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OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

FOURTH SPECIAL SESSION

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14 MAY-27 JUNE 1963

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INTRODUCTORY NOTE

The *Official Records of the General Assembly* include the records of the meetings, the annexes to those records and the supplements. The annexes are printed in fascicles, by agenda item. The present volume contains the annex fascicles of the fourth special session.

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Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

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6.	Adoption of the agenda.
7.	Consideration of the financial situation of the Organization in the light of the report of the Working Group on the Examination of the Administrative and Budgetary Procedures of the United Nations.
8.	Admission of new Members to the United Nations.

* No fascicles were issued for the following agenda items : 1, 2, 4 and 5.



Agenda item 3: Appointment of the Credentials Committee*

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* For the discussion of this item, see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fourth Special Session, Plenary Meetings*, 1203rd and 1205th meetings.

DOCUMENT A/5432

Report of the Credentials Committee

[Original text: English]
[11 June 1963]

1. At its 1203rd plenary meeting on 14 May 1963, the General Assembly decided that the Credentials Committee was to consist of the same Member States who had served on the Committee during the seventeenth regular session, namely: Canada, El Salvador, Greece, Guinea, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America.

2. The Credentials Committee met on 5 June 1963.

3. Mr. Dimitri S. Bitsios (Greece) was unanimously elected Chairman of the Committee.

4. The Chairman drew the attention of the Committee to the memorandum by the Secretary-General on the status of the credentials of representatives to the General Assembly.

5. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics introduced a draft resolution providing that the Credentials Committee "having considered the credentials of the group of persons calling themselves representatives of China, decides to regard these credentials as invalid in view of the fact that they are inconsistent with the provisions of rule 27 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly".

6. The representative of Guinea stated that he supported the draft resolution. His Government considered the Government of the People's Republic of China as the only Government entitled to represent China in the United Nations.

7. The representative of the United States stated that the credentials of the representatives of the Republic of China were in accord with rule 27 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly and that the draft resolution went to the substance of a question which was not even included in the agenda of the fourth special session, a question on which the General Assembly had consistently decided in favour of continued representation by the Government of the Republic of

China. For these reasons he would oppose the draft resolution.

8. The representative of Nigeria stated that although the representatives of the People's Republic of China should be allowed to take their proper place in the United Nations, the matter should come before the General Assembly and not before the Credentials Committee. He would consequently abstain from voting on the draft resolution.

9. The representative of El Salvador stated that since this was a question on which any decision should be reached only by the General Assembly itself, he would not vote in favour of the draft resolution.

10. The representative of Indonesia stated that his Government recognized the Government of the People's Republic of China and that he would vote in favour of the draft resolution.

11. The representative of Mexico stated that he supported the views expressed by the representative of El Salvador and would oppose the draft resolution for the same reasons.

12. The draft resolution was rejected by 5 votes to 3, with 1 abstention.

13. The representative of the United States stated that he reserved his Government's position on the credentials of the Hungarian representatives, pending further clarification of the situation. He took note of the recent announcement of a general amnesty in Hungary and of reports of a number of steps taken which appear to have improved the lot of the Hungarian people. He expressed satisfaction at the Secretary-General's forthcoming visit to Hungary.

14. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics stated that the position of the United States had no moral, political or legal basis and noted that this Government had normal diplomatic relations with Hungary. He stressed that the credentials of the

representatives of Hungary were in accordance with the relevant rules of procedure of the General Assembly, and that therefore he could not accept the position of the United States in this connexion.

15. The representative of Guinea stated that his Government had diplomatic, economic, cultural and friendly relations with the Hungarian Government. He expressed the hope that a satisfactory development of the question would take place in the near future.

16. The representative of Canada, while taking note of the recent humanitarian measures in Hungary, reserved the position of his Government concerning the credentials of the Hungarian representatives, pending receipt of additional information.

17. The representative of Indonesia stated that he supported the credentials of the Hungarian representatives.

18. The representative of Nigeria stated that his Government considered the credentials of the Hungarian representatives in order.

19. The Chairman suggested that the Credentials Committee should find the credentials of all representatives in order and recommend that the General Assembly approve its report. The proposal of the Chairman was approved by the Committee.

20. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics stated that the absence of objections on the part of his delegation to the procedures suggested by the Chairman did not imply any change in his delegation's position with regard to the representation of the People's Republic of China and of the credentials of the Hungarian delegation.

Recommendation of the Credentials Committee

21. The Credentials Committee therefore recommends to the General Assembly the adoption of the following draft resolution:

[Text adopted by the General Assembly without change. See "Action taken by the General Assembly" below.]

ACTION TAKEN BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

At its 1205th plenary meeting, on 27 June 1963, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution submitted by the Credentials Committee (A/5432, para. 21). For the final text, see resolution 1873 (S-IV) below.

Resolution adopted by the General Assembly

1873 (S-IV). CREDENTIALS OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE FOURTH SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

The General Assembly

Approves the report of the Credentials Committee. (A/5432).

*1205th plenary meeting,
27 June 1963.*



FOURTH SPECIAL SESSION

Agenda item 6: Adoption of the agenda*

DOCUMENT A/5410

Provisional agenda of the fourth special session¹

[Original text: English, French and Spanish]
[29 April 1963]

1. Opening of the session by the Chairman of the delegation of Pakistan.
2. Minute of silent prayer or meditation.
3. Appointment of the Credentials Committee.
4. Election of the President.
5. Organization of the session.
6. Adoption of the agenda.
7. Consideration of the financial situation of the Organization in the light of the report of the Working Group on the Examination of the Administrative and Budgetary Procedures of the United Nations.

DOCUMENT A/5420

Supplementary item proposed for the agenda of the fourth special session

[Original text: English, French and Spanish]
[10 May 1963]

Admission of new Members to the United Nations [item proposed by Costa Rica, Ecuador, Ghana, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Jordan, Liberia, Mali, Morocco, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanganyika and Tunisia].²

* For the discussion of this item, see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fourth Special Session, Plenary Meetings*, 1203rd meeting.

¹ For the text of the agenda, see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fourth Special Session, Plenary Meetings*, prefatory fascicle.

² See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fourth Special Session, Annexes*, agenda item 8, document A/5419 and Add.1.



Agenda item 7: Consideration of the financial situation of the Organization in the light of the report of the Working Group on the Examination of the Administrative and Budgetary Procedures of the United Nations*

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* For the discussion of this item, see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fourth Special Session, Fifth Committee*, 948th to 1005th meetings, and *ibid.*, *Plenary Meetings*, 1205th meeting.

ABBREVIATIONS

ITU	International Telecommunication Union
ONUC	United Nations Operation in the Congo
UNEF	United Nations Emergency Force
WMO	World Meteorological Organization

Documents of the Working Group on the Examination of the Administrative and Budgetary Procedures of the United Nations

DOCUMENT A/AC.113/2

Working paper submitted by the delegation of Canada

[Original text: English]
[7 February 1963]

1. The Working Group on the Examination of the Administrative and Budgetary Procedures of the United Nations has been given a difficult and complex assignment with very little time to carry out its task. It is therefore essential that all possible measures be taken to facilitate the expeditious advancement of the Group's work. Experience in its predecessor—the Working Group of Fifteen on the Examination of the Administrative and Budgetary Procedures of the United Nations—proved that one of the most useful aids to progress was the submission of working papers which served as a focus and basis for discussion. It is with this in mind that the Canadian delegation has prepared the following summary of its views in the hope that, during the course of the present Working Group's consideration, it would be possible to discuss two of the major aspects of the problem of financing peace-keeping, the financing of UNEF and ONUC and the financing of any future United Nations peace-keeping operations.

2. General Assembly resolution 1854 B (XVII) lays down very clearly the area to be studied by the Working Group. The Canadian delegation believes that if we are to have any prospect of completing our work and reaching agreement on a report for submission to the Secretary-General before 31 March 1963, it is essential that discussion be limited to specific subject matter related to the apportionment of expenses.

3. The basis of the Canadian approach to United Nations financing is that all Members have an interest in and a responsibility for the activities of the Organization and their financing. For this reason the Canadian delegation believes that there is a collective financial responsibility for all Members to finance all United Nations activities, including peace-keeping. Since each Member State benefits from the regular programmes of the Organization it should contribute its share of the costs as determined by the General Assembly. This principle, in the view of the Canadian delegation, applies especially to United Nations peace-keeping operations. The maintenance of international peace and security is the United Nations primary purpose under the Charter and by virtue of signing the Charter all Member States have undertaken to co-operate in achieving this objective.

4. The concept of collective responsibility is fundamental to the future of United Nations peace-keeping operations because no Member State or group of States

has a special or exclusive interest in the maintenance of international peace and security. This interest and responsibility is shared by all. Consequently, the costs should be shared by all according to some generally acceptable financing arrangement. One possible method of sharing this collective responsibility with respect to peace-keeping costs would be for Member States to contribute according to the scale of assessment employed under the regular budget. This scale makes extensive allowances for the position of countries with low capacities to pay. The Canadian delegation believes that this scale is equitable and should apply to the budget for peace-keeping operations, as well as to the regular programme of United Nations activities, except in circumstances when peace-keeping expenditures are so heavy as to merit provision of additional relief to those developing countries which are understandably preoccupied with pressing problems of economic and social development.

5. In addition to the question of the financial ability of Member States to meet the costs of large-scale peace-keeping operations involving heavy expenditures, the Working Group has been requested in resolution 1854 B (XVII) to take into account, in its study of methods to apportion the costs of peace-keeping operations, certain other factors. A number of these factors are mentioned in paragraph 35 of the report of the Working Group of Fifteen on the Examination of the Administrative and Budgetary Procedures of the United Nations.¹ The Canadian delegation is not in agreement with proposals which would attempt to introduce such special factors or criteria, political or otherwise, which do not normally enter into the calculation of the regular scale of assessment and which would have the effect of arbitrarily allocating among certain Member States more or less interest in and financial responsibility for United Nations peace-keeping operations.

6. The Canadian delegation believes that the imposition of such factors would be wrong in principle and impractical of application. Many, if not all, of such factors are of a subjective nature, and, therefore, it would be most difficult if not impossible to express them in the mathematical terms necessary for use in a scale of assessments for the apportionment

¹ Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 62, document A/4971.

of peace-keeping costs. Furthermore, attempts to introduce such factors, especially those of a political nature, could lead to lengthy and possibly fruitless political arguments since both their possible use and relationship, if any, to peace keeping in general or to particular peace-keeping operations are matters of individual judgement. If this occurred, it would not be in the best interests of the United Nations.

7. In brief, therefore, the Canadian delegation believes that the Working Group should avoid making proposals for financing peace-keeping costs which involve factors other than those which normally enter into calculation of the regular scale of assessment.

8. In accordance with the views as expressed above the Canadian delegation submitted to the Working Group of Fifteen, on 7 September 1961, a working paper [A/AC.104/Working Paper No. 2] which put forward, as a basis for discussion, certain principles and suggestions as a possible basis for recommendations which might be made to the General Assembly. Unfortunately, circumstances were such that the Working Group of Fifteen was unable to give detailed consideration to these proposals. It is our hope, however, that in the light of decisions taken at the seventeenth session of the United Nations General Assembly, the present Working Group might find them useful in formulating its conclusions. The main features of the Canadian proposals, modified slightly in light of subsequent developments, are set out in following paragraphs.

BASIC PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES

9. The collective responsibility of the membership of the Organization to finance authorized expenditures, incurred by or on behalf of the Organization in respect of duly approved peace-keeping operations involving armed military forces, can be assured most effectively by agreement in advance on what procedures are to be followed and on how expenditures shall be apportioned among Members.

10. Experience has shown that it is desirable at the time of initiating each peace-keeping operation for the Secretary-General to provide estimates of the costs of each operation. These estimates should be produced as a matter of course, and as quickly as possible. In this way all Members would be given as much information as possible about the financial consequences for the United Nations of embarking on a particular operation.

11. The financial implications of any future peace-keeping operation which involves expenses in excess of those covered by the current resolution (e.g. resolution 1862 (XVII), relating to unforeseen and extraordinary expenses), should be brought to the attention of the United Nations General Assembly for action, at the earliest possible time. If the General Assembly is in regular session at the time of the initiating decision, the Assembly should be aware of and deal with the financial implications before the end of that session. When initiating decisions are taken by the Security Council at a time when the General Assembly is not in session, the Assembly should be convened as soon as possible, either in a special session or in an emergency special session depending upon existing circumstances.

12. In considering the financial implications the General Assembly would need to act as follows:

(a) To examine the cost estimates prepared by the Secretary-General to decide upon their appropriateness and to consider the financial implications;

(b) To give the necessary authority to the Secretary-General to enter into financial commitments in accordance with the estimates; and

(c) To decide upon a method whereby expenses are to be met. The Working Group might wish to recommend that this be done in accordance with the ideas contained in paragraphs 13, 14 and 15 of this Working Paper.

If agreement were reached on some such basis, the Canadian delegation hopes that appropriate accounting for such peace-keeping operations, including the possibility of special accounts, would form an integral part of future United Nations budgets.

METHOD OF FINANCING

13. At the fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth sessions the General Assembly adopted *ad hoc* arrangements which allowed substantial reductions in the 1960, 1961 and 1962 UNEF and ONUC assessments of a large number of Member States in recognition of the fact that large-scale peace-keeping operations placed a heavy financial burden on a number of Members with limited capacities to pay. To a considerable extent these reductions were made possible by the willingness and generosity of some Members to make voluntary contributions. The Canadian delegation believes that it would be desirable to develop a method to apportion (in the future) the costs of peace-keeping operations in a manner which would not rely on *ad hoc* arrangements. Furthermore, in order to assist the Assembly in establishing a method to apportion the costs of peace-keeping, it would seem desirable for the Working Group to find some method which would give effect to the principle of collective financial responsibility while safeguarding the financial interest of all Member States and giving some additional relief to those Members with low capacities to pay.

14. The Canadian delegation believes that the Working Group should be able to devise a method to finance peace-keeping operations involving military forces and equipment whereby:

(a) A certain pre-determined level of expenses for each peace-keeping operation in one year in the future would be financed under the scale of assessments used to apportion the costs of the regular budget. An appropriate level might seem to be \$10 million for each duly approved peace-keeping operation;

(b) Expenses in excess of \$10 million for each peace-keeping operation in any future year, but which are less than, for example, \$75 million, should be financed according to a special peace-keeping scale of assessments under Article 17 of the Charter based on the elements listed in paragraph 16;

(c) Commitments for expenses to be incurred in any one year for each peace-keeping operation above \$75 million or higher than \$125 million for total peace-keeping operations would require authorization by the General Assembly and adoption of special *ad hoc* financial arrangements.

15. The starting point for such a special peace-keeping scale mentioned in paragraph 14 (b) above would be the capacity of Member States to pay, as

expressed in terms of their national income. Not only is capacity to pay the most equitable criteria but, unlike many other special factors which have been suggested in the past, it is capable of being expressed in quantitative terms. It is visualized that many Members with developing economies and consequently a low capacity to pay would be assessed for peace-keeping operations, depending on the extent of their capacity to pay, at various rates substantially lower than their customary assessment rates under the regular scale; while others, depending on the extent of their capacity to pay, might be assessed at rates higher, or lower

than, or at their customary rates under the regular scale. In no case would any country in receipt of technical assistance from the United Nations under the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance be assessed at a rate higher than its usual rate under the regular scale and in most instances a country receiving such technical assistance would probably be granted a substantial reduction. Such a method, if adopted, would of course apply only to future assessments in respect of duly authorized peace-keeping operations of the United Nations within the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter.

DOCUMENT A/AC.113/3

Working paper submitted by the delegations of Argentina, Brazil and Mexico

[Original text: Spanish]
[7 February 1963]

1. The Latin American countries formerly considered that expenses arising from United Nations operations for the maintenance of peace, such as those undertaken in the Middle East and the Congo, were essentially different from the expenses of the Organization provided for in the regular budget and that procedures different from those applied in the case of the regular budget must therefore be adopted in order to defray such expenses.

2. This position was argued by the Latin American group collectively in 1956, when the first budget estimates for the United Nations Emergency Force were debated, and was maintained until the seventeenth session of the General Assembly, at which the advisory opinion given by the International Court of Justice on 20 July 1962² on certain expenses of the United Nations was considered.

3. The International Court's ruling that such expenses constitute "expenses of the Organization" within the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter", with all that it implies, is not consistent with the views we had been upholding. The Court's advisory opinions, however, deserve the most careful consideration by the Latin American countries, particularly in view of the fact that the Court is the highest judicial authority of the United Nations; accordingly, and also because they wish to maintain the prestige of the Court, whose objectivity in considering the matters submitted to it is one of the most solid guarantees for the maintenance of international peace and security, the Latin American countries accepted the advisory opinion.

4. One element of doubt which complicated the solution of this problem has thus been eliminated. The Court's decision has also made it clear that the General Assembly has the widest possible power to determine the method and the scale of contributions for financing expenditure incurred by the Organization for the purpose of maintaining peace.

5. On the basis of the foregoing, we set forth in this document our views as to the recommendations which the Working Group established under resolution 1854 B (XVII) should submit to the General Assembly.

² Certain expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962: I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 151, transmitted to the Members of the General Assembly by a note of the Secretary-General (A/5161 and Corr.1).

(a) The special methods of financing United Nations operations for the maintenance of peace will apply to all expenses incurred by the Organization in carrying out operations of that kind which are not provided for in the Organization's regular budget and which total more than \$2 million in any financial year. When such expenses do not exceed the sum of \$2 million, it is considered that the Secretary-General may enter into commitments up to that sum, certifying that they are connected with the maintenance of international peace and security, under the authorization given him each year by the General Assembly in its resolution on unforeseen and extraordinary expenses.

(b) Any United Nations operations the expenses of which are covered by the parties directly concerned under agreements concluded by them shall be excluded from the application of any provision concerning special methods of financing.

(c) In the case of operations for the maintenance of peace which entail heavy expenditure and thus require a different method of financing from that applied to the regular budget, a special scale of contributions shall be adopted, based on the following criteria:

(i) Collective financial responsibility of the States Members of the United Nations;

(ii) Special financial responsibility of the permanent members of the Security Council with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security;

(iii) The special interest and/or responsibility of any Member State or group of Member States in connexion with such operations;

(iv) The total expenditure by each Member State on armaments;

(v) The ability to pay, depending on *per caput* national income, insufficient domestic savings to maintain full employment and growth and the balance-of-payments situation of each Member State.

With this special scale, collective responsibility would be represented by contributions of a symbolic nature amounting to some 5 per cent of the total cost of the operations. Member States would be assessed for this percentage in accordance with the scale for the regular budget. The remaining 95 per cent of the expenses would be distributed among the Member States covered by sub-paragraphs (ii) and (iii) bearing in mind the criteria mentioned in sub-paragraphs (iv) and (v).

6. Some delegations have expressed opposition to the selection of criteria for determining contributions to United Nations operations for the maintenance of peace. We accordingly submit an alternative method for distributing such expenses. According to this method, the expenses would be defrayed as follows:

(a) By a compulsory contribution of a sum equal to 5 per cent of the total expenses for the operations for the maintenance of peace each Member State paying the same percentage of that sum as it pays under the scale of contributions to the regular budget;

(b) By voluntary contributions;

(c) For the remainder, by contributions by the economically advanced Member States in proportion to their quotas of the regular budget.

7. In this document the Latin American delegations are advancing the possibility that the method or methods of financing approved by the Working Group should be applied with respect to the provisional financing arrangements made in resolutions 1732 (XVI) and 1733 (XVI) and in earlier resolutions on methods of financing the United Nations Emergency Force and the United Nations Operation in the Congo.

8. Regarding the provisions of operative paragraph 4 of resolution 1854 B (XVII), we consider that the Working Group should draw up a recommendation to the General Assembly in which the Member States that are behind in paying their share of the expenses of operations for the maintenance of peace would be urged to pay their arrears as soon as possible. Where eco-

nomical circumstances make it advisable, such Member States would be authorized to pay their arrears in annual instalments of not less than 10 per cent of the total, spread over a maximum period of ten years. In such cases, as long as the payments were being made regularly, Article 19 of the Charter would, as an exceptional measure, be suspended.

9. The ideas put forward in this document do not represent the views of the Latin American countries alone. The debates in the Fifth Committee show that many delegations share our concern over the burden which ever-increasing contributions to the expenses of United Nations military operations impose on the budgets of countries of limited economic capacity, which need imports of capital and technical assistance from international organizations in order to develop their economies and to improve the living conditions of their people.

10. We accept the obligations imposed on us by the Charter and wish to bear our share of the responsibility for maintaining peace. But in view of the economic situation in the world, the same efforts cannot be required of all States Members of the United Nations. Some can do only a little, others are in a position to make a substantial contribution. If a suitable procedure can be found to take account of this fact, which is undeniable, the United Nations will be able to overcome its present financial difficulties and at the same time to carry out in full its proposals for the effective maintenance of international peace and security.

DOCUMENT A/AC.113/4

Note dated 8 February 1963 from the Permanent Representative of Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Working Group

[Original text: English]
[13 February 1963]

1. The Permanent Representative of Ireland to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Chairman of the Working Group on the Examination of the Administrative and Budgetary Procedures of the United Nations and has the honour to refer to paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution 1854 B (XVII) entitled "Administrative and Budgetary Procedures of the United Nations" which requests the Working Group "to take into account any criteria proposed by Member States at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly or submitted by them directly to the Working Group".

2. On the instructions of the Government of Ireland the Permanent Representative has the honour to transmit, for consideration by the Working Group, the full text of the statement made by the Minister for External

Affairs of Ireland, Mr. Frank Aiken, in the general debate at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly on 4 October 1962.³ In connexion with this request for consideration attention is called in particular to the proposal, contained in the concluding paragraphs of the Minister's statement, to empower the Secretary-General of the United Nations to borrow in any financial year up to the full amount of the cost of implementing all the decisions of the United Nations in that year.

3. The Permanent Representative is at the disposal of the Working Group should they require his assistance in supplying further details of the proposal.

³ For the text of this statement see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventeenth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 1142nd meeting, paras. 3-17.

DOCUMENT A/AC.113/5

Statement by the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at the third meeting of the Working Group

[Original text: Russian]
[13 February 1963]

1. The Working Group is taking up its work pursuant to instructions from the General Assembly to study special methods of financing peace-keeping oper-

ations of the United Nations involving heavy expenditures, such as those for the Congo and the Middle East. This question deserves careful consideration.

2. United Nations expenditure on the operations in the Middle East and in the Congo amounts to \$402 million. Of this sum, the United Nations treasury has not received about \$170 million. A bond issue of \$200 million has been made, an act without precedent in the history of the United Nations. It should be emphasized that there is no definite indication as to when the heavy expenditure incurred through these operations is to end. What is more, it is being proposed more and more frequently and insistently that United Nations armed forces should remain in the Middle East and in the Congo on a virtually permanent basis and, consequently, that the United Nations should continue a course of action the financial result of which is that the Organization is even now unable to meet its bills. Furthermore, as we shall show later on, all this expenditure has been incurred in flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations. Vast sums, equal to four times the United Nations annual budget, have been illegally drawn from the various accounts in the Organization's custody.

3. In order to find some way out of the unsound financial situation which has been artificially created in the United Nations to please the colonial Powers headed by the United States of America and in their interests, many attempts have been made over the past few years, as we all know, to lay the burden of this expenditure on all the States Members of the United Nations by including it in the so-called regular budget of the Organization. This step, as a contravention of the Charter—we shall discuss this in more detail later on—was bound to arouse, and has aroused, well-founded objections on the part of many States Members of the United Nations; they have rightly refused to regard the sums arbitrarily assessed against them as contributions which, as Members, they were bound to pay under Article 17 of the Charter.

4. We shall not now recall all the stages in the disputes on this question in the United Nations. All this is widely known. We shall merely emphasize that even in the most recent stage, namely, at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly, no definite decisions were reached on this question. The position on 1 January 1963 was that forty-nine countries had in effect refused to acknowledge any obligation to pay for the maintenance of the armed forces in the Middle East while sixty-seven countries had taken the same position with regard to the operations in the Congo.

5. Faced with this situation, the General Assembly was unfortunately unable to take any definite political or financial decisions, though it must be frankly said that the United States and other Western Powers tried in every possible way to impose their own thesis that the expenses in question should be included in the Organization's regular budget—a thesis which is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations.

6. In the Assembly forty-two delegations, including those of the socialist countries and of a number of African-Asian countries, refused in one way or another to support the Western Powers' position; this was reflected, in particular, in the voting on the Jordanian amendment⁴ to the effect that the General Assembly could not ratify a certain opinion of the International Court of Justice.

⁴ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventeenth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 64, document A/5380, para. 9 (a).

7. In the aggregate, then, about half the Members of the United Nations have expressed in one way or another—by refusing to pay the sums assessed against them, or through their votes and public statements—a critical attitude to the ever more insistent demands of the United States and other Western Powers that expenses incurred through the operations of United Nations armed forces in the Middle East and in the Congo should be included in the United Nations regular budget.

8. Now our Working Group has been instructed to pursue the examination of the question left unresolved at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly. It is to prepare a report for the special session of the Assembly which is to be convened not later than the end of June 1963.

9. In beginning our work, we naturally cannot and must not disregard everything that has happened in the preceding period. It is also natural that we should ask ourselves what are the main, decisive reasons for the attempt which is being made deliberately, for definite political purposes, to represent an artificially created situation to the Members of the United Nations as a financial crisis, or even financial ruin, facing the Organization. It is impossible to reach the right conclusions until this question has been clarified. It is necessary to make a diagnosis, to examine not only the external symptoms of the disease but also, and above all, its causes.

10. Let us look once again at what was said during the General Assembly's seventeenth session. Let us remember that the delegations of many Asian and African countries continued to stress that the question of paying the expenses of maintaining armed forces, in the Middle East and in the Congo was not at all a financial but, first and foremost, a political question. This was pointed out, in particular, by the representatives of the United Arab Republic, Algeria, Indonesia, Iraq, Mali, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Syria, Ghana, Jordan and Cambodia. The representatives of Argentina, Uruguay, Ecuador, Venezuela, Denmark, United Arab Republic, Jordan and several other countries emphasized that such expenses could not be identified with the expenses included in the United Nations budget (i.e., under Article 17 of the Charter) and must be examined separately.

11. We agree with this approach to the question. The longer the discussions continue on this subject in the United Nations, the more obvious it becomes, even to those who formerly doubted this, that the problem at issue is one of vast political significance, one which affects the very foundations of our Organization's existence.

12. The financial aspect of the matter is merely the outcome of the fact that decisions concerning the expenses incurred through the operations in the Middle East and in the Congo have been adopted in disregard of the Security Council. The principle of unanimity among the permanent members of the Council in the adoption of the Council's decisions has been by-passed in this connexion. In both cases the Assembly has arrogated to itself, under pressure from the United States and other Western Powers, functions and rights which, under the Charter, are placed within the exclusive competence of the Security Council.

13. As you know, under the United Nations Charter only the Security Council is competent to take decisions in any matters relating to any action for the

maintenance of international peace and security, including the establishment and use of armed forces acting in the name of the United Nations. The Security Council, as is stated in Article 24 of the Charter, bears "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security". Accordingly, it is precisely the Security Council, and only the Security Council, which, as Article 39 states, "shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security".

14. When the existence of a threat to the peace or a breach of the peace in any given area or any specific situation has been established by the Security Council, and if the Council has decided to use force to maintain or restore peace, it decides, as may be seen from Article 44, just which States Members of the United Nations, in the given instance, are to make contingents of their armed forces available to the Council. Members of the United Nations, as is stated in Article 43, are bound, for their part, to make available to the Security Council the appropriate contingents of their national armed forces "on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements . . . Such agreements . . . shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided".

15. Thus, all material or financial matters connected with the execution of Security Council decisions concerning the use of armed forces in the name of the United Nations are to be the subject of agreements between the Security Council and the Member State concerned.

16. Do I need to show that the Security Council was by-passed when such matters were considered with reference to the operations on the Middle East and the Congo? In the first case, the Security Council was simply replaced by the General Assembly. In the second case, the matter was more complex, but this substitution is equally evident. On 14 July 1960,⁵ the Council took its well-known political decision to send armed forces to the Congo in connexion with Belgian aggression against the young Republic of the Congo. This was done at the request of the Congolese Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba. However, everyone knows what happened literally on the day after the adoption of this decision. From the very outset, the operations in the Congo were organized and conducted in a manner contrary to the Council's decision to give United Nations military aid to the Congo.

17. The United Nations flag was used by the United States and other Western Powers as a cover for acts which had nothing to do with the maintenance of international peace and security. The Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba, who had called on United Nations troops for help, was foully murdered.

18. A further gross violation of the Security Council's decision of 14 July 1960 was the fact that the Council was prevented from determining which States Members of the United Nations were to play a part in carrying out the Council's decisions and from concluding the necessary agreements with these States governing the numbers and types of forces,

the nature of the assistance, and hence also the method of financing, as provided in the Charter. Moreover, the Security Council was prevented from having any say in the use of the armed forces acting in the name of the United Nations in the Congo. Why did this happen? It was obvious that any decisions regarding the organization, including also the financing, of the operations in the Congo which were to the liking and to the advantage of the colonial Powers would not command the necessary support in the Council and would not be adopted. That is why from the very outset, as early as July 1960, the former Secretary-General of the United Nations and his closest colleagues in the United Nations Secretariat themselves (instead of the Council) determined, contrary to the Charter, which States should be invited to participate in the operations in the Congo. That is why, ignoring the Security Council, they took charge of these operations. It was not, of course, a question of the former Secretary-General himself. He was merely a tool in the hands of those who controlled him.

19. On one occasion, as far back as 20 October 1960, the Head of the Soviet Government, Mr. N. S. Khrushchev, said in Moscow: "Nothing can wash away the shame with which the United Nations has covered itself as the result of the policies pursued in the Congo by the United Nations Secretariat under the leadership of the Secretary-General, Mr. Hammarskjöld . . ."

20. The profound justice of this estimate was confirmed by the whole further course of events. The predominance of the Western Powers, headed by the United States, as long as Hammarskjöld was carrying out the practical policies of the United Nations in the Congo has been more than eloquently revealed in a recently published book by the former chief representative of the United Nations in Katanga, Mr. Conor Cruise O'Brien, who knew the whole "inside story" as to how decisions were taken by the then Secretary-General of United Nations.

21. This is what O'Brien says in this connexion on page 50 of his book:⁶ ". . . if there was any 'Cabinet' for the Congo operation it was not the Security Council but the highly informed . . . 'Congo Club' within the Secretariat itself." And further on page 56 he says: "The Congo Club, then, consisted . . . of an inner core of Americans round Mr. Hammarskjöld . . ."

22. We know what all this led to in practice. For it was on the instructions of the American Cordier, as O'Brien says in his book, that the Congolese Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba, was isolated at the crucial moment by United Nations troops, who deprived him of any opportunity to speak on the radio, to get help, etc.

23. The result of the violations of the Security Council's resolutions and of the usurpation of its powers was the murder of the man who turned to the United Nations for help, suppression of the national liberation forces of the country, and advancement of the interests in the Congo of the international monopolies, above all, of the well-known company Union minière du Haut-Katanga, financed by United Kingdom, Belgian, French and United States capital.

24. The unalterable truth is that, acting in the interests of Union minière du Haut-Katanga and other

⁵ See *Official Records of the Security Council, Fifteenth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1960*, document S/4387.

⁶ *To Katanga and Back*, London: Hutchinson and Co. (Publishers) Ltd.

international monopolies, the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Belgium embarked on a course of gross interference in the internal affairs of the country from the very first days in the existence of the Republic of the Congo, using the United Nations operations in the Congo for their own venal purposes. This is the reason why the Congo crisis arose, why it has dragged on and why it has not been settled to this day. Let me just refer to a few facts.

25. The report dated 8 October 1962⁷ from the Officer-in-Charge of the United Nations Operation in the Congo to the Secretary-General contains conclusive evidence as to who supplied Tshombé with the weapons and mercenaries to carry on his criminal activities against the legal Central Government of the Republic of the Congo.

26. As is clear from the report, the countries which were involved either directly or indirectly in the delivery of aircraft to Tshombé via Angola, for example, include the Republic of South Africa, some of whose companies sold the aircraft to Tshombé; Portugal, without whose approval the aircraft could not have been transported across Angola; the United Kingdom, one of whose companies (Benguela Railway) transported the aircraft in parts via its railway line; Belgium, one of whose companies (Union minière du Haut-Katanga) assembled the aircraft at its factories in Kolwezi; and the United States and France, which own part of the shares in Union minière.

27. It is no less revealing to consider the types of aircraft which were supplied to Tshombé from abroad. As stated in the report, the overwhelming majority (no less than twenty-four) were produced in the United States, eight in the Federal Republic of Germany, four in the United Kingdom and three in France (which also supplied Tshombé with 400 air rockets).

28. The main centres for recruiting mercenaries for Tshombé's army, as is again clear from the report, were Belgium, France, the Republic of South Africa, and the United Kingdom colony known under the name of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

29. Finally, the chief financial source from which Tshombé drew funds to buy weapons and hire mercenaries was, as everybody knows, the Belgian, or rather, the Anglo-Belgo-Franco-American company, Union minière, which, according to an estimate made by the *Washington Post* in its issue of 17 January 1963, has spent between \$100 and \$150 million on Tshombé.

30. These were the actual "outside resources" that provided the material basis for the shameless violations of the Security Council's decisions of 14 July 1960. Was it, perhaps, the Asian, African and Latin American countries or the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries that were responsible? No. The responsibility for all this lies with the Western Powers, headed by the United States.

31. As is well known, they have not hesitated and do not hesitate now to interfere directly in the operations of the United Nations forces in the Congo in order to guide those operations in a direction favourable to them. Thus, operations against Tshombé were

twice brought to a halt, in September and December 1961.

32. Such evidence could be multiplied, as everyone here present knows full well. Another indication that the colonial Powers have adopted a policy of prolonging the Congo crisis is the well-known fact that when it was necessary for these Powers, wishing to have an official settlement of accounts, if I may put it like that, in the secret reallocation of "spheres of influence" in the Congo which was going on between them, to order Tshombé to change over to a new "status", they were able to do so almost instantaneously and without any apparent difficulty.

33. In the light of all this evidence, what is the meaning of the demand put forward by the United States and its allies at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly that countries which are in no way guilty of aggression either in the Congo or the Middle East should assume the financial, and consequently the political, responsibility for such aggression?

34. In point of fact, in addition to the \$100-150 million which the monopolies of the colonial Powers have spent for their own purposes outside the framework of the United Nations in giving help to Tshombé, the Governments of a number of the same colonial Powers have already contributed or intend to contribute the funds necessary to cover expenditure in the Congo, which has in fact been undertaken in order to achieve the very same purposes under cover of the United Nations. The familiar story of the "United Nations bond issue", of course, will not deceive anyone. Everyone knows who made the main "investment".

35. Why do they continue to demand so insistently that it should be compulsory for all States to share in financing the operations of the United Nations forces in the Middle East and the Congo? What is the political significance of this demand, what is the real reason for it?

36. It is becoming more and more difficult for the colonial Powers to interfere openly, by armed force and in other ways, in the affairs of nations which have won independence or are still engaged in the struggle for national liberation. Considerable light is thrown on the new situation which has arisen in recent years by statements made quite openly in the United States and elsewhere.

37. Thus Dr. Atwater, representing the Friends' Committee on National Legislation, speaking in the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the United States Congress on 17 July 1962, said:

"Although the Congo case is exceptionally complex, it illustrates strikingly how United States interests have been more effectively served by relying on United Nations agencies Indeed, I would go farther and suggest that the United States' interests in the new countries of the world can be more effectively accomplished by using the United Nations rather than by trying to do it exclusively ourselves."

38. As recently as 4 February 1963, the United States periodical *U.S. News and World Report*, revealing the secret intentions of the United States, quoted the following frank statement by a member of the staff of the United States Mission to the United Nations:

"Had there been no U.N." (in the Congo) "then" (i.e., at the very beginning of the Congo crisis) "the

⁷ *Official Records of the Security Council, Seventeenth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1962, document S/5053/Add.12.*

U.S. would have had to do the job The U.N. 'presence' in the Congo may be resented by some. A U.S. 'presence' would have been resented by everyone."

39. That is the actual state of affairs. That is why the United States and some other Powers have in practice met most of the cost of financing these operations. That is why they nevertheless wish to avoid officially recognizing their obligation at least to finance the United Nations operations in the Congo. Instead they paint a picture of the United Nations as undergoing a financial crisis.

40. That is why proposals designed to force all the States Members of the United Nations to participate in financing the operations in the Middle East, without a decision on the subject by the Security Council, go not only far beyond the limits of a purely financial aim but even beyond the limits of such important political problems as the situation in the Congo and in the Middle East. Such proposals represent one of the new and, in my opinion, insidious and therefore particularly dangerous stages in the struggle against the principle of great-Power unanimity in the Security Council.

41. It is scarcely necessary, in the present discussion, to prove in detail again and again the importance of this principle to the activity and the very existence of the United Nations.

42. That decisions adopted by two-thirds of the Members of the United Nations in the General Assembly should supplant the principle of unanimity among the great Powers in the Security Council when decisions are taken concerning the action required for the maintenance of international peace and security: that is the aim in all this.

43. The fallacy of such an approach, on the part of certain States, to decisions adopted in the General Assembly of the United Nations was explained by Mr. N. S. Khrushchev, in his statement on United States television on 9 October 1960, in these words:

"Principles based on the majority, which you fix at two-thirds for deciding disputatious questions, are perfectly acceptable within a country when domestic issues—political, economic and so on—are to be settled. Here, however, we are concerned with a complex international question. This question is to be decided by the countries which form the United Nations; and that is not a parliament but an international forum, established to settle questions in such a way that the decision does not injure a single State participating in that forum.

" Consequently you must not abuse a temporary majority in the United Nations in order to impose your decisions on the minority, because—I repeat—it is not a parliament. We are discussing here, not domestic issues in a particular country, but international questions, with due respect for sovereignty and for non-intervention in the affairs of other States. It is necessary to keep that in mind and to proceed on that basis. Then the correct decision will be reached in the matter."

44. It was specifically the recognition of the special and equal responsibility of the permanent members of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security which prompted the inscription of the so-called unanimity rule as the basis

of the Charter. Only those who would like to regard the United Nations as a "club of the politically like-minded", those who would like to destroy the Organization, can object to this most important principle.

45. As is well known, the Soviet Union, which is concerned to preserve and support the United Nations as an important instrument for the maintenance of peace and security, has always come out in support of the principles of the Charter, and especially the principle of unanimity among the permanent members of the Security Council.

46. It follows from all the foregoing that any proposals designed to force all States Members of the United Nations to bear any financial consequences of the operations in the Middle East and in the Congo, without a decision by the Security Council, are unacceptable to the Soviet delegation for reasons of principle, because such proposals are contrary to the Charter of the United Nations.

47. As already noted, the very people who instigated all the aggressive and illegal actions in the Middle East and in the Congo have also committed gross violations of the Charter with respect to the financing of the operations of United Nations armed forces in those regions. Now they are trying to represent this situation as a financial crisis for the United Nations. This, however, is not a financial crisis for the Organization but simply the financial reflection of the downfall which will inevitably overtake the colonial Powers if they continue on their course of violating the Charter of the United Nations and suppressing the movement of national liberation. The United Nations operations in the Middle East and in the Congo were provoked by the aggressive actions of the colonial Powers. Both operations, and especially the United Nations operation in the Congo, have become long drawn-out affairs and have put the Organization to considerable expense solely through the fault of the colonial Powers and their accomplices, whose aims—as already pointed out—have nothing whatever to do with the maintenance of international peace and security. In view of this fact, it would be no more than justice that those same Powers should also assume the entire material responsibility for the United Nations operations in the Middle East and in the Congo.

48. The recognition of this principle as the basis for the solution of the problem of financing the United Nations operations in the Middle East and in the Congo would represent a triumph for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and would help to enhance the authority of the Organization as a force capable of upholding the cause of the peace and security of peoples.

49. As to the methods of financing the possible future operations of armed forces acting on behalf of the United Nations, the Working Group should approach this question from the premise that such questions can and must be decided by the Security Council alone. This is plainly the conclusion to be drawn from the analysis we have made of the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations which relate to this question.

50. Such are the two fundamental criteria which, in the opinion of the Soviet delegation, should form the foundation of the study to be made by our Working Group on the instructions of the General Assembly.

DOCUMENT A/AC.113/6

Statement by the representative of China at the third meeting of the Working Group

[Original text: Chinese/English]
[13 February 1963]

1. We are meeting here in this Working Group under more auspicious circumstances than the Working Group of Fifteen on the Examination of the Administrative and Budgetary Procedures of the United Nations in 1961. In the first place, there have recently been favourable developments in the Congo operations. The Secretary-General has announced that the military phase in the Congo is about over and that there will be no need to maintain the present level of expenditure in that country. This is indeed good news for us. It appears that we are no longer in the snowed-under condition in which the Working Group of Fifteen undertook its work.

2. Another important factor which facilitates our work is General Assembly resolution 1854 A (XVII) by which the Assembly accepts the relevant advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice.⁸ We may, as individual delegations, have taken different positions in the General Assembly on the advisory opinion. However, as members of this Working Group, we have no competence to reopen the question. We have to work under the premise that the expenses incurred in the peace-keeping operations are expenses of the Organization within the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter. This puts our discussion on a firm basis which the Working Group of Fifteen did not have.

3. Still another helpful factor in our work is the favourable response to the sale of the United Nations bonds. It appears that some \$140 million worth of the bonds have been pledged or purchased. The proceeds thus realized will be enough to cover the United Nations operations in the Congo and in the Middle East at least up to the middle of 1963 or, with a scaling-down of the United Nations forces in the Congo, up to the latter part or even to the end of 1963. While the United Nations financial crisis still exists, its pressing and grave nature appears to have somewhat subsided.

4. In saying this, I am not unaware of the difficulties underlying the two questions to which we are asked to help find solutions. These are inherently difficult questions, as are all other questions involving dollars and cents. We are here primarily to help devise methods of financing future United Nations peace-keeping operations involving heavy expenditures. At the same time, we are to study the situation arising from the arrears in the payment of contributions for financing peace-keeping operations that have accumulated to a little over \$100 million. This second question seems to me to be even more complex than the first one. I will leave the discussion of this second question to a later stage and address myself at present only to the first question, that is, how to finance future peace-keeping operations.

5. Since it has now been established that the expenses incurred for peace-keeping operations are the expenses of the Organization, it follows that such expenses are the collective responsibility of the entire

membership of the United Nations. I think this is a fundamental principle on which the Working Group should first of all agree. It should be the point of departure from which we may proceed to find workable and equitable methods of financing peace-keeping operations.

6. The establishment of this principle certainly does not preclude the applicability of another equally fundamental principle, namely, that assessments should be made for such expenditures only after voluntary contributions have in the first place been applied to them. Past experience has shown that United Nations peace-keeping operations involving heavy expenditures have been successfully financed by voluntary contributions. The two most outstanding examples are the peace-keeping operations in Korea and in West New Guinea. It is obvious that only when voluntary contributions are unavailable or inadequate will the financial obligations of the membership arise.

7. A third fundamental principle applicable is that the expenses incurred in peace-keeping operations should be apportioned among the Members of the United Nations in accordance with their capacity to pay. This is the guiding principle in the assessments in relation to the regular budget of the United Nations. In fact, it is the only criterion that is provided in the rules of procedure of the General Assembly and in the Financial Regulations and Rules of the United Nations. This is a sound and well-established principle which, as I understand, has never been disputed.

8. It may be asked why a special scale of assessments should be prepared for financing peace-keeping operations as distinct from the regular scale of assessments if the principle of capacity to pay is to be applied in both cases. The answer is that when peace-keeping operations involve heavy expenditures, the assessments made according to the regular scale will, in the case of a large number of Member States, simply exceed their capacity to pay. Indeed, the regular expenses of the United Nations have been on the increase throughout the years. However, there is a limitation to the increase. We cannot imagine a situation in which the regular expenses of the United Nations for any given year would suddenly be double those for the preceding year. Therefore, the regular scale of assessment established according to capacity to pay would not normally give rise to undue hardships, although the ever-increasing regular expenses of the Organization may already make some Member States feel their financial burdens extremely heavy.

9. In the case of peace-keeping operations, the situation is entirely different. The Member States are asked to pay, in addition to their regular assessments, another large amount which, in the case of the Congo operations, is even larger than the regular expenses of the Organization. In the case of many Member States, their capacity to pay is almost exhausted after their regular financial obligations are met. In other words, for these Member States, there is little capacity left in such circumstances. There is no question of willingness; it is the question of ability.

⁸ *Certain expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962: I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 151, transmitted to the Members of the General Assembly by a note of the Secretary-General (A/5161 and Corr.1).*

10. This is the question which we are meeting here to help solve. To try to solve it, we have to study and answer two concrete preliminary questions: first, which Member States will find their capacity to pay almost exhausted after paying contributions to the regular budget? Second, what maximum additional financial burdens can such Member States be expected to bear after meeting their regular financial obligations?

11. To the first preliminary question, a simple and easy yet fair answer may be found in the past General Assembly resolutions relating to the financing of the peace-keeping operations in the Congo and the Middle East. The yardstick used there is whether or not a Member State is in receipt of technical assistance from the United Nations.

12. In past years, my delegation has put forward in the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly the view that the capital-exporting countries should share among themselves the additional burdens resulting from the heavy expenditures for peace-keeping operations and that the capital-importing countries should be exempted from such burdens. I believe that this view is well-founded and I wish to restate the reasons in brief terms.

13. The capital-importing countries would not import capital if they did not lack capital and were not badly in need of capital for their vital national development. It is already difficult for them to use up a part of this badly-needed and hard-to-get capital to pay their contributions to the regular budgets of the United Nations. It is indeed ironical to make them re-export to the United Nations whatever capital they may be able to import or at least a sizable part of it, in order to pay their contributions to the additional heavy assessments for peace-keeping operations. To force them to do so would be to defeat one of the objectives which the United Nations is committed to promote under Article 55 of the Charter, namely, higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development. That is why we feel that these countries should be exempted from such additional financial burdens.

14. In the Working Group of Fifteen, my delegation made a more detailed analysis and listed five factors as measures of a Member's capacity to pay. These five factors are, first, a Member's national savings, or alternatively its national and especially its *per caput* income. Secondly, its development requirements. Thirdly, the state of its public finance. Fourthly, its balance of payments position; and, lastly, special hardships. All these factors are actually determinants of whether a Member needs to import capital or has surplus capital for export.

15. As I said earlier, the relevant General Assembly resolutions use the receipt of technical assistance from the United Nations as the yardstick. I believe that the General Assembly is saying the same thing. It is safe to say that the Members which need and import capital would be the same as those in receipt of United Nations technical assistance. From the United Nations point of view, the yardstick of technical assistance is more advantageous because the United Nations is in possession of all relevant facts. My delegation therefore thinks that this is a good yardstick and concludes that the Members in receipt of United Nations technical assistance have little remaining capacity to pay after paying their contributions to the regular assessments. That answers the first of the two preliminary

questions I have posed. Now I have yet to answer the second preliminary question, which is: what maximum additional burdens can such Member States be expected to bear after meeting their regular financial obligations towards the Organization? This question would not be necessary if the only principle applicable in this matter were that of capacity to pay. As I have said, these Member States have in fact little capacity left to pay and therefore should not be expected to bear additional burdens. However, General Assembly resolution 1854 A (XVII), by accepting the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, has established the principle of collective responsibility. Consequently, the capital-importing Member States, while finding almost no surplus resources for additional contributions, have to make some extraordinary efforts to pay a share of the heavy expenditures as a token of their support of the United Nations peace-keeping operations. In such circumstances, their share cannot be expected to be more than a token one.

16. The answer to my second preliminary question therefore lies in the determination of what constitutes an adequate token payment for these Member States. I must admit that I am no expert on budgetary matters and that this question baffles me a great deal. However, relying on common sense, I submit that an additional payment of 5 per cent of their contributions to the regular budget should be considered as an adequate token of support and at the same time would not appear to have a damaging effect on their economic development. Whatever amount exceeding 5 per cent of the assessments for the regular budget may be required to finance peace-keeping operations should be the responsibility of the capital-exporting Member States. Here I have used the figure of 5 per cent in a rather tentative manner. It could be 4 per cent or 6½ per cent. I am open-minded on this point, but I believe that 5 per cent is about the right figure.

17. Let us take, for example, contributions payable by Member States to the United Nations regular budget for 1963. The total of the contributions, in round figures, amounts to about \$82 million. Five per cent of that amount is \$4.1 million. If a given peace-keeping operation costs \$4.1 million, or less, it may be safely considered as not belonging to the category of peace-keeping operations involving heavy expenditures as referred to in paragraph 1 of General Assembly resolution 1854 B (XVII). The expenditure thus incurred should be shared by all Member States according to the scale of assessments for the regular budget. Thus, a Member State whose contribution to the regular budget is 0.04 per cent is required to pay about \$1,600 for the peace-keeping operation in addition to about \$32,000 for the regular budget.

18. Now let us suppose that, under different circumstances, the total cost of the peace-keeping operation is \$20 million in 1963, which is about the size of that for UNEF in the Middle East and which, of course, exceeds 5 per cent of the regular budget. Such an operation should be considered as belonging to the category of operations involving heavy expenditures as referred to in operative paragraph 1 of General Assembly resolution 1854 B (XVII). In accordance with the formula I have just proposed, \$4.1 million of the expenditure would be borne by all Member States. The remainder, which is \$15.9 million, would be apportioned only among those Member States which are capital-exporting or which are not in receipt of tech-

nical assistance from the United Nations. The apportioning would also be determined in proportion to their contributions to the regular budget.

19. It appears that this formula has several advantages. It requires no special scale of assessments. It is pegged on the scale for the regular budget which is itself subject to constant review and readjustments. It is entirely in accordance with the principles of collective responsibility and of capacity to pay. Above all, it is fair and reasonable. My delegation, therefore, wishes to commend this formula to the Working Group for careful consideration.

20. It may be asked whether, under this formula, the burden put on what I call the capital-exporting Member States may not be too heavy for them to share. If that should be the case, then it is only too clear that the United Nations would be undertaking activities beyond its financial capacity. We must admit that even the United Nations has its limitations. In those circumstances, it is up to the capital-exporting Member States to indicate that the expenditures involved are too heavy and beyond the means of the United Nations.

21. Let me sum up the points I have made in this intervention: first, the expenditures incurred in United Nations peace-keeping operations are the collective responsibility of the entire membership of the Organization. Secondly, voluntary contributions to meet such expenditures should be encouraged and should be used

for such expenditures in the first place. Thirdly, of the remainder of such expenditures after voluntary contributions have been applied, an amount equivalent to 5 per cent of the regular budget should be apportioned as the expenses of the Organization among all Member States in accordance with the scale of assessment for the regular budget. Lastly, any additional amount required should be apportioned among capital-exporting Member States or Member States non-recipients of technical assistance from the United Nations.

22. I am not unaware of the fact that General Assembly resolution 1854 B (XVII) makes reference to two other principles on which I have not commented. I have not done so because, in my opinion, those two principles are either not really relevant or are impractical. Thus, the special responsibility of members of the Security Council has really no bearing on their financial obligations to the Organization. That factor has never been taken into consideration in the determination of the scale of assessment for the regular budget. Furthermore, a member of the Security Council may also suffer from temporary economic dislocations which limit its capacity to pay. As to what is referred to in the General Assembly resolution as "special factors", a discussion of that principle will only give rise to a lengthy and probably inconclusive debate. With all due respect, I am of the opinion that it is too complicated to be of practical value.

DOCUMENT A/AC.113/7

Statement by the representative of Brazil at the fourth meeting of the Working Group

[Original text: French]
[13 February 1963]

1. At this point I should like to define as briefly as possible some aspects of my delegation's position on procedure in this Working Group and on a few questions of substance.

