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REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT

Addendum

ANNEX IV

Documents attached to the report covering the periods  
18 January-14 March 1968  
and  
21 February-14 December 1967



#### ANNEX IV

##### DOCUMENTS ATTACHED TO THE REPORT COVERING THE PERIODS

18 JANUARY - 14 MARCH, 1968 and

21 FEBRUARY - 14 DECEMBER 1967

United States of America: ENDC/192/Rev.1  
Draft Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of  
Nuclear Weapons

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ENDC/193/Rev.1  
Draft Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of  
Nuclear Weapons

Brazil: ENDC/201/Rev.2  
Amendments to the Draft Treaty on the  
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

United Kingdom ENDC/203/Rev.1  
Suggested Amendment to the third  
paragraph of Article VIII of the Draft  
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of  
Nuclear Weapons

Letter dated 11 January 1968 from the ENDC/210  
Secretary-General of the United Nations  
to the Co-Chairmen of the Conference of  
the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament  
transmitting resolutions 2286 (XXII),  
2289 (XXII), 2342 (XXII), 2343 (XXII),  
2344 (XXII) and 2346 (XXII) of the  
General Assembly

United Kingdom: ENDC/211  
Message to the Eighteen-Nation  
Disarmament Committee from the Prime  
Minister of the United Kingdom, the  
Right Honourable Harold Wilson

United States of America: ENDC/212  
Statement of President Lyndon B. Johnson  
dated 18 January 1968

United States of America: ENDC/213  
Statement of the United States Atomic  
Energy Commission dated 25 January 1968  
on Project Gasbuggy

Sweden:

ENDC/215

Working Paper with suggestions in regard to the Draft Treaty on the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, put forward by the Delegation of Sweden at the meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament on 8 February 1968

Sweden:

ENDC/216

Working Paper with further suggestions in regard to the Draft Treaty on the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, put forward by the Delegation of Sweden at the meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament on 13 February 1968

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

ENDC/217

Aide-memoire from the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Government of the United States of America dated 10 February 1968

Italy:

ENDC/218

Working Paper containing additions and amendments to Articles IV, VIII and X of the Draft Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

ibid

ENDC/218/Corr.2

Memorandum of the Government of Spain presented on 8 February 1968 to the Co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament

ENDC/219

Nigeria:

ENDC/220

Working Paper containing additions and amendments for inclusion in the Draft Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

ibid

ENDC/220/Rev.1

Italy:

Working Paper

ENDC/221

Union of Soviet Socialists Republics - United Kingdom - United States of America: Draft Resolution of the Security Council on Security Assurances

ENDC/222

Romania:

ENDC/223

Amendments to the Draft Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

ibid

ENDC/223/Rev.1

Letter dated 18 January 1967 from the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament transmitting resolutions 2149(XXI), 2153(XXI), 2162(XXI), 2163(XXI), 2164(XXI) and 2165(XXI) of the General Assembly

ENDC/185

Final Act of the Fourth Session of the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America. Held at Mexico City on 30 August 1966 and 31 January to 14 February 1967

ENDC/186

United States of America:  
Message of the President of the United States, Lyndon B. Johnson, to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament

ENDC/187

United Kingdom:  
Message to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament from the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Mr. Harold Wilson

ENDC/188

Sweden:  
Memorandum on the control of an underground test ban treaty

ENDC/191

United States of America:  
Draft Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

ENDC/192

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:  
Draft Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

ENDC/193

United States of America:  
Statement of President Lyndon B. Johnson dated 24 August 1967

ENDC/194

Sweden:  
Draft Text of an Article on International Control to be inserted in the Draft Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

ENDC/195

Mexico:

ENDC/196

Working Paper containing a Summary of the suggested Additions to the Draft Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, made by the Delegation of Mexico in its Statement at the 331st Meeting of the ENDC dated 19 September 1967

United Arab Republic:

ENDC/197

Working Paper containing the formulation of certain suggestions for incorporation in the Draft Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Romania:

ENDC/199

Working Paper containing amendments and additions to the Draft Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Italy:

ENDC/200

Amendment to Article VII of the Draft Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

ibid

ENDC/200/Rev.1

Brazil:

ENDC/201

Amendments to the Draft Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Nigeria:

ENDC/202

Working Paper containing additions and amendments for inclusion in the Draft Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

United Kingdom:

ENDC/203

Suggested Amendment to the third paragraph of Article V of the Draft Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Aide-memoire of the Government of Switzerland presented on 17 November 1967 to the Co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament

ENDC/204

Italy:  
Working Paper Proposal concerning  
the transfer of fissile material

ENDC/205

United States of America:  
Statement of President  
Lyndon B. Johnson dated  
2 December 1967

ENDC/206

United Kingdom:  
Statement made by the British  
Minister of State for Foreign  
Affairs, The Right Honourable  
F. Mulley in the House of  
Commons on 4 December 1967

ENDC/207

Interim report to the United  
Nations General Assembly and  
the United Nations Disarmament  
Commission  
(recommended by the Co-Chairmen)

ENDC/208

Statement by the President of  
the Republic of Chile presented  
on 29 November 1967 to the  
Co-Chairmen of the Conference  
of the Eighteen-Nation Committee  
on Disarmament  
Statement by the President of  
Chile 31 October 1967

ENDC/209

ibid

ENDC/209/Rev.1

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT**

ENDC/192/Rev.1  
18 January 1968  
Original: ENGLISH

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Draft Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Parties to the Treaty",

Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,

In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,

Undertaking to co-operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,

Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,

Convinced that in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to this Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race,

Urging the co-operation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Have agreed as follows:

#### ARTICLE I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

#### ARTICLE II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

#### ARTICLE III

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special

fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article.

3. The safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble.

4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this Article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.

#### ARTICLE IV

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.

2. All the Parties to the Treaty have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty.

#### ARTICLE V

Each Party to this Treaty undertakes to co-operate to insure that potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available through appropriate international procedures to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. It is understood that non-nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty so desiring may, pursuant to a special agreement or agreements, obtain any such benefits on a bilateral basis or through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States.

#### ARTICLE VI

Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures regarding cessation of the nuclear arms race and disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

#### ARTICLE VII

Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

### ARTICLE VIII

1. Any Party to this Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.

3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes and provisions of the Treaty are being realized.

### ARTICLE IX

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of \_\_\_\_\_, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by all nuclear weapon States signatory to this Treaty, and 40 other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

#### ARTICLE X

1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a Conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.

#### ARTICLE XI

This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

Done in \_\_\_\_\_ at \_\_\_\_\_ this \_\_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_\_\_.

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT**

ENDC/193/Rev 1  
18 January 1968  
Original: RUSSIAN

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UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Draft Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Parties to the Treaty",

Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,

In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,

Undertaking to co-operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,

Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,

Convinced that in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to this Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race,

Urging the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Have agreed as follows:

#### ARTICLE I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

#### ARTICLE II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

#### ARTICLE III

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material

whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article.

3. The safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble.

4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this Article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.

#### ARTICLE IV

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.

2. All the Parties to the Treaty have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty.

#### ARTICLE V

Each Party to this Treaty undertakes to cooperate to insure that potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available through appropriate international procedures to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. It is understood that non-nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty so desiring may, pursuant to a special agreement or agreements, obtain any such benefits on a bilateral basis or through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States.

#### ARTICLE VI

Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures regarding cessation of the nuclear arms race and disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

#### ARTICLE VII

Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

ARTICLE VIII

1. Any Party to this Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.

3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes and provisions of the Treaty are being realized.

ARTICLE IX

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of \_\_\_\_\_, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by all nuclear weapon States signatory to this Treaty, and 40 other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

#### ARTICLE X

1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a Conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.

#### ARTICLE XI

This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

Done in \_\_\_\_\_ at \_\_\_\_\_ this \_\_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_\_\_.

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/201/Rev.2  
13 February, 1968  
Original: ENGLISH

B R A Z I L

Amendments to the Draft Treaty on Non-Proliferation  
of Nuclear Weapons

Article I shall be amended to read as follows:

ARTICLE I Each nuclear-weapon state party to this treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or control over such weapons directly or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear weapon state to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or control over such weapons;

Article II shall be amended to read as follows:

ARTICLE II Each non-nuclear weapon State party to this Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or the control over such weapons directly or indirectly, not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture, acquisition or control of nuclear weapons;

Article IV shall be amended to read as follows:

ARTICLE IV 1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop, alone or in cooperation with other States, research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including nuclear explosive devices for civil uses, without discrimination.  
2. All the parties to the Treaty have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific and technological information for, and to contribute alone or in cooperation with

Note

Document ENDC/201/Rev.1 exists only in French for a revision of the text of the original document ENDC/201.

other States to, the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States or International Organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes specially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty.

Article VI shall be amended to read as follows:

- ARTICLE VI 1. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures regarding a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.
2. Each nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes the obligation to negotiate at the earliest possible date a Treaty for the cessation of nuclear arms race and for the eventual reduction and elimination of the nuclear arsenals and the means of delivery of the nuclear weapons.
3. Each nuclear-weapon State party to this Treaty undertakes the obligation to channel, through a special United Nations fund for the benefit of the economic development of developing countries, in particular for their scientific and technological progress, a substantial part of the resources freed by the measures of nuclear disarmament.

Article VII shall be amended to read as follows:

- ARTICLE VII Nothing in this Treaty affects or shall be interpreted as affecting, in any way, the rights or obligations of signatory States under regional Treaties on the proscription of nuclear weapons or the rights of any group of States to conclude regional Treaties, consistent with the objectives of this Treaty.

Paragraph 3 of Article IX shall be amended to read as follows:

ARTICLE IX 3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by all nuclear-weapon-States signatory to this Treaty, and \_\_\_\_\_ other States signatory to the Treaty, and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty a nuclear-weapon-State is the one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon prior to January 1st, 1967.

Paragraph 1 of Article X shall be amended to read as follows:

ARTICLE X 1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that there have arisen or may arise circumstances related with the subject matter of this Treaty which may affect the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to the Depositary Governments, three months in advance.

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT**

ENDC/203/Rev.1

22 February 1968

Original: ENGLISH

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UNITED KINGDOM

Suggested Amendment to the third paragraph  
of Article VIII of the Draft Treaty on the  
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Article VIII

3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realised.

# CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/210  
18 January 1968  
Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 11 JANUARY 1968 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO THE CO-CHAIRMAN OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE 18-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING RESOLUTIONS 2286 (XXII), 2289 (XXII), 2342 (XXII), 2343 (XXII) 2344 (XXII) AND 2346 (XXII) OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

I have the honour to transmit the following resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its twenty-second session, which entrust specific responsibilities to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament:

- A/RES/2289 (XXII) - "Conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons", adopted at the 1623rd meeting on 8 December 1967;
- A/RES/2342A (XXII) and A/RES/2342B (XXII) - "Question of general and complete disarmament", adopted at the 1640th meeting on 19 December 1967;
- A/RES/2343 (XXII) - "Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests", adopted at the 1640th meeting on 19 December 1967;
- A/RES/2344 (XXII) - "Elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America", adopted at the 1640th meeting on 19 December 1967;
- A/RES/2346A (XXII) - "Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons", adopted at the 1640th meeting on 19 December 1967.

I would draw attention particularly to the following direct references to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament contained in the above-mentioned resolutions:

In A/RES/2289 (XXII), operative paragraph 2 referring to the possibility of negotiations by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament on the conclusion of an appropriate convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons;

In A/RES/2342A (XXII), operative paragraph 4 recommending that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, in its efforts towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, should take into account the Report of the Secretary-General on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and on the security and economic implications for States of the acquisition and further development of these weapons and the conclusions thereof (A/6858);

In A/RES/2342B (XXII), operative paragraphs 1 and 3 requesting the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to resume at the earliest possible date consideration of the question of general and complete disarmament in accordance with resolution 2162C (XXI) and to report on the progress achieved to the General Assembly at its twenty-third session;

In A/RES/2343 (XXII), operative paragraph 4 requesting the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to take up as a matter of urgency the elaboration of a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests and to report to the General Assembly at its twenty-third session;

In A/RES/2344 (XXII), operative paragraphs 1 and 2 requesting the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to resume consideration of the question of the elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, in accordance with resolution 2165 (XXI), and to report on the progress achieved to the General Assembly at its twenty-third session;

In A/RES/2346A (XXII), operative paragraphs 2 and 3 calling upon the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament urgently to continue negotiations on a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons giving all due consideration to all proposals submitted to the Committee as well as the views expressed by Member States during the twenty-second session of the General Assembly, and requesting the Committee to submit to the General Assembly on or before 15 March 1968 a full report on the negotiations together with pertinent documents and records.

In connexion with paragraph 3 of A/RES/2289 (XXII), the relevant documents and records are the following:

A/6834; A/6840/Add.1; A/6850/Rev.1; A/6851/Rev.1  
A/C.1/L.409; A/C.1/PV.1532, 1534-1537, 1539-1541  
A/6945; A/PV.1623

In connexion with paragraph 2 of A/RES/2342B (XXII), the relevant documents and records are the following:

A/6680/Rev.1; A/6840; A/6850/Rev.2; A/6851/Rev.2  
A/C.1/L.411; A/C.1/L.411/Rev.1; A/C.1/L.412 and Add. 1-2;  
A/C.1/L.415; A/C.1/L.417; A/C.1/L.419 and Add. 1-2  
A/C.1/PV.1545-1555; A/7017; A/PV.1640

I also have the honour to transmit herewith, for information of the members of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, the following resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its twenty-second session, which deal with disarmament matters:

- A/RES/2286 (XXII)      - "Treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America", adopted at the 1620th meeting on 5 December 1967;
- A/RES/2346B (XXII)    - "Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons", adopted at the 1640th meeting on 19 December 1967.

Accept, Sirs, the assurances of my highest consideration.

U Thant  
Secretary-General



UNITED NATIONS

GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY



Distr.  
LIMITED

A/RES/2289 (XXII)  
11 December 1967

Twenty-second session  
Agenda item 96

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

/On the report of the First Committee (A/6945)/

2289 (XXII). Conclusion of a convention on the prohibition  
of the use of nuclear weapons

The General Assembly,

Recalling the Declaration on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and  
thermonuclear weapons, contained in resolution 1653 (XVI) of 24 November 1961,

Reaffirming its conviction, expressed in resolution 2164 (XXI) of  
5 December 1966, that the signing of a convention on the prohibition of the use  
of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons would greatly facilitate negotiations on  
general and complete disarmament under effective international control and give  
further impetus to the search for a solution of the urgent problem of nuclear  
disarmament,

Considering that it is necessary, in view of the present international  
situation, to make new efforts aimed at expediting the solution of the question  
of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons,

1. Expresses its conviction that it is essential to continue urgently the  
examination of the question of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and  
of the conclusion of an appropriate international convention;

2. Urges all States, in this connexion, to examine in the light of the  
Declaration adopted by the General Assembly in resolution 1653 (XVI) the question  
of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and the draft convention on the  
prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons proposed by the Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics<sup>1/</sup> and such other proposals as may be made on this question and to

<sup>1/</sup> See A/6834.

/...

undertake negotiations concerning the conclusion of an appropriate convention through the convening of an international conference, by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, or directly between States;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit the draft convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons proposed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the records of the meetings of the First Committee relating to the discussion of the item entitled "Conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons" to all States Members of the United Nations and to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament,

1623rd plenary meeting,  
8 December 1967.

UNITED NATIONS

GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY



Distr.  
LIMITED

A/RES/2342 (XXII)  
4 January 1968



Twenty-second session  
Agenda item 29

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[On the report of the First Committee (A/7017)]

2342 (XXII). Question of general and complete disarmament

A

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 2162 A (XXI) of 5 December 1966, in which the Secretary-General was requested to prepare a concise report on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and on the security and economic implications for States of the acquisition and further development of these weapons,

Noting that the report has been completed and is available,<sup>1/</sup>

Convinced that the wide dissemination of the report would contribute to a better understanding of the threat presented by nuclear weapons and encourage speedy progress in the prevention of their spread, as well as in other measures of nuclear disarmament,

1. Takes note with satisfaction of the Secretary-General's report as an authoritative statement on the effects of nuclear weapons and on the implications of their acquisition and further development;
2. Expresses its appreciation to the Secretary-General and to the consultant experts who assisted him for the prompt and effective manner in which the report was prepared;
3. Notes the conclusions of the report and expresses the hope that all the parties concerned will consider them carefully;

<sup>1/</sup> A/6858.

/...

4. Recommends that the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament should take into account the report and the conclusions thereof in its efforts towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to arrange for the reproduction of the full report as a United Nations publication and, making full use of all the facilities of the United Nations Office of Public Information, to publicize the report in as many languages as is considered desirable and practicable;

6. Recommends to all Governments the wide distribution of the report and its publication in their respective languages, as appropriate, so as to acquaint public opinion with its contents;

7. Invites regional intergovernmental organizations, the specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency, and national and international non-governmental organizations to use all the facilities available to them to make the report widely known.

1640th plenary meeting,  
19 December 1967.

B

The General Assembly,

Having received the interim report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament,<sup>1/</sup>

Recalling its resolutions 1378 (XIV) of 20 November 1959, 1722 (XVI) of 20 December 1961, 1767 (XVII) of 21 November 1962, 1908 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963, 2031 (XX) of 3 December 1965 and 2162 C (XXI) of 5 December 1966,

Noting that since then the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has not been able to devote sufficient time to the consideration of the question of general and complete disarmament,

Reaffirming its conviction of the necessity to continue to exert new efforts, for the purpose of ensuring tangible progress towards the achievement of an agreement on the question of general and complete disarmament,

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<sup>1/</sup> A/6951.

1. Requests the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to resume at the earliest possible date consideration of the question of general and complete disarmament in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2162 C (XXI);

2. Decides to transmit to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament all the documents and records of the meetings of the First Committee, as well as those of the plenary meetings of the General Assembly pertaining to this item;

3. Requests the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to report on the progress achieved on the question of general and complete disarmament to the General Assembly at its twenty-third session.

1640th plenary meeting,  
19 December 1967.

UNITED NATIONS

GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY



Distr.  
LIMITED

A/RES/2343 (XXII)  
4 January 1968



Twenty-second session  
Agenda item 30

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/7021)]<sup>7</sup>

2343 (XXII). Urgent need for suspension of nuclear  
and thermonuclear tests

The General Assembly,

Having considered the question of the urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and the interim report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament,<sup>1/</sup>

Recalling its resolutions 1762 (XVII) of 6 November 1962, 1910 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963, 2032 (XX) of 3 December 1965 and 2163 (XXI) of 5 December 1966,

Noting with regret the fact that all States have not yet adhered to the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, signed in Moscow on 5 August 1963,<sup>2/</sup>

Noting with increasing concern that nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere and underground are continuing,

Taking into account the existing possibilities of establishing, through international co-operation, an exchange of seismic data so as to create a better scientific basis for national evaluation of seismic events,

Recognizing the importance of seismology in the verification of the observance of a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests,

<sup>1/</sup> A/6951.

<sup>2/</sup> United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964.

Realizing that such a treaty would also constitute an effective measure to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons,

1. Urges all States which have not done so to adhere without further delay to the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water;

2. Calls upon all nuclear-weapon States to suspend nuclear weapon tests in all environments;

3. Expresses the hope that States will contribute to an effective international exchange of seismic data;

4. Requests the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to take up as a matter of urgency the elaboration of a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests and to report to the General Assembly on this matter at its twenty-third session.

1640th plenary meeting,  
19 December 1967.

UNITED NATIONS

GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY



Distr.  
LIMITED

A/RES/2344 (XXII)  
4 January 1968



Twenty-second session  
Agenda item 31

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/7022)]

2344 (XXII). Elimination of foreign military bases in the  
countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America

The General Assembly,

Having received the interim report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation  
Committee on Disarmament,<sup>1/</sup>

Recalling its resolution 2165 (XXI) of 5 December 1966,

Noting that the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament  
has not been able to give sufficient consideration to the question of the  
elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin  
America,

1. Requests the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament  
to resume consideration of the question of the elimination of foreign military  
bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, in accordance with  
General Assembly resolution 2165 (XXI);

2. Requests the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament  
to report to the General Assembly at its twenty-third session on the progress  
achieved on the question of the elimination of foreign military bases in the  
countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

1640th plenary meeting,  
19 December 1967.

<sup>1/</sup> A/6951.

UNITED NATIONS

GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY



Distr.  
LIMITED

A/RES/2346 (XXII)  
5 January 1968

Twenty-second session  
Agenda item 25

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[On the report of the First Committee (A/7016)]

2346 (XXII). Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

A

The General Assembly,

Having received the interim report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament,<sup>1/</sup>

Noting the progress that the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has made towards preparing a draft international treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons,

Noting further that it has not been possible to complete the text of an international treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons,

Reaffirming that it is imperative to make further efforts to conclude such a treaty at the earliest possible date,

Expressing the hope that the remaining differences between all the States concerned can be quickly resolved,

Taking into account the fact that the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament is continuing its work with a view to negotiating a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and intends to submit a full report for the consideration of the General Assembly as soon as possible,

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<sup>1/</sup> A/6951.

1. Reaffirms its resolutions 2028 (XX) of 19 November 1965, 2149 (XXI) of 4 November 1966 and 2153 A (XXI) of 17 November 1966;
2. Calls upon the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament urgently to continue its work, giving all due consideration to all proposals submitted to the Committee and to the views expressed by Member States during the twenty-second session of the General Assembly;
3. Requests the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to submit to the General Assembly on or before 15 March 1968 a full report on the negotiations regarding a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, together with the pertinent documents and records;
4. Recommends that upon the receipt of that report appropriate consultations should be initiated, in accordance with the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, on the setting of an early date after 15 March 1968 for the resumption of the twenty-second session of the General Assembly to consider item 28 (a) entitled "Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament".

1640th plenary meeting,  
19 December 1967.

