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REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE SITUATION WITH
REGARD TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON
THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES
AND PEOPLES

(covering its work during 1967)

Rapporteur: Mr. M.S. ESFANDIARY (Iran)

CHAPTER III

SOUTHERN RHODESIA

CONTENTS

	<u>Paragraphs</u>	<u>Page</u>
I. ACTION TAKEN PREVIOUSLY BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND SPECIAL COMMITTEE AND BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL . . .	1 - 17	3
II. INFORMATION ON THE TERRITORY		
A. Political developments (June-December 1966) . . .	18 - 119	11
B. Economic developments (June-December 1966) . . .	120 - 289	39
C. Political developments (January-April 1967) . . .	290 - 321	82
D. Economic developments (January-April 1967) . . .	322 - 363	88

* This document contains chapter III of the Special Committee's report to the General Assembly. The general introductory chapter will be issued subsequently under the symbol A/6700. Other chapters of the report will be issued as addenda.

CONTENTS (continued)

	<u>Paragraphs</u>	<u>Page</u>
III. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE		
Introduction	364	100
A. Written petitions and hearings	365 - 467	100
B. General statements	468 - 548	133
IV. ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE		
A. Consensus adopted by the Special Committee on 6 June 1967	549 - 565	160
B. Adoption of resolution on the question of Southern Rhodesia	566 - 610	163

I. ACTION PREVIOUSLY TAKEN BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND
THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE AND BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL

1. The situation in Southern Rhodesia has been under continuous consideration by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples since 1962 and has been the subject of numerous General Assembly resolutions. It was also considered by the Security Council both before and after the illegal declaration of independence. By its resolution 217 (1965) adopted after the illegal declaration, the Security Council, inter alia, called upon the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to quell the rebellion by the racist minority and called upon all States not to recognize the illegal régime and to do their utmost to break all economic relations with Southern Rhodesia, including an embargo on oil and petroleum products. By its resolution 221 (1966), the Security Council called upon the Government of the United Kingdom to prevent by the use of force if necessary, the arrival at Beira of vessels reasonably believed to be carrying oil destined for Rhodesia, and empowered the United Kingdom to arrest and detain the tanker known as the Ioanna V upon her departure from Beira in the event her oil cargo was discharged there.^{1/}

2. At its 407th meeting on 21 April 1966, the Special Committee adopted a resolution^{2/} on the question of Southern Rhodesia. In this resolution the Special Committee:

1. Reaffirmed the inalienable rights of the people of Southern Rhodesia to freedom and independence in accordance with the Declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), and recognized the legitimacy of their struggle for the enjoyment of their rights as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations;

2. Reaffirmed in particular General Assembly resolution 2022 (XX) which condemns the policies of racial discrimination and segregation practised in Southern Rhodesia, which constituted a crime against humanity;

^{1/} For details of Security Council decisions of April/May 1966, see A/6300/Add.1 (part I), paragraphs 589-592.

^{2/} Ibid., paragraph 587.

3. Condemned the failure of certain States, particularly South Africa and Portugal, to implement the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, the Special Committee and the Security Council by giving support and assistance to the racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia;

4. Called upon the administering Power to take all effective measures, including the use of force, to put an end to the racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia;

5. Considered that the explosive situation in Southern Rhodesia continued to constitute a threat to international peace and security;

6. Recommended to the Security Council to consider urgently the further measures envisaged under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to put into effect its decisions concerning Southern Rhodesia;

7. Decided to transmit to the Security Council the records of the discussions of the Special Committee on this question;

8. Decided to keep the question of Southern Rhodesia on the agenda of the Special Committee and to review the situation whenever it considers it necessary.

3. During its meetings in Africa the Special Committee adopted a further resolution relating to Southern Rhodesia,^{3/} as well as a general resolution on the question of the attainment of the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) with particular reference to the Territories in Southern Africa.^{4/}

4. At its twenty-first session, the General Assembly, on the recommendation of the Fourth Committee, adopted two resolutions on the question of Southern Rhodesia.

5. By its resolution 2138 (XXI) of 22 October 1966, the General Assembly:

1. Condemned any arrangement reached between the administering Power and the illegal racist minority régime which would not recognize the inalienable rights of the people of Zimbabwe to self-determination and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);

2. Reaffirmed the obligation of the administering Power to transfer power to the people of Zimbabwe on the basis of universal adult suffrage, in accordance with the principle "one man, one vote".

^{3/} Ibid., paragraph 1097.

^{4/} A/6300 (part II), paragraph 619.