2. As representatives know, until the General Assembly's sixteenth session Brazil had a clear-cut position on the definition of military expenses of the Organization. It did not believe that such expenses could be regarded as "expenses of the Organization", within the meaning of Article 17 of the Charter, irrespective of the nature of the military operations involved. Thus, in interpreting the Charter on this subject, Brazil was guided by the following three principles: first, the financial responsibility of each Member State was determined, according to the Charter, by the nature of the proposed operation and by the legal nature of the resolution authorizing that operation. Secondly, operations carried out according to the procedure laid down in Chapter VII of the Charter would be financed under the military agreements referred to in that Chapter. Thirdly, operations carried out under recommendations of the General Assembly, or even of the Security Council, would lay no obligation on Member States to share in the expenses.

3. Notwithstanding the clarity of that position, Brazil was compelled at the General Assembly's seventeenth session to take account of a new factor fundamental to its sense of loyalty to the legal obligations of States: I refer to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice⁹ that the expenditures au-

thorized in the General Assembly resolutions designated in resolution 1731 (XVI) constitute "expenses of the Organization" within the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter. In the circumstances Brazil decided to accept the Court's advisory opinion by voting in favour of resolution 1854 (XVII) of which, indeed, it had been a sponsor.

4. The vote on that resolution represents, in my delegation's view, a crucial moment in the history of our whole problem. We have henceforth to refer to this resolution as a point of departure for our future work.

5. The fact remains that this has not shut the door on the past. The future of the United Nations will remain in jeopardy until the major world Powers manage to find some common ground. Until they find some way to recognize that the previous resolutions authorizing military expenditures can be regarded as legal, or at any rate as capable of being legalized by some means, it will be very difficult—or so my delegation feels—to find a "technical" solution to our problem. It is plain to see that our problem becomes strictly technical as soon as a political understanding has been reached.

6. In present circumstances the only hope lies in accepting the fact that what is past is past and in looking ahead, so that such military operations as we may undertake in the future may be decided upon with the common consent of the very few Powers which together possess over 95 per cent of mankind's military strength.

⁹ *Ibid.*

7. Nevertheless, facts must be faced. If this consent—for whatever reasons—is lacking, it is foreseeable that the United Nations will have to take its decisions on such operations through the General Assembly. We may thus accept it as a possibility that situations of the type we are facing now may recur at any time.

8. This means that solving our problem is well worth any effort, for the present state of affairs imperils the very existence of the United Nations or at any rate its effective functioning, which amounts to the same thing.

9. In the circumstances our duty is plain. What is not always plain is the wording of the resolution that guides us, for it is not without ambiguity. Perhaps it would help us to find common ground if we made a study of resolution 1854 B (XVII) purely from the semantic standpoint.

10. With this in mind, then, I venture to draw your attention to these few points: first, the second preambular paragraph refers to “a different procedure... from that applied to the regular budget of the United Nations”. Secondly, the fourth preambular paragraph refers to “different financing methods from those applied to the regular budget to cover, in the future, peace-keeping operations of the United Nations”. Thirdly, operative paragraph 1 refers to “Administrative and Budgetary Procedures” as part of the title of the Working Group, whose purpose—according to the same paragraph—is to study “special methods for financing peace-keeping operations of the United Nations involving heavy expenditures, such as those for the Congo and the Middle East, including a possible special scale of assessments”. Lastly, operative paragraphs 2 and 3 refer to “criteria” which, according to the French text, are made up of “*éléments*”. This notion of “*éléments*” can be discarded, however, for it is merely a mode of expression used in the French text: in contrast to the French phrase employed—“*attention particulière aux éléments suivants*”—the English text reads “giving particular attention to the following”, the word “criteria” being understood, while the Spanish text says “ *fijando especialmente la atención en los siguientes*”, with the word “*criterios*” understood.

11. It will thus be seen that we are dealing with three main concepts: *procédure*-procedure-*procedimiento*; *méthode*-method-*método*; and *critères*-criteria-*criterios*. Listed in this order, these three concepts represent, roughly speaking, a descending order of generality. While the semantic borderlines between the first two are not very well defined, there is a clear-cut distinction between the last two. There is also a generic and specific relationship between the three, and in the same order.

12. Needless to say, however, all these concepts are tools to be used to produce something which is clearly described in operative paragraphs 1 and 2, i.e. “special methods for financing... including a possible special

scale of assessments”, for the “sharing of the costs of peace-keeping operations”.

13. Our procedure should therefore be to try to solve our problem, if possible, through a series of objective and specific conclusions from which one or, if necessary, several draft resolutions can be prepared for the forthcoming special session of the General Assembly.

14. As to our methods, there are at least two approaches that might be considered: either we could adopt a formula of the type proposed by the representative of China [see A/AC.113/6] which would spare us the necessity of scrutinizing shades of value among the criteria submitted for our consideration; or we could decide that that formula, or a similar formula, was undesirable, in which case we would have to decide to draw up a special scale of assessments. If we opted for the second method, we could proceed to consider the criteria already listed for us by the Secretariat.

15. In conclusion, I venture to state what my delegation hopes for with regard to our work: first, that we shall conclude, *inter alia*, that the collective responsibility of Member States for military expenses involves in itself a moral and political choice of great significance. Secondly, that the military contingents which under-developed Member States will almost certainly be called upon to provide will in themselves represent a noteworthy contribution, even where the cost involved is recovered by those Member States. Thirdly, that future peace-keeping military operations of the United Nations may be authorized with the common consent of the major Powers, so as to spare the Organization itself the consequences of their disagreements, call it cold war or what you will; in a world where roughly \$120,000 million a year is being spent on armaments it is almost ironical and certainly tragic that the Organization for peace, the only one which mankind can yet appreciate or even conceive, should be torn apart on account of a budget representing a relatively tiny fraction of that sum. Fourthly, that, for the time being, very serious consideration will be given to the Chinese proposal or some other equally simple and logical method. That proposal is simple in that it spares us the difficulty of making a choice among the criteria, and it is logical because it goes directly to the point by taking as the immediate yardstick the scale of assessments for the regular budget. Lastly, that, whatever the procedure, method or criteria adopted, the contributions of the under-developed Member States will be set as low as possible. One of the causes of the world's troubles is the risk that a very few rich countries may grow richer, and a vast number of poor countries poorer, every day. There can be no nobler scale of values than one based on the realization of this fact which, indeed, is the reason for the very existence of this Working Group.

DOCUMENT A/AC.113/8

Statement by the representative of Pakistan at the sixth meeting of the Working Group

[Original text: English]
[13 February 1963]

1. To begin with, let me say that I have no radical new ideas to suggest nor any concrete formula to put forward for the solution of the problem before us. If

this problem has remained unsolved it is not for lack of ideas but because of the absence of agreement among Members of the United Nations as to the best way to

solve it and, in a sense, about the very nature of the problem. Discussions in the Fifth Committee during the fifteenth and sixteenth sessions of the General Assembly and in the Working Group of Fifteen on the Examination of the Administrative and Budgetary Procedures of the United Nations—the predecessor of the present Working Group—showed clearly enough the nature and extent of the controversy. The root of this dispute lay in disagreement firstly about the purposes and objectives of the operations undertaken by the United Nations in the Middle East and the Congo and then more, importantly, in opposing conceptions of the scope and meaning of the provisions of the Charter relating to the maintenance of international peace and security. One has to admit that this basic disagreement remains unresolved. It follows, I think, that the difficulty in which the Organization finds itself for the present, will not be removed and, if removed by some means for the present, is likely to recur if these political disagreements are not resolved through a compromise based on the recognition of the common interests of all Member States in the survival and viability of the Organization and, in particular, in situations demanding emergency action, its ability to function promptly, effectively and impartially.

2. This Working Group is, however, not competent to deal with these issues. We have a limited and specific mandate, namely to suggest, first, special methods for financing peace-keeping operations involving heavy expenditure and, secondly, arrangements designed to bring up to date the dues of Members which are in arrears in their contributions for financing peace-keeping operations. This is a narrower mandate than the one under which the Working Group of Fifteen had to work. That group had to examine such questions as the sources of authority for peace-keeping operations, the applicability of Article 17 of the Charter and so forth. We are not concerned with these questions since the International Court of Justice answered them in its advisory opinion of 20 July 1962.¹⁰ The advisory opinion constitutes the framework within which we have been instructed to work by the General Assembly—in saying this, I am not suggesting that the differences that continue to exist between the Powers, the Court's advisory opinion notwithstanding, can be ignored. But I do hold that we cannot reopen these questions here and that, even if we could, it would take us no further towards agreement than did the long and intricate discussions held in the past. Our task is to recommend, as regards the future, a method of financing peace-keeping operations which would be just and equitable and more dependable than the *ad hoc* arrangements that have had to be hurriedly devised in all cases up to now. In so far as past expenditures are concerned, we have to recommend some arrangements for the recovery of arrears from those Members which are willing to pay their contributions but have been unable to do so for reasons beyond their control. In regard to Members which are able to pay but are unwilling to do so for one reason or another, it will have to be admitted that there is no substitute for willingness to co-operate and that the Working Group is unlikely to come up with a magic formula to solve the problem.

3. As regards the methods of financing peace-keeping operations, the question resolves itself into

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

that of determining the principles on the basis of which the expenditures should be shared among Member States. When I refer to expenditures, I do not have in mind expenditures after taking into account funds that might be made available voluntarily by Member States. Such voluntary contributions are of course to be welcomed and, although they cannot be calculated in advance or foreseen, in the present circumstances, they must continue to provide an important portion of finances available for peace-keeping operations. In certain cases, as for instance the operation in West Irian, peace-keeping operations will be financed entirely by voluntary contributions. The views of the Government of Pakistan on the matter were conveyed to the Secretary-General in August 1961 in connexion with the work of the Working Group of Fifteen. The text of these observations is contained in document A/AC.104/1/Add.4 and I will not repeat it here. In summary, the Government of Pakistan believes that all Members of the United Nations share in the responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and therefore in the financing of operations undertaken with that aim. It believes further that while the regular scale of assessments provides a fair and equitable distribution of the expenses of the United Nations, under-developed countries would find it beyond their means to pay additional contributions of more than a token amount for operations involving heavy expenditures. It considers that expenses such as those incurred in the Congo are different in nature from the regular expenses of the Organization and that therefore a procedure different from the one applied in the case of the regular budget is required for meeting these expenses. The permanent members of the Security Council have special responsibilities and powers under the Charter in connexion with the maintenance of international peace and security and in the view of the Government of Pakistan this special responsibility extends to the financing of peace-keeping operations. On the basis of these principles, the Government of Pakistan concluded that peace-keeping operations should be financed under a special scale which would provide relief to those Members which had inadequate capacities to pay and would take into account the special responsibilities of permanent members of the Security Council.

4. A number of other criteria were put forward by other Members of the United Nations. The list of these is contained in the statement [A/AC.113/27] prepared by the Secretariat for this Working Group. Side by side with the, as it were, abstract discussions of criteria and principles, the United Nations was of course carrying on various peace-keeping operations upon which it had embarked with funds provided in an *ad hoc* manner under resolutions adopted by the General Assembly. A certain practice has therefore grown up for apportioning the cost of peace-keeping operations. In the case of both UNEF and ONUC, the financing resolutions take into account the principles of collective responsibility on the one hand and, on the other, that of granting relief to Members with a relatively low capacity to bear the additional financial burden.

5. In parenthesis, I might state here that in our view the effect of the opinion of the International Court of Justice merely confirms that the various actions taken in this regard by the General Assembly were in consonance with its responsibilities and powers under

the Charter. The International Court's opinion thus confirmed the General Assembly's right to authorize peace-keeping operations in certain circumstances and to authorize and apportion expenditures involved in such operations. This does not of course mean that the General Assembly can act with the same freedom as does a national parliament. Limitations to its powers are written into the Charter and others are dictated by the common sense consideration of political and financial consequences of any action it may wish to authorize. I should like to anticipate a little here and to say that we strongly commend, in this connexion, the suggestions put forward in paragraphs 10 to 12 of the very useful working paper submitted by the Canadian delegation [A/AC.113/2]. Obviously the examination by the General Assembly of the financial consequences of a peace-keeping operation will not eliminate difficulties that might arise as to the political objectives and scope of the operation or as to the manner of their execution. Nevertheless, if the General Assembly had the opportunity to examine the cost estimates of an operation before the operation was undertaken and the Secretary-General received from it specific authorization to enter into financial commitments, this would bring much greater clarity into the picture in future and help to avoid the kind of confusion and uncertainty which have surrounded the operations in the Congo, quite apart from the disagreement on principles which has beset it.

6. To return to the matter of the apportionment of expenditures, the practice followed in the United Nations, and in all but one or two of the criteria put forward by Member States, is based on the principle of collective financial responsibility as well as that of allowing relief to countries with under-developed or developing economies. The three working papers submitted respectively by China [A/AC.113/6], Canada and the Latin American members of the Group [A/AC.113/3], all proceed on the same basis. On behalf of my delegation I should like to pay the warmest tribute to the authors of these working papers. Their great merit lies in the fact that they avoid all abstract discussion of criteria and proceed to formulate concrete proposals in respect of the question that is before us, namely how the expenditures involved in peace-keeping operations should be shared among Members of the United Nations. We are very strongly in favour of this approach even though the various criteria we have before us have much merit in them and a great deal could be said about each. For that very reason,

we feel that we should leave aside such thorny and undefinable questions as to who is the delinquent and who the victim in a particular situation, or who stands to benefit more than another from the restoration of peace and tranquillity in a particular area of the world. A discussion of these matters would be highly interesting and even diverting but I am afraid that it would not end before 31 March 1963, when we have to submit our report to the General Assembly.

7. If we can reach agreement on the principle that every Member of the United Nations has an interest in securing international peace and security but that not all Members can share the financial burden of peace-keeping operations to the same degree, then I think we could reach agreement fairly quickly on some specific formula for sharing the expenses of peace-keeping operations.

8. This formula would have three elements. First, a definition of what constitutes heavy expenditure on peace-keeping operations. All peace-keeping expenditures below an agreed figure would be included in the regular budget as they have in the past. Then we shall need a yardstick for determining which Members cannot bear to the full extent the additional burden involved in heavy peace-keeping expenditures. Finally, the extent to which they are to be granted relief and how the additional burden is to be distributed among the remaining Members of the United Nations will need to be determined.

9. Three such formulae are already on the table. As I said, they share the approach which we ourselves consider the most fruitful. There are nevertheless important differences in their financial implications. At this stage I should prefer not to enter into a detailed examination of these proposals. I should like to state only our agreement with the view that for the great majority of the Members of the United Nations collective financial responsibility for peace-keeping operations would be reflected by contributions of a token nature. We also agree that the receipt of technical assistance is the simplest yardstick for determining the granting of relief from the full burden of the cost of peace-keeping operations. Although modifications may be necessary in individual cases based on the assessment of the Member concerned to the regular budget or on some other factor reflecting its capacity to pay.

10. At this stage I shall confine myself to these rather general observations, reserving the position of my delegation until we examine concrete proposals.

DOCUMENT A/AC.113/9

Statement by the representative of Nigeria at the sixth meeting of the Working Group

[Original text: English]
[14 February 1963]

1. My delegation has listened with great interest to the views expressed by the several representatives who have spoken before us. Although our views on this subject are contained fully in several Fifth Committee documents, as well as in the report of the Working Group of Fifteen on the Examination of the Administrative and Budgetary Procedures of the United

Nations,¹¹ we believe that a restatement of our stand will still be in order in the light of the special task confronting the present Working Group. We shall divide our statement into three headings: basic principles, evaluation of the criteria contained in document

¹¹ Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 62, document A/4971.

A/AC.113/27, and, finally, our proposal on the methods of financing peace-keeping operations.

2. As regards basic principles, Nigeria was a sponsor of resolution 1854 A (XVII), which called on the General Assembly to accept the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice¹² that the expenses of peace-keeping operations constitute expenses of the Organization within the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter. The Assembly adopted the resolution, and it is our opinion that the Working Group should, as a starting point, accept this basic principle contained in the General Assembly resolution.

3. Nigeria believes that the fact that peace-keeping expenses of the Organization fall within Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter does not necessarily invalidate the distinction between such expenses and other expenses of the Organization, in so far as apportionment is concerned. In fact, the International Court itself stated in its opinion that the obligation to contribute to the financing of the expenses in question was one thing and the way in which that obligation was met was another. In our opinion it is the recognition of this fact that gave rise to resolution 1854 B (XVII), calling for a special scale of assessments different from that used for the regular budget.

4. Nigeria accepts resolution 1854 B (XVII) and we believe that this is not inconsistent with special obligations vested in the Security Council by Chapter VII of the Charter. In our opinion Article 43, which enables the Security Council to enter into special agreements for the supply of armed forces, assistance and facilities, does not affect the liability of Member States for the financial obligations arising from these peace-keeping operations, except in so far as the States which supply those forces or other military assistance also agree to meet the costs themselves, thereby reducing the amount apportionable among States Members as a whole.

5. As regards the evaluation of criteria, those adopted in past resolutions and others proposed at one time or the other by Member States have been summarized succinctly by the Secretariat in document A/AC.113/27. This summary appears to us to be quite useful as a basis of discussion even though there is much overlapping which perhaps cannot be avoided. We regret that we have to go into a brief examination of the criteria, but this is necessary in order to make intelligible the apportionment formula we are submitting.

6. We agree with criterion (a) in paragraph 2 of the summary, which refers to "the situation of Members having a special responsibility in the events which necessitate any peace-keeping operations". We take this to mean that those whose negligence or malfeasance has led to the events which make a peace-keeping operation necessary should be surcharged with part, at least, of the cost. The fact that it may be difficult in some cases to fix responsibility, or to reduce that responsibility to monetary terms, does not invalidate this principle which, in spite of similar difficulties, constitutes an important feature of the national financial systems of most, if not all, countries.

¹² *Certain expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962: I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 151, transmitted to the Members of the General Assembly by a note of the Secretary-General (A/5161 and Corr.1).*

7. We agree with criterion (b) in paragraph 2 that the permanent members of the Security Council should bear special financial responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. This would appear to be consistent with the Articles of the Charter which give permanent members of the Security Council extraordinary powers for the maintenance of peace and security. We are, however, doubtful whether this special responsibility should be compulsorily enforced. We are inclined to the view that, once acknowledged, it should be left to the countries concerned to implement by voluntary contributions.

8. We agree with criterion (c) in paragraph 2, that there is a special need to reduce the financial burden of those Members which have the least capacity to pay as indicated by the regular scale of assessment. We do not think that any one will have difficulty in accepting this particular criterion.

9. We agree generally with criterion (d) in paragraph 2, that the degree of development of each Member State should be taken into consideration in apportioning expenses of peace-keeping operations, but we do not think that the receipt of technical assistance is conclusive as a sign of financial need. It is well known that in some cases it may become necessary for even a highly developed country to request the United Nations for experts in particular fields. This, in our opinion, should not necessarily qualify that country for reduced rates of assessment for peace-keeping operations.

10. We accept unconditionally criterion (e) in paragraph 2 which stresses the collective financial responsibility of the Members of the United Nations. This, of course, was the principle recommended by the International Court of Justice and accepted by the General Assembly in resolution 1854 A (XVII).

11. We agree with criterion (f) in paragraph 2 which states that special factors relating to particular peace-keeping operations might be relevant to a variation in the cost of the operations. We interpret this to mean that we should beware of establishing a formula in detail for application to all operations, considering that some factors which may affect the apportionment of the costs of one operation may not be present in the case of another operation. We think that the formula we are going to suggest will pass this test.

12. We agree with item (a) in paragraph 3 which calls attention to the magnitude of the amount required to finance peace-keeping operations. It is this magnitude which, more than anything else, makes necessary a method of financing different from that applicable to the regular budget of the Organization.

13. We consider criterion (b) in paragraph 3 to be unsatisfactorily phrased; because as drafted it would penalize countries whose investments in the area of a peace-keeping operation may have nothing to do with the causes which give rise to the operation. It would serve as a disincentive to foreign investments and it would therefore prejudice the cause of developing countries seeking such investments. For example, if country "X" at the invitation of country "Y" makes a mutually agreeable investment in country "Y", and if a political explosion occurs in "Y" giving rise to a peace-keeping operation for which the investment of country "X" is not remotely responsible, it would appear to us morally wrong that country "X" should

be asked to bear, as a matter of course, part of the cost of the peace-keeping operation. If country "X" wishes to make a special contribution voluntarily in recognition of his special stake in the area, such voluntary contributions should be gratefully accepted. However, if the investment of country "X" was made or utilized in such a way as to cause political trouble and give rise to peace-keeping operations, then it seems to us that there are good grounds for surcharging country "X" a proportion of the cost of such peace-keeping operations but this point is covered by item (a) in paragraph 2 of the Secretariat's paper.

14. We also find it difficult to accept criterion (c) in paragraph 3 as it stands. It attempts to relate each Member's contribution to its expenditure on armaments. Whilst we are anxious to discourage the accumulation of armaments it seems to us that due recognition must be given to the necessity of armaments for the maintenance of peace and security in each State. We must recognize that external dangers, actual or potential, may compel a country to spend a considerable part of its national budget on armaments. It would appear to us to be unwise to penalize such a country by using its expenditure on armaments as a direct yardstick for assessing its contribution to the cost of peace-keeping operations. This is not to say, however, that the armament expenditure of a country is altogether irrelevant to our present purpose. We think it is relevant, but relevant only in determining the country's financial capacity generally. For instance, a country can hardly be allowed to claim a reduced assessment while it at the same time piles up national armaments which are out of all proportion to its genuine security needs and which might even constitute a threat to international peace and security.

15. We agree with criterion (d) in paragraph 3 which states certain factors for determining the capacity of Member States to pay. We should, however, point out that the factors enumerated cannot in any way be regarded as exhaustive.

16. We agree with criterion (e) in paragraph 3 which suggests a limit of expenditure to which any percentage assessment for peace-keeping operations should be applicable. This is most essential for the protection of Member States whose financial capacity is very limited.

17. We agree with criteria (a) and (b) in paragraph 4 but we believe that criterion (c) in paragraph 4 is inconsistent with the principle of collective responsibility which has been accepted by the General Assembly. As we have said earlier, we think that aggressors and others directly responsible for the events which lead to a peace-keeping operation should be surcharged with as much of the cost as is warranted by the circumstances of the case, but the residue of that cost is the collective responsibility of the States Members of the Organization.

18. As regards the formulae proposed, that of China [A/AC.113/6] has the merit of tidiness and simplicity. We, however, find it difficult to accept the principle on which it is based, viz., that capital-exporting countries should bear 95 per cent of the cost of peace-keeping operations whilst capital-importing countries should be responsible for 5 per cent. To a capital-importing country like Nigeria it is a very attractive formula, but we think it could even do such countries harm. Its adoption will discourage capital exportation and this will be injurious to the

capital-hungry countries of the world. Besides, it is not necessarily correct that the exportation of capital is evidence of great wealth. For example, in recent years some African countries have offered aid to other African countries to tide them over some temporary financial difficulties. Must we assume that those African countries which gave such assistance are self-sufficient, and assess them for peace-keeping operations accordingly? In our view, the extent to which exportation of capital reflects a strong economy should be taken into account only as one factor in the determination of financial capacity generally, and we believe that criterion (d) in paragraph 2 has already given due recognition to this point. At a time when the United Nations is calling upon the more advanced countries to help the developing countries through investment and trade, it would seem to us unwise to institute an assessment formula which in effect penalizes these countries for exporting their capital.

19. The method of financing that Nigeria wishes to put forward at this stage for consideration along with others is as follows. The first element in that method—in any method for that matter—is the assistance provided by countries under special agreements negotiated with them by the Security Council under Article 43 of the Charter. Such of this assistance as is provided free of charge must serve to reduce the cost of the peace-keeping operations which would fall to be met from other sources.

20. The second element in our scheme is voluntary financial contributions. By this we mean contributions made voluntarily by countries over and above, and separately from, their compulsory assessments. We attach considerable importance to this element. We think that voluntary contributions should be encouraged and the countries which make them applauded. We think that the permanent members of the Security Council, in recognition of their special responsibility for international peace and security, ought to make such contributions to the cost of every peace-keeping operation. We think that countries with special stakes in the area of an operation should do likewise. We think that any other country which, for any reason whatsoever, cares to do the same should be made to feel that its act of generosity would be appreciated.

21. The next element in the method that we propose is a surcharge on the countries responsible for the events which make a peace-keeping operation necessary. Again, this surcharge should be additional to the amounts payable by those countries under the general assessment scheme for the operation. In the absence of a determined effort to levy these surcharges, more countries will start more bush-fires in the expectation that they can get away with it.

22. When the gross costs of an operation have been reduced by contributions under the three heads already indicated, there will remain a residue which in some cases will be of considerable magnitude. It is this residue that will need to be apportioned among all the Member States of the Organization. We think the apportionment should be on the basis of the criteria which we have in this statement accepted as valid for the purpose of the compulsory assessment. What this amounts to is that the apportionment should be based on financial capacity.

23. Considering that the scale of assessments for the regular budget is supposed to reflect financial capacity, we think that that scale should serve as the

basic scale for the apportionment of the net costs of peace-keeping operations. For this latter purpose, however, the scale will require one important modification. At present, it is subject to an upper limit of 33½ per cent for any single country. This limitation should be removed, at least in regard to peace-keeping costs. We were glad to note from an earlier intervention by the United States representative that his Government is taking steps which might facilitate the lifting of this restriction.

24. Two other conditions to the application of this scale seem to us to be vitally necessary. A number of the smaller Member States may be quite unable to pay their assessment for peace-keeping operations in addition to their assessment under the regular budget. We should be prepared to scale down the former to accommodate them—what is lost to the peace-keeping budget in that way being recovered from other Member States in proportion *inter se* to their assessment quotas.

25. The other condition that must be made to the application of the scale of assessments is a limitation on the magnitude of each year's expenditure on peace-keeping operations. We would suggest a figure of \$50 million. We think that any expenditure above this figure should be financed by a special appeal for voluntary contributions by members.

26. The Nigerian scheme may be summarized as follows: first, "free of charge" supplies (if any) of men and materials under Article 43 of the Charter. Secondly, voluntary contributions by the permanent members of the Security Council in recognition of their special responsibility for international law and order. Thirdly, voluntary contributions by States with special stakes in the area of the peace-keeping operation. Fourthly, voluntary contributions by any other States willing to make them. Fifthly, surcharge on States responsible for events necessitating the operation. Sixthly, for net costs (that is to say, gross estimated expenditure reduced by receipts under the foregoing items) amounting to not more than \$50 million a year, the scale of assessments for regular budget should be applied, subject to the two qualifications indicated in this statement. Lastly, net costs in excess of \$50 million a year should be met by an appeal for special voluntary contributions.

27. These comments and proposals represent the views of the Nigerian delegation at this stage of the Working Group's deliberations, and are volunteered in the spirit, advocated by the Chairman, of co-operating to find a compromise solution likely to command general acceptance. The Nigerian delegation is prepared to join, either in the full Working Party or in committee, in considering any other proposals submitted by other delegations.

DOCUMENT A/AC.113/10

Statement by the representative of Cameroon at the sixth meeting of the Working Group

[Original text: French]
[14 February 1963]

1. Mr. Chairman, if I congratulated you rather diffidently at the opening meeting of the Working Group when you were elected it was because I found myself in total sympathy with you and full of the same feeling of responsibility. The honour which was done to you and to us confers upon us, as it does to Africa, a formidable duty which strangely complicates our position within this body. Both judges and parties to the dispute, we have to solve a difficulty occasioned by a situation where we are most intimately concerned.

2. Permit me to thank sincerely our colleagues for this confidence which they have shown in you. Permit me also, on behalf of Africa and of the Republic of Congo (Leopoldville), to thank all Members of the Organization for the magnificent spontaneous sympathy shown by the action of the United Nations undertaken in that country, thanks to which we may hope that the country's independence and integrity will be preserved.

3. We should also be pleased—and we Africans should be particularly pleased—with the success of this action which we hope will lead finally to national cohesion, calm and peace. This is naturally the time to congratulate all the sponsors and the executives at whatever level in this vast and long-drawn-out enterprise, and above all, the two Secretaries-General—U Thant and his distinguished predecessor who served until he made the supreme sacrifice.

4. In such a delicate, complex and difficult enterprise there were mistakes—and even faults—who can

deny it? Men are men and I am among those who do not believe in human infallibility.

5. If I raise this matter of the Congo problem immediately, it is because it is at the very centre of this financial discussion which we have to consider; for ever since its inception, the Organization has undertaken several peace-keeping operations in various parts of the world, but never before has it known the financial embarrassment it does today.

6. Our reflections, then, should be based on the present experience so as to encompass the future, bearing in mind of course that the most urgent and the most pressing thing is to remedy the present ills while laying down foundations for the future.

7. The present situation seems very simple to my delegation. Moreover, you, Mr. Chairman, defined it very admirably, when you addressed the Working Group. You said, in substance: "The present is being tackled." As long as explanation of law existed among jurists, there was discussion. Arguments and counter-arguments had their respective validity. But the discussion is closed. It was closed at the request of the General Assembly by those who rejected the opinion of the majority; and closed indeed by the supreme tribunal where sit the representatives of those who persisted. Is there not some irony in the fact, an irony which tells of a particular responsibility as we shall have occasion to demonstrate in a few moments.

8. The debate is closed; I do not think that our Working Group has any mandate to reopen it. The General Assembly has already accepted the advisory

opinion of the International Court of Justice¹³ by a large majority. We must all bow to it and those who are lagging must try to comply with this decision. But having said this, what is to be done in the future?

9. I confess that I was very much attracted by the interpretation given at the fourth meeting of the Working Group by the representative of Brazil of the former position in his country concerning the nature of military operations [see A/AC.113/7]. My delegation is in full agreement with the two principles enunciated, that is to say: first, the financial responsibility of each State is determined under the Charter by the nature of the operation envisaged and by the juridical character of the resolution upon which this operation is based. Secondly, the operations carried out under the procedure established by Chapter VII of the Charter should be financed in accordance with military agreements mentioned in this Chapter. Thirdly, operations carried out on the recommendations of the General Assembly or even of the Security Council would lay no obligation on Member States to share in the expenses. This last principle is more difficult to follow because it departs from the basic budgetary principle of all financial legislation which lays down that all proposals for new expenditure should include proposals for corresponding income.

10. Since the recommendations of the General Assembly authorizing expenses do not contain proposals for specific financing they should logically place an obligation on Member States to participate in such expenses.

11. As was so well said by the Brazilian representative, the opinion of the Court, accepted by the General Assembly, indeed constitutes a point of departure for our work, for no legal precedent is static, certainly not those of the United Nations.

12. If, therefore, we take resolution 1854 (XVII) as a point of departure for the formulation of proposals to the General Assembly in accordance with our terms of reference, our considerations should in the humble view of my delegation, be based upon the following points. First, the world being what it is and men being what they are, the proliferation of military operations for the safeguarding of peace is possible in such circumstances; assessment in accordance with the scale followed in connexion with the regular budget would far exceed the contributory possibilities of a great number of Member States. This point calls immediately for a first and necessary distinction to be made.

13. First, operations carried out in conformity with Chapter VII of the Charter. This Chapter is self-explanatory and does not require any particular comments. It deals with operations carried out under the aegis of the Security Council and on that body's exclusive responsibility. It lays down the procedure to be followed and assumes that military operations will be financed by means of the agreements to which reference is made in the Chapter.

14. Such operations carried out in conformity with Chapter VII could be put in the category of those for which the working paper submitted by the Latin American countries [A/AC.113/3] has proposed an expenditure ceiling. The final cost, under this ceiling, could be met from regular budgetary provisions. As to the actual ceiling proposed, my delegation has no

a priori objection but nevertheless reserves the right to study it more closely before expressing support for it.

15. But if, unfortunately, operations carried out under Chapter VII exceed the ceiling fixed—that is, of course, on the assumption that the Working Group accepts the idea of a ceiling—it will be necessary for the Security Council to inform the General Assembly automatically, since such expenditures will require contributions exceeding those provided in the regular budget unless the Security Council itself finds a means of financing operations which do not call for contributions by States within the framework of collective financial responsibility.

16. Secondly, there are other operations undertaken outside the framework of Chapter VII of the Charter. I may be permitted to recall that Article 12 of the Charter envisages the possibility that the Security Council, already seized of a situation or a dispute threatening international peace and security, could inform the General Assembly which, being then duly apprised of the matter, would no longer violate the rights and prerogatives of the Council. That means that the Charter provides for cases in which the Security Council finds itself compelled to inform the General Assembly of the matter because it has failed to make the necessary arrangements itself.

17. In case of such a failure, or in case the expenditures incurred under Chapter VII exceed the ceiling established—assuming, I repeat, that we adopt the idea of a ceiling—the General Assembly should be automatically seized of the question. In the opinion of my delegation, this is a first condition relating to methods and procedures.

18. Once the General Assembly has been informed of the mounting of military operations for the maintenance of international peace and security, a second fundamental factor in the opinion of my delegation must guide the Assembly's consideration of the matter. That is the provisional, accidental and limited nature of the operation in time and space. My delegation is convinced that the General Assembly would never embark on indefinite or too lengthy operations. It cannot be too often repeated that military intervention must be temporary, brief and effective.

19. If I may be permitted a short aside, my delegation believes that with things going as they are it is time for us to consider whether we should not stop these operations and repatriate the contingents as soon as possible. Whatever the merits of international intervention, it should be borne in mind that it is no substitute for national responsibility and that it risks becoming unpopular or even suspected, rightly or wrongly, of being a kind of disguised colonialism. For military intervention must be rapidly substituted a civilian operation which naturally finds its justification in the already existing specialized agencies—which are devoid of any character of automatic participation—with their own necessary funds.

20. A third important element which the Assembly must take into account in connexion with collective financial responsibility is the principle of the direct responsibility for the cause which led to the intervention. It seems curious, to say the least, that the Assembly could take decisions in this matter as if the threat to international peace and security was due to some cataclysm or to an invasion from Mars. The threat to peace comes, and we must have the courage to

¹³ *Ibid.*

say so, from aggression. Therefore, before collective financial responsibility comes into play there is, as I have just explained, a direct responsibility. As we may say colloquially "he who breaks the glasses must pay for them". Thus, and here I am following the logic of the working paper submitted by the Latin American States, it is necessary that a percentage, and a large percentage, should be reserved for the country responsible for the aggression which necessitated military operations by the United Nations.

21. If the international community needs peace and is forced to take collective measures to remove a threat to peace, this procedure should itself have the consequence of discouraging in future other threats to peace. What would be so effective in discouraging such threats as the idea of being obliged to pay for the cost of the operations?

22. There is another element which I would call indirect responsibility. That responsibility flows, as has been so well said, from the position of certain States as great Powers and permanent members of the Security Council. How and why, in all sincerity, could the Security Council be unable to act within the framework of Chapter VII? Evidently, only because of the privileged position held by the permanent members of the Council.

23. The solution, naturally, as was pointed out so eloquently by the representative of Brazil, would be for the great Powers of the world to reach a certain area of agreement.

24. Speaking here as the representative of a small country, how could I fail to tell the truth, which is that the aggressions or the situations which endanger the peace of the world, even when they are actually the acts of small countries, are really the deeds of the great Powers committed through intermediaries? Even when United Nations operations are taking place it is still true that the complications met with and the delays in the conclusion of such operations are the result of influences which it is very difficult for a small country to organize with any hope of success and if they are successful, they are so only because of the support of a great Power.

25. If I may refer once again to the case which we all have in mind, who could have affirmed that the

secession of Katanga would have lasted so long, had it not been for the surprising operations of the mercenaries and the strange consultations which, rightly or wrongly, were attributed to the famous plan of the Central African Federation? My delegation believes that there is a certain responsibility there also.

26. Finally, a certain economic element is introduced whenever peace-keeping operations take place in a country which produces raw materials. It cannot be denied that calm is a factor in prosperity, and is one of the requisites for a healthy and profitable exploitation of the raw materials involved. There, also, my delegation believes that the country which directly exploits the raw materials of a troubled country has an immediate interest in the liquidation of the crisis and has therefore the duty to participate to an appropriate extent.

27. Taking all these factors into account it is possible, as the representative of China has suggested, to rely first on an appeal for voluntary contributions. If this is unsuccessful it will be necessary to resort to a normal allocation of expenses, due account being taken of the criteria which govern the allocation of contributions to the regular budget. These different factors have been explained with so much eloquence by previous speakers that I need not repeat them. They have already been put into practice and constant efforts are made to improve them from year to year.

28. Referring to voluntary contributions, a tribute should be paid to the great Powers which respond so generously to the appeal for collective security. Efforts to achieve disarmament have made very slow progress and my delegation thinks that the chief protagonists could create a budget for the safeguarding of peace by allocating immediately to it a certain percentage of the funds now spent on armaments.

29. These are the preliminary ideas which my delegation thought it useful to submit to the Working Group. I ask you to excuse me if I have referred from time to time to a specific case. I have only done so because in that way I could best illustrate my delegation's point of view, without any intention of taking up the subject from any other point of view than the financial and administrative one. My delegation reserves the right to intervene again later if it thinks it necessary to do so.

DOCUMENT A/AC.113/11

Statement by the representative of Sweden at the seventh meeting of the Working Group

[Original text: English]
[20 February 1963]

1. The task confronting the Working Group has been greatly facilitated by the solution of the fundamental legal question concerning the authority of the General Assembly as regards the apportionment of expenses for the United Nations peace-keeping operations in the Congo and in the Middle East. In the advisory opinion given by the International Court of Justice¹⁴ it is stated that the expenses for these peace-keeping operations are expenses of the Organization within the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter. The advisory opinion has been accepted by the General Assembly and this Working Group will have to base its recommendations on that fact.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

2. The advisory opinion of the Court does not, however, exclude the possibility of applying different principles of apportionment to expenses for peace-keeping operations than to other expenses of the Organization. There are indeed different views as to the principles which should apply. The opinion of the Swedish Government is now, as before, that the financing of these operations must be based on the principle of collective responsibility. Every Member State has an equal interest in efforts by the United Nations to solve any conflict in any part of the world by peaceful means. Therefore, Member States should also accept equal sacrifices in relation to their economic and finan-

cial possibilities when it comes to paying the expenses of the United Nations for peace-keeping operations.

3. There are some delegations which consider that the main burden of financial obligations for operations such as UNEF and ONUC should be carried by a limited group of States. Among the theories that have been presented in this connexion there are two which have strong undertones of a political nature. According to the first of these theories, payment should be secured from the Member State or group of Member States whose actions have brought about the situation leading to any particular operations. The Swedish Government considers that it would be very unpractical to use this theory as a criterion for the apportionment of expenses. At least two reasons may be given. First, it would be a complicated procedure, loaded with political problems, to try to determine which State or group of States are ultimately responsible for international brush-fires. Secondly, even if in particular cases it were possible to establish such responsibility on objective grounds, it would still not be expedient to make the peace-keeping capability of the United Nations in these cases dependent on financial contributions from the culpable States. It appears to the Swedish Government that the international community, in the same manner as the national community, must rely on contributions made by its law-abiding members for the maintenance of law and order.

4. Another theory seems to depart from the hypothesis that special benefits may accrue to a certain State or group of States as a result of a particular peace-keeping operation. The Swedish Government does not share the view that such alleged special benefits constitute a criterion for financial assessments.

5. It is regrettable when an international undertaking, such as the United Nations Operation in the Congo, which has been initiated and guided by decisions of the Security Council, does not enjoy the positive support of all Member States. The fact that all States do not participate in a particular peace-keeping operation may give rise to allegations that those who do participate have special political interests in the area of the operation. Political balance in a particular operation can be secured only if all States contribute to its successful implementation and if their contributions are assessed on a non-political basis.

6. If the General Assembly decides—and the Swedish Government hopes that this may be taken for granted—that all Member States should contribute to the financing of United Nations peace-keeping operations, such as UNEF and ONUC, the question arises how to distribute the costs among the Members.

Sweden proposed from the outset that the regular scale of assessments for the United Nations budget should be applied. The experiences of recent Assembly sessions, however, have shown that the regular scale cannot be realistically applied to peace-keeping operations, when exceptionally high costs are involved. Those Members whose capacity to pay is limited must be granted considerable reductions. The Swedish Government would find it natural that this Working Group in its recommendations to the Assembly takes guidance from the principles of reduction which were embodied in the resolutions on UNEF and ONUC adopted during the fifteenth and sixteenth sessions of the Assembly. However, in one respect there would have to be a change: the reductions granted to some Members should in the future be balanced by increased assessments of the other Members, instead of being covered by voluntary contributions.

7. It is the hope of the Swedish Government that the problem of financing peace-keeping operations will be solved by the establishment of a special scale of assessments. However, it may be appropriate to consider also parallel means of obtaining funds for future operations. The Swedish Government, which does not hold very firm views in this matter, would merely like to mention, as one suggestion among others which might be discussed by the Working Group, the possibility of establishing a voluntary fund for peace-keeping operations. The Assembly might issue an appeal to Member States for contributions to such a fund. Contributions might also be received from non-governmental and other sources. It should be made quite clear, however, that the existence of such a voluntary fund would in no way prejudice the principle of collective responsibility and the applicability of Article 19. A voluntary fund could present an opportunity for Governments as well as private individuals to demonstrate active support for the peace-keeping activities of the United Nations. It would, *inter alia*, provide a possibility for Member States to make extra contributions over and above their assessments without prejudice to the existing scale; whenever such States wish to give special proof of their solidarity.

8. The Swedish Government will study with an open mind all suggestions presented in the Working Group concerning the establishment of a special scale of assessments, based on the principle of collective responsibility. It is hoped that after informal consultations and after one or two more rounds of discussion in the Working Group it will be possible for the Group to arrive at unanimity or near unanimity concerning a recommendation to the General Assembly.

DOCUMENT A/AC.113/12

Statement by the representative of Mongolia at the seventh meeting of the Working Group

[Original text: Russian]
[19 February 1963]

1. First of all I should like to ask your forgiveness for the somewhat general character of the statement that I am about to make. As members of this Working Group know, this is the first time that my delegation has taken part in the work of this body. I should also like to inform members that our Government decided to participate in the work of the Group because of its sincere desire to co-operate with the Members

of the United Nations in this particular matter. According to standard procedure the President of the General Assembly, before appointing any given State of the United Nations as a member of a certain body, carries out a preliminary consultation with the party concerned. This was not done in the case of my country. My delegation is taking part in the work of this group only one week after Mongolia learned from

a note by the Secretary-General that it had been appointed a member of the Working Group on the Examination of the Administrative and Budgetary Procedures of the United Nations. My delegation has noted the documents prepared by the Secretariat concerning criteria for the apportionment of expenses connected with peace-keeping operations and has followed with great attention the statements made by the members of this Working Group.

2. In the opinion of my delegation the only right criterion for the apportionment of expenses connected with operations for the maintenance of peace is the principle that a State whose aggressive acts have led to the implementation of a concrete peace-keeping operation should bear the full material responsibility, for indeed it is clear to all that such operations can only take place where external aggression has been committed, for in other cases the Charter of the United Nations does permit us to interfere in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State. The establishment and application of such a principle would in the future have a sobering influence on any aggressive attempt on the part of any State. This is specially applicable to the concrete cases before us, that is to say, to the expenses connected with the operations of the emergency armed forces in the Congo and in the Middle East.

3. Here we are faced with flagrant aggression on the part of the imperialist Powers which has led to the creation of armed forces that are now such a heavy financial burden for the United Nations—amounting to one third of the total expenses in the case of the Congo. The creation of United Nations armed forces was in the two cases carried out in flagrant violation of the Charter and in circumvention of the Security Council which is the main organ for the maintenance of peace and security.

4. I shall not repeat here various facts that are well known about these operations or cite here all the well-known Articles of the Charter which state very clearly how, and by whom, such armed forces should be created.

5. My delegation cannot therefore support the principle of collective financial responsibility. The very term "collective financial responsibility of all Members of the United Nations" is not applicable in this case. One can speak of the collective responsibility of those who are guilty and whose acts have led to the so-called financial crisis. That would represent a just course and in the opinion of my delegation would enhance the authority and prestige of the United Nations.

6. There is a well-known standard of international law according to which aggressors who cause material harm are liable for the payment of damages. In the opinion of my delegation financial responsibility for the consequences of aggressive acts should include the accomplices of the aggressors who, in one way or another, took part in the aggression or impeded the implementation of effective measures for the restoration of peace in various regions.

7. The lengthy character of the operations of the United Nations in the Congo is due precisely to the fact that some States, pursuing their selfish and narrow ends, did their utmost to impede the decisive steps taken to end the arbitrariness of the separatist Tshombé in Katanga. The well-known corporation—Union minière du Haut-Katanga—which is operating with Bel-

gian, British, French and United States capital, has become a nest of Tshombé mercenaries and has consolidated the separatist activities of Tshombé.

8. The very fact that Tshombé found asylum either in the United Kingdom consulate or in Northern Rhodesia, which is administered by the British, clearly shows British complicity in this matter. It was no coincidence that the Secretary-General recently appealed to the Governments of Belgium, the United Kingdom, South Africa and Portugal to take part in the economic sanctions that were being planned against Katanga, for it was the position of the Governments of these countries that governed the success of such measures to a large extent in that area.

9. As a result of this policy of allowing separatism and promoting the interests of the various colonial Powers headed by the United States of America, the Congo has been ruined. Funds have disappeared from the Bank of Katanga; mines and bridges have been destroyed. The damages are estimated to amount to a very large sum. The culprit responsible for all these misfortunes, the murderer of Patrice Lumumba who had requested United Nations assistance, is now travelling freely from one colonial Power to another. This dubious and abnormal situation has aroused and is still arousing indignation in broad sections of world public opinion. In this connexion, I would recall the well-known letter of 11 January 1963, sent by the President of Ghana, Mr. Nkrumah, to the Secretary-General, in which he demanded that Tshombé be arrested and brought to trial. All progressive mankind remembers the evil misdeeds of this puppet of colonialism—Tshombé. Tomorrow, 16 February, will mark the anniversary of the cruel assassination of Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, a fateful day in the history of the Congolese people.

10. We recently received a letter from an organization called the Pan-African Students in America, requesting us to take part in a procession to honour the memory of Patrice Lumumba. This is one of the episodes which truly reflects public indignation at the course of events in the Congo.

11. The position adopted by the Government of the People's Republic of Mongolia on the question of financing the emergency forces in the Middle East and in the Congo is based upon respect for the United Nations Charter since both operations, which were the result of the aggressive acts of the colonial Powers, were carried out in violation of the Charter and in circumvention of the Security Council, which is the main organ for the maintenance of peace and security.

12. Consequently, my Government has not considered itself, nor does it now consider itself, to be bound by any obligations as the result of these operations. My Government has not changed its position because of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice,¹⁵ which it considers to be merely advisory and thus not binding on States Members of the United Nations.

13. In the light of these considerations, the delegation of the People's Republic of Mongolia cannot put forward any criterion other than that of the full financial responsibility of the countries whose actions have led to the creation of armed forces and the prolongation of their operations.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

14. Concerning the procedure for the financing of operations of the United Nations armed forces in the future, the Mongolian delegation continues to believe

that such questions can only be solved by the Security Council on the basis of the United Nations Charter.

DOCUMENT A/AC.113/13

Statement by the representative of the Netherlands at the seventh meeting of the Working Group

[Original text: English]
[19 February 1963]

1. In its advisory opinion of 20 July 1962¹⁶ the International Court of Justice confirmed that the expenses relating to the United Nations operations in the Congo and in the Middle East constitute expenses of the Organization within the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter. In resolution 1854 A (XVII), the General Assembly accepted the opinion of the International Court of Justice. In resolution 1854 B (XVII), the General Assembly gave our Working Group a mandate which falls into two parts: one concerning the methods of financing peace-keeping operations of the United Nations involving heavy expenditures, including a possible special scale of assessments; another concerning the situation arising from the arrears of some Member States in their payment of contributions for the financing of the operations in question. Thus, as the Chairman stressed at the beginning of the fourth special session, the Working Group has a specific task. The Netherlands delegation hopes to be able to contribute to a successful outcome of the Group's deliberations in the same constructive spirit as already manifested by a majority of the distinguished representatives.

2. In the opinion of the Netherlands delegation, the question of methods of financing peace-keeping operations, including a possible special scale of assessments, can best be solved if we take as a starting point the collective financial responsibility of Member States. We have always firmly believed that when the General Assembly takes a decision with the required majority, the financial implications of such a decision have to be borne by all the Members of the Organization. The Netherlands delegation, therefore, finds itself in agreement with the view already expressed by many other delegations represented in this Working Group, that the collective financial responsibility of Member States is to be regarded as a criterion of fundamental importance.

3. In the second place, the Netherlands delegation is of the opinion that in terms of Member States' contributions, the correct way to give expression to the collective financial responsibility is to use the regular scale, that scale being the generally accepted translation of the various national capacities to pay into percentage shares of United Nations budgets. This point, too, has already been made by various distinguished speakers before me.

4. It sounds, therefore, repetitious if I stress as a third point the desirability of elaborating a special scale of contributions for the financing of peace-keeping operations when the expenditures concerned can be considered as being too heavy to be borne by all Member States according to the percentage allotted to them in the regular scale. This point, in fact, is simply a part of the mandate of the Working Group.

5. The next question is concerned with the kind of special scale of assessments which should be applied. On this point the Netherlands delegation welcomes the various proposals and suggestions already made which it regards both as precious material for discussion and a promise of a constructive solution. We value the ideas set out by the representatives of China, Canada, the Latin American countries, Pakistan, Nigeria and Cameroon, because they seem to us to be very helpful in enabling the Working Group to fulfil its mandate. We have also noted that the representative of the Soviet Union is ready to be co-operative in trying to succeed in our business by a real effort. In fact, he has proposed two alternative formulae—the one embodying an exclusive financial responsibility of a limited number of Member States, the other representing the regular scale of contributions. By so doing, the representative of the Soviet Union has actually defined the two extreme positions between which the Working Group as a whole will have to find that intermediate position which will constitute the most generally acceptable compromise.

6. The way to define, in a general sense, the best possible intermediate position between the various proposals and suggestions before the Working Group, which especially recommends itself to my delegation, is the following. On the one hand, there is no doubt that in the case of heavy expenditures for peace-keeping operations the regular scale of contributions has to be replaced by a special scale in order to provide the necessary relief to countries with only a modest capacity to pay. On the other hand, the principle of collective financial responsibility requires from each Member State a maximum contribution in relation to its capacity to pay. Here again are two extremes between which a balance has to be struck. Relief should be sought for those countries whose capacity to pay is relatively modest. At the same time it would seem wrong to reduce this share to purely symbolic amounts which in fact would weaken the spirit of collective responsibility to which they themselves have subscribed.

7. In the opinion of the Netherlands delegation, the question of how to strike the correct balance between the necessity to provide relief to Member States with a relatively small capacity to pay, and the necessity to give expression to collective financial responsibility is one of the crucial issues before this Working Group. For a possible reply to this question, the Netherlands delegation would like to refer first of all to the proposal of the Canadian delegation [A/AC.113/2] to devise a method whereby a certain predetermined level of expenses for each peace-keeping operation would be financed under the scale of assessment used with regard to the regular budget. Without being too rigid as to the actual determination of this level of expenses, the Netherlands delegation values the Canadian proposals as embodying a useful principle.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

8. The next step would be to establish a special scale for the remainder of the expenditures concerned. In this respect I should like to refer to the observations of the Netherlands Government regarding General Assembly resolution 1620 (XV), as submitted to the Working Group of Fifteen on the Examination of the Administrative and Budgetary Procedures of the United Nations on 15 September 1961 [see A/AC.104/1/Add. 7]. In these observations the proposal was made to draw up a scale for peace and security expenses by which the percentages of the Member States with little capacity to pay are reduced, while those of Member States with a greater capacity to pay are increased proportionately. Our proposal was, and still is, to reduce the minimum percentages of the regular scale to, for example, 0.01 per cent. By so doing, and by making corresponding corrections in the rest of the regular scale, in particular in its upper part, the Working Group would arrive at one of the purest forms of a special scale as suggested in its mandate. The main criterion for allowing Member States a reduction in comparison with the regular scale, might be, for example, the receipt of technical assistance, with due corrections in cases where this criterion would clearly not be applicable, as already pointed out by some of the distinguished representatives.