B

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 2153 B (XXI) of 17 November 1966, by which it decided that a conference of non-nuclear-weapon States should be convened not later than July 1968,

Having considered with appreciation the report of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States,<sup>1/</sup>

1. Approves the recommendations of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, subject to paragraph 2 below;
2. Decides to convene the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States at Geneva from 29 August to 28 September 1968;

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<sup>1/</sup> A/6817.

/...

3. Decides to invite to the Conference non-nuclear-weapon States Members of the United Nations and members of the specialized agencies and of the International Atomic Energy Agency;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to make appropriate arrangements for convening the Conference in accordance with the recommendations of the Preparatory Committee.

1640th plenary meeting,  
19 December 1967.

UNITED NATIONS  
GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY



Distr.  
LIMITED  
A/RES/2286 (XXII)  
8 December 1967



Twenty-second session  
Agenda item 91

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/6921)]

2286 (XXII). Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear  
Weapons in Latin America

The General Assembly,

Recalling that in its resolution 1911 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963 it expressed the hope that the States of Latin America would carry out studies and take appropriate measures to conclude a treaty that would prohibit nuclear weapons in Latin America.

Recalling also that in the same resolution it voiced its confidence that, once such a treaty was concluded, all States, and particularly the nuclear Powers, would lend it their full co-operation for the effective realization of its peaceful aims,

Considering that in its resolution 2028 (XX) of 19 November 1965 it established the principle of an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear-and non-nuclear Powers,

Bearing in mind that in its resolution 2153 A (XXI) of 17 November 1966 it expressly called upon all nuclear-weapon Powers to refrain from the use, or the threat of use, of nuclear weapons against States which might conclude regional treaties in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories,

Noting that that is precisely the object of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America signed at Tlatelolco, Mexico, by twenty-one

Latin American States, which are convinced that the Treaty will constitute a measure that will spare their peoples the squandering of their limited resources on nuclear armaments and will protect them against possible nuclear attacks on their territories; that it will be a stimulus to the peaceful use of nuclear energy in the promotion of economic and social development and that it will act as a significant contribution towards preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and as a powerful factor for general and complete disarmament,

Noting that it is the intent of the signatory States that all existing States within the zone defined in the Treaty may become parties to the Treaty without any restriction,

Taking note of the fact that the Treaty contains two additional protocols open, respectively, to the signature of States which, de jure or de facto, are internationally responsible for territories which lie within the limits of the geographical zone established in the Treaty, and to the signature of States possessing nuclear weapons, and convinced that the co-operation of such States is necessary for the greater effectiveness of the Treaty,

1. Welcomes with special satisfaction the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, which constitutes an event of historic significance in the efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to promote international peace and security and which at the same time establishes the right of Latin American countries to use nuclear energy for demonstrated peaceful purposes in order to accelerate the economic and social development of their peoples;

2. Calls upon all States to give their full co-operation to ensure that the régime laid down in the Treaty enjoys the universal observance to which its lofty principles and noble aims entitle it;

3. Recommends States which are or may become signatories of the Treaty and those contemplated in Additional Protocol I of the Treaty to strive to take all the measures within their power to ensure that the Treaty speedily obtains the widest possible application among them;

4. Invites Powers possessing nuclear weapons to sign and ratify Additional Protocol II of the Treaty as soon as possible.

1620th plenary meeting,  
5 December 1967.

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT**

ENDC/211  
18 January 1968  
Original: ENGLISH

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UNITED KINGDOM

Message to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee  
from The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom,  
The Right Honourable Harold Wilson

With the resumption of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, the negotiations for the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons to which the Committee has devoted so much effort move to their crucial stage. I am glad that agreement has been reached on a complete text to be tabled at the opening of this session and hope that the Treaty will soon be opened for signature.

The early conclusion of this Treaty will not only constitute a major arms control achievement; it should also open the way to further progress in the field of disarmament.

I send the Disarmament Committee my best wishes for a constructive session.

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT**

ENDC/212  
19 January 1968  
Original: ENGLISH

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Statement of President Lyndon B. Johnson dated 18 January 1968

I am most heartened to learn the Soviet Union will join the United States, as co-chairmen of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, to submit a complete text of a treaty to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and that this draft treaty will be submitted today to the Committee in Geneva. This revised text includes an agreed safeguards article and other revisions that will make the treaty widely acceptable.

We have worked long and hard in an effort to draft a text that reflects the views of other nations. I believe the draft presented today represents a major accomplishment in meeting these legitimate interests.

The text submitted today must now be considered further by all governments. Following its review by the conference in Geneva, it will be considered by the General Assembly in the spring. It is my fervent hope that I will be able to submit it to the Senate of the United States for its advice and consent this year.

The draft treaty text submitted today clearly demonstrates an important fact. In the face of the differences that exist in the world, the two nations which carry the heaviest responsibility for averting the catastrophe of nuclear war can, with sufficient patience and determination, move forward. They can move forward toward the goal which all men of good will seek -- a reversal of the arms race and a more secure peace based on our many common interests on this one small planet.

I believe history will look on this treaty as a landmark in the effort of mankind to avoid nuclear disaster while ensuring that all will benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

This treaty will be a testament of man's faith in the future. In that spirit I commend it to all.

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/213  
25 January 1968  
Original: ENGLISH

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Statement of the United States Atomic Energy Commission  
dated 25 January 1968 on Project Gasbuggy

The United States Atomic Energy Commission and other project participants released today the preliminary technical data obtained from Project Gasbuggy. Project Gasbuggy is the first joint government-industry experiment in the AEC's Flowshare Program to develop the peaceful uses of nuclear explosives.

The detonation occurred on December 10, 1967 near Farmington, New Mexico. The limited seismic data analyzed to date indicate that the explosion released approximately 26 kilotons of energy.

The specific objective of Project Gasbuggy is to obtain data to help determine whether nuclear explosives can be used to stimulate production and recovery of natural gas from formations where gas is not presently economically recoverable by conventional means. The experiment is being conducted jointly by the El Paso Natural Gas Company, the Department of the Interior, and the AEC. The technical programme is under the direction of the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory at Livermore, California, operated for the AEC by the University of California. The final results of Project Gasbuggy are not expected to be known for about a year.

Re-entry drilling was completed on January 10, 1968 and indicates that a chimney of broken rock formed as expected. The top of this chimney is 3,907 feet below the surface of the ground which gives a chimney height of 333 feet. Pre-shot calculations had indicated that a layer of coal, located 334 feet above the explosion point would stop the formation of the chimney at that height. The agreement between calculations and the actual chimney height is considered remarkably good. The fact that the chimney height was so close to that expected gives increased confidence that other pre-shot calculations such as the 78-foot chimney radius may be also approximately correct. Other measurements indicate that the chimney was formed by collapse within a minute after the explosion.

At the time of the explosion the instrumentation designed to measure the extent of fracturing in rock around the chimney indicated that such fractures were formed and extend out to about 440 feet. The pre-shot prediction of the extent of such fracturing was about 390 feet.

The chimney formation and the extent of the fracturing are important since the rate at which natural gas flows into the well is determined by the permeability of the rock and the pressure of the gas within the rock. Thus, the size of the chimney of broken rock and the extent of the fractures extending outward from it, determine the increase in the recoverable gas.

The measurements of gas pressure in the Gasbuggy reservoir prior to detonation revealed a gas pressure of about 1,050 pounds per square inch. The gas pressure, measured after the explosion currently is 833 pounds per square inch at the surface which indicates the pressure in the chimney now to be about 950 pounds per square inch. The lower pressure results from the fact that the explosion created about two million cubic feet of void space between the broken rock in the chimney into which gas can flow. As gas enters the chimney, pressure within the chimney starts to increase and is expected to approach original levels within a few months. One of the objectives of the Gasbuggy experiment is to determine the rate at which gas re-enters the chimney, and this can be measured, in part, by the rate of the pressure increase. This data will be refined further by removing the gas collected in the chimney and again measuring the rate at which gas re-enters the chimney. Such determinations will be part of the continuing post-shot programme.



The predictions made before the Gasbuggy explosion indicated that several radionuclides would be present in the gas after the explosion - including krypton-85, iodine-131, and tritium. Measurements to determine the amount of tritium are important in assessing the public health and safety aspects of this experiment. However, the samples of gas collected and measured to date at the Gasbuggy site have shown only that xenon-133 is present. The presence of xenon is not unexpected, and its short radio-active half-life of about five days means that it would not be of significance in future applications.

On-site instruments used for these radioactivity measurements are designed primarily to assure the health and safety of the workers at the site. They are not designed to perform detailed analyses to identify very small quantities of krypton or tritium. Samples of natural gas have been flown to Lawrence Radiation Laboratory at Livermore, California, for detailed analyses, to investigate the presence of these and other nuclides. The results of these analyses are not expected to be known for several months.

Scientists working on this project point out that the most important information to be obtained from the Gasbuggy experiment -- on radioactivity, gas flow increases related to fracturing, gas pressure, and gas production testing -- will be gathered and analyzed during the coming year, after which it will be possible to draw firm conclusions about the results of the experiment.

In the attached figure, the larger drawing at the right shows schematically the chimney, or column of crushed rock, and attendant fracturing, resulting from the use of a nuclear explosive used for the stimulation of gas production. The smaller drawing at the left shows in idealized form how nuclear explosives might be used for actual gas production in a gas bearing field.

# GAS RESERVOIR STIMULATION



W.P. : LOCATION OF EXPLOSIVE  
 $R_c$  : CAVITY RADIUS  
 $r_f$  : FRACTURE RADIUS  
 $r_d$  : RADIUS OF DRAINAGE  
 $H$  : HEIGHT OF CHIMNEY  
 $h$  : DEPTH OF BURIAL

# CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/215  
8 February 1968  
Original: ENGLISH

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## SWEDEN

Working Paper with suggestions in regard to the draft Treaty on Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, put forward by the Delegation of Sweden at the meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament on 8 February, 1968

Preamble: after the tenth paragraph insert a new paragraph worded as follows:

"Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 in its preamble to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end,"

Article VI: insert in the second line after the words "nuclear arms race" the following words: "at an early date," and insert in the third line before the word "disarmament" the word "nuclear".

The article would then read as follows:

"Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures regarding cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date, and nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."

Article VIII: add to the present wording of paragraph 3 the following sentence:

"At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty."

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT**

ENDC/216  
13 February 1968  
Original: ENGLISH

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SWEDEN

Working Paper with further suggestions in regard to the draft Treaty on Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, put forward by the Delegation of Sweden at the meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament on 13 February 1968.

Preamble: in the seventh paragraph, second and third lines delete the words "by nuclear-weapon States".

Article V: delete in the third and sixth lines the words "non-nuclear-weapon",

delete in the seventh line the words "so desiring" and "or agreements" and

delete in the eighth line the words "on a bilateral basis or".

The Article would then read as follows:

"Each Party to this Treaty undertakes to cooperate to insure that potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available through appropriate international procedures to other States Party to this Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. It is understood that States Party to this Treaty may, pursuant to a special agreement, obtain any such benefits through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States."

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT**

ENDC/217  
13 February 1968  
ENGLISH  
Original: RUSSIAN

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UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Aide-memoire from the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics to the Government of the United States of America,  
dated 10 February 1968

On 21 January 1968 a B-52 bomber of the United States Strategic Air Command carrying four hydrogen bombs crashed in the area of North Star Bay off the western coast of Greenland while trying to land at the United States Air Force base at Thule.

As a result of the disaster the bombs fragmented and radio-active substances leaked out of them. The search party of the United States Air-Force that arrived at the place of the accident has stated that radio-activity consisting of alpha particles emitted by plutonium has been discovered in the vicinity of Thule. According to a dispatch of Associated Press, the leader of the search party, Major General Richard O. Hunziker, has stated that, apparently, it will take months before the United States Air Force succeeds in recovering the lost bombs, and that the search party has not even determined the scale of the problem facing it.

Competent scientists in various countries consider that the risk of radio-active contamination off the shores of Greenland is a very serious one. The extensive fisheries areas of the Atlantic Ocean will suffer from radio-active contamination for many months and possibly years. This hazard will be even further increased when radio-active particles are caught up by currents and carried throughout the waters of the Atlantic. The Gulf Stream, which washes the shores of many States, is directly in the area of radio-activity.

The operations of the United States Air Force, which have led, not for the first time, to radio-active contamination of wide areas of the sea, are a violation of the generally recognized principles and standards of international law. They are contrary to the purpose of the Moscow Treaty of 1963 banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. This purpose is to "put an end to the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substances". These operations also infringe the 1958 Convention on the High Seas, to which the United States is a party. This Convention obliges each State to take measures to prevent "pollution of the seas or air space above, resulting from any activities with radio-active materials or other harmful agents".

In attempting to minimize the seriousness of the disaster, the United States Defense Department has stated that the hydrogen bombs did not explode because they had a safety device. Of course, this explanation in no way alters the fact of the dangerous leakage of radio-active substances from the hydrogen bombs, which occurred in the present case, as in many previous similar cases. Attempts to represent as normal a situation in which United States nuclear bombs fall to the ground year after year, even though they have a safety device, cannot be taken seriously.

Is there any guarantee that the next accident to a United States bomber armed with nuclear bombs will not lead to the explosion of the bombs, with all the ensuing consequences? According to a statement in the Western press, there has already been an incident in which, at the time of an accident to a United States B-52 bomber in January 1961, four of the five switches were brought into operation, and everything depended solely on the last switch, which, had it been actuated, would have caused the hydrogen bomb to explode.

According to an Associated Press dispatch from Thule, each of the four hydrogen bombs carried by the B-52 bomber was of 1.1 megatons. The explosion of even one of these bombs would be 50 times greater than the power of the explosion that wiped Hiroshima off the face of the earth. Such a catastrophe is possible not only over Greenland, but also over densely populated areas of the earth, since the United States Air Force, as is known, makes flights over many countries of the world. Who can guarantee that in the present, tense enough situation, such a nuclear explosion would not entail a whole chain of irreversible events, hazardous for the whole of mankind?

It is therefore quite understandable that many Governments, including Governments of the military allies of the United States, are protesting against flights of American aircraft carrying nuclear weapons in their air space. Two years ago, when United States nuclear bombs fell on Spanish soil in the Palomares area, a number of Governments protested against such flights and demanded their cessation. Justifiable anxiety is now being expressed by the Government of Denmark, which has stated that flights over Greenland of aircraft carrying nuclear weapons are a violation of existing agreements.

The Soviet Government, for its part, has more than once warned the Government of the United States of the serious risk that is represented by flights of bombers carrying nuclear weapons outside national boundaries. Attention was drawn to this in the aide-memoire from the Soviet Government to the Government of the United States of 16 February 1966 in connexion with the incident on the Spanish coast, when a

considerable area of land and water was contaminated by radio-activity following a similar air disaster. Nevertheless, as is evidenced, in particular, by the new disaster to a United States B-52 bomber off the shores of Greenland, the United States Government has not drawn the appropriate conclusions.

The Soviet Government once again draws the attention of the United States Government to the dangerous and even aggressive nature of flights by United States bombers carrying nuclear weapons, especially in the neighbourhood of the boundaries of the Soviet Union. From a purely military standpoint these flights by United States bombers are pointless under the circumstances of the existence of nuclear missile weapons. They can have only one purpose: to increase international tension, without regard to the consequences for the security of the peoples and the fate of mankind. It is obvious that the responsibility for such a way of acting rests wholly and entirely on the Government of the United States.

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT**

ENDC/218  
20 February 1968  
ENGLISH  
Original: FRENCH

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I T A L Y

Working Paper containing additions and amendments to  
articles IV, VIII and X of the draft treaty on the  
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

Article IV: insert the following new paragraph after paragraph 1:

2. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to acquire source and special fissionable materials or equipment for the use of source and special fissionable materials for peaceful purposes.

Article VIII: amend paragraph 3 to read as follows:

3. Every five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized.

Article X: amend paragraph 2 to read as follows:

2. The Treaty shall have a duration of 25 years. It shall be renewed automatically for periods equal to its initial duration for all governments which shall not have given, six months before the date of its expiry, notice of their intention to withdraw.

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT**

ENDC/218/Corr.2  
22 February 1968

ENGLISH ONLY

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I T A L Y

Working Paper containing additions and amendments to  
Articles IV, VIII and X of the draft treaty on the  
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

Article IV 2. second line. For "acquire" read "the supply of"

Article X 2. third line. For "the date of" read "the successive dates of"

# CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/219  
27 February 1968  
ENGLISH  
Original: SPANISH

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## Memorandum of the Government of Spain presented on 8 February 1968 to the co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament

Nuclear energy is one of the aspects of technical progress that can contribute most decisively to the welfare of all countries; but if its use is not controlled it is capable of destroying man and his work on earth. Hence the imperative need to prevent its use for ends not wholly peaceful. Likewise, until such time as nuclear disarmament and the destruction of atom-bomb arsenals are achieved, an objective which cannot be overlooked in the context of general and complete disarmament, a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons would bring the international community nearer to that end.

The mature stage reached by the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament on the preparation of a draft treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the opportunities that its rules of procedure offer to non-member countries to set forth their ideas, have led the Spanish Government to address to the co-Chairmen some remarks on the text submitted on 18 January last, containing its views on some aspects of the draft which Spain regards as most important.

For many years the Spanish Government has been interested in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and in prospecting for its sources. As a result Spain is now mining large uranium deposits with highly-favourable prospects of extension. It also has three atomic power stations under construction with an overall rating of more than 1,000 MW, and four others in an advanced stage of design which will certainly double that rating in the very near future.

The measures in the new draft concerning the right to participate as fully as possible in scientific and technical information for the peaceful uses of atomic energy are sound, and can have important effects on the development of non-nuclear countries. Nevertheless, the Spanish Government takes the view that this information should refer specifically to the entire technology of reactors and fuels.

In regard to the measures proposed in paragraph 2 of article X of the draft, the Spanish Government considers too long the period of 25 years which is specified before a conference would decide whether the treaty is thereafter to continue in force indefinitely or to be extended for a limited period. Likewise, the twenty years between the conference mentioned in paragraph 3 of article VIII and that mentioned in article X is too long a time for the treaty to be adaptable solely through the procedure laid down for introducing amendments, to any fresh circumstances that may arise in the international situation. Thus it seems advisable that conferences like that provided for in article VIII should be held every five years, and that the one mentioned in article X should be held twenty years after the treaty comes into force.

In the Spanish Government's view the vitality of the treaty will be directly proportional to the support it receives from the members of the international community. Thus the important question is not merely the number of ratifying countries, for the purposes both of putting it into force and of introducing amendments, but the nuclear characteristics of the countries whose signature and ratification will help to put it into force. Hence this Government takes the view that the non-nuclear Powers which ratify the treaty and its amendments ought to include the largest possible number of countries having some development in this field. It would therefore be advisable to require that the ratifying countries should include at least twelve which possess power reactors in operation or under construction, or else possess within their territories uranium deposits which have been proved economically exploitable. Lastly, the number of forty for the countries ratifying the treaty seems too small, and should be raised to sixty at least.

In regard to the ratification of amendments, it would seem logical that the procedure for putting them into force should be similar to that proposed for ratifying the treaty, naturally subject to the provision of article VIII, paragraph 2, that amendments shall be binding solely on the parties that ratify them.

The Spanish Government attaches the greatest importance to the content of article VI of the draft. It is indeed essential that non-proliferation shall never be regarded as an end in itself. Actually it is only a stage — one of vital importance to mankind, certainly, but only a stage in the consummation we all seek to achieve: general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Hence this Government considers that the obligations set out in article VI should be strengthened to the maximum by specially including in them the destruction of nuclear weapons and their vehicles, since disarmament will not have any effective reality except under a general scheme which covers nuclear armament. Though the undertaking to pursue negotiations is of the greatest importance, it seems advisable to specify more concretely the obligations which signatories of the Treaty undertake through this clause.

The Spanish Government attaches the greatest importance to the statements made by the President of the United States of America and by the Government of the United Kingdom to the effect that both these countries are ready to accept the application of the system of safeguards to all their peaceful activities, following the principle set forth in section (b) of paragraph 2 of the operative part of resolution 2028 (XX) of the United Nations General Assembly, which is fundamental in all matters connected with the non-proliferation of atomic weapons. The Spanish Government thinks it necessary that an obligation of this kind should also be included in the text of the treaty, binding all the nuclear Powers, so as to reduce as far as possible the existing discrimination between them and those who do not possess atomic weapons.

Lastly, a feature which the Spanish Government misses in the text submitted to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee on 18 January last is any measure relating to the guarantees which must be given to non-nuclear countries by signatories possessing nuclear weapons, first that they shall not be attacked or threatened with attack by nuclear weapons, and secondly that, if a nuclear Power not party to the treaty attacks or threatens to attack a non-nuclear signatory, the nuclear parties to the treaty shall react appropriately. The Government of Spain hopes that a formula will be found for a positive solution of this problem, the importance of which has been stressed by most countries and which is fundamental for this Government.

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CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/220  
28 February 1968  
Original: ENGLISH

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N I G E R I A

Working Paper  
containing additions and amendments  
for inclusion in the draft treaty  
on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

Article IV

The words "undertake to facilitate" should be substituted for the words "have the right to participate in". Further down the sentence, the word "on" should replace the word "for", between "technological information" and "peaceful uses".

Article V

Paragraph 2 Insert as paragraph 2:

"Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to communicate annually to the IAEA, full information on the nature, extent and results of its co-operation with any other Party or group of Parties, in the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The Reports so received by the IAEA shall be circulated by the Agency to all the Parties to the Treaty".

Article VIII

Paragraph 4 Insert after the amendments of the United Kingdom and Sweden (ENDC 203/Rev. 1 and 215 respectively):

"The findings of the review conferences shall be adopted by a majority of signatory states present."

# CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/220/Rev.1  
14 March 1968

Original: ENGLISH

## NIGERIA

Working Paper containing Additions and Amendments  
for Inclusion in the Draft Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

### Article II

Insert as Article II, paragraph 2, the following:

"Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes, if requested, to come to the aid of any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty which is threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons."