6. By its resolution 2151 (XXI) of 17 November 1966, the General Assembly:

1. Reaffirmed the inalienable right of the people of Zimbabwe to freedom and independence, and the legitimacy of their struggle for the exercise of that right;

2. Deplored the failure of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland so far to put an end to the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia;

3. Condemned any arrangement between the administering Power and the illegal racist minority régime in the Territory which would transfer power to the latter on any basis and which would fail to recognize the inalienable right of the people of Zimbabwe to self-determination and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);

4. Condemned the Governments of Portugal and South Africa for their support of the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia;

5. Condemned the activities of those foreign financial and other interests which, by supporting and assisting the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia, were preventing the African people of Zimbabwe from attaining freedom and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), and called upon the Governments of the States concerned to take all necessary measures to bring to an end such activities;

6. Drew the attention of the Security Council once again to the grave situation prevailing in Southern Rhodesia, in order that it might decide to apply the necessary enforcement measures envisaged under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations;

7. Called upon the Government of the United Kingdom to take prompt and effective measures to prevent any supplies, including oil and petroleum products, from reaching Southern Rhodesia;

8. Called once again upon the Government of the United Kingdom to take all necessary measures, including in particular the use of force, in the exercise of its powers as the administering Power, to put an end to the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia and to ensure the immediate application of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and other relevant resolutions;

9. Called upon the administering Power to report on its actions in the implementation of the present resolution to the Special Committee on the situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples;

10. Called upon all States to render all moral and material support to the people of Zimbabwe in their legitimate struggle to overthrow the illegal racist régime and to achieve freedom and independence;

11. Requested the specialized agencies concerned and other international assistance organizations to aid and assist the refugees from Zimbabwe and those who were suffering from oppression by the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia;

12. Requested the Special Committee to continue its study of the situation in Southern Rhodesia;

13. Decided to keep the question of Southern Rhodesia on its agenda.

7. As at the end of December 1966, replies had been received from seventy-four States in response to the notes verbales of the Secretary-General transmitting the text of General Assembly resolution 2022 (XX) of 5 November 1965 and Security Council resolution 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965 on the question of Southern Rhodesia.^{5/} The seventy-fourth reply was received from the Government of Sudan and is contained in documents A/6479 and S/7558.

8. At its 1331st to 1333rd, and 1335th through 1340th meetings, held between 8 and 16 December 1966, the Security Council resumed its consideration of the question of Southern Rhodesia on the basis of a letter dated 5 December 1966 (S/7610) from the representative of the United Kingdom in which he stated that since the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia had not been brought to an end, and following consultations with other Commonwealth Governments, he had been instructed to request an early meeting of the Security Council at which his Government would propose certain additional measures to be taken against the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia.

9. At the 1340th meeting on 16 December 1966, the Security Council adopted resolution 232 (1966) by a roll-call vote of 11 to none with 4 abstentions (Bulgaria, France, Mali, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). The text of the resolution reads as follows:

5/ See A/6300/Add.1 (part I), paragraph 14; A/6300/Add.1 (part II), appendix II, paragraphs 3 and 4; A/C.4/671.

"The Security Council,

"Reaffirming its resolutions 216 (1965) of 12 November 1965, 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965 and 221 (1966) of 9 April 1966, and in particular its appeal to all States to do their utmost in order to break off economic relations with Southern Rhodesia,

"Deeply concerned that the Council's efforts so far and the measures taken by the administering Power have failed to bring the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia to an end,

"Reaffirming that to the extent not superseded in this resolution, the measures provided for in resolution 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965, as well as those initiated by Member States in implementation of that resolution, shall continue in effect, .

"Acting in accordance with Articles 39 and 41 of the United Nations Charter,

"1. Determines that the present situation in Southern Rhodesia constitutes a threat to international peace and security;

"2. Decides that all States Members of the United Nations shall prevent:

- "(a) the import into their territories of asbestos, iron ore, chrome, pig-iron, sugar, tobacco, copper, meat and meat products and hides, skins and leather originating in Southern Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the date of this resolution;
- "(b) any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote or are calculated to promote the export of these commodities from Southern Rhodesia and any dealings by their nationals or in their territories in any of these commodities originating in Southern Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the date of this resolution, including in particular any transfer of funds to Southern Rhodesia for the purposes of such activities or dealings;
- "(c) shipment in vessels or aircraft of their registration of any of these commodities originating in Southern Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the date of this resolution;
- "(d) any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote or are calculated to promote the sale or shipment to Southern Rhodesia of arms, ammunition of all types, military aircraft, military vehicles, and equipment and materials for the manufacture and maintenance of arms and ammunition in Southern Rhodesia;