9. The advantages of a method based on reducing the minimum percentages of the regular scale to something like 0.01 per cent would be many. Such a method

would be simple. It would bring considerable relief to poorer countries. At the same time, the contributions asked from those countries would be more than just symbolical. In brief, the type of scale as proposed by the Netherlands delegation would indeed be a genuine scale, comparable with the regular scale, but taking into account the specific requirements outlined in the mandate of the Working Group. In an attempt to elaborate such a proposal, the Group might find it useful to enter into consultation with the Committee on Contributions.

10. As a final point, the Netherlands delegation would like to express its agreement with the view of the Canadian delegation that it would be desirable to develop a method to apportion in future the costs of peace-keeping operations in a manner which would not rely on *ad hoc* arrangements. It is the earnest hope of my delegation that the work of this Group will not only be useful for solving the problems immediately ahead, but will also have a more lasting significance for the future. In the interest of the United Nations and as a means of ensuring the Organization's continued existence, the uncertainties which up to now have been characteristic of the financing of peace-keeping operations, should once and for all be eliminated.

11. These are the views of the Netherlands delegation. They have been put forward in the same spirit of flexibility and of willingness to find a generally acceptable solution as has already been expressed by many other representatives.

DOCUMENT A/AC.113/14

Statement by the representative of Italy at the seventh meeting of the Working Group

[Original text: French]
[20 February 1963]

1. The Italian delegation has listened with great interest to the statements made by the representatives who have already spoken on the problem referred to us by the General Assembly.

2. First, I should like to recall briefly my delegation's position on the question of the principle of the financial responsibility of Members of the United Nations. As soon as the problem came before the Organization in a concrete form, the Italian delegation expressed the opinion that expenses connected with the peace-keeping operations in the Congo and the Middle East were expenses of the Organization within the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter and that, consequently, it was incumbent on the General Assembly to settle the question and apportion the expenses among the States Members of the Organization.

3. The General Assembly itself arrived at the same interpretation of the Charter provisions relating to its competence. Certain States Members opposed this interpretation, and thus was born the idea of asking the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion. My delegation believed it appropriate to have recourse to the technically qualified organ of the United Nations in the hope that an authoritative opinion would put an end to differences which threatened the very future of the Organization. Here let me pay a tribute to the Argentine, Brazilian, and Mexican dele-

gations. Until the seventeenth session of the General Assembly, those countries had supported the thesis that expenses incurred for military purposes could not be considered expenses of the Organization within the meaning of Article 17. In accordance with their brilliant juridical traditions they now support the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice,¹⁷ which the General Assembly accepted in its resolution 1854 A (XVII), and are giving valuable assistance in our efforts to solve the problem on which we have to report to the General Assembly. Only if we all show a similar spirit of co-operation shall we be able to reach, if not a solution satisfactory to everyone, at least an honourable compromise. Otherwise, new difficulties will be added to those we already face and the possibility of effective action by the Organization for the maintenance of peace will be very seriously limited.

4. Resolution 1854 B (XVII) gave this group the task of submitting to the General Assembly a report on the procedure to be followed in order to meet the cost of operations for the maintenance of peace which impose, and I quote, "a heavy financial burden on the States Members". The resolution which set up this group recognized that such a procedure would have to be different from that applied in regard to the regular budget of the Organization.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

5. It seems to us, therefore, that we must above all try to establish the meaning of the expression "heavy expenses" used in the fourth preambular paragraph of the resolution referred to. The task which is entrusted to us is to find a special method for the sharing of these "heavy expenses". The resolution does not envisage particular procedures in relation to peace-keeping operations not involving heavy financial burdens. We can, it seems to us, deduce therefrom that in such cases, by virtue of the principle of collective responsibility, the scale of assessments for the regular budget of the Assembly should be applied.

6. If we do not wish to indicate at random a figure above which an expense may be considered "heavy", we may perhaps refer to certain financial decisions adopted by the Organization which may help us to select some figure which we could not subsequently be accused of having chosen arbitrarily.

7. At its fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth sessions the General Assembly decided, in its resolutions 1615 (XV), 1735 (XVI) and 1862 (XVII) on unforeseen and extraordinary expenses, that if, as a result of a decision of the Security Council, commitments relating to the maintenance of peace and security should arise in an estimated total exceeding \$10 million before the next regular session of the General Assembly, a special session of the Assembly should be convened by the Secretary-General to consider the matter.

8. The fact that a special session of the General Assembly is judged necessary to examine expenditures in connexion with peace-keeping operations when those expenditures exceed \$10 million indicates, in our opinion, that the "burden" becomes "heavy" at that point. Consequently, when the cost of a peace-keeping operation is below that total, it seems to us that the scale of contributions to the ordinary budget of the Organization should be applied.

9. In regard to expenses exceeding \$10 million, my delegation believes that it would not be advisable to establish a rigid scale to be applied automatically whatever the circumstances. Indeed, we believe that one cannot ignore the fact that some countries are more directly interested than others in the solution of certain controversies, that they have what I would like to call a "special interest" in the normalization of certain situations. The case of West New Guinea has already been mentioned here several times. The two States having a "special interest" in the question have agreed to pay all the costs of the Organization's participation in the settlement of the dispute. It may also be recalled that the Secretary-General has appointed a permanent Special Representative whose task it is to try to re-establish normal relations between Cambodia and Thailand. Those two countries have agreed to share the cost of Mr. Gussing's mission in that geographical area.

10. These precedents are encouraging. It therefore seems opportune to give the Secretary-General a mandate to try to obtain from the countries most directly interested substantial voluntary contributions to peace-keeping operations, when such have to be undertaken.

The impartiality of the Secretary-General, the discretion he exercises in his activities, the many and frequent contacts he has with the countries which are parties to a dispute, give reason to hope that his intervention will have positive results.

11. On the other hand, we cannot share the opinion of certain delegations which have maintained that a special financial responsibility must be recognized to rest upon the States whose actions made United Nations intervention necessary. The notion of political responsibility is particularly hard to define, and it is even more difficult for a political Organization like ours to take a decision in the matter. It seems to us therefore that we must not insist on this criterion if we do not wish to be unrealistic or make the solution of certain problems even more difficult.

12. My delegation believes that the special position which the Charter confers upon the permanent Members of the Security Council necessarily carries with it corresponding obligations. Thus, when a peace-keeping operation is decided upon, those countries should be asked to make substantial voluntary contributions to the operation in question.

13. Lastly, we think it is time to ask all the Member States of the Organization to make voluntary contributions towards meeting the cost of peace-keeping operations.

14. If the total of the voluntary contributions to which I have just referred is not sufficient to cover the difference between the sum of \$10 million which I mentioned earlier and the cost of the operation, the excess should be apportioned—still in accordance with the principle of collective responsibility—among States Members according to a scale to be established, taking into account above all the ability of States Members to pay with certain adjustments for developing countries depending on whether they are or are not receiving technical assistance. I should like to emphasize that, if the voluntary contributions referred to are not made, it would be necessary to establish a different scale taking into account not only the ability to pay but also the special interest of certain States in a given operation, as well as the special responsibility of the permanent members of the Security Council.

15. May I be allowed, in conclusion, to summarize the Italian delegation's suggestions as follows: first, when the total cost of a peace-keeping operation does not exceed \$10 million, the expenditure should be divided among regular States Members in accordance with the scale adopted in regard to the budget of the United Nations. Secondly, if the cost of such an operation exceeds the sum of \$10 million, the excess should be covered as follows: (a) by voluntary contributions from States having a "special interest" in the question which led to United Nations intervention; (b) by voluntary contributions from States which are permanent members of the Security Council; (c) by voluntary contributions from other States Members of the Organization; (d) by all States Members according to a special scale taking into account their ability to pay and, in the case of developing countries, of whether they do or not receive technical assistance.

DOCUMENT A/AC.113/15

Statement by the representative of Bulgaria at the eighth meeting of the Working Group

[Original text: English]
[20 February 1963]

1. The question of finding ways and means of financing the operations of the United Nations in the Middle East and in the Congo has been discussed at length at many previous sessions of the General Assembly. The Working Group on the Examination of the Administrative and Budgetary Procedures of the United Nations is now dealing with the problem which will be the only item on the agenda of the forthcoming special session of the General Assembly.

2. I should now like to stress once again my delegation's position—a position already developed by us on various occasions. We are firmly convinced that if the operations of the United Nations in the Middle East and in the Congo had been carried out in conformity with the Charter and with the requirements of international law, this question would now have been a matter of the past.

3. The establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East was made in connexion with the armed aggression committed against Egypt. This aggression was an act in flagrant violation of international peace and security. There is no doubt that in such a case any action for maintaining international peace and security comes within the exclusive competence of the Security Council. In order to establish UNEF the former Secretary-General of the United Nations pretended to base himself on the resolutions adopted by the first emergency special session of the General Assembly in November 1956.

4. The establishment of UNEF in violation of the Charter is one reason why my Government cannot consider itself bound by the financial implications of the maintenance of this Force. The second reason is not less important. This reason, rooted in the principles of international law, was simply but wisely expressed by our colleague Mr. Bindzi, representative of Cameroon, who said: "*Celui qui casse les verres les paie*" [A/AC.113/10] which means that those countries which have committed the aggression must bear the consequences of it.

5. In the case of the Congo, I do not believe there is anything more to be added to what has already been said on previous occasions. More than two and a half years have elapsed since the day when the late Patrice Lumumba, Prime Minister of the Congo, appealed for United Nations help to cope with the aggression of a former colonial Power.

6. Many facts about these tragic events at that time—either obscure or ignored—have now come out into the open. The recently published book of Mr. Conor Cruise O'Brien,¹⁸ former chief representative of the United Nations in Katanga, has thrown abundant light on what happened in that country.

7. When one considers the pattern of events in that long-suffering country as these events are known to everyone now, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the Congo was the victim of a conspiracy organized by the colonial Powers. It was not a mere accident

that the late Secretary-General of the United Nations violated Chapter VII of the Charter and assumed the role of the Security Council. The Security Council was kept away from the operations and denied control of the forces acting there allegedly on behalf of the United Nations. This conduct was in conformity with the interests of those colonial Powers which were exploiting the wealth of this country.

8. My delegation stresses once more these notorious events in the Middle East and in the Congo, not because we enjoy doing so, but because we feel obliged to make our position explicitly clear. Our position is based on the provisions of the Charter.

9. In the case of UNEF in the Middle East, we believe that it was the Security Council and not the General Assembly which was competent to deal with the situation created by the aggression against Egypt. This belief of ours is based on Article 11, paragraph 2 of the Charter which reads:

"2. The General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by any Member of the United Nations, or by the Security Council, or by a State which is not a Member of the United Nations . . . Any such question on which action is necessary shall be referred to the Security Council by the General Assembly either before or after discussion."

10. In the case of the Congo, we believe that the United Nations forces were sent there to help the legitimate Government of Patrice Lumumba, and not to isolate him in a way which led to his assassination and the murder of many other Congolese patriots.

11. We believe also that the operations of the forces should have been directed not by the late Secretary-General of the United Nations and his "Congo Club" in which Mr. Cordier played such an important role, but by the Security Council.

12. This belief of ours is based on the Charter, more precisely on the provisions of Articles 43, 46, 47 and 48. I prefer to refrain from quoting these Articles since their contents are well known.

13. At the seventeenth regular session of the General Assembly and at previous sessions also many Western delegates spoke very emphatically about the financial crisis or the financial collapse of the United Nations. In our opinion, the present financial difficulties of our Organization are the result of flagrant violations of the Charter. It is only by observing the spirit and provisions of the Charter that we can remedy the present financial difficulties of the United Nations and preserve this Organization for the benefit of mankind.

14. We cannot therefore conceal our apprehension at the fact that some Powers, for their own selfish interests, are pushing the Organization in the wrong direction. These Powers spare no effort to veil their violations of the Charter.

15. We do not believe that the acceptance by the General Assembly of the Advisory opinion of the In-

¹⁸ *To Katanga and Back*, London: Hutchinson and Co. (Publishers) Ltd.

ternational Court of Justice¹⁹ would help to solve the financial problems of the United Nations.

16. When we discussed the Court's opinion in the Fifth Committee, we stated that the question of financing the operations in the Middle East and in the Congo was not a juridical question but predominantly a political one. The Court is not entitled to give opinions on political issues.

17. When we analyse the vote of the judges on the recent advisory opinion—five out of the fourteen judges voted against, four gave separate opinions and only five were in favour—we cannot fail to conclude that it was not easy for them to make a decision on this thorny matter.

18. It is true that at previous sessions many delegations courageously and successfully fought to show that the extraordinary expenses of the United Nations operations in the Congo and in the Middle East are essentially different in nature from the expenses of the Organization under the regular budget. They have subsequently accepted the Court's opinion that these expenses of the Organization are expenses within the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2. But this acceptance was just a formal act on their part. These delegations are not willing to accept all the material consequences which logically result from this acceptance. I am far from blaming them for the adoption of this position. On the contrary, my delegation understands those delegations very well. Why should the neutral countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America be forced to pay such enormous amounts of money for those who are guilty of the aggression against Egypt and the conspiracy of the colonial Powers in the Congo?

19. Our position on this point is quite similar to theirs. The difference lies in the fact that we do not accept the opinion of the Court. We do not agree that these expenses are expenses within the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2, and we do not see any reason for changing our previous position.

20. At the seventeenth session of the General Assembly attempts were made by the United States and their allies to impose on all Member States more than \$400 million worth of expenditures for ONUC and UNEF by including those expenditures in the regular budget of the Organization. As I have already tried to show, this is in contradiction with the Charter and must inevitably provoke objections on the part of many Member States. The resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its seventeenth session have not solved the problem. And on this point, we think that the provisions of the Charter cannot, and should not, be replaced by a simple resolution or resolutions of the General Assembly.

21. Under resolution 1854 B (XVII) our Group has been instructed to continue the consideration of the question of finding ways and means for

financing previous, present and future peace-keeping operations.

22. We have listened with great attention to the various statements made before this Working Group by representatives. We were especially impressed by some points raised by the representatives of Pakistan, Nigeria and Cameroon. My delegation looks with sympathy upon the following two factors stressed by the above-mentioned delegations for defraying the cost of the peace-keeping operations: first, the responsibility of the State or States whose acts or delinquencies make the operations necessary. Secondly, operations carried out in accordance with the procedure established in Chapter VII of the Charter should be financed according to the military agreements referred to in that Chapter.

23. At this stage it is rather difficult for my delegation to formulate a practical proposal for finding ways and means for financing the past, present and future peace-keeping operations of the United Nations. Most of these difficulties arise from the provisions of the Charter. The Charter is a treaty concluded between States, and my country cannot accept any more obligations than those included in the present Charter of the United Nations. I should like to clarify the basis of the difficulties that we encounter. First, Article 11, paragraph 2, of the Charter provides that where action for the maintenance of international peace and security is concerned, such action may be undertaken only on the grounds of a resolution of the Security Council. Secondly, Article 43 requires that for the maintenance of international peace and security the agreement or agreements for the provision of armed forces, facilities, etc., must be concluded between the Security Council and the Member States. Thirdly, when the Security Council makes a binding decision providing for peace-keeping operations involving the use of armed forces, the financial responsibility of the Member States will be governed by the terms of the agreement referred to in Article 43.

24. These are some of the stumbling blocks confronting our Group, and my delegation believes that during the present discussion the aforesaid fundamental principles of the Charter will find clear and positive expression in our work.

25. At this stage, my delegation would like to stress the following two principles which in our opinion should be accepted as a basis for the studies entrusted to our Working Group by the General Assembly. First, recognition of the principle that the Powers which commit aggression or are guilty of the delinquency must assume all material responsibilities for peace-keeping operations. We think that at present this is the case with the operations in the Congo and in the Middle East. Secondly, for future peace-keeping operations involving financial responsibilities, our Group should apply the principle that only the Security Council is authorized by the Charter to take decisions.

26. These principles are not new. They have been mentioned in the statements of many representatives who have preceded me. These principles have been most clearly and frankly set forth by the representative of the Soviet Union.

¹⁹ *Certain expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962: I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 151, transmitted to the Members of the General Assembly by a note of the Secretary-General (A/5161 and Corr.1).*

DOCUMENT A/AC.113/16

Statement by the representative of the United Arab Republic
at the eighth meeting of the Working Group

[Original text: English]
[20 February 1963]

1. In the brief remarks that I intend to make now I shall endeavour not to dwell at length on the many arguments which have been advanced with regard to the important questions that we, in this Working Group, are called upon to study and make recommendations upon.

2. I should like to state unambiguously that, in the opinion of my delegation, the question of the financing of peace-keeping operations, whether in the past or in the future, and here I earnestly hope that there will be no need for future peace-keeping operations, is of a political nature rather than a juridical one. It is very fitting to recall the words of the representative of Brazil when he said that "it is plain to see that our problem becomes strictly technical as soon as political understanding has been reached" [A/AC.113/7]. This opinion has always been the one that had guided my Government's decisions in this respect.

3. Such being the case, my delegation expressed its regret that the General Assembly had to request the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice²⁰ on such a political question. The question addressed to the Court did not constitute the main subject of the real problem, and the answer of the Court was not of a nature to help the Assembly to formulate a practical solution to the financial difficulties of the United Nations. My delegation does not propose to make here a study of the Court's opinion and will confine itself to underlining the aspect which it considers the most significant.

4. As I have already said, the core of the problem is not the question addressed to the Court. The Court itself has distinguished between three categories of questions which could arise in the interpretation of Article 17. On pages 157 and 158 of its Advisory opinion, the Court says: "One question is that of identifying what are 'the expenses of the Organization'; a second question might concern apportionment by the General Assembly; while a third question might involve the interpretation of the phrase 'shall be borne by the Members'. It is the second and third questions which directly involve 'the financial obligations of the Members', but it is only the first question which is posed by the request for the advisory opinion."

5. Therefore the Court has limited itself to answering the first of these questions, namely whether the expenses relating to emergency operations constitute "expenses of the Organization". To this question the Court has answered in the affirmative, but it has not specified the method of financing these operations, whether from the regular budget of the Organization or from a special fund, as my delegation precognizes.

6. Consequently, the General Assembly having requested the opinion of the Court as to the expenses relating to the emergency operations, the Court states that these expenses constituted "expenses of the Organization" in the meaning of Article 17 of the Charter. But, not having been asked the question whether these ex-

penses, special in nature, should be covered by the regular budget of the Organization, the Court did not express its opinion as to the method of financing these operations.

7. Yet, the problem which has confronted the United Nations is not to know whether these expenses constitute expenses of the Organization, but it is the question of how these operations shall be financed.

8. My delegation believes that the real problem is whether these expenses do or do not constitute expenses of a special nature which should be distinguished from the regular expenses of the Organization. In this respect may I read from the document submitted to us by our colleagues from Argentina, Brazil and Mexico [A/AC.113/3], "The Court's decision has also made it clear that the General Assembly has the widest possible power to determine the method and the scale of contributions for financing expenditure incurred by the Organization for the purpose of maintaining peace."

9. Thus, while the Court has not dealt with this question, the General Assembly, in its resolution 1732 (XVI) has specifically differentiated between these two categories of expenses. In the third preambular paragraph of that resolution, we read:

"Bearing in mind that the extraordinary expenses for the United Nations operations in the Congo are essentially different in nature from the expenses of the Organization under the regular budget and that, therefore, a procedure different from that applied in the case of the regular budget is required for meeting these extraordinary expenses."

10. It follows that these expenses, which, although they are expenses of the Organization, do not constitute a part of the regular budget of the Organization, should therefore be treated differently.

11. If I have dwelt at length on this important point, it was to illustrate that we, in the United Arab Republic, have, since the beginning, adopted and maintained the view which corresponds to the conclusion I arrived at and which is a natural outcome of the Court's opinion. Our position has been based on the following principles: first, the expenses occasioned by the formation of emergency forces differ by nature and by the reasons which have motivated their creation from the regular expenses of the Organization. This is why we must differentiate between the regular expenses of the Organization and the extraordinary expenses entailed by unforeseen operations. With regard to this point my delegation finds itself in the company of many others around this table who advocate this same principle.

12. The second principle that has guided us was and certainly still is, that the country or countries which are the victims of the action which necessitated the dispatch of United Nations forces should be exempt from payment of a contribution with regard to such expenses. This, in our opinion, is a very important principle which should be recommended by this Working Group, since it is inconceivable for a country to

²⁰ *Ibid.*

suffer morally, materially and humanly and, over and above that, to be made to contribute such funds which certainly should be used to alleviate a part of these sufferings.

13. On the other hand, in organizing the financing of these operations, one must take into account the following factors: first, the responsibility of the State or the States whose acts made and make the operations necessary. Secondly, the benefits which certain States derive from the operation. Thirdly, the special responsibility of the permanent members of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

14. In other words, the peace-keeping operations, when duly organized, should be financed by funds drawn from the following sources:

(a) The country or countries whose actions have necessitated the dispatch of the United Nations force. May I be allowed to refer at this point to paragraph 6 of the statement made before this Group by the distinguished representative of Nigeria who rightly said: "We take this to mean that those whose negligence or malfeasance has led to the events which make a peace-keeping operation necessary should be surcharged with part at least of the cost. The fact that it may be difficult in some cases to fix responsibility, or to reduce that responsibility to monetary terms, does not invalidate this principle . . ." [A/AC.113/9].

(b) The country or countries which are at the source of the events which led to the dispatch of the force, or whose actions necessitate the continuance of the United Nations operations. Again, history, especially recent history, has given us ample proof of how the actions of certain countries have made it imperative that the Congo operation, for example, should continue until the present and might have led to the destruction of our Organization. The least to be taken into consideration is that such countries should not be left to gain from these ruthless acts and that their aims should not only be defeated but that they should be made to pay for their actions.

(c) The permanent members of the Security Council as being primarily responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. These States are in general, and due to political realities, tied in one way or another to world events. I should like again, with the permission of the representative of Nigeria, to read from paragraph 7 of his statement. He said that "we agree with criteria (b) in paragraph 2 that the permanent members of the Security Council should bear special financial responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. This would appear to be consistent with the Articles of the Charter which give permanent members extraordinary powers for the maintenance of peace and security" [A/AC.113/9].

(d) A special fund should be established as a stand-by arrangement into which voluntary contributions for peace and security would be paid by Member States. This suggestion was also advanced by the distinguished representative of Sweden in his address to the Working Group on 15 February 1963 (see A/AC.113/11). In contributing to this fund, on a voluntary basis, Member States would demonstrate their solidarity in repelling aggression, even before it happens, and by the same action would live up to their collective responsibility.

15. During the course of the debate, some of the representatives who have preceded me have spoken of finding a way out of the problem by advancing certain proposals with regard to what system of apportionment should be followed. They have pointed out, and rightly so, the capabilities and the capacities of what they have called at certain times "the developing countries", "the poorer countries", "countries that receive technical assistance" or "countries that cannot face such tremendous expenses". But, while my delegation appreciates that feeling, we believe it should not be the point of departure in finding the ways and means of arriving at a solution.

16. In the opinion of my delegation, the principles that I have mentioned and which many delegations before the Fifth Committee and also here in this Working Group shared with us, should really constitute the point of departure in finding our way out.

17. How can we, in all fairness, put aside the principle that the country or the countries victims of an act of aggression should be exempt from these financial burdens? How can the United Nations, in all honesty, fail to put the blame and the responsibility squarely on that country or countries that created the situation which necessitated United Nations intervention? It was argued here that defining responsibility would be a difficult task, as was stated by the distinguished representative of Pakistan when he said, ". . . we feel that we should leave aside such thorny and undefinable questions as to who is the delinquent and who the victim in a particular situation or who stands to benefit from the restoration of peace and tranquillity in a particular area of the world" [A/AC.113/8]. But the source of the trouble in each of the cases that has confronted the Organization has been very clear to all of us, and we should not really close our eyes and let those who created these menacing situations escape from their responsibilities.

18. I do not propose that we, in this Working Group, should embark on a lengthy discussion to define aggression. It is certainly not my intention. But still, any recommendation by the Working Group to the General Assembly should refer to this important factor, and it would be for the Assembly itself to decide who is responsible for the operation.

19. The fact that the United Nations succeeded in stopping aggression would in itself be a very great achievement; but, still, the achievement cannot be complete unless, as the representative of Nigeria stated [see A/AC.113/9] those whose negligence or malfeasance has led to the events are made to pay. In fact and in all honesty, if these principles are not upheld the future of the Organization itself may be in jeopardy.

20. My delegation has been heartened, as I have already stated, to hear several of our colleagues around this table express in one way or another, in one form or another, to a certain extent or to a greater extent, these same principles. Moreover, it is to be noted that the General Assembly, in resolution 1732 (XVI), has approved most of these ideas. In the paragraph which I already quoted, it recognizes that "a procedure different from that applied in the case of the regular budget is required for meeting these extraordinary expenses". It stresses the special responsibility of the permanent members of the Security Council when it states in its fourth preambular paragraph:

"*Bearing in mind* that the permanent members of the Security Council have a special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and, therefore, for contributing to the financing of peace and security operations."

and in operative paragraph 6:

"*The General Assembly,*

"6. *Urges* the permanent members of the Security Council to make sizable additional contributions;".

The Assembly has further taken into account the special responsibility of the State which is at the source of the events which led to the formation of ONUC when, in operative paragraph 8, it

"*Calls upon* the Government of Belgium, a State directly concerned with the situation in the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville), to make a substantial contribution;".

Finally, it appeals "to all Member States which are in a position to assist to make voluntary contributions to help defray the costs of the United Nations operations in the Congo".

21. There is still a very important point which should be borne in mind. The cost of operations of this nature varies considerably according to the geographical region, the country or countries victims of aggression, the country or countries responsible for

the United Nations operation, the duration and the aim of the operation. My delegation believes, therefore, that the Working Group should not enunciate immutable rules concerning the methods of financing the operations, but that these rules should leave the General Assembly latitude to adapt them by a simple procedure in each particular case. In other words, each operation should have an *ad hoc* method of financing.

22. This idea has also been advocated by several representatives during the present debate. I appeal to those representatives who have expressed their objections to that method to understand the magnitude of these operations and to realise that, in suggesting this point, we are not obstructing any definite steps to be taken in the Working Group. In fact, in the light of certain principles which we have advanced, this latitude is necessary and freedom for the General Assembly to decide on each case is imperative.

23. These are the observations which my delegation deemed appropriate to make at this juncture of our work in the hope that they will be considered by the members of the Working Group. I need not emphasize that the debates which took place in the Fifth Committee reveal that a considerable number of countries share the views I have advanced today.

24. I naturally reserve the right of my delegation to express our opinion on documents submitted later to the Working Group.

DOCUMENT A/AC.113/17

Statement by the representative of the United States of America at the ninth meeting of the Working Group

[Original text: English]
[7 March 1963]

1. In his opening remarks, the Chairman very properly and very eloquently pointed out the difficult nature of the task which the General Assembly has placed before the Working Group on the Examination of the Administrative and Budgetary Procedures of the United Nations. Perhaps this is the only point on which there is unanimous agreement in this room.

2. The problem itself may be stated simply. It is how to provide the necessary funds to finance peace and security operations of the United Nations—and specifically the operations in the Gaza Strip in the Middle East and in the Congo.

3. While the statement of the problem is simple, its solution is difficult. The United Nations has struggled with the issue since late in 1956, and no one has been really satisfied with the results of these efforts. The best illustration of this is that every year between 1956 and 1961 saw a change by the General Assembly in the methods adopted for financing these operations. It is not surprising that the complexities of the problem have so far defeated our efforts to find a single solution satisfactory to all. We must remember that we are still at an early stage in the life of this world Organization, with few precedents to guide us and many lessons still to be learned.

4. It occurs to me that perhaps one of the main reasons why we have thus far failed to arrive at general agreement in our search for a solution is that our approach has not taken sufficient account of the

complexities I have mentioned. Perhaps we have tried at too early a stage to reach solutions that were too broad. Perhaps we should have realized that it was too early to find an ideal solution, good for all times and circumstances, and that only limited solutions were possible for the immediate operations before us.

5. Furthermore, when we look ahead, we see no way to prophesy what future peace-keeping operations by the United Nations may turn out to be. One cannot foretell their origin, their character, their size, their duration, their cost or the surrounding circumstances. All that one can forecast is that they will be different, and that no single formula or single approach can possibly take into account their potential variations and differing characteristics.

6. Apart from the complex character of the problem we are asked by the General Assembly to solve, there is an additional complicating fact. This is the pressure of time and circumstances. We are called upon to complete and circulate our report by 31 March 1963. This means that we cannot spend the time, as we might otherwise like, to study in detail all conceivable avenues of approach.

7. When I mentioned the pressure of circumstances, I had two matters in mind. One is the fact that this Organization now has two peace-keeping operations in the field which must be financed if they are to continue, regardless of whether we can or cannot agree on some ideal formula for financing all future opera-

tions of this kind. Secondly, it now appears that funds to continue these operations, even if that in the Congo is sharply reduced in magnitude, will run out by about 30 June 1963.

8. This means that, when the General Assembly meets in special session this coming May, it will have to adopt resolutions which will provide for the future financing of these two operations, at least for the six months from 1 July to 31 December 1963, or it will have to recommend their abrupt discontinuance. This is the very practical problem immediately before us, and I submit that it should receive our prompt attention and not be lost sight of in a search for possible general principles to govern the financing of unknown operations not yet begun. Accordingly, the United States believes that the Working Group should concentrate its attention as rapidly and fully as possible on concrete proposals for financing UNEF and ONUC in the six months from 1 July to 31 December 1963.

9. Secondly, the United States believes that it would be wise, for some time to come, to deal with the method of financing of each peace-keeping operation and when that operation occurs, learning from each experience what might be desirable for the future and adjusting each solution to the particular facts of each case. We believe that this approach is the only sensible and practical one for this Working Group to follow at this time, given the present financial plight of the United Nations, the present deep political differences between Member States, the unpredictable character of any future peace-keeping operations, and the virtual impossibility of our now agreeing on any one single formula or any one single set of principles or criteria to govern unknown operations yet to be begun—even if such a single pattern could ever be considered practicable.

10. I know that there are those who would like to see a simple solution worked out now for all time, and fear that any solutions with reference to UNEF and ONUC alone might prejudice their future interests. To these I suggest that we can all agree that what we decide now for UNEF and ONUC need not constitute any pattern for the future. Given our uncertainties and lack of experience in this area—plus the fact, stated by the representative of Sweden [see A/AC.113/11] that the proper political climate does not exist—it would undoubtedly be wise not to try to freeze any such pattern now or in the immediate future.

11. Some representatives may feel that the Working Group would not be fulfilling its mandate if it did not recommend some universal formula or some universal set of principles or criteria to be followed in the case of any and all future peace-keeping operations. Surely the General Assembly expects this Working Group to use its own best judgement in this matter, and if the Working Group comes to the conclusion, as we believe it should, that for the foreseeable future no single formula or simple set of principles or criteria can be applied to any and all peace-keeping operations, we are confident that the General Assembly will respect that conclusion.

12. Some Member States may feel concern that, in the absence of some agreed-upon single formula or fixed set of definite principles or criteria, they may in the future be subjected to excessive assessments for some yet unforeseen peace-keeping operation. Our delegation would point out, however, that any assess-

ment on Member States, whether for peace-keeping operations or for any other matter, requires in the General Assembly an affirmative vote of two-thirds of the Members present and voting, and that excessive and unfair assessments are very unlikely to receive any such vote.

13. If, as our delegation recommends, we concentrate our efforts on the financing of UNEF and ONUC in the period immediately ahead and not try to fix some single pattern for the financing of unknown future operations, then we should consider only facts and principles which are relevant to these two existing operations and put to one side elements which might be relevant only to other possible operations. This should enable us to reduce the area of our discussion and make it possible to comply with our mandate within the time-limit fixed by the General Assembly.

14. Let me turn now to the substance of the matter before us, namely, the methods to be recommended by this Working Group for financing UNEF and ONUC operations beyond June 1963. In this connexion, it should be noted that resolution 1854 B (XVIII) does not limit this Working Group to considering or recommending a single method of financing and, in fact, provides that the Working Group is "to study . . . special methods for financing peace-keeping operations . . .".

15. A very strong case can be made for financing these operations in their entirety on the basis of the regular budget scale of assessments. As has been pointed out by the representative of Australia, peace-keeping expenses are just as much expenses of the Organization as are any other, and there is a strong *prima facie* case for applying to them the same scale which is considered equitable for other expenses of the Organization. The regular assessment scale does take into account relative capacity to pay; indeed it is based broadly on relative capacity to pay. Furthermore, very substantial adjustments in the regular assessment scale are made for low *per caput* income countries, beyond what would be called for by comparative national income figures.

16. The so-called ceiling applied to the United States percentage in the regular scale is not an exception to the general principles of cost-sharing adopted by the General Assembly—indeed, it is one of those general principles. When in 1946 the General Assembly accepted the recommendations of the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations²¹ that expenses of the Organization should be based "broadly" on capacity to pay, it expressly contemplated the imposition of a ceiling on the contribution of the largest contributor and it applied such a ceiling in the very first scale of assessments. Ever since that time the General Assembly has continued to accept the principle that, in an organization of sovereign States—where each nation has one vote—it is not in the interest of the organization to depend too much financially on any one State or to concentrate too much financial responsibility in any one State, regardless of what some statistics might appear to imply with regard to relative capacity to pay.

17. Also, the so-called ceiling is not the only modification in the regular scale of assessments of the principle of capacity to pay. Equally a modification is

²¹ See *Report of the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations* (PC/20), chap. IX, section 2, para. 13.

the special reduction which, as I have mentioned, is given to all States—a majority of the Members—having a *per caput* income below 1,000. A pure capacity-to-pay approach would require the elimination of this reduction. Needless to say, the United States would oppose such an elimination.

18. In the discussions to date, considerable emphasis has been laid upon the need for voluntary contributions from the developed countries. With respect to this suggestion, I can only say that, while voluntary contributions may have had considerable value as an adjunct to an assessment of a portion of peace-keeping expenses, there is merit in relying upon voluntary contributions only if a sizable number of governments join in making such contributions.

19. I mention this because of the past record. In connexion with the major United Nations peace-keeping operation, that in the Congo, only the United States has made voluntary cash contributions in excess of its assessed percentage. Even though those voluntary contributions brought the United States total percentage of the costs of this operation close to the 50 per cent level, not a single other State has seen fit to make a voluntary cash contribution in response to the General Assembly's appeal. This has meant that the United States has borne the entire extra burden of keeping the operation a going concern. For this reason, the United States will now be required to study very carefully any proposal for financing these operations which involves voluntary contributions. Moreover, for the United States to give serious consideration to any such proposal, solid assurances would be needed that a sizable number of nations will make sizable voluntary contributions along with us.

20. Many speakers have indicated support of a possible scale of assessments. Those speakers have made it quite clear that the special scale they have in mind would involve an assessment percentage for the United States—some speakers have added other States—in excess of that in the regular scale of assessments. In this connexion, I call the Working Group's attention to several important facts:

(a) Under legislation enacted by the United States Congress in 1952, no United States representative may commit the United States to an appropriation of funds in excess of $33\frac{1}{3}$ per cent of a budget of the United Nations.

(b) Although the General Assembly decided in 1957 that in principle no Member State should have a percentage of more than 30 per cent in the regular scale, the United States percentage in the regular scale of assessments is 32.02 per cent.

(c) Since the establishment of the United Nations, the United States has been by far its largest financial contributor. Its assessed contributions have always been more than twice that of the second largest contributor. The proportion of its voluntary contributions, and of its actual payments against its contributions and pledges, has been even higher.

(d) Let me be more specific.

(i) The United States has contributed over the calendar years 1946-1962 an aggregate of \$1,864,218,000 to the United Nations and its specialized agencies and special programmes;

(ii) The United States pays an assessment percentage in the regular scale of 32.02 per cent as against

14.97 for the second largest contributor, namely the Soviet Union.

(iii) The United States has contributed to special United Nations programmes percentages such as 57-60 per cent for the International Refugee Organization, 40-72 per cent for the United Nations Children's Fund, 70 per cent for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, 40-60 per cent for the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance, 40 per cent for the Special Fund, and over 50 per cent for the Congo economic assistance programme.

(e) In the case of the major United Nations peace-keeping operations in the Middle East and the Congo, the United States has added very substantial voluntary contributions to its assessed contributions ever since 1957. This has resulted in its paying between 44 and $49\frac{1}{2}$ per cent of the total costs of these operations.

(f) Apart from the foregoing, any calculation of what the United States should pay by way of an assessed percentage must take account of the amounts the United States contributes in the way of bilateral assistance to less developed countries, the amounts it contributes to regional and multilateral assistance programmes, and the amounts of its military expenditures to protect the free world from aggression.

21. From the facts mentioned, it is clear that any proposal to increase any United States assessment over the regular scale would present the most acute and serious difficulty. It follows that the United States attitude towards the special scale proposals which thus far have been suggested is necessarily negative.

22. My delegation is fully aware of the needs and concerns of the less developed States, and realizes that these States reach sooner than developed States a point beyond which the financial strain of contributing to international organizations becomes a difficult burden to bear. The United States has recognized this in a very practical way by its substantial voluntary contributions in the past to meet the Middle East and Congo expenses. However, I join with those speakers who reject the idea that the contributions of less developed countries to peace-keeping operations should be only "token" or "symbolic" in nature.

23. Surely there is nothing "token" or "symbolic" about the interest that every country has in the keeping of the peace. Peace is the equal concern of all of us, and peace-keeping should be the equal concern of all of us. Surely we have learned what history teaches us—that a single spark, unextinguished, is capable of starting a conflagration that engulfs all of us in flames. In 1914 a single shot, fired in a spot which at the time seemed remote to many of us, produced such a holocaust, and in 1939 a dispute over a far-off city which used to be called Danzig again set the whole world afire. Today, with international interrelations and tensions increasing as distances decrease, it is increasingly and compellingly necessary that all of us give full measure of support, and not "token" or "symbolic" support, to the United Nations efforts to keep the peace.

24. I submit that there would be little chance of this Working Group's reaching agreement on any basis involving only "token" or "symbolic" contributions to peace-keeping operations. Any arrangement

which would involve the eighty or ninety so-called "under-developed" States, whose regular scale percentages amount to only some 18 per cent of the total, paying a much smaller or insignificant amount, could never be considered just or equitable. And, I would point out, any recommendation of this Working Group must appear just and equitable, not only to the smaller nations, but also to the countries which are the major contributors to this Organization.

25. This Working Group has been asked to work on a problem which involves the survival of the United Nations itself, for no institution can survive if it cannot pay its debts and if its members are not willing to supply it with the funds necessary to pay those debts and continue its operations.

26. Let me review the deadly serious situation in which the United Nations finds itself. As at 31 December 1962, only fifty-two Members had paid the regular budget assessment which had been levied a year earlier. The other Members owed a total of over \$17 million for that budget assessment and prior budget assessments. At the same date, only forty-one Members had paid in full their UNEF assessments for 1962 and prior years, and the rest owed an aggregate of over \$27 million for such assessments. Twenty-five Members had never paid anything. At the same date, only thirty-two Members had paid in full their Congo assessments for 1962 and prior years, and the other Members owed a total of over \$76 million for such assessments. Forty-eight Members had never paid anything. This makes a grand total of arrears for the regular budget, for UNEF, and for ONUC of over \$121 million, one full year after the latest of such assessments became due.

27. The United States realizes with appreciation that many Members have indicated that they are now prepared, since the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice²² and its acceptance by the General Assembly, to pay their arrears as soon as practicable. But I would remind the Working Group that at 31 December 1962 the United Nations had unpaid obligations of over \$160 million and net cash resources of only \$88 million, or an estimated deficit of over \$72 million. I will say no more on the subject of arrears at this time since I know that the Chairman has scheduled a discussion of this subject for later in our session.

28. As to the United Nations bond issue, which was overwhelmingly voted by the General Assembly as a partial solution towards the United Nations financial difficulties, out of the \$200 million authorized, only about \$74 million has been subscribed to by fifty-eight countries other than the United States, despite United States readiness to buy up to \$100 million of bonds on a matching basis and of this \$74 million, \$14.3 million was purchased by five nations which are not members of the United Nations. Assuming that all the bonds so subscribed for are purchased, the United States matching purchase would bring the total up to only about \$148 million out of the \$200 million of bonds that was contemplated. Prudent financing dictates that the rest of these bonds be sold, and quickly.

²² *Certain expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962: I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 151, transmitted to the Members of the General Assembly by a note of the Secretary-General (A/5161 and Corr.1).*

29. Why do I mention these melancholy facts? The reason is very simple. It is because several of the statements that have been made to the Working Group apparently are based on the assumption that the United States can fairly be asked, to be committed to pay for peace-keeping operations more than the 33⅓ per cent limitation which the Congress of the United States has stipulated, or on the assumption that the United States will make very substantial voluntary contributions, far above those of others, for such operations.

30. I must in all candour say to the Working Group that, until the United Nations and all its Members face up to the financial situation of the United Nations, and not merely face up to it but do something concrete about it, my Government is not prepared to proceed on the basis of either of such assumptions.

31. Let me make my meaning clear. The United Nations is not being supported and is not supporting itself when arrears accumulate in staggering amounts and continue to increase, when major Powers refuse to fulfil their legal obligations, and when adequate steps are not being taken to remedy the situation.

32. The assessment which the United States believes is necessary at this time is a reassessment of the attitude of the United Nations towards its financial position, and a reassessment of the willingness of Members of the United Nations to give full support to all of its operations and to take steps to ensure its fiscal integrity. Until those reassessments have been made, and have resulted in changes evidencing a real desire by the United Nations and its Members to put its financial house in order, the United States must reserve its position as to the United Nations financial problems.

33. In the light of the present financial circumstances of the United Nations, and until these circumstances show improvement, the United States Government is not prepared to commit itself to the making of contributions for peace-keeping operations in excess of its normal regular scale percentage. In particular, the United States will oppose any special scale of assessments for UNEF and ONUC for the last six months of 1963 which would involve an assessment percentage for the United States in excess of 32.02 per cent.

34. I need hardly say that the United States is of course prepared to pay an assessment of 32.02 per cent if the General Assembly decides to apply the regular scale of assessments to the financing of any United Nations peace-keeping operations.

35. There remains the possibility of financing UNEF and ONUC for the balance of 1963 by some combination of assessed and voluntary contributions. We are prepared to explore this possibility with other members of the Working Group. However, the contribution of anything—even a small amount—more than its regular share by the United States will depend on whether in the next several months, the membership demonstrates the will to give this Organization the financial support which is absolutely essential to its survival. Until deeds can demonstrate that this support is forthcoming, the United States will have to reserve its position.

36. Our attitude should not be construed as negative. The position I have stated is related to the pre-

sent extremely unsatisfactory financial situation of the United Nations and the apparent lack of a firm determination on the part of its Members to do much about it. We want that situation to improve—and to improve rapidly. We will watch it closely. If it shows satisfactory signs of improvement, we will review our position when the special session of the General Assembly faces the problem of dealing with the financial situation.

37. What I have said does not mean that we will remain aloof from the discussions and negotiations in this Working Group. We helped to establish this Group and have held high hopes that useful recommendations would come forth from its deliberations. We continue

to hold these hopes, particularly in view of the Chairman's dedication to the task of finding better paths to follow in the future. We will do our best to assist in the formulation of proposals to the forthcoming special session for the financing of UNEF and ONUC during the last six months of 1963, and hope that workable and practicable recommendations can be agreed upon.

38. Above all, we hope that all the members of this Working Group, and all the other Members of the United Nations, will during the coming weeks give the most serious attention to its financial plight and demonstrate that determined support which alone can ensure its survival.

DOCUMENT A/AC.113/18

Memorandum submitted by the delegations of Argentina, Brazil, Cameroon, India, Nigeria, Pakistan and the United Arab Republic

[Original text: English]
[15 March 1963]

The following seven members of the Working Group on the Examination of the Administrative and Budgetary Procedures of the United Nations—Argentina, Brazil, Cameroon, India, Nigeria, Pakistan and the United Arab Republic—present to the Working Group as a whole the following principles which, they believe, should be considered in the examination of the method for the financing of future peace-keeping operations of the Organization.

A

1. Subject to the exceptions listed in the following paragraph, the special method of financing United Nations operations for the maintenance of peace will apply to all expenses incurred by the Organization in carrying out peace-keeping operations which are not provided for in the Organization's regular budget and which total more than \$5 million in any financial year.

2. The expenses of operations for the maintenance of peace provided for: (a) under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations; (b) by common agreement of the interested parties approved by the Organization; (c) by voluntary contributions covering part or the whole of a peace-keeping operation or operations; and (d) by the acceptance by a Member State or Member States to meet, on behalf of the United Nations, the expenses or part or the whole of a peace-keeping operation or operations, should be excluded from the expenses referred to in the above paragraph.

3. In order to institutionalize and encourage voluntary contributions for the peace-keeping operations referred to in paragraph 2 (c) above, a voluntary peace-keeping fund should be created towards which contributions would be welcome.

4. Expenses for peace-keeping operations necessitating a special method of sharing among the Member States should be assessed taking into consideration: (a) the individual capacity of Member States to pay; and (b) the difference between the capacity to pay of each Member State when contributing to the regular budget of the Organization and its capacity to pay where peace-keeping operations involving heavy expenditures are concerned.

5. The regular scale of assessments represents a measure of capacity to pay where contributions to the

regular budget are involved. A special scale of assessments therefore requires to be established to reflect the capacity of Member States to pay when peace-keeping operations involving heavy expenditures are concerned. The special scale should be based on the principle of increasing the share of certain Member States and decreasing the share of certain other Member States according to the magnitude of the amount of the expenditures concerned.

6. Permanent members of the Security Council should bear a greater responsibility for peace-keeping expenditures in recognition of their primary responsibility with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security.

7. For the purpose of the special assessment, Member States should be divided into two groups, namely, (a) developed countries, and (b) developing countries.

8. Developed Member States are more capable economically and financially of meeting the expenses of peace-keeping operations involving heavy expenditures, while developing Member States are considered less capable, and this difference should be reflected in the assessment formula.

9. The Committee on Contributions should report to the General Assembly as appropriate on the grouping of Member States, taking into account *inter alia* the following elements: (a) *per caput* income, (b) the insufficiency of national savings for the maintenance of full employment and development, (c) the situation of the balance of payments of each country. The General Assembly should accordingly examine the situation of Member States in their relationship to those groups.

10. The situation of a Member State or Member States, victims of acts that led to a peace-keeping operation, should be taken into special consideration, including total exemption for them in the apportionment of the expenses.

11. When the General Assembly determines that a Member State or Member States are responsible for acts that led to a peace-keeping operation, it should give the matter appropriate consideration.

12. The special method set forth here should apply to all peace-keeping operations involving heavy expenditures, unless in the view of the General Assembly

any future peace-keeping operation involving heavy expenditures necessitated a different or *ad hoc* method.

B

13. According to the principles set forth in part A above, and without prejudging the financial consequences of the application of paragraphs 10 and 11 of said part A, the total expenses of peace-keeping operations involving heavy expenditures and in excess of \$5 million (mentioned in paragraph 1 of said part A) in any financial year should be apportioned according to the formula set forth below:

(a) Up to 50 per cent of the next \$20 million should be shared by all Member States according to the regular scale of assessments; and the remaining 50 per cent should be shared by permanent members of the Security Council and developed Member States according to the same scale duly rectified.

(b) Up to 25 per cent of the next \$25 million should be shared by all Member States according to the regular scale of assessments; up to 5 per cent, by the permanent members of the Security Council, according to the regular scale of assessments duly rectified; and up to 70 per cent by the developed Member States and the permanent members of the Security Council, according to the regular scale of assessments duly rectified.

(c) Up to 5 per cent of the next \$50 million should be shared by all Member States, according to the regular scale of assessments; up to 5 per cent, by the permanent members of the Security Council, according to the regular scale of assessments duly rectified; and up to 90 per cent, by the developed Member States, and the permanent members of the Security Council, according to the regular scale of assessments duly rectified.

(d) The excess over \$100 million should be apportioned according to an *ad hoc* scale of assessments.

DOCUMENT A/AC.113/19

Working paper on operative paragraph 4 of General Assembly resolution 1854 B (XVII) submitted by the delegations of Argentina, Brazil, Cameroon, India, Nigeria and Pakistan

[Original text: English]
[26 March 1963]

1. Operative paragraph 4 of resolution 1854 B (XVII) reads as follows:

"4. Requests the Working Group to study also the situation arising from the arrears of some Member States in their payment of contributions for financing peace-keeping operations and to recommend, within the letter and spirit of the Charter of the United Nations, arrangements designed to bring up to date such payments, having in mind the relative economic positions of such Member States."

2. The present paper, therefore, limits itself to a consideration of the situation arising from the fact that there are arrears of contributions of certain Member States in so far as expenses of peace-keeping operations are concerned. It is an attempt to make possible a solution of the problem, as the General Assembly has asked for specific recommendations in this respect.

3. The General Assembly has emphasized that in making suggestions for the collection of arrears the letter and the spirit of the United Nations Charter be respected, and also that attention should be paid to the relative economic positions of such Member States.

4. At present fifty-seven Member States are in arrears in respect of their assessed contributions for payment to the UNEF Special Account, and sixty-seven in respect of the Congo *ad hoc* Account. Some of these Member States object to making payments to meet the expenses of these peace-keeping operations on political grounds; while others have found it difficult to make payments owing to their peculiar economic and financial problems.

5. The over-all situation shows the following facets:

(a) The present difficult financial situation of the Organization as a whole;

(b) The financial difficulties which certain Member States face in paying in a lump sum their accumulated arrears;

(c) The consequences of the adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 1854 (XVII).

6. During the period following the adoption of resolution 1854 (XVII), some Member States paid their arrears. It is greatly to be hoped that other Member States that continue to be in arrears will pay them, disregarding other factors, as soon as their respective constitutional and financial arrangements can be processed, and pending these arrangements, will make an announcement of their intention to do so. Member States which are in arrears and object to making payments to meet the expenses of these peace-keeping operations on political or juridical grounds are invited nevertheless to make a special effort towards solving the financial difficulties of the Organization by making this payment.

7. The magnitude of the accumulated arrears on the UNEF and ONUC accounts may create special problems, as regards immediate payment in full, for any Member States which may have financial difficulties. The Secretary-General is invited to begin immediately an examination of the situation and, in consultation with any such Member States, work out arrangements with them as to the most appropriate modalities within the letter and the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations, including the possibility of payment of arrears by instalments, for bringing the payments on these two accounts up to date as soon as possible. The Secretary-General is also invited to submit a preliminary report on this subject to the forthcoming special session of the General Assembly, and to report in full to the eighteenth session of the General Assembly concerning the progress which has been made in the payment of arrears and any recommendations he might have for improving the situation if it is not yet satisfactory.