### Article IV

The words "undertake to facilitate" should be substituted for the words "have the right to participate in". Further down the sentence, the word "on" should replace the word "for" between "technological information" and "peaceful uses".

### Article VIII

Insert at the end of last paragraph:

"The findings of the Review Conferences shall be adopted by a majority of Parties to the Treaty who are present."

### Article X

Insert "after extraordinary events" (second line), "or important international developments" and after "have jeopardized" "or are likely to jeopardize", and instead of "supreme interests" insert "national interests", so that the paragraph reads as follows:

"Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, or important international developments, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized, or are likely to jeopardize, the national interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests."

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT**

ENDC/221  
6 March 1968  
ENGLISH  
Original: FRENCH

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ITALY

Working Paper

Resolution A/RES/2346 (XXII) adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 19 December 1967 called upon the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, among other things, to continue its work, giving all due consideration to all proposals submitted to the Committee concerning non-proliferation and to the views expressed by Member States during the twenty-second session of the General Assembly.

In view of the short time separating us from 15 March, the date on which a full report on the state of our work is to be submitted to the United Nations General Assembly, the Italian delegation desires to make an initial contribution to the preparation of this report, at the same time facilitating the task of its drafters.

For this purpose, it has endeavoured to group, by chapter headings relating to the specific points raised, the various documents which reflect the opinions and proposals advanced from all quarters concerning the non-proliferation treaty. The Italian delegation expresses the opinion that these documents should be referred to in the report to the United Nations General Assembly.

The list of these documents, which is reproduced below, far from claiming to be complete, is, on the contrary, open to any additions and amendments which other delegations may wish to make to it:

A - Link between the non-proliferation treaty and other disarmament measures:  
the treaty as a first step towards the achievement of general and complete  
disarmament.

1. MEXICO, ENDC/196 of 19 September 1967
2. SWEDEN A/PV.1563
3. JAPAN A/PV.1563
4. UNITED KINGDOM A/PV.1567
5. ROMANIA A/PV.1584
6. ROMANIA ENDC/PV.362 of 6 February of 1968
7. SWEDEN ENDC/215 of 8 February 1968
8. BRAZIL ENDC/201/Rev.2 of 13 February 1968
9. UNITED KINGDOM ENDC/PV.369 of 22 February 1968
10. INDIA ENDC/PV/370 of 27 February 1968

B - Balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations between nuclear and non-nuclear Powers

1. ROMANIA ENDC/199 of 19 October 1967
2. ITALY ENDC/PV.318 of 1 August 1967
3. ITALY ENDC/PV.326 of 29 August 1967
4. SWITZERLAND ENDC/204 of 24 November 1967
5. BRAZIL A/PV.1562
6. BURMA A/PV.1575
7. NETHERLANDS A/PV.1576
8. MALTA A/PV.1582
9. INDIA A/PV.1582
10. INDIA A/C.1/PV.1551
11. SUDAN A/PV.1585
12. PAKISTAN A/PV.1584
13. NIGERIA A/PV.1586
14. CEYLON A/PV.1588
15. GHANA A/C.1/PV.1553

C - Development of research and utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes

1. ITALY ENDC/PV.289 of 28 February 1967
2. ITALY ENDC/PV.326 of 29 August 1967
3. CANADA ENDC/PV.329 of 12 September 1967
4. MEXICO ENDC/196 of 19 September 1967
5. ROMANIA ENDC/199 of 19 October 1967
6. BRAZIL ENDC/201/Rev.1 of 1 November 1967
7. NIGERIA ENDC/202 of 2 November 1967
8. SWITZERLAND ENDC/204 of 24 November 1967
9. BRAZIL A/PV.1562
10. JAPAN A/PV.1563
11. USSR A/PV.1563
12. CANADA A/PV.1569
13. ARGENTINA A/PV.1569
14. PARAGUAY A/PV.1579
15. INDIA A/PV.1582

16. ROMANIA A/PV.1584
17. NIGERIA A/PV.1586
18. INDIA A/C.1/PV.1551
19. SWEDEN ENDC/216 of 13 February 1968
20. BRAZIL ENDC/201/Rev.2 of 13 February 1968
21. ITALY ENDC/218 of 20 February 1968
22. NIGERIA ENDC/220 of 28 February 1968

D - Problem of security guarantees against nuclear attack and against the threat of such attack

1. ITALY ENDC/PV.326 of 29 August 1967
2. UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC ENDC/197 of 26 September 1967
3. ROMANIA ENDC/199 of 19 October 1967
4. NIGERIA ENDC/202 of 2 November 1967
5. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA A/1562
6. JAPAN A/PV.1563
7. GHANA A/PV.1565
8. CANADA A/PV.1569
9. MALTA A/PV.1582
10. JAMAICA A/PV.1584
11. PAKISTAN A/PV.1584
12. CEYLON A/PV.1588
13. FINLAND A/C.1/PV.1548
14. MALAYSIA A/PV.1581 - A/C.1/PV.1552
15. ROMANIA ENDC/PV.362 of 6 February 1968

E - Problem of the universality of the non-proliferation treaty

1. JAPAN A/PV.1563
2. MALTA A/PV.1582
3. TANZANIA A/PV.1583
4. LIBERIA A/PV.1587
5. BRAZIL A/C.1/PV.1551
6. GHANA A/C.1/PV.1553

F - Problem of control.

1. - ITALY ENDC/PV.289 of 28 February 1967
2. - ITALY ENDC/PV.326 of 29 August 1967
3. - ITALY ENDC/PV.341 of 24 October 1967
4. - SWEDEN ENDC/195 of 30 August 1967
5. - ROMANIA ENDC/199 of 19 October 1967
6. - SWITZERLAND ENDC/204 of 24 November 1967
7. - UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ENDC/206 of 5 December 1967
8. - UNITED KINGDOM ENDC/207 of 5 December 1967
9. - ROMANIA A/PV.1584
10. - ROMANIA ENDC/PV.362 of 6 February 1968

G - Vertical proliferation in its various aspects.

1. - UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC ENDC/197 of 26 September 1967
2. - SWITZERLAND ENDC/204 of 24 November 1967
3. - BRAZIL ENDC/201/Rev.2 of 13 February 1968

H - Regional denuclearization agreements.

1. - MEXICO ENDC/196 of 19 September 1967
2. - BRAZIL ENDC/201/Rev.2 of 13 February 1968

I - Duration of the non-proliferation treaty and problem of amendments.

1. - ITALY ENDC/PV.326 of 29 August 1967
2. - ROMANIA ENDC/199 of 19 October 1967
3. - ITALY ENDC/PV.341 of 24 October 1967
4. - BRAZIL ENDC/201/Rev.1 of 1 November 1967
5. - ITALY ENDC/PV.350 of 23 November 1967
6. - BRAZIL ENDC/PV.363 of 8 February 1968
7. - ITALY ENDC/218 of 20 February 1968

L - Periodic revision conferences.

1. - ROMANIA ENDC/PV.362 of 6 February 1968
2. - SWEDEN ENDC/215 of 8 February 1968
3. - ITALY ENDC/218 of 20 February 1968
4. - NIGERIA ENDC/220 of 28 February 1968

M - Right of withdrawal.

1. - NIGERIA ENDC/202 of 2 November 1967
2. - ROMANIA ENDC/PV.362 of 6 February 1968
3. - BRAZIL ENDC/201/Rev.2 of 13 February 1968

N - Entry into force of the non-proliferation treaty.

1. - SWITZERLAND ENDC/204 of 24 November 1967

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT**

ENDC/222  
7 March 1968

ENGLISH  
Original: ENGLISH/RUSSIAN

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UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS - UNITED KINGDOM - UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Draft Resolution of the Security Council on Security Assurances

The Security Council

Noting with appreciation the desire of a large number of States to subscribe to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and thereby to undertake not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices,

Taking into consideration the concern of certain of these States that, in conjunction with their adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, appropriate measures be undertaken to safeguard their security,

Bearing in mind that any aggression accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons would endanger the peace and security of all States,

1. Recognizes that aggression with nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon State would create a situation in which the Security Council, and above all its nuclear-weapon State permanent members, would have to act immediately in accordance with their obligations under the United Nations Charter;

2. Welcomes the intention expressed by certain States that they will provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that is a victim of an act or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used;

3. Reaffirms in particular the inherent right, recognized under Article 51 of the Charter, of individual and collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT**

ENDC/223

8 March 1968

ENGLISH

Original: FRENCH

ROMANIA

Amendments to the draft treaty on the non-proliferation  
of nuclear weapons

I. ARTICLE III

1. Introduce a new paragraph - paragraph 1 - worded as follows:

"I. The control established by this Article shall have the exclusive purpose of preventing the use of special fissionable materials for the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices by non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty. Control shall be applied to such peaceful nuclear activities of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty as, by their nature and the quantities of source and special fissionable materials which they produce, process or use, may lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons."

2. Amend paragraph 1 of the present text, which becomes paragraph 2 in the proposed formulation, in the following way:

(a) Replace the words "assumed under this Treaty" by the words "assumed under Articles I and II of this Treaty".

(b) Replace the expression "required by this Article" by the expression "stipulated in the aforesaid agreement concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency".

(c) Replace the last sentence, beginning "The safeguards required by this Article", by the following sentence: "The safeguards stipulated in the aforesaid agreement concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material which exceeds the qualitative and quantitative limits beyond which its use in peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere may lead to the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices".

3. Amend paragraph 2 of the present text, which becomes paragraph 3 in the proposed formulation, by replacing the words "safeguards required by this Article" by the words "safeguards stipulated in the aforesaid agreement concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency".

4. Amend paragraph 3 of the present text, which becomes paragraph 4 of the proposed formulation, in the following way:

(a) Replace the words "The safeguards required by this Article" by the words "The safeguards stipulated by the aforesaid agreement concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency".

(b) Replace the words "in accordance with the provisions of this Article" by the words "in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Agency's safeguards system".

5. Paragraph 4 of the present text becomes, as a result of the foregoing amendments, paragraph 5.

6. Insert at the end of the present text a new paragraph worded as follows:

"6. The States Party to the Treaty agree to establish through the Security Council an appropriate control to ensure that non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on whose territory there are foreign military bases shall not acquire in any form whatsoever access to nuclear weapons indirectly through such bases".

As a result of the proposed amendments Article III will have the following wording:

"1. The control established by this Article shall have the exclusive purpose of preventing the use of special fissionable materials for the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices by non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty. Control shall be applied to such peaceful nuclear activities of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty as, by their nature and the quantities of source and special fissionable materials which they produce, process or use, may lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

2. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency, in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under Articles I and II of this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards stipulated in the aforesaid agreement concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility

or is outside any such facility. The safeguards stipulated in the aforesaid agreement concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material which exceeds the qualitative and quantitative limits beyond which its use in peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere may lead to the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

3. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards stipulated in the aforesaid agreement concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

4. The safeguards stipulated in the aforesaid agreement concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with the provisions of Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Agency's safeguards system and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble.

5. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this Article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.

6. The States Party to the Treaty agree to establish through the Security Council an appropriate control to ensure that non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on whose territory there are foreign military bases shall not acquire in any form whatsoever access to nuclear weapons indirectly through such bases".

II. ARTICLE VI

Replace the present text by the following formulation:

"1. Nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty undertake to adopt specific measures to bring about as soon as possible the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and the reduction and destruction of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery.

2. If, five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, such measures shall not have been taken, the Parties shall examine the situation thus created and decide on the measures to be taken".

III. ARTICLE VI-A

Insert a new article worded as follows:

"Nuclear-weapon States solemnly undertake never in any circumstances to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States which undertake not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons".

IV. ARTICLE VIII

After paragraph 3, add a new paragraph:

"Such conferences shall be convened thereafter periodically every five years, to review the manner in which the obligations assumed by all Parties to this Treaty are carried out".

V. ARTICLE X

Delete the last sentence of the first paragraph of this Article: "Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests".

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# CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/223/Rev.1  
8 March 1968

ENGLISH  
Original: FRENCH

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## ROMANIA

### Amendments to the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

#### I. ARTICLE III

1. Introduce a new paragraph - paragraph 1 - worded as follows:

"I. The control established by this Article shall have the exclusive purpose of preventing the use of special fissionable materials for the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices by non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty. Control shall be applied to such peaceful nuclear activities of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty as, by their nature and the quantities of source and special fissionable materials which they produce, process or use, may lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons."

2. Amend paragraph 1 of the present text, which becomes paragraph 2 in the proposed formulation, in the following way:

(a) Replace the words "assumed under this Treaty" by the words "assumed under Articles I and II of this Treaty".

(b) Replace the expression "required by this Article" by the expression "stipulated in the aforesaid agreement concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency".

(c) Replace the last sentence, beginning "The safeguards required by this Article", by the following sentence: "The safeguards stipulated in the aforesaid agreement concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material which exceeds the qualitative and quantitative limits beyond which its use in peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere may lead to the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices".

3. Amend paragraph 2 of the present text, which becomes paragraph 3 in the proposed formulation, by replacing the words "safeguards required by this Article" by the words "safeguards stipulated in the aforesaid agreement concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency".

4. Amend paragraph 3 of the present text, which becomes paragraph 4 of the proposed formulation, in the following way:

(a) Replace the words "The safeguards required by this Article" by the words "The safeguards stipulated by the aforesaid agreement concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency".

(b) Replace the words "in accordance with the provisions of this Article" by the words "in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Agency's safeguards system".

5. Paragraph 4 of the present text becomes, as a result of the foregoing amendments, paragraph 5.

6. Insert at the end of the present text a new paragraph worded as follows:

"6. The States Party to the Treaty agree to establish through the Security Council an appropriate control to ensure that non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on whose territory there are foreign military bases shall not acquire in any form whatsoever access to nuclear weapons indirectly through such bases".

As a result of the proposed amendments Article III will have the following wording:

"1. The control established by this Article shall have the exclusive purpose of preventing the use of special fissionable materials for the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices by non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty. Control shall be applied to such peaceful nuclear activities of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty as, by their nature and the quantities of source and special fissionable materials which they produce, process or use, may lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

2. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency, in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under Articles I and II of this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards stipulated in the aforesaid agreement concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility

or is outside any such facility. The safeguards stipulated in the aforesaid agreement concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material which exceeds the qualitative and quantitative limits beyond which its use in peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere may lead to the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

3. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards stipulated in the aforesaid agreement concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

4. The safeguards stipulated in the aforesaid agreement concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with the provisions of Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Agency's safeguards system and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble.

5. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this Article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.

6. The States Party to the Treaty agree to establish through the Security Council an appropriate control to ensure that non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on whose territory there are foreign military bases shall not acquire in any form whatsoever access to nuclear weapons indirectly through such bases".

## II. ARTICLE VI

Replace the present text by the following formulation:

"1. Nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty undertake to adopt specific measures to bring about as soon as possible the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and the reduction and destruction of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery.

"2. If, five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, such measures shall not have been taken, the Parties shall examine the situation thus created and decide on the measures to be taken".

## III. ARTICLE VI-A

Insert a new article worded as follows:

"1. Nuclear-weapon States solemnly undertake never in any circumstances to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States which undertake not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons.

"2. The States Party to the Treaty agree to establish through the Security Council an appropriate procedure to ensure that the undertaking set forth in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be fulfilled".

## IV. ARTICLE VIII

After paragraph 3, add a new paragraph:

"Such conferences shall be convened thereafter periodically every five years, to review the manner in which the obligations assumed by all Parties to this Treaty are carried out".

## V. ARTICLE X

Delete the last sentence of the first paragraph of this Article: "Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests".

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# CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/185  
21 February 1967  
Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 18 JANUARY 1967 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS  
TO THE CO-CHAIRMEN OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE 18-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT  
TRANSMITTING RESOLUTIONS 2149 (XXI), 2153 (XXI), 2162 (XXI), 2163 (XXI), 2164 (XXI)  
AND 2165 (XXI) OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

I have the honour to transmit the following resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its twenty-first session, which entrust specific responsibilities to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament:

- A/RES/2153A (XXI)/Rev.1 - "Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons",  
adopted at the 1469th meeting on  
17 November 1966;
- A/RES/2162C (XXI) - "Question of general and complete disarmament",  
adopted at the 1484th meeting on 5 December 1966;
- A/RES/2163 (XXI) - "Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and  
thermonuclear tests", adopted at the  
1484th meeting on 5 December 1966;
- A/RES/2165 (XXI) - "Elimination of foreign military bases in the  
countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America",  
adopted at the 1484th meeting on 5 December 1966.

I would draw attention particularly to the following direct references to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament:

In A/RES/2153A (XXI)/Rev.1, paragraphs 4, 6 and 8 of the operative part requesting the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to consider urgently the proposal that the nuclear-weapon Powers should give an assurance that they will not use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States without nuclear weapons on their territories, and any other proposals that have been or may be made for the solution of this problem; calling upon the Committee to give high priority to the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in accordance with resolution 2028 (XX); and requesting the Committee to report to the General Assembly at an early date on the result of its work on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons;

His Excellency the Representative  
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics  
His Excellency the Representative  
of the United States of America  
Co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation  
Committee on Disarmament  
United Nations Office at Geneva

In A/RES/2162C (XXI), paragraphs 1 and 3 of the operative part requesting the Committee to pursue new efforts towards achieving substantial progress in reaching agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective international control, as well as on collateral measures, and to report to the General Assembly, as appropriate, on the progress achieved;

In A/RES/2163 (XXI), paragraph 4 of the operative part requesting the Committee to elaborate without any further delay a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests;

In A/RES/2165 (XXI), paragraph 1 of the operative part requesting the Committee to give consideration to the question of elimination of foreign military bases in countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America and to report to the General Assembly.

In connexion with paragraph 7 of A/RES/2153A (XXI)/Rev.1, the relevant documents and records are the following:

A/6350; A/6395; A/6440; A/6509  
A/C.1/933; A/C.1/L.371 and Corr.1 and Add. 1-6; A/C.1/L.373;  
A/C.1/L.371/Rev. 1  
A/C.1/PV.1441-1450; A/C.1/SR.1441-1450  
A/PV.1469

In connexion with paragraph 2 of A/RES/2162C (XXI), the relevant documents and records are the following:

A/6350; A/6395; A/6440; A/6529 and Add. 1; A/6597  
A/C.1/933; A/C.1/L.370; A/C.1/L.370/Rev. 1 and Add. 1/Corr. 1  
and Add. 2-8  
A/C.1/L.374 and Rev. 1 and Add. 1; A/C.1/L.377; A/C.1/L.378  
and Add. 1-2  
A/C.1/L.379 and Rev. 1; A/C.1/L.381 and Rev. 1; A/C.1/L.382  
and Rev. 1-2  
A/C.1/PV. 1450-1457 and A/C.1/PV. 1460-1462; A/C.1/SR. 1450-1457  
and A/C.1/SR. 1460-1462  
A/PV.1484; A/PV.1498

In connexion with paragraph 1 of A/RES/2165 (XXI), the relevant documents and records are the following:

A/6399; A/6438; A/6440; A/6541  
A/C.1/933; A/C.1/L.369; A/C.1/L.385; A/C.1/L.386; A/C.1/L.387  
A/C.1/PV. 1463-1471; A/C.1/SR. 1463-1471  
A/PV.1484

The documents and records listed above have already been circulated to the Members of the United Nations, including all members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

I also have the honour to transmit herewith, for the information of the members of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, the following resolutions, adopted by the General Assembly at its twenty-first session, which deal with matters relating to the work of the Conference:

- A/RES/2149 (XXI) - "Renunciation by States of actions hampering the conclusion of an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons", adopted at the 1458th plenary meeting on 4 November 1966;
- A/RES/2153B (XXI)/Rev. 1 - "Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons", adopted at the 1469th plenary meeting on 17 November 1966;
- A/RES/2162A (XXI) and A/RES/2162B (XXI) - "Question of general and complete disarmament", adopted at the 1484th plenary meeting on 5 December 1966;
- A/RES/2164 (XXI) - "Question of convening a conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons", adopted at the 1484th plenary meeting on 5 December 1966.

Accept, Sirs, the assurances of my highest consideration.

U Thant  
Secretary-General

UNITED NATIONS

GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY



Distr.  
LIMITED

A/RES/2149 (XXI)  
7 November 1966



Twenty-first session  
Agenda item 97

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/6496)]

2149 (XXI). Renunciation by States of actions hampering the conclusion of an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

The General Assembly,

Reaffirming its resolution 2028 (XX) of 19 November 1965,

Convinced that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would endanger the security of all States and hamper the achievement of general and complete disarmament,

Considering that international negotiations are now under way with a view to the preparation of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and wishing to create an atmosphere conducive to the successful conclusion of those negotiations,

Urgently appeals to all States, pending the conclusion of such a treaty:

(a) To take all necessary steps to facilitate and achieve at the earliest possible time the conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in accordance with the principles laid down in General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX);

(b) To refrain from any actions conducive to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or which might hamper the conclusion of an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

1458th plenary meeting,  
4 November 1966.


UNITED NATIONS

GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY



Distr.  
LIMITED

A/RES/2153 (XXI)/Rev.1  
5 January 1967



Twenty-first session  
Agenda item 26

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[On the report of the First Committee (A/6509)]

2153 (XXI). Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

A

The General Assembly,

Having discussed the report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons,<sup>1/</sup>

Noting that it has not yet been possible to reach agreement on an international treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons,

Viewing with apprehension the possibility that such a situation may lead not only to an increase of nuclear arsenals and to a spread of nuclear weapons over the world but also to an increase in the number of nuclear-weapon Powers,

Believing that if such a situation persists it may lead to the aggravation of tensions between States and the risk of a nuclear war,

Believing further that the remaining differences between all concerned should be resolved quickly so as to prevent any further delay in the conclusion of an international treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons,

Convinced, therefore, that it is imperative to make further efforts to bring to a conclusion a treaty which reflects the mandate given by the General Assembly in its resolution 2028 (XX) of 19 November 1965, and which is acceptable to all concerned and satisfactory to the international community,

<sup>1/</sup> See A/6390.