"(e) any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote or are calculated to promote the supply to Southern Rhodesia of all other aircraft and motor vehicles and of equipment and materials for the manufacture, assembly, or maintenance of aircraft and motor vehicles in Southern Rhodesia: the shipment in vessels and aircraft of their registration of any such goods destined for Southern Rhodesia: and any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote or are calculated to promote the manufacture or assembly of aircraft or motor vehicles in Southern Rhodesia;

"(f) participation in their territories or territories under their administration or in land or air transport facilities or by their nationals or vessels of their registration in the supply of oil or oil products to Southern Rhodesia; notwithstanding any contracts entered into or licences granted before the date of this resolution;

"3. Reminds Member States that the failure or refusal by any of them to implement the present resolution shall constitute a violation of Article 25 of the Charter;

"4. Reaffirms the inalienable rights of the people of Southern Rhodesia to freedom and independence in accordance with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV); and recognizes the legitimacy of their struggle to secure the enjoyment of their rights as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations;

"5. Calls upon all States not to render financial or other economic aid to the illegal racist régime in Southern Rhodesia;

"6. Calls upon all States Members of the United Nations to carry out this decision of the Security Council in accordance with Article 25 of the United Nations Charter;

"7. Urges, having regard to the principles stated in Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, States not Members of the United Nations to act in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 of the present resolution;

"8. Calls upon States Members of the United Nations or of the specialized agencies to report to the Secretary-General the measures each has taken in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 of the present resolution;

"9. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the progress of the implementation of the present resolution, the first report to be submitted not later than 1 March 1967;

"10. Decides to keep this item on its agenda for further action as appropriate in the light of developments."

10. By a note dated 17 December 1966, the Secretary-General transmitted the text of the resolution to States Members of the United Nations or of the specialized agencies and drew their particular attention to the fact that the Security Council had acted in accordance with Articles 39 and 41 of the United Nations Charter and had reminded Member States that the failure or refusal by any of them to implement this resolution would constitute a violation of Article 25 of the Charter. He drew attention to the provisions of operative paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 of the resolution and requested information, as early as possible, on the measures taken by the Governments in accordance with the provisions of the resolution.

11. In a further note dated 13 January 1967 addressed to States Members of the United Nations or of the specialized agencies, the Secretary-General added that he would appreciate receiving a detailed account of the action taken by the Governments in the implementation of operative paragraphs 2 and 5 of the resolution, as well as such other measures they may have taken in accordance with the spirit and general intent of the resolution. The Secretary-General transmitted with the note a questionnaire on imports and exports of the commodities listed in operative paragraph 2 of the resolution in order to facilitate the supply of uniform data by States and to enable the Secretary-General to provide the Security Council from time to time with analyses of the progress of the implementation of the resolution with regard to trade in those commodities.

12. In his first report in pursuance of the above resolution (S/7781 and Corr.1 Add.1), the Secretary-General stated that up to 21 February 1967 he had received replies from seventy-two States Members of the United Nations or of the specialized agencies. The substantive parts of these replies were reproduced in annex 2 of the report.

13. The Secretary-General also noted in his report that a substantial number of States, including certain States which had significant trade with Southern Rhodesia, had not yet reported in pursuance of operative paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution 232 (1966).

14. The Secretary-General noted further that while several States had undertaken to provide the trade statistics requested in his note of 13 January 1967, full information on the effect of implementation of Security Council resolution 232 on

the trade of Southern Rhodesia was not at present available and might not be available for some time. It was his intention to utilize the data hitherto provided by States Members of the United Nations and of the specialized agencies as a basis for estimating the effect of these measures. A report to this effect would be submitted to the Council later.

15. The Secretary-General expressed the hope that all States Members of the United Nations or of the specialized agencies would submit information on the measures taken in accordance with the provisions of the resolution, or, in the case of those States which had replied to the two notes, information on further measures they had taken, if any.

16. The report also provided the Security Council with certain data on the trade of Southern Rhodesia in 1965 and 1966. These data, set out in an addendum to the report, show the direction of past trade in commodities listed in the resolution and the value of the trade of Southern Rhodesia with each trading partner.

17. The second report of the Secretary-General (S/7781/Add.2) in pursuance of the above resolution showed that nineteen more States Members of the United Nations or of the specialized agencies had replied to the above notes, bringing the total to ninety-one. In addition to the replies mentioned above, the Secretary-General also drew attention to a letter dated 27 February 1967 from the Permanent Representative of Bulgaria (S/7794) transmitting "a statement of the Government of the German Democratic Republic on the implementation of resolution S/RES/232 (1966) adopted by the Security Council on 16 December 1966, concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia".