DOCUMENT A/AC.113/20

Statement by the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland at the fourteenth meeting of the Working Group

[Original text: English]
[25 March 1963]

1. It was on 20 February, at the eighth meeting, that my delegation last intervened here on the substance of the problems under study by the Working Group on the Examination of the Administrative and Budgetary Procedures of the United Nations, when I made, and circulated copies of, a brief general statement on behalf of the United Kingdom. At that time, my delegation tried to help in the search for a generally acceptable solution to the problem of financing costly United Nations peace-keeping operations in the future, by indicating certain ideas or proposals which fall outside our own notion of a possible consensus of opinion. Since then we have all been afforded, and most of us have used, some valuable time for informal consultations; and I believe that these have been quite as intensive as the Chairman had hoped. During the past month also, there have been at least three very significant developments in the Working Group itself. At the ninth meeting, on 6 March, we heard an important statement of present policy by the representative of the United States of America, a loyal supporter and by far the highest contributor to the finances of the United Nations; and this statement, which I am sure we have all studied with the greatest care, was circulated as document A/AC.113/17. On 15 March, a joint working paper was issued, as document A/AC.113/18, under the sponsorship of one-third of the twenty-one Governments represented in this Group. On 21 and 22 March, at the twelfth and thirteenth meetings, several other delegations made statements in which they commented on that working paper and, in so doing, helped to define more clearly the areas in which a general consensus may be found possible before the Working Group comes to approve its report on the first item on our agenda. So, whatever may be the final outcome, it would certainly be wrong to say that no progress has been made; and, for this, we must all be grateful to the Chairman for the firmness and wisdom with which he has presided over our work.

2. This morning I wish to state more fully the views of the United Kingdom delegation on methods for financing peace-keeping operations involving heavy expenditures, such as those on the Congo and the Middle East—those which we have come to know as ONUC and UNEF. I shall begin by expressing again our appreciation of the constructive efforts made by the delegations responsible for the memorandum in document A/AC.113/18. Like several previous speakers, we believe that this paper usefully reflects a number of important principles which at least a large majority of this Working Group would agree on for recommendation to the General Assembly; and these were admirably summarized by the representative of Sweden in his statement at the seventh meeting on 21 March [see A/AC.113/11]. In the application of these principles, my delegation would join with those who consider that an appropriate initial amount to be apportioned according to the regular scale of assessments would be \$10 million in a year for each operation of the kind we are discussing. We also hold the view that, in any special scale which might be adopted for apportioning

costs beyond that level, subject to a suitable upper limit, it would be fair and adequate to modify the regular scale percentages of Member States in the under-developed areas of the world by halving those percentages, either generally or perhaps on an average basis, and by this means paying due regard to the relative capacity of Member States to contribute to expenses of this magnitude. Following the example of the distinguished representative of the Netherlands, I will not go deeply into the arithmetic. But it may be useful to point out that, on this basis of apportionment, most of the Member States now at the minimum of the regular scale—and they number nearly a third of the membership of the United Nations—would be obliged to contribute annually to an operation costing \$50 million a year an amount of \$12,000 which, incidentally, is I believe about equivalent to the annual salary of one fairly senior Professional officer in the United Nations Secretariat.

3. In regard to what I have said so far, my delegation believes that, subject perhaps to some further negotiation, the possibility exists of a consensus of opinion both in the Working Group and in the General Assembly. We have noted also that the memorandum in document A/AC.113/18 leaves open the possibility of peace-keeping costs being partly met by voluntary contributions. Here is another point on which a general consensus should be possible, although we recognize that it would be undesirable for the financing of the kind of operation we are talking about to be virtually dependent upon voluntary contributions.

4. While on the subject of voluntary financing, I should like to comment on paragraph 3 of document A/AC.113/18, in which the idea of creating a voluntary peace-keeping fund is briefly mentioned. My delegation seriously doubts whether this idea is either desirable or practicable of achievement at the present stage in the development of the United Nations; and we are inclined to think that even to recommend a study of it would be at least premature and might only tend to raise false hopes in the General Assembly and elsewhere, diverting attention from the more immediate problems facing the Organization and the Governments of Member States.

5. We all now what these problems are, and I think we all agree that they are extremely serious, however much we may differ as to causes and remedies. I am sure that none of my colleagues here would misunderstand me when I say that, in the view of the United Kingdom delegation, this Working Group has a duty to look beyond achieving some highest common factor of agreement on theoretical principles or formulae for cost-sharing and must take fully into account the political realities affecting the future capacity of the United Nations to act effectively for the maintenance of peace and security in our troubled world.

6. First, there is the present position of the United States Government, as explained to us at the ninth meeting. My delegation has great sympathy with the emphasis then laid on the need for more concrete evidence by the membership as a whole of the will to

give the Organization the financial support essential to its survival, particularly by the payment of arrears and by a more widely based support of the bond issue authorized by the General Assembly at the sixteenth session. Pending improvements in this respect, which we must all hope appear soon, let us face up to the fact that the United States delegation has made very clear its position as to the level of percentage assessment which it could accept.

7. In his same statement, the United States representative drew attention to the situation with which the General Assembly will have to deal at the fourth special session next May; and he expressed the belief that the Working Group should concentrate its attention as rapidly and fully as possible on concrete proposals for financing UNEF and ONUC in the six months from 1 July to 31 December 1963. I shall refrain at this stage from commenting on the point made last week by the distinguished representatives of Sweden, Canada and Japan—with which in principle we have much sympathy—that the problem of further assessments for UNEF and ONUC arises from the earlier date of 1 July 1962. Up to the end of 1963 at any rate, it is clear that some further financing action by the General Assembly will be necessary if these two operations are to continue even on a reduced scale. In all the circumstances, my delegation believes that the Working Group should recommend dealing with this matter on an *ad hoc* basis. By this I mean that we should try to agree on a proposed method which, without doing violence to generally accepted principles, would apply only to the period in question and would be regarded neither as establishing a precedent for the future nor as prejudicing the position of any one of us regarding arrangements in the longer term.

8. On the assumption that there is an early improvement in the financial circumstances of the Organization, my delegation considers that a reasonable *ad hoc* arrangement for the financing of UNEF and ONUC to the end of 1963 would be as follows: first, an initial amount of \$10 million per operation should be apportioned on the regular scale of assessments. If, as there is some reason to hope, the costs of UNEF in the second half of 1963 can be reduced below the authorized monthly rate of expenditure for the first half of the year of \$1.58 million, there would be perhaps considerably less than a total of \$20 million on the regular scale, representing quite a modest percentage of the regular budget for 1963. Secondly, for the remaining costs, the regular scale should again be applied but with the modification of halving the percentages of all Member States which are covered under the appropriate United Nations definition of "underdeveloped areas" and which undertake to pay promptly their peace-keeping assessments for 1963. Thirdly, since the foregoing modification of the regular percentages of a great many Member States would leave a shortfall, this should be met by means of a recommendation by the General Assembly to all Member States assessed at their regular percentages unmodified, to make voluntary contributions to the relevant accounts in accordance broadly with their relative capacities to pay.

9. My delegation hopes that the Working Group will commend this *ad hoc* arrangement for 1963 to the General Assembly or, at least, will agree that it provides a useful basis for discussion and perhaps negotiation before the time comes for the special session to adopt financing resolutions.

10. At the same time, my delegation would find it hard to accept that the labours of this Working Group should result in nothing but an *ad hoc* arrangement on these lines being recommended for 1963. We would like to be beyond the limited but useful consensus which we see developing here on the few general principles mentioned earlier in my present statement; and we should wish to couple an *ad hoc* solution for 1963 with at least some further guidelines for special methods of financing in future years. We recognize that the ideas put forward in document A/AC.113/18 are intended to serve this purpose. But, here again, I must revert to the hard facts of life which this Working Group must surely take into account.

11. What must we regard as the primary object of our studying the future financing of expensive peace and security operations? Is it not, by thorough and frank discussion and negotiation, to arrive at arrangements which will actually enable the costs of peace-keeping to be met—in other words, arrangements for the future which would enable the Organization to help maintain the peace without running into serious, and possibly mortal, political and financial difficulties?

12. From this standpoint, my delegation finds certain features of the seven-Power memorandum unhelpful and unacceptable. Other speakers have already mentioned the objections to the subjective concepts in paragraphs 10 and 11 of document A/AC.113/18. We see no justification for exempting the so-called "victims of acts that led to a peace-keeping operation" from their share of the collective financial responsibility for the operation, although we see the case for some special consideration, when expenses are apportioned, for a country which could show that its capacity to pay has been reduced as a result of the situation leading to the peace-keeping operation in question. That would be an objective matter, to be determined under existing procedures. If paragraph 11 of document A/AC.113/18 is intended to suggest that the General Assembly should look for a special financial contribution from a Member State alleged to be "responsible for acts that led to a peace-keeping operation", my delegation can think of no easier way to ensure political discord and inability to cover the costs of the operation.

13. Secondly, paragraph 6 of document A/AC.113/18 appears to impose on the permanent members of the Security Council a special responsibility for contributing to peace-keeping expenditures. This may be intended to mean only that it is in some way more deplorable for a permanent member of the Security Council than for other Member States to fail to fulfil its financial responsibilities to the Organization with regard to peace-keeping operations. But if it means that permanent members, by virtue of being such, ought to pay specially high percentages in any special scale of assessments, my delegation must point out, as we have done before, that there is no warrant for this in the Charter or indeed in logic. In looking to the future, however, my delegation was extremely interested by the suggestion of the representative of Canada at the twelfth meeting on 21 March that if the permanent members of the Security Council are to have a special responsibility regarding the financing of peace-keeping costs, it would not be unreasonable for them to be given more opportunity to influence decisions relating to financing methods. I shall come back to this thought later on.

14. The future financing of United Nations peace-keeping operations is a subject to which Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have been giving—and are prepared to continue giving—the most serious, constructive and detailed thought. I hope that, from what I have already said today, it will be clear how far my delegation would like to meet the preoccupations of those many Member States which are concerned lest their share of collective financial responsibility in this field might excessively strain their resources and hamper the development of their economies. We have been equally conscious of the need in the future to find some basis for reconciling the views of the large majority about what the General Assembly may legally do in this whole area and the views hitherto strongly held by other Member States, whose political and financial co-operation will obviously be important to the Organization in the years ahead if they desire to play a constructive part in carrying out the purposes of the Charter. As the Chairman has reminded us, all of us in this room represent Governments of Member States. Each and every such Government is, of course, entitled to hold its own views on matters discussed in these halls and to express them strongly and even, if necessary, repetitiously. But each Government is also free to reconsider its views, whether in the light of changing circumstances or for any other reason, and to adjust its position if it deems fit without being regarded as feeble or inconsistent. This must be so if there is to be any chance of peaceful co-operation among the nations of the world; and it is in this light that compromise is possible between the sometimes conflicting interests of different States, as of different individuals. In relation to the present problem, I should like to remind the Working Group of something which was recently said by Lord Home, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. In the course of a speech on 20 February 1963, in the House of Lords of the United Kingdom Parliament, Lord Home referred to the Organization's financial difficulties in connexion with UNEF and ONUC and, in speaking generally about possibilities for the future, he used the following words:

"We must accept, I think, that there might be an occasion when a contributing country feels so deeply that a decision to initiate an operation is wrong, that it would refuse to pay, but as some countries are always going to dislike some action, some compromise must be reached, or all action will be paralysed."

15. Against this background my delegation wishes now to share with all our colleagues in this Working Group some thoughts about future financing arrangements which we hope may at least open a way for further fruitful discussions in the weeks or months ahead. We have done our best to work out proposals which appear to us both to be entirely consistent with the United Nations Charter and in line with the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice²³ which the General Assembly accepted on 19 December last (in resolution 1854 A (XVII)), and also to provide a reasonable basis for a satisfactory compromise which to some extent would meet the different preoccupations of all the Member States in this Organization. The general lines of our present thinking may be outlined as follows:

(a) The General Assembly should approach by stages the financing of a given major peace-keeping operation in the future, because this will enable the Organization to make sure that, at each stage, the scale of action envisaged is within its financial capacity.

(b) In the first stage, an initial and limited amount of expenditure should be authorized and these expenses should be apportioned by mandatory assessment on all Member States in accordance with an agreed scale of percentages.

(c) If this proved insufficient, the Assembly could authorize a further limited amount of expenditure, perhaps as much in this second stage as in the first, on the understanding that all those Member States which had voted in favour, or which had abstained on an original authorization, would thereby be deemed to have pledged themselves to make additional contributions on an appropriate proportionate basis.

(d) If still further funds were required to continue the operation, the question of financing would have reached a third stage, at which those relatively few Member States on whom most of the costs would fall could justly expect a greater say in the methods of financing to be adopted. This could be provided by the Assembly's establishing a special financing committee, perhaps not unlike this Working Group, and by agreeing to consider only such recommendations as the committee put forward by a majority of at least two-thirds of its members. The five permanent members of the Security Council would be represented on the committee and, if all the five permanent members concurred, the committee could recommend financing the third stage wholly by compulsory assessment. In that event, the regular scale might be used for apportioning the first \$5 million and the remainder might be apportioned on a special scale in which the five permanent members would share 25 per cent of the total among themselves, as well as joining with all others in contributing to the remainder at their regular percentages and helping to cover the shortfall resulting from a 50 per cent modification in the percentage shares of countries in the under-developed areas.

(e) If a case should arise where, at the third stage, the concurrence of all five permanent members could not be obtained in the special financing committee, the committee could only recommend (by at least a two-thirds majority) the raising of funds by compulsory assessment to a limited extent, and on a somewhat different basis under which part of the costs would be covered through pledged contributions from those members not voting against the committee's recommendation.

16. These proposals are not really as complicated as I may have made them sound; and I shall ask the Secretariat to circulate my statement as a Working Group document and shall distribute copies in English immediately I have finished. My delegation hopes that our proposals will be received in the spirit in which they have been put forward—that is to say with a sincere desire to reach a satisfactory compromise between conflicting viewpoints which will help the Organization to fulfil its role in the maintenance of peace and security with less difficulty and painful controversy than in the recent past. We hope also that every Government represented here, as well as all other Member States, will be prepared at least to study our proposals in the same constructive spirit and to

²³ *Ibid.*

consider seriously whether a compromise solution may not be possible along these lines. The United Kingdom delegation holds itself ready to join in further consultations or to discuss particular aspects with any of our colleagues. No doubt some Governments may feel unable to offer their reactions in the very short time now left before the Working Group is due to report. But our proposals both for an *ad hoc* arrangement for financing UNEF and ONUC in 1963 and for a carefully balanced compromise scheme for future

financing will no doubt be clearly brought out in the Working Group's report as well as in its records to be given general circulation.

17. In conclusion, I shall not apologize for having spoken at some length this morning because I believe that my colleagues will recognize the difficulty of putting forward this United Kingdom initiative, as well as our comments on other proposals, in a shorter compass.

DOCUMENT A/AC.113/21

Statement by the representative of Australia at the fourteenth meeting of the Working Group

[Original text: English]
[25 March 1963]

1. Our discussions during the last seven weeks have emphasized that we are working in an area where there are genuine differences of opinion—an area where it is important to avoid extreme positions or the reopening of issues which can fairly be considered as settled by recent decisions of the General Assembly. A willingness to negotiate is essential if we are to move forward and it was in that spirit that the Australian delegation put forward proposals at the seventh meeting of the Working Group [see A/AC.113/24] which we considered to be a reasonable basis for agreement. These proposals were based on two principles—first, that the costs of peace-keeping operations are the collective responsibility of all members; secondly, that the apportionment of these costs by the General Assembly should be broadly according to the capacity of each member country to pay. I have suggested that the first principle, i.e. collective responsibility, would find a better expression if members who voted in the future for peace-keeping operations thereby committed themselves to a predetermined share of the costs or an agreed approach to cost-sharing, although I said that this did not necessarily imply the adoption of a firm and inflexible formula for all future circumstances. I also expressed the view that the principle of capacity to pay could be more easily and realistically applied through the well established and generally accepted methods and criteria used for working out the regular scale. Accordingly, the scheme proposed by the Australian delegation was fairly simple: first, the apportionment of an initial amount on the regular scale; second, the application thereafter of a special scale based strictly on capacity to pay but with additional allowances for the under-developed countries to be worked out in much the same way as the Committee on Contributions calculates the *per caput* allowances for the regular scale. This scheme has the advantage of flexibility as well as simplicity. It could be put into operation as a special arrangement without departing significantly from recognized principles and procedures. The Australian delegation continues to believe that this approach provides the most satisfactory method of sharing heavy peace-keeping costs. We appreciate the support and consideration which our proposals have received and hope that we can continue to move towards an arrangement whereby all heavy peace-keeping costs may be assessed among all members.

2. Since our statement at the seventh meeting there have been several new developments as a result of

discussions here and the intensive informal consultations which have gone on among us. Perhaps the most important of these developments has been the submission of a memorandum [A/AC.113/18] including the considered views of seven members of this Working Group. Although this paper includes the only proposals put forward thus far by several delegations, we should not forget that there is another working paper before the group which stands in the name of Canada [A/AC.113/2] and which outlines the general approach of a number of other countries including Australia.

3. Several delegations have already said that the seven-Power memorandum is a useful contribution to our proceedings. It is clearly the result of real efforts on the part of the countries concerned to harmonize their views and to move in a direction that they believe offers some prospects of majority support and a solution in the interests of the Organization. The Australian delegation also appreciates these efforts and we are anxious to respond to them in the same spirit in which they were made.

4. The first point that I would make is that the general framework for the main recommendations in this memorandum is not so very far removed from the broad approach of the Australian delegation. The working paper accepts collective responsibility and capacity to pay as the main elements in any cost-sharing arrangement. It accepts the apportionment of an initial amount of heavy peace-keeping costs on the regular scale. It also accepts the application to the balance of these costs of a special scale based on capacity to pay. Under this special scale a special allowance would be made for countries which could fairly claim that the sharing of costs above a certain level on the regular scale would place an unreasonable burden on them. This claim would be recognized by a recommendation of the Committee on Contributions. Since the percentage shares of some countries would be reduced a correspondingly larger amount would have to be provided by other countries.

5. Furthermore, the scheme put forward in the memorandum does not depend on voluntary contributions. It leaves the door open for such contributions and encourages them. But it provides a means for closing the gap by compulsory assessment if other forms of finance, including voluntary contributions, are not available. This approach has our support. Voluntary contributions may be welcome since they reduce

the amount to be apportioned. But an arrangement which cannot be put into effect without voluntary contributions will always be uncertain in operation.

6. If this is a fair summary of the thinking behind this memorandum the Australian delegation welcomes it as a significant advance over previous discussions of this matter.

7. In introducing this memorandum at the tenth meeting of the Working Group, the representative of Brazil said that it represented a unity of views never before achieved in the United Nations on this question. Despite the important differences which remain, I would not disagree with that statement. For this reason and because we believe that the areas of agreement are now sufficiently wide to make possible further progress in due course the Australian delegation would like to comment also on certain parts of the memorandum which we cannot accept or which we would wish to see modified. I will comment mainly on three questions—the amount of heavy peace-keeping costs which should be apportioned on the regular scale, the method of deciding which countries should benefit from special arrangements, and the use of criteria based on the victim/aggressor theory to apportion costs under a special arrangement.

8. It is clear from our discussions that there is a fairly wide difference of opinion regarding the amount of heavy peace-keeping costs which should be apportioned on the regular scale. The memorandum suggests \$5 million. I agree with those who have said this amount is not a fair reflection of collective responsibility, particularly in the light of the substantial reductions which the paper recommends for many countries once this initial amount has been apportioned. My delegation considers that the apportionment on the regular scale of an initial amount of not less than \$10 million per operation is realistic and in keeping with the spirit of the Charter and the sovereign equality and responsibilities of Member States. Here I would return to the point I made in my earlier statement. The capacity of a government to contribute towards heavy peace-keeping costs and the ability of the United Nations to respond to peace-keeping commitments are directly related to the cost of other activities of the United Nations. Therefore it is reasonable and logical to relate the point at which a special arrangement should apply to the level of expenditure on other United Nations activities. This can be done by expressing the amount as a modest percentage of the regular budget for the year in which the costs are incurred. This would also be more in keeping with the general tone and approach of part A of the memorandum which is drafted in general terms and does not refer to specific figures except in paragraph 1.

9. A second point which presents difficulties for my delegation is the reference in paragraphs 7 and 8 to two groups of countries, namely the "developed" countries and the "developing" countries. The Australian delegation welcomes the decision of the sponsors of this memorandum to abandon receipt of technical assistance as the criterion for determining eligibility for reductions and to look at this question in terms of the economic and financial situation of member countries. However, we would suggest that the sharing of costs on the basis of capacity to pay should not be approached by dividing the membership of the United Nations into two categories. It is not simply a question of saying that some countries are entitled to reduc-

tions and the other countries can afford to pay for these reductions. On the contrary, the proper expression of capacity to pay would be a sliding scale with different percentages in much the same way as the regular scale percentages vary from country to country. I would suggest that all we should say and all we need to say in any general formulation of a cost-sharing arrangement is that there are some countries in the under-developed areas of the world whose capacity to contribute to peace-keeping costs above a certain level is limited and which therefore cannot reasonably be expected to pay for these costs on the basis of the regular scale. We do not need to define these under-developed countries with accuracy or precision at this stage, although the United Nations definition which has been mentioned by several delegations provides a good guide. Economic conditions change and there will always be borderline cases. Still less is there any need to indicate which countries are not under-developed. The main difficulty that my delegation has with paragraphs 7 and 8 is that any attempt to divide the Members of the United Nations into these two broad categories will create unnecessary and perhaps insoluble problems. The two paragraphs would in my view be more acceptable if they were confined to a statement to the effect that when costs go beyond a certain point the regular scale percentages require modification to reflect the fact that there are countries in under-developed areas which cannot reasonably be expected to contribute to heavy peace-keeping costs at their regular scale percentages. After all, this is really what we want to say. It goes without saying that any reductions in the regular percentages of some countries will put a heavier financial responsibility on others. My delegation hopes the co-sponsors of this memorandum will consider this alternative approach to the wording of these paragraphs and avoid the emphasis on a two-category classification with all the difficulties to which that gives rise. One way of doing this would be to eliminate paragraph 7 and to modify paragraph 8 to read "some Member States are more capable economically and financially of meeting the expenses of peace-keeping operations involving heavy expenditures, while other Member States are considered less capable, and this difference should be reflected in the assessment formula".

10. This brings me to paragraph 9 concerning the Committee on Contributions. The idea that the Committee on Contributions should have a part to play in the apportionment of peace-keeping costs commends itself to my delegation. This Committee is the organ established by the General Assembly to consider questions concerning the capacity of Member countries to contribute to the expenses of the Organization. We agree that the Committee might be asked to determine reductions and perhaps consider certain other aspects of any special cost-sharing arrangement. But I have considerable misgivings about asking the Committee to indicate whether a Member State falls into one of two groups which are hard to define. And I have even greater misgivings about the suggestion in the last sentence of paragraph 9 that the General Assembly should conduct some kind of examination of the economic and financial situation of a Member State to determine whether it is "developed" or "developing". I suggest that this procedure would create unnecessary problems in the General Assembly. Therefore, although the Australian delegation agrees that there should be provision for using the Committee on Con-

tributions we could not accept the mandate that appears in paragraph 9. We feel it would be sufficient to indicate that the assessment formula should take into account where appropriate the advice or recommendations of the Committee on Contributions.

11. Another difficulty which the Australian delegation has with this working paper arises from the references in paragraphs 10 and 11 to victims of aggression and responsibility for aggression. The Australian delegation cannot accept the view that these criteria ought to be used, as such, to determine the apportionment of heavy peace-keeping costs. The cases of victims of aggression will be covered by criteria such as capacity to pay in so far as that would be affected by the consequences of aggression. As to the countries responsible for aggression, history has shown that it is not realistic to expect compensation from them of the kind which would be material to the problem facing us. While therefore my delegation can appreciate the reasoning behind the phrases and concepts in paragraphs 10 and 11, it is bound to regard this approach as unrealistic.

12. Regarding certain other aspects of the memorandum I have only a few comments. We would not wish to express any firm views at this stage about the suggestion for a voluntary fund (although we have some misgivings about this) for it is not an essential part of the scheme. The potential sources of financing mentioned in paragraph 2 of part A also do not appear to us to call for any special comment since our understanding of this paragraph is that it is simply a more detailed way of saying that any special scale or special arrangement for peace-keeping operations shall apply only to the net amount, that is the amount which remains to be apportioned after taking account of any other sources of finance that may be available. As to the modification of percentages under a special scale my delegation considers that the reductions proposed in part B of the memorandum are rather excessive in the light of the principle of capacity to pay. However, we share the hope of the distinguished representative of Sweden that our views are not so far apart as to exclude the possibility of a consensus on this point [see A/AC.113/11].

13. Having made these comments on aspects of this memorandum I wish to emphasize once again that the differences which exist should not blind us to the important areas of agreement. The Australian delegation does not agree with those who have implied that this Working Group has made no progress or that our report can contain nothing more than a series of minority views. We hope—indeed we expect—that the report will clearly indicate that there was in fact a consensus or majority view in favour of several propositions. I would venture to suggest that these propositions include at least the following four points:

(a) The sharing of peace-keeping costs must properly reflect the collective financial responsibility of all Member States;

(b) A reasonable amount or proportion of the costs should be apportioned according to the regular scale of assessment;

(c) The remaining costs should be shared on a basis reflecting as closely as possible capacity to pay;

(d) This reflection of capacity to pay will require reductions in the regular assessment percentages of

Member States from under-developed areas whose capacities to pay are limited.

14. If it is correct that there are a majority of members in this Working Group who support these propositions then I think the report should say so, quite apart from the views of individual countries or group of countries which may also be reflected in the report. We will then have moved forward in the work with which we were entrusted. Furthermore, if these propositions are accepted as a point of departure for our discussions at the fourth special session of the General Assembly in May 1963 the Australian delegation believes that the areas of disagreement will have been significantly reduced, the prospects of finding a practical solution will have increased and this Working Group may be able to conclude its present series of meetings on a note of cautious optimism.

15. I realize that much of what I have said concerns general principles and that these general principles cannot carry us beyond a certain point. I also recognize that the United Nations is faced with an immediate financial problem and that our answers to it must take account of the realities of the existing political climate. One of these realities is that the representative of a major Power—the largest single contributor to United Nations accounts—has made clear that his Government cannot accept for the time being an arrangement involving an obligation to contribute to peace-keeping costs beyond its share of those costs on the basis of the regular scale. We have carefully considered the statement of the United States representative [A/AC.113/17]. It would be wrong to ignore this statement and it would be unrealistic to ignore the reasons for it. In his references to the need for an improvement in the financial situation, the representative of the United States has said what many other Governments have felt and thought for some time.

16. During the discussion of the budget estimates of this Organization at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly I referred at the 920th meeting of the Fifth Committee to the rather gloomy picture of the Organization's financial prospects in the following words:

"I have heard it said by some representatives that this picture of the present situation and of future prospects is too gloomy. These persons are inclined to argue that the money will be found somehow, that the big nations need the United Nations just as much as the small developing countries and so cannot afford to let it collapse, that the Organization has managed to get along in the past and that despite the increasing publicity given to the apparent financial crisis bills are still paid and activities continue to go forward. The best that can be said for this view is that it is foolish and dangerous. But it is more than that. It is quite wrong. Whatever may have been the position in the last year or so a point has now been reached when we can no longer proceed on the assumption that in an unexplained but inevitable way contributions will pour in at the eleventh hour to relieve some members of their responsibilities for putting this organization on its feet.

"Until now the emphasis has been almost entirely—and in the circumstances perhaps understandably—on finding a formula to suit governments who for one reason or another declined to pay what other governments felt was an equitable share of certain expenses. But the problem has gone beyond that

stage and is now much more serious. It is no longer simply a question of working out arrangements to help those governments to pay. It is equally a problem of persuading those countries which have scrupulously fulfilled their obligations in the past that they should continue to assume an extra financial burden because some countries, while not hesitating to benefit from what the Organization has to offer, have made clear that they do not intend to meet their commitments."²⁴

I hope that there will be a positive response to this situation and concrete evidence of a significant improvement in the financial situation.

17. Because of these political realities and because a consensus on general principles is not enough to produce a practical solution, the Australian delegation is not optimistic about getting agreement at this time on satisfactory long-term arrangements. However, we hope that even at this late stage a consensus may emerge on satisfactory arrangements for sharing the immediate costs facing the Organization in the Congo and Middle East in the coming months. There are several ways in which this could be done. One such

²⁴ For a summary of this statement see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventeenth Session, Fifth Committee, 920th meeting, para. 6.*

way was suggested earlier this morning by the representative of the United Kingdom [see A/AC.113/20]. However, such an approach would reflect the need to find an immediate short-term answer and it would necessarily be without prejudice to the views of individual delegations on the longer-term arrangement for financing. The Australian delegation would be willing to explore such possibilities.

18. In this statement I have tried to respond to the views put forward in the memorandum submitted by seven members and to indicate the general position of the Australian delegation at this stage of the working group's proceedings. I have suggested that we have in fact come quite a long way forward, that there is room for cautious optimism though not complacency, and that our report can include a fair consensus on the principal elements in any framework for the formulation of cost-sharing arrangements. My statement has recognized that the present political climate makes it unlikely that we can agree now on a detailed arrangement for future peace-keeping operations. However, the Australian delegation still hopes that a consensus may emerge on a practical method of meeting the immediate challenge—a method which would at the same time leave the door open for the longer-term arrangements which are necessary if this Organization is to survive and grow in strength.

DOCUMENT A/AC.113/22

Statement by the representative of Brazil at the fourteenth meeting of the Working Group

[Original text: English]
[25 March 1963]

1. Some doubts have arisen on the interpretation of the joint memorandum submitted to the Working Group by Argentina, Brazil, Cameroon, India, Nigeria, Pakistan and the United Arab Republic [A/AC.113/18].

2. May I try to clarify these doubts on some matters relating to the objective interpretation of the memorandum. A number of suggestions and criticisms on the memorandum will be considered separately by one of the co-sponsors, my colleague from Pakistan.

3. I shall ask your indulgence, if I tend to be somewhat repetitious, but I feel that it is not only inevitable but even useful to be repetitious in certain situations, particularly since in this case the objective is the clarification of a point of our discussions that has been almost a point of reference in our collective work.

4. What does the joint memorandum really mean? What are its implications? First, in the case of future peace-keeping operations a special method of financing should apply to all expenses incurred by the Organization which are not provided for in the regular budget and which, subject to the exceptions listed in the following paragraph, total more than \$5 million in any financial year. Secondly, the special method should not apply to the expenses of a peace-keeping operation or operations the financing of which is provided for:

(a) Under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations;

(b) By common agreement of the interested parties approved by the Organization;

(c) By voluntary contributions, covering part or whole of the expenses;

(d) By the acceptance by a Member State or Member States to meet, on behalf of the United Nations, part or whole of the expenses.

5. Thirdly, the special method should be based on the following criteria:

(a) The individual capacity of Member States to pay;

(b) The difference between the capacity of each Member State to pay when contributing to the regular budget of the Organization and its capacity to pay when peace-keeping operations involving heavy expenditures are concerned;

(c) The principle of increasing the share of certain Member States and decreasing the share of certain other Member States according to the magnitude of the expenditures involved;

(d) The greater responsibility for peace-keeping expenditures of the permanent members of the Security Council in recognition of their primary responsibility in respect of the maintenance of international peace and security;

(e) The principle that developed Member States are more capable economically and financially of meeting the expenses of peace-keeping operations involving heavy expenditures, while developing Member States should be considered less capable;

(f) Special consideration of the situation of a Member State or Member States, victims of acts that have led to a peace-keeping operation, including total exemption in the apportionment of expenses;

(g) Appropriate consideration of the situation of a Member State or Member States when the General

Assembly determines that they are responsible for acts that have led to a peace-keeping operation.

6. Fourthly, unless in the view of the General Assembly any future peace-keeping operation involving heavy expenditures necessitates a different or *ad hoc* method and without prejudice to the financial consequences of any consideration which might be given to the situation of a Member State or Member States which may be the victims of acts that led to a peace-keeping operation or of a Member State or Member States when the General Assembly determines that they are responsible for such acts, the total expenses on peace-keeping operations involving heavy expenditures, as defined in paragraph 4 above, should be apportioned according to the following formula:

(a) Up to 50 per cent of the next \$20 million should be shared by all Member States according to the regular scale of assessment; and the remaining 50 per cent should be shared by permanent members of the Security Council and developed Member States according to the same scale duly rectified.

(b) Up to 25 per cent of the next \$25 million should be shared by all Member States according to the regu-

lar scale of assessment; up to 5 per cent by the permanent members of the Security Council, according to the regular scale of assessment duly rectified; and up to 70 per cent by the developed Member States including those which are permanent members of the Security Council, according to the regular scale of assessment duly rectified.

(c) Up to 5 per cent of the next \$50 million should be shared by all Member States, according to the regular scale of assessment; up to 5 per cent by the permanent members of the Security Council, according to the regular scale of assessment duly rectified; and up to 90 per cent by the developed Member States and the permanent members of the Security Council, according to the regular scale of assessment duly rectified.

(d) The excess over \$100 million should be apportioned according to an *ad hoc* scale of assessment.

7. The following table illustrates the apportionment according to the proposed formula of costs up to \$100 million, expressed in terms of the total amount of the assessments in each category of calculation:

Scale	5	In millions of United States dollars			Total
		20	25	50	
I. All Member States according to regular scale of assessments	5 (100%)	10 (50%)	6.25 (25%)	2.5 (5%)	23.75
II. Permanent Members of the Security Council and developed Member States according to the regular scale rectified	—	10 (50%)	17.5 (70%)	45 (90%)	72.5
III. Permanent members of the Security Council according to the regular scale rectified	—	—	1.25 (5%)	2.5 (5%)	3.75
	5	20	25	50	100

8. The individual assessments according to scale II in this table cannot be given, pending a decision on the grouping of Member States into either of the two proposed categories—developed countries and developing countries. The Committee on Contributions should be requested to report to the General Assembly, as appropriate, on this grouping of Member States, taking into account *inter alia* the following elements:

- (a) *Per caput* income;
- (b) The insufficiency of national savings for the maintenance of full employment and development; and
- (c) The balance of payments situation.

9. Scale III, comprising the permanent members of the Security Council, can be stated as follows, on the basis of their share in the regular scale approved for 1962, 1963 and 1964, duly rectified:

	Regular scale Percentage	Regular scale (rectified) Percentage
China	4.57	7.03
France	5.94	9.12
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	14.97	23.00

	Regular scale Percentage	Regular scale (rectified) Percentage
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.....	7.58	11.65
United States of America.....	32.02	49.20
	65.08	100.00

10. Finally, in order to institutionalize and encourage voluntary contributions towards the costs of peace-keeping operations, a voluntary peace-keeping fund should be created towards which contributions would be welcome.

11. Now I would like to add some estimates to illustrate my point, pending, evidently, the results of the grouping of Member States into either of the proposed categories developed and developing countries. Let us begin by stating with a certain amount of precision that the Committee on Contributions reported to the General Assembly that the assessment of the developing countries would amount to 13.70 per cent. We already have the figure of 65.08 per cent as the

amount assessed permanent members of the Security Council. Accordingly, it follows that the amount assessed the developed Member States should be 21.22 per cent. On this basis, we could calculate with the same degree of precision the rectified assessment of any developed Member States, including among them the permanent members of the Security Council. Let us take the case of the United States of America, for instance. Its rectified assessment would be 37.13 per cent. In other terms, the regular assessment of the United States being 32.03 per cent, it would be rectified among the permanent members of the Security Council to 49.20 per cent, and among the developed Member States to 37.13 per cent. On the basis of the \$100 million of the formula, the contribution of the United States would amount under scale I to \$7,607,125; under scale II to \$26,919,250; under scale III to \$1,865,000, or to the total amount of \$36,391,375, or 36.39 per cent.

12. I turn now to two last points of our past discussions. I beg you to understand that I now am speaking for my own delegation alone, for the above considerations could and should be, to a certain degree, considered as views shared in common, as I would hope, by all the signatories of the joint memorandum.

13. I would now like to consider the prospects of our work, having specifically in mind two stands on the over-all matter which the General Assembly has asked us to study. In my first statement in this Working Group [A/AC.113/7] I said: "The future of the United Nations will remain in jeopardy until the major Powers manage to find some common ground. Until they find some way to recognize that the previous resolutions authorizing military expenditures can be regarded as legal, or at any rate as capable of being legalized by some means, it will be very difficult—or so my delegation feels—to find a 'technical' solution to our problem". And, in stating this fact, I have stressed the word "technical". And I added: "It is plain to see that our problem becomes strictly technical as soon as political understanding has been reached".

14. Now we can see that a political understanding seems to be still far from sight. The position of the Soviet Union has been inalterably and consistently sustained here by Mr. Morozov. Even so, I had hoped, during our discussions, that he would be able to separate the issues to the point that some forward steps could be taken here towards a certain compromise. Now, as I believe we all feel, we must be sceptical in this connexion. Let us hope, nevertheless, that a high level of understanding can be reached. Because we believe that Member States which are in arrears and object to making payments to meet the expenses of peace-keeping operations on political or juridical grounds could make a special effort towards solving the financial difficulties of the Organization, making the explicit reservation, should they consider it necessary to do so, that their payments would not imply the recognition of principles that they do not accept. No one would think of it as a surrender of principles. All would think of it as a supreme effort of good will towards an Organization that, after all, deserves it.

15. On the other side, the United States representative has stated here:

"The so-called ceiling applied to the United States percentage in the regular scale is not an exception to the general principles of cost-sharing adopted by

the General Assembly—indeed, it is one of those general principles. When in 1946 the General Assembly accepted the recommendations of the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations²⁵ that expenses of the Organization should be based 'broadly' on capacity to pay, it expressly contemplated the imposition of a ceiling on the contribution of the largest contributor and it applied such a ceiling in the very first scale of assessments. Ever since that time the General Assembly has continued to accept the principle that, in an organization of sovereign States—where each nation has one vote—it is not in the interest of the Organization to depend too much financially on any one State or to concentrate too much financial responsibility in any one State, regardless of what some statistics might appear to imply with regard to relative capacity to pay" [A/AC.113/17].

And Mr. Plimpton added to these considerations an impressive series of factual data regarding the contributions of the United States to the United Nations and its specialized agencies, either under the compulsory form or on a voluntary basis, citing as the first datum of that impressive series the following:

"Under legislation enacted by the United States Congress in 1952, no United States representative may commit the United States to an appropriation of funds in excess of 33 $\frac{1}{3}$ per cent of a budget of the United Nations".

16. If we separate facts and doctrines, we see, factually, that the United States currently contributes, practically more than 33 $\frac{1}{3}$ per cent to almost all the organizations of the so-called family of the United Nations. Factually, too, no one is unaware of the reasons underlying the self-limitation the United Nations imposed on itself in 1946, when the capacity to pay of the United States of America was estimated, with a certain degree of precision, at 60 per cent as compared with the total capacity to pay of all the rest of the Member States. Today, some eighteen years later, thanks to the relative development of the world, the capacity to pay of the United States is estimated, with a certain degree of precision, as being about 40 per cent, as recognized in the Fifth Committee at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly by a representative of the United States of America.

17. From the point of view of pure doctrine, the reasons underlying the self-limitation the United Nations imposed on itself are no longer the same. But now we face a situation that I would dare to call a *fait accompli doctrinaire*. Even so, the United Nations should be able to reconsider its own doctrine. The legislation enacted by the United States Congress in 1952 is certainly an element to be given the highest consideration. But, in spite of the fact that the United Nations is an Organization of sovereign States, there is the prerequisite that these sovereign States must work together, have mutual respect for the Charter and the recommendations of the United Nations, if they do not wish, by sovereign national legislation, to condition the functioning of the international Organization itself.

18. Lastly, I feel, on behalf of my delegation, that I should like to avoid a sceptical balancing of our work. I should like to believe that, if certain Member

²⁵ See *Report of the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations* (PC/20), chap. IX, section 2, para. 13.

States are not likely to make a supreme effort to compromise, others will, and that, thanks to the effort of the majority, the Organization will be able to surmount its current financial difficulties and remain the funda-

mental instrument of mankind—and the only one conceivable in the world of today—for the discussion of opposing, contradictory or even antagonistic views, in order to avoid that evil of evils—war.

DOCUMENT A/AC.113/23

Statement by the representative of Pakistan at the fifteenth meeting of the Working Group

[Original text: English]
[27 March 1963]

1. Since the proposals contained in document A/AC.113/18 were tabled in this Working Group, a number of delegations have taken the floor to make comments on them. I should like to say on behalf of the sponsors of this memorandum, of which my country is one, how much we appreciate the kind words that have been said about our efforts and how encouraged we feel at the constructive spirit in which their proposals have been received by a majority of those who have spoken. In welcoming the memorandum, a number of members have offered criticism of, or expressed doubts about some of the proposals contained in it. The sponsors have done me the honour of entrusting me with the duty of clarifying and explaining these proposals and principles in the hope that such further elucidation might lead the Working Group, as a whole, towards a general consensus of opinion.

2. Before dealing with the specific points raised by various speakers, I should like very briefly to refer to two criticisms of a relatively negative nature, which could be made against the seven-Power memorandum. In the first place, it was asserted that the Security Council alone is entitled to apportion expenses of peace-keeping operations and that consequently any proposals for the apportionment of such expenses by the General Assembly are *ultra vires*. On the other hand it was suggested that it was premature, if not utopian, to try to establish or isolate general principles on the basis of which the General Assembly could apportion peace-keeping expenses in the future. The simple answer to both these criticisms is, of course, that this Working Group has to work within its mandate which is to study "special methods for financing peace-keeping operations of the United Nations, involving heavy expenses, such as those for the Congo and the Middle East, including a possible special scale of assessments" [resolution 1854 B (XVII)]; while the seven sponsors of the memorandum do not take a rigid or liberal view of this mandate, they could naturally not be expected to proceed on any contrary or wholly different assumption as to the basis of their work. Nevertheless, if I may say so in all modesty, in drawing up the memorandum, which is before the Working Group, they did keep very much in mind the political realities to which many speakers have made reference. Certainly, there is no suggestion in their memorandum that the very important role of the Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security can be ignored. Nor could the authors overlook the fact that for many years now the General Assembly has indeed been apportioning the expenses of peace-keeping operations and has believed itself to be within its rights in doing so. I am mentioning these points as factual elements in the situation facing the United Nations and do not intend to offer an opinion one way or another, on the controversy surrounding these questions.

3. The seven-Power memorandum thus limits itself to suggesting the principles on which the General Assembly might proceed to apportion peace-keeping expenses, if and when it is called upon to do so.

4. There is no doubt about the complexities of the problem of finding a solution for the financial difficulties facing the United Nations. It is true that peace-keeping operations that may occur in future will differ in their origin, character, size, duration, cost and surrounding circumstances. An attempt to find an ideal solution, good for all time and circumstances runs the risk of being vain; however, the sponsors of the seven-Power memorandum do not share the opinion that this Working Group should, therefore, give up its efforts to draw lessons and conclusions from the peace-keeping operations that the United Nations has so far carried out and, on the basis of these conclusions, try to reach agreement on general principles. We are gratified that many of the speakers who have commented on the seven-Power memorandum, share this feeling. I have no need to state that the memorandum reflects a consensus which was the result of a great deal of give and take, in the interests of the Organization and its future, among the seven countries which have subscribed to it. The sponsors had also very much in mind the need to avoid doctrinaire positions and to put forward ideas on which general agreement would be possible, both here and in the General Assembly. None of the ideas contained in the memorandum can be described as constituting a radical new departure. Each of the principles outlined in the memorandum has, at one time or another, received the approval of the General Assembly. What we have tried to do is to put forward a set of principles which are consistent with the letter and spirit of the Charter, bearing in mind the evolving role of the United Nations, and which would appear as reasonable, fair-minded and practical to members of this Working Group and of the United Nations as a whole.

5. After these preliminary observations of a general character, I turn now to the memorandum itself to examine it in the light of the comments that have been made about it by a number of speakers.

6. In the first place a question was raised as to the date from which any agreed principles or formula would become applicable to the apportionment of peace-keeping operations. Our colleague from Canada, who was supported by the representative of Japan, considers that such a formula or set of principles should go into effect from 1 July 1962, the date on which the last assessment made by the General Assembly for peace-keeping expenses came to an end. In logic, agreement should be reached on the formula and principles before this question can be taken up. At all events, the question is not one to which the sponsors of the seven-

Power memorandum can give an authoritative answer. All they can say is that if the Working Group accepts their proposals, as we would like it to do, and if the General Assembly adopts them, as we hope it might, the authors of the proposals would, of course, not object to their being made applicable from any date that the General Assembly considered appropriate. It would be premature at this stage, when we have yet to agree on a formula and its principles, to make any recommendations about the date of their applicability.

7. The next point arises in connexion with the proposal made in part A, paragraph 1, to the effect that the special method of financing suggested in the memorandum would not apply to expenses on peace-keeping operations amounting to less than \$5 million in any financial year. Expenses up to this figure would be assessed in accordance with the regular scale of assessment and the figure is of course additional to the expenses on peace-keeping provided for in the regular budget.

8. Some speakers consider that the amount of \$5 million is inadequate. The main thing about this paragraph is that it provides for apportionment at the regular scale of assessments of a certain amount of expenditure incurred on peace-keeping operations each year. The principle is important. The amount itself is related to part B of the memorandum, of the financial implications of which our colleague from Brazil gave us a lucid exposition at the fourteenth meeting [see A/AC.113/22]. I do not therefore feel it necessary to enlarge upon the matter other than to say that the authors of the memorandum do consider \$5 million a reasonable figure. Operations of the size of ONUC, it is to be hoped and prayed, will be rare exceptions. Normal expenditures on peace-keeping operations are likely to be much smaller. In any case, the sponsors of the memorandum are quite sure that suggestions for including in the regular scale the first \$10 million of each peace-keeping operation in each year would place an unreasonably heavy burden on Member States, with relatively low capacities to pay.

9. Paragraph 2 of the memorandum states the obvious in saying that expenses on peace-keeping operations which are met outside the scope of the General Assembly's competence in the ways enumerated, would not be apportioned by the General Assembly. The financing proposals put forward in the memorandum would apply to expenses on peace-keeping which are not covered by such arrangements and would apply to all such expenses. There is thus no question of a shortfall arising.

10. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the memorandum refer to voluntary contributions towards meeting expenditures on peace-keeping operations. Voluntary contributions have indeed been very much a feature of the two major peace-keeping operations undertaken thus far by the United Nations. There appears to be some division of opinion within the Working Group on the role that voluntary contributions should continue to play in peace-keeping expenditures. Many delegations have questioned the wisdom of any system of financing peace-keeping operations which would need to depend on voluntary contributions. On the other hand, the failure to agree on some special scale of assessments and reliance on *ad hoc* financing methods would make voluntary contributions an essential and unavoidable part of financing peace-keeping expenses if reductions are to be granted, as in fairness they should be, to countries which are unable to bear the extra financial burden

of meeting heavy peace-keeping expenses. The sponsors of the memorandum, while considering that voluntary contributions to peace-keeping expenses would in the present circumstances continue to provide some part of peace-keeping expenses and should therefore be welcomed, agree that financing of peace-keeping operations should not become dependent on voluntary contributions. It is for this reason that in paragraph 3 of the memorandum they have drawn attention to the desirability of establishing a voluntary peace-keeping fund which would institutionalize voluntary contributions and eliminate the uncertainties as well as the one-sidedness which have characterized them so far. They are aware, of course, of the many problems that would have to be solved before such a fund can be set up. Without wishing to minimize the seriousness and complexity of some of these problems, I find it difficult to agree with my United Kingdom colleague when he states that it is yet too early even to make a study of the problem concerned. This is not the first time that the idea of a voluntary peace-keeping fund has been suggested but there never has been a full examination of its feasibility and implications. Both those who consider that the establishment of such a fund would be a good idea and those who doubt its wisdom or practicability would benefit from such a study being made. It would stimulate thinking on the subject and related questions and even if nothing positive emerges immediately, attention will have focused on the problem involved.

11. I leave aside, for the moment, paragraphs 4 and 5, and turn to paragraph 6, which refers to the special responsibility of the permanent members of the Security Council in respect both of the maintenance of international peace and security and of the cost of the maintenance of international peace and security. A number of the members have suggested that it is somehow invidious to assert that Member States, which have been given primary responsibility under the Charter for keeping the peace of the world, should also bear a correspondingly substantial responsibility for peace-keeping expenses. In point of fact, they do bear a heavier financial burden, even under the regular scale of assessment. This arises not only from the fact that the permanent members of the Security Council possess statutory responsibilities and prerogatives of a special kind under the Charter but because in fact they possess also the overwhelming share of the wealth and military strength of the world. It is, I think, evident that whether the financial responsibility of the permanent members of the Security Council is described as being special or not it would be difficult to work out a formula for meeting the extra burdens involved in heavy peace-keeping expenditures in which these Members did not have to bear a proportionately larger share of these expenditures. In the case of one permanent member of the Security Council, this statement is, perhaps, not altogether accurate. The representative of China suggested certain amendments to part B of the memorandum at the eleventh meeting, designed to take account of this anomaly. The sponsors of the memorandum recognize that a problem exists in this case and would be willing to give very careful consideration to the amendments suggested by the representative of China, should the stage be reached of giving consideration to the memorandum with a view to its adoption by the Working Group.

12. Paragraphs 10 and 11 have elicited comments from many speakers. What do these paragraphs state?

Paragraph 10 says that the case of victims of acts which led to a peace-keeping operation should be given special consideration. Paragraph 11 focuses attention on the fact that in the event of a finding by the General Assembly that a Member State or Member States were responsible for such acts, then that matter too should be given appropriate consideration. These two paragraphs are the result of a consensus of opinion among the authors of the memorandum, of which they form an essential and important part. The authors of the memorandum are therefore happy to note that no opposition has been expressed to the principle that where there are victims of acts leading to a peace-keeping operation, they should be given special consideration. This principle is so patently in accord with the dictates of common sense and of natural justice that it would be difficult indeed to find grounds for opposing it.

13. Now, the meaning of the two paragraphs is plain and clear. We have not set forth anything radical or subjective; nor are we suggesting anything that is not already within the power of the General Assembly to do. We are not laying down *a priori* definitions of who is a victim and who is the opposite. It is certainly not the intention of the authors that every time the Organization undertakes a peace-keeping operation, it should feel bound to seek out a victim, still less that in every case it should proceed to apportion guilt or responsibility.

14. This morning we heard the representative of the United States of America make some criticism of these paragraphs. I have not yet had time to study his statement [A/AC.113/17] carefully and, therefore, do not know whether the criticism amounts to an express opposition to the principles contained in these paragraphs or whether it only enters reservations to them. The first point raised by the United States representative was that the provision regarding the grant of total exemption from assessment to victims was inconsistent with the seven-Power formula for lumping all peace-keeping expenditures together for the purpose of apportionment. I would submit that the inconsistency is apparent rather than real. In practice, it would not be at all difficult to separate the amounts of expenditures relating to different peace-keeping operations and, in any case, the seven-Power memorandum does not suggest that victims should in all cases be given total exemption from assessment. On the contrary, depending on the circumstances, the General Assembly may decide in particular cases to allow an exemption only of a symbolic nature. The United States representative also had objections of a philosophic nature against the concept of victim States. To this I would say that, while the victim State does benefit from a peace-keeping operation, it must be recognized that it has also suffered the consequences of the acts that led to the peace-keeping operation concerned. Collective security is a most important element of the United Nations structure and we all share in it and benefit from it. However, the fact that on occasion a State might be victim of attack, indicates that the system of collective security has in that case broken down.

15. It was suggested at the twelfth meeting by the distinguished representative of Sweden—and his suggestion was supported by the representatives of Italy, the Netherlands and United Kingdom—that agreement might be reached on this point on the basis of providing special reductions in the assessments of victim States to take account of the fact that acts com-

mitted against them would have reduced their capacity to pay. I should like to take this occasion to say in what great respect we hold the representative of Sweden and the delegation of which he is a member. We are extremely grateful to him for the very helpful and constructive statement he made here some days ago on the seven-Power memorandum. We appreciate equally the spirit in which he has put forward this suggestion. I should like only to say that I very much hope that we shall not treat this matter as a problem in semantics. When a country is attacked, naturally it suffers losses of various kinds, buildings are destroyed, people are killed, economic growth receives a setback and so on. This is one element which the Assembly may take into account when giving special consideration to the position of a State which was subjected to attack. There are other elements of a moral and political nature which too must enter into consideration. We do not believe, however, that any useful purpose would be served by going into these various aspects of the problem. As I said, the meaning of paragraphs 10 and 11 is plain and clear and their wording devoid of any subjective bias or polemical overtones. The authors hope therefore that on these two important paragraphs the Working Group will find it possible to be of one mind.