1. Reaffirms its resolution 2028 (XX);
2. Urges all States to take all necessary steps conducive to the earliest conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons;
3. Calls upon all nuclear-weapon Powers to refrain from the use, or the threat of use, of nuclear weapons against States which may conclude treaties of the nature defined in paragraph 2 (e) of General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX);
4. Requests the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to consider urgently the proposal that the nuclear-weapon Powers should give an assurance that they will not use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States without nuclear weapons on their territories, and any other proposals that have been or may be made for the solution of this problem;
5. Calls upon all States to adhere strictly to the principles laid down in its resolution 2028 (XX) for the negotiation of the above-mentioned treaty;
6. Calls upon the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to give high priority to the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in accordance with the mandate contained in General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX);
7. Transmits the records of the First Committee relating to the discussion of the item entitled "Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons", together with all other relevant documents, to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament;
8. Requests the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to submit to the General Assembly at an early date a report on the results of its work on the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

1469th plenary meeting,  
17 November 1966.

B

The General Assembly,

Recalling previous resolutions on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons,

Considering that the further spread of nuclear weapons would endanger the peace and security of all States,

Convinced that the emergence of additional nuclear-weapon Powers would provoke an uncontrollable nuclear arms race,

/...

Reiterating that the prevention of further proliferation of nuclear weapons is a matter of the highest priority demanding the unceasing attention of both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon Powers,

Believing that a conference of non-nuclear-weapon Powers would contribute to the conclusion of arrangements designed to safeguard the security of those States,

1. Decides to convene a conference of non-nuclear-weapon States to meet not later than July 1968 to consider the following and other related questions:

"(a) How can the security of the non-nuclear States best be assured?

"(b) How may non-nuclear Powers co-operate among themselves in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons?

"(c) How can nuclear devices be used for exclusively peaceful purposes?";

2. Requests the President of the General Assembly immediately to set up a preparatory committee, widely representative of the non-nuclear-weapon States, to make appropriate arrangements for convening the conference and to consider the question of association of nuclear States with the work of the conference and report thereon to the General Assembly at its twenty-second session.

1469th plenary meeting.  
17 November 1966.

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The President of the General Assembly, in pursuance of paragraph 2 of resolution B above, designated the members of the Preparatory Committee for the conference of non-nuclear-weapon States.<sup>2/</sup>

The Preparatory Committee will be composed of the following Member States: Chile, Dahomey, Kenya, Kuwait, Malaysia, Malta, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Spain and United Republic of Tanzania.

<sup>2/</sup> See A/FV.1500, p.84.

UNITED NATIONS

GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY



Distr.  
LIMITED

A/RES/2162 (XXI)  
5 December 1966



Twenty-first session  
Agenda item 27

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/6529)]

2162 (XXI). Question of general and complete disarmament

A

The General Assembly,

Considering that one of the main purposes of the United Nations is to save mankind from the scourge of war,

Convinced that the armaments race, in particular the nuclear arms race, constitutes a threat to peace,

Believing that the peoples of the world should be made fully aware of this threat,

Noting the interest in a report on various aspects of the problem of nuclear weapons which has been expressed by many Governments, as well as by the Secretary-General in the introduction to his annual report for 1965-1966<sup>1/</sup> and on other occasions,

1. Requests the Secretary-General to prepare a concise report on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and on the security and economic implications for States of the acquisition and further development of these weapons;

2. Recommends that the report be based on accessible material and prepared with the assistance of qualified consultant experts appointed by the Secretary-General;

<sup>1/</sup> See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Supplement No. 1A (A/6301/Add.1), section II.

3. Requests that the report be published and transmitted to the Governments of Member States in time to permit its consideration at the twenty-second session of the General Assembly;

4. Recommends that the Governments of all Member States give the report wide distribution in their respective languages, through various media of communication, so as to acquaint public opinion with its contents.

1484th plenary meeting,  
5 December 1966.

B

The General Assembly,

Guided by the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law,

Considering that weapons of mass destruction constitute a danger to all mankind and are incompatible with the accepted norms of civilization,

Affirming that the strict observance of the rules of international law on the conduct of warfare is in the interest of maintaining these standards of civilization,

Recalling that the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare of 17 June 1925<sup>2/</sup> has been signed and adopted and is recognized by many States,

Noting that the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has the task of seeking an agreement on the cessation of the development and production of chemical and bacteriological weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and on the elimination of all such weapons from national arsenals, as called for in the draft proposals on general and complete disarmament now before the Conference,

1. Calls for strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and condemns all actions contrary to those objectives;

2. Invites all States to accede to the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925.

1484th plenary meeting,  
5 December 1966.

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2/ League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. XCIV, 1929, No. 2138.

C

The General Assembly,

Having received the report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament,<sup>3/</sup>

Recalling its resolutions 1378 (XIV) of 20 November 1959, 1722 (XVI) of 20 December 1961, 1767 (XVII) of 21 November 1962, 1908 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963 and 2031 (XX) of 3 December 1965,

Conscious of its responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for disarmament and the preservation of peace,

Firmly believing that it is imperative to make further efforts to achieve early progress towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

1. Requests the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to pursue new efforts towards achieving substantial progress in reaching agreement on the question of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, as well as on collateral measures, and in particular on an international treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and on the completion of the test ban treaty so as to cover underground nuclear weapon tests;

2. Decides to refer to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament all documents and records of the meetings of the First Committee concerning all matters related to the disarmament question;

3. Requests the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to resume its work as early as possible and to report to the General Assembly, as appropriate, on the progress achieved.

1484th plenary meeting,  
5 December 1966.

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<sup>3/</sup> A/6390.

UNITED NATIONS

GENERAL  
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Distr.  
LIMITED

A/RES/2163 (XXI)  
5 December 1966



Twenty-first session  
Agenda item 28

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

On the report of the First Committee (A/6530)<sup>1/</sup>

2163 (XXI). Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests

The General Assembly,

Having considered the question of the cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear weapon tests and the report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament,<sup>1/</sup>

Recalling its resolutions 1762 (XVII) of 6 November 1962, 1910 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963 and 2032 (XX) of 3 December 1965,

Recalling further the joint memorandum on a comprehensive test ban treaty submitted by Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic and annexed to the report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament,<sup>2/</sup> and in particular the concrete suggestions contained therein,

Noting with great concern the fact that all States have not yet adhered to the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, signed in Moscow on 5 August 1963,<sup>3/</sup>

Noting also with great concern that nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere and underground are continuing,

Taking into account the possibilities of establishing, through international co-operation, an exchange of seismic data so as to create a better scientific basis for national evaluation of seismic events,

<sup>1/</sup> A/6390.

<sup>2/</sup> Ibid., annex I, document ENDC/177.

<sup>3/</sup> United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964.

/...

Recognizing the importance of seismology in the verification of the observance of a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests,

Realizing that such a treaty would also constitute an effective measure to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons,

1. Urges all States which have not done so to adhere to the Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water;
2. Calls upon all nuclear-weapon States to suspend nuclear weapon tests in all environments;
3. Expresses the hope that States will contribute to an effective international exchange of seismic data;
4. Requests the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to elaborate without any further delay a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests.

1484th plenary meeting,  
5 December 1966.

UNITED NATIONS

GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY



Distr.  
LIMITED

A/RES/2164 (XXI)  
6 December 1966



Twenty-first session  
Agenda item 29

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

/on the report of the First Committee (A/6532)/

2164 (XXI). Question of convening a conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons

The General Assembly,

Recalling the declaration on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons contained in its resolution 1653 (XVI) of 24 November 1961,

Cognizant of the fact that the consultations carried out by the Secretary-General, pursuant to General Assembly resolutions 1653 (XVI) and 1801 (XVII), with the Governments of Member States to ascertain their views on the possibility of convening a conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons have not been conclusive,

Recalling that, by General Assembly resolution 1909 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963, the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament was requested to give urgent consideration to this question,

Believing that the signing of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons would greatly facilitate negotiations on general and complete disarmament under effective international control and give further impetus to the search for a solution of the urgent problem of nuclear disarmament,

Believing further that the widest possible attendance at a conference for the purpose of signing such a convention is of vital importance for the effective and universal observance of its provisions,

Requests that the forthcoming world disarmament conference give serious consideration to the question of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons.

148th plenary meeting  
5 December 1966

UNITED NATIONS

GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY



Distr.  
LIMITED

A/RES/2165 (XXI)  
6 December 1966



Twenty-first session  
Agenda item 98

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[On the report of the First Committee (A/6541)]

2165 (XXI). Elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America

The General Assembly,

Having discussed the item entitled "Elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America",

Considering that this question is of paramount importance and therefore necessitates serious discussion because of its implications for international peace and security,

Decides to transmit to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, for further consideration and report, all the documents and records of the meetings of the First Committee and the plenary meetings of the General Assembly pertaining to this item.

1484th plenary meeting,  
5 December 1966.

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT**

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ENDC/186  
21 February 1967  
ENGLISH  
Original: SPANISH

FINAL ACT  
of the  
FOURTH SESSION OF THE  
PREPARATORY COMMISSION FOR THE  
DENUCLEARIZATION OF LATIN AMERICA

Held at Mexico City  
on 30 August 1966  
and 31 January to 14 February 1967

# FINAL ACT

The Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America held its fourth session in two parts. The first part consisted of a single meeting on 30 August 1966; at this meeting the Commission decided to postpone the discussions at its fourth session until 31 January 1967 in order to facilitate more thorough consultation and exchanges of views among the member States and thus enable them to reach an understanding on the outstanding points in the draft Treaty on the Denuclearization of Latin America. The second part of the session covered the period 31 January to 14 February 1967.

At the meeting of 30 August 1966, at which the resolution to postpone discussion (resolution 19 (IV)) was adopted, the member States were represented by officials of their diplomatic missions accredited to the Government of Mexico. At the second part of the session, the member States accredited the following delegations:

<u>Argentina</u>	Representative:	H.E. Ambassador Luis Santiago Sanz
	Alternate representatives:	H.E. Minister Fidel González Paz Mr. Vicente Ernesto Berasategui Mr. Octaviano Adolfo Saracho
	Advisers:	Commander Roberto Ornstein Major Rodolfo Reynoso Mr. Mario Eduardo Bancora
<u>Bolivia</u>	Representative:	H.E. Minister Reinaldo del Carpio Jáuregui
	Alternate representative:	Mr. Hugo Estenssoro Baldomar
<u>Brazil</u>	Representative:	H.E. Ambassador Sérgio Corrêa da Costa
	Alternate representatives:	H.E. Ambassador Geraldo de Carvalho Silos Colonel Fernando Guimaraes de Cerqueira Lima Professor Paulo Ribeiro de Arruda Mr. Ovidio Andrade Melo
	Advisers:	Mr. Carlos Antônio de Bettencourt Bueno Mr. Aderbal Costa

<u>Chile</u>	Representative:	H.E. Ambassador Armando Uribe Arce
	Alternate representatives:	Mr. Enrique Cobo del Campo Mr. Oscar Ruiz Bourgeois
<u>Colombia</u>	Representative:	H.E. Ambassador Álvaro Herrán Medina
	Alternate representative:	H.E. Ambassador César Augusto Pantoja
	Adviser:	Mr. Tulio Marulanda
<u>Costa Rica</u>	Representative:	H.E. Ambassador Rafael Ángel Calderón Guardia
	Alternate representatives:	Mr. Guillermo Jiménez Ramírez Mr. Carlos Alberto Moreno Velázquez Mr. Antonio Willis Quesada
<u>Dominican Republic</u>	Representative:	H.E. Minister René Fiallo
<u>Ecuador</u>	Representative:	H.E. Ambassador Leopoldo Benites Vinuesa
	Alternate representative:	H.E. Ambassador Gonzalo Almeida Urrutia
<u>El Salvador</u>	Representative:	H.E. Ambassador Rafael Eguizábal Tobías
	Alternate representative:	Mr. Guillermo Rubio Melhado
<u>Guatemala</u>	Representative:	H.E. Ambassador Carlos Leónidas Acevedo
	Alternate representative:	H.E. Ambassador Carlos Hall Lloreda Mr. Juan Carlos Delprée Crespo
<u>Haiti</u>	Representative:	H.E. Ambassador Julio Jean Pierre-Audain
<u>Honduras</u>	Representative:	H.E. Ambassador Colonel Armando Velázquez Cerrato
	Alternate representative:	Mr. Hernán López Callejas
	Adviser:	Mr. Roberto Alonzo Cleaves

<u>Jamaica</u>	Representative:	H.E. Ambassador Frederick E. Degazon
	Alternate representative:	Mr. Oswald G. Harding
<u>Mexico</u>	Representative:	H.E. Ambassador Alfonso García Robles
	Alternate representative:	H.E. Ambassador Jorge Castañeda
	Advisers:	Mr. Roberto de Rosenzweig-Díaz A. Mr. Manuel Tello Macías Major Jaime Contreras Guerrero Captain Agustín Muñoz de Cote Mr. Carlos Graef Fernández Mr. Roberto Treviño
<u>Nicaragua</u>	Representative:	H.E. Ambassador Alejandro Argüello Montiel
	Alternate representatives:	Mr. Edgar Escobar Fornos Mr. Silvio Morales Ocón
<u>Panama</u>	Representative	H.E. Ambassador José B. Cárdenas
	Alternate representative:	Mr. Simón Quirós Guardia Mr. José B. Calvo
<u>Paraguay</u>	Representative:	H.E. Ambassador Bacón Duarte Prado
<u>Peru</u>	Representative:	H.E. Minister Eduardo Valdez Pérez del Castillo
<u>Trinidad and Tobago</u>	Representative:	H.E. Ambassador Sir Ellis Clarke
<u>Uruguay</u>	Representative:	H.E. Ambassador Manuel Sánchez Morales
	Alternate representative:	Mr. Aníbal Abadie-Aicardi Mr. Alfredo Giró Fintos
<u>Venezuela</u>	Representative:	H.E. Ambassador Dr. Rolando Salcedo Delima
	Alternate representative:	Commander Augusto Brito Ascanio Professor José A. Velandía
	Adviser:	Mr. Alberto Domínguez R.

The Preparatory Commission again received the valuable help of Mr. William Epstein, Chief of the Disarmament Affairs Division, United Nations Secretariat, as Technical Consultant. Mr. Gurdon W. Wattles, an official of the United Nations Office of Legal Affairs, served as Technical Adviser to the Drafting Committee.

The countries listed below demonstrated their interest by sending the following Observers to attend the proceedings:

<u>Austria</u>	H.E. Ambassador Hans Thalberg Alternate: Mr. Christoph Georg Parisini
<u>Belgium</u>	H.E. Ambassador Max Wéry Alternate: Mr. Marcel Lejeune
<u>Canada</u>	Mr. Dwight Wilder Fulford
<u>China</u>	H.E. Ambassador Chen Chih-Ping Alternate: Minister Wei Yu Sun
<u>Denmark</u>	H.E. Ambassador Hans von Haffner Alternate: Mr. Erno Carl Marinus Olsen
<u>Federal Republic of Germany</u>	H.E. Ambassador Dr. Swidbert Schnippenkötter Alternate: Mr. Bernhard Wolf
<u>Finland</u>	H.E. Ambassador Kai Somerto
<u>France</u>	H.E. Ambassador Jacques Vimont Alternate: Mr. Henri de Coignac
<u>Ghana</u>	H.E. Ambassador General Nathan A. Aferi
<u>India</u>	H.E. Ambassador Naranjan Singh Gill Alternate: Mr. Pramod Kumar
<u>Israel</u>	H.E. Ambassador Shimshon Arad Alternate: Mr. Sinai Rome
<u>Italy</u>	H.E. Ambassador Enrico Guastone Belcredi Alternate: Dr. Pio Pignatti Morano di Custoza
<u>Japan</u>	Mr. Masami Nakana Alternate: Mr. Yoji Sugiyama
<u>Netherlands</u>	H.E. Ambassador Luis A.M. Lichtveld Alternate: Mr. Janssen Mathias J.M.
<u>Norway</u>	H.E. Ambassador Eigil Nygaard Alternate: Mr. Nils O. Dietz

<u>Poland</u>	H.E. Ambassador Ryszard Majchrzak Alternate: Mr. Roman Czyzyki
<u>Romania</u>	H.E. Ambassador Gheorghe Diaconescu
<u>Sweden</u>	H.E. Ambassador Tord Goransson Alternate: Mr. Arne Helleryd
<u>United Arab Republic</u>	H.E. Ambassador Hassan Salah el Din Gohar Alternate: Mr. Abdel Rahman Hassan
<u>United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland</u>	H.E. Ambassador Sir Nicolas J.A. Cheetham, K.C.M.G. Alternates: Mr. Ian M. Sinclair Mr. Thomas C. Barker
<u>United States of America</u>	H.E. Ambassador Fulton Freeman Alternates: Mr. Duncan A.D. Mackay Mr. Robert W. Smith
<u>Yugoslavia</u>	H.E. Ambassador Dalibor Soldatić Alternate: Mr. Borivoje Stojadinović
<u>International Atomic Agency</u>	Mr. Reinhard Rainer

Among the Observers referred to above, special mention should be made of those from Belgium, China, Finland, Ghana, Israel and Romania, who for the first time, to the Preparatory Commission's pleasure, joined the other Observers who had followed the Commission's work at earlier sessions.

It should also be mentioned that, shortly before the opening of the second part of the fourth session, one of the extracontinental States having international responsibility for territories in America - namely, the Kingdom of the Netherlands - requested permission to participate in the session on a footing of equality with the member States. When the Preparatory Commission had made considerable progress in its work without reaching any decision whether or not to accept this friendly overture, the Observer from the Netherlands stated that his Government would not press the point. The basic reason why a Netherlands delegation did not participate in the discussions at this session was that it had finally been decided that extracontinental States in the same situation would not be Contracting Parties to the Treaty in preparation and consequently the participation of a Netherlands delegation was not essential, notwithstanding the friendly attitude in which the Preparatory Commission received the approach made by the Government of the Netherlands.

As background material for its fourth session the Preparatory Commission had before it, in addition to the aforementioned resolution 19 (IV), the recommendations which the Co-ordinating Committee had made to the Governments of the member States in December 1966, at the end of the meetings it had held in New York in connexion with the twenty-first regular session of the United Nations General Assembly, to spare no time or effort in arriving as soon as possible at the conclusion of a contractual instrument for the establishment of a Latin American demuclearized zone.

On the basis of the Co-ordinating Committee's suggestions further to the proposals adopted by the Preparatory Commission at its third session, and the observations submitted by the Governments of Mexico, Uruguay, Chile and Venezuela (COPREDAL/OAT/1, 2, 3 and 4), the Commission adopted the following agenda:

1. Report of the Co-ordinating Committee (COPREDAL/CC/23);
2. Preparation of the draft Treaty on the Denuclearization of Latin America (COPREDAL/36, 46 to 49, 51 to 53, 55, 56 and 60; COPREDAL/L/14 Rev; COPREDAL/OAT/1 to 4, COPREDAL/CN/2);
3. Consideration of the draft Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, with a view to its possible adoption as a Treaty and its being opened for signature.

On this occasion the following served as officers of the Commission:

Chairman: H.E. Ambassador Alfonso García Robles,  
representative of Mexico

Vice-Chairman: H.E. Ambassador Rafael Eguizábal Tobías,  
representative of El Salvador, and  
H.E. Ambassador Sergio Corrêa da Costa,  
representative of Brazil.

At the fourth session, the representative of Brazil served in the office held at earlier sessions by H.E. Ambassador José Sette Camara, also representative of Brazil on the Preparatory Commission.

Ambassador Carlos Peón del Valle served as General Secretary of the Preparatory Commission. He was assisted by Minister Antonio Gonzáles de León, as Deputy Secretary of the Commission, and by Mr. Sergio González Gálves, Mr. Alvaro Carranco, Mr. Joaquín Mercado and Mr. Mario Vallejo Hinojosa as Assistant Secretaries. Mr. Donaciano González Gómez served as Co-ordinator.

The Preparatory Commission was gratified to receive, both at the opening and at the closure of the fourth session, messages of encouragement and congratulation from His Excellency U Thant, Secretary-General of the United Nations, and also had the great honour of receiving His Excellency Gustavo Díaz Ordaz, President of the United Mexican States.

The President of Mexico was good enough to attend the closing meeting of the fourth session, at which the Commission's term of office expired upon the opening for signature of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America.

In order to carry out faithfully, the task assigned to it, the Preparatory Commission divided its work between two Working Groups that examined the provisions on which no identity of views had been achieved. Working Group 1 was instructed to study questions relating to the control system and other predominantly technical problems, while Working Group 2 dealt mainly with legal and political questions.

Working Group 1 had as its Chairman H.E. Ambassador Armando Uribe Arce, representative of Chile, and as its Rapporteur Commander Roberto Ornstein of the Argentine Republic. Working Group 2 had as its Chairman H.E. Ambassador Sérgio Corrêa da Costa, representative of Brazil, and as its Rapporteur Mr. Vicente Ernesto Berasategui of the Argentine Republic.

In addition to those Working Groups, the Commission decided to set up a Drafting Committee to prepare the final texts. This Committee was presided over by H.E. Ambassador Mr. Alvaro Herrán Medina, representative of Colombia.

Lastly, a Credentials Committee was set up under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador Carlos Leónidas Acevedo, representative of Guatemala.

At its fortieth plenary meeting on 7 February, the Preparatory Commission decided to place on record the correct interpretation of the omission, from Article 1, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (b), of the Treaty, of the term "transport", which had appeared in one of the alternative texts included in the "Proposals for the preparation of the Treaty on the Denuclearization of Latin America" (COPREDAL/36). The Commission accordingly decided to include the following statement in the Final Act:

"The Commission deemed it unnecessary to include the term "transport" in article 1, concerning "Obligations", for the following reasons:

"1. If the carrier is one of the Contracting Parties, transport is covered by the prohibitions expressly laid down in the remaining provisions of article 1 and there is no need to mention it expressly, since the article prohibits 'any form of possession of any nuclear weapon, directly or indirectly, by the Parties themselves, by anyone on their behalf or in any other way'.