II. INFORMATION ON THE TERRITORY

A. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS (June-December 1966)

A. INTERNAL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Opening of Southern Rhodesian "Parliament"

18. On 22 June 1966, the first session of the Southern Rhodesian "Parliament" since the illegal declaration of independence, was opened. The official opening was not attended by the judges of the High Court. The "Speaker of Parliament" issued a statement on 16 June 1966 in which he said that the judges had informed him that certain litigation was pending in the High Court involving the standing of the Government and possibly of Parliament itself. In these circumstances, the judges considered it proper to stand aloof from the present parliamentary proceedings. The statement added that both the "Speaker" and the "Prime Minister" recognized the desirability of judges preserving their impartiality in all judicial proceedings and appreciated the difficulties facing them.

19. Mr. Clifford Dupont, "Officer Administering the Government", delivered "the speech from the throne" after the Speaker had formally declared "Parliament" opened. The speech from the throne, under the 1961 Constitution, is delivered by the Governor as the Queen's representative.

20. After reviewing the work of the "Government" and outlining future legislative, economic and social plans of the régime, Mr. Dupont stated, inter alia, that it would be imprudent for the régime to ignore the threat to security which faced Southern Rhodesia from those who resented the peace and tranquility enjoyed by all people in the country and who for their own purposes would rather see chaos supervene. His régime had no intention whatsoever of relaxing its forces either to deter aggression from any external source or to eliminate internal subversion. The regular forces of the British South Africa police, the Army and the Royal Rhodesian Air Force would continue to be maintained at maximum efficiency and every endeavour would be made to provide the additional training, for which in their keenness to be prepared, all branches of the reserves were being called.

21. In the field of international affairs, Mr. Dupont said that the régime had assured full responsibility for the conduct of external relations, and the possibility of establishing formal diplomatic relations with other countries was under constant consideration. His régime appreciated the action of other

Governments who had retained missions in Salisbury, notwithstanding that some had been reduced in size. Indeed his régime noted with gratification that of the twenty countries represented in Salisbury before 11 November 1965, only two, regrettably both Commonwealth countries, had withdrawn their local missions, and three others had terminated the appointment of their honorary consuls.

"African Affairs (Amendment) Bill"

22. The "Minister of Internal Affairs" of Southern Rhodesia, Mr. William Harper, introduced an "African Affairs (Amendment) Bill", in the Southern Rhodesian Legislative Assembly in July 1966. He stated that policy towards the Southern Rhodesian African population would be channelled through the chiefs. He said that the bill contained provisions which would give more dignity and power to the chiefs, and these new powers would fulfil the undertaking which had been given by the "Government" to the country's tribal leaders. In the tribal areas, Mr. Harper said, the chiefs would now become responsible for the administration of their people. The "Government" had a high regard for African traditions and customs and did not wish to see them removed when they were not offensive to common right. Opposition members criticized a provision in the bill which made it mandatory for Southern Rhodesian chiefs to notify district commissioners of all rumours which might affect the public peace. The bill was subsequently approved by the Legislative Assembly and signed by the "Officer Administering the Government".

Extension of state of emergency

23. On 28 July 1966, the Southern Rhodesian Legislative Assembly purported to have approved the extension of the state of emergency for a further three months. The state of emergency was declared by the Government of Southern Rhodesia on 5 November 1965, and has since been extended in three-month periods. In moving the emergency resolution, the "Minister of Justice and Law and Order", Mr. Desmond Lardner-Burke, said there was an obvious threat to lives and properties from terrorist activity directed from Zambia and Tanzania. For these and other reasons the security forces must have the power to detain terrorists and saboteurs who infiltrated from neighbouring territories. In view

of the threats still facing the country, the powers must be available to deal with any deteriorating situation and they must be able to maintain the emergency measures at present in force to deal with sanctions. On 27 October 1966, the Legislative Assembly again extended the state of emergency for a further three months to expire on 31 January 1967. On 26 January 1967, the Legislative Assembly approved a further three-month extension of the state of emergency to expire on 30 April 1967.

Restriction powers extended for two years

24. On 23 August 1966, the Southern Rhodesian Legislative Assembly purported to have extended for two years, from 31 August, the period during which the "Minister of Justice and Law and Order" might restrict people without trial for periods up to five years. These powers of restriction were conferred on the Government of Southern Rhodesia in 1962 and were extended in 1964 for a further two years. Mr. Lardner-Burke, speaking on the motion seeking the further extension, said that they were still at a critical stage in their fight to maintain law and order under present circumstances and to maintain the comparative peace and calm which existed in Southern Rhodesia today. He emphasized that the powers sought had nothing whatever to do with detention since restrictees were given basic freedom of movement within an area, communications and so on. The Government would continue to use the courts whenever it could but the normal processes of the court were extremely difficult to apply in cases of subversion.

