test.

Noting, in the report, that the Group has collected and compiled a large amount of information and experience through the test in truly global context, we do hope that the Group will further analyse and evaluate them appropriately and thoroughly so that the report to be finally presented to the Conference will contain useful suggestions for action. The direction of the work of the Ad Hoc Group seems very encouraging in terms also of our own in-house activities to determine the cost effectiveness of upgrading the world seismic network and its data transmission capabilities as a multilateral verification system within the context of a nuclear test ban.

In this respect, we believe that the Conference should approve the continuation of the Group's work as suggested in the progress report.

The Group of Scientific Experts will be meeting again in the summer to further refine the analysis of the results, and to continue their works of evaluation. It will be very useful if the outcome of such evaluation will lead to added activities in terms of refinement of the global seismic observation network, as well as to refined technology in seeking unique correlation between seismic observation and the energy released from the event concerned. This will most likely involve the appropriate and efficient exchange of Level II data.

(Mr. Imai, Japan)

I wanted to take this opportunity to thank the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts for their good work, as well as to express the conviction of my delegation that step-by-step progress of this kind is the necessary ingredient of a nuclear-test-ban treaty.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Japan for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

That concludes my list of speakers for today. I now give the floor to Ambassador Depasse of Belgium.

Mr. DEPASSE (Belgium) (translated from French): I have been responsible in 1984 and in 1985 for the co-ordination of the positions of the States of the western group with regard to the issue of the prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters, which is the full title of agenda item 3, and I should therefore like to dispel the doubt expressed by our distinguished colleague of India concerning the willingness of the members of the western group to treat this problem seriously. I should like to stress that it is neither correct nor fair to say that the western group wishes to "prevent the Conference from coming to grips with the real issues". In 1984 there was unfortunately no agreement on the terms of a mandate which could have led to the setting up of a working group on the subject, despite the intensive and prolonged efforts of a group of delegations, at the forefront of which mention must be made, obviously, of the delegation of India. The consultations which took place on this subject did not lead to the essential consensus. The avenue which was explored did not prove to be the right one, and that is why I encouraged my western colleagues this year to seek a different avenue.

This change in approach simply reflects our wish to reach a successful conclusion instead of becoming locked into a stalemate, our desire to find a new solution to this difficult problem. Thus, for my western colleagues it is not at all a question of going back on an agreement which in fact never existed.

I must also say that, in my opinion, to describe at a plenary meeting the suggestion which I made in the informal consultations you have undertaken as being "extraordinary preconditions" does not appear to be the best way of contributing to the search for the consensus to which the western group remain entirely attached. Such consensus will make it possible to tackle, with an equanimity which has at times been lacking during this morning's meeting, the issues covered by agenda item 3.

In any event, if the views I expressed during the consultations you conducted seemed to you to be "extraordinary preconditions", I should like you to attribute that to a lack of precision in my language and certainly not to the intentions either of the western group or of myself. I think these comments may help you in continuing these consultations which are, I believe, taking place in a positive manner. For my part, in any event, I shall continue to participate in them with the same wish to reach successful conclusions as before.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Belgium for his statement, and I note that the representative of India has asked for the floor. You have the floor, Ambassador Dubey.

Mr. DUBEY (India): I am very glad that the distinguished representative of Belgium decided to take the floor to respond to a few of the points raised in my statement this morning in a very very constructive and co-operative spirit, and also to explain the position of the western group. I am particularly glad to hear that the western group does intend to approach the problem of considering agenda item 3 with seriousness and sincerity.

What I had done this morning was not to question their seriousness and sincerity per se, but just to analyse what the consequences would be of pursuing some of the suggestions that they have made. The distinguished representative of Belgium stated that some of the points that were discussed in informal groups should not be brought to the plenary if we really want to approach the subject in a constructive spirit and if we really want to make progress. I could not agree more, but the point is that what I brought to the plenary in my statement is entirely based upon statements made and proposals submitted formally in the plenary. I can quote from at least half a dozen statements in the plenary where distinguished representatives of the western countries have stated that they want a programme of work before they can consider the subject, and we have also in the plenary a document which suggests what could be the programme of work. All that I wanted to submit was my delegation's judgement, very humbly, that if this kind of programme of work is expected to be discussed in advance and sorted out in advance, there is absolutely no prospect for an agreement on the subject for undertaking serious discussion. I am saying this not only on the basis of the nature of the suggestion made in that document. I can anatomize the document and take about half an hour in doing so, but I do not want to do that because I feel that it would not be conducive to our constructive work in the coming days. But I am convinced, both on the basis of my assessment of that document, and on the basis of my own experience of negotiations in small groups, that this is not the best way of proceeding with this matter, and I would like to submit the same point again.

Now, I did not say that anybody has gone back on the commitment already made; what I said was that the position is changing. I would not like to go into details, I think that I have very clearly stated in my statement what we were expecting last year, what happened, what we were prepared to do this year, and what additional things we have been asked to do this year. I do not wish to prolong the debate and I still sincerely believe that the western group will forsake this path of advance agreement on a programme of action as a precondition for starting a dialogue on this important issue.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of India for his statement. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? I recognize the representative of Brazil, Ambassador de Souza e Silva.