"2. If the carrier is a State not a Party to the Treaty, transport is identical with "transit" which, in the absence of any provision in the Treaty, must be understood to be governed by the principles and rules of international law; according to these principles and rules it is for the territorial State, in the free exercise of its sovereignty, to grant or deny permission for such transit in each individual case, upon application by the State interested in effecting the transit, unless some other arrangement has been reached in a Treaty between such States."

At the same time, the delegation of the Argentine Republic expressed the wish that the following statement should be recorded in the Final Act:

"The delegation of Argentina declares that, in its opinion, the prohibition of transport (including transit) of nuclear weapons within the territorial jurisdiction of the Contracting Parties needs to be specified inasmuch as to permit such transport would in its opinion violate the spirit of the Treaty, which - as expressly stated in the preamble to the Treaty - is that Latin America should be wholly free from nuclear weapons."

The delegation of Nicaragua expressly requested at the forty-seventh plenary meeting on 12 February 1967 that the following statement should be included in this Final Act:

"The delegation of Nicaragua understands that the prohibitions laid down in this Treaty refer solely to the use of nuclear energy for warlike purposes. Consequently Nicaragua, in signing this Treaty, reserves its sovereign right to use nuclear energy as it sees fit for peaceful purposes, such as the large-scale removal of earth for the construction of inter-oceanic or other canals, irrigation works and electric power stations, and to permit transit of atomic materials through its territory."

The Preparatory Commission adopted, at its only meeting in the first part of the fourth session, the following resolution:

RESOLUTION 19 (IV)

Postponement of discussions at the fourth session

The Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America,

Considering that several member States have taken the view that the discussions at the fourth session should be postponed until January 1967 in order to facilitate the successful culmination of the Commission's work,

Wishing to help in fostering the most favourable conditions for the completion of the draft Treaty on the Denuclearization of Latin America,

Noting, furthermore, the urgent need to conclude the task entrusted to it for the benefit of the peoples of Latin America and of all mankind,

Decides

1. To postpone the discussions at the fourth session of the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America;
2. To set Tuesday, 31 January 1967, as the date for the resumption of the fourth session at the headquarters of the Commission;
3. Earnestly to urge the Governments of member States to give priority, during this interval, to the study of those points in the draft Treaty on the Denuclearization of Latin America which are still unresolved;
4. That the date set in this resolution may be changed only by the Commission through the affirmative vote of two-thirds of its members.

Lastly, the second part of the fourth session resulted in the adoption of the following resolutions:

RESOLUTION 20 (IV)

Territories subject to disputes or claims

The Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America,

Considering that the maintenance of the territorial integrity of a State takes on particular importance by virtue of the aims pursued by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America,

Recalling that in the Act of Washington of the First Special Inter-American Conference it was decided that the Council of the Organization of American States should take no decision, on any application for admission submitted by a political entity whose territory was, in whole or in part and prior to the date of that resolution, the subject of a dispute or claim between a country outside the continent and one or more States members of that Organization, until the dispute had been settled by peaceful means;

Recalling also that the Preparatory Commission itself agreed to include the guiding principle of that resolution in article 20, paragraph 3, by providing that the General Conference of the Agency established by article 8 of the Treaty shall not take any decision regarding the admission of a political entity whose territory is in whole or in part and prior to the date of the signature of the Treaty, the subject of a dispute or claim between a country outside the continent and one or more Latin American States until the dispute has been settled by peaceful means,

Decides

That, for the purposes of representing territories that are, in whole or in part and prior to the date of signature of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, the subject of a dispute or claim between a country outside the continent and one or more Latin American States, the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America recognizes the law of the Latin American States.

RESOLUTION 21 (IV)

Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America

The Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America;

Recalling resolution 1911 (XVIII), in which the United Nations General Assembly noted with satisfaction, on 27 November 1963, the initiative for the denuclearization of Latin America taken in the joint declaration of 29 April 1963;

Noting that in the same resolution the General Assembly expresses the hope that the States of Latin America will initiate studies concerning the measures that should be agreed upon with a view to achieving the aims of the said declaration;

Considering that the Preparatory Commission, in fulfilment of the task entrusted to it by the Governments of the member States in resolution II of the Preliminary Meeting on the Denuclearization of Latin America adopted at Mexico City on 27 November 1964, has completed the preparation of a draft Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America,

Decides

1. To adopt the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, as set forth in the annex to this resolution;
2. To open the said instrument for an indefinite period for signature by the States referred to in article 25 of the Treaty, at Mexico City, with effect from Tuesday, 14 February 1967.

TREATY FOR THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS  
IN LATIN AMERICA

Preamble

In the name of their peoples and faithfully interpreting their desires and aspirations, the Governments of the States which have signed the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America,

Desiring to contribute, so far as lies in their power, towards ending the armaments race, especially in the field of nuclear weapons, and towards strengthening a world at peace, based on the sovereign equality of States, mutual respect and good neighbourliness,

Recalling that the United Nations General Assembly, in its resolution 808 (IX), adopted unanimously as one of the three points of a co-ordinated programme of disarmament "the total prohibition of the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction of every type",

Recalling that militarily denuclearized zones are not an end in themselves but rather a means for achieving general and complete disarmament at a later stage,

Recalling United Nations General Assembly resolution 1911 (XVIII), which established that the measures that should be agreed upon for the denuclearization of Latin America should be taken "in the light of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of regional agreements",

Recalling United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2028 (XX), which established the principle of an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and duties for the nuclear and non-nuclear powers, and

Recalling that the Charter of the Organization of American States proclaims that it is an essential purpose of the organization to strengthen the peace and security of the hemisphere,

Convinced:

That the incalculable destructive power of nuclear weapons has made it imperative that the legal prohibition of war should be strictly observed in practice if the survival of civilization and of mankind itself is to be assured,

That nuclear weapons, whose terrible effects are suffered, indiscriminately and inexorably, by military forces and civilian population alike, constitute, through the persistence of the radioactivity they release, an attack on the integrity of the human species and ultimately may even render the whole earth uninhabitable,

That general and complete disarmament under effective international control is a vital matter which all the peoples of the world equally demand,

That the proliferation of nuclear weapons, which seems inevitable unless States, in the exercise of their sovereign rights, impose restrictions on themselves in order to prevent it, would make any agreement on disarmament enormously difficult and would increase the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear conflagration,

That the establishment of militarily denuclearized zones is closely linked with the maintenance of peace and security in the respective regions,

That the military denuclearization of vast geographical zones, adopted by the sovereign decision of the States comprised therein, will exercise a beneficial influence on other regions where similar conditions exist,

That the privileged situation of the signatory States, whose territories are wholly free from nuclear weapons, imposes upon them the inescapable duty of preserving that situation both in their own interests and for the good of mankind,

That the existence of nuclear weapons in any country of Latin America would make it a target for possible nuclear attacks and would inevitably set off, throughout the region, a ruinous race in nuclear weapons which would involve the unjustifiable diversion, for warlike purposes, of the resources required for economic and social development,

That the foregoing reasons, together with the traditional peace-loving outlook of Latin America, give rise to an inescapable necessity that nuclear energy should be used in that region exclusively for peaceful purposes, and that the Latin American countries should use their right to the greatest and most equitable possible access to this new source of energy in order to expedite the economic and social development of their peoples,

Convinced finally:

That the military denuclearization of Latin America - being understood to mean the undertaking entered into internationally in this Treaty to keep their territories forever free from nuclear weapons - will constitute a measure which will spare their peoples from the squandering of their limited resources on nuclear armaments and will protect them against possible nuclear attacks on their territories, and will also constitute a significant contribution towards preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and a powerful factor for general and complete disarmament, and

That Latin America, faithful to its tradition of universality, must not only endeavour to banish from its homelands the scourge of a nuclear war, but must also strive to promote the well-being and advancement of its peoples, at the same time co-operating in the fulfilment of the ideals of mankind, that is to say, in the consolidation of a permanent peace based on equal rights, economic fairness and social justice for all, in accordance with the principles and purposes set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and in the Charter of the Organization of American States,

Have agreed as follows:

## Obligations

### Article 1

1. The Contracting Parties hereby undertake to use exclusively for peaceful purposes the nuclear material and facilities which are under their jurisdiction, and to prohibit and prevent in their respective territories:

(a) The testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition by any means whatsoever of any nuclear weapons, by the Parties themselves, directly or indirectly, on behalf of anyone else or in any other way; and

(b) The receipt, storage, installation, deployment and any form of possession of any nuclear weapon, directly or indirectly, by the Parties themselves, by anyone on their behalf or in any other way.

2. The Contracting Parties also undertake to refrain from engaging in, encouraging or authorizing, directly or indirectly, or in any way participating in the testing, use, manufacture, production, possession or control of any nuclear weapon.

## Definition of the Contracting Parties

### Article 2

For the purposes of this Treaty, the Contracting Parties are those for whom the Treaty is in force.

## Definition of territory

### Article 3

For the purposes of this Treaty, the term "territory" shall include the territorial sea, air space and any other space over which the State exercises sovereignty in accordance with its own legislation.

## Zone of application

### Article 4

1. The zone of application of the Treaty is the whole of the territories for which the Treaty is in force.

2. Upon fulfilment of the requirements of article 28, paragraph 1, the zone of application of the Treaty shall also be that which is situated in the western

hemisphere within the following limits (except the continental part of the territory of the United States of America and its territorial waters): starting at a point located at 35° north latitude, 75° west longitude; from this point directly southward to a point at 30° north latitude, 75° west longitude; from there, directly eastward to a point at 30° north latitude, 50° west longitude; from there along a loxodromic line to a point at 5° north latitude, 20° west longitude; from there directly southward to a point at 60° south latitude, 20° west longitude; from there directly westward to a point at 60° south latitude, 115° west longitude; from there directly northward to a point at 0° latitude, 115° west longitude; from there, along a loxodromic line to a point at 35° north latitude, 150° west longitude; from there, directly eastward to a point at 35° north latitude, 75° west longitude.

Definition of nuclear weapons

Article 5

For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear weapon is any device which is capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled manner and which has a group of characteristics that are appropriate for use for warlike purposes. An instrument that may be used for the transport or propulsion of the device is not included in this definition if it is separable from the device and not an indivisible part thereof.

Meeting of signatories

Article 6

At the request of any of the signatories or if the Agency established by article 7, should so decide, a meeting of all the signatories may be convoked to consider in common questions which may affect the very essence of this instrument, including possible amendments to it. In either case, the meeting will be convoked by the General Secretary.

## Organization

### Article 7

1. In order to ensure compliance with the obligations of this Treaty, the Contracting Parties hereby establish an international organization to be known as the "Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America", hereinafter referred to as "the Agency". Only the Contracting Parties shall be affected by its decisions.
2. The Agency shall be responsible for the holding of periodic or extraordinary consultations among member States on matters relating to the purposes, measures and procedures set forth in this Treaty and to supervision of compliance with the obligations arising therefrom.
3. The Contracting Parties agree to extend to the Agency full and prompt co-operation in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, of any agreements they may conclude with the Agency and of any agreements the Agency may conclude with any other international organization or body.
4. The headquarters of the Agency shall be in Mexico City.

## Organs

### Article 8

1. There are hereby established as principal organs of the Agency a General Conference, a Council and a Secretariat.
2. Such subsidiary organs as are considered necessary by the General Conference may be established within the purview of this Treaty.

## The General Conference

### Article 9

1. The General Conference, the supreme organ of the Agency, shall be composed of all the Contracting Parties; it shall hold regular sessions every two years, and may also hold special sessions whenever this Treaty so provides, or, in the opinion of the Council, the circumstances so require.
2. The General Conference:
  - (a) May consider and decide on matters or questions covered by the Treaty, within the limits thereof, including those referring to powers and functions of any organ provided for in this Treaty.
  - (b) Shall establish procedures for the control system to ensure observance of this Treaty in accordance with its provisions.

- (c) Shall elect the members of the Council and the General Secretary.
  - (d) May remove the General Secretary from office if the proper functioning of the Agency so requires.
  - (e) Shall receive and consider the biennial and special reports submitted by the Council and the General Secretary.
  - (f) Shall initiate and consider studies designed to facilitate the optimum fulfilment of the aims of this Treaty, without prejudice to the power of the General Secretary independently to carry out similar studies for submission to and consideration by the Conference.
  - (g) Shall be the organ competent to authorize the conclusion of agreements with Governments and other international organizations and bodies.
3. The General Conference shall adopt the Agency's budget and fix the scale of financial contributions to be paid by member States, taking into account the systems and criteria used for the same purpose by the United Nations.
4. The General Conference shall elect its officers for each session and may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.
5. Each member of the Agency shall have one vote. The decisions of the General Conference shall be taken by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting in the case of matters relating to the control system and measures referred to in article 20, the admission of new members, the election or removal of the General Secretary, adoption of the budget and matters related thereto. Decisions on other matters, as well as procedural questions, and also determination of which questions must be decided by a two-thirds majority, shall be taken by a simple majority of the members present and voting.
6. The General Conference shall adopt its own rules of procedure.

### The Council

#### Article 10

1. The Council shall be composed of five members of the Agency elected by the General Conference from among the Contracting Parties, due account being taken of equitable geographical distribution.
2. The members of the Council shall be elected for a term of four years. However, in the first election three will be elected for two years. Outgoing members may not be re-elected for the following period unless the limited number of States for which the Treaty is in force so requires.
3. Each member of the Council shall have one representative.
4. The Council shall be so organized as to be able to function continuously.
5. In addition to the functions conferred upon it by this Treaty and to those which may be assigned to it by the General Conference, the Council shall, through the General Secretary, ensure the proper operation of the control system in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty and with the decisions adopted by the General Conference.
6. The Council shall submit an annual report on its work to the General Conference as well as such special report as it deems necessary or which the General Conference requests of it.
7. The Council shall elect its officers for each session.
8. The decisions of the Council shall be taken by a simple majority of its members present and voting.
9. The Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure.

### The Secretariat

#### Article 11

1. The Secretariat shall consist of a General Secretary, who shall be the chief administrative officer of the Agency, and of such staff as the Agency may require. The term of office of the General Secretary shall be four years and he may be re-elected for a single additional term. The General Secretary may not be a national of the country in which the Agency has its headquarters. In case the office of General Secretary becomes vacant, a new election shall be held to fill the office for the remainder of the term.

2. The staff of the Secretariat shall be appointed by the General Secretary, in accordance with rules laid down by the General Conference.
3. In addition to the functions conferred upon him by this Treaty and to those which may be assigned to him by the General Conference, the General Secretary shall ensure, as provided by article 10, paragraph 5, the proper operation of the control system established by this Treaty, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty and the decisions taken by the General Conference.
4. The General Secretary shall act in that capacity in all meetings of the General Conference and of the Council and shall make an annual report to both bodies on the work of the Agency and any special reports requested by the General Conference or the Council or which the General Secretary may deem desirable.
5. The General Secretary shall establish the procedures for distributing to all Contracting Parties information received by the Agency from governmental sources, and such information from non-governmental sources as may be of interest to the Agency.
6. In the performance of their duties the General Secretary and the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any Government or from any other authority external to the Agency and shall refrain from any action which might reflect on their position as international officials responsible only to the Agency; subject to their responsibility to the Agency, they shall not disclose any industrial secrets or other confidential information coming to their knowledge by reason of their official duties in the Agency.
7. Each of the Contracting Parties undertakes to respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the General Secretary and the staff and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities.

## Control system

### Article 12

1. For the purpose of verifying compliance with the obligations entered into by the Contracting Parties in accordance with article 1, a control system shall be established which shall be put into effect in accordance with the provisions of articles 13 - 18 of this Treaty,
2. The control system shall be used in particular for the purpose of verifying:
  - a. That devices, services and facilities intended for peaceful uses of nuclear energy are not used in the testing or manufacture of nuclear weapons;
  - b. That none of the activities prohibited in article 1 of this Treaty are carried out in the territory of the Contracting Parties with nuclear materials or weapons introduced from abroad, and
  - c. That explosions for peaceful purposes are compatible with article 18 of this Treaty.

## IAEA safeguards

### Article 13

Each Contracting Party shall negotiate multilateral or bilateral agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of its safeguards to its nuclear activities. Each Contracting Party shall initiate negotiations within a period of 180 days after the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification of this Treaty. These agreements shall enter into force, for each Party, not later than eighteen months after the date of the initiation of such negotiations except in case of unforeseen circumstances or force majeure.

## Reports of the parties

### Article 14

1. The Contracting Parties shall submit to the Agency and to the International Atomic Energy Agency, for their information, semi-annual reports stating that no activity prohibited under this Treaty has occurred in their respective territories.

2. The Contracting Parties shall simultaneously transmit to the Agency a copy of any report they may submit to the International Atomic Energy Agency which relates to matters that are the subject of this Treaty and to the application of safeguards.

3. The Contracting Parties shall also transmit to the Organization of American States, for its information, any reports that may be of interest to it, in accordance with the obligations established by the Inter-American System.

Special reports requested by the General Secretary

Article 15

1. With the authorization of the Council, the General Secretary may request any of the Contracting Parties to provide the Agency with complementary or supplementary information regarding any event or circumstance connected with compliance with this Treaty, explaining his reasons. The Contracting Parties undertake to co-operate promptly and fully with the General Secretary.

2. The General Secretary shall inform the Council and the Contracting Parties forthwith of such requests and of the respective replies.

Special inspections

Article 16

1. The International Atomic Energy Agency and the Council established by this Treaty have the power of carrying out special inspections in the following cases:

(a) In the case of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in accordance with the agreements referred to in article 13 of the Treaty;

(b) In the case of the Council:

(i) When so requested, the reasons for the request being stated, by any Party which suspects that some activity prohibited by this Treaty has been carried out or is about to be carried out, either in the territory of any other Party or in any other place on such latter Party's behalf, the Council shall immediately arrange for such an inspection in accordance with article 10, paragraph 5.

(ii) When requested by any Party which has been suspected of or charged with having violated the Treaty, the Council shall immediately arrange for the special inspection requested, in accordance with article 10, paragraph 5.

The above requests will be made to the Council through the General Secretary.

2. The costs and expenses of any special inspection carried out under paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (b), sections (i) and (ii) of this article shall be borne by the requesting Party or Parties, except where the Council concludes on the basis of the report on the special inspection that, in view of the circumstances existing in the case, such costs and expenses should be borne by the Agency.
3. The General Conference shall formulate the procedures for the organization and execution of the special inspections carried out in accordance with paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (b), sections (i) and (ii) of this article.
4. The Contracting Parties undertake to grant the inspectors carrying out such special inspections full and free access to all places and all information which may be necessary for the performance of their duties and which are directly and intimately connected with the suspicion of violation of this Treaty. If so requested by the Contracting Party in whose territory the inspection is carried out, the inspectors designated by the General Conference shall be accompanied by representatives of the authorities of that Contracting Party, provided that this does not in any way delay or hinder the work of the inspectors.
5. The Council shall immediately transmit to all the Parties, through the General Secretary, a copy of any report resulting from special inspections.
6. Similarly, the Council shall send through the General Secretary to the Secretary-General of United Nations for transmission to the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly, and to the Council of the Organization of American States, for its information, a copy of any report resulting from any special inspection carried out in accordance with paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (b), sections (i) and (ii) of this article.

7. The Council may decide, or any Contracting Party may request, the convening of a special session of the General Conference for the purpose of considering the reports resulting from any special inspection. In such a case, the General Secretary shall take immediate steps to convene the special session requested.

8. The General Conference, convened in special session under this article, may make recommendations to the Contracting Parties and submit reports to the Secretary-General of the United Nations to be transmitted to the Security Council and the General Assembly.

Use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes

Article 17

Nothing in the provisions of this Treaty shall prejudice the rights of the Contracting Parties, in conformity with this Treaty, to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in particular for their economic development and social progress.

Explosions for peaceful purposes

Article 18

1. The Contracting Parties may carry out explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes - including explosions which involve devices similar to those used in nuclear weapons - or collaborate with third parties for the same purpose, provided that they do so in accordance with the provisions of this article and the other articles of the Treaty, particularly articles 1 and 5.

2. Contracting Parties intending to carry out, or co-operate in the carrying out of such, an explosion shall notify the Agency and the International Atomic Energy Agency, as far in advance as the circumstances require, of the date of the explosion and shall at the same time provide the following information:

- (a) The nature of the nuclear device and the source from which it was obtained,
  - (b) The place and purpose of the planned explosion,
  - (c) The procedures which will be followed in order to comply with paragraph 3 of this article,
  - (d) The expected force of the device,
  - (e) The fullest possible information on any possible radioactive fall-out that may result from the explosion or explosions, and the measures which will be taken to avoid danger to the population, flora and fauna, and territories of any other Party or Parties.
3. The General Secretary and the technical personnel designated by the Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency may observe all the preparations, including the explosion of the device, and shall have unrestricted access to any area in the vicinity of the site of the explosion in order to ascertain whether the device and the procedures followed during the explosion are in conformity with the information supplied under paragraph 2 of the present article and the other provisions of this Treaty.
4. The Contracting Parties may accept the collaboration of third parties for the purpose set forth in paragraph 1 of the present article, in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3 thereof.

Relations with other international organizations

Article 19

1. The Agency may conclude such agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency as are authorized by the General Conference and as it considers likely to facilitate the efficient operation of the control system established by this Treaty.
2. The Agency may also enter into relations with any international organization or body, especially any which may be established in the future to supervise disarmament or measures for the control of armaments in any part of the world.
3. The Contracting Parties may, if they see fit, request the advice of the Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission on all technical matters connected with the application of the Treaty with which the Commission is competent to deal under its Statute.