"Constitution Amendment Bill"

25. On 25 August 1966, the "Minister of Justice and Law and Order", introduced in the Legislative Assembly, the "Constitution Amendment Bill" to amend a number of provisions of the Declaration of Rights which form an entrenched chapter of the so-called 1965 Constitution carried over intact from the 1961 Constitution.

26. A statement issued by the Commonwealth Office in London on 25 August 1966, said that the United Kingdom Government had learnt with concern of the intention of the illegal régime in Salisbury to introduce a "Constitution Amendment Bill" containing powers of preventive detention and making changes in the specially entrenched clauses of the 1961 Constitution. These changes would, of course, have no legal validity. Ministers were studying the implications of these new developments.

27. Speaking on the bill in the Legislative Assembly on 26 August 1966, Mr. Lardner-Burke said that the bill was designed to make possible the passing of legislation to provide for detention without the existence of a state of emergency. This new legislation, "The Public Security Bill", would be presented to the Legislative Assembly in due course. He recalled that preventive detention had been introduced in Southern Rhodesia by an act passed by a previous Government in 1959. The act, which had a life of five years, was renewed by the Government in 1964, but when challenged in the courts, was declared to be outside the powers of the 1961 Constitution. Neither, he said, had the 1965 Constitution made any provision for preventive detention outside of a state of emergency. The Public Security Bill would therefore remedy this omission and regularize the laws relating to all restricted and detained persons and so restore the position as it was in 1959.

28. So that the detention of an individual should not be left entirely to the discretion of the "Minister of Justice", Mr. Lardner-Burke said the bill would provide for the establishment of an impartial body other than the Minister which would give consideration to each case. The powers of preventive detention without a state of emergency, he added, were absolutely necessary to permit the "Government" to maintain law and order in Southern Rhodesia. Mr. Lardner-Burke denied that the proposed amendments to the Constitution were an attempt to give the régime more permanent and arbitrary power with the object of stifling the opposition.

29. Mr. William Harper, the "Minister of Internal Affairs", also stated that the bill would empower the régime to introduce legislation to give the African chiefs greater powers in the administration of their areas. Among other powers, the proposed legislation would give the chiefs or their courts powers for dealing with certain criminal offences. The legislation would not force the tribal courts to adhere to the Declaration of Rights in so far as legal representation was concerned. It would also give powers to the chiefs for the removal of certain people from one position of tribal trust land to another. The legislation would also make some changes in relation to tribal trust lands.

30. During the debate on the second reading of the bill on 8 September, the Leader of the Opposition and most of the Opposition United People's Party members walked out of the Assembly; they had not returned when the vote was taken. There were

48 votes for the bill and 2 against (1 UPP member and 1 independent member).
Mr. Ian Smith announced on 14 September that the bill had been signed by Mr. Dupont, the "Officer Administering the Government".

Court judgement

31. Within the period under review, many cases which in one way or the other challenged the legality of the Ian Smith régime, were brought before the courts of Southern Rhodesia. Of these, the most important in terms of the judgement delivered, was the case before the High Court in which two detainees, Mr. Leo Baron and Mr. Daniel Madzimbamuto, had applied to be released on the ground that the orders detaining them were illegal. The Court held on 9 September 1966 that their application must fail.

32. One of the two judges, Mr. Justice Lewis, was reported to have stated his conclusions in the case, which came before the High Court in Salisbury in March 1966, as follows:

"1. The 1965 constitution is not the lawful constitution of this country and the government of this country set up under it is not the lawful government; it will not become the lawful government unless and until the ties of sovereignty are severed either by consent or by acquiescence of Her Majesty's Government in abandoning the attempt to end the revolution.

"2. The government is, however, the only effective government of the country and therefore on the basis of necessity and in order to avoid chaos and a vacuum in the law this court should give effect to such measures of the effective government, both legislative and administrative, as could lawfully have been taken by the lawful government under the 1961 constitution for the preservation of peace and good government and the maintenance of law and order.