16. The remaining paragraphs of the memorandum are based on the fact, a fact which is not disputed, that in the case of a large number, indeed the majority, of the Member States of the Organization, capacity to contribute towards heavy expenditures on peace-keeping operations is relatively low and that they should not be expected to contribute towards such expenses on the scale designed for the regular budget of the Organization or the application of which would place an unduly heavy burden on their economies and hinder their economic development. While there is general agreement on this principle, a number of members of this Group have expressed the opinion that the specific proposals made in the seven-Power memorandum give more relief to the developing countries than they consider justifiable. In the statement of [A/AC.113/22] he made yesterday our distinguished colleague from Brazil worked out the arithmetic of the formula contained in part B of the memorandum. I think it will be seen that the adoption of this formula does not place a significantly lighter burden on the developing countries than they have been carrying under the various *ad hoc* arrangements made so far to finance UNEF and ONUC. Nor does it place an unfairly heavier burden on the remaining Members, if one includes in the total of their contributions to the two operations the amounts which they have contributed voluntarily.

17. It was suggested that the classification of Member States into two groups only is somewhat rough and ready and that a sliding scale would more accurately reflect the relative capacity of Member States to pay towards heavy peace-keeping expenses. If the division of Member States into those with developed economies appears an over-simplification, then I would say that is the precise virtue of the scheme. The seven sponsors of the memorandum felt that a classification that was simple, and had the sanction of usage, would be more generally acceptable and easier to work in practice than one which in the interest of accuracy or judiciousness attempted to take account of the whole range of shades and nuances between rich and poor Member States.

18. We have not yet had the benefit of actually examining any such sliding scale but one wonders whether the amounts that various Member States would actually have to pay would be very different under such a sliding scale from what they would be paying under the twofold grouping suggested by us. Our proposals envisage that the Committee on Contributions would study the matter taking into account, among other things, the elements mentioned in paragraph 9 and would then make appropriate recommendations to the General Assembly. The General Assembly would examine the report in the same way as it examines the regular reports of the Committee on Contributions and, assuming that the formula we have suggested in part B has been accepted, proceed to assess peace-keeping expenses accordingly. The representative of Australia expressed certain misgivings regarding this procedure [see A/AC.113/21]. The procedure appears more cumbersome than it will turn out to be in practice; in any case any other procedure for classifying Member States on the basis of their capacity to contribute to heavy peace-keeping expenses would be likely to raise similar misgivings. In point of fact, we all recognize on the basis of common sense that certain States have a more limited capacity to contribute to heavy expenses of this nature and I doubt if under one procedure or another, the lists of such countries would be different.

19. The discussions which have taken place in the Working Group since the submission of the seven-Power memorandum show clearly that a wide measure of agreement exists on the proposals contained in it. The representative of Sweden summed up admirably the general consensus. As he himself said, there is scope for enlarging the consensus. It was not to be expected of course that our proposals or for that matter any proposals put forward by a delegation or a group of delegations would receive unanimous acclaim and approval. The sponsors of the memorandum had no such expectation when they presented it to the Working Group. Rather have they tried, by putting forward ideas which in their opinion are fair, realistic

and practicable, to stimulate our discussions along lines which might result in general agreement. As I said, their hopes have not been belied and we are much nearer a consensus than many of us had thought possible when we began our work here. We would hope very much that, even at this late hour, it would be possible for the Working Group to agree on submitting some concrete and clear-cut proposal for the General Assembly's consideration. Should this however prove difficult, then we would urge that the report which the Working Group will shortly be submitting to the Assembly should reflect the very large measure of agreement that exists on the principles contained in the memorandum. This would, we are convinced, assist the General Assembly in its tasks when it meets in special session next May.

20. I have refrained from making any reference to the very interesting thoughts indicated to us yesterday by the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom [see A/AC.113/20]. I am not competent to comment on them on behalf of the sponsors of the seven-Power memorandum, nor can I do so on behalf of my own delegation, since these proposals envisage financing arrangements of a novel and far-reach character, which all delegations would wish to examine very carefully before pronouncing on them. At first sight, it would seem that the proposals outlined by the United Kingdom in respect of future operations concern themselves as much with the problem of authorizing peace-keeping expenses as with their apportionment. They appear to imply also some modification of the concept of collective responsibility. The point I should like to make, however, is that subsequent consideration of these and other similar proposals need not preclude the Working Group from agreeing on general principles of the nature contained in the seven-Power memorandum, since these principles apply to the apportionment of expenditures by the General Assembly and that eventually of apportionment by the General Assembly will arise at some stage under proposals of the nature received yesterday from the United Kingdom representative.

DOCUMENT A/AC.113/24

Statement by the representative of Australia at the seventh meeting of the Working Group

[Original text: English]
[27 March 1963]

1. At our first meeting the Chairman emphasized that the task of this Working Group is difficult and that solutions will not be found without a genuine willingness to negotiate our differences. He also appealed to us to avoid extreme positions and the re-opening of issues which can fairly be considered as settled by recent decisions of the General Assembly. The Australian delegation agrees that it is important to avoid at this stage inflexible positions or a dogmatic approach and to recognize that we are working in an area where there have been and still are, genuine differences of opinion. We also wish to respond to the Chairman's appeal to put forward concrete proposals.

2. However, the working out of satisfactory concrete proposals requires some consensus on general principles so that we can see more clearly where the possibilities of agreement lie. For this reason I wish to indicate the principles which my delegation believes should pro-

vide the point of departure for our work. These principles can be stated briefly. First, the costs of peace-keeping operations are the collective responsibility of all Members. If the General Assembly apportions all or part of these costs, each Member must pay his apportioned share. Secondly, the apportionment by the General Assembly should be broadly according to the capacity of each Member to pay. I believe there is fairly wide agreement on these principles not only in this Working Group but also in the General Assembly. But there seem to be some differences of opinion regarding their meaning and their implications. This is why I wish to make some preliminary remarks.

3. The first point I would make is that collective responsibility does not relate exclusively or even mainly to peace-keeping activities. This Organization is the collective responsibility of its Members. All its activities are the responsibility of each Member. The

Charter makes no distinction between peace-keeping and other activities. Peace-keeping activities are as much a normal activity of the Organization as other activities, and as much a normal responsibility of each Member. Similarly, the costs of peace-keeping activities are as much a collective responsibility of Members as the costs, for example, of running the General Assembly. Peace-keeping costs do not differ in kind from other expenses but only in their potential magnitude. Therefore, my delegation cannot accept the view that any State or group of States has only a "symbolic" or "token" financial responsibility for the costs of the maintenance of peace and security. As far as I am aware, there is no authority either in the Charter or in the practice of the United Nations for this proposition. If the assessment of a Member State is only a very small part of the costs of a peace-keeping operation, it is not because the State has a "token" or "symbolic" responsibility for the expenses but because that small share represents the most that the State can reasonably be expected to pay in relation to the costs involved and to its contributions to other areas of United Nations activities, and having regard to the contributions of other Members.

4. Another point I would make about collective responsibility is that the principle will find a better expression if Members who vote in the future for peace-keeping operations commit themselves thereby to a predetermined share of the costs or at any rate to an agreed approach to cost-sharing. This does not mean that respect for the principle of collective responsibility requires the adoption of a firm and inflexible formula for all future circumstances. But it does mean that our approach should take into account the need to ensure that the arrangements we work out can be applied if appropriate, not only to current peace-keeping operations but also to the sharing of future peace-keeping expenses. The Working Group therefore has a responsibility and an opportunity that goes beyond the immediate problem of how to finance UNEF and ONUC.

5. The second principle—that apportionment of peace-keeping expenses by the General Assembly should be based broadly on capacity to pay—is well understood and long established. The only comment I would make at this stage is that capacity to pay is a relative, not an absolute concept. It is not simply a question of whether a Member State can afford to pay a certain amount of money. It is equally a question of ensuring that no State, whether large or small, rich or poor, should be asked to bear a share of the costs that is disproportionate or inequitable in relation to the shares of other Members. This principle of relative capacity to pay is reflected in the regular scale of assessments though with limitations to which I shall refer later.

6. Indeed, the regular scale of assessments is widely regarded as equitable. There are strong arguments in favour of using this scale to finance peace-keeping costs. For one thing, the regular scale already makes a significant allowance for countries with low *per caput* incomes. However, although peace-keeping costs do not differ in kind from other expenses of the Organization, it would be unrealistic to ignore the fact that these costs may be extremely heavy. It is not always possible to foresee all the financial implications of a peace-keeping operation. It may be necessary to act quickly before all the circumstances are completely clear. Once the operation has been launched, the ex-

penditure will be more difficult to control or limit than expenditure on other forms of United Nations activity. A point may therefore be reached beyond which the costs become so heavy that their continued apportionment on the regular scale will throw a much greater burden on some countries than on others. In these circumstances we must be prepared to contemplate some variation of the percentages worked out for the regular budget—not because the fundamental principles on which the regular scale is based are inapplicable but because a fair application of those principles to heavy peace-keeping costs will lead to a different pattern of cost-sharing. It is equally evident that if the percentage shares of some countries are reduced, a correspondingly larger amount will have to be provided by at least some of the other countries.

7. The Australian delegation therefore believes that we should work towards an arrangement for sharing future peace-keeping costs which begins with the regular scale, which apportions costs broadly on the basis of capacity to pay, and which enables a special allowance to be made for countries which can fairly claim that the sharing of costs above a certain level, in accordance with the regular scale, would place an unreasonable burden on them.

8. With these rather general comments as a point of departure, I would now like to turn to four separate but interrelated questions. First, what proportion of peace-keeping costs should be shared on the basis of the regular scale—that is, at what point in the expenditure curve is there justification for considering a special scale? Secondly, what countries have the strongest claim to benefit from a special scale? Thirdly, how can we work out reasonable reductions? And, fourthly, how can these reductions be financed without placing unreasonable burdens on the other Members?

9. It is probably impossible to find an answer to any of these questions which will fully satisfy everyone. Therefore the suggestions I am going to make are not put forward in a dogmatic way. Instead, they represent our view of the approach which offers the best prospects not only of reaching agreement but of expressing that agreement in a concrete and practical form.

10. The answer to the first question (i.e. at what point do peace-keeping costs become sufficiently heavy to justify consideration of a special arrangement or scale) need not be entirely arbitrary. We must recognize that there is a limit to the resources which any Government, rich or poor, can make available to the United Nations family. The capacity of a Government to contribute towards heavy peace-keeping costs is directly related to the amounts it is contributing to other activities of the United Nations, whether voluntarily or by assessment. Therefore, instead of plucking a specific figure out of the air—whether \$5 million or \$50 million—it would seem more reasonable and logical to relate the point at which a special arrangement should apply to the level of expenditure under the regular budget. This could be done by expressing the amount as a percentage of the regular budget for the year in which the costs are incurred rather than as a specific sum. At this stage, I do not wish to express a firm view on the actual percentage figure. The representative of China has suggested [see A/AC.113/6] that the regular scale should apply to an amount equivalent to 5 per cent of the regular budget but that this should be the only amount to be apportioned. I must

say that the Australian delegation cannot accept the proposition that there are some thirty-five Member States whose capacity to contribute to a peace-keeping operation in 1963 is limited to \$1,600 dollars each. The representative of Canada has made another suggestion. He has suggested that the first \$10 million of a peace-keeping operation should be assessed on the regular scale. This is certainly a more realistic approach.

11. Let me, then, put forward as a suggestion that we say that peace-keeping costs amounting to not less than 10 per cent of the regular budget should be apportioned on the regular scale. Beyond that point a special scale might apply. This method of determining the point at which the regular scale could be varied has the double advantage of precision and flexibility. It also reflects the fact that the expenses of the Organization are indivisible. The Organization cannot be solvent in one area of its activities and bankrupt in another. A Government which in its domestic budget finds itself confronted with very heavy expenditure in one sector, takes this into account in considering its capacity to act in other areas. In the same way we in the United Nations cannot, and should not, approach the problem of sharing heavy peace-keeping costs as if these costs were isolated from and unrelated to other areas of United Nations expenditures and to the total resources which Governments can make available for United Nations activities.

12. The second question which arises is what countries have the strongest claim to the benefits of a special scale. Several proposals have already been made in this connexion. For example, it has been suggested that reductions should be given to those countries in receipt of technical assistance through United Nations programmes. My delegation finds this formula vague and unsatisfactory. It is true that countries which receive any significant amount of technical assistance generally have pressing problems of economic and social development, but it does not follow that a country not receiving such assistance has no such problems. Furthermore there is no necessary relationship between the receipt of technical assistance and capacity to pay peace-keeping costs of a defined magnitude. The economic conditions of countries receiving technical assistance also vary enormously. A Member State, for example a new Member, might not yet be in receipt of technical assistance but might have a reasonable claim to a reduction in its share of costs above a certain level. The Australian delegation sees very little logic or wisdom in an approach based on whether a country is receiving technical assistance, though at first sight it has the attraction of simplicity.

13. It has also been suggested that countries which contribute less than a certain percentage to the regular budget should be entitled to special consideration. This approach is also unsatisfactory since relative percentage shares of the regular budget may not reflect corresponding degrees of economic development. Indeed, some countries on a lower percentage might be much better off than others paying a higher percentage when their position is considered from the viewpoint of standards of living. Here again it is very difficult to be precise because there will always be exceptional circumstances to be taken into account and also some "borderline" cases.

14. One approach, which is at least as precise as the others and probably more equitable, would be to de-

fine the countries with the greatest development problems in much the same way as the United Nations has in recent years come to define the so-called "under-developed" countries. This definition may be expressed in very broad terms as Africa excluding South Africa, Asia excluding Japan, the Middle East and America excluding the United States of America and Canada.

15. We come now to the heart of the matter. How should we work out the percentages for the special scale? And by special scale, I mean the scale which would apply to the sharing of costs above the initial amount to be apportioned on the regular scale. This special scale would make a special allowance for the so-called "under-developed" countries within the broad definition mentioned earlier. I have already said that the approach should be based on relative capacity to pay. I would suggest that for the purposes of the special scale this principle should be applied strictly, that is, without the limitations which the regular scale puts on the principle. A special scale without these limitations, i.e. without a ceiling for the highest contributor or a floor for the lowest contributor, would reduce very significantly the percentage assessments of many Member States. Indeed, it would lower the percentages of practically all Members except the highest contributor. Furthermore, in addition to the reductions which would result from the elimination of a ceiling and a floor, we believe there is a good case for some additional allowance for countries with very low *per caput* incomes. The Australian delegation would suggest that this allowance might be calculated in much the same way as the Committee on Contributions calculates the corresponding reductions for the regular scale, that is, by applying a formula whereby the lower the *per caput* income the more the percentage deduction approaches the maximum reduction—at present 50 per cent—from the national income figure. I believe it is unnecessary at this stage to expand on the technical aspects of such an approach. But I would suggest that for the special scale a new formula could be easily worked out—preferably by the Committee on Contributions—which would increase to, say, 60 per cent the allowance for countries with a *per caput* income of, say, \$200 or less.

16. The effect of a special scale without a ceiling and without a floor, and with an increased allowance for countries with a very low *per caput* income, would be to give very substantial relief to the less developed countries in the sharing of heavy peace-keeping costs. At the same time this arrangement would raise significantly the percentage share of the highest contributor. In order to ensure that this percentage share did not become inequitable and disproportionate, the Australian delegation would propose that all the countries which are not "under-developed" and which would therefore not receive a special *per caput* income allowance—that these countries should renounce the reduction in their percentages which would result from this special scale. The significant reductions thus renounced would be used to lower the percentage share of the highest contributor to a figure which we would not consider to be unreasonable.

17. At this point I should like briefly to review the proposals I have put forward. The Australian delegation has suggested that the costs of a peace-keeping operation up to an amount of not less than, say, 10 per cent of the regular budget should be apportioned among all Members on the regular scale. Above this amount, a special scale would apply, based strictly on

capacity to pay without a ceiling and without a floor and with a special allowance for the "under-developed" countries with low *per caput* incomes. This allowance would be calculated by a formula which would raise to, say, 60 per cent, the maximum reduction in the national-income figure for countries with a *per caput* income below \$200. Those countries which did not receive the allowance would renounce their percentage reductions under this special scale so that the burden of financing the reductions would be more evenly distributed and the increase in the percentage share of the highest contributor kept within a reasonable limit.

18. Before concluding, I should like to add three comments. First, I have made no mention in this statement of voluntary contributions. This is because the Australian delegation believes that we should work towards an arrangement which can be put into effect without relying on voluntary contributions. This does not mean that voluntary contributions would be excluded. On the contrary, they would be welcome since they would reduce the amount to be apportioned. Secondly, I have not referred to several criteria which have been put forward here and in the General Assembly. This is because the Australian delegation believes that the best hope of concluding our task successfully is to use criteria that are well established, generally acceptable in themselves, and capable of producing a specific scale of percentages. Finally, I would emphasize

that special arrangements for sharing heavy peace-keeping costs affect all Member States and not just one or more groups. While the less developed countries are understandably concerned that they should not be committed to pay a share of heavy costs which they consider unreasonable and inequitable, so also the more developed countries are concerned that they will not find themselves committed to an arrangement which in some circumstances might throw a disproportionate or unfair share on one or more of them. This is a point which must be weighed carefully. Any arrangement recommended by this Working Group will need to take account of this and also of the fact that countries which at present make large voluntary contributions to technical and social activities will inevitably find difficulties in maintaining their contributions if they are at the same time to meet heavy peace-keeping costs which they feel are excessive. This last point is also relevant in connexion with the question of arrears of contributions, a matter to which we will turn our attention in due course.

19. The Australian delegation believes that these proposals provide an approach to the financing of heavy peace-keeping costs which is practical, flexible, and relatively simple. The proposals also take account as far as possible of the legitimate interests of Member States. For these reasons we believe that they offer a good basis for agreement.

DOCUMENT A/AC.113/25

Statement by the representative of Japan at the twelfth meeting of the Working Group

[Original text: English]
[1 April 1963]

1. I have so far refrained from making any statement of a general character in deference to the appeal which the Chairman made at the beginning of our work, namely, to confine our statements so far as possible to positive proposals on the immediate task that confronts us, rather than merely repeating our previous positions. This silence on the part of my delegation does not in any sense imply a lack of interest in the subject. On the contrary, we have now carefully and closely examined the proposals advanced by many other delegations, and we are indeed grateful to these delegations for their sincere efforts to find some common ground within the Working Group on this problem which so clearly appears to defy an easy solution. My delegation welcomes in particular the strenuous efforts of the seven countries—Argentina, Brazil, Cameroon, India, Nigeria, Pakistan, and the United Arab Republic—which have presented their concerted views to us in the memorandum of 15 March 1963 [A/AC.113/18]. A preliminary study of this memorandum indicates that it represents a valuable step towards the meeting of minds among the members of the Working Group in its search for a satisfactory solution. I should like, therefore, to present at this stage the following preliminary observations on these and other proposals, reserving the right to elaborate on them at some later stage.

2. First of all, my delegation is happy to note a common recognition, now clearly discernible among the members of the Working Group, despite the op-

position of a small minority, that the principle of collective responsibility applies to the financing of United Nations peace-keeping operations. The memorandum of the seven countries, if I understand it correctly, appears to base its whole proposition upon this principle, and the delegations of these countries are to be congratulated for taking this approach in spite of some differences in their original positions as reflected in the statements made by them earlier in this Group.

3. The principle of collective responsibility could perhaps best and most clearly and simply be achieved if the expenses of the United Nations peace-keeping operations irrespective of their magnitude, were apportioned by the General Assembly among all the Member States according to the scale of assessments applicable to the regular budget of the Organization. As many representatives have pointed out, the costs of peace-keeping operations are just as much expenses of the Organization as are any other financial obligations, and they differ from other expenses only in their potential magnitude. The regular scale of assessments, as pointed out by the United States representative [see A/AC.113/17] is based broadly on relative capacity to pay, and makes substantial adjustments for *low caput* income countries.

4. My delegation, however, is not unaware of the difficulties facing a number of Member States in meeting their shares in the cost of peace-keeping operations when such operations become large in scale, requiring

heavy expenditures for their execution. It appears to my delegation that there is a general consensus in the Working Group to the effect that, first, a certain initial segment of the expenses of peace-keeping operations should be apportioned on the regular scale of assessment, and secondly, that when the magnitude of the expenses exceeds the initial segment, a special scale of assessments should apply to the remaining expenses. This would be necessary in order to bring about some adjustments in the shares of less developed countries whose capacity to pay would make it difficult for them to meet assessments due under the regular scale of assessments. In principle, my delegation supports this majority view. If the Working Group should now decide to embark upon the establishment of a concrete formula for cost-sharing on the basis of this general consensus, I should regard \$10 million per operation as an appropriate figure for the initial segment to which the regular scale of assessments should apply.

5. I should now like to turn to the second point of the general consensus that I mentioned a minute ago; that is, the necessity of establishing a special scale of assessments for expenses beyond the initial segment of a certain agreed amount. The crux of the matter, upon which the success of our Working Group hinges, lies indeed in devising a method of calculating a special scale of assessments, in particular, how and to what extent the percentage shares of the developing countries should be reduced from those in the regular scale of assessments, and how the reduction thus obtained should be made up.

6. In this regard, my delegation takes quite an interest in the special scale of calculation formula proposed by the representative of Australia at the seventh meeting. The gist of that formula is, that above the amount of the initial segment to which the regular scale applies there would be a special scale based strictly on capacity to pay, without a ceiling and without a floor, and with a special allowance for the "underdeveloped" countries with low *per caput* incomes. The Australian representative went on to say that this allowance would be calculated by a formula which would raise to, say, 60 per cent, the maximum reduction in the national-income figure for countries with a *per caput* income below \$200, and that those countries which did not receive the allowance would renounce their percentage reductions under this special scale in order to ensure an even distribution of the burden of financing the reduction and a reasonable limitation upon the percentage share of the higher contributor. I believe that this proposal deserves the serious study of the Working Group.

7. Another comment that I should like to make on the question of a special scale is that, no matter what kind of formula could be worked out and agreed upon in the Working Group for the computation of the special scale, it should not be such as to require a radical and drastic change in the contribution of any Member State in comparison with that which has been assessed in recent years in respect of UNEF and ONUC expenses. While the past patterns of UNEF and ONUC are in no sense considered as precedents binding upon the Working Group with any kind of legal force, they provide us with good guidelines. A formula which would result in a drastic deviation from past patterns in terms of percentage shares of individual Member States, assessed or voluntary, would make it extremely

difficult for any Member State or its legislative branch to accept the formula. My country, for one, would be in no position to accept a formula requiring it to contribute at a rate more than its regular scale of assessments, which would be double its percentage share in past UNEF and ONUC expenses.

8. Most of the preceding speakers have mentioned the desirability of voluntary contributions. A cost-sharing formula which would depend upon particular amounts of voluntary contributions as an indispensable factor for financing is bound to be unreliable, and thus not ideal. However, we believe that the door for such contributions should always be kept open, and furthermore that encouragement should be given for a flow of such contributions.

9. Last, but in no way least, my delegation wishes to draw the attention of the Working Group to a time factor in the application of any new cost-sharing formula which may be worked out by the Group.

10. Many delegations either stressed the need for, or expressed their views on the assumption of, establishing a cost-sharing formula applicable to any future peace-keeping operations. Other delegations emphasized the desirability of an *ad hoc* arrangement applicable to a limited period. It is beyond any doubt that a long-term solution—if agreement is possible on any such solution—is much more desirable than any short-term *ad hoc* arrangement. Yet, as there are many other considerations to be taken into account on the matter, my delegation would wish to know first what sort of agreement could emerge on the method of cost-sharing. But what we are most anxious to hear now is an enunciation of the views of other delegations on when whatever cost-sharing formula we may arrive at should begin its application. As we are all aware, apportionment of expenses has not been made for UNEF and ONUC for the period of one year beginning on 1 July 1962, while the authorization of expenditures for the same period has already been given to the Secretary-General. If this period of an entire year or even any portion of it were to be left unassessed, the deficit caused thereby would no doubt cause irreparable damage to the financial situation of the United Nations. When the General Assembly decided upon the sale of United Nations bonds at its sixteenth session a year and a half ago, the United Nations was indeed on the verge of bankruptcy. While the financial position improved thereafter as the result of considerable success in the sale of bonds, the United Nations would delude itself if it depended upon this relative success in the sale of bonds, and failed to take any positive financing measures with regard to UNEF and ONUC expenses for the period that I mentioned. It would in fact, by June 1963, find itself in the same financially precarious situation of near bankruptcy that it had reached in the autumn of 1961. The primary purpose of the sale of United Nations bonds is to improve the precarious financial position of the United Nations in general, it is not to use the proceeds for the definitive financing of specific operations.

11. For the sound fiscal policy of the United Nations my delegation therefore subscribes to the view expressed by the representative of Canada at the tenth meeting on 15 March to the effect that the assessment should be made retroactively for the period starting from 1 July 1962 and not from 1 July 1963.

DOCUMENT A/AC.113/26

Statement by the representative of the United States of America
at the fifteenth meeting of the Working Group

[Original text: English]
[1 April 1963]

1. I wish to express my appreciation to the Chairman and to the Working Group for permitting me to postpone until today my final statement on the subject of financing United Nations peace-keeping operations.

2. The principal reason why I have waited to make this statement until all other members of the Working Group have spoken has been my desire to ascertain whether there existed any basis on which the majority of the Working Group could join in a specific recommendation to the fourth special session of the General Assembly in May 1963. I am speaking now with the certainty that, despite the great efforts which have been made, and the fact that we have achieved a much better understanding of the dimensions of the problem before us and have narrowed our differences, an agreed solution is not yet at hand.

3. In stating this conclusion, I wish to make it clear that I do not underestimate the value of the work of this Group under the Chairman's able guidance. Never before have the issues been so thoroughly explored. Never before has there been produced such a realization of what is the hard core of our financing problem. There has clearly emerged a recognition that the problem cannot be solved by a single Member State or group of States—that only a sincere and honest acceptance and implementation of the principle of collective responsibility of all Members can assure the survival of this Organization.

4. This means that there has been real progress—and much of the credit for this is attributable to the Chairman's untiring and patient efforts. The fact that considerably more progress is necessary before the General Assembly acts in May does not detract from the achievements of the Working Group.

5. What I have said about progress should not be understood to imply a belief on our part that the present financial situation and prospects of the Organization are less grave than when this Working Group convened. There is as yet no real basis for any such view. Accordingly, the position of the United States on this matter remains as I stated it to the Working Group at the ninth meeting [see A/AC.113/17].

6. Let me summarize that position briefly. The United States believes that we must all concentrate first and foremost on financing the two present peace-keeping operations of the United Nations for the second half of 1963. It is a mistake to ignore the real problems of the present in a search for solutions of problems not yet before us.

7. In dealing with the problem of financing the costs of UNEF and ONUC for the second half of 1963, the United States will oppose any proposal that it pay an assessed percentage of more than 32.02 per cent. It continues to believe that a strong case can be made for financing costs of the amounts likely to be involved on the basis of the regular scale of assessments. It is unable to consider any other method of financing thus far proposed pending a review at the fourth special session of the General Assembly of what

progress has been made in the improvement of the United Nations financial situation—and that means primarily what Governments have done and are doing to pay arrears on past assessments and fully to subscribe the United Nations bond issue. The degree of progress made in this regard will greatly influence the position of the United States at the special session of the General Assembly.

8. How has the United Nations been financing UNEF and ONUC since 1 July 1962? Clearly it has been doing so from the proceeds of the sale of United Nations bonds—and just as clearly the United States has been purchasing 50 per cent of the bonds. These facts impel me to point out that more than \$50 million in bonds are still unsold despite the fact that the United States remains prepared to purchase half of this amount. If other Member States will purchase all of the remaining 50 per cent—as they should—then the UNEF and ONUC could continue to be financed as at present for the remainder of 1963. At a minimum, the sale of a substantial part of the balance of the bonds could so reduce the amount to be assessed for 1963 UNEF and ONUC costs that the special session could well decide that the regular scale of assessments was the appropriate basis for financing the small remainder. This readiness of the United States to purchase another \$25 million in bonds on a fifty-fifty matching basis shows its positive attitude towards the financing of UNEF and ONUC. We should like to see this attitude matched by other States in a position to help assure the sale of the entire United Nations bond issue.

9. While I have already said that the United States cannot at this time consider giving its support to any proposal thus far made in this Group by other delegations, the United States delegation believes it owes to those who have made specific proposals the courtesy of commenting on the main features of them. Accordingly, I turn now to the memorandum submitted by the delegations of Argentina, Brazil, Cameroon, India, Nigeria, Pakistan and the United Arab Republic [A/AC.113/18]. A basic feature of that document is that it would impose a mandatory assessment in excess of 32.02 per cent on the United States. I have already made it clear that we oppose this feature. Another element of that document is that it consolidates the financing of peace-keeping operations and applies one financing method to the consolidated account. We have serious doubts about this approach and are strongly inclined to favour treating the financing of major peace-keeping operations separately. Indeed, on this point it appears to us that the seven-Power memorandum is internally inconsistent. If there is a consolidated account and a single assessment, how would the sponsors of the memorandum propose to apply its concept of exempting a so-called "victim" and surcharging a so-called "aggressor", since surely the States so characterized would differ with each peace-keeping operation?

10. There is then the proposal in the memorandum that only a total of \$5 million a year of the costs of

all major peace-keeping operations be financed on the basis of the regular scale of assessments. We cannot understand the justification for such a minimum figure. I use the word minimum advisedly, for the application of the \$5 million figure means that the approximately fifty States that are assessed on the regular scale at 0.05 and below would each be assessed a total of only \$2,500 on the regular scale. This hardly appears to be a serious proposition. We believe that the proposal by other delegations that at least \$10 million per operation be assessed on the regular scale is much more worthy of consideration, though we believe that setting the amount at \$20 million per operation could well be justified.

11. Related to what I have just said is the range of reduced percentages fixed for the developing countries in the memorandum. We appreciate that these represent a decided advance over the proposal in document A/AC.113/3. Nevertheless, they provide for developing countries a lower assessment percentage on the financing of a total of \$40-\$50 million than was approved by the General Assembly in 1960, when an amount of almost \$70 million had to be assessed for ONUC and UNEF. Thus, they represent a shifting of such a magnitude of the cost of peace-keeping operations to a relatively few countries that they are most difficult to justify if all Member States are to continue to have a voice in the decisions concerning such operations. We believe that suggestions made by other delegations for increasing the percentages in question are much more realistic than the proposals in the seven-Power memorandum.

12. On the matter of deciding what countries are entitled to reduced percentage assessments for peace-keeping operations we find some difficulty with the method proposed in the memorandum. We doubt that the Committee on Contributions can make the decision in this respect as proposed.

13. Finally, we join with those who have criticized the use in the memorandum of the "victim" and "aggressor" concept in fixing a scale of assessments. Such political concepts have no place here, and it is completely impractical to apply them. What we are talking about is financing an operation to maintain the peace in which all—and especially actual and potential victims—have a special interest. In a world without a collective security system, a "victim" bears the whole financial brunt of protecting himself. Can it be seriously argued that in a collective security system the entire burden is shifted to others and the "victim", who benefits most from a peace-keeping operation, is completely freed of financial responsibility for the operation which protects him? It is equally difficult to accept the idea that the financing of a peace-keeping operation can be made to rely to any significant extent on surcharging a State said to have made the operation necessary. What happens to the gap created if that State refuses to pay the surcharge? One cannot rely on a so-called "aggressor" to finance an operation directed to impede his activities.

14. I have been very frank in my criticism of certain features of the seven-Power memorandum. I do

not wish this critical comment to obscure our recognition of the fact that the sponsors of the proposal have spent many hours in a determined effort to formulate and place before us what they consider to be a moderate and constructive approach to the problem being studied by the Working Group. Their efforts have already borne some fruit, and I am certain that they will contribute to the eventual solution of this problem. We respect the views of the sponsors of the memorandum and know that they will respect our criticism and give them consideration when this matter is taken up again at a later date.

15. I wish to say a few words on the interesting statement made at the fourteenth meeting by the United Kingdom representative [A/AC.113/20] concerning an *ad hoc* approach to the financing problem. He has suggested a method using voluntary contributions by developed countries in place of mandatory assessment percentages above regular scale percentages. In discussing this and other *ad hoc* approaches, I would hope that the members of the Working Group would look also at another suggested approach, which appears to merit equal consideration. This is the possible financing of excess percentages from the miscellaneous income of the United Nations. A further suggestion which merits attention has been the proposal to permit developed countries to contribute some part of their total contribution, however arrived at, in the form of unreimbursed goods and services acceptable to the Secretary-General for a peace-keeping operation.

16. There was one other point of special interest in the United Kingdom statement. This was the suggestion that, if the Organization were at some future time to consider a special scale of assessments providing for increased mandatory assessments for developed countries, then there should be created a special mechanism giving an increased voice to developed countries in the decision to apply such a scale. This would seem to be a thoroughly justified approach, and one which I believe all Members should consider carefully.

17. The United Nations is still a fragile mechanism. It can be badly hurt by the withholding of assessed contributions necessary to finance its operations. An equally serious threat to its future would be for us to attempt, while continuing to give equal political voice to all Member States, at the same time to shift the bulk of the financial responsibility to a few. The Organization cannot thrive if power is dissociated from responsibility. An increase in the number of voices heard in the making of political decisions must mean a greater—and not less—sharing in the financial responsibility for the carrying out of these decisions.

18. My final point is this. There must be a return to the basic objective for which this Organization was created after the last great war. There must be again an awareness that our basic purpose and interest is to keep the peace and "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war". We must think again of peace-keeping as a great mission—not a burden. We must recognize that we must all play a part, and an important part, if this mission is to be successful.

DOCUMENT A/AC.113/27

Criteria for the sharing of the costs of peace-keeping operations

Statement by the Secretariat

[Original text: English]
[1 February 1963]

1. The Working Group on the Examination of the Administrative and Budgetary Procedures of the United Nations, at its second meeting held on 29 January 1963, requested the Secretariat to prepare a statement summarizing succinctly:

(a) All the criteria contained in past resolutions, including in particular operative paragraph 2 (a), (b), (c) and (d) of General Assembly resolution 1854 B (XVII); and

(b) Any additional criteria proposed by Member States at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly either in the Fifth Committee or in plenary for the sharing of the costs of peace-keeping operations.

2. In response to this request the following information is provided:

<i>Criteria</i>	<i>Source: General Assembly resolution</i>
(a) The situation of Members having a special responsibility in the events which necessitated the peace-keeping operation	1583 (XV), operative paragraph 6 1619 (XV), operative paragraph 7
(b) A special financial responsibility of permanent members of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security	1619 (XV), fourth preambular paragraph 1732 (XVI), fourth preambular paragraph 1854 B (XVII), operative paragraph 2 (a)
(c) The need to reduce the financial burden of those Members which have the least capacity to contribute as indicated by the regular scale of assessment	1441 (XIV), fifth preambular paragraph 1619 (XV), operative paragraph 8 (a) 1732 (XVI), operative paragraph 5 (a) 1733 (XVI), operative paragraph 6 (a)
(d) The degree of development of each Member and whether or not a developing State is in receipt of technical assistance from the United Nations	1583 (XV), operative paragraph 5 (b) 1619 (XV), operative paragraph 8 (b) and (c) 1732 (XVI), operative paragraph 5 (b) and (c) 1733 (XVI), operative paragraph 6 (b) and (c) 1854 B (XVII), operative paragraph 2 (c)
(e) The collective financial responsibility of the Members of the United Nations	1854 B (XVII), operative paragraph 2 (d)
(f) Such special factors relating to a particular peace-keeping operation as might be relevant to a variation in the sharing of the costs of the operation	1854 B (XVII), operative paragraph 2 (b)

3. The criteria listed above, with the exception of (d), were also contained in the report of the Working Group of Fifteen on the Examination of the Administrative and Budgetary Procedures of the United Nations (A/4971).²⁶ That report also contained the following additional criteria which were not specifically reflected in any resolution:

<i>Criteria</i>	<i>Source of reference</i>
(a) The magnitude of the amount required to finance the peace-keeping operation	A/4971, para. 35 (f)
(b) The extent to which special benefits may be considered as accruing to a Member State or group of Member States from the peace-keeping operation (the benefits being broadly estimated on the basis of the value of investments in the area and other relevant factors)	A/4971, para. 35 (d)
(c) The possibility of relating each Member's contribution to its expenditure on armaments of any kind	A/4971, para. 35 (b)

²⁶ Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 62.

<i>Criteria</i>	<i>Source of reference</i>
(d) Members' capacity to contribute should be determined on the basis of their <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (i) Gross national income; (ii) <i>Per caput</i> income; (iii) Balance of payments position; (iv) Economic and social development needs 	A/4971, para. 35 (e)
(e) Any agreed scale of assessment for expenditures relating to peace-keeping operations should be applicable in respect of expenditures not exceeding a certain specified limit	A/4971, para. 36

4. Additional criteria proposed by Member States at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly in either the Fifth Committee or in plenary are as follows:

<i>Criteria</i>	<i>Source of reference²⁷</i>
(a) The special situation of the Member States which are victims of aggression	Statement by the representative of the United Arab Republic at the 968th meeting of the Fifth Committee (A/C.5/SR.968, para. 26). Statement by the representative of Syria at the 969th meeting of the Fifth Committee (A/C.5/SR.969, para. 39). Statement by the representative of Nepal at the 973rd meeting of the Fifth Committee (A/C.5/SR.973, para. 12). Statement by the representative of Algeria at the 973rd meeting of the Fifth Committee (A/C.5/SR.973, para. 19).
(b) The special financial responsibility of those countries whose actions are deemed to have necessitated the particular peace-keeping operation	Statement by the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at the 961st meeting of the Fifth Committee (A/C.5/SR.961, para. 37). Statement by the representative of Czechoslovakia at the 965th meeting of the Fifth Committee (A/C.5/SR.965, para. 25). Statement by the representative of Nepal at the 973rd meeting of the Fifth Committee (A/C.5/SR.973, para. 12).
(c) Member States which are in no way responsible should not be made to bear the consequences of acts of direct and indirect aggression by other Member States	Statement by the representative of Hungary at the 966th meeting of the Fifth Committee (A/C.5/SR.966, para. 30).

²⁷ This list is not exhaustive.

DOCUMENT A/5407**

Financing of United Nations peace-keeping operations

Report of the Working Group on the Examination of the Administrative and Budgetary Procedures of the United Nations

[Original text: English]
[29 March 1963]

1. The Working Group on the Examination of the Administrative and Budgetary Procedures of the United Nations²⁸ held eighteen meetings between 29 January

and 29 March 1963 to consider the matters referred to it for study under General Assembly resolution 1854 B (XVII) of 19 December 1962.

** Incorporating document A/5407/Corr.1.

²⁸ Originally established under General Assembly resolution 1620 (XV) of 21 April 1961 and composed of representatives of the following fifteen States: Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, France, India, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United

Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America. Re-established under General Assembly resolution 1854 B (XVII) of 19 December 1962 with its membership increased to twenty-one by the addition of the representatives of the following six States: Argentina, Australia, Cameroon, Mongolia, Netherlands and Pakistan.

2. The Working Group elected Mr. S. O. Adebo (Nigeria), Chairman; Mr. R. Quijano (Argentina), Vice-Chairman, and Mr. V. A. Hamdani (Pakistan), Rapporteur.

3. In considering the organization of work, the Working Group recognized that its task consisted of two parts: the first part corresponded to operative paragraph 1 of resolution 1854 B (XVII), in which the General Assembly decided that the Working Group should study, in consultation as appropriate with the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions and the Committee on Contributions, special methods for financing peace-keeping operations of the United Nations involving heavy expenditures, such as those for the Congo and the Middle East, including a possible special scale of assessments; the second part would correspond to operative paragraph 4 of the same resolution in which the General Assembly requested the Working Group to study the situation arising from the arrears of some Member States in their payment of contributions for financing peace-keeping operations and to recommend, within the letter and spirit of the Charter of the United Nations, arrangements to bring up to date such payments, having in mind the relative economic positions of such Member States. It was agreed to consider the two parts separately.

A. SPECIAL METHODS FOR FINANCING PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS INVOLVING HEAVY EXPENDITURE

Terms of reference

4. Under operative paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of resolution 1854 B (XVII) the Working Group was requested:

(a) To study, in consultation as appropriate with the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions and the Committee on Contributions, special methods for financing peace-keeping operations of the United Nations involving heavy expenditures, such as those for the Congo and the Middle East, including a possible special scale of assessments;

(b) To take into account in its study the criteria for the sharing of the costs of peace-keeping operations mentioned in past resolutions of the General Assembly, giving particular attention to the following:

(i) The references to a special financial responsibility of members of the Security Council, as indicated in General Assembly resolutions 1619 (XV) of 21 April 1961 and 1732 (XVI) of 20 December 1961;

(ii) Such special factors relating to a particular peace-keeping operation as might be relevant to a variation in the sharing of the costs of the operation;

(iii) The degree of economic development of each Member State and whether or not a developing State is in receipt of technical assistance from the United Nations;

(iv) The collective financial responsibility of the Members of the United Nations;

(c) To take into account any criteria proposed by Member States at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly or submitted by them directly to the Working Group.

5. In order to give effect to the provisions of paragraph 4 (b) and (c) above, the Working Group requested the Secretariat to provide a summary of all criteria mentioned in past resolutions and those proposed by Member States at the seventeenth session;

it also arranged for the insertion, in the *Journal of the United Nations* of 31 January 1963, of an announcement asking those Member States who wished to submit any new criteria to the Working Group to do so as soon as possible, taking into account the time-limit of 31 March 1963 for the submission of the Working Group's own report to the General Assembly.

6. In response to this invitation, the Permanent Representative of Ireland to the United Nations addressed a note to the Working Group transmitting the full text of the statement made on 4 October 1962 by the Minister of External Affairs of Ireland in the general debate at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly²⁹ and calling attention, in particular, to his proposal that the Secretary-General be empowered to borrow in any financial year up to the full amount of the cost of implementing all the decisions of the United Nations in that year.

7. While the Working Group has not in the time at its disposal been able to arrive at any generally agreed recommendation on a special method for the financing of peace-keeping operations, it has been able, as a result of its discussions and of informal consultations during periods of recess agreed to for this purpose, to identify the various individual approaches to the question and to indicate the views of many members on certain principles on which the financing of future peace-keeping operations could appropriately be based.

8. For the guidance of the General Assembly this report, under the immediately following heading (paragraph 9), sets forth, in the order in which they were submitted, a series of individual positions taken by certain members or groups of members. These positions cover, as the case may be, either ONUC and UNEF alone, or any future operations of a similar nature, or all operations including ONUC and UNEF from an effective date to be determined by the General Assembly. Under a subsequent heading (paragraph 10) the report, with reference to the above-mentioned positions and the various reactions to them, presents the views of members on certain principles on which the financing of future peace-keeping operations could appropriately be based. This is followed by a section (paragraphs 11-23) indicating the different views of members on the manner in which these principles should be applied. In a concluding section under part A of the report (paragraph 24), an indication is given of the various views expressed in regard to possible *ad hoc* approaches to the financing of the current peace-keeping operations, ONUC and UNEF.

Positions taken by members or groups of members of the Working Group

9. Positions taken by individual members or groups of members are set forth below in the order in which they were submitted.

Bulgaria (A/AC.113/15), Mongolia (A/AC.113/12) and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (A/AC.113/5)

(a) Expenses incurred in the maintenance of the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East and in the United Nations Operation in the Congo cannot be imposed as binding upon the States Members of the United Nations without a corresponding decision of the Security Council. Under the United Nations

²⁹ Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventeenth Session, Plenary Meetings, 1142nd meeting.

Charter only the Security Council has the right to take action involving the use of armed force on behalf of the United Nations (Articles 11, 12, 24, 42, 43 and 48). In particular, it also rests with the Security Council to define all conditions pertaining to the financing of operations connected with the use of United Nations armed forces for the maintenance of international peace and security. The General Assembly has no right under any circumstances to arrogate to itself any functions belonging to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Security Council in matters relating to the organization and conduct of such operations, including their financing. All attempts to circumvent the Security Council in these matters constitute an inadmissible violation of the Charter and of one of its fundamental provisions—the principle of the unanimity of the permanent members of the Security Council in the adoption of decisions.

(b) The United Nations armed forces in the Middle East were created in contravention of the Charter and in circumvention of the Security Council. The United Nations Operation in the Congo was carried out in violation of the Security Council's decisions and in circumvention of the Security Council and consequently in violation of the Charter. Accordingly, the financing of such operations cannot be regarded as an obligation resting on the States Members of the United Nations under the terms of the Charter. Similarly, the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on this matter,³⁰ an opinion which is incorrect and incompatible with the Charter, does not and cannot create any obligations of any kind for States; nor does General Assembly resolution 1854 A (XVII) on the acceptance of this opinion in any way affect the substance of the question.

(c) The United Nations operations in the Middle East and the Congo were necessitated by the aggressive acts of the colonial Powers and both these operations, and especially the United Nations Operation in the Congo, have become protracted and have involved the Organization in considerable expenditure. The blame for this lies exclusively with the colonial Powers and their accomplices, whose aims have nothing in common with the maintenance of international peace and security, and the only equitable solution must be one whereby those Powers alone would assume the entire material responsibility connected with the United Nations operations in the Middle East and the Congo.

(d) With regard to methods of financing in the future possible peace-keeping operations by United Nations armed forces, for the reasons set forth above there is no necessity whatsoever for these matters to be considered either in the Working Group or in the General Assembly, since under the Charter they can be decided only by the Security Council in each individual case; this is clear, in particular, from Articles 43, 48 and 49 of the Charter.

(e) For these reasons, the delegations of Bulgaria, Mongolia and the USSR opposed the adoption of any recommendations based on the assumption that questions relating to the use of armed forces in the name of the United Nations, including questions of their financing, can be decided outside the Security Council, and also of recommendations based on the recognition as binding on States Members of the United Nations

of decisions on these matters adopted in circumvention of the Security Council and in contravention of the Charter. Accordingly, the three delegations opposed, in particular, the positions and proposals set forth in the statements by the United States, United Kingdom, Canadian and other representatives, and also the proposals in documents A/AC.113/2 (Canada), A/AC.113/3 (Argentina, Brazil and Mexico), A/AC.113/18 (Argentina, Brazil, Cameroon, India, Nigeria, Pakistan and United Arab Republic), and A/AC.113/19 (Argentina, Brazil, Cameroon, India, Nigeria and Pakistan).

Canada (A/AC.113/2)

(f) There is a collective financial responsibility for all members to finance all United Nations activities, including peace-keeping operations.

(g) The scale of assessment applicable to the regular budget, which makes extensive allowances for the position of countries with low capacity to pay, may equitably be applied to peace-keeping as well as regular budget expenses, except in circumstances when peace-keeping expenses are so heavy as to merit provision of additional relief to those developing countries which are understandably preoccupied with pressing problems of economic and social development. Any special scale which may be applied to meet such expenses should not involve special factors or criteria, political or otherwise, which do not normally enter into the calculation of the regular scale of assessment and which would have the effect of arbitrarily allocating among certain Member States more or less interest in, and financial responsibility for, United Nations peace-keeping operations.

(h) In respect of duly-approved peace-keeping operations involving armed military forces, there should be agreement in advance on what procedures are to be followed and on how expenditures shall be apportioned among Member States. To this end, the following special administrative and legislative procedures should apply:

- (i) The financial implications of any operation which involves expenses in excess of those covered by the annual resolution relating to unforeseen and extraordinary expenses should be brought to the attention of the General Assembly at the earliest possible time. If the General Assembly is in regular session at the time of the initiating decision, the Assembly should be aware of and deal with the financial implications before the end of that session. When initiating decisions are taken by the Security Council at a time when the General Assembly is not in session, the latter should be convened as soon as possible, either in a special session or in an emergency special session depending on the circumstances.
- (ii) In considering the financial implications of the peace-keeping operation, the General Assembly would need to act as follows:
 - a. Examine the cost estimates prepared by the Secretary-General;
 - b. Give the necessary authority to the Secretary-General to enter into financial commitments in accordance with the estimates as approved;
 - c. Decide upon the details of the method whereby the expenses are to be met.
- (iii) There should be appropriate accounting procedures for peace-keeping operations, including the possibility of special accounts.

³⁰ *Certain expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962: I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 151, transmitted to the Members of the General Assembly by a note of the Secretary-General (A/5161 and Corr.1).*

(i) In the light of the considerations above, the following special method is proposed for the financing of peace-keeping operations involving military forces and equipment:

- (i) A certain predetermined level of expenses in one year for each peace-keeping operation involving military forces and equipment would be financed under the scale of assessments used to apportion the costs of the regular budget. An appropriate level might be \$10 million for each duly approved peace-keeping operation.
- (ii) Expenses in any future year in excess of \$10 million for each peace-keeping operation, but which are less than, for example, \$75 million, should be financed according to a special peace-keeping scale of assessments based on capacity to pay as expressed in terms of national income.
- (iii) Commitments for expenses to be incurred in any one year for each peace-keeping operation above \$75 million or higher than \$125 million for total peace-keeping operations would require authorization by the General Assembly and adoption of special *ad hoc* financial arrangements.

United States of America (A/AC.113/17)

(j) The acceptance by the General Assembly at its seventeenth session—by a vote of 76 to 17, with 8 abstentions—(resolution 1854 A (XVII))—of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 20 July 1962 established that the costs of UNEF and ONUC assessed by the General Assembly against Member States were expenses of the Organization within the meaning of Article 17 of the Charter. It is accordingly clear that the General Assembly, and not the Security Council, is the appropriate body to apportion among Member States expenses of peace-keeping operations such as those for ONUC and UNEF, and that such apportionment by the General Assembly creates binding legal obligations on Member States to pay amounts assessed against them. The opinion of the Court and its acceptance by the General Assembly disposed of the contentions of Bulgaria, Mongolia, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, made before the Court, at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly and in the Working Group concerning the interpretation of the Charter.

(k) There is a strong *prima facie* case for financing peace-keeping operations according to the scale considered equitable for other expenses of the Organization. The regular scale does take into account relative capacity to pay and makes substantial adjustments for low *per caput* income countries, beyond what would be called for by comparative national income figures.

(l) The so-called ceiling applied to the United States percentage in the regular scale is not an exception to the general principles of cost-sharing adopted by the General Assembly—indeed, it is one of those general principles, as is the allowance made for countries with a low *per caput* income.

(m) While voluntary contributions may have had considerable value as an adjunct to an assessment of a portion of peace-keeping expenses, there is merit in relying upon voluntary contributions only if a sizable number of Governments join in making such contributions.

(n) In the foreseeable future no single formula or simple set of principles or criteria can be applied to

any and all peace-keeping operations. The method of financing of each peace-keeping operation should be dealt with as it occurs, learning from each operation what may be desirable for the future and adjusting each solution to the particular facts of the case.

(o) In present circumstances, the first requirement is to reach agreement on the method whereby the current peace-keeping operations, ONUC and UNEF, are to be financed. According to the best estimates, the costs of these operations for the last half of 1963 should not exceed \$40-50 million. The methods adopted need not constitute any pattern for the future.

(p) In the light of the present financial circumstances of the United Nations, and until these circumstances show improvement, the United States Government is not prepared to commit itself to contributions for peace-keeping operations in excess of its normal regular scale percentage of 32.02 per cent. In particular, the United States will oppose any special scale of assessments for UNEF and ONUC for the last six months of 1963 which would involve an assessment percentage for the United States in excess of 32.02 per cent.