Mr. de SOUZA e SILVA (Brazil): Mr. President, let me say briefly the great satisfaction of my delegation in seeing you presiding over our deliberations, and please accept, Sir, the pleasure of my delegation to give you our fullest collaboration during your Presidency.

This morning I heard with great interest the statement made by the distinguished representative of Czechoslovakia, my good friend Ambassador Vejvoda. I found many interesting points and ideas in his speech. However, I have to make a couple of comments on an assertion made in that speech, and I shall quote from the speech for the record. "Last Friday we finally established the Ad Hoc Committee for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The mandate it was accorded is

(Mr. de Souza e Silva, Brazil)

not considered completely satisfactory by the Group of Socialist countries as well as by the Group of 21". I have two comments to make on that statement. First, my delegation is not aware of any pronouncement made by the Group of 21 qualifying that mandate either finding it more satisfactory or less satisfactory. Second, my delegation as a member of the Group of 21 finds that the mandate is a satisfactory one.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Brazil for his statement. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor?

I see none. It is now my intention to suspend the plenary meeting and to convene, in five minutes' time, the informal meeting scheduled for today to consider those matters which I mentioned at the opening of the plenary this morning. Later we shall resume the plenary to formalize any agreements that we might have reached at the informal meeting. The plenary meeting is suspended.

The meeting was suspended at 4.05 p.m. and reconvened at 4.10 p.m.

The PRESIDENT: The 306th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed.

The Conference has before it draft decisions on requests received from non-members already invited to participate in our work and dealing with their participation in the Ad Hoc Committee just established under item 5 on the agenda. We shall take up those draft decisions one by one, in the order in which they were received by the secretariat.

The first draft decision deals with the request received from Norway and is contained in CD/WP.174. 1/ If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

1/ In response to the request received from Norway (CD/552) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, the Conference decides to invite the representative of Norway to participate during 1985 in the meetings of its subsidiary body established under item 5 of its agenda.

The PRESIDENT: I will now take up the decisions concerning the requests received from Finland, New Zealand, Denmark, Austria, Spain and Greece contained in documents CD/WP.175, 2/ 176, 3/ 177, 4/ 178, 5/ 179 6/ and 180, 7/ respectively.

If there is no objection I shall consider that the Conference adopts the draft decisions.

It was so decided.

The last request has been received from Ireland. It is a new request and, accordingly, the secretariat has circulated the relevant communication as well as the draft decision.

Ireland requests participation in plenary meetings as well as in the subsidiary bodies under items 4 and 5. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the draft decision contained in CD/WP.173. 8/

It was so decided.

2/ In response to the request received from Finland (CD/553) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, the Conference decides to invite the representative of Finland to participate during 1985 in the meetings of its subsidiary body established under item 5 of its agenda.

3/ In response to the request received from New Zealand (CD/554) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, the Conference decides to invite the representative of New Zealand to participate during 1985 in the meetings of its subsidiary body established under item 5 of its agenda.

4/ In response to the request received from Denmark (CD/555) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, the Conference decides to invite the representative of Denmark to participate during 1985 in the meetings of its subsidiary body established under item 5 of its agenda.

5/ In response to the request received from Austria (CD/557) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, the Conference decides to invite the representative of Austria to participate during 1985 in the meetings of its subsidiary body established under item 5 of its agenda.

6/ In response to the request received from Spain (CD/560) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, the Conference decides to invite the representative of Spain to participate during 1985 in the meetings of its subsidiary body established under item 5 of its agenda.

7/ In response to the request received from Greece (CD/565) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, the Conference decides to invite the representative of Greece to participate during 1985 in the meetings of its subsidiary body established under item 5 of its agenda.

8/ In response to the request received from Ireland (CD/586) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, the Conference decides to invite the representative of Ireland to participate during 1985 in the plenary meetings of the Conference and in its subsidiary bodies established under items 4 and 5 of its agenda.

The PRESIDENT: I wish now to put before the Conference the appointment of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons. As I noted at our informal meeting, I understand that there is agreement on the appointment of Ambassador Richard Butler of Australia as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee. If my understanding is correct, I shall take it that the Conference agrees to his appointment.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I request the delegation of Australia to convey my congratulations and those of all members of the Conference to Ambassador Butler on his appointment. I wish him every success in the performance of his important functions which I am sure he will discharge very effectively.

The secretariat has circulated today, at my request, a time-table for meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. That time-table has been prepared in consultation with the Chairmen of the Ad Hoc Committees. As you know, we have just appointed the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons. Accordingly, I will invite him to let me know, as soon as he is back in Geneva, when he intends to hold a meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee during the coming week. If this would be the case, a revision of the time-table will be circulated by the secretariat. As usual, the time-table is merely indicative and subject to change, if necessary. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the time-table.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: That concludes our business for today. I intend now to adjourn the plenary meeting. As there are no speakers on the list for Tuesday, this meeting will be cancelled and the next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 11 April at 10.30 a.m. The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 4.15 p.m.