"3. The extensions of the state of emergency and of the Emergency Powers (Maintenance of Law and Order) Regulations contained in Rhodesian Government Notice 71 of 1966 made thereunder are measures falling within the above category and neither in their purpose nor in their mode of enforcement in the present cases have they been shown to be hostile to the authority of the sovereign power or to have impaired the just rights of citizens under the 1961 constitution or to have been taken with actual intent to further the revolution.... In the result I am of the opinion that both applications must fail."

33. The other judge, Mr. Justice Goldin, agreed in a separate judgement with the conclusions of Mr. Justice Lewis. He was reported to have written:

"In my view, after careful consideration of the unprecedented situation in which the court finds itself, I am satisfied that the court can and should give effect to at least certain legislative measures and administrative acts performed by virtue of powers exercised under the 1965 constitution. I base my conclusion on the doctrine of public policy, the application of which is required, justified and rendered unavoidable in these circumstances by necessity."

An appeal by the two detainees against the judgement is currently being heard by the Court of Appeals in Salisbury.

Changes in Southern Rhodesian opposition leadership

34. The opposition United People's Party caucus on 31 August 1966, replaced Mr. Chad Chipunza by Mr. Josiah Gondo as party leader. Mr. Gondo, who became leader of the opposition, formerly led the party before Mr. Chipunza. On 22 January 1967, at a later party congress, Mr. Percy Mkudu was elected to succeed Mr. Gondo.

Deputy Prime Minister named

35. On 7 September 1966, Mr. Ian Smith named as "Deputy Prime Minister", Mr. John Wrathall. The announcement said that Mr. Wrathall would continue to hold the portfolio of finance in addition to his new responsibilities.

Rhodesian Front Party Congress

36. The annual Congress of the Rhodesian Front Party was held in Bulawayo from 22 to 24 September 1966. It was reported to have been attended by more than 500 party delegates from all over the country. The open session, which started on 23 September 1966, was addressed by Mr. Ian Smith in his capacity as president of the party. In his statement, Mr. Smith recapitulated the history of the party from the time of the 1961 Constitution to the period ending with the illegal declaration of independence and stated that as long as he continued to be president of the party, his régime would never deviate from the principles which the party stood for and the promises it had made to the electorate of Southern Rhodesia. Regarding the period after the illegal declaration of independence,

he stated that "Rhodesians" had come a long way which he described as an incredible success. So long as they continued to succeed, those friends that they had in the world today would not let them down. They were carrying on one of the most incredible exercises in contemporary history by standing up not to one great country, but almost to the whole world.

37. On 24 September, the Congress, in closed session, held the election of party officers. The results of the elections showed few changes from 1965. Mr. Ian Smith was re-elected president of the party. Mr. W.H. Harper, "Minister of Internal Affairs" and Lord Graham, "Minister of Defence and External Affairs" were re-elected as deputy presidents. Four party vice-presidents were elected - two of whom have to be "MPs" and two drawn from party members. They were Mr. John Wrathall, "Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance", Mr. Jack Carey, Mr. Stan Eastwood and Mr. D.C. Lilford. Col. W.M. Knox was re-elected chairman of the party and Mr. Ralph Neilson was elected deputy chairman.

38. The Congress debated twenty resolutions on both local and national affairs. Of these resolutions, the most important was adopted on 24 September 1966, by which the Congress unanimously endorsed the action of the "Government" during the last twelve months and recorded its full confidence in the "Prime Minister" and his cabinet and caucus. The proposer and seconder and all the speakers mentioned not only the courage and determination that had been shown by the "Prime Minister" and his cabinet, but also the "unity that they had achieved amongst the people of Southern Rhodesia". In a statement after the adoption of the resolution, Mr. Smith said that by the resolution, the Congress had made him and his officers even stronger and more dedicated. After this they could not, even if they had any intention of doing so, deviate or let the party down.

Clashes with nationalists

39. On 13 May 1966, twenty Africans were sentenced in Salisbury to ten years' imprisonment with hard labour after being found guilty in the High Court of being saboteurs and spies. All were found guilty of preparing for an African nationalist attempt to overthrow the white minority régime. A twenty-first man was given five years with hard labour. In his judgement, the judge said that

a sabotage training scheme had been organized in Lusaka, Zambia, by officials of the banned Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) with staging posts at Mbeya and Dar es Salaam.

40. A European farmer, Mr. Viljoen, and his wife were murdered in the farming district of Hartley, about seventy miles from Salisbury, on 17 May. A police statement said that they had been shot with an automatic weapon and that the murders were believed to be "the work of a dangerous gang". Later the same day in Lusaka, responsibility for the murders was claimed by the banned Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU).

41. On 1 June 1966, the Southern Rhodesia police announced that an African arrested on suspicion of being connected with the terrorist gang that murdered the white couple had died from wounds he received. The police had said earlier that he had been wounded when arrested by the security forces.