Measures in the event of violation of the Treaty

Article 20

1. The General Conference shall take note of all cases in which, in its opinion, any Contracting Party is not complying fully with its obligations under this Treaty and shall draw the matter to the attention of the Party concerned, making such recommendations as it deems appropriate.
2. If, in its opinion, such non-compliance constitutes a violation of this Treaty which might endanger peace and security, the General Conference shall report thereon simultaneously to the Security Council and the General Assembly through the Secretary-General of the United Nations and to the Council of the Organization of American States. The General Conference shall likewise report to the International Atomic Energy Agency for such purposes as are relevant in accordance with its Statute.

United Nations and Organization of American States

Article 21

None of the provisions of this Treaty shall be construed as impairing the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or, in the case of States members of the Organization of American States, under existing regional treaties.

Privileges and immunities

Article 22

1. The Agency shall enjoy in the territory of each of the Contracting Parties such legal capacity and such privileges and immunities as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and the fulfilment of its purposes.
2. Representatives of the Contracting Parties accredited to the Agency and officials of the Agency shall similarly enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the performance of their functions.

3. The Agency may conclude agreements with the Contracting Parties with a view to determining the details of the application of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article.

Notification of other agreements

Article 23

Once this Treaty has entered into force, the Secretariat shall be notified immediately of any international agreement concluded by any of the Contracting Parties on matters with which this Treaty is concerned; the Secretariat shall register it and notify the other Contracting Parties.

Settlement of disputes

Article 24

Unless the Parties concerned agree on another mode of peaceful settlement, any question or dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Treaty which is not settled shall be referred to the International Court of Justice with the prior consent of the parties to the controversy.

Signature

Article 25

1. This Treaty shall be open indefinitely for signature by:

- a. All the Latin American Republics;
- b. All other sovereign States situated in their entirety south of latitude 35° north in the western hemisphere; and, except as provided in paragraph 2 of this article, all such States which become sovereign, when they have been admitted by the General Conference.

2. The General Conference shall not take any decision regarding the admission of a political entity part of all of whose territory is the subject, prior to the date when this Treaty is opened for signature, of a dispute or claim between an extra-continental country and one or more Latin American States, so long as the dispute has not been settled by peaceful means.

Ratification and deposit

Article 26

1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures.
2. This Treaty and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Government of the United States of Mexico, which is hereby designated the Depositary Government.
3. The Depositary Government shall send certified copies of this Treaty to the Governments of signatory States and shall notify them of the deposit of each instrument of ratification.

Reservations

Article 27

This Treaty shall not be subject to reservations.

Entry into Force

Article 28

1. Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3 of this article, this Treaty shall enter into force among the States that have ratified it as soon as the following requirements have been met:
  - (a) Deposit of the instruments of ratification of this Treaty with the Depositary Government by the Governments of the States mentioned in article 25 which are in existence on the date when this Treaty is opened for signature and which are not affected by the provisions of article 25, paragraph 2;
  - (b) Signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I annexed to this Treaty by all extracontinental and continental States having de jure or de facto international responsibility for territories situated in the zone of application of the Treaty;
  - (c) Signature and ratification of the Additional Protocol II annexed to this Treaty by all powers possessing nuclear weapons;
  - (d) Conclusion of bilateral agreements on the application of the Safeguards System of the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with article 13 of this Treaty.

2. All signatory States shall have the imprescriptible right to waive, wholly or in part, the requirements laid down in the preceding paragraph. They may do so by means of a declaration which shall be annexed to their respective instruments of ratification and which may be formulated at the time of deposit of the instrument or subsequently. For those States which exercise this right, this Treaty shall enter into force upon deposit of the declaration, or as soon as those requirements have been met which have not been expressly waived.
3. As soon as this Treaty has entered into force in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 for eleven States, the Depositary Government shall convene a preliminary meeting of those States in order that the Agency may be set up and commence its work.
4. After the entry into force of the Treaty for all the countries of the zone, the rise of a new power possessing nuclear weapons shall have the effect of suspending the execution of this Treaty for those countries which have ratified it without waiving the requirements of paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (c) of this article, and which request such suspension; the Treaty shall remain suspended until the new power, on its own initiative or upon request by the General Conference, ratifies the annexed Additional Protocol.

#### Amendments

#### Article 29

1. Any Contracting Party may propose amendments to this Treaty and shall submit their proposals to the Council through the General Secretary, who shall transmit them to all the other Contracting Parties and, in addition, to signatories in accordance with Article 6. The Council, through the General Secretary, shall, immediately following the meeting of signatories, convene a special session of the General Conference to examine the proposals made, for the adoption of which a two-thirds majority of the Contracting Parties present and voting shall be required.
2. Amendments adopted shall enter into force as soon as the requirements set forth in article 28 of this Treaty have been complied with.

Duration and denunciation

Article 30

1. This Treaty shall be of a permanent nature and shall remain in force indefinitely, but any Party may denounce it by notifying the General Secretary of the Agency if, in the opinion of the denouncing State, there have arisen or may arise circumstances connected with the content of the Treaty or of the annexed Additional Protocols I and II which affect its supreme interests and the peace and security of one or more Contracting Parties.
2. The denunciation shall take effect three months after the delivery to the General Secretary of the Agency of the notification by the Government of the signatory State concerned. The General Secretary shall immediately communicate such notification to the other Contracting Parties and to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for the information of the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations. He shall also communicate it to the Secretary General of the Organization of American States.

Authentic texts and registration

Article 31

This Treaty, of which the Spanish, Chinese, English, French, Portuguese and Russian texts are equally authentic, shall be registered by the Depositary Government in accordance with Article 102 of the United Nations Charter. The Depositary Government shall notify the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the signatures, ratifications and amendments relating to this Treaty and shall communicate them to the Secretary General of the Organization of American States for his information.

Transitional Article

Denunciation of the declaration referred to in Article 28, paragraph 2, shall be subject to the same procedures as the denunciation of the Treaty, except that it shall take effect on the date of delivery of the respective notification.

In witness whereof the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, having deposited their full powers, found in good and due form, sign this Treaty on behalf of their respective Governments.

Done at Mexico, Distrito Federal, on the Fourteenth day of February, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-seven.

#### ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I

The undersigned Plenipotentiaries, furnished with full powers by their respective Governments,

Convinced that the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, negotiated and signed in accordance with the recommendations of the General Assembly of the United Nations in resolution 1911 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963, represents an important step towards ensuring the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons,

Aware that the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is not an end in itself but rather a means of achieving general and complete disarmament at a later stage,

Desiring to contribute, so far as lies in their power, toward ending the armaments race, especially in the field of nuclear weapons, and towards strengthening a world at peace, based on mutual respect and sovereign equality of States,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1. To undertake to apply the status of denuclearization in respect of warlike purposes as defined in Articles 1, 3, 5 and 13 of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America in territories for which, de jure or de facto, they are internationally responsible and which lie within the limits of the geographical zone established in that Treaty.

Article 2. The duration of this Protocol shall be the same as that of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America of which this Protocol is an annex, and the provisions regarding ratification and denunciation contained in the Treaty shall be applicable to it.

Article 3. This Protocol shall enter into force, for the States which have ratified it, on the date of the deposit of their respective instruments of ratification.

In witness whereof the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, having deposited their full powers, found in good and due form, sign this Treaty on behalf of their respective Governments.

## ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL II

The undersigned Plenipotentiaries, furnished with full powers by their respective Governments,

Convinced that the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, negotiated and signed in accordance with the recommendations of the General Assembly of the United Nations in resolution 1911 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963, is an important step towards ensuring the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons,

Aware that the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is not an end in itself achieving general and complete disarmament at a later stage,

Desiring to contribute, so far as lies in their power, towards ending the ~~armaments~~ race, especially in the field of nuclear weapons, and toward promoting and strengthening a world at peace based on mutual respect and sovereign equality of States,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1. The status of denuclearization of Latin America in respect of warlike purposes, as defined, delimited and set forth in the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America of which this instrument is an annex, shall be fully respected by the Parties to this Protocol in all its express aims and provisions.

Article 2. The Governments represented by the undersigned Plenipotentiaries undertake, therefore, not to contribute in any way to the performance of acts involving a violation of the obligations of article 1 of the Treaty in the territories to which the Treaty applies in accordance with article 4 thereof.

Article 3. The Governments represented by the undersigned Plenipotentiaries also undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America.

Article 4. The duration of this Protocol shall be the same as that of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America of which this Protocol is an annex, and the definitions of territory and nuclear weapons set forth in articles 3 and 5 of the Treaty shall be applicable to the Protocol, as well as the provisions regarding ratification, reservations, denunciation, authentic texts and registration contained in articles 26, 27, 30 and 31 of the Treaty.

Article 5. This Protocol shall enter into force, for the States which have ratified it, on the date of the deposit of their respective instruments of ratification.

In witness whereof the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, having deposited their full powers, found in good and due form, sign this Treaty on behalf of their respective Governments.

RESOLUTION 22 (IV)

Twenty-second session of the United Nations General Assembly

The Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America,

Having regard to the spirit and intention in which United Nations General Assembly resolution 1911 (XVIII) was adopted,

Convinced that it has spared no effort to arrive at the conclusion of a multilateral agreement to establish in Latin America a zone permanently free of nuclear weapons,

Conscious that the opening and signature of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America are important to the world effort to halt the armaments race and, in particular, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and accordingly make a significant contribution towards reducing international tension for the benefit of peace,

Decides

To recommend to the Governments of the member States that they should jointly promote the inclusion in the agenda for the United Nations General Assembly's twenty-second session of the item: "Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America", in order that the representatives of the signatory States may explain, in the forum of the world Organization, the significance and scope of the provisions of the Treaty.

RESOLUTION 23 (IV)

The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and IAEA

The Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America,

Considering that the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, which is to be opened for signature at Mexico City on 14 February 1967, constitutes a distinguished contribution by the signatory States to the international community's effort to avert the danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons and thereby marks an important step, as a collateral measure, towards general and complete disarmament,

Considering at the same time that the faithful application of the Treaty entails the good will and co-operation of the international organs concerned with disarmament and the participation, in particular, of the International Atomic Energy Agency in substantial parts of the control system provided for in the said Treaty,

Decides

1. To recommend the Chairman to transmit, by such means as he deems most appropriate, the Final Act of this session, which includes the full text of the Treaty, to the Co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament;

2. To request the Chairman to transmit to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, for all appropriate purposes, the Final Act of this session with the full text of the Treaty.

#### RESOLUTION 24 (IV)

##### Text of the Treaty in the Chinese and Russian languages

##### The Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America,

Having regard to United Nations General Assembly resolution 1911 (XVIII), which, in operative paragraph 4, requests the Secretary-General to extend to the States of Latin America such technical facilities as they may require in order to achieve their aim of prohibiting nuclear weapons in Latin America for ever,

##### Decides

1. To request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to prepare the Chinese and Russian texts of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, and of the two Additional Protocols to the said Treaty, which are to be opened for signature at Mexico City on 14 February 1967;
2. Further to request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to be good enough to have the Final Act of the fourth session of the Preparatory Commission circulated among all States Members of the United Nations as a General Assembly document;
3. To ask the Chairman to transmit this resolution to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

#### RESOLUTION 25 (IV)

##### Depositary Government

##### The Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America

1. Conveys to the Government of Mexico thanks in advance for its co-operation as Depositary Government of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America;
2. Requests the Government of Mexico to make the necessary arrangements to ensure the continuation of the documentation and information services for which the secretariat of the Preparatory Commission has been responsible;
3. Recommends it to undertake the preparations for the preliminary meeting provided for in article 28, paragraph 3, of the Treaty.

RESOLUTION 26 (IV)

Vote of gratitude

The Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America,

Having completed the task entrusted to it by the Preliminary Meeting on the Denuclearization of Latin America,

Conscious that the peaceful and Americanist policy of the Government of Mexico has been of value morally, practically and in every way in the successful discharge of its responsibilities, and that the said Government has made a valuable contribution by providing all the facilities and services needed to enable the Commission secretariat to work efficiently,

Having received with all due respect and warmth the demonstrations of support in its task which have been made to it by the Mexican authorities,

Sure that it faithfully interprets the wishes of the Governments and peoples who laid on the Commission the responsibility of preparing for a Latin America free from the consequences of the use of nuclear energy in war,

Decides

1. To convey to the Government of Mexico its gratitude for the moral and material contribution it has made to the Commission throughout its existence;
2. To submit to His Excellency Gustavo Díaz Ordaz, the President of the United Mexican States, and to His Excellency Antonio Carrillo Flores, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Mexico, a clear and expressive statement of its deep appreciation for the support they have given the Preparatory Commission in the performance of its functions and for the facilities they have provided for its work.

RESOLUTION 27 (IV)

Vote of thanks

The Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America,

Seeking to make the results of its efforts as good and as lasting as possible,

Keenly aware, for this high purpose, of the contributions it has received from the holders of offices of particular prominence in the Commission's proceedings,

Conscious of the merit which has distinguished the services of those officers of the Commission who have been called upon to play a particularly representative part in the Preparatory Commission,

Recalling with satisfaction the agreements reached by this Commission and by the Preliminary Meeting on the Denuclearization of Latin America concerning the appointment of the Commission's officers and the organization of the work of this Latin American body,

Decides

1. To express in this resolution the deep appreciation which is due to His Excellency Ambassador Alfonso García Robles for having brought the task entrusted to the Preparatory Commission to a successful conclusion through his distinguished services as its Chairman;
2. To extend its congratulations to Their Excellencies Ambassador José Sette Camara, Ambassador Rafael Eguizábal Tobías and Ambassador Sérgio Corrêa da Costa on their efficient work as Vice-Chairmen of the Commission;
3. To record its gratitude to His Excellency Carlos Peón del Valle, General Secretary, His Excellency Antonio González de León, Deputy Secretary, Mr. Donaciano González, Mr. Sergio González Gálvez, Mr. Álvaro Carranco Ávila, Mr. Joaquín Mercado and other officials of the secretariat for the zeal and diligence with which they have contributed to the success of the Preparatory Commission's task.

RESOLUTION 28 (IV)

Vote of appreciation

The Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America,

Deeply grateful for the co-operation it has received, in its own work and in the specific activities of its various organs, from the United Nations Secretariat,

Particularly thankful for the generous spirit of co-operation shown by the United Nations Secretariat whenever recourse has been had to operative paragraph 4 of United Nations General Assembly resolution 1911 (XVIII) in order that the Secretary-General of the United Nations might extend to the States of Latin America, at their request, such technical facilities as they might require for the purposes of ensuring the denuclearization of Latin America,

Esteeming likewise the technical co-operation with which the International Atomic Energy Agency has contributed to its work,

Decides

1. To address a vote of thanks to His Excellency U Thant, Secretary-General of the United Nations, for the valuable services which the international organization under his charge has rendered to the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America by appointing Mr. William Epstein, the Technical Consultant, whose ability and efficiency the Commission takes pleasure in acknowledging once again;

2. To extend this vote of thanks to Dr. Sigvard Eklund, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, for having accredited to the Commission Mr. Reinhard H. Rainer as Observer and, in that capacity, as a distinguished participant in the Preparatory Commission's work.

RESOLUTION 29 (IV)

Vote of appreciation

The Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America,

Considering it a matter of justice to express the gratitude of its members and of the countries they represent to Mr. Adolfo López Mateos, the former President of Mexico who, sincerely anxious to preserve our peoples from the terrible dangers of nuclear wars, took the initial steps towards the conclusion of a treaty to prohibit nuclear weapons on our continent,

Decides

To record a vote of appreciation to Mr. Adolfo López Mateos, the former President of Mexico, for his magnanimous initiative and decisive contribution to the cause of peace.

This Final Act was adopted unanimously by the Preparatory Commission at the forty-ninth plenary meeting, held on 14 February 1967.

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of the Final Act  
of the fourth session  
of the Preparatory Commission  
for the Denuclearization of Latin America

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# CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/187  
21 February 1967  
Original: ENGLISH

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## UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

### Message of the President of the United States, Lyndon B. Johnson, to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

The Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee reconvenes today in a time of renewed hope. Conclusion of a treaty banning weapons of mass destruction in outer space, and a treaty for a Latin American nuclear free zone, give new impetus to the effort to bring the arms race under control.

The Disarmament Committee now faces a great opportunity -- a treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. I earnestly hope that it will soon be possible to recommend draft provisions of a non-proliferation treaty for the consideration of the Committee.

As I pointed out to the Congress in my State of the Union Message, the world is "in the midst of a great transition, a transition from narrow nationalism to international partnership; from the harsh spirit of the cold war to the hopeful spirit of common humanity on a troubled and threatened planet".

Our deepest obligation to ourselves and to our children is to bring nuclear weapons under control. We have already made considerable progress. The next step is to prevent the further spread of these weapons. If we fail to act now, nation after nation will be driven to use valuable resources to acquire them. Even local conflicts will involve the danger of nuclear war. Nuclear arms will spread to potentially unstable areas where open warfare has taken place during the last decade. Indeed, all the progress of the past few years toward a less dangerous world may well be undone.

A non-proliferation treaty must be equitable as between the nuclear and the non-nuclear-weapon powers. I am confident that we can achieve such equity and that the security of all nations will be enhanced.

Such a treaty will help free the non-nuclear nations from the agonizing decision of whether to pursue a search for security through nuclear arms. Freed from the fear that non-nuclear neighbors may develop such weapons, nations can devote their efforts in the field of atomic energy to developing strong, peaceful programs.

I have instructed our negotiators to exercise the greatest care that the treaty not hinder the non-nuclear powers in their development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. We believe in sharing the benefits of scientific progress and we will continue to act accordingly. Through IAEA, through EURATOM, and through other international channels, we have shared -- and will continue to share -- the knowledge we have gained about nuclear energy. There will be no barrier to effective co-operation among the signatory nations.

I am sure we all agree that a non-proliferation treaty should not contain any provisions that would defeat its major purpose. The treaty must, therefore, cover nuclear explosive devices for peaceful as well as military purposes. The technology is the same. A peaceful nuclear explosive device would, in effect, also be a highly sophisticated weapon.

However, this will not impose any technological penalty on the participating nations. The United States is prepared to make available nuclear explosive services for peaceful purposes on a non-discriminatory basis under appropriate international safeguards. We are prepared to join other nuclear states in a commitment to do this.

More generally, we recommend that the treaty clearly state the intention of its signatories to make available the full benefits of peaceful nuclear technology -- including any benefits that are the by-product of weapons research.

To assure that the peaceful atom remains peaceful, we must work toward a broad international system of safeguards satisfactory to all concerned. The treaty provides a unique opportunity for progress to this end.

Agreement on a treaty to stop the spread of nuclear weapons will be an historic turning point in the long effort to bring the atom to heel. It will, I am confident, permit further co-operative steps to reduce nuclear armaments. Plain sanity calls for a halt to the competition in nuclear arms.

There is nothing to choose here between the interests of the nuclear and the non-nuclear nations: there is a terrible and inescapable equity in our common danger. I wish you Godspeed in your work.

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT**

ENDC/188  
21 February 1967  
Original: ENGLISH

UNITED KINGDOM

Message to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament  
from the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Mr. Harold Wilson

The 1967 Session of the E.N.D.C. will be of critical importance. I believe that we have now reached the point at which, given the political will, a Treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons can be negotiated soon. This is the most urgent of the Committee's tasks.

Such an agreement, however, cannot stand on its own. If, as I hope, the Committee's negotiations result in a non-proliferation treaty, this must spur it on to new endeavours. I believe that progress is possible in two most important areas. The first is that of a complete test ban; the second, real progress to more general disarmament, particularly in nuclear weapons. Dangerous tendencies now exist which could lead the world into a new arms race. It must be the Committee's objective to halt these tendencies and to begin the pressing task of reducing nuclear stocks and conventional forces, so that the world can devote a higher proportion of its resources to the problems of hunger and inequality.

In seeking these objectives the Committee will have the full support of the United Kingdom. I send it my best wishes for a fruitful Session.

GE.67-2699  
67-04336

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/191  
19 July 1967

Original: ENGLISH

SWEDEN

MEMORANDUM

on the control of an underground test ban treaty.

1. Purpose

The purpose of this document is to provide a more detailed explanation of the scientific background to some of the statements on the problems of underground test ban control, made by the Representative of Sweden in the ENDC on June 29, 1967 (ENDC/PV.309). To make it more generally accessible, descriptive language has been used. To be fully understandable some of the points would, however, require an explanation in mathematical terms.

As stated in the speech, the Swedish investigations have been concentrated on the question of how to use seismological methods of identification to distinguish underground explosions among earthquakes for the purpose of verifying an underground test ban treaty.

2. Analytical  
method used

The statistical method of evaluation employed constitutes an application of decision theory and is a further development of the method described in a report from the National Defence Research Institute in Stockholm<sup>1/</sup>. It has been used to evaluate both the case of control with inspection and the case of such control without inspection.

The basic assumption made was that a convincing control system would have to satisfy two political requirements:

(1) It should provide sufficient deterrence against violations by making the probability for discovery sufficiently high;

(2) It should contain adequate assurance against the risk that "freaks of nature", in the form of earthquakes similar in appearance to explosions, should induce unwarranted political accusations.

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<sup>1/</sup> Approaches to some test ban control problems, National Defence Research Institute, Stockholm Report C 4286 - 20(23) 1967

These political requirements were put into mathematical form together with the statistical properties of the identification method investigated. The quantities obtained were then used in a mathematical model of control procedures which takes into account the always present risks of mistaking explosions for earthquakes and vice versa. (The appearance now and then of explosions looking like earthquakes is covered in this way). This model then provides a procedure by which to determine the level of earthquake similarity below which an event is regarded as an explosion. This level is selected in such a way as to provide the required deterrence against violations and at the same time providing sufficient assurance against mistakes concerning earthquakes. An essential feature of the method employed is that it also permits the determination of the most efficient level of earthquake-similarity, efficient in the sense that the required deterrent is maintained at the same time as - in the non-inspection case - the risk for mistakes concerning earthquakes is made as small as possible. Likewise, in the inspection case, the number of inspections required is minimized.