(q) The United States would be prepared to pay an assessment of 32.02 per cent if the General Assembly decides to apply the regular scale in the case of ONUC and UNEF for the balance of 1963. In the event that the possibility of financing these two operations by some combination of assessed and voluntary contributions is considered by the General Assembly, the United States reserves its position on the payment of any amount over and above its regular share. There remains the possibility of financing ONUC and UNEF costs for the last half of 1963 by the same method currently being used, i.e. from the proceeds of the United Nations bond issue. If a substantial amount of the remainder of the bond issue is sold, it should be possible to finance the balance of ONUC and UNEF costs on the regular scale of assessments.

(r) The ability of the United States to consider any other method of financing thus far proposed would depend on the degree of progress made in the improvement of the financial position of the United Nations, particularly in regard to the payment of arrears on past assessments and subscriptions to the United Nations bond issue. Without prejudice to its future position, the United States suggests that, in addition to the other *ad hoc* approaches proposed in the course of the Working Group's deliberations, attention be given to the following possible aspects:

- (i) The financing from the miscellaneous income of the United Nations of unassessed amounts under the *ad hoc* approaches;
- (ii) An arrangement whereby developed countries would be permitted to contribute some part of their total contribution, however arrived at, in the form of un-reimbursed goods and services acceptable to the Secretary-General for a peace-keeping operation;
- (iii) If the Organization were at some future time to consider a special scale of assessments providing for increased mandatory assessments for developed countries, the creation of a special mechanism giving an increased voice to developed countries in the decision to apply such a scale.

Argentina, Brazil, Cameroon, India, Nigeria, Pakistan and the United Arab Republic (A/AC.113/18)

(s) In the case of future peace-keeping operations, a special method of financing should apply to all expenses incurred by the Organization which are not provided for in the regular budget and which, subject to the exceptions listed in the following paragraph, total more than \$5 million in any financial year.

(t) The special method should not apply to the expenses of a peace-keeping operation or operations the financing of which is provided for:

- (i) Under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations;
- (ii) By common agreement of the interested parties approved by the Organization;
- (iii) By voluntary contributions covering part or whole of the expenses;
- (iv) By the acceptance by a Member State or Member States to meet, on behalf of the United Nations, part or whole of the expenses.

(u) The special method should be based on the following criteria, taken as a whole:

- (i) The individual capacity of Member States to pay;
- (ii) The difference between the capacity of each Member State to pay when contributing to the regular budget of the Organization and its capacity to pay when peace-keeping operations involving heavy expenditures are concerned;
- (iii) The principle of increasing the share of certain Member States and decreasing the share of certain other Member States according to the magnitude of the expenditures involved;
- (iv) The greater responsibility for peace-keeping expenditures of the permanent members of the Security Council in recognition of their primary responsibility in respect of the maintenance of international peace and security;
- (v) The principle that developed Member States are more capable economically and financially of meeting the expenses of peace-keeping operations involving heavy expenditures while developing Member States are considered less capable;
- (vi) Special consideration of the situation of a Member State or Member States, victims of acts that led to a peace-keeping operation, including the possibility of total exemption for them in the apportionment of expenses;
- (vii) Appropriate consideration of the situation of a Member State or Member States when the General Assembly determines that they are responsible for acts that led to a peace-keeping operation.

(v) Unless in the view of the General Assembly any future peace-keeping operation involving heavy expenditures necessitates a different or *ad hoc* method and without prejudice to the financial consequences of any consideration which might be given to the situation of a Member State or Member States which may be victims of acts that led to a peace-keeping operation or of a Member State or Member States whom the General Assembly may hold responsible for such acts, the total expenses of peace-keeping operations involving heavy expenditures, in any financial year as defined in sub-paragraphs (s) and (t) above, should be apportioned according to the following formula:

- (i) Up to 50 per cent of the next \$20 million after the initial amount of \$5 million should be shared by all Member States according to the regular scale of assessment; and the remaining 50 per cent should be shared by permanent members of the Security Council and developed Member States according to the same scale duly rectified.
- (ii) Up to 25 per cent of the next \$25 million should be shared by all Member States according to the regular scale of assessment; up to 5 per cent by the permanent members of the Security Council according to the regular scale of assessment duly rectified; and up to 70 per cent by the developed Member States and the permanent members of the Security Council, according to the regular scale of assessment duly rectified.
- (iii) Up to 5 per cent of the next \$50 million should be shared by all Member States according to the regular scale of assessment; up to 5 per cent by the permanent members of the Security Council according to the regular scale of assessment duly rectified; and up to 90 per cent by the developed Member States and the permanent members of the Security Council, according to the regular scale of assessment duly rectified.
- (iv) The excess over \$100 million should be apportioned according to an *ad hoc* scale of assessment.

(w) Finally, in order to institutionalize and encourage voluntary contributions towards the costs of peace-keeping operations, a voluntary peace-keeping fund should be created towards which contributions would be welcome.

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (A/AC.113/20)

(x) The study of financing methods cannot be isolated from political realities if the United Nations is to have the capacity to act effectively in future for the maintenance of peace and security. The General Assembly would face an immediate task of financing existing operations if these were to continue, even on a reduced scale, up to the end of 1963. Bearing in mind the position understandably taken by the United States of America in regard to its assessment percentage, the following *ad hoc* basis of financing should be adopted for UNEF and ONUC expenses to be incurred during the relevant period ending 31 December 1963, such method to apply only to the period in question and to be regarded neither as a precedent for the future nor as prejudicing the position of any Member State in respect of arrangements in the longer term:

- (i) An initial amount of a maximum of \$10 million per operation should be apportioned in accordance with the scale of assessment applicable to the regular budget;
- (ii) For the balance of the costs of each of the operations, the regular scale should be modified by halving the percentages of all Member States covered by the appropriate United Nations definition of "under-developed areas" and which undertake to pay promptly their peace-keeping assessment for 1963;
- (iii) The shortfall left by such modification of the regular percentages of certain Member States should be met by means of a recommendation by the General Assembly to all Member States, assessed at their regular percentage unmodified,

that they should make voluntary contributions to the relevant accounts in accordance broadly with their relative capacities to pay.

(y) The *ad hoc* approach for 1963 proposed above should be coupled with the establishment of guidelines for special methods of financing costly peace-keeping operations in the future, which should offer a satisfactory compromise between present conflicting viewpoints of Member States and meet to some extent the different preoccupations of all. For this purpose, the following ideas deserved the most careful consideration:

- (i) The General Assembly should approach by stages the financing of a given major peace-keeping operation in the future, because this will enable the Organization to make sure that, at each stage, the scale of action envisaged is within its financial capacity;
- (ii) In the first stage, an initial and limited amount of expenditure should be authorized and these expenses should be apportioned by mandatory assessment on all Member States in accordance with an agreed scale of percentages;
- (iii) If this proved insufficient, the Assembly could authorize a further limited amount of expenditure, on the understanding that all those Member States which had voted in favour or which had abstained on an original authorization would thereby be deemed to have pledged themselves to make additional contributions on an appropriate proportionate basis;
- (iv) If still further funds were required to continue the operation, the question of financing would have reached a third stage, at which those relatively few Member States on whom most of the costs would fall could justly expect a greater say in the methods of financing to be adopted. This could be provided by the Assembly's establishing a special financing committee, perhaps not unlike the present Working Group, and by agreeing to consider only such recommendations as the committee put forward by a majority of at least two-thirds of its members. The five permanent members of the Security Council would be represented on the committee and, if all the five permanent members concurred, the committee could recommend financing the third stage wholly by compulsory assessment. In that event, the regular scale might be used for apportioning the first \$5 million and the remainder might be apportioned on a special scale in which the five permanent members would share 25 per cent of the total among themselves, as well as joining with all others in contributing to the remainder at their regular percentages and helping to cover the shortfall resulting from a 50 per cent modification in the percentage shares of countries in the under-developed areas;
- (v) If a case should arise where, at the third stage, the concurrence of all five permanent members could not be obtained in the special financing committee, the committee could only recommend (by at least a two-thirds majority) the raising of funds by compulsory assessment to a limited extent, and on a somewhat different basis under which part of the costs would be covered through pledged contributions from those members not voting against the committee's recommendation.

Other positions

(z) Some delegations which did not subscribe to all the elements in the positions described above put forward their own proposals for the financing of peace-keeping operations involving heavy expenditures. These proposals included a number of elements in the positions already described and are to a large extent reflected below in the section dealing with individual views on the application of basic principles (paragraphs 11-23). The delegation of Sweden, furthermore, made a statement at the fifteenth meeting of the Working Group on certain aspects of the guidelines for future peace-keeping operations proposed by the United Kingdom (see sub-paragraph 9 (y) above). Verbatim texts of statements appear in the following documents of the Working Group:

A/AC.113/3	Argentina, Brazil and Mexico
A/AC.113/6	China
A/AC.113/9	Nigeria
A/AC.113/11	Sweden
A/AC.113/13	Netherlands
A/AC.113/14	Italy
A/AC.113/16	United Arab Republic
A/AC.113/21	Australia
A/AC.113/24	Australia
A/AC.113/25	Japan

Views on certain principles

10. Many members of the Working Group expressed the view that the financing of future peace-keeping operations could appropriately be based on the following:

(a) The financing of United Nations operations for the maintenance of peace and security is the collective responsibility of all States Members of the Organization;

(b) The expenses of such operations should be apportioned among the Member States to the extent that they are not covered by voluntary contributions or by some other agreed arrangement of the kind referred to above;

(c) To the extent that the expenses were not covered by other means, the apportionment among the States Members of the United Nations should be effected with due regard to their relative capacity to pay;

(d) To this effect, a certain initial segment of the net costs should be assessed on all Member States on the basis of the scale applicable to the regular budget;

(e) The balance to be apportioned should be shared, within reasonable limits, in accordance with a special scale which would serve to reduce the financial burden on Member States less capable of bearing the financial burden when heavy expenditures are involved;

(f) In respect of all duly approved peace-keeping operations, there should be agreement in advance on procedures along the lines proposed by the representative of Canada (see paragraph 9 (h) above).

Individual views on the application of the basic principles

11. Of the members whose views are reflected in paragraph 10 above, a number expressed differing individual views, as given under the headings which fol-

low, on the manner in which certain of these principles or aspects thereof should be applied.

Voluntary contributions

12. Many members agreed that voluntary contributions towards the costs of peace-keeping operations should be encouraged and that such contributions should be applied in the first instance to the amount to be apportioned amongst Member States. At the same time it was stressed that, in principle, there should be no reliance on voluntary contributions and that at most they should be complementary and additional to a system based on mandatory assessments. In one view, voluntary contributions should be forthcoming in the first instance and in the order indicated from States having a special interest in the question which led to United Nations intervention and from permanent members of the Security Council.

13. A number of members were in favour of the establishment of a voluntary peace-keeping fund. In one case it was suggested that contributions might be made to such a fund by Member States as well as from non-governmental and other sources, including private individuals. Certain other members either opposed the idea on the grounds that it would encourage excessive reliance on voluntary contributions as an indispensable factor in any method of financing or questioned whether it was desirable or practicable. It was also suggested that in any event the General Assembly might wish to have the matter studied further, with respect *inter alia* to the manner in which such a fund might be administered.

Extent of initial segment of costs to be financed by apportionment on regular scale of assessments

14. The initial segment of net peace-keeping costs, not provided for in the regular budget, to be apportioned amongst all Member States in accordance with the scale applicable to the regular budget was variously described as follows:

(a) Expenses per operation in any financial year up to an amount expressed as a percentage of the regular budget of the particular year; in this respect percentages ranging from five to ten were mentioned;

(b) Expenses per operation³¹ in any financial year up to an amount of \$10 million or, in the view of one member, \$20 million;

(c) Expenses of all operations up to a total of \$5 million in any financial year.

15. Both the concept of a maximum of \$10 million per operation under sub-paragraph (b) above and the concept of a total of \$5 million for all operations in any financial year under sub-paragraph (c) received substantial support in different quarters.

Main factors determining the nature of a possible special scale

16. Many members agreed that above a certain pre-determined level net expenses might be apportioned on the basis of a special scale which, while reflecting the principle of collective responsibility, would reduce the financial burden on Members with a limited capacity to pay, with a corresponding increase in the shares of the balance of the membership, according broadly to their capacities to pay. The proposals put forward by

³¹ In one case the type of peace-keeping operation to which a special method of financing should apply was further qualified as one involving armed forces and equipment.

the representatives of Argentina, Brazil, Cameroon, India, Nigeria, Pakistan and the United Arab Republic, while based on the principle of collective responsibility, involved the following additional factors:

(a) The greater obligation of the permanent members of the Security Council to contribute towards peace-keeping costs in recognition of their primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security;

(b) Special consideration of the situation of a Member State or Member States, victims of acts that led to a peace-keeping operation, including total exemption in the apportionment of expenses;

(c) Appropriate consideration of the situation of a Member State or Member States when the General Assembly determines that they are responsible for acts that led to a peace-keeping operation.

17. The reaction to these three factors on the part of other members favouring a special scale was as follows:

(a) On the question of the special obligation of permanent members of the Security Council one member was in agreement; a second member, while preferring as a matter of principle an arrangement embodying fully the collective responsibility of all Member States, saw no objection in practice, provided the Member States involved were in agreement; a third member suggested that if these Member States were to have such a special responsibility it would not be unreasonable for them to be given more opportunity to influence decisions relating to financing methods; some other members could not agree that the special position which the five Member States occupied in the Security Council should be construed to imply that they have greater financial responsibilities than other States;

(b) The representative of China suggested an amendment to the wording of the proposals submitted by Argentina, Brazil, Cameroon, India, Nigeria, Pakistan and the United Arab Republic (see paragraph 9 (v) (ii) and (iii) above). In terms of this amendment the wording "and the permanent members of the Security Council" would read "including those which are permanent members of the Security Council". The sponsors of the proposals indicated that they would be willing to give careful consideration to these amendments, should the stage be reached of giving consideration to the proposals with a view to its adoption by the Working Group;

(c) In respect of the concept that special consideration might be given to the situation of Member States victims of acts leading to a peace-keeping operation, a measure of agreement on this principle was apparent; however, certain members stated that the problem should be approached objectively on the basis of the reduced capacity to pay of the States involved; some other members opposed the concept on the grounds that it would be impractical to introduce a political criterion of this nature or that it would derogate from the principle of collective responsibility;

(d) For similar reasons and the fact that such a course was considered impractical, some members opposed the suggestion that Member States found to be responsible for acts leading to a peace-keeping operation should be required to pay a larger share of the costs.

18. Other aspects of a possible special scale on which a number of different concepts were put forward were:

(a) The interpretation of the term "capacity to pay";

(b) Criteria for the identification of countries to be granted reductions on the grounds of their limited capacity to pay.

19. In respect of the interpretation to be given to the term "capacity to pay", collective responsibility requires that each Member State should make a maximum contribution in relation to its ability to pay. This means that no Member State should be asked to bear a share that is disproportionate or inequitable as compared with the share of others. The proper expression of capacity to pay would be a sliding scale with different percentages in much the same way as the scale applicable to the regular budget involves percentages which vary from country to country. The strict application of the principle of capacity to pay would require a revision of regular scale procedures regarding the upper and lower limits. A reduction for under-developed countries with a low *per caput* income would also be justifiable. In this context, a number of members expressed the view that the extent of the reductions envisaged in terms of the seven-Power proposal would be excessive; some suggested that the limit of reductions should be 50 per cent of any individual assessment on the regular scale.

20. As to the criteria to be applied for the identification of Member States which under a special scale should be granted reductions as compared to their share under the regular scale, the following proposals were made:

(a) The special method recommended by the representatives of Argentina, Brazil, Cameroon, India, Nigeria, Pakistan and the United Arab Republic, in addition to providing for the greater financial obligation of the permanent members of the Security Council, involved a grouping of Member States, with the assistance of the Committee on Contributions, into developed countries and developing countries, taking into account, *inter alia*, the following elements:

- (i) *Per caput* income;
- (ii) The insufficiency of national savings for the maintenance of full employment and development;
- (iii) The balance of payments situation.

21. A related approach, favoured by a number of other members, was that it would be sufficient to describe the countries with the greatest development problems in much the same way as the United Nations has in practice characterized the so-called "under-developed" countries, i.e. in very broad terms, as Africa excluding South Africa, Asia excluding Japan, the Middle East and America excluding the United States and Canada, it being recognized that there will always be borderline cases outside this working formula. Both the above-mentioned formulae involved a departure, generally welcomed from that advanced by certain other members, in terms of which the receipt or non-receipt of United Nations technical assistance would be the decisive factor. In this regard, it had been pointed out that it was true that countries which receive any significant amount of technical assistance generally have pressing problems of economic and social development, but that it did not follow that a country not receiving such assistance had no such problems. Furthermore, there was no necessary relationship between the receipt of technical assistance and capacity to pay towards peace-keeping costs. The economic conditions of countries receiving technical assistance also varied considerably.

22. A further view was that the sharing of costs on the basis of capacity to pay should not be approached by dividing the membership of the United Nations into two categories since this would create unnecessary and insoluble problems. It would be sufficient to recognize that when the cost of a peace-keeping operation goes beyond a certain point, there are countries in under-developed areas which cannot reasonably be expected to contribute to heavy peace-keeping costs at their regular scale percentages. The proper solution in such a case would be the construction of a sliding scale with different percentages which would take into account that some Members are more capable economically and financially of meeting the expenses of peace-keeping operations involving heavy expenditures, while other Members are to be considered less capable.

23. In terms of the views advanced by the representatives of Argentina, Brazil, Cameroon, India, Nigeria, Pakistan and the United Arab Republic, the Committee on Contributions would be requested to report to the General Assembly on the grouping of Member States between "developed" and "developing" countries. The General Assembly would thereupon examine the situation of Member States in their relationship to those groups. While there was no disagreement with the idea that the Committee on Contributions should assist in the construction of a special scale, the view was expressed that that Committee should not be asked to group Member States into categories which are hard to define and that, furthermore, it would be impractical and undesirable for the General Assembly to conduct an examination of the economic and financial situation of a Member State to determine whether it is "developed" or "developing".

Possibility of an ad hoc approach to the financing of ONUC and UNEF

24. The representative of the United States of America, as indicated in paragraph 9 (o) above, expressed the view that as a first requirement it would be necessary to resort to an *ad hoc* method for the financing of ONUC and UNEF for the last six months of 1963. A number of other members agreed that an *ad hoc* approach might be necessary, while considering that this should be linked with some longer-term arrangement for future financing; however, certain of these suggested that assessments for ONUC and UNEF cover the period beginning 1 July 1962. The representative of the United Kingdom proposed a specific *ad hoc* method, as described in paragraph 9 (x) above, for the relevant period ending 31 December 1963. Another member indicated support for the principles underlying this method. The representative of the United States stated that, if consideration were given to the United Kingdom proposal, there should also be considered certain other suggestions for *ad hoc* financing arrangements mentioned in paragraph 9 (r) above, including the possible use of the miscellaneous income of the Organization and the possible payment of portions of contributions in goods and services.

B. ARREARS IN THE PAYMENT OF CONTRIBUTIONS FOR THE FINANCING OF PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS

Terms of reference

25. In terms of operative paragraph 4 of General Assembly resolution 1854 B (XVII), the Working Group was requested to study the situation arising from

the arrears of some Member States in their payment of contributions for financing peace-keeping operations and to recommend, within the letter and spirit of the Charter of the United Nations, arrangements designed to bring up to date such payments, having in mind the relative economic positions of such Member States.

Positions taken by Member States

26. The representatives of Argentina, Brazil, Cameroon, India, Nigeria and Pakistan submitted a paper (A/AC.113/19) in the following terms:

(a) The General Assembly has emphasized that in making suggestions for the collection of arrears the letter and the spirit of the Charter should be respected, and attention should be paid to the relative economic positions of such Member States.

(b) At present fifty-seven Member States are in arrears in respect of their assessed contributions for payment to the UNEF Special Account, and sixty-seven in respect of the Congo *ad hoc* Account. Some of these Member States object to making payments to meet the expenses of these peace-keeping operations on political grounds, while others have found it difficult to make payments owing to their peculiar economic and financial problems.

(c) The over-all situation shows the following facets:

- (i) The present difficult financial situation of the Organization as a whole;
- (ii) The financial difficulties which certain Member States face in paying in a lump sum their accumulated arrears;
- (iii) The consequences of the adoption by the General Assembly of its resolution 1854 (XVII).

(d) During the period following the adoption of resolution 1854 (XVII), some Member States paid their arrears. It is greatly to be hoped that other Member States that continue to be in arrears will pay theirs,

disregarding other factors, as soon as their respective constitutional and financial arrangements can be processed, and, pending these arrangements, will make an announcement of their intention to do so; Member States who are in arrears and object to making payments to meet the expenses of these peace-keeping operations on political or juridical grounds are invited nevertheless to make a special effort towards solving the financial difficulties of the Organization by making this payment.

(e) The magnitude of the accumulated arrears on the UNEF and ONUC accounts may create special problems, as regards immediate payment in full, for any Member States who may have financial difficulties. The Secretary-General is invited to commence immediately an examination of the situation and in consultation with any such Member States work out arrangements with them as to the most appropriate modalities within the letter and the spirit of the Charter, including the possibility of payment of arrears by instalments, for bringing the payments on these two accounts up to date as soon as possible. The Secretary-General is also invited to submit a preliminary report on this subject to the forthcoming fourth special session of the General Assembly, and to report in full to the eighteenth session of the General Assembly concerning the progress which has been made in the payment of arrears and any recommendations he might have for improving the situation if it is not yet satisfactory.

27. Apart from the six sponsors of the proposals, the representatives of Australia, Canada, China, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States expressed their agreement with these proposals as a useful basis for further progress on this matter in accordance with the provisions of the Charter; the representatives of Bulgaria, Mongolia and the USSR expressed their opposition for the reasons mentioned in paragraph 9 (a)-(e) above. The United Arab Republic reserved fully its position in regard to the contents of document A/AC.113/19.

DOCUMENT A/5416

United Nations Operation in the Congo: cost estimates for 1963

Report of the Secretary-General

[Original text: English]
[8 May 1963]

1. In a report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council dated 4 February 1963³² on the implementation of the Council's resolutions of 14 July 1960, 21 February and 24 November 1961, it was indicated that an important phase of the United Nations Operation in the Congo had been completed in January 1963.

2. As the Secretary-General stated: "This does not, however, automatically indicate an immediate military disengagement in the Congo by the United Nations. To do that could result in quickly undoing almost everything that has been achieved by the United Nations operation in more than two and one-half painful and costly years. It may be that a smaller United Nations

armed force in the Congo will be needed for some time, owing to the still inadequate military and police resources of the Central Government in coping with endemic problems of tribal warfare and maintenance of law and order."³³

3. The Secretary-General remains of the opinion that a United Nations military force and the continuance of United Nations civilian operations will be required during 1963 to ensure that the purposes and objectives of the Security Council resolutions are achieved. However, in view of the situation that has prevailed in the Congo since January 1963, he has been able, in consultation with the Officer-in-Charge of the United Nations Operation in the Congo and the Commander

³² Official Records of the Security Council, Eighteenth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1963, document S/5240.

³³ *Ibid.*, para. 35.

of the Force, to schedule during the year substantial reductions in the military strength of the Force.

4. The Force, which consisted of 18,918 officers and other ranks on 1 January 1963, was reduced to 15,643 by 1 April and to approximately 12,500 by 1 May. It will be further reduced to approximately 7,400 by 1 July and to 6,700 by 1 October 1963. The average strength of the Force during the first half of 1963 is estimated at approximately 15,200 officers and other ranks and during the entire year at 11,125. During 1962 the average strength was 17,730 and during 1961 17,000.

5. In view of the radical changes in the logistical requirements of the Force following the termination of its active military operations late in January, and the fact that it has only been possible within the past few weeks to formulate definite plans and arrangements for reductions in the size of the Force, it is not possible at this time to present ONUC budget estimates for 1963 in the form or detail that would be desirable.

6. The Secretary-General, nevertheless, submits herewith his estimate of the probable magnitude of the expenses to be incurred in 1963 if the United Nations operations in the Congo continue throughout the year in accordance with his present anticipations.

7. The estimate, which provides for the maintenance and operation of the reduced Force, as well as the expenses of the Office of the Officer-in-Charge of the United Nations Operation in the Congo, the Commander of the Force and his general staff, the Office of the Chief of Civilian Operations and his Consultative Group, and the international and locally recruited staff assisting the Force or required at United Nations Headquarters and other offices for essential operations relating to ONUC, totals \$83,745,000. Of the total estimate, \$68,645,000 represents operating costs incurred or to be incurred directly by the United Nations, and \$15,100,000 represents the amount estimated to be required for reimbursements of the extra and extraordinary costs incurred, or to be incurred, by Governments providing contingents to ONUC.

8. The 1963 estimate represents a reduction of approximately \$36 million, or 30 per cent, from the ONUC expenditure levels during the past two years when expenses totalled approximately \$120 million annually. While the reduction in the number of ONUC troops will permit a directly proportionate reduction in certain ONUC expenses, such as in the United Nations daily allowance paid to members of the Force, certain other expenses, such as those relating to the movement of contingents, salaries and wages of civilian personnel and the rental and maintenance of premises, cannot be reduced in direct proportion to the scheduled cut in the military strength. The departure of military contingents with their supplies and equipment will make it necessary for the civilian staff to perform certain functions such as movement control, which previously has been handled by the military, and will increase the

civilian staff workload for a number of months in such areas as adjustment of procurement schedules and orders, termination of rental leases, finance and accounting, etc. It is also necessary to provide throughout the year for the continuance at least at present levels of such activities as those performed by the Office of the Chief of Civilian Operations and his Consultative Group, and for the continuance of certain essential services in the Congo which are required for both military and non-military purposes, such as the maintenance and operation of airport facilities, air-traffic control and meteorological services. The 1963 cost estimates, nevertheless, involve substantial reductions from 1962 expenditure levels in all major categories of expense.

9. Annexed hereto is a table giving the 1963 estimates under various chapter headings, together with such explanatory information regarding the estimates and their comparison with 1962 and 1961 expenditures as is now available.

10. In considering the cost estimates for the year 1963, it undoubtedly will be appreciated that ONUC expenses will be substantially higher in the first six months than during the last half of the year. Relatively high costs were required to be incurred for military supplies and services during the period of active military operations at the beginning of 1963 and the disruption of railway and road traffic resulting from the destruction of many bridges by the Katangese *gendarmerie* requires ONUC during the first half of the year to rely more heavily on expensive chartered air transport for the movement of ONUC personnel and supplies than will be the case during the second half of the year. Moreover, the major savings in costs arising from the reductions in the strength of the Force will be realized only during the second half of the year. It is now estimated that ONUC costs during the first half of 1963 will total approximately \$51 million and that such costs for the last six months of 1963 will total approximately \$33 million.

11. Since the General Assembly, in resolution 1865 (XVII) of 20 December 1962, authorized the Secretary-General to expend up to 30 June 1963 at an average monthly rate not to exceed \$10 million for the continuing costs of the United Nations operations in the Congo, it will be necessary for the General Assembly at its fourth special session to extend the authority for such expenditures after 30 June if the objectives and purposes of the Security Council resolutions relating to the Congo are to be achieved. The Secretary-General ventures to suggest, in this connexion, that the General Assembly might wish to authorize him to expend during the period from 1 July 1963 to 31 December 1963 at an average monthly rate not to exceed \$5.5 million for the continuing costs of ONUC, provided that such expenditures do not result in total expenditures for the year 1963 in excess of \$84 million.

ANNEX

UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN THE CONGO (ONUC)

COST ESTIMATES FOR THE PERIOD 1 JANUARY TO 31 DECEMBER 1963

(United States dollars)

Part A. Operating costs incurred by the United Nations

SECTION I. MILITARY PERSONNEL

Chapter

1. United Nations daily allowance.....	5,280,000	
2. Movement of contingents.....	6,000,000	
3. Travel and subsistence of military personnel.....	1,450,000	
4. Leave payments	935,000	13,665,000

SECTION II. CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

Chapter

1. Pay of international staff.....	4,950,000	
2. Pay of local staff.....	3,225,000	
3. Travel and subsistence of civilian personnel.....	4,800,000	12,975,000

SECTION III. MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF EQUIPMENT

Chapter

1. Maintenance and operation of vehicles.....	1,500,000	
2. Maintenance and operation of aircraft.....	21,500,000	23,000,000

SECTION IV. RATIONS

Chapter

1. Rations	3,650,000	3,650,000
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SECTION V. SUPPLIES AND SERVICES

Chapter

1. Freight	3,000,000	
2. Rental and maintenance of premises.....	3,400,000	
3. Communications	350,000	
4. Other supplies and services.....	3,500,000	10,250,000

SECTION VI. PURCHASE OF EQUIPMENT

Chapter

1. Transport and heavy mobile equipment.....	940,000	
2. Purchase of aircraft.....	500,000	
3. Purchase of other equipment.....	500,000	1,940,000

SECTION VII. WELFARE

Chapter

1. Welfare	165,000	165,000
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SECTION VIII. CONTINGENCIES

Chapter

1. Contingencies	1,000,000	1,000,000
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SECTION IX. AERONAUTICAL AND METEOROLOGICAL SERVICES

Chapter

1. Aeronautical and meteorological services.....	2,000,000	2,000,000
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TOTAL, PART A

68,645,000

**Part B. Reimbursement of extra and extraordinary costs incurred by
Governments providing contingents**

(United States dollars)

SECTION X. REIMBURSEMENT TO GOVERNMENTS

Chapter

1. Reimbursement of extra and extraordinary costs relating to pay and allowances of contingents.....	11,900,000	
2. Reimbursement in respect of equipment, material and supplies furnished by Governments to their contingents.....	3,000,000	
3. Reimbursement in respect of death and disability awards on behalf of members of contingents.....	200,000	15,100,000
	<hr/>	
TOTAL, PART B		15,100,000
GRAND TOTAL		<hr/> <hr/> 83,745,000

Part A. Operating costs incurred by the United Nations

SECTION I. MILITARY PERSONNEL

The cost estimates under this section bear a direct relation to the strength of the Force and to the scheduled movement to or from the Congo of national contingents being rotated or repatriated at the conclusion of their service in ONUC.

As at 1 January 1963, the military personnel comprising the Force totalled 18,918 officers and other ranks from twenty-one Member States. There was a net addition of 458 to the Force in January 1963 as a result of increases in the size of nine national contingents and reductions in the size of eight other contingents. During February, March and April, there were net reductions in the Force strength as follows: 714 during February, 3,019 during March and 3,419 during April. The Force accordingly totalled 12,225 officers and other ranks at 1 May and further reductions, planned to take place in June and September, will reduce the strength of the Force to 6,705 by 30 September.

The composition of the Force as at 1 January and 1 May, and its anticipated composition as at 1 October 1963, is shown in the following table:

TABLE 1

Member State providing contingent	Number of officers and men		
	1 January 1963	1 May 1963	1 October 1963
Argentina	52	1	—
Austria	44	36	36
Brazil	2	44	44
Canada	310	311	210
Congo (Leopoldville)	617	785	785
Denmark	100	263	75
Ethiopia	2,992	1,500	1,550
Federation of Malaya.....	782	—	—
Ghana	706	720	—
India	5,626	400	200
Indonesia	1,627	3,313	880
Iran	—	26	26
Ireland	867	545	660
Italy	52	53	53
Liberia	242	240	—
Netherlands	6	46	46
Nigeria	1,852	1,886	640
Norway	146	463	100
Pakistan	687	690	500
Philippines	—	47	—
Sierra Leone	122	—	—
Sweden	1,044	856	900
Tunisia	1,042	—	—
TOTAL	<hr/> 18,918	<hr/> 12,225	<hr/> 6,705

The average strength of the Force during the first six months of 1963 is estimated at approximately 15,200 officers and other ranks, and during the second half of the year at approximately 7,000. The average strength for the year 1963 is estimated at 11,125, as compared to the actual average strength of 17,730 throughout 1962 and 17,000 throughout 1961.

While the average strength figures are useful for estimating certain types of cost, such as the cost of the United Nations daily allowances, they do not reveal the total number of military personnel who will serve in ONUC during some part of the year and whose transportation to and/or from the Congo is at ONUC expense. It is estimated that during 1963 a total of more than 30,000 officers and men will serve as members of the ONUC Force.

On the basis of the composition, changes and strength of the Force referred to above, the 1963 cost estimates for the four chapters comprising section I, together with the total 1962 and 1961 expenses incurred under the same chapter headings, are set forth in the following table:

TABLE 2

Chapter	1963 estimates	1962 expenses	1961 expenses
	(United States dollars)		
1. United Nations daily allowance.....	5,280,000	8,413,670	8,065,702
2. Movement of contingents.....	6,000,000	8,955,509	8,308,165
3. Travel and subsistence of military personnel...	1,450,000	1,937,729	2,949,935
4. Leave payments	935,000	1,521,112	1,558,443
TOTAL: SECTION I	13,665,000	20,828,020	20,882,245

<i>Chapter 1. United Nations daily allowance</i>	\$5,280,000
1962:	8,413,670
1961:	8,065,702

Provision is made under this chapter for payment of a daily allowance in Congolese francs equivalent to \$US1.30 to all military personnel serving in ONUC for the purposes of meeting their incidental personal requirements. The principle of paying such an allowance to members of United Nations peace-keeping forces was established at the General Assembly's eleventh session by decision of the Fifth Committee at its 541st meeting on 3 December 1956, and the rate of the allowance paid to members of the ONUC Force has remained unchanged since October 1960.

The total estimate for the year is based on an estimated average strength throughout the year of 11,125 officers and other ranks.

<i>Chapter 2. Movement of contingents</i>	\$6,000,000
1962:	8,955,509
1961:	8,308,165

Provision is made under this chapter for the costs involved in transporting by sea and air the troops being repatriated without replacement as well as the troops involved in normal rotations of contingents.

Sixty-one major movements of military personnel in and out of the Congo are provided for. These involve approximately 15,500 one-way passages at an average estimated cost of \$220 per passage, and 8,500 round-trip passages for rotating troops at an average estimated cost of \$300 per round trip.

The average costs per passage shown above are based on the experience of previous years and include the cost of transporting large quantities of personal arms, ammunition and equipment. The costs also cover the transport of contingent-owned materials, supplies and vehicles whenever these are repatriated with the returning troops.

Twenty-one major troop movements to or from the Congo, involving 16,935 members of the Force, have been completed during the first four months of 1963. During the balance of the year, it is estimated that there will be forty additional troop movements involving the transportation of 15,565 members of the Force.

<i>Chapter 3. Travel and subsistence of military personnel</i>	\$1,450,000
1962:	1,937,729
1961:	2,949,935

Provision is made under this chapter to cover the costs of travel and subsistence payments to military personnel while on official duty with the Force and for subsistence allowances payable to military staff when messing facilities and housing are not provided by ONUC at their duty stations. A considerable reduction in the expenditures relating to travel on official business within and outside the mission area was effected during 1962, as compared with 1961 expenses, through exercising rigid control over such travel, and it was possible to effect substantial savings on subsistence allowance payments by increasing messing and housing facilities for military personnel thereby reducing the number of personnel granted subsistence and housing allowances. The same rigid controls will be applied during 1963 and it is estimated that an amount of \$1,450,000 will be required to meet expenditures relating to travel and subsistence costs for military staff.

<i>Chapter 4. Leave payments</i>	\$ 935,000
1962:	1,521,112
1961:	1,558,443

Leave is accumulated by Force members at the rate of two and one-half days for each completed month of service. In view of the impracticality of establishing leave centres in the Congo area, a payment of \$3 per day has been authorized in respect of any unused leave due a Force member at the end of his service with ONUC. This estimate has been calculated on the basis of 10,375 men having thirty days' leave per year.

SECTION II. CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

The cost estimates included in this section cover the requirements for salaries and common staff costs for international staff specifically recruited for ONUC service in the Congo, the pay of locally recruited staff and labour employed in the Congo, and the travel and subsistence allowance costs for all ONUC international staff. Also included are the salaries and common staff costs for staff employed as replacements or in "overload" posts at established United Nations and specialized agency offices as a consequence of the detailing of regular staff to ONUC, or the additional workload imposed on the various organizations as a result of the ONUC operations. The replacement of detailed staff assigned to ONUC continues to be restricted to the extent feasible in the light of the circumstances in the department providing the detailed personnel.

The civilian personnel internationally or locally recruited or detailed for ONUC service include the staff of the Office of the Officer-in-Charge of the United Nations Operation in the Congo, the Commander of the Force and his staff, the Office of the Chief of the United Nations Civilian Operations and his Consultative Group, as well as the staff directly involved in providing administrative support and services for the military Force.

Since the civilian personnel requirements in some of the offices referred to above, as well as in the replacement and "overload" post requirements at the established offices of the United Nations and the specialized agencies, are not directly related to the size of the military force, it is not possible to reduce these 1963 cost estimates below the 1962 expenditure level to the same extent as has been possible under section I. Appreciable reductions will be made, however, from the 1962 level of expenditures under each of the three chapters in this section as indicated in the following table:

TABLE 3

Chapter	1963 estimates	1962 expenses	1961 expenses
(United States dollars)			
1. Pay of international staff	4,950,000	5,824,953	3,832,359
2. Pay of local staff	3,225,000	3,792,572	3,686,057
3. Travel and subsistence of civilian personnel	4,800,000	5,638,288	4,123,245
TOTAL: SECTION II	12,975,000	15,255,813	11,641,661

Chapter 1. Pay of international staff	\$4,950,000
1962:	5,824,953
1961:	3,832,359

As at 1 April 1963, the number of international staff serving ONUC in the Congo totalled 633, of whom 148 were in Professional posts, 361 were in General Service posts, and 124 were in Field Service posts. The distribution of this staff within the different organizational units of ONUC are shown in the following table:

TABLE 4

Unit	Professional	General Service	Field Service	Total
Office of the Officer-in-Charge of the United Nations Operation in the Congo.....	9	6	1	16
Office of the Chief Administrative Officer.....	7	7	—	14
Civilian Personnel Office.....	10	39	—	49
Finance Office	9	40	5	54
Audit and Inspection Service.....	13	4	—	17
Office of Public Information.....	6	11	1	18
General Services	9	41	98	148
Language Services	7	3	1	11
Claims Office	2	3	—	5
Procurement Services	7	32	1	40
Supply and Purchase Control.....	2	8	—	10
PX and Commissary	3	5	—	8
Civilian Operations	15	67	—	82
Military Operations	3	24	—	27
<i>Field offices:</i>				
Albertville	2	7	—	9
Bukavu	3	5	1	9
Elisabethville	19	30	16	65
Kamina	6	8	—	14
Luluabourg	3	7	—	10
Stanleyville	2	3	—	5
Other offices	11	11	—	22
TOTAL	148	361	124	633

Of the total numbers shown above, 104 of the Professional staff, 242 of the General Service staff and 124 of the Field Service staff were recruited specifically for service in ONUC.

In addition to ONUC staff working in the Congo, there were 18 Professional and 107 General Service staff members serving in ONUC replacement posts and 26 in Professional or above, 89 General Service and 2 Field Service staff serving in ONUC overload posts at United Nations Headquarters and other offices whose salaries and common staff costs are charges to the ONUC budget.

The ONUC overload posts are distributed as shown in the following table:

TABLE 5

Office	Professional	General Service	Field Service	Total
Executive Office of the Secretary-General.....	6	9	—	15
Under-Secretary in Charge of Civilian Operations	5	6	—	11
Office of the Controller.....	3	10	—	13
Office of Personnel.....	2	10	—	12
Office of General Services.....	8	44	—	52
European Office of the United Nations, ITU and WMO	2	10	2	14
TOTAL	26	89	2	117

On the basis of anticipated reductions during the second half of 1963 in the civilian staff providing administrative support for the military Force, it is considered that it will be possible to reduce the expenses for pay of the ONUC international staff by approximately 15 per cent from the 1962 level. Accordingly, the amount estimated to be required in 1963 for this purpose is \$4,950,000.

<i>Chapter 2. Pay of local staff</i>	\$3,225,000
1962:	3,792,572
1961:	3,686,057

Provision is made for the salaries and wages of locally recruited staff and local labour employed in the mission area. As at 31 March 1963 the number of such employees totalled 4,825, of whom 332 were non-Congolese nationals serving in a wide variety of administrative, technical and clerical posts throughout the Congo, and 4,493 were Congolese nationals engaged principally in clerical positions and as semi-skilled and unskilled labour. The assignment of this staff and labour at various duty stations in the Congo is shown in the following table:

TABLE 6

Location	Non-Congolese	Congolese	Total
<i>Leopoldville:</i>			
Administration	28	157	185
General Services	89	488	577
Civilian Operations	14	116	130
Military Operations	13	563	576
Albertville	18	285	303
Bukavu	43	179	222
Elisabethville	62	634	696
Kamina	21	1,293	1,314
Luluabourg	17	196	213
Stanleyville	20	163	183
Other offices	7	419	426
TOTAL	332	4,493	4,825

In addition to the above, 23 local staff whose pay is charged to the ONUC budget were employed in Pisa, Italy.

It will be possible to reduce the number of locally recruited staff and labour force as the strength of the Force is reduced, and the cost estimate for pay of the local staff is estimated at \$3,225,000 for the year.

<i>Chapter 3. Travel and subsistence of civilian personnel</i>	\$4,800,000
1962:	5,638,283
1961:	4,123,245

Provision is made for the costs of travel and subsistence of non-military personnel and includes:

- Air travel by international staff assigned to the Congo;
- Subsistence payments at established rates to international personnel stationed at the several duty stations in the Congo;
- Costs of visits of senior staff to and from New York Headquarters in connexion with the work of ONUC;

(d) Costs relating to travel to and from the mission area, such as freight charges for the transportation of personal effects and other miscellaneous charges.

Taking into consideration that staff at present assigned to the Congo have return portion of air tickets already paid for and that replacements of staff leaving the Congo will be curtailed, it is estimated that expenditures relating to travel and subsistence during 1963 will be 15 per cent less than 1962 costs, or \$4,800,000.

SECTION III. MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF EQUIPMENT

The estimates under this section cover the costs of maintenance and operation of ONUC and contingent-owned vehicles and aircraft and the costs of rented vehicles and chartered aircraft.

The 1963 estimates, together with the total 1962 and 1961 expenses incurred under the two chapter headings comprising this section, are set forth in the following table:

TABLE 7

Chapter	1963 estimates	1962 expenses	1961 expenses
(United States dollars)			
1. Maintenance and operation of vehicles.....	1,500,000	2,046,876	2,089,133
2. Maintenance and operation of aircraft.....	21,500,000	33,271,064	32,936,075
TOTAL: SECTION III	23,000,000	35,317,940	35,025,208

Chapter 1. Maintenance and operation of vehicles	\$1,500,000
	1962: 2,046,876
	1961: 2,089,133

This estimate covers the maintenance and operation of vehicles, including the cost of petrol, oil, lubricants and spare parts and contractual maintenance and repair costs for such vehicles.

As at 1 January 1963 the number of ONUC vehicles totalled 3,611, of which 2,832 were United Nations-owned and 779 were contingent-owned vehicles. The number of these vehicles by type and ownership are shown in the following table:

TABLE 8

Description	ONUC-owned	Contingent-owned	Total
Cars (heavy, medium and light).....	698	1	699
Specialist vehicles	4	18	22
Buses (heavy and light).....	142	—	142
Pick-ups and station wagons.....	484	—	484
Lorries—¼ ton and ¾ ton.....	461	275	736
Lorries—1 ton and above.....	735	158	893
Ambulances	51	3	54
Fork lifters	24	—	24
Motor cycles	61	17	78
Tractors	6	2	8
Recovery vehicles	6	3	9
Fuel trucks	4	—	4
Trailer trucks	84	255	339
Armed cars APC.....	45	44	89
Fire engines and trailers.....	4	—	4
Engineer equipment	19	3	22
Miscellaneous vehicles	4	—	4
TOTAL	2,832	779	3,611

With the anticipated reduction in the Force, it is expected that the number of vehicles in operation during the second half of the year can be reduced to approximately 1,800. On the basis of 1962 experience, the average cost for maintenance and operation per vehicle was approximately \$50 per month. On the above basis it is estimated that the amount required under this chapter for 1963 will be \$1,500,000.

Chapter 2. Maintenance and operation of aircraft	\$21,500,000
	1962: 33,271,064
	1961: 32,936,075

The air support for ONUC continues to consist of the following three broad elements:

(a) Aircraft operated by the Force;

- (b) Air services provided by Governments;
 (c) Aircraft chartered from commercial sources.

(a) *Aircraft operated by the Force*

As at 31 March 1963, the following United Nations-owned aircraft were operated by the Force, and it is planned to continue this operation until the end of 1963:

C-47's	12
Helicopters	10
Otters	8
	—
	TOTAL
	30
	==

In addition to United Nations aircraft as at 31 March, 14 fighter craft on loan from Governments were operated by the Force. This number is planned to be reduced to 10 by 1 July, and operational requirements will determine their need during the last half of 1963.

The costs of air crews assigned to the Force from Argentina, Brazil, Ethiopia, Iran, Norway, the Philippines and Sweden are provided for under section I and section X of the estimates. The costs under this budget provision include expenses relating to spare parts, repairs and fuel, and are estimated to total \$7,750,000 during 1963.

(b) *Air services provided by Governments*

The air services provided by Governments include shuttle services provided by Canada, special flights by the United Kingdom in conjunction with the Nigerian and Ghanaian contingents and special flights by the United States.

The shuttle services carried out by the Royal Canadian Air Force include two flights per month between Pisa, Italy, and Leopoldville and the same number of flights between Canada and Pisa. The costs of the Canada-Pisa flights are shared on the basis of the amount of ONUC cargo or number of passengers in relation to flight load. The special flights provided by the Royal Air Force of the United Kingdom between Nigeria, Ghana and Leopoldville during the first four months of 1963 have averaged ten round-trip flights per month. It is expected that this service will be reduced during the last half of 1963 when the Nigerian and Ghana contingents become smaller in number. The special flights by the United States Air Force are arranged in accordance with operational requirements of the Force.

It is estimated that costs relating to air services provided by Governments will total \$3,500,000 for 1963.

(c) *Aircraft chartered from commercial sources*

As at 1 January 1963, a total of 21 aircraft were under charter from commercial companies. This number will be reduced to a total of 13 as at 15 May 1963, in accordance with cancellation action already taken. The types of aircraft under charter as of 1 January and 15 May 1963 were as follows:

Type	1 January	15 May
DC-6	1	1
DC-4	13	7
C-46	5	3
Corvairs	2	2
	—	—
	TOTAL	13
	==	==

It is planned that the number of chartered aircraft will be reduced further on or about 1 July 1963 to approximately five aircraft contingent upon satisfactory arrangements being made with commercial carriers to transport passenger and freight traffic on scheduled flights or special charters for full loads when required.

It is estimated that the 1963 costs of chartered aircraft will total \$10,250,000.

SECTION IV. RATIONS

TABLE 9

Chapter	1963 estimates	1962 expenses	1961 expenses
	(United States dollars)		
1. Rations	3,650,000	6,047,193	7,184,592
Chapter 1. Rations		\$3,650,000	
		1962:	6,047,193
		1961:	7,184,592

This provision covers the cost of feeding the military Force members at a cost of \$0.90 per day, which was the cost of daily ration issues during 1962. This average daily cost of rations issued of \$0.90 during 1962 compares with the originally estimated daily cost of \$1.60

per man-day, and the actual average cost of \$1.10 per man-day during 1961, and resulted from instituting improved controls and management methods in addition to the ability of the procurement personnel in buying quality goods in mass lots at lower cost.

SECTION V. SUPPLIES AND SERVICES

Provision for supplies and services includes the estimated expenditures for freight, rental and maintenance of premises, communications and other supplies and services. The estimated expenditures for 1963, compared with 1962 and 1961 expenses, are as follows:

TABLE 10

Chapter	1963 estimates	1962 expenses	1961 expenses
(United States dollars)			
1. Freight	3,000,000	4,344,933	3,970,298
2. Rental and maintenance of premises.....	3,400,000	3,971,250	4,418,928
3. Communications	350,000	500,164	329,423
4. Other supplies and services.....	3,500,000	5,562,227	7,324,137
TOTAL: SECTION V	10,250,000	14,378,574	16,042,786

Chapter 1. Freight	\$3,000,000
	1962: 4,344,933
	1961: 3,970,298

Provision is made to cover cost of freight charges for rations, supplies and equipment furnished to ONUC. Freight costs during 1963 are anticipated to be below the expenditures incurred during 1961 and 1962 owing to the reduction in the need for moving materials to the Congo by air. However, the scarcity of commodities in the local area, the irregularity and disruption of surface transport within the Congo, and the inability to plan on a long-range basis during the period in which the Force is being reduced, will require considerable freight expense. Based on the experience of the last part of 1962 and the first quarter of 1963, it is estimated that the freight costs for the current year will total \$3 million.

Chapter 2. Rental and maintenance of premises	\$3,400,000
	1962: 3,971,250
	1961: 4,418,928

The estimate covers the cost of rental, maintenance and alteration of premises required as billets for members of the Force and to provide offices, warehouses, hospitals, messes and other accommodations for ONUC. The accommodation cost during the first six months of 1963 will involve a cost approximately at the 1962 rate. While it will be possible to terminate many rented quarters as a result of the reduction in the size of the Force during the second half of the year, savings in rental charges will be partially offset since substantial renovations must be undertaken to place premises in satisfactory condition prior to termination of leases. An amount of \$3,400,000 is provided to meet the costs of rental and maintenance of premises during the year.

Chapter 3. Communications	\$ 350,000
	1962: 500,164
	1961: 329,423

Provision is made to cover communication costs which include: cost of radio-teleprinter circuits between Leopoldville and both New York and Geneva; postal services for ONUC excluding the cost of free mail for the troops which is provided for under section VII, telephone services and cables sent by commercial carrier. The estimate for 1963 is \$350,000.

Chapter 4. Other supplies and services	\$3,500,000
	1962: 5,562,227
	1961: 7,324,137

This estimate covers the cost of all supplies in the quartermaster, engineering, medical, dental, ordnance, sanitation and other operational categories. The items involved include, *inter alia*, electrical supplies, expendable implements, small arms ammunition for training purposes, paint, building materials, crockery, clothing and uniforms issued to members of the Force and the Field Service and contractual personal services such as cobbling, tailoring, laundering and barbering.

Also included is a provision for stationery and office supplies, miscellaneous claims and adjustments and any other supplies and services furnished to the Force. Taking into consideration stocks on hand at present and stocks on hand at the end of 1962 and the reduction of the Force to approximately two-thirds of the strength of the previous year, it is estimated that costs under this chapter will total \$3,500,000.

SECTION VI. PURCHASE OF EQUIPMENT

This section provides for the purchase of transport and heavy mobile equipment, aircraft and other equipment; the estimated expenditures for 1963 and comparable costs incurred in 1962 and 1961 are included in the following table:

TABLE 11

Chapter	1963 estimates	1962 expenses	1961 expenses
(United States dollars)			
1. Purchase of transport and heavy mobile equipment	940,000	1,216,907	1,036,427
2. Aircraft	500,000	3,022,674	1,300,000
3. Purchase of other equipment	500,000	1,179,008	1,721,995
TOTAL: SECTION VI	1,940,000	5,418,589	4,058,422

Chapter 1. Purchase of transport and heavy mobile equipment	\$ 940,000
1962:	1,216,907
1961:	1,036,427

The provision for the purchase of transport and heavy mobile equipment includes mainly the cost of 166 lorries and 31 trailers which were delivered early in 1963 for which contracts were placed in 1962. A nominal provision is made for the balance of 1963 for emergency purchases as it is expected that the present holdings of the Force will meet their essential requirements for vehicles during the year.