42. On 13 June 1966, there was a two-hour outbreak of violence in Salisbury. During the outbreak, a hotel about seven miles from the city near the African township of Highfield was stoned and petrol bombs thrown. A car in the hotel grounds was set on fire but the fire was extinguished. A furniture warehouse in the same vicinity was burnt out causing damage estimated at £50,000. A bus was burnt out in Highfield township when an incendiary device was thrown into it. Other stoning incidents in the African township and an attempt to set fire to an office in the industrial sites were reported. It was also reported that in the neighbouring township of Harare there were scattered outbreaks of stone-throwing.

43. On 22 June 1966, three Africans who were accused of having attacked a train with knobkerries and stones and set it on fire with petrol were sentenced to death in the High Court in Bulawayo. The sentence for such an offence is mandatory under Southern Rhodesia's Law and Order (Maintenance) Act.

44. On 23 June 1966, seven Africans who were reported to have been caught armed in Southern Rhodesia after entering the country secretly from Zambia were sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment each in the High Court in Salisbury. The judge found the men guilty of illegally possessing a large quantity of Soviet and Chinese weapons and explosives. Evidence was given that all the accused were members of the banned Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). The prosecution

said that they had entered the country secretly from Zambia on 1 April 1966, with orders to blow up the Beira-Umtali oil pipeline, attack white farmers and fight the army and police in an attempt to overthrow the "Government".

45. On 19 July, the Southern Rhodesian police stated that an "African nationalist terrorist gang" had opened fire on Southern Rhodesian security forces and hurled hand grenades at them in a gun battle in a remote part of the Zambezi Valley on 18 July 1966. The statement said that the security forces immediately returned fire, killing one "terrorist". The dead African was "positively identified" by the police as a member of the nationalist gang which had gunned down the white farming couple in the Hartley district, about seventy miles from Salisbury in May. A member of the security forces was said to have been wounded but not seriously. The statement said that the terrorists fled shortly after the start of the battle.

46. On 22 July 1966, the "Minister of Justice and Law and Order", Mr. Desmond Lardner-Burke, in reply to a question in "Parliament", stated that there had been eighty acts of sabotage since the illegal declaration of independence. There had been twenty attacks on railroads, twenty-three cases of interference with essential services, thirty-two molotov cocktail cases, and five involving the use of explosives.

47. On 5 August 1966, the "Department of Information" announced that five African "terrorists" would appear in the Sincia Magistrates' court the same day to answer charges of carrying offensive weapons. The statement said that the terrorists had surrendered to the security forces during the recent operations in the Zambezi Valley near the frontier with Zambia. It said that the terrorists had infiltrated Southern Rhodesia from Zambia and were members of a banned Rhodesian African nationalist organization. On 3 October 1966, four of the arrested Africans were sentenced to eighteen years' imprisonment each for the above charges. The fifth African was sentenced to twelve years' imprisonment.

48. On 12 August 1966, the police reported that seven white people and an African waiter were taken to a hospital with slight injuries after an explosion in a cafe in the city centre near the Salisbury town hall. A subsequent police statement said that the bomb thrown into the cafe was a hand grenade. On 24 August 1966, it was reported that the Southern Rhodesian police had arrested four Africans in

connexion with the grenade thrown into the cafe. On 21 September 1966, two Africans were sentenced to death by a Salisbury Court for the hand grenade attack in the cafe.

49. On 15 August 1966, the police reported that another group of African "terrorists" had surrendered to Southern Rhodesian forces. According to the statement by the police, they were captured in an area to the north of Matabeleland. It was alleged that these individuals who recently left Lusaka, Zambia, had received training in a communist or pro-communist country and were carrying weapons and materials of communist origin. On 29 September 1966, eleven of the terrorists were each sentenced to eighteen years' imprisonment for possessing firearms.

Official statements on security forces

50. The annual defence report tabled in the Rhodesian Legislative Assembly on 26 April 1966 stated that throughout the past year emphasis had been placed on counter-insurgency in training at all levels and on "the defence phase of limited war". Certain parts of the country's borders were now under continuous surveillance and troops were permanently stationed at Kariba. The Royal Rhodesian Air Force possessed a considerable strike ability which posed a valid deterrent to aggression. In almost 13,000 hours flown, a daily serviceability rate of 82 per cent had been recorded.

51. The "Ministry of Defence" of the illegal régime announced on 1 July 1966, that territorial force and army reserve training camps would be held between 24 July and 2 October 1966. An official announcement said that the camps would be held in areas not only in but outside the main centres of the country and training would include refresher courses, range firing, and night operations.