In conclusion, the method employed provides a procedure to determine whether a particular identification method, exploited in the most efficient way, meets a particular political control requirement or not.

3. Specific assumptions

The method involves eight basic quantities. These are described more fully in the following. In order to be able to make the calculations, specific numerical values have been assigned to some of them. This is also explained below.

For three of the eight quantities the numerical values are determined by nature and by the observational techniques available.

For the purpose of calculation, the number of earthquakes per year in the area to be monitored was taken as 200. According to an official statement in the United States<sup>2/</sup> this corresponds to the yearly number of shallow earthquakes in the Soviet Union, of magnitudes larger than 4. This number has also been said to be not far from the corresponding number of earthquakes in the United States. The particular magnitude level of 4 was selected as being close to the level of routine detection by the powerful seismological LISA station in Montana. Events of magnitudes just above this detection level will, because of the sophisticated post detection processing possible with data from this station, have a signal to noise ratio which is helpful to identification analysis also of these weak events. The magnitude corresponds to underground explosions in hard rock of nuclear devices with yields of approximately one kiloton.

Two statistical quantities were employed to describe the particular identification methods considered. One of them is determined by the physical properties of earthquakes and the other by the corresponding properties of explosions. Both are influenced by the particular method of measurement employed. In all, five identification methods were studied. The statistical properties of these various methods were obtained from published reports or from articles in scientific journals. Three of them<sup>3/</sup> make use of local or regional data, measured within approximately 1000 km from the event. (For the purpose of test ban control such regional data could be obtained through a proper international data exchange.) The two

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2/ US Congress, Hearings on Developments in Technical Capabilities for Detecting and Identifying Nuclear Weapon Tests, March 1963.

3/ J. Brune, A. Espinosa and J. Oliver  
Journal of Geophysical Research, June 1, 1963, p.3501-3513

E. Jebe and D. Willis  
Earthquake Notes, September-October 1964, p.28-40

A. Brooker and W. Mitronovas  
Bulletin of the Seismological Society of America,  
Volume 54, 1964, p.961-971.

other identification methods considered<sup>4/</sup> employ teleseismic data, obtained at distances between 2000 and 10000 km from the event. (These can thus be used over intercontinental distances.)

The remaining five quantities involved in our analysis express the political requirements of the control procedure. Their numerical determination is largely a matter of political and technical judgement and should be considered as a major step in the definition of a control system.

The sufficient deterrence against violations is defined by two quantities: the number of explosions per year in violation of a treaty and a sufficiently high probability of disclosure of such violations. In our calculations the number of these explosions was chosen to be one per year. The disclosure probability level was put at 10 per cent, meaning that a prospective violator would have to face one chance in ten of being disclosed. This level was estimated to be high enough to deter from violations in view of the high political costs involved in a disclosure. As a matter of fact, this figure seems to have been used in similar calculations in the United States. It should not be confused with the higher levels of disclosure desirable in intelligence activities, where one, of course, wants to find out as much as possible.

The second political requirement of the control system, as outlined in the Swedish speech, concerns the adequate assurance against the risk that earthquakes, similar in appearance to explosions, could lead to unwarranted political accusations.

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<sup>4/</sup> E.J. Kelly  
Semiannual Technical Summary report on Seismic Discrimination,  
31 December 1966, Lincoln Laboratory, Lexington, Mass.

P.D. Marshall, E.W. Carpenter, A. Douglas and J.B. Young  
Atomic Weapons Research Establishment report No.0-67/66,  
Aldermaston, Berks, UK, October 1966.

In the case of control with inspection the process of verification contains two steps. In the first one mistakes concerning earthquakes on the basis of seismological and collateral evidence are of limited importance as the final political decision will be made only after that the second step, that of inspection, has given conclusive evidence of a violation. The case of control with on-site inspection therefore has to take into account the number of such inspections required or permitted. At the outset of our calculations this number was left open as a quantity to be determined by the calculation. In the inspection case the efficiency of inspections also has to be taken into account. This will depend on the inspection procedure provided in the treaty (in past test ban discussions referred to as inspection modalities) and on available techniques for event localization and on-site inspection. This inspection efficiency was taken into account in terms of the probability that inspections of violations will be successful. This probability was put at 50 per cent, being an estimate of what event location capabilities and modalities could provide, taken together.

In the case of control without on-site inspections, the guarantee given by the inspections against mistaking in the final assessment earthquakes for explosions does not exist and has to be replaced by an extremely low probability for making such mistakes. This probability is measured by the expected number of years between such mistakes. In our calculations this number was left open as a quantity to be determined. In assessing the results, we assumed that control systems, where such mistakes are expected to occur only once in a hundred years, are acceptable and that systems with one mistake in ten years are worth being discussed.

#### 4. Results

Using the assumptions described above the calculations showed that some of the identification methods that have been published are of rather limited efficiency. However, data on the British tele-seismic or long distance method of identification by complexity, as presented by Kelly in the report referred to in an earlier footnote and obtained with the LASA station in Montana, indicate the

possibility of a control system with no more than one on-site inspection in two years. A similar number of on-site inspections would be sufficient if regional data, proper to the identification method developed in the United States by Booker and Mitronovas and also referred to above, could be obtained, for instance, through an international data exchange. If combined, these two methods should result in a further decrease in the number of on-site inspections required. This constitutes considerable progress if compared with the requirement of several inspections per year stated in the past.

The efficiency of the published identification methods has indeed improved so much during the last years that it has become meaningful to discuss the possibilities for control without inspection. The data on identification by complexity, already referred to, indicate the possibility of an inspection-free control system with the required ten per cent deterrence level and limiting mistakes concerning earthquakes to once in 15 years. This might constitute an acceptable system in itself. It would be further improved if regional data for the Booker and Mitronovas identification method were made available through an international data exchange.

The most promising of the published identification methods is, however, one which makes use of certain simultaneous measurements, from long distances, of long period and short period waves. The value of this method was recognized at an early stage by British scientists and the data on this method, published by Marshall et al. in the British report referred to earlier, indicate the possibility of an inspection-free system operating at a deterrence level of more than 10 per cent and limiting mistakes concerning earthquakes to one in a hundred years. This would be a very impressive system but in this case our estimates rest on rather few observations and one should be cautious in using our conclusions until more data have been made available. To include in its practical application sufficiently low magnitudes this short period/long period method of identification requires that the sensitive short period array stations are combined with arrays of very sensitive long period instruments and powerful computers.

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT**

ENDC/192  
24 August 1967  
Original: ENGLISH

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Draft Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Parties to the Treaty",

Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,

In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,

Undertaking to co-operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,

Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,

Convinced that in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to this Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

Declaring their intention that potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions should be available through appropriate international procedures to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used should be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race,

Urging the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Noting that nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories,

Have agreed as follows:

#### ARTICLE I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

#### ARTICLE II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

ARTICLE III

(International Control)

ARTICLE IV

Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty, as well as the right of the Parties to participate in the fullest possible exchange of information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

ARTICLE V

1. Any Party to this Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for all Parties upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes and provisions of the Treaty are being realized.

ARTICLE VI

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of \_\_\_\_\_, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by all nuclear weapon States signatory to this Treaty, and \_\_\_\_\_ other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

#### ARTICLE VII

This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

#### ARTICLE VIII

This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

Done in \_\_\_\_\_ at \_\_\_\_\_ this \_\_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_\_\_.

# CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/193  
24 August 1967  
English  
Original: RUSSIAN

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## UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

### Draft Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Parties to the Treaty",

Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,

In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,

Undertaking to cooperate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,

Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,

Convinced that in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to this Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in cooperation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

Declaring their intention that potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions should be available through appropriate international procedures to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used should be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race,

Urging the co-operation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Noting that nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories,

Have agreed as follows:

#### ARTICLE I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

#### ARTICLE II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

ARTICLE III

(International Control)

ARTICLE IV

Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty, as well as the right of the Parties to participate in the fullest possible exchange of information for, and to contribute alone or in cooperation with other States to, the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

ARTICLE V

1. Any Party to this Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for all Parties upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes and provisions of the Treaty are being realized.

#### ARTICLE VI

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of \_\_\_\_\_, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by all nuclear-weapon States signatory to this Treaty, and \_\_\_\_\_ other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

#### ARTICLE VII

This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

ARTICLE VIII

This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

Done in \_\_\_\_\_ at \_\_\_\_\_ this \_\_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_\_\_.

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/194  
24 August 1967  
Original: ENGLISH

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Statement of President Lyndon B. Johnson dated 24 August 1967

"Today at Geneva the United States and the Soviet Union as Co-Chairmen of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee are submitting to the Committee a draft treaty to stop the spread of nuclear weapons.

"For more than twenty years, the world has watched with growing fear as nuclear weapons have spread.

"Since 1945, five nations have come into possession of these dreadful weapons. We believe now - as we did then - that even one such nation is too many. But the issue now is not whether some have nuclear weapons while others do not. The issue is whether the nations will agree to prevent a bad situation from becoming worse.

"Today, for the first time, we have within our reach an instrument which permits us to make a choice.

"The submission of a draft treaty brings us to the final and most critical stage of this effort. The draft will be available for consideration by all governments, and for negotiation by the Conference.

"The treaty must reconcile the interests of nations with our interest as a community of human beings on a small planet. The treaty must be responsive to the needs and problems of all the nations of the world - great and small, aligned and non-aligned, nuclear and non-nuclear.

"It must add to the security of all.

"It must encourage the development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

"It must provide adequate protection against the corruption of the peaceful atom to its use for weapons of war.

"I am convinced that we are today offering an instrument that will meet these requirements.

"If we now go forward to completion of a worldwide agreement, we will pass on a great gift to those who follow us.

"We shall demonstrate that - despite all his problems, quarrels, and distractions - man still retains a capacity to design his fate, rather than be engulfed by it.

"Failure to complete our work will be interpreted by our children and grandchildren as a betrayal of conscience, in a world that needs all of its resources and talents to serve life, not death.

"I have given instructions to the United States representative, William C. Foster, which reflect our determination to ensure that a fair and effective treaty is concluded.

"The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament now has before it the opportunity to make a cardinal contribution to man's safety and peace."

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/195  
30 August 1967  
Original: ENGLISH

SWEDEN

Draft Text of an Article on International Control  
to be inserted in the Draft Treaty on the  
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Article III

For the purpose of providing assurance that source or special fissionable material, covered by this article, shall not be diverted to nuclear weapons:

1. Each State Party to this Treaty undertakes

- (a) not to allow source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to be transferred to any other State unless such material and equipment are subject to the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and
- (b) to apply the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency on all such material and equipment, transferred to its territory or territory under its jurisdiction after the entry into force of the Treaty.

2. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes, in addition, to accept the full application of the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency on all nuclear energy activities within its territory or territory under its jurisdiction.

3. Each nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes, in addition, to co-operate in facilitating the gradual application of the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency on the peaceful nuclear energy activities within its territory or territory under its jurisdiction.

4. For such transfers referred to in paragraph 1 of this article, or such nuclear energy activities referred to in paragraph 2 of this article, as are regulated by bilateral or multilateral arrangements entered into before the date of the original entry into force of this Treaty, the obligations stipulated in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be implemented as soon as practicable, but not later than three years from the date of the original entry into force of the Treaty.

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT**

ENDC/196

19 September 1967

Original: English/Spanish

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MEXICO

Working Paper  
containing a Summary of the suggested Additions to  
the Draft Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear  
Weapons, made by the Delegation of Mexico in its  
Statement at the 331st Meeting of the ENDC  
dated 19 September 1967

ARTICLE IV

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.

2. All the Parties to this Treaty have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific and technological information on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Those Parties that are in a position to do so, have the duty to contribute, according to their ability, alone or in cooperation with other States or international organizations, to the further development of the production, industries, and other applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States.

ARTICLE IV-A

1. Nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty shall provide adequate means and facilities to make available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty the potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions.

2. Such assistance shall be requested and channeled through appropriate international bodies with adequate representation of non-nuclear weapon States, subject to procedures to be established in a special agreement; it shall be provided on a non-discriminatory basis and shall not be withheld because of extraneous considerations. The charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used should be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development.

ARTICLE IV-B

Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

ARTICLE IV-C

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith, with all speed and perseverance, to arrive at further agreements regarding the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests, the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery, as well as to reach agreement on a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament under strict and effective international control.

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT**

ENDC/197  
26 September 1967  
ENGLISH  
Original: FRENCH

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UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

Working Paper containing the formulation of  
certain suggestions for incorporation in  
the Draft Treaty on the Non-Proliferation  
of Nuclear Weapons

ARTICLE I

(1) Second line - after the words "any recipient whatsoever" add:  
"in any form whatsoever".

(2) At the end of article I, add the following new paragraph:

"Each nuclear-weapon State undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that no person, company, enterprise or private, public or semi-public body that is subject to its jurisdiction and is engaged in nuclear activities participates in any act which is prohibited by this article."

ARTICLE II

Insert the following at the end of the last sentence:

"..., and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices".

ARTICLE IV-A:

"Each nuclear-weapon State undertakes not to use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty which has no nuclear weapons on its territory".

# CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/199  
19 October 1967  
ENGLISH  
Original: FRENCH

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## ROMANIA

### Working Paper containing amendments and additions to the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

#### PREAMBLE

1. After the third paragraph, introduce a new paragraph:

"Recognizing that the danger of a nuclear war can be eliminated only by the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, and the destruction of all existing stockpiles of such weapons and of the means of their delivery".

2. At the end of the fourth paragraph, add the following provisions:

"... based on the following principles:

(a) The treaty should be void of any loop-holes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear Powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form;

(b) The treaty should embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers;

(c) The treaty should be a step towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament and, more particularly, nuclear disarmament;

(d) There should be acceptable and workable provisions to ensure the effectiveness of the treaty;

(e) Nothing in the treaty should adversely affect the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories".

3. Replace the present fifth preambular paragraph by the following text:

"Undertaking to co-operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards to their peaceful nuclear activities in accordance with the bilateral or multilateral agreements concluded by them".

4. After the sixth paragraph, insert a new paragraph:

"Affirming the absolute right of all States, whether they possess nuclear weapons or not, to undertake research on the peaceful applications of nuclear energy and to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, both now and in the future, on the basis of equality and without any discrimination".

5. In the ninth paragraph:

Replace the words "declaring their intention" by the words "expressing their determination".

After the words "through appropriate international procedures", add the words: "accepted by all States signatories to the Treaty".

6. In the twelfth preambular paragraph, after the words "in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons", amend the text to read: "the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery, and to achieve eventually the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."

ARTICLE III A

1. "The nuclear-weapon States Parties to this Treaty undertake to adopt specific measures to bring about as soon as possible the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and the reduction and destruction of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery".

2. "If five years after the entry into force of this Treaty such measures have not been adopted, the Parties shall consider the situation created and decide on the measures to be taken".

ARTICLE III B

"Nuclear-weapon States Parties to this Treaty solemnly undertake never in any circumstances to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States which undertake not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons".

ARTICLE IV

After the words "use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes", add the words "on a basis of equality".

ARTICLE V

Delete the second sentence of paragraph 2 and replace it by the following text:

"The amendment shall enter into force, for every Party having deposited its instruments of ratification thereof, upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Parties to this Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency".

2. After paragraph 3, insert a new paragraph:

Such conferences shall be convened thereafter periodically every five years, to review the manner in which the obligations assumed by all Parties to this Treaty are carried out.

ARTICLE VII

Delete the last sentence of this article, beginning with the words "Such notice shall include ...".

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CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/200  
24 October 1967  
ENGLISH  
Original: FRENCH

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I T A L Y

Amendment to article VII of the Draft Treaty on the  
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

ARTICLE VII

1. This treaty shall have a duration of X years and shall be renewed automatically for any party which shall not have given, six months before the date of expiry of the treaty, notice of its intention to withdraw from the treaty.

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT**

ENDC/200/Rev.1  
26 October 1967  
ENGLISH  
Original: English/French

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I T A L Y

Amendment to article VII of the Draft Treaty on the  
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

ARTICLE VII

1. This treaty shall have a duration of X years and shall be renewed automatically for any party which shall not have given, six months before the date of expiry of the treaty, notice of its intention to cease to be party to the treaty.

# CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/201

31 October 1967

Original: ENGLISH

## BRAZIL

### Amendments to the Draft Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

1. Article I shall be amended to read as follows:

"Article I. Each nuclear weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or control over such weapons directly or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or control over such weapons. Each nuclear weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes the obligation to channel, through a special United Nations fund, for the benefit of the economic development of developing countries, in particular for their scientific and technological progress, a substantial part of the resources freed by the measures of nuclear disarmament."

2. Article II shall be amended to read as follows:

"Article II. Each non nuclear weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or the control over such weapons directly or indirectly, not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture, acquisition or control of nuclear weapons."

3. A new article, provisionally numbered II-A, shall be included and formulated as follows:

"Article II-A. Each nuclear weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes the obligation to negotiate at the earliest possible date a Treaty for the cessation of nuclear arms race and for the eventual reduction and elimination of their nuclear arsenals and the means of delivery of their nuclear weapons."

4. Article IV shall be amended to read as follows:

"Article IV. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop, alone or in cooperation with other States, research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including nuclear explosive devices for civil uses, without discrimination, as well as the right of the Parties to participate in

the fullest possible exchange of information for, and to contribute alone or in cooperation with other States to, the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes."

5. Paragraph 2 of article V shall be amended to read as follows:

"2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear weapon States Party to this Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force upon the deposit of the instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear weapon States Party to this Treaty, and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency."

6. Paragraph 3 of article V shall be amended to read as follows:

"3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty, with a view to assuring that the purposes and provisions of the Treaty are being realized, in particular the provisions of articles I and II-A."

7. Paragraph 3 of article VI shall be amended to read as follows:

"3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by all nuclear weapon States signatory to this Treaty, and \_\_\_\_\_ other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is the one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon prior to January 1, 1967."

8. A new paragraph to article VI, provisionally numbered paragraph 7, shall be included and formulated as follows:

"7. Nothing in this Treaty affects nor shall be interpreted as affecting, in any way, the rights or obligations of signatory States under regional treaties on the proscription of nuclear weapons or the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties, consistent with the objectives of this Treaty".

9. Article VII shall be amended to read as follows:

"Article VII. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that there have arisen or may arise circumstances related with the subject matter of this Treaty which may affect the supreme interest of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to the Depositary Governments, three months in advance."

# CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/202  
2 November 1967  
Original: ENGLISH

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## NIGERIA

### Working Paper containing additions and amendments for inclusion in the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

#### ARTICLE IIA:

Each nuclear weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes, if requested, to come to the aid of any non-nuclear weapon State which is threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons.

#### ARTICLE IVA:

Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to cooperate directly or through the IAEA, in good faith and according to its technological and/or material resources, with any other State or group of States Party to this Treaty in the development and advancement of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, and in the fullest possible exchange of scientific and technological information on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The nuclear weapon States Party to this Treaty shall make available, through the IAEA, to all non-nuclear weapon Parties, full scientific and technological information on the peaceful applications of nuclear energy accruing from research on nuclear explosive devices.

The nuclear weapon States Party to the Treaty shall also provide facilities for scientists from non-nuclear weapon countries Party to the Treaty to collaborate with their scientists working on nuclear explosive devices, in order to narrow the intellectual gap which will be created in that field as a result of restrictions imposed by this Treaty on non-nuclear weapon States.

#### ARTICLE IVB:

Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to communicate annually to the IAEA, full information on the nature, extent and results of its cooperation with any other Party or group of Parties, in the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The Reports so received by the IAEA shall be circulated by the Agency to all the Parties to the Treaty.

ARTICLE IVC:

Each Party to this Treaty shall take necessary legal and administrative steps to ensure that all organisations working on the development of nuclear energy in territory under its jurisdiction do so in conformity with the aims and provisions of the Treaty.

ARTICLE VII:

This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides:

- (a) that the aims of the Treaty are being frustrated;
- (b) that the failure by a State or group of States to adhere to the Treaty jeopardizes the existing or potential balance of power in its area, thereby threatening its security;
- (c) any other extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.

It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of reasons for withdrawal.

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT**

ENDC/203  
22 November 1967  
Original: ENGLISH

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UNITED KINGDOM

Suggested Amendment to the third paragraph  
of Article V of the Draft Treaty on the  
Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Article V

3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realised.

# CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/204  
24 November 1967  
ENGLISH  
Original: FRENCH

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AIDE-MEMOIRE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF SWITZERLAND PRESENTED  
ON 17 NOVEMBER 1967 TO THE CO-CHAIRMAN OF THE  
CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

Switzerland is paying the greatest attention to the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. It is convinced that the interest of the community of nations requires that the spread and proliferation of nuclear weapons should be checked. Hence it hopes very much that a satisfactory non-proliferation treaty will be concluded.

The present draft treaty (ENDC/192, 193) cannot yet give rise to the adoption of a definitive position by the Swiss Government, since the text is subject to amendment and one of its main articles is missing. Nevertheless, the draft calls for some comments which it is to be hoped that the negotiators will be able to take into account.

- (1) Articles I and II of the draft treaty contain some ideas which should be defined more accurately in order to clarify the commitments which they entail.
  - (a) The two articles prohibit the direct or indirect transfer of any nuclear explosive device. The Swiss authorities consider that the term "indirect" concerns the supply of arms, explosives or technical assistance for military purposes through the agency of a third State whether a Party to the treaty or not.
  - (b) The phrase "to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices" does not cover, according to the interpretation of the Swiss authorities, exploitation of uranium deposits, enrichment of uranium, extraction of plutonium from nuclear fuels, or manufacture of fuel elements or heavy water, when these processes are carried out for civil purposes.

The Swiss authorities would like these interpretations to be confirmed formally.

(2) The future article III on control should express in particular the following principles:

- (a) Control should be limited to the flow of source and special fissionable materials, as indeed the fifth paragraph of the preamble provides. It should not go **beyond** its objective, which is to prevent these products from being used for the manufacture of weapons.