Chapter 2. Purchase of aircraft	\$ 500,000
1962:	3,022,674
1961:	1,300,000

This estimate covers the cost of the four Otter aircraft which were delivered early in 1963 and for which contracts had been placed late in 1962.

Chapter 3. Purchase of other equipment	\$ 500,000
1962:	1,179,008
1961:	1,721,995

This estimate provides for the purchase of equipment other than vehicles and heavy mobile equipment and aircraft and includes quartermaster equipment, engineering equipment, equipment required for maintenance of buildings, including power generators, medical and dental equipment, signals equipment for internal communications within the Congo and other equipment such as water pumps, fire extinguishers, kitchen equipment, tool kits, etc.

SECTION VII. WELFARE

TABLE 12

Chapter	1963 estimates	1962 expenses	1961 expenses
(United States dollars)			
1. Welfare	165,000	220,488	430,657

Chapter 1. Welfare	\$ 165,000
1962:	220,488
1961:	430,657

The estimate for welfare covers the free dispatch of personal mail of members of the Force, the rental of films, the engagement of occasional live shows and the purchase of recreational and sports materials. The estimate has been adjusted to meet the needs of the reduced Force and takes into consideration recreational facilities provided through the facilities of the PX welfare fund.

SECTION VIII. CONTINGENCIES

TABLE 13

Chapter	1963 estimates	1962 expenses	1961 expenses
(United States dollars)			
1. Contingencies	1,000,000	43,979	258,817

Chapter 1. Contingencies	\$1,000,000
1962:	43,979
1961:	258,817

The estimate under this section provides for contingencies in the event that circumstances unknown at the time of the budget preparation necessitate expenditures in excess of the estimates. Factors which might give rise to a need for contingency funds are upward adjustment of salaries of local staff as a result of increases in minimum wage rates, increase in prices of foods and other commodities, possible losses from exchange rate variations,

and the inability to maintain withdrawal schedules for contingents which could increase the expenditures under several sections. It is considered prudent, therefore, that an amount of \$1 million be provided to meet these possible contingencies during 1963.

SECTION IX. AERONAUTICAL AND METEOROLOGICAL SERVICES

Included in this section are the 1963 cost estimates for the operation of air traffic services and associated aeronautical radio communication services at major airports in the Congo and meteorology operations which are essential for both military and non-military purposes in the Congo. These operations require the employment of 107 experts for air traffic and associated services and 34 meteorological experts. The salaries, subsistence allowances and travel costs for these experts, which have not been included elsewhere, are estimated at \$2 million for 1963.

The air traffic and associated service experts include 39 air-traffic controllers, 39 radio operators, 17 radio technicians, 8 airport electricians, 3 dieselists and 1 fire-fighting expert. The meteorological experts include 18 forecasters and 16 experts in electronics, precision instruments, IBM operations, hydrometeorology, agrometeorology and aerology.

Part B. Reimbursement of extra and extraordinary costs incurred by Governments providing contingents

SECTION X. REIMBURSEMENT TO GOVERNMENTS

The following table provides a comparison, by chapter total, between the 1963 estimates, the 1962 expenses and the 1961 expenses:

TABLE 14

Chapter	1963 estimates	1962 expenses	1961 expenses
	(United States dollars)		
1. Reimbursement of extra and extraordinary costs relating to pay and allowances of contingents..	11,900,000	14,350,000	16,149,901
2. Reimbursement in respect of equipment, material and supplies furnished by Governments to their contingents.....	3,000,000	6,067,000	6,167,000
3. Reimbursement in respect of death and disability awards on behalf of members of contingents..	200,000	1,000,000	1,000,000
TOTAL: SECTION X	15,100,000	21,417,000	23,316,901

<i>Chapter 1. Reimbursement of extra and extraordinary costs relating to pay and allowances of contingents</i>	\$11,900,000
1962:	14,350,000
1961:	16,149,901

This provides funds for the settlement of claims from participating Governments relating to expenditure on pay and allowances over and above those costs which the Governments concerned would in any event be obliged to meet. Payments under this chapter follow the pattern established for the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) under paragraph 88 of the Secretary-General's report on UNEF to the General Assembly at its twelfth session^a and approved by the General Assembly in resolution 1151 (XII). The estimate for 1963 is based on experience acquired in previous years in respect of contingents serving in the Congo and takes into account the periods each contingent will be assigned to the Congo during 1963. It is estimated that these costs will be \$11,900,000.

<i>Chapter 2. Reimbursement in respect of equipment, material and supplies furnished by Governments to their contingents</i>	\$3,000,000
1962:	6,067,000
1961:	6,167,000

In accordance with principles approved in General Assembly resolutions 1151 (XII) and 1575 (XV), the United Nations has assumed financial responsibility for the loss or deterioration of government-owned equipment, material and supplies furnished by Governments to their contingents. During 1961 and 1962 and the early part of 1963, it has been possible to negotiate a number of settlements with Governments in respect of their claims for extra and extraordinary costs relating to equipment, material and supplies provided with their contingents. Based on this experience it is estimated that the 1963 costs under this heading will be approximately \$3 million.

<i>Chapter 3. Reimbursement in respect of death and disability awards on behalf of members of contingents</i>	\$ 200,000
1962:	1,000,000
1961:	1,000,000

^a Official Records of the General Assembly, Twelfth Session, Annexes, agenda item 65, document A/3694.

This estimate provides for the reimbursement to Governments in respect of death and disability awards on behalf of members of contingents, in accordance with the principles set forth in part III, section 6, in the Secretary-General's report on UNEF.^b Payments to beneficiaries continue to be paid initially by Governments with the Governments concerned in turn lodging claims with the United Nations. While only a relatively few Governments have presented claims for reimbursement of expenses relating to death and disability awards, based on experience to date, an amount of \$200,000 has been included in the estimate to cover such reimbursements.

^b *Ibid.*

DOCUMENT A/5421

United Nations Operation in the Congo: cost estimates for 1963

Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions

[Original text: English]
[13 May 1963]

1. The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions has considered the cost estimates submitted by the Secretary-General (A/5416) for the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) in 1963.

2. The Committee recalls that, in its previous report on this item³⁴ it expressed its concern that, even after several years, it had still proved impossible to submit detailed budget estimates. However, the Committee noted that, in view of the radical changes in the logistical requirements of the Force following the termination of the more active phase of its operations late in January 1963, and the fact that it had only been possible within the past few weeks to formulate definite plans and arrangements for reductions in the size of the Force, the Secretary-General had not found it possible at this time to present ONUC budget estimates for 1963 in the form or detail that would be desirable. The Committee was informed by the representative of the Secretary-General that operations in the Congo were proceeding in accordance with the Secretary-General's report of 4 February 1963 to the Security Council,³⁵ and that it was on the assumption that they would continue throughout the remainder of the year in accordance with his present anticipations that he had prepared estimates of the probable magnitude of the expenses to be incurred in 1963.

3. These estimates total \$83,745,000. Of this amount, \$68,645,000 under part A represents operating costs incurred, or to be incurred, directly by the Organization, while the balance of \$15,100,000 under part B constitutes the amount estimated to be required for reimbursement of the extra or extraordinary costs incurred, or to be incurred, by Governments providing contingents to ONUC. The 1963 estimates represent a reduction of approximately \$36.3 million or 30 per cent as compared with the level of each of the past two years. The decrease amounts to approximately \$30 million under part A, and \$6.3 million under part B.

4. It should be noted that the decrease in the 1963 estimates is largely attributable to a reduction in the

Force, from 18,918 officers and other ranks on 1 January 1963 to 15,643 on 1 April, to approximately 12,500 on 1 May, and, by further anticipated departures, to approximately 7,400 by 1 July, and to 6,700 by 1 October 1963. The Secretary-General estimates that of the total anticipated costs for 1963, approximately \$51 million will be incurred during the first six months of the year, and approximately \$33 million during the last six months.

5. The Advisory Committee was informed by the representative of the Secretary-General that, although it was not possible to make firm predictions with respect to the date upon which complete military disengagement could take place, present indications were encouraging and if events continued to follow the current trend, it would not be unreasonable to foresee such disengagement, together with the withdrawal of supporting civilian personnel, by the end of the year.

6. In paragraph 11 of his report (A/5416), the Secretary-General states that, since the General Assembly in resolution 1865 (XVII) of 20 December 1962 authorized him to expend up to 30 June 1963 at an average monthly rate not to exceed \$10 million for the continuing costs of the United Nations operations in the Congo, it would be necessary for the General Assembly at its fourth special session to extend the authority for expenditure after 30 June if the objectives and purposes of the Security Council resolutions relating to the Congo were to be achieved. The Secretary-General has accordingly suggested "that the General Assembly might wish to authorize him to expend during the period from 1 July 1963 to 31 December 1963 at an average monthly rate not to exceed \$5.5 million for the continuing costs of ONUC provided that such expenditures do not result in total expenditures for the year 1963 in excess of \$84 million".

7. The Advisory Committee understands that the \$51 million which the Secretary-General considers necessary for the first six months have already been expended or committed. Consequently, its comments refer more particularly to the \$33 million requested for the last six months of 1963.

8. The Advisory Committee would hope that, parallel to the phasing-out of the military operations, it would also prove feasible to reduce at a somewhat more rapid rate than is at present contemplated the number of personnel engaged in civilian operations, provided for under section II. While it is recognized that certain

³⁴ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventeenth Session, Annexes*, agenda items 32 and 63, document A/5366, para. 4.

³⁵ *Official Records of the Security Council, Eighteenth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1963*, document S/5240.

functions performed by the military will, after the latter's repatriation, have to be taken over for a time by civilian personnel, the Committee believes that, if the situation continues to follow the present trend, the actual level of expenditure under section II may prove to be lower than is currently foreseen in the estimates.

9. The Committee also thinks that if it were possible to accelerate the regrouping and concentration of all remaining personnel, both military and civilian, in a limited number of areas, savings might be achieved in sections III (Maintenance and operation of equipment), V (Supplies and services), and possibly in section VI

(Purchase of equipment). In this connexion, the Committee wishes to emphasize the necessity, particularly in the present phasing-out stage, of applying the strictest controls.

10. The Advisory Committee recognizes that, for the reasons stated in paragraph 2 above, the Secretary-General is unable to present precise budget estimates for 1963. In the circumstances, the Committee is prepared to recommend approval of the Secretary-General's figures, while expressing the earnest hope that his resolute efforts will enable him to keep actual expenses well below that level.

DOCUMENT A/C.5/974

**United Nations financial position and prospects
Report of the Secretary-General**

*[Original text: English]
[14 May 1963]*

CASH POSITION

1. The deficit between the Organization's available cash resources and its current liabilities increased by \$19.8 million in the first three months of 1963, during which period cash receipts from the collection of contributions, miscellaneous income receipts, and the sale of additional United Nations bonds amounted to \$35.6 million, and \$48.8 million of obligations were liquidated through cash disbursements.

2. The deficit, which totalled \$74.1 million at the end of 1962, increased to \$93.9 million as at 31 March 1963. In the same period the Organization's net cash resources, which totalled \$86.1 million at the end of 1962, were reduced by \$13.2 million to a total of \$72.9 million as at 31 March 1963.

3. The deterioration in the financial position may be attributed principally to the large outstanding balances of assessed contributions for the Organization's two major peace-keeping operations, to the fact that no assessments have been levied to cover the costs of these operations since 30 June 1962, and to the customary delay in the early months of the year in collecting assessments for the current year's regular budget. Should the same factors continue to operate through the second quarter of the year a further deterioration may be anticipated.

4. The following table summarizes the financial position as at 31 December 1962 and 31 March 1963, and includes the Secretary-General's projection of the situation at it may appear at 30 June 1963.

	31 December 1962 (actual)	31 March 1963 (actual)	30 June 1963 (projected)
<i>(In millions of United States dollars)</i>			
Unpaid obligations	160.2	166.8	162.2
Net cash resources.....	86.1	72.9	60.8
Deficit	74.1	93.9	101.4

5. The above projection of the situation as at 30 June 1963 is made on the assumption that the factors mentioned in paragraph 3 above will continue to operate during the second quarter of the year, that UNEF and ONUC obligations for the first half of 1963 will total respectively \$9.5 million and \$51 million,

and that approximately \$13 million of United Nations bonds, representing the balance of pledges that have not yet resulted in sales, will be sold by 30 June 1963.

6. If the same factors prevailed during the second half of the year, and there were no additional sales of United Nations bonds beyond the amount of current outstanding pledges, and UNEF and ONUC obligations were incurred during the last six months of 1963 in the respective amounts of, say, \$9.5 and \$33 million, it is probable that the deficit would increase to about \$140 million and the Organization's cash resources would decrease to about \$10 million. This amount of cash would represent less than one month's requirements.

7. In view of the financial position and prospects indicated above the Secretary-General believes it imperative that the General Assembly take action at its fourth special session to assure that the Organization will have the necessary cash resources to defray its continuing operations either by assessing the costs of the operations among Members or by such other methods as the General Assembly may wish to adopt.

COLLECTION OF CONTRIBUTIONS

8. At its seventeenth session, the General Assembly, in resolution 1863 B (XVII), requested the Secretary-General to explore all possible avenues to secure the liquidation of arrears and the early payment of current contributions in respect of the regular budget and to report on the efforts made by him to the General Assembly at its eighteenth session. Paragraphs 9 to 13 hereunder are intended to be an interim response to this request as well as to the invitation of the Working Group on the Examination of the Administrative and Budgetary Procedures of the United Nations, as expressed in its report in the following terms:

"The magnitude of the accumulated arrears on the UNEF and ONUC accounts may create special problems, as regards immediate payment in full, for any Member States who may have financial difficulties. The Secretary-General is invited to commence immediately an examination of the situation and in consultation with any such Member States work out arrangements with them as to the most appropriate modalities within the letter and the spirit of the

Charter of the United Nations, including the possibility of payment of arrears by instalments, for bringing the payments on these two accounts up to date as soon as possible. The Secretary-General is also invited to submit a preliminary report on this subject to the forthcoming special session of the General Assembly, and to report in full to the eighteenth session of the General Assembly concerning the progress which has been made in the payment of arrears and any recommendations he might have for improving the situation if it is not yet satisfactory." (A/5407, para. 26 (e).)

9. In the light of the actions taken by the General Assembly at its seventeenth session, the Secretary-General, and his representatives, in addition to the normal arrangements under which Members are initially advised and thereafter periodically reminded of their assessment obligations, have devoted much time and effort during the past four and a half months to the problem of collecting arrear assessments and of arranging, to the extent possible, for the early payment of current contributions to the regular budget and advances to the Working Capital Fund. For the most part, these efforts have involved continuous contact and consultations with permanent representatives at United Nations Headquarters concerning payment possibilities, particularly in the case of Members who are in arrears, as well as similar discussions with appropriate governmental authorities in the course of official travel undertaken by the Secretary-General and his senior staff. To facilitate and at the same time expedite payment of both arrears and current contributions, Members wishing to do so have been afforded the opportunity of paying to the fullest extent possible in usable currencies other than United States dollars. Special efforts have also been made and are continuing to speed up the settlement of claims for reimbursement of extra and extraordinary costs incurred by Governments furnishing contingents to UNEF and ONUC or to arrange for advances against such claims, pending final settlement, in order that certain of the Governments concerned may, in turn, be in a position to liquidate in whole or in part arrear contributions due by them to the UNEF Special Account or the Congo *ad hoc* Account.

10. Efforts under way to improve the Organization's financial position and prospects were further strengthened in February 1963 with the appointment of Mr. Eugene R. Black, former President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, as Special Financial Consultant to the Secretary-General. In this capacity, in which he has generously offered to serve without remuneration, Mr. Black, in addition to making available to the Organization the benefit of his broad and extensive experience in international financial matters, is giving particular attention to the sale of United Nations bonds and to ways and means of securing early payments of contributions from Member States which are in arrears. During the past two months initial approaches have been made to more than sixty such Member States. As replies are received, the further steps that might most usefully and appropriately be taken will be actively explored. The Secretary-General wishes to record his appreciation of Mr. Black's assistance. He is confident that as a result of all the efforts now being made, positive results can be expected over the coming months.

11. Already, in fact, there are definite indications of progressive improvement so far as the collection of arrear contributions is concerned. Since 1 January 1963, such collections have appreciably exceeded earlier estimates based on actual collection experience for a corresponding period in 1962 and prior years. Thus, arrear payments, from 1 January to 13 May 1963 (as distinct from regular budget assessments and Working Capital Fund advances due and payable in 1963) have been received from thirty-eight Member States in a total amount of \$15,480,302, distributed as follows:

	<i>United States dollars</i>
Regular budget for 1962 and prior years.....	11,302,299
UNEF Special Account.....	298,254
Congo <i>ad hoc</i> Account.....	3,863,006
Balance due to Working Capital Fund for 1962	16,743

In addition, payments have been made during the same period in respect of currently due 1963 obligations, Working Capital Fund advances and regular budget assessments in the amounts of \$3,313,298 and \$17,465,546 respectively. The latter figure does not differ appreciably on a percentage basis (21.2 per cent of total regular budgetary contributions) from previous years' experience for the same period.

12. Despite these payments, there still remains a total of \$106,206,765 of contributions due for 1962 and prior years from sixty-nine Member States. Of this total, \$6,503,301 represents regular budgetary arrears of thirty-two Members; \$27,349,581 is due to the UNEF Special Account from fifty-three Members; and \$72,353,883 to the Congo *ad hoc* Account from sixty-four Members. These figures excluded three Members admitted late in 1962 whose initial contributions are due and payable in 1963. The total of all contributions due as at 13 May 1963, inclusive of unpaid 1963 assessments and advances to the Working Capital Fund as well as arrears, amounted to \$182,958,797. Detailed statements showing the status of contributions, as at 13 May 1963 for each of the three contributions accounts (regular budget, UNEF and ONUC) and the Working Capital Fund, together with an over-all summary, are presented in annexes I to V inclusive.

13. While the arrears situation as summarized above must obviously remain a matter of serious concern, the Secretary-General is not unhopeful that the coming months will see an accelerated rate of improvement, at least in the number of Member States which are in default. He is encouraged in this belief by the assurances he has received from some Governments of their intention to liquidate in full past obligations as soon as necessary legislative processes can be completed, and by the desire expressed by some others who find themselves in real financial difficulties, to work out appropriate modalities, within the letter and spirit of the Charter, for bringing the payments due up to date as soon as possible.

UNITED NATIONS BONDS

14. A total of sixty countries (excluding the United States of America but including five non-members of the United Nations) have pledged subscriptions in an aggregate amount of \$74,440,897. Of this amount, bonds to the value of \$70,869,922 have actually been purchased by forty-four of the countries pledging subscriptions

(other than the United States of America). In the case of the United States of America, purchases totaling \$65,215,840 have also been made in accordance with the terms and conditions of Public Law 87-731 under which such purchases are dependent upon the purchases of bonds by other subscribers on a dollar-for-dollar basis, up to a maximum of \$100 million. Actual sales to date thus total \$136,085,762 while subscriptions pledged, on the basis of full United States matching of purchases thus far made, amount to \$145,310,819. When all present pledges are purchased, the United States can pledge a total of \$3,570,975 additional for a grand total of purchases and pledges of \$148,881,794.

15. The terms and conditions under which bonds are issued require that the interest charges and instalments of principal due on the bonds shall be paid once a year, on 15 January. For the \$121,054,506 of bonds which had been purchased as at 15 January 1963, such payments were duly effected on that date in the amount of \$728,065.21 for interest and \$3,752,689.69 for instalments of principal.

16. At its 979th meeting, held on 17 December 1962, the Fifth Committee considered, on the basis of reports of the Secretary-General³⁶ and the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions,³⁷ the desirability of extending beyond 31 December 1962 the subscription period for the purchase of United Nations bonds issued pursuant to General Assembly resolution 1739 (XVI) of 20 December 1961.

17. The decision of the Fifth Committee on this matter was reported to the General Assembly in paragraph 62 of the report of the Fifth Committee on the budget estimates for the financial year 1963 as follows:

"It was also decided, by 47 votes to 2, with 17 abstentions, to recommend to the General Assembly an amendment of the terms and conditions governing the issue of United Nations Bonds under resolution 1739 (XVI), such amendment to take the form of a decision by the General Assembly that bonds might be sold in whole or in part from time to time

³⁶ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventeenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 62, document A/C.5/963.*

³⁷ *Ibid.*, document A/5358.

until 30 June 1963, provided that the Secretary-General might, at any time, on or before that date, enter into agreements to sell bonds for delivery after that date and on or before 31 December 1963."³⁸

18. The report of the Fifth Committee as a whole was considered and acted upon at the 1202nd plenary meeting on the final day of the seventeenth session. Owing to pressure of time the specific recommendation referred to above was not, however, put to the Assembly for formal approval.

19. To date the subscriptions for United Nations bonds total \$148,881,794 whereas the total amount authorized to be issued is \$200 million. The Secretary-General believes, however, that a number of Governments would still wish to subscribe for the purchase of additional bonds if the subscription period were extended

20. In view of the fact that, in the circumstances described in paragraph 18 above, it has not been possible to accept new subscriptions since 31 December 1962, the Secretary-General now wishes to renew his proposal that the subscription period for the purchase of United Nations bonds be extended. Since, however, the extension to 30 June 1963 as originally suggested would provide little time during which such subscriptions could be received, the Secretary-General now recommends that the extension be made to 31 December 1963.

21. Should the Secretary-General's proposal be approved, a decision might be taken in the following form:

The General Assembly

Recalling its decision, in operative paragraph 1 of General Assembly resolution 1739 (XVI) of 20 December 1961, to authorize the Secretary-General to issue United Nations bonds in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in the annex to that resolution,

Decides to amend paragraph 8 of the annex to General Assembly resolution 1739 (XVI) to read as follows:

"8. The bonds may be sold in whole or in part from time to time until 31 December 1963."

³⁸ *Ibid.*, document A/5391.

ANNEXES

Annex I

STATEMENT OF ADVANCES TO THE WORKING CAPITAL FUND FOR 1963 AS AT 13 MAY 1963

<i>Member States</i>	<i>Additional advances for 1963^a</i>	<i>Amounts received</i>	<i>Balance due 13 May 1963</i>
<i>(United States dollars)</i>			
Afghanistan	7,392	—	7,392.00
Albania	6,000	—	6,000.00
Argentina	150,421	—	150,421.00
Australia	247,597	247,597.00	—
Austria	67,717	67,717.00	—
Belgium	178,921	—	178,921.00
Bolivia	6,000	—	6,000.00
Brazil	157,000	2,391.00	154,609.00
Bulgaria	30,432	—	30,432.00
Burma	10,393	—	10,393.00
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic.....	78,539	—	78,539.00
Cambodia	6,000	—	6,000.00
Cameroon	6,431	6,431.00	—

Annex I (continued)

<i>Member States</i>	<i>Additional advances for 1963^a</i>	<i>Amounts received</i>	<i>Balance due 13 May 1963</i>
<i>(United States dollars)</i>			
Canada	468,109	—	468,109.00
Central African Republic	6,431	—	6,431.00
Ceylon	13,392	—	13,392.00
Chad	6,431	6,431.00	—
Chile	38,892	—	38,892.00
China	680,752	—	680,752.00
Colombia	38,460	—	38,460.00
Congo (Brazzaville)	6,431	—	6,431.00
Congo (Leopoldville)	11,256	—	11,256.00
Costa Rica	6,000	—	6,000.00
Cuba	32,676	—	32,676.00
Cyprus	6,431	6,431.00	—
Czechoslovakia	178,738	—	178,738.00
Dahomey	6,431	—	6,431.00
Denmark	86,784	86,784.00	—
Dominican Republic	7,500	—	7,500.00
Ecuador	9,000	5,598.66	3,401.34
El Salvador	5,891	—	5,891.00
Ethiopia	7,392	7,392.00	—
Federation of Malaya	19,068	19,068.00	—
Finland	55,608	55,608.00	—
France	886,036	—	886,036.00
Gabon	6,431	—	6,431.00
Ghana	13,715	—	13,715.00
Greece	34,500	—	34,500.00
Guatemala	7,500	—	7,500.00
Guinea	6,431	—	6,431.00
Haiti	6,000	—	6,000.00
Honduras	6,000	—	6,000.00
Hungary	85,511	85,511.00	—
Iceland	6,000	6,000.00	—
India	299,860	299,860.00	—
Indonesia	67,284	—	67,284.00
Iran	29,892	—	29,892.00
Iraq	13,500	—	13,500.00
Ireland	20,784	—	20,784.00
Israel	22,608	2,392.00	20,216.00
Italy	335,892	—	335,892.00
Ivory Coast	6,431	—	6,431.00
Japan	341,363	341,363.00	—
Jordan	6,000	—	6,000.00
Laos	6,000	—	6,000.00
Lebanon	7,500	7,500.00	—
Liberia	6,000	—	6,000.00
Libya	6,000	—	6,000.00
Luxembourg	7,392	7,392.00	—
Madagascar	6,431	6,431.00	—
Mali	6,431	6,431.00	—
Mexico	111,324	—	111,324.00
Morocco	21,000	1,361.00	19,639.00
Nepal	6,000	—	6,000.00
Netherlands	151,500	151,500.00	—
New Zealand	61,392	—	61,392.00
Nicaragua	6,000	—	6,000.00
Niger	6,431	—	6,431.00
Nigeria	33,767	—	33,767.00
Norway	67,069	67,069.00	—
Pakistan	63,216	—	63,216.00

Annex I (continued)

Member States	Additional advances for 1963 ^a	Amounts received	Balance due 13 May 1963
(United States dollars)			
Panama	6,000	30.96	5,969.04
Paraguay	6,000	—	6,000.00
Peru	14,892	—	14,892.00
Philippines	59,677	—	59,677.00
Poland	191,030	—	191,030.00
Portugal	23,569	—	23,569.00
Romania	47,785	47,785.00	—
Saudi Arabia	13,000	13,000.00	—
Senegal	20,000	15,253.00	4,747.00
Somalia	6,431	—	6,431.00
South Africa	79,176	79,176.00	—
Spain	128,245	128,245.00	—
Sudan	10,608	—	10,608.00
Sweden	194,029	194,029.00	—
Syria	7,464	—	7,464.00
Thailand	24,000	—	24,000.00
Togo	6,431	—	6,431.00
Tunisia	7,500	7,500.00	—
Turkey	57,950	57,950.00	—
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic	298,943	—	298,943.00
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	2,260,069	—	2,260,069.00
United Arab Republic	37,320	—	37,320.00
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	1,134,842	1,134,842.00	—
United States of America	4,797,713	—	4,797,713.00
Upper Volta	6,431	6,431.00	—
Uruguay	16,391	—	16,391.00
Venezuela	78,216	78,216.00	—
Yemen	6,000	—	6,000.00
Yugoslavia	57,324	57,324.00	—
	15,016,743	3,314,040.62	11,702,702.38
Mauritania	16,000	—	16,000.00
Mongolia	16,000	—	16,000.00
Sierra Leone	16,000	16,000.00	—
Tanganyika	16,000	—	16,000.00
TOTAL	15,080,743	3,330,040.62	11,750,702.38

^a Includes unpaid balances totalling \$16,743.00 for 1962.

Annex II

UNITED NATIONS REGULAR BUDGET

Status of contributions for 1963 and prior years as at 13 May 1963

Member States	Current			Arrears				Grand Total
	1963 Assessments	Amount received	Balance due	1962	1961	1960	1959	
(United States dollars)								
Afghanistan	39,459	—	39,459.00	—	—	—	—	39,459.00
Albania	31,965	—	31,965.00	15,648.00	—	—	—	47,613.00
Argentina	782,949	—	782,949.00	611,362.00	315,815.00	—	—	1,710,126.00
Australia	1,294,537	647,268.50	647,268.50	—	—	—	—	647,268.50
Austria	359,655	52,283.00	307,372.00	—	—	—	—	307,372.00
Belgium	941,070	—	941,070.00	741,687.00	57,212.09	—	—	1,739,969.09
Bolivia	30,126	—	30,126.00	24,274.00	136.00	—	—	54,536.00
Brazil	823,116	—	823,116.00	2,391.00	—	—	—	825,507.00
Bulgaria	159,930	—	159,930.00	87,088.00	—	—	—	247,018.00
Burma	55,911	—	55,911.00	—	—	—	—	55,911.00
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic	415,674	—	415,674.00	—	—	—	—	415,674.00

Annex II (continued)

Member States	Current			Arrears				Total	Grand Total
	1963 Assessments	Amount received	Balance due	1962	1961	1960	1959		
				(United States dollars)					
Cambodia	31,965	—	31,965.00	24,746.00	—	—	—	24,746.00	56,711.00
Cameroon	31,965	31,965.00	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Canada	2,451,553	2,135,655.57	315,897.43	—	—	—	—	—	315,897.43
Central African Republic	31,965	—	31,965.00	—	—	—	—	—	31,965.00
Ceylon	71,893	—	71,893.00	—	—	—	—	—	71,893.00
Chad	31,965	31,965.00	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Chile	200,759	—	200,759.00	160,340.00	—	—	—	160,340.00	361,099.00
China	3,624,229	—	3,624,229.00	2,650,814.00	—	—	—	2,650,814.00	6,275,043.00
Colombia	207,637	—	207,637.00	—	—	—	—	—	207,637.00
Congo (Brazzaville)	31,965	—	31,965.00	26,175.00	193.60	—	—	26,368.60	58,333.60
Congo (Leopoldville)	56,018	—	56,018.00	17,669.50	—	—	—	17,669.50	73,687.50
Costa Rica	31,965	—	31,965.00	9,231.12	—	—	—	9,231.12	41,196.12
Cuba	169,817	—	169,817.00	132,913.00	61,551.00	—	—	194,464.00	364,281.00
Cyprus	31,965	—	31,965.00	—	—	—	—	—	31,965.00
Czechoslovakia	910,187	—	910,187.00	549,255.40	—	—	—	549,255.40	1,459,442.40
Dahomey	31,965	—	31,965.00	15,854.89	—	—	—	15,854.89	47,819.89
Denmark	451,230	451,230.00	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Dominican Republic	39,231	—	39,231.00	—	—	—	—	—	39,231.00
Ecuador	47,733	—	47,733.00	—	—	—	—	—	47,733.00
El Salvador	31,255	—	31,255.00	—	—	—	—	—	31,255.00
Ethiopia	39,930	39,930.00	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Federation of Malaya	103,778	103,778.00	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Finland	295,699	295,699.00	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
France	4,667,518	—	4,667,518.00	—	—	—	—	—	4,667,518.00
Gabon	31,965	—	31,965.00	—	—	—	—	—	31,965.00
Ghana	71,973	—	71,973.00	—	—	—	—	—	71,973.00
Greece	177,048	—	177,048.00	6,633.67	—	—	—	6,633.67	183,681.67
Guatemala	39,518	—	39,518.00	32,203.00	9,601.00	—	—	41,804.00	81,322.00
Guinea	31,965	—	31,965.00	25,682.00	—	—	—	25,682.00	57,647.00
Haiti	30,801	—	30,801.00	24,949.00	23,582.00	19,436	1,667	69,634.00	100,435.00
Honduras	31,687	—	31,687.00	25,835.00	3,303.00	—	—	29,138.00	60,825.00
Hungary	447,877	—	447,877.00	365,819.00	—	—	—	365,819.00	813,696.00
Iceland	31,965	31,965.00	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
India	1,559,041	1,419,041.50	139,999.50 ^a	—	—	—	—	—	139,999.50
Indonesia	359,549	—	359,549.00	—	—	—	—	—	359,549.00
Iran	156,035	—	156,035.00	—	—	—	—	—	156,035.00
Iraq	70,165	—	70,165.00	—	—	—	—	—	70,165.00
Ireland	111,823	—	111,823.00	—	—	—	—	—	111,823.00
Israel	119,893	—	119,893.00	—	—	—	—	—	119,893.00
Italy	1,789,993	—	1,789,993.00	—	—	—	—	—	1,789,993.00
Ivory Coast	31,912	—	31,912.00	—	—	—	—	—	31,912.00
Japan	1,814,206	1,814,206.00	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Jordan	31,965	—	31,965.00	—	—	—	—	—	31,965.00
Laos	31,965	—	31,965.00	24,746.00	—	—	—	24,746.00	56,711.00
Lebanon	39,956	39,956.00	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Liberia	31,965	—	31,965.00	—	—	—	—	—	31,965.00
Libya	31,965	—	31,965.00	—	—	—	—	—	31,965.00
Luxembourg	38,658	3,199.99	35,458.01	—	—	—	—	—	35,458.01
Madagascar	31,912	—	31,912.00	—	—	—	—	—	—
Mali	31,965	31,965.00	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Mexico	587,301	—	587,301.00	—	—	—	—	—	587,301.00
Morocco	111,876	—	111,876.00	—	—	—	—	—	111,876.00
Nepal	31,965	—	31,965.00	2,290.81	—	—	—	2,290.81	34,255.81
Netherlands	784,252	784,252.00	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
New Zealand	317,187	—	317,187.00	—	—	—	—	—	317,187.00
Nicaragua	31,810	—	31,810.00	25,958.00	2,831.18	—	—	28,789.18	60,599.18
Niger	31,965	—	31,965.00	1,783.00	—	—	—	1,783.00	33,748.00
Nigeria	167,814	—	167,814.00	—	—	—	—	—	167,814.00
Norway	349,562	324,676.36	24,885.64	—	—	—	—	—	24,885.64
Pakistan	335,682	—	335,682.00	140,000.00 ^a	—	—	—	140,000.00	475,682.00
Panama	30,586	—	30,586.00	—	—	—	—	—	30,586.00
Paraguay	31,965	—	31,965.00	26,113.00	20,806.50	—	—	46,919.50	78,884.50
Peru	77,673	—	77,673.00	—	—	—	—	—	77,673.00
Philippines	319,566	—	319,566.00	—	—	—	—	—	319,566.00
Poland	993,624	—	993,624.00	—	—	—	—	—	993,624.00
Portugal	127,752	—	127,752.00	—	—	—	—	—	127,752.00
Romania	255,664	26,622.00	229,042.00	—	—	—	—	—	229,042.00
Saudi Arabia	55,965	55,965.00	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Senegal	39,930	—	39,930.00	—	—	—	—	—	39,930.00
Somalia	31,965	—	31,965.00	—	—	—	—	—	31,965.00
South Africa	403,749	379,342.50	24,406.50	—	—	—	—	—	24,406.50
Spain	687,054	687,054.00	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Sudan	55,965	—	55,965.00	2,392.00	—	—	—	2,392.00	58,357.00
Sweden	1,015,280	821,251.00	194,029.00	—	—	—	—	—	194,029.00
Syria	39,947	—	39,947.00	32,356.00	—	—	—	32,356.00	72,303.00
Thailand	119,664	—	119,664.00	—	—	—	—	—	119,664.00
Togo	31,965	—	31,965.00	—	—	—	—	—	31,965.00
Tunisia	39,956	12,870.00	27,086.00	—	—	—	—	—	27,086.00
Turkey	313,292	255,342.00	57,950.00	—	—	—	—	—	57,950.00
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic	1,582,727	—	1,582,727.00	—	—	—	—	—	1,582,727.00
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	11,951,498	—	11,951,498.00	—	—	—	—	—	11,951,498.00
United Arab Republic	195,532	—	195,532.00	28,416.37 ^b	—	—	—	28,416.37	223,948.37
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	5,941,632	4,456,224.00	1,485,408.00	—	—	—	—	—	1,485,408.00
United States of America	28,582,212	2,049,479.99	26,532,732.01	—	—	—	—	—	26,532,732.01
Upper Volta	31,965	6,221.00	25,744.00	—	—	—	—	—	25,744.00
Uruguay	82,963	—	82,963.00	65,655.00	60,000	—	—	125,655.00	208,618.00
Venezuela	412,156	412,156.00	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

Annex II (continued)

Member States	Current			Arrears					Grand Total
	1963 Assessments	Amount received	Balance due	1962	1961	1960	1959	Total	
(United States dollars)									
Yemen	31,965	—	31,965.00	26,113.00	772.50	—	—	26,885.50	58,850.50
Yugoslavia	285,465	—	285,465.00	—	—	—	—	—	285,465.00
	82,255,437	17,433,475.41	64,821,961.59	5,926,393.76	555,803.87	19,436	1,667	6,503,300.63	71,325,262.22
Mauritania	32,071	—	32,071.00	26,182.00	2,686.00	—	—	28,868.00	60,939.00
Mongolia	32,071	—	32,071.00	—	—	—	—	—	32,071.00
Sierra Leone	32,071	32,071.00	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Tanganyika	32,071	—	32,071.00	26,182.00	2,686.00	—	—	28,868.00	60,939.00
TOTAL	82,383,721	17,465,546.41	64,918,174.59	5,978,757.76	561,175.87	19,436	1,667	6,561,036.63	71,479,211.22

^a This balance represents an amount withheld by the Government pending allocation of a credit of \$140,000 from the Working Capital Fund which is the subject of consultations between the Governments of India and Pakistan. In the meantime, the sum of \$140,000 is being held in a suspense account by the United Nations.

^b Balance carried forward from 1961 when the United Arab Republic and Syria were assessed jointly.

Annex III

UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE SPECIAL ACCOUNT FOR 1957-1962

Statement of assessments, payments received and balances due as at 13 May 1963

Member States	Total net assessments for 1957-1962	Payments received	Balance due 13 May 1963
(United States dollars)			
Afghanistan	45,322.50	6,000.00	39,322.50
Albania	34,108.00	—	34,108.00
Argentina	856,376.00	—	856,376.00
Australia	1,587,792.00	1,587,792.00	—
Austria	371,986.00	371,986.00	—
Belgium	1,180,820.00	1,022,042.00	158,778.00
Bolivia	38,059.00	—	38,059.00
Brazil	794,195.00	794,195.00	—
Bulgaria	129,306.00	—	129,306.00
Burma	68,389.50	68,389.50	—
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic	443,761.00	—	443,761.00
Cambodia	30,346.00	30,346.00	—
Cameroon	8,745.00	8,745.00	—
Canada	2,897,299.00	2,897,299.00	—
Central African Republic	4,983.00	4,983.00	—
Ceylon	79,603.50	79,603.50	—
Chad	4,983.00	4,206.00	777.00
Chile	214,002.00	122,200.00	91,802.00
China	4,439,836.50	250,000.00	4,189,836.50
Colombia	255,424.50	255,424.50	—
Congo (Brazzaville)	8,745.00	—	8,745.00
Congo (Leopoldville)	5,568.00	4,206.00	1,362.00
Costa Rica	30,346.00	22,717.91	7,628.09
Cuba	218,001.00	27,000.00	191,001.00
Cyprus	4,983.00	4,983.00	—
Czechoslovakia	822,112.00	—	822,112.00
Dahomey	4,983.00	3,824.07	1,158.93
Denmark	575,197.00	575,197.00	—
Dominican Republic	42,623.00	32,348.00	10,275.00
Ecuador	41,565.50	41,565.50	—
El Salvador	41,688.00	36,311.00	5,377.00
Ethiopia	65,084.50	—	65,084.50
Federation of Malaya	121,133.50	121,133.50	—
Finland	337,485.00	337,485.00	—
France	6,238,262.00	6,238,262.00	—
Gabon	4,983.00	4,983.00	—
Ghana	46,669.00	46,669.00	—
Greece	160,116.00	160,116.00	—
Guatemala	45,836.00	27,783.00	18,053.00
Guinea	19,404.00	11,185.00	8,219.00
Haiti	30,346.00	15,876.00	14,470.00
Honduras	30,346.00	21,938.00	8,408.00
Hungary	402,928.00	—	402,928.00
Iceland	30,346.00	30,346.00	—

Annex III (continued)

<i>Member States</i>	<i>Total net assessments for 1957-1962</i>	<i>Payments received</i>	<i>Balance due 13 May 1963</i>
		<i>(United States dollars)</i>	
India	2,101,367.00	2,101,367.00	—
Indonesia	369,487.50	369,487.50	—
Iran	180,341.00	180,341.00	—
Iraq	88,598.00	12,000.00	76,598.00
Ireland	145,342.00	145,342.00	—
Israel	127,476.00	127,476.00	—
Italy	2,013,436.00	2,013,436.00	—
Ivory Coast	7,085.50	7,085.50	—
Japan	1,629,896.50	1,629,896.50	—
Jordan	34,108.00	—	34,108.00
Laos	30,346.00	26,624.00	3,722.00
Lebanon	37,931.00	18,086.00	19,845.00
Liberia	30,332.00	30,332.00	—
Libya	34,108.00	—	34,108.00
Luxembourg	50,966.00	50,966.00	—
Madagascar	7,085.50	7,085.50	—
Mali	8,745.00	8,729.50	15.50
Mexico	597,028.00	70,000.00	527,028.00
Morocco	98,304.00	98,304.00	—
Nepal	30,346.00	29,410.80	935.20
Netherlands	987,664.00	987,664.00	—
New Zealand	391,279.00	391,279.00	—
Nicaragua	30,346.00	27,015.25	3,330.75
Niger	4,983.00	—	4,983.00
Nigeria	26,166.00	26,166.00	—
Norway	449,648.00	449,648.00	—
Pakistan	360,619.50	360,619.50	—
Panama	34,297.00	6,056.00	28,241.00
Paraguay	30,346.00	5,876.00	24,470.00
Peru	109,408.00	15,000.00	94,408.00
Philippines	315,232.00	314,747.00	485.00
Poland	1,269,004.00	—	1,269,004.00
Portugal	187,031.00	187,031.00	—
Romania	375,230.00	—	375,230.00
Saudi Arabia	55,309.00	—	55,309.00
Senegal	7,280.50	6,309.50	971.00
Somalia	8,745.00	8,745.00	—
South Africa	567,589.00	567,589.00	—
Spain	867,164.00	—	867,164.00
Sudan	71,118.00	—	71,118.00
Sweden	1,305,078.00	1,305,078.00	—
Syria ^a	32,667.00	—	32,667.00
Thailand	121,381.00	118,441.00	2,940.00
Togo	4,983.00	—	4,983.00
Tunisia	37,931.00	37,931.00	—
Turkey	454,718.00	454,718.00	—
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic ..	1,700,104.00	—	1,700,104.00
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	14,218,288.00	—	14,218,288.00
United Arab Republic	284,742.00	—	284,742.00
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	7,954,620.00	7,954,620.00	—
United States of America	33,701,242.00	33,701,242.00	—
Upper Volta	8,745.00	—	8,745.00
Uruguay	106,650.00	81,667.00	24,983.00
Venezuela	349,550.00	349,550.00	—
Yemen	34,108.00	—	34,108.00
Yugoslavia	267,568.50	267,568.50	—
	97,167,251.50	69,817,670.53	27,349,580.97
Mauritania	1,196.00	—	1,196.00
Mongolia	1,196.00	—	1,196.00
Sierra Leone	1,196.00	1,196.00	—
Tanganyika	1,196.00	—	1,196.00
TOTAL	97,172,035.50	69,818,866.53	27,353,168.97

^a For the years 1959, 1960 and 1961, assessments have been shown against the United Arab Republic.

Annex IV

CONGO *ad hoc* ACCOUNT FOR 1960-1962

Statement of assessments, payments received and balances due as at 13 May 1963

<i>Member States</i>	<i>Total net assessments for 1960-1962</i>	<i>Payments received</i>	<i>Balance due 13 May 1963</i>
	(United States dollars)		
Afghanistan	34,365.50	—	34,365.50
Albania	33,664.00	—	33,664.00
Argentina	649,372.00	250,000.00	399,372.00
Australia	3,966,576.00	3,966,576.00	—
Austria	993,847.00	568,875.00	424,972.00
Belgium	2,876,284.00	—	2,876,284.00
Bolivia	33,664.00	—	33,664.00
Brazil	613,022.50	202,080.00	410,942.50
Bulgaria	141,055.00	—	141,055.00
Burma	46,355.00	46,355.00	—
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic	1,108,811.00	—	1,108,811.00
Cambodia	33,664.00	6,366.00	27,298.00
Cameroon	16,452.00	16,452.00	—
Canada	7,080,341.00	7,080,341.00	—
Central African Republic	15,386.50	15,386.50	—
Ceylon	58,344.00	58,344.00	—
Chad	15,386.50	2,572.00	12,814.50
Chile	160,247.00	—	160,247.00
China	5,751,743.50	—	5,751,743.50
Colombia	177,825.50	177,825.50	—
Congo (Brazzaville)	16,452.00	—	16,452.00
Congo (Leopoldville)	20,186.50	8,990.50	11,196.00
Costa Rica	23,977.50	—	23,977.50
Cuba	205,598.00	—	205,598.00
Cyprus	15,386.50	15,386.50	—
Czechoslovakia	2,218,437.00	—	2,218,437.00
Dahomey	15,386.50	9,140.44	6,246.06
Denmark	1,348,439.00	1,348,439.00	—
Dominican Republic	42,079.00	—	42,079.00
Ecuador	35,965.50	30,774.75	5,190.75
El Salvador	28,371.00	12,108.00	16,263.00
Ethiopia	34,365.50	—	34,365.50
Federation of Malaya	95,504.00	95,504.00	—
Finland	826,664.00	826,664.00	—
France	14,186,015.00	—	14,186,015.00
Gabon	15,386.50	15,386.50	—
Ghana	45,160.00	45,160.00	—
Greece	137,869.50	137,869.50	—
Guatemala	29,971.00	—	29,971.00
Guinea	33,664.00	—	33,664.00
Haiti	23,977.50	—	23,977.50
Honduras	23,977.50	—	23,977.50
Hungary	734,270.00	—	734,270.00
Iceland	23,977.50	23,977.50	—
India	2,624,062.50	2,624,062.50	—
Indonesia	278,534.00	278,534.00	—
Iran	124,281.50	25,000.00	99,281.50
Iraq	75,744.00	—	75,744.00
Ireland	131,455.00	131,455.00	—
Israel	85,520.50	85,520.50	—
Italy	5,108,646.00	5,108,646.00	—
Ivory Coast	19,903.50	19,903.50	—
Japan	2,521,177.50	2,521,177.50	—
Jordan	33,664.00	—	33,664.00
Laos	23,977.50	6,366.00	17,611.50
Lebanon	29,971.00	17,862.98	12,108.02
Liberia	23,977.50	23,977.50	—
Libya	33,664.00	33,664.00	—
Luxembourg	48,895.00	40,946.00	7,949.00
Madagascar	19,903.50	2,573.50	17,330.00
Mali	16,452.00	2,131.00	14,321.00
Mexico	602,331.00	—	602,331.00
Morocco	117,823.00	—	117,823.00
Nepal	23,977.50	17,474.34	6,503.16
Netherlands	2,296,805.00	2,296,805.00	—
New Zealand	947,107.00	947,107.00	—
Nicaragua	23,977.50	—	23,977.50
Niger	15,386.50	—	15,386.50

Annex IV (continued)

Member States	Total net assessments for 1960-1962	Payments received	Balance due 13 May 1963
	(United States dollars)		
Nigeria	80,827.50	80,827.50	—
Norway	1,082,292.00	1,082,292.00	—
Pakistan	242,974.00	242,974.00	—
Panama	23,977.50	—	23,977.50
Paraguay	23,977.50	9,686.50	14,291.00
Peru	64,337.50	—	64,337.50
Philippines	252,956.50	252,956.50	—
Poland	1,852,915.00	—	1,852,915.00
Portugal	161,919.00	—	161,919.00
Romania	757,181.00	—	757,181.00
Saudi Arabia	52,095.00	—	52,095.00
Senegal	21,503.50	13,509.50	7,994.00
Somalia	16,452.00	8,944.93	7,507.07
South Africa	1,249,477.00	—	1,249,477.00
Spain	771,483.00	—	771,483.00
Sudan	37,565.50	37,565.50	—
Sweden	3,088,949.00	3,088,949.00	—
Syria ^a	7,955.00	—	7,955.00
Thailand	95,909.50	70,444.50	25,465.00
Togo	15,386.50	—	15,386.50
Tunisia	29,971.00	29,971.00	—
Turkey	323,266.00	323,266.00	—
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic	4,237,317.00	—	4,237,317.00
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	32,052,762.00	—	32,052,762.00
United Arab Republic	258,155.00	—	258,155.00
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	17,532,224.00	17,532,224.00	—
United States of America	73,565,272.00	73,565,272.00	—
Upper Volta	16,452.00	—	16,452.00
Uruguay	70,332.00	—	70,332.00
Venezuela	302,916.50	—	302,916.50
Yemen	33,664.00	—	33,664.00
Yugoslavia	299,358.00	—	299,358.00
	197,836,546.00	125,482,662.94	72,353,883.06
Mauritania	7,277.00	—	7,277.00
Mongolia	7,277.00	—	7,277.00
Sierra Leone	7,277.00	7,277.00	—
Tanganyika	7,277.00	—	7,277.00
TOTAL	197,865,654.00	125,489,939.94	72,375,714.06

^a For the years 1960 and 1961, assessments have been shown against the United Arab Republic.

Annex V

SUMMARY OF CONTRIBUTIONS DUE AS AT 13 MAY 1963

(In United States dollars)

Member States	Arrears			Total arrears	Current assessments			Grand total due
	Regular budget	United Nations Emergency Force Special Account	Congo ad hoc account		Working Capital Fund	Regular budget	Total current assessments	
Afghanistan	—	39,322.50	34,365.50	73,688.00	7,392.00	39,459.00	46,851.00	120,539.00
Albania	15,648.00	34,108.00	33,664.00	83,420.00	6,000.00	31,965.00	37,965.00	121,385.00
Argentina	927,177.00	856,376.00	399,372.00	2,182,925.00	150,421.00	782,949.00	933,370.00	3,116,295.00
Australia	—	—	—	—	—	647,268.50	647,268.50	647,268.50
Austria	—	—	424,972.00	424,972.00	—	307,372.00	307,372.00	732,344.00
Belgium	798,899.09	158,778.00	2,876,284.00	3,833,961.09	178,921.00	941,070.00	1,119,991.00	4,953,952.09
Bolivia	24,410.00	38,059.00	33,664.00	96,133.00	6,000.00	30,126.00	36,126.00	132,259.00
Brazil	2,391.00	—	410,942.50	413,333.50	154,609.00	823,116.00	977,725.00	1,391,058.50
Bulgaria	87,088.00	129,306.00	141,055.00	357,449.00	30,432.00	159,930.00	190,362.00	547,811.00
Burma	—	—	—	—	10,393.00	55,911.00	66,304.00	66,304.00
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic	—	443,761.00	1,108,811.00	1,552,572.00	78,539.00	415,674.00	494,213.00	2,046,785.00
Cambodia	24,746.00	—	27,298.00	52,044.00	6,000.00	31,965.00	37,965.00	90,009.00
Cameroon	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Canada	—	—	—	—	468,109.00	315,897.43	784,006.43	784,006.43
Central African Republic	—	—	—	—	6,431.00	31,965.00	38,396.00	38,396.00
Ceylon	—	—	—	—	13,392.00	71,893.00	85,285.00	85,285.00

Annex V (continued)

Member States	Arrears				Current assessments			
	Regular budget	United Nations	Congo ad hoc account	Total arrears	Working Capital Fund	Regular budget	Total current assessments	Grand total due
		Emergency Force Special Account						
Chad	—	777.00	12,814.50	13,591.50	—	—	—	13,591.50
Chile	160,340.00	91,802.00	160,247.00	412,389.00	38,892.00	200,759.00	239,651.00	652,040.00
China	2,650,814.0	4,189,836.50	5,751,743.50	12,592,394.00	680,752.00	3,624,229.00	4,304,981.00	16,897,375.00
Colombia	—	—	—	—	38,460.00	207,637.00	246,097.00	246,097.00
Congo (Brazzaville)	26,368.60	8,745.00	16,452.00	51,565.60	6,431.00	31,965.00	38,396.00	89,961.60
Congo (Leopoldville)	17,669.50	1,362.00	11,196.00	30,227.50	11,256.00	56,018.00	67,274.00	97,501.50
Costa Rica	9,231.12	7,628.09	23,977.50	40,836.71	6,000.00	31,965.00	37,965.00	78,801.71
Cuba	194,464.00	191,001.00	205,598.00	591,063.00	32,676.00	169,817.00	202,493.00	793,556.00
Cyprus	—	—	—	—	—	31,965.00	31,965.00	31,965.00
Czechoslovakia	549,255.40	822,112.00	2,218,437.00	3,589,804.40	178,738.00	910,187.00	1,088,925.00	4,678,729.40
Dahomey	15,854.89	1,158.93	6,246.06	23,259.88	6,431.00	31,965.00	38,396.00	61,655.88
Denmark	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Dominican Republic	—	10,275.00	42,079.00	52,354.00	7,500.00	39,231.00	46,731.00	99,085.00
Ecuador	—	—	5,190.75	5,190.75	3,401.34	47,733.00	51,134.34	56,325.09
El Salvador	—	5,377.00	16,263.00	21,640.00	5,891.00	31,255.00	37,146.00	58,786.00
Ethiopia	—	65,084.50	34,365.50	99,450.00	—	—	—	99,450.00
Federation of Malaya	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Finland	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
France	—	—	14,186,015.00	14,186,015.00	886,036.00	4,667,518.00	5,553,554.00	19,739,569.00
Gabon	—	—	—	—	6,431.00	31,965.00	38,396.00	38,396.00
Ghana	—	—	—	—	13,715.00	71,973.00	85,688.00	85,688.00
Greece	6,633.67	—	—	6,633.67	34,500.00	177,048.00	211,548.00	218,181.67
Guatemala	41,804.00	18,053.00	29,971.00	89,828.00	7,500.00	39,518.00	47,018.00	136,846.00
Guinea	25,682.00	8,219.00	33,664.00	67,565.00	6,431.00	31,965.00	38,396.00	105,961.00
Haiti	69,634.00	14,470.00	23,977.50	108,081.50	6,000.00	30,801.00	36,801.00	144,882.50
Honduras	29,138.00	8,408.00	23,977.50	61,523.50	6,000.00	31,687.00	37,687.00	99,210.50
Hungary	365,819.00	402,928.00	734,270.00	1,503,017.00	—	447,877.00	447,877.00	1,950,894.00
Iceland	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
India	—	—	—	—	—	139,999.50	139,999.50	139,999.50
Indonesia	—	—	—	—	67,284.00	359,549.00	426,833.00	426,833.00
Iran	—	—	99,281.50	99,281.50	29,892.00	156,035.00	185,927.00	285,208.50
Iraq	—	76,598.00	75,744.00	152,342.00	13,500.00	70,165.00	83,665.00	236,007.00
Ireland	—	—	—	—	20,784.00	111,823.00	132,607.00	132,607.00
Israel	—	—	—	—	20,216.00	119,893.00	140,109.00	140,109.00
Italy	—	—	—	—	335,892.00	1,789,993.00	2,125,885.00	2,125,885.00
Ivory Coast	—	—	—	—	6,431.00	31,912.00	38,343.00	38,343.00
Japan	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Jordan	—	34,108.00	33,664.00	67,772.00	6,000.00	31,965.00	37,965.00	105,737.00
Laos	24,746.00	3,722.00	17,611.50	46,079.50	6,000.00	31,965.00	37,965.00	84,044.50
Lebanon	—	19,845.00	12,108.02	31,953.02	—	—	—	31,953.02
Liberia	—	—	—	—	6,000.00	31,965.00	37,965.00	37,965.00
Libya	—	34,108.00	—	34,108.00	6,000.00	31,965.00	37,965.00	72,073.00
Luxembourg	—	—	7,949.00	7,949.00	—	35,458.01	35,458.01	43,407.01
Madagascar	—	—	17,330.00	17,330.00	—	—	—	17,330.00
Mali	—	15.50	14,321.00	14,336.50	—	—	—	14,336.50
Mexico	—	527,028.00	602,331.00	1,129,359.00	111,324.00	587,301.00	698,625.00	1,827,984.00
Morocco	—	—	117,823.00	117,823.00	19,639.00	111,876.00	131,515.00	249,338.00
Nepal	2,290.81	935.20	6,503.16	9,729.17	6,000.00	31,965.00	37,965.00	47,694.17
Netherlands	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
New Zealand	—	—	—	—	61,392.00	317,187.00	378,579.00	378,579.00
Nicaragua	28,789.18	3,330.75	23,977.50	56,097.43	6,000.00	31,810.00	37,810.00	93,907.43
Niger	1,783.00	4,983.00	15,386.50	22,152.50	6,431.00	31,965.00	38,396.00	60,548.50
Nigeria	—	—	—	—	33,767.00	167,814.00	201,581.00	201,581.00
Norway	—	—	—	—	—	24,885.64	24,885.64	24,885.64
Pakistan	140,000.00	—	—	140,000.00	63,216.00	335,682.00	398,898.00	538,898.00
Panama	—	28,241.00	23,977.50	52,218.50	5,969.04	30,586.00	36,555.04	88,773.54
Paraguay	46,919.50	24,470.00	14,291.00	85,680.50	6,000.00	31,965.00	37,965.00	123,645.50
Peru	—	94,408.00	64,337.50	158,745.50	14,892.00	77,673.00	92,565.00	251,310.50
Philippines	—	485.00	—	485.00	59,677.00	319,566.00	379,243.00	379,243.00
Poland	—	1,269,004.00	1,852,915.00	3,121,919.00	191,030.00	993,624.00	1,184,654.00	4,306,573.00
Portugal	—	—	161,919.00	161,919.00	23,569.00	127,752.00	151,321.00	313,240.00
Romania	—	375,230.00	757,181.00	1,132,411.00	—	229,042.00	229,042.00	1,361,453.00
Saudi Arabia	—	55,309.00	52,095.00	107,404.00	—	—	—	107,404.00
Senegal	—	971.00	7,994.00	8,965.00	4,747.00	39,930.00	44,677.00	53,642.00
Somalia	—	—	7,507.07	7,507.07	6,431.00	31,965.00	38,396.00	45,903.07
South Africa	—	—	1,249,477.00	1,249,477.00	—	24,406.50	24,406.50	1,273,883.50
Spain	—	867,164.00	771,483.00	1,638,647.00	—	—	—	1,638,647.00
Sudan	2,392.00	71,118.00	—	73,510.00	10,608.00	55,965.00	66,573.00	140,083.00
Sweden	—	—	—	—	—	194,029.00	194,029.00	194,029.00
Syria	32,356.00	32,667.00	7,955.00	72,978.00	7,464.00	39,947.00	47,411.00	120,389.00
Thailand	—	2,940.00	25,465.00	28,405.00	24,000.00	119,664.00	143,664.00	172,069.00
Togo	—	4,983.00	15,386.50	20,369.50	6,431.00	31,965.00	38,396.00	58,765.50
Tunisia	—	—	—	—	—	27,086.00	27,086.00	27,086.00
Turkey	—	—	—	—	—	57,950.00	57,950.00	57,950.00
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic	—	1,700,104.00	4,237,317.00	5,937,421.00	298,943.00	1,582,727.00	1,881,670.00	7,819,091.00
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	—	14,218,288.00	32,052,762.00	46,271,050.00	2,260,069.00	11,951,498.00	14,211,567.00	60,482,617.00
United Arab Republic	28,416.37	284,742.00	258,155.00	571,313.37	37,320.00	195,532.00	232,852.00	804,165.37
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	—	—	—	—	—	1,485,408.00	1,485,408.00	1,485,408.00
United States of America	—	—	—	—	4,797,713.00	26,532,732.01	31,330,445.01	31,330,445.01
Upper Volta	—	8,745.00	16,452.00	25,197.00	—	25,744.00	25,744.00	50,941.00
Uruguay	125,655.00	24,983.00	70,332.00	220,970.00	16,391.00	82,963.00	99,354.00	320,324.00
Venezuela	—	—	302,916.50	302,916.50	—	—	—	302,916.50
Yemen	26,885.50	34,108.00	33,664.00	94,657.50	6,000.00	31,965.00	37,965.00	132,622.50
Yugoslavia	—	—	299,358.00	299,358.00	—	285,465.00	285,465.00	584,823.00
Total	6,503,300.63	27,349,580.97	72,353,883.06	106,206,764.66	11,702,702.38	64,821,961.59	76,524,663.97	182,731,428.63

Annex V (continued)

Member States	Arrears				Current assessments			Grand total due
	Regular budget	United Nations Emergency Force Special Account	Congo ad hoc account	Total arrears	Working Capital Fund	Regular budget	Total current assessments	
Mauritania	28,868.00	1,196.00	7,277.00	37,341.00	16,000.00	32,071.00	48,071.00	85,412.00
Mongolia	—	1,196.00	7,277.00	8,473.00	16,000.00	32,071.00	48,071.00	56,544.00
Sierra Leone	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Tanganyika	28,868.00	1,196.00	7,277.00	37,341.00	16,000.00	32,071.00	48,071.00	85,412.00
TOTAL	6,561,036.63	27,353,168.97	72,375,714.06	106,289,919.66	11,750,702.38	64,918,174.59	76,668,876.97	182,958,796.63

Annex VI

UNITED NATIONS BONDS

As at 13 May 1963

States	Purchases dollar equivalent	Pledges dollar equivalent
Afghanistan	25,000	—
Australia	4,000,000	—
Austria	—	900,000
Brazil	—	100,000
Burma	100,000	—
Cambodia	—	5,000
Cameroon	9,569	—
Canada	6,240,000	—
Ceylon	25,000	—
China	500,000	—
Cyprus	—	26,175
Denmark	2,500,000	—
Ecuador	—	12,000
Ethiopia	—	200,000
Federal Republic of Germany	10,000,000	—
Federation of Malaya	340,000	—
Finland	1,480,000	—
Ghana	—	100,000
Greece	10,000	—
Honduras	10,000	—
Iceland	80,000	—
India	2,000,000	—
Indonesia	200,000	—
Iran	250,000	250,000
Iraq	—	100,000
Ireland	300,000	—
Israel	200,000	—
Italy	8,960,000	—
Ivory Coast	60,000	—
Japan	5,000,000	—
Jordan	25,000	—
Kuwait	1,000,000	—
Lebanon	8,271	—
Liberia	—	200,000
Luxembourg	100,000	—
Mauritania	4,082	—
Morocco	280,000	—
Netherlands	2,020,000	—
New Zealand	800,000	200,000
Nigeria	1,000,000	—
Norway	1,800,000	—
Pakistan	500,000	—
Panama	—	25,000
Philippines	—	750,000
Republic of Korea	400,000	—
Republic of Viet-Nam	10,000	—
Sierra Leone	28,000	—
Saudi Arabia ^a	—	50,000
Sudan	50,000	—
Sweden	5,800,000	—
Switzerland	1,900,000	—
Tanganyika ^a	—	2,800
Thailand	160,000	—

Annex VI (continued)

States	Purchases dollar equivalent	Pledges dollar equivalent
Togo	10,000	—
Tunisia	485,000	—
Turkey	—	100,000
United Arab Republic	—	250,000
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	12,000,000	—
Venezuela	—	300,000
Yugoslavia	200,000	—
	70,869,922	3,570,975
United States of America	65,215,840	5,654,082
	136,085,762	9,225,057
		3,570,975 ^b United States possible additional pledge
	12,796,032	12,796,032: Possible total pledges
Possible total purchases and pledges	148,881,794	

^a Offers to subscribe made subsequent to 31 December 1962.

^b Maximum additional United States pledge when present outstanding pledges of other countries are actually purchased.

DOCUMENT A/C.5/975

**Letter dated 13 May 1963 from the Permanent Representative of Albania to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General**

[Original text: French]
[15 May 1963]

With reference to resolution 1861 (XVII) adopted by the General Assembly on 20 December 1962 on the budget of the United Nations for the financial year 1963, which includes part of the expenditures for the maintenance of United Nations forces in the Near East and in the Congo, I have the honour to bring to your attention the following:

The position of the Government of the People's Republic of Albania with regard to the organization and financing of United Nations forces in the Near East and in the Congo is now well known. It is the view of the Albanian Government that the sending of those forces was a flagrant violation of the Charter and that the costs of their maintenance should be borne by the imperialist Powers which, by their aggressive actions in those areas, have created situations which are dangerous not only to the peoples of those countries but also to international peace and security.

As early as 1956, at the eleventh session of the General Assembly, the head of the Albanian delegation stated that the expenditure necessitated by the maintenance of United Nations forces should be borne by the Governments of the countries which had, by their aggression, given rise to that expenditure. Similarly, with regard to the costs of the United Nations forces in the Congo, the Albanian delegation declared at the sixteenth session that such costs should be borne by the imperialist Powers, primarily the United States of America, which, in order to achieve their colonialist aims in the Congo, had created a dangerous situation in that country and attempted to cloak their aggressive acts under the United Nations flag.

At the seventeenth session of the General Assembly the head of the Albanian delegation declared: "The Albanian Government reiterates its position which is already known: it does not intend to share in any way in the costs of the United Nations forces in the Congo and the Near East; only the imperialist and colonialist aggressors who are responsible for this situation, should pay".³⁹ That remains the unaltered view of the Government of the People's Republic of Albania on this question.

The development of events in the Congo has shown that the United Nations flag has been used to cloak the military intervention of the imperialist Powers, headed by the United States of America, in order to exploit the wealth of the Congo, to trample underfoot the freedom and independence of the Congolese people, to overthrow by force the legitimate Government of Patrice Lumumba, whom they actually murdered, and to install a neo-colonialist régime causing fresh suffering to the Congolese people.

The inclusion of expenditure on the United Nations forces in the Congo in the regular budget of the United Nations is entirely unlawful. The General Assembly of the United Nations itself, in its resolution 1732 (XVI) of 20 December 1961, recognized that "the extraordinary expenses for the United Nations operations in the Congo are essentially different in nature from the expenses of the Organization under the regular budget". That is in line with the content of Article 17 of the Charter. The relevant documents of the

³⁹ *Ibid.*, Seventeenth Session, Plenary Meetings, 1136th meeting, para. 155.

San Francisco Conference give us incontestable proof that Committee I of Commission II at that Conference considered that the nature of United Nations expenditure provided for in Article 17 of the Charter is entirely different from that of the expenditure provided for in Article 43.

In the light of the foregoing, it is obvious that the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice⁴⁰ to the effect that the expenditure on the maintenance of United Nations forces in the Middle East and the Congo is of the same nature as United Nations expenditure provided for in Article 17 of the Charter is unfounded, contrary to the Charter, and unacceptable, and that, consequently, quite apart from its non-binding nature, it cannot be used as justification for including this expenditure in the regular budget of the United Nations and spreading it over the assessments of Member States.

The Government of the People's Republic of Albania, which has roundly condemned the machinations of the United States imperialists and of the other Powers

⁴⁰ *Certain expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962: I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 151, transmitted to the Members of the General Assembly by a note of the Secretary-General (A/5161 and Corr.1).*

responsible for the aggression in the Middle East and the Congo, considers resolution 1861 (XVII) to be unlawful, has expressed its disagreement with it, and does not regard itself as bound by its terms. The Albanian Government thus considers all measures which have been taken, or which may be taken in the future, to cover this expenditure by increasing the assessments of Member States, to be unacceptable, and it wishes to declare once more that expenditure resulting from the aggressive acts of the imperialist Powers in the areas mentioned above must be borne by the Governments of the Powers in question, and that, as it recognizes only the obligations incumbent upon it in its capacity as a Member of the United Nations, it will deduct from its assessment for 1963 the portion relating to the maintenance of the United Nations forces in the Middle East and the Congo, and will pay only that part of the assessment for which it is justly responsible.

I should be grateful if you would circulate copies of this letter to all Member States.

(Signed) Halim BUDO
Permanent Representative of the
People's Republic of Albania
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT A/5438

Report of the Fifth Committee

[Original text: English]
[26 June 1963]

1. At a series of meetings held between 15 May and 26 June 1963 (984th to 1005th meetings) the Fifth Committee considered item 7 of the agenda entitled "Consideration of the financial situation of the Organization in the light of the report of the Working Group on the Examination of the Administrative and Budgetary Procedures of the United Nations".

2. The Committee had before it the following documentation:

(a) The report of the Working Group on the examination of the Administrative and Budgetary Procedures of the United Nations established in terms of General Assembly resolution 1854 B (XVII) of 19 December 1962 (A/5407) and related papers (A/AC.113/1-27);

(b) The report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations financial position and prospects (A/AC.5/974);

(c) The report by the Secretary-General on the cost estimates for 1963 for the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) (A/5416) and the related report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (A/5421);

(d) The report by the Secretary-General on the cost estimates for 1963 for the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) (A/5187) and the related report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (A/5274).

THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP (A/5407)

3. This report was presented in two parts. The first concerned its study, in terms of operative paragraphs

1, 2 and 3 of General Assembly resolution 1854 B (XVII), of special methods for financing peace-keeping operations involving heavy expenditures, such as those for the Congo and the Middle East, including a possible special scale of assessments; the second dealt with its examination, in compliance with operative paragraph 4 of the same resolution, of the situation arising from the arrears of some Member States in their payment of contributions for financing peace-keeping operations.

4. On the subject of a special method for the financing of peace-keeping operations, the Working Group indicated that it had not in the time at its disposal been able to arrive at any generally agreed recommendation; however, it had found it possible to identify the various individual positions taken in the Working Group by certain members or groups of members (see A/5407, para. 9) as well as the views of many members on certain principles on which the financing of future peace-keeping operations could appropriately be based (*Ibid.*, para. 10). In an ensuing section of the report (*Ibid.*, paras. 11-23) were set forth the individual views of a number of members on the manner in which certain of the latter principles or aspects thereof should be applied. Finally, an indication was given (*Ibid.*, para. 24) of the various views expressed in regard to the possibility of an *ad hoc* method for the financing of ONUC and UNEF.

5. In the second part of the report of the Working Group (*Ibid.*, paras. 25-27), dealing with the arrears in the payment of contributions to the financing of peace-keeping operations, the terms of a paper (A/AC.113/19) submitted by Argentina, Brazil, Cameroon, India, Nigeria and Pakistan were quoted and an indication

given of the degree of support for the proposals in question, or otherwise, on the part of other Members of the Group.

REPORT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS FINANCIAL POSITION AND PROSPECTS (A/AC.5/974)

6. In his report the Secretary-General indicated that the deficit between the Organization's available cash resources and its current liabilities, which totalled \$74.1 million at the end of 1962, had increased to \$93.9 million as at 31 March 1963. The deterioration in the financial position was attributed principally to the large outstanding balances of assessed contributions for ONUC and UNEF, to the fact that no assessments had been levied to cover the costs of these operations since 30 June 1962, and to the customary delay in the early months of the year in collecting assessments for the current year's regular budget. It was further indicated that if the same factors continued to prevail and on the basis of certain assumptions concerning the estimated level of expenses for UNEF and ONUC and the extent of sales of United Nations bonds, the deficit might increase to \$101.4 million as at 30 June and \$140 million at 31 December 1963. On the latter date the Organization's cash resources would have decreased to about \$10 million or less than one month's requirements. Accordingly, the Secretary-General believed it imperative that the General Assembly take action at its fourth special session to ensure that the Organization would have the necessary cash resources to defray its continuing operations, either by assessing the costs of the operations among Members or by such other methods as the General Assembly may wish to adopt.

7. The Secretary-General proceeded to report on the results of certain actions that had been taken to secure the liquidation of arrears and the early payment of current contributions. There were definite indications of progressive improvement as far as the collection of arrear contributions was concerned. Nevertheless, as at 13 May 1963 the total of all contributions due, inclusive of unpaid 1963 assessments and advances to the Working Capital Fund as well as arrears for prior years, amounted to \$182,958,797. While the arrears situation remained a matter of serious concern, the Secretary-General was not unhopeful that the coming months would see an accelerated rate of improvement at least in the number of States which were in default. He was encouraged in this belief by the assurances he had received from some Governments of their intention to liquidate in full past obligations as soon as the necessary legislative processes could be completed, and by the desire expressed by some others who found themselves in real financial difficulties, to work out appropriate modalities, within the letter and spirit of the Charter, for bringing the payments due up to date as soon as possible.

8. With regard to the issue of United Nations bonds under resolution 1739 (XVI) the Secretary-General reported a grand total of purchases and pledges of \$148,881,794 out of the total of \$200 million authorized for issue up to 31 December 1962. In the belief that a number of Governments would still wish to subscribe if the subscription period were extended, the Secretary-General recommended such extension to 31 December 1963. In the event his proposal were approved, he suggested a decision in the following form:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its decision, in paragraph 1 of General Assembly resolution 1739 (XVI) of 20 December 1961, to authorize the Secretary-General to issue United Nations bonds in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in the annex to that resolution,

Decides to amend paragraph 8 of the annex to General Assembly resolution 1739 (XVI) to read as follows:

"8. The bonds may be sold in whole or in part from time to time until 31 December 1963."

REPORTS ON THE COST ESTIMATES FOR 1963 FOR THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN THE CONGO (A/5416, A/5421)

9. In his report to the General Assembly at its fourth special session, the Secretary-General indicated that, in view of the situation that had prevailed in the Congo since January 1963, he had been able to schedule during the year substantial reductions in the military strength of the Force (see A/5416, para. 3). In consequence, the estimated costs in 1963 could be kept to \$83,745,000, representing a reduction of approximately \$36 million, or 30 per cent, from the ONUC expenditure levels during the previous two years when costs totalled some \$120 million annually. Of the total of approximately \$84 million, it was estimated that \$51 million would be required during the first half of 1963 and \$33 million during the last six months. Since the General Assembly, in terms of resolution 1865 (XVII) of 20 December 1962, had authorized the Secretary-General to expend up to 30 June 1963 at an average monthly rate not to exceed \$10 million for the continuing cost of the operations, it would be necessary for the Assembly at its fourth special session to extend the authority for such expenditures after 30 June if the objectives of the Security Council resolutions relating to the Congo were to be achieved. The Secretary-General ventured to suggest, in this connexion, that the General Assembly might wish to authorize him to expend during the period from 1 July 1963 to 31 December 1963 at an average monthly rate not to exceed \$5.5 million for the continuing costs of ONUC, provided that such expenditures did not result in total expenditures for the year 1963 in excess of \$84 million.

10. The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions in its report (A/5421) recommended approval of the Secretary-General's estimates, while expressing the earnest hope that his resolute efforts would enable him to keep actual expenses well below that level.

REPORTS ON THE COST ESTIMATES FOR 1963 FOR THE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE (A/5187, A/5274)

11. In his report on UNEF, submitted to the General Assembly at its seventeenth session (A/5187), the Secretary-General submitted cost estimates for the financial year 1 January to 31 December 1963, in the total amount of \$19,256,870. The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, in its related report (A/5274), recommended a reduction of \$256,870 or an appropriation of \$19 million for 1963. At the same time the Committee expressed the hope that every effort would continue to be made to keep costs for the operation at the lowest possible level and suggested that a figure of \$18.5 million would represent

a reasonable target for this purpose. The General Assembly subsequently decided in the case of UNEF, as in that of ONUC, to refrain from appropriation action having in mind the terms of resolution 1854 B (XVIII), re-establishing the Working Group on the Examination of the Administrative and Budgetary Procedures of the United Nations to study special methods for financing the peace-keeping operations of the United Nations involving heavy expenditures. Instead, the Secretary-General was authorized, in terms of resolution 1864 (XVII) of 20 December 1962, to expend up to 30 June 1963 at an average monthly rate not to exceed \$1,580,000 for the continuing cost of UNEF. This represented a somewhat lower rate of expenditure than that envisaged under the annual amount of \$19 million recommended by the Advisory Committee.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

12. In the course of fourteen meetings held between 15 May and 14 June 1963 (984th-998th meetings), members of the Committee presented their general views on the item under discussion. This debate was preceded by opening statements by the Secretary-General and by Mr. Adebo (Nigeria), Chairman of the Working Group, who introduced the latter's report (A/5407). In the course of a further five meetings, held between 20 and 25 June (999th-1004th meetings) certain members expressed their general views in conjunction with their explanations of vote on the various draft resolutions before the Committee. The general discussion of the various matters considered by the Committee, including the resolutions which were introduced, and the views of the delegations participating in the discussions are summarized in the official records of the Committee (A/C.5/SR.984-1005).

DRAFT RESOLUTIONS

13. The following formal proposals were submitted for the consideration of the Committee:

(a) A draft resolution (A/C.5/L.782 and Add.1) on general principles to serve as guidelines for the sharing of the costs of future peace-keeping operations involving heavy expenditures, submitted by Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Federation of Malaya, Gabon, Ghana, Honduras, Iceland, India, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Liberia, Mauritania, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Sweden, Tanganyika, Uruguay, Venezuela;

(b) A draft resolution (A/C.5/L.783 and Add.1) on cost estimates and financing of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) for the period 1 July to 31 December 1963, submitted by Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Federation of Malaya, Gabon, Honduras, Iceland, India, Italy, Japan, Liberia, Mauritania, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Sweden, Tanganyika, Uruguay, Venezuela;

(c) A draft resolution (A/C.5/L.784 and Add.1) on cost estimates and financing of the United Nations Operation in the Congo for the period 1 July to 31 December 1963, submitted by Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Federation of Malaya, Gabon, Honduras, Iceland, India, Italy, Japan,

Liberia, Mauritania, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Sweden, Tanganyika, Uruguay, Venezuela;

(d) A draft resolution (A/C.5/L.785 and Add.1 and 2) on the payment of arrears in respect of assessed contributions to the United Nations Emergency Force Special Account and the *ad hoc* Account for the United Nations Operation in the Congo submitted by Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Federation of Malaya, Gabon, Honduras, Iceland, India, Italy, Japan, Liberia, Mauritania, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Sweden, Tanganyika, Uruguay, Venezuela;

(e) A draft resolution (A/C.5/L.786 and Add.1) on the terms and conditions governing the issue of United Nations bonds, submitted by Cameroon, Canada, Denmark, Federation of Malaya, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Tunisia, Uganda;

(f) A draft resolution (A/C.5/L.787) on the establishment of a peace fund, submitted by Cyprus, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Nigeria; subsequently revised (A/C.5/L.787/Rev.1) to reflect the addition of Pakistan as a co-sponsor and the acceptance by the sponsors of an amendment to the last phrase of the fifth preambular paragraph proposed by the representative of Sweden, namely, that the words "constitutes one of the best means of furthering this objective" be replaced by "is worthy of study as a means of furthering this objective".

(g) A draft resolution (A/C.5/L.788 and Add.1) on the continuation of the Working Group on the Examination of the Administrative and Budgetary Procedures of the United Nations re-established under General Assembly resolution 1854 B (XVII), submitted by Cameroon, Cyprus, Federation of Malaya, Ghana, Guinea, Uruguay.

14. The texts of these draft resolutions, which were adopted without amendment at the 1004th meeting, appear as draft resolutions I to VII in paragraph 17 of this report.

15. The results of the voting were:

(a) Draft resolution A/C.5/L.782 and Add.1 was adopted by a roll-call vote of 91 in favour, 13 against and 3 abstentions as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Finland, Gabon, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Syria, Tanganyika, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia.

Against: Albania, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France, Hungary, Madagascar, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Abstaining: Belgium, Burundi, Portugal.

(b) Draft resolution (A/C.5/L.783 and Add.1) was adopted by a roll-call vote of 79 in favour, 11 against and 17 abstentions as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Finland, Gabon, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mauritania, Mexico, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sweden, Tanganyika, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.

Against: Albania, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Abstaining: Algeria, Belgium, Burundi, France, Haiti, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Mali, Morocco, Peru, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, United Arab Republic, Yemen.

(c) Draft resolution A/C.5/L.784 and Add.1 was adopted by a roll-call vote of 79 in favour, 12 against and 16 abstentions as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Finland, Gabon, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Sweden, Tanganyika, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela.

Against: Albania, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Abstaining: Algeria, Belgium, Chad, Haiti, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Madagascar, Mali, Peru, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Republic, Yemen, Yugoslavia.

(d) Draft resolution A/C.5/L.785 and Add.1 and 2 was adopted by a roll-call vote of 77 in favour, 12 against and 19 abstentions as follows:

In favour: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Finland, Gabon, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sweden, Tanganyika, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela.

Against: Albania, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Abstaining: Afghanistan, Algeria, Belgium, Chad, Haiti, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Madagascar, Mali, Peru, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sudan, Syria, United Arab Republic, Yemen, Yugoslavia.

(e) Draft resolution A/C.5/L.786 and Add.1 was adopted by a roll-call vote of 90 in favour, 12 against and 6 abstentions as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Finland, Gabon, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Sweden, Syria, Tanganyika, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia.

Against: Albania, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Abstaining: Belgium, Haiti, Mexico, Peru, Portugal, Spain.

(f) Draft resolution A/C.5/L.787/Rev.1 was adopted by a roll-call vote of 92 in favour, 12 against and 4 abstentions as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Finland, Gabon, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan,

Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Syria, Tanganyika, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia.

Against: Albania, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Abstaining: Belgium, Mexico, Peru, Portugal.

(g) Draft resolution A/C.5/L.788 and Add.1 was adopted by a roll-call vote of 94 in favour, 12 against and 2 abstentions as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Finland, Gabon, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Syria, Tanganyika, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia.

Against: Albania, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Abstaining: Belgium, Portugal.

16. After the vote the representative of Paraguay explained that had he been present during the voting, he would have expressed himself in favour of all seven draft resolutions. The representative of Togo stated that he was not able to participate in the voting at the Committee stage.

Recommendations of the Fifth Committee

17. The Committee therefore recommends to the General Assembly the adoption of the following draft resolutions:

I

GENERAL PRINCIPLES TO SERVE AS GUIDELINES FOR THE SHARING OF THE COSTS OF FUTURE PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS INVOLVING HEAVY EXPENDITURES

[Text adopted by the General Assembly without change. See "Action taken by the General Assembly" below.]

II

UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE: COST ESTIMATES AND FINANCING FOR THE PERIOD 1 JULY TO 31 DECEMBER 1963

[Text adopted by the General Assembly without change. See "Action taken by the General Assembly" below.]

III

UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN THE CONGO: COST ESTIMATES AND FINANCING FOR THE PERIOD 1 JULY TO 31 DECEMBER 1963

[Text adopted by the General Assembly without change. See "Action taken by the General Assembly" below.]

IV

PAYMENT OF ARREARS IN RESPECT OF ASSESSED CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE SPECIAL ACCOUNT AND THE *ad hoc* ACCOUNT FOR THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN THE CONGO

[Text adopted by the General Assembly without change. See "Action taken by the General Assembly" below.]

V

TERMS AND CONDITIONS GOVERNING THE ISSUE OF UNITED NATIONS BONDS

[Text adopted by the General Assembly without change. See "Action taken by the General Assembly" below.]

VI

ESTABLISHMENT OF A PEACE FUND

[Text adopted by the General Assembly without change. See "Action taken by the General Assembly" below.]

VII

CONTINUATION OF THE WORKING GROUP ON THE EXAMINATION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND BUDGETARY PROCEDURES OF THE UNITED NATIONS

[Text adopted by the General Assembly without change. See "Action taken by the General Assembly" below.]

ACTION TAKEN BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

At its 1205th plenary meeting, on 27 June 1963, the General Assembly adopted draft resolutions I to VII submitted by the Fifth Committee (A/5438, para. 17). For the final texts see resolutions 1874 (S-IV), 1875 (S-IV), 1876 (S-IV), 1877 (S-IV), 1878 (S-IV), 1879 (S-IV) and 1880 (S-IV), respectively, below.

Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly

1874 (S-IV). GENERAL PRINCIPLES TO SERVE AS GUIDELINES FOR THE SHARING OF THE COSTS OF FUTURE PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS INVOLVING HEAVY EXPENDITURES

The General Assembly,

Noting with appreciation the report of the Working Group on the Examination of the Administrative and Budgetary Procedures of the United Nations (A/5407) submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 1854 B (XVII) of 19 December 1962,

Recognizing the necessity of sharing equitably the financial burden of peace-keeping operations to the extent not otherwise covered by agreed arrangements,

1. *Affirms* that the following principles, *inter alia*, shall serve as guidelines for the equitable sharing, by assessed or voluntary contributions or a combination thereof, of the costs of peace-keeping operations involving heavy expenditures that may be initiated in the future:

(a) The financing of such operations is the collective responsibility of all States Members of the United Nations;

(b) Whereas the economically more developed countries are in a position to make relatively larger contributions, the economically less developed countries have a relatively limited capacity to contribute towards peace-keeping operations involving heavy expenditures;

(c) Without prejudice to the principle of collective responsibility, every effort should be made to encourage voluntary contributions from Member States;

(d) The special responsibilities of the permanent members of the Security Council for the maintenance of peace and security should be borne in mind in connexion with their contributions to the financing of peace and security operations;

(e) Where circumstances warrant, the General Assembly should give special consideration to the situation of any Member States which are victims of, and those which are otherwise involved in, the events or actions leading to a peace-keeping operation;

2. *Considers* that suitable administrative procedures should be established to ensure that provision for the financing of a peace-keeping operation is made by the General Assembly at the time the operation is authorized;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to review in consultation with the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, as appropriate, suitable administrative procedures designed to improve the financial procedures to be followed by the General Assembly at the time peace-keeping operations are authorized, and to report to the Assembly at its eighteenth session on the results of this review and any recommendations he may wish to make regarding procedures to be followed in the future.

*1205th plenary meeting,
27 June 1963.*

1875 (S-IV). UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE: COST ESTIMATES AND FINANCING FOR THE PERIOD 1 JULY TO 31 DECEMBER 1963

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 1089 (XI) of 21 December 1956, 1090 (XI) of 27 February 1957, 1151 (XII)

of 22 November 1957, 1337 (XIII) of 13 December 1958, 1441 (XIV) of 5 December 1959, 1575 (XV) of 20 December 1960 and 1733 (XVI) of 20 December 1961,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the cost estimates of the United Nations Emergency Force for the period 1 January to 31 December 1963 (A/5187), and the report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions thereon (A/5274),

1. *Decides* to continue the Special Account for the expenses of the United Nations Emergency Force;

2. *Authorizes* the Secretary-General to expend up to 31 December 1963 at an average monthly rate not to exceed \$1,580,000 for the continuing cost of the United Nations Emergency Force;

3. *Decides* to appropriate an amount of \$9,500,000 for the operations of the United Nations Emergency Force for the period 1 July to 31 December 1963;

4. *Decides* to apportion:

(a) The amount of \$2,500,000 among all Member States in accordance with the regular scale of assessments for 1963,

(b) The \$7 million balance of the amount appropriated in paragraph 3 of this resolution, among all Member States in accordance with the regular scale of assessments for 1963, except that each economically less developed country shall be assessed an amount calculated at 45 per cent of its rate under the regular scale of assessments for 1963,

provided that this apportionment shall constitute an *ad hoc* arrangement for the present phase of this peace-keeping operation, and shall not constitute a precedent for the future;

5. *Decides* that, for the purpose of this resolution, the term "economically less developed countries" shall mean all Member States except Australia, Austria, Belgium, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Romania, South Africa, Sweden, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America;

6. *Recommends* that the Member States named in paragraph 5 above make voluntary contributions in addition to their assessments under the present resolution in order to finance authorized expenditures in excess of the total amount assessed under this resolution, such voluntary contributions to be credited to a special account by the Secretary-General and transferred to the United Nations Emergency Force Special Account as and when an economically less developed country has once paid to the credit of that account its assessment under paragraph 4 (b) above or an equal amount, the transfer to be of an amount which bears the same proportion to the total of such voluntary contributions as the amount of such payment bears to the total of the assessments on economically less developed countries under paragraph 4 (b); any amount left in such special account on 31 December 1965 shall revert to the Member States that made such voluntary contributions in proportion to their respective voluntary contributions;

7. *Appeals* to all other Member States which are in a position to assist to make similar voluntary contributions or alternatively to forgo having their assessments

calculated at the rate mentioned in the exception contained in paragraph 4 (b) above;

8. *Decides* that the voluntary contributions referred to in paragraphs 6 and 7 above may be made by a Member State, at its option, in the form of services and supplies, acceptable to the Secretary-General, furnished for use in connexion with the United Nations Emergency Force during the period 1 July to 31 December 1963 for which the Member State does not require reimbursement, the Member State to be credited with the fair value thereof as agreed upon by the Member State and the Secretary-General.

1205th plenary meeting,
27 June 1963.

1876 (S-IV). UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN THE CONGO: COST ESTIMATES AND FINANCING FOR THE PERIOD 1 JULY TO 31 DECEMBER 1963

The General Assembly,

Recalling the Security Council resolutions of 14 July 1960,⁴¹ 22 July 1960,⁴² 9 August 1960,⁴³ 21 February 1961⁴⁴ and 24 November 1961,⁴⁵ and General Assembly resolutions 1474 (ES-IV) of 20 September 1960, 1583 (XV) of 20 December 1960, 1595 (XV) of 3 April 1961, 1599 (XV), 1600 (XV) and 1601 (XV) of 15 April 1961, 1619 (XV) of 21 April 1961, 1633 (XVI) of 30 October 1961 and 1732 (XVI) of 20 December 1961,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the cost estimates of the United Nations Operations in the Congo for the period 1 July to 31 December 1963 (A/5416), and the report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions thereon (A/5421),

1. *Decides* to continue the *ad hoc* Account for the expenses of the United Nations Operations in the Congo;

2. *Authorizes* the Secretary-General to expend up to 31 December 1963 at an average monthly rate not to exceed \$5.5 million for the continuing cost of the United Nations Operations in the Congo;

3. *Decides* to appropriate an amount of \$33 million for the United Nations Operation in the Congo for the period 1 July to 31 December 1963;

4. *Decides* to apportion:

(a) The amount of \$3 million among all Member States in accordance with the regular scale of assessments for 1963,

(b) The \$30 million balance of the amount appropriated in paragraph 3 above among all Member States in accordance with the regular scale of assessments for 1963, except that each economically less developed country shall be assessed an amount calculated at 45 per cent of its rate under the regular scale of assessments for 1963,

provided that this apportionment shall constitute an *ad hoc* arrangement for the present phase of this peace-

⁴¹ *Official Records of the Security Council, Fifteenth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1960, document S/4387.*

⁴² *Ibid.*, document S/4405.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, document S/4426.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, *Sixteenth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1961, document S/4741.*

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, *Supplement for October, November and December 1961, document S/5002.*

keeping operation, and shall not constitute a precedent for the future;

5. *Decides* that, for the purpose of this resolution, the term "economically less developed countries" shall mean all Member States except Australia, Austria, Belgium, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Romania, South Africa, Sweden, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America;

6. *Recommends* that the Member States named in paragraph 5 above make voluntary contributions in addition to their assessments under the present resolution in order to finance authorized expenditures in excess of the total amount assessed under this resolution, such voluntary contributions to be credited to a special account by the Secretary-General and transferred to the Congo *ad hoc* Account as and when an economically less developed country has once paid to the credit of that account its assessment under paragraph 4 (b) above or an equal amount, the transfer to be of an amount which bears the same proportion to the total of such voluntary contributions as the amount of such payment bears to the total of the assessments on economically less developed countries under paragraph 4 (b); any amount left in such special account on 31 December 1965 shall revert to the Member States that made such voluntary contributions in proportion to their respective voluntary contributions;

7. *Appeals* to all other Member States which are in a position to assist to make similar voluntary contributions or alternatively to forgo having their assessments calculated at the rate mentioned in the exception contained in paragraph 4 (b) above;

8. *Decides* that voluntary contributions referred to in paragraphs 6 and 7 above may be made by a Member State, at its option, in the form of services and supplies, acceptable to the Secretary-General, furnished for use in connexion with the United Nations Operations in the Congo during the period 1 July to 31 December 1963 for which the Member State does not require reimbursement, the Member State to be credited with the fair value thereof as agreed upon by the Member State and by the Secretary-General.

1205th plenary meeting,
27 June 1963.

1877 (S-IV). PAYMENT OF ARREARS IN RESPECT OF ASSESSED CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE SPECIAL ACCOUNT AND THE *ad hoc* ACCOUNT FOR THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN THE CONGO

The General Assembly,

Having considered the report of the Working Group on the Examination of the Administrative and Budgetary Procedures of the United Nations (A/5407),

Noting with concern the present financial situation of the Organization resulting from the non-payment of a substantial portion of past assessments for the United Nations Emergency Force Special Account and the *ad hoc* Account for the United Nations Operation in the Congo,

Believing that it is essential that all assessments for these accounts be paid as soon as possible,

1. *Appeals* to Member States which continue to be in arrears in respect of their assessed contributions for payment to the United Nations Emergency Force Special Account and the *ad hoc* Account for the United Nations Operation in the Congo to pay their arrears, disregarding other factors, as soon as their respective constitutional and financial arrangements can be processed, and, pending such arrangements, to make an announcement of their intention to do so;

2. *Expresses its conviction* that Member States which are in arrears and object on political or juridical grounds to paying their assessments on these accounts nevertheless will, without prejudice to their respective positions, make a special effort towards solving the financial difficulties of the United Nations by making these payments;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to consult with those Member States which are in arrears on the United Nations Emergency Force Special Account and on the Congo *ad hoc* Account and to work out with them arrangements as to the most appropriate modalities within the letter and spirit of the Charter of the United Nations, including the possibility of payment by instalment, for bringing the payments of these accounts up to date as soon as possible;

4. *Requests* Member States which in arrears on these accounts to make the arrangements with the Secretary-General set out in paragraph 3 above before 31 October 1963;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report, as appropriate, to the General Assembly on the consultations and arrangements mentioned in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the present resolution.

*1205th plenary meeting,
27 June 1963.*

1878 (S-IV). TERMS AND CONDITIONS GOVERNING THE ISSUE OF UNITED NATIONS BONDS

The General Assembly,

Recalling its decision, in operative paragraph 1 of General Assembly resolution 1739 (XVI) of 20 December 1961, to authorize the Secretary-General to issue United Nations bonds in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in the annex to that resolution,

Decides to amend paragraph 8 of the annex to General Assembly resolution 1739 (XVI) to read as follows:

"8. The bonds may be sold in whole or in part from time to time until 31 December 1963."

*1205th plenary meeting,
27 June 1963.*

1879 S-IV). ESTABLISHMENT OF A PEACE FUND

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind the purposes of the United Nations as set out in Article 1 of the Charter,

Realizing the need for prompt and effective action to prevent any threats to or breaches of international peace and security,

Believing that inadequate financial resources can seriously delay or jeopardize the success of such action,

Desiring to make sufficient funds readily available to the Secretary-General, thus enabling him to dis-

charge, without undue delay, his responsibilities under the Charter in cases of breaches of the peace,

Convinced that the establishment of a peace fund through voluntary contributions from Member States as well as organizations and individuals is worthy of study as a means of furthering this objective,

1. *Requests* the Secretary-General to consult all Member States and other interested organizations on the desirability and feasibility of establishing such a peace fund;

2. *Further requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its eighteenth session.

*1205th plenary meeting,
27 June 1963.*

1880 (S-IV). CONTINUATION OF THE WORKING GROUP ON THE EXAMINATION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND BUDGETARY PROCEDURES OF THE UNITED NATIONS

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 1854 B (XVII) of 19 December 1962,

Bearing in mind the principles enunciated in its resolution 1874 (S-IV) of 27 June 1963, that shall serve as guidelines for the equitable sharing of the costs of peace-keeping operations involving heavy expenditures that may be initiated in the future, to the extent that these expenditures will not be otherwise covered by agreed arrangements,

Bearing in mind further that the maintenance of peace and security is a primary purpose of the United Nations,

Desirous that ways and means should be found to arrive at working arrangements so that all Member States may feel able to share in such costs,

Noting that the tasks with which the Working Group on the Examination of the Administrative and Budgetary Procedures of the United Nations was charged have not been completed,

1. *Decides* to continue in being the Working Group on the Examination of the Administrative and Budgetary Procedures of the United Nations;

2. *Requests* the Working Group:

(a) To recommend a special method for the equitable sharing of the costs of future peace-keeping operations involving heavy expenditures to the extent not otherwise covered by agreed arrangements;

(b) To consider suggestions regarding other sources of financing future peace-keeping operations;

(c) To explore ways and means for bringing about the widest possible measure of agreement among all Member States on the question of the financing of future peace-keeping operations;

3. *Invites* the Working Group to consult as appropriate with the Committee on Contributions;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to make available to the Working Group the necessary facilities and assistance for the accomplishment of its tasks;

5. *Requests* the Working Group to report on these matters to the General Assembly as soon as possible, but not later than its nineteenth regular session.

*1205th plenary meeting,
27 June 1963.*

CHECK LIST OF DOCUMENTS

NOTE. This check list includes the documents mentioned during the consideration of agenda item 7 which are not reproduced in the fascicle.

<i>Document No.</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Observations and references</i>
A/5161 and Corr.1	Note by the Secretary-General transmitting to Members of the General Assembly the advisory opinion given by the International Court of Justice on 20 July 1962 on certain expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter)	Mimeographed. For the text of the Opinion see <i>Certain expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962: I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 151</i>
A/5187	United Nations Emergency Force: cost estimates for the maintenance of the Force—report of the Secretary-General	<i>Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventeenth Session, Annexes</i> , agenda items 32 and 63
A/5274	United Nations Emergency Force: cost estimates for the maintenance of the Force—report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions	<i>Ibid.</i>
A/AC.104/ Working Paper No. 2	Working Group of Fifteen on the Examination of the Administrative and Budgetary Procedures of the United Nations—proposal submitted by the Canadian delegation	Mimeographed
A/AC.104/1/Add.4 and 7	Working Group of Fifteen on the Examination of the Administrative and Budgetary Procedures of the United Nations—replies of Governments indicating their views on principles to be applied in determining a special scale of assessments for peace and security and on other relevant matters	Ditto
A/AC.104/ SR.1-18	Summary records of the Working Group of Fifteen on the Examination of the Administrative and Budgetary Procedures of the United Nations	Ditto
A/AC.113/1	Budgetary and financial practices of the United Nations: note by the Secretary-General	Ditto
A/AC.113/ SR.1-18	Summary records of the Working Group on the Examination of the of the Administrative and Budgetary Procedures of the United Nations	Ditto
A/C.5/L.782 and Add.1	Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Federation of Malaya, Gabon, Ghana, Honduras, Iceland, India, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Liberia, Mauritania, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Sweden, Tanganyika, Uruguay and Venezuela: draft resolution	Same text as A/5438, para. 17, draft resolution I
A/C.5/L.783 and Add.1	Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Federation of Malaya, Gabon, Honduras, Iceland, India, Italy, Japan, Liberia, Mauritania, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Sweden, Tanganyika, Uruguay and Venezuela: draft resolution	<i>Idem</i> , draft resolution II
A/C.5/L.784 and Add.1	Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Federation of Malaya, Gabon, Honduras, Iceland, India, Italy, Japan, Liberia, Mauritania, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Sweden, Tanganyika, Uruguay and Venezuela: draft resolution	<i>Idem</i> , draft resolution III
A/C.5/L.785 and Add.1 and 2	Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Federation of Malaya, Gabon, Honduras, Iceland, India, Italy, Japan, Liberia, Mauritania, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Sweden, Tanganyika, Uruguay and Venezuela: draft resolution	<i>Idem</i> , draft resolution IV
A/C.5/L.786 and Add.1	Cameroon, Canada, Denmark, Federation of Malaya, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Tunisia and Uganda: draft resolution	<i>Idem</i> , draft resolution V
A/C.5/L.787	Cyprus, Ghana, Ivory Coast and Nigeria: draft resolution	See A/5438, para. 13 (f)
A/C.5/L.787/ Rev.1	Cyprus, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Nigeria and Pakistan: revised draft resolution	Same text as A/5438, para. 17, draft resolution VI
A/C.5/L.788 and Add.1	Cameroon, Cyprus, Federation of Malaya, Ghana, Guinea and Uruguay: draft resolution	<i>Idem</i> , draft resolution VII
A/C.5/L.789	Draft report of the Fifth Committee	For the text of this document as amended by the Fifth Committee at its 1005th meeting, see A/5438



Agenda item 8: Admission of new Members to the United Nations*

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* For the discussion of this item, see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fourth Special Session, Plenary Meetings*, 1203rd meeting.

DOCUMENT A/5417
**Letter dated 7 May 1963 from the President of the Security Council
to the Secretary-General**

[Original text: French]
[8 May 1963]

I have the honour to request you to inform the General Assembly that at its 1034th meeting on 7 May 1963, after examining the application of Kuwait for membership in the United Nations, the Security Council unanimously recommended that the General Assembly should admit Kuwait to membership in the United Nations.

In accordance with the second paragraph of rule 60 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, I also request you to transmit to the General Assembly, for its information, the verbatim record of the 1034th meeting of the Security Council, at which the application of Kuwait was examined.

(Signed) Roger SEYDOUX
President of the Security Council

DOCUMENT A/5419 AND ADD.1¹

Costa Rica, Ecuador, Ghana, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Jordan, Liberia, Mali, Morocco, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanganyika and Tunisia: request for the inclusion of a supplementary item in the agenda of the fourth special session

[Original text: English]
[9 May 1963]

Pursuant to rule 18 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, the undersigned representatives request the inclusion in the agenda of the fourth special session of the General Assembly, to be convened on 14 May 1963, the recommendation made by the Security Council at its 1034th meeting, on 7 May

¹ By document A/5419/Add.1, dated 10 May 1963, Tanganyika was added to the list of sponsors.

1963, concerning the application of the State of Kuwait for membership in the United Nations:

Signed

Fernando VOLIO JIMÉNEZ	(Costa Rica)
Leopoldo BENITES	(Ecuador)
Alex QUAISON-SACKEY	(Ghana)
Guillermo CACERES PINEDA	(Honduras)
K. NATWAR SINGH	(India)
Sumarjo SOSROWARDOJO	(Indonesia)
Mehdi VAKIL	(Iran)
Frederick H. BOLAND	(Ireland)
Abdul Monem RIFA'I	(Jordan)
Nathan BARNES	(Liberia)
Sori COULIBALY	(Mali)
Ahmed Taibi BENHIMA	(Morocco)
Sivert A. NIELSEN	(Norway)
Viqar Ahmed HAMDANI	(Pakistan)
Privado G. JIMENEZ	(Philippines)
Jamil M. BAROODY	(Saudi Arabia)
Gershon B. O. COLLIER	(Sierra Leone)
Hassan Nur ELMi	(Somalia)
Sir-El-Khatim El SANOUSI	(Sudan)
Taieb SLIM	(Tunisia)

ACTION TAKEN BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

At its 1203rd plenary meeting, on 14 May 1963, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution submitted by seventeen Powers (A/L.424 and Add. 1). For the final text see resolution 1872 (S-IV) below.

Resolution adopted by the General Assembly

1872 (S-IV). ADMISSION OF KUWAIT TO MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED NATIONS

The General Assembly,
Having received the recommendation of the Security Council of 7 May 1963 that Kuwait should be admitted to membership in the United Nations (A/5417),
Having considered the application for membership of Kuwait (A/5412),
Decides to admit Kuwait to membership in the United Nations.

*1203rd plenary meeting,
 14 May 1963.*

CHECK LIST OF DOCUMENTS

NOTE: This check list includes the documents mentioned during the consideration of item 8 which are not reproduced in the present fascicle.

<i>Document No.</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Observations and references</i>
A/5412	Letter dated 20 April 1963 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Kuwait to the Secretary-General	Same text as S/5294. See <i>Official Records of the Security Council, Eighteenth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1963</i>
A/L.424 and Add.1	Costa Rica, Ecuador, Federation of Malaya, Guinea, Hungary, India, Ireland, Jordan, Liberia, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan and Tunisia: draft resolution	Adopted without change. See above "Action taken by the General Assembly", resolution 1872 (S-IV). The text of the resolution appears also in <i>Official Records of the General Assembly, Fourth Special Session, Supplement No. 1</i>