Consequently there should be an accurate description of what can be controlled in accordance with the rules of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of 3 December 1965.

- (b) There should not be any double control.
  - (c) The costs of control should be borne by the control organ in order to avoid commercial discrimination against peaceful exports of nuclear material from non-nuclear-weapon States for the benefit of nuclear-weapon States not subject to control or of non-signatory non-nuclear-weapon States.
  - (d) Each State should be entitled to object to particular inspectors, and to have inspectors accompanied during control by its own officials.
  - (e) To maintain equality in the conditions of competition between States, it would be desirable that control should extend also to the civil nuclear installations of nuclear-weapon States.
- (3) Article IV on freedom to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes should be supplemented:

- (a) The sixth paragraph of the preamble expresses the intention of the nuclear-weapon States to make available to all Parties to the treaty the knowledge and benefits of applications of nuclear technology derived from the development of nuclear explosive devices and capable of civil use. This intention should be transformed into a juridical commitment in the body of the treaty, without however implying that the communication of such information would be free of charge.
- (b) In regard to atomic explosions for peaceful purposes, the Swiss authorities consider that the intentions expressed in the eighth paragraph of the preamble should also constitute an article of the treaty; this article could provide for the establishment of a special body, in which the non-nuclear-weapon States would be represented, to determine the conditions in which nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes could take place.

- (4) For the treaty to fulfil its aim, it should come near to universality. It would be desirable that article VI, paragraph 3, should stipulate that the entry into force of the treaty shall be subject to ratification by as large a number of States as possible, including all the signatory nuclear-weapon States. Switzerland could only be a party to the treaty if most of the Powers likely to possess nuclear weapons acceded to it. So long as that condition is not fulfilled, the treaty will contain a gap endangering the security of the small States on which it would be binding. Moreover, the non-accession of important industrial Powers might be economically prejudicial to the competitive capacity of the atomic industry of the signatory States.
- (5) Article VII stipulates that the treaty shall be of unlimited duration. To subscribe to such a commitment seems hardly conceivable in a field where development is as rapid and unpredictable as that of nuclear science and its technical, economic, political and military implications. Consequently it would be preferable that the treaty should be concluded for a definite period, at the end of which a review conference would decide about its renewal. During that interval the nuclear-weapon States could adopt specific measures aimed at a limitation of armaments. The non-nuclear-weapon States certainly cannot take the responsibility of tying their hands indefinitely if the nuclear-weapon States fail to arrive at positive results in that direction.
- (6) The Treaty will establish a lasting juridical discrimination between States according to whether they possess nuclear weapons or not. To consent to this would represent for the non-nuclear-weapon States a heavy sacrifice which is inconceivable unless something is given in return. Since their security is what the arms race chiefly endangers, some progress should be made in limiting this.

The provisions on that subject in the preamble are not sufficient because they do not constitute a commitment but a mere declaration of intent. They should not only be given a place in the body of the treaty but should also comprise more precise obligations, such as the stabilization of atomic armaments at their present level. Furthermore, the nuclear-weapon States should solemnly and formally undertake never to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States parties to the treaty.

Such provisions would to some extent meet the security requirements of the non-nuclear-weapon States.

- (7) It would be desirable that the treaty should provide a mandatory arbitration procedure for all disputes over its interpretation and application.

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT**

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ENDC/205  
30 November 1967  
ENGLISH  
Original: FRENCH

I T A L Y

Working Paper

Proposal concerning the transfer of fissile material

(Extract from the speech delivered at the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament on 1 August by H.E. Mr. Amintore Fanfani, Minister for Foreign Affairs).

"Because of the importance we attribute to a well-balanced and effective treaty, no effort should be spared to make progress with other collateral disarmament measures, especially if they are likely to encourage adherence to the draft treaty.

I therefore wonder whether it would not be possible to imagine some proposal which, while linked up with measures examined in the past, might respond to certain imperatives important for all of us and more particularly for the non-nuclear Powers that have undertaken the negotiation of the treaty. This proposal could be independent of the treaty, linked with or even incorporated in it according to circumstances; it could consist of an agreement under which the nuclear Powers would transmit periodically to the non-nuclear States signatories to the treaty an agreed quantity of the fissile material they produce. Such an agreement would be based on the proposal put forward by the United States in 1964 for a "cut-off" (ENDC/120)-- that is, a discontinuance of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons -- a proposal which was not followed up because of the difficulties encountered in connexion with the question of control. It represented, however, an expression of the will to achieve disarmament, an expression of will to which it might perhaps be opportune to revert today.

An agreement of this kind would indirectly subject the production of nuclear weapons by the militarily-nuclear States to a brake consisting in the necessity of allocating part of their fissile material to non-nuclear countries for peaceful uses.

Within the same context, the non-nuclear countries to which the fissile material transferred by the nuclear Powers would be assigned should pay a reduced price compared to the market value; while part of this price would go to the nuclear producing Powers, the other part could be paid into the United Nations funds for the progress of the developing countries.

The agreement thus proposed could also lay down the principles of the distribution of fissile material among the beneficiary countries. As for control, one could refer to the provisions to be proposed for a non-proliferation treaty.

I wish to stress the link that exists in this proposal between the brake on nuclear armament, the encouragement of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and the aid given to the social and economic progress of the developing countries.

This initiative, of which I have sketched the broad outline, would also be a gesture of goodwill by the nuclear Powers in respect of disarmament to prove their willingness to give up part of their fissile material and to put a brake, even a modest one, on the continuous growth of their military nuclear potential. This initiative would provide them with the means of counterbalancing renunciation by the non-nuclear countries by allocating to them fissile material for peaceful uses at a favourable price, which would not fail to encourage concrete measures to fill the technological gap, such as those that were envisaged in an Italian proposal put forward in 1966. The initiative which we suggest would enable the nuclear countries which would give up part of the value, and the non-nuclear countries which would pay the agreed price, to establish an ideal link between disarmament measures and the progress of developing areas, in conformity with the appeal of His Holiness Pope Paul VI and the Italian proposal made in 1965.

Lastly, if the transfer of fissile material would benefit only the non-nuclear countries signatories to the non-proliferation treaty, the idea which I have just explained to you would favour the accession to this treaty of the greatest possible number of non-nuclear countries by providing an appreciable material and moral compensation for their renunciation of nuclear weapons.

If the Committee agrees that this idea is interesting, the Italian delegation could easily develop it for the purposes of the Conference in a document which might prove useful either in the expectation of a draft treaty and even in its preparation or in supplementing and strengthening it."

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT**

ENDC/206  
5 December 1967  
Original: ENGLISH

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Statement of President Lyndon B. Johnson dated 2 December 1967

I believe history will record that on this day 25 years ago, mankind reached the turning-point of his destiny.

The Book of Genesis tells us that, in the beginning, God directed man to:

"Be fruitful, and multiply, and to replenish the earth, and subdue it ..."

But only in our lifetime have we acquired the ultimate power to fulfill all of that command. Throughout history, man has struggled to find enough power -- and to find enough energy -- to do his work in the world. He domesticated animals, he sold his brother into slavery, and enslaved himself to the machine -- all in a desperate search for energy.

Desperation ended in the experiment conducted in Chicago, 25 years ago, by Enrico Fermi and by his fellow scientists. In a single stroke, they increased man's available energy more than a thousand-fold.

They placed in our hands the power of the universe itself.

Nothing could have been more appropriate than the words that were used by Dr. Arthur Compton to describe what happened on that day:

"The Italian navigator has just landed in the new world."

This modern "Italian navigator" was a great man of science. But he was also something more. He was one of millions who, in the long history of the world, have been compelled to leave a beloved native land to escape the forces of tyranny. Like millions before him, Enrico Fermi found here a new home, among free men, in a new world. His life and career have a special meaning to all who love freedom.

There are today millions of young Americans with an Italian heritage who feel a deep personal pride in Enrico Fermi. America was born out of the voyages of a great Italian navigator. In a time of greatest danger, another -- equally willing to pursue his dream beyond existing charts -- took us into a new epoch.

Today we commemorate our debt to him. And in doing so, we also honor the historic bond between the old world and the new.

In a short time, we will be dedicating, in Illinois, a new national accelerator laboratory. This laboratory, with its 200,000 million electron-volt accelerator, will maintain our country's position in the forefront of nuclear research.

And I suggest that we dedicate this great new laboratory to the memory of the modern-day "Italian navigator".

In so honoring Enrico Fermi, we will also honor the immeasurable contributions made, over the centuries, by the people of Italy to the people of the United States.

Much has already happened in that new world which began 25 years ago.

Giant nuclear reactors, direct descendants of Fermi's first atomic pile, are producing millions of kilowatts of power for peaceful purposes. Other reactors are powering nuclear submarines under the seas of the earth -- our first line of defense against tyranny, whatever its contemporary doctrine or disguise, which Enrico Fermi dedicated himself to resist.

But it is really the peaceful uses of atomic energy about which Enrico Fermi would have wished us to speak -- and they are many.

When I became President, nuclear energy was generating about 1,000,000 kilowatts of electric power in the United States.

Today, the atom is giving us more than 2,800,000 kilowatts -- almost three times as much. And more than 70 additional nuclear power plants are already planned or under construction.

This will equal about 20 per cent of the whole electric generating capacity in the United States today. It is enough to meet the total requirements of 45 million people. All this from what was, 25 years ago -- before the success of Fermi's experiment -- only a scientist's dream.

The dream has been realized. By learning the secret of the atom, we have given mankind -- for the first time in history -- all the energy mankind can possibly use.

It took the genius of countless generations of dedicated scientists to find the secret, and it remains to us to use it wisely.

What began as the most terrible instrument of war that man has even seen, can become the key to a golden age of mankind. But this will not happen unless we make it happen.

We cannot forget that another, darker future also opened on this day, 25 years ago.

The power to achieve the promise of Genesis is also power to fulfill the prophecy of Armageddon. We can either remake life on earth or we can end it forever.

Let me be specific.

If Enrico Fermi's reactor had operated ten thousand years, it would not have produced enough plutonium for one atomic bomb.

Today, a single reactor can, while generating electricity, produce enough plutonium to make dozens of bombs every year. And scores of these reactors are now being built all over the world.

Their purpose is peaceful. Yet the fact remains that the secret diversion of even a small part of the plutonium they create could soon give every nation power to destroy civilization -- if not life on this earth.

We cannot permit this to happen.

Nor can mankind be denied the unlimited benefits of the peaceful atom.

We must find a way to remove the threat while preserving the promise.

The American people made their own desires crystal clear when their representatives in the United States Senate voted unanimously to support an effective nonproliferation treaty for nuclear weapons.

We are now engaged in a major effort to achieve such a treaty, in a form acceptable to all nations.

We are trying to assure that the peaceful benefits of the atom will be shared by all mankind -- without increasing the threat of nuclear destruction.

We do not believe that the safeguards we propose in that treaty will interfere with the peaceful activities of any country.

And I want to make it clear to the world that we in the United States are not asking any country to accept safeguards that we are unwilling to accept ourselves.

So I am, today, announcing that when such safeguards are applied under the treaty, the United States will permit the International Atomic Energy Agency to apply its safeguards to all nuclear activities in the United States -- excluding only those with direct national security significance.

Under this offer the Agency will be able to inspect a broad range of U.S. nuclear activities, both governmental and private, including the fuel in nuclear reactors owned by utilities for generating electricity, and the fabrication and chemical reprocessing of such fuel.

This pledge maintains the consistent policy of the United States since the beginning of the nuclear age.

Just 14 years ago, a President of the United States appeared before the General Assembly of the United Nations to urge the peaceful use of the atom. President Eisenhower said on that occasion:

"...The United States pledges...before the world...its determination to help solve the fearful atomic dilemma -- to devote its entire heart and mind to find the way by which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life."

We renew that pledge today. We reaffirm our determination to dedicate the miraculous power of the atom, not to death, but to life.

We invite the world's nations to join with us.

Let us use then this historic anniversary to deepen and reaffirm the search for peace.

Let us so conduct ourselves that future generations will look back upon December 2, 1942 -- not as the origin of sorrow and despair -- but as the beginning of the brightest, most inspiring chapter in the long history of man.

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT**

ENDC/207  
5 December 1967  
Original: ENGLISH

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UNITED KINGDOM

Statement made by the British Minister  
of State for Foreign Affairs, The Right  
Honourable F. Mulley in the House of  
Commons on 4 December, 1967

As the House will know, a key issue in the negotiations at present taking place in Geneva to secure a Non-proliferation Treaty has been the safeguards to be applied in order to ensure that there is no diversion by the non-nuclear weapon signatories of the Treaty of materials from their civil nuclear programmes to nuclear weapon purposes.

In order to assist these negotiations Her Majesty's Government have decided that, at such time as international safeguards are put into effect in the non-nuclear weapon states in implementation of the provisions of a Treaty, they will be prepared to offer an opportunity for the application of similar safeguards in the United Kingdom subject to exclusions for national security reasons only. Her Majesty's Government welcome the similar decision announced by President Johnson on behalf of the United States.

# CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/208

7 December 1967

Original: ENGLISH/RUSSIAN

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## INTERIM REPORT TO THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND THE UNITED NATIONS DISARMAMENT COMMISSION

(recommended by the co-Chairmen)

1. The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament submits to the United Nations General Assembly and to the United Nations Disarmament Commission an interim report of the Committee's deliberations on the questions before it for the period 21 February 1967 to 7 December 1967.
2. Representatives of the following States continued their participation in the work of the Committee: Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, India, Italy, Mexico, Nigeria, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and United States of America.
3. Upon the recommendation of the co-Chairmen, members of the Committee reconvened the Conference on 21 February 1967 and have held two sessions. The first session recessed on 23 March 1967. The second session reconvened on 18 May 1967.
4. In view of the approaching adjournment of the Twenty-Second Session of the UN General Assembly and the need for the Eighteen-Nation Committee to remain in session in order to expedite its work on a draft non-proliferation treaty, the Committee has decided to submit this interim status report to the UNGA and the UNDC.
5. Pursuant to the recommendations of the General Assembly in Resolution 2153A (XXI) the Committee has undertaken intensive consideration of a draft Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Representatives participating in the work of the Committee have made valuable contributions toward achievement of a treaty which would be in conformity with that resolution. These contributions are contained in the public records of the Committee. The Committee has already made substantial progress, although a final draft has not as yet been achieved. Since the Committee has concentrated its major efforts on the elaboration of a non-proliferation treaty, it reports regarding the "Question of general and complete disarmament," General Assembly Resolution 2162C (XXI), and the "Elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America," General Assembly Resolution 2165 (XXI), that it

has not been able to devote sufficient time to the consideration of these matters. With respect to the "Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests," General Assembly Resolution 2163 (XXI), the Committee reports that it has held a valuable discussion regarding this matter in which several delegations made important contributions.

6. Since the Committee is continuing its work with a view to negotiating a draft Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, it is unable at this time to provide a report on this question for the consideration of the UNGA or the UNDC. The Committee intends to submit a full report, including all relevant documents, as soon as possible.

This report is submitted by the co-Chairmen on behalf of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

United States of America

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A. A. Roshchin

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William C. Foster

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT**

ENDC/209  
12 December 1967  
ENGLISH  
Original: SPANISH

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Statement by the President of the Republic of Chile  
Presented on 29 November 1967 to the co-Chairmen of the  
Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament

Statement by the President of Chile  
31 October 1967

"In view of various publications regarding the situation of Latinamerican armament, the Government of Chile wishes to express its opinion as follows.

Chile neither supports nor sponsors disarmament of the Latinamerican countries.

The military institutions represent a vital element in life of our countries and constitute the warranty of internal and external security, of public order and national sovereignty, and for this reason they must maintain the necessary level of efficiency to fulfil their important task.

Different, however, is to fall into a militaristic career.

Our Government, as well as the former one, supports the necessity to restrict the acquisition of armaments, because otherwise we could precipitate ourselves into a competition, the political, economical and social consequences of which would be of greatest seriousness, since no country, without risking its own security, could exclude itself from that competition.

It is inconceivable that while on one part we are supporting economical integration of our nations as the main objective, on the other part we should initiate a policy of unlimited acquisition of armaments.

This situation would be even more inexplicable if we think that weapons so acquired would have no other sense than to defend ourselves against a possible attack from the same neighbour countries which are at present engaged in the struggle for economical integration. Notwithstanding the high costs of such weapons they would not be of the latest technological standards and in any case suitable in the event of a world war, which moreover in our days would be absolutely out of control for our countries.

On the other hand, a warlike preparation means an economical and social decision. It is absolutely incompatible for our people to support simultaneously an accelerated effort of economical and social development in order to extirpate misery, bring education to a high level, build housings, improve health conditions, develop agriculture and industry and create full employment and to pay the costs of uncontrolled armament competition.

Furthermore, unanimously and solemnly all American Presidents assembled in Punta del Este support the above mentioned attitude in connexion with the acquisition of armaments. It seems appropriate to reproduce their declaration:

"The Latinamerican Presidents, well aware of the importance of the armed forces for the maintenance of security, recognize at the same time that the requirements of economical development and social progress make it necessary to apply to that purpose the maximum of the available resources in Latin America".

"Consequently, they express their intention to restrict military expenses in proportion to the real requirements of national security and in accordance with the constitutional dispositions of each country, avoiding such costs which are not indispensable for the fulfilment of the specific tasks of the armed forces and, should this be the case, of international commitments that bound the respective governments".

"As regards the Treaty of Abolishment of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, they express their wish that it will come into force as soon as possible, once the requirements of this Treaty are fulfilled".

This declaration was based on the philosophy inspiring the Alliance for Progress. To act otherwise would mean to destroy its basic grounds and conception.

The Government of Chile, when making this statement, does not pretend to judge nor to refer to resolutions adopted by any of the States within the scope of its sovereignty. It has no reproach nor complaint against any nation of the hemisphere. Chile respects them and seeks their friendship, convinced that only economic integration and co-operation between our countries can open us a wide road of progress, justice and social peace.

We are guided only by the strong wish to seek, considering the reality and necessary outfit of the Armed Forces, agreements enabling us to put into practice the declaration of Punta del Este in order to devote fundamentally our resources to the economical and social development which our people require so urgently.

We do not pretend ourselves to provoke a meeting to consider this problem. We just want to point out to all friendly people and governments in Latin America that our Government is open and well disposed to participate in any high level meeting that should be held or proposed by any country with this purpose.

Not to act immediately would bring along evident dangers. It would mean a deep senselessness between the facts and the declarations and would compel us to esteem valueless the established machinery intended to unite and to assure ourselves peace."

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT**

ENDC/209/Rev.1

15 December 1967

ENGLISH/FRENCH AND RUSSIAN ONLY

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Statement by the President of the Republic of Chile  
Presented on 29 November 1967 to the co-Chairmen of the  
Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament

Statement by the President of Chile

31 October 1967

"In view of various publications regarding the situation of Latin American armament, the Government of Chile wishes to express its opinion as follows.

Chile neither supports nor sponsors disarmament of the Latin American countries.

Our armed forces are essential to the life of our countries: they safeguard our internal and external security, public order and national sovereignty, and must therefore maintain the level of efficiency necessary for the fulfilment of their important task.

To be drawn into an arms race is, however, quite a different matter.

Our present Government, like its predecessor, maintains that the acquisition of armaments must be restricted, for otherwise we might throw ourselves into a competition which would have the most serious political, economic and social consequences, since no country could refuse to compete without risking its own security.

It is inconceivable that we should make our chief aim the integration of our nations, and at the same time should initiate a policy of unlimited acquisition of armaments.

The situation would be even more unreasonable, for the weapons so acquired would have no other use than to defend each country against attack by the very neighbours who are seeking integration. However much the weapons cost, they could not be of the latest technological standards, nor of any use in a world war, over which moreover in these days our countries would have absolutely no control.

On the other hand, an arms race imports an economic and social decision. It would be absolutely incompatible for our peoples to redouble their efforts at economic and social development in order to extirpate misery, raise education to a high level, build housing, improve health conditions, develop agriculture and industry and create employment, and simultaneously to pay the costs of an uncontrolled competition in armaments.

Furthermore, all the American Presidents assembled in Punta del Este unanimously and solemnly supported that attitude towards the acquisition of armaments. We think it necessary to reproduce their declaration:

'The Presidents of the Latin-American Republics, conscious of the importance of armed forces to the maintenance of security, recognize at the same time that the demands of economic development and social progress make it necessary to devote to those purposes the maximum resources available in Latin America.

'Therefore, they express their intention to limit military expenditures in proportion to the actual demands of national security in accordance with each country's constitutional provisions, avoiding those expenditures that are not indispensable for the performance of the specific duties of the armed forces and, where pertinent, of international commitments that obligate their respective governments.

'With regard to the Treaty on the Banning of Nuclear Arms in Latin America, they express the hope that it may enter into force as soon as possible, once the requirements established by the Treaty are fulfilled'.

This declaration was based precisely on the philosophy inspiring the Alliance for Progress. To act otherwise would destroy its fundamental meaning.

The Government of Chile, in making this statement, does not claim to judge nor to refer to resolutions adopted by any of the States in the exercise of their sovereignty. It makes no complaint or reproach against any nation of the hemisphere. Chile respects those nations and seeks and needs their friendship, for it is convinced that only integration and co-operation between our countries can open before us a wide road of progress, justice and social peace.

We are guided only by an earnest desire, subject to the actual situation and the need to maintain armed forces, to seek agreements which will enable us to put the Declaration of Punta del Este into practice and devote the bulk of our resources to the economic and social development which our people so urgently require.

We do not ourselves claim to convene a meeting to consider this problem. We merely wish to point out to all fraternal peoples and governments in Latin America that our Government is completely ready and willing to participate in any high-level meeting that may be convened or may be proposed by any country, for this purpose.

Failure to act immediately would court obvious dangers. It would mean a deep contradiction between the facts and the declarations, and would compel us to admit that none of the machinery intended to unite us and ensure peace had the least value."

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