52. In a recorded interview which was broadcast on 26 August 1966, on the African Service of the Rhodesia Broadcasting Corporation, the "Minister of Internal Affairs", Mr. William Harper, said that nearly all the terrorists who had entered Southern Rhodesia had been captured and that the security forces had shot whole gangs of terrorists, not one surviving, when they had resisted arrest. Those people ought to know that when they resisted arrest that was the sort of treatment they were going to receive from the armed forces of Southern Rhodesia. Asked what sort of reception Southern Rhodesian Africans who had left their country and wished to return would receive, Mr. Harper replied that if those people were terrorists their chances of being rounded up was extremely high.

53. On Southern Rhodesia's security position, Mr. Harper said that there was no suggestion of a general breakdown in law and order. Since political hooligans had been removed from the townships and countryside he thought that everyone would admit that life for the average man and women was far more peaceful than anything the country had known for a long time. He said that it had always been the case in Southern Rhodesia that it was only those who did wrong, the evildoers, who had cause to fear the authorities. People who organized the terrorists should not think that they could work against Southern Rhodesia while they lived beyond its borders and then be welcomed back with open arms if they sought to return. Those people shared equally the guilt with the actual terrorists themselves. Mr. Harper said that if such people fell into the hands of the police they would be dealt with as the criminals they were and they should remember that the police did not close cases on such persons until they had achieved their objective.

54. In a recorded interview on the African Service of the Rhodesia Broadcasting Corporation on 2 September 1966, Air Vice Marshal Hawkins, ACC, the "Royal Rhodesian Air Force", stated that apart from South Africa, the Royal Rhodesian Air Force was the strongest and best balanced force within 3,500 miles. He said that there was nothing like the Royal Rhodesian Air Force "this side of North Africa". The RRAF had the weapons and the bombs. Air Vice Marshal Hawkins said: "If anyone attacked us, if we were certain that anyone was about to attack us, then we reserve the right to defend ourselves in this way, by using our offensive force. But let us be clear for this moment and for the foreseeable future that we have no aggressive intention against anyone." The Rhodesian Air Force jet bombers were the country's strike effort. This meant that anyone with evil intentions towards the country would have to think twice before attacking it. It also meant that if anyone was misguided enough to launch a fairly large land-based assault against the country it could withstand these forces and give support to the army and other security forces in repelling such an attack. The Rhodesian Air Force was also well equipped and capable of capturing and wiping out small groups of terrorists. In case of an attack the Rhodesian Air Force would, with transport aircraft and helicopters, get ground forces to any point, in some cases, within minutes. Asked if he could see any threat which the country could not meet, Air Vice Marshal Hawkins said he did not. He just hoped that no one was misguided enough to pose one.

Further clashes with Africans

55. On 2 September 1966, three alleged African "terrorists" were committed to trial in Bulawayo for being in possession of offensive weapons. A fourth African appearing with them was committed to a similar charge and was alleged to have hidden guns and ammunition for the terrorists. The men were reported to be handcuffed in pairs and wearing leg-irons when they were escorted into court by the police. At the preliminary hearing, the judge ruled, among other things, that the political parties they represented should not be published. They were reported to have crossed the border into Southern Rhodesia from Zambia. On 27 September 1966, the three African terrorists were each gaoled for eighteen years, and the fourth for six years.

56. The police announced on 27 September that two suspected "terrorists" had been killed and a number of others captured in a clash with security forces on 25 September 1966. The action took place in the Chirundi Valley near the Zambian border when a patrol of the Rhodesian Light Infantry ran into the alleged terrorist group. According to the report one member of the security forces suffered a slight injury. The clash, according to the police, took place near the spot where an African driver was found shot dead and his truck wrecked in the Chirundi Valley on 18 September. Since then the police had instituted a convoy and patrol system in the area. Seven Africans accused of the murder on 18 September of an African truck driver were found guilty and sentenced to death in Salisbury High Court on 14 December. In passing sentence, Mr. Justice Fieldsend said that the men were members of a gang who had entered the country with the avowed intention of raising a "rebellion riot". All seven men pleaded not guilty to the charges and appealed against the verdict.

57. On 6 October 1966, an African clerk was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment for being in possession of offensive weapons.

58. On 1 November, Mr. Elisha Tarisayi, an African, was sentenced to death under the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act in the Salisbury High Court. He had been found guilty for having thrown a hand grenade at a suburban house in August. No one had been injured in the ensuing explosion.

59. On 3 November, four Africans who had been found guilty of having been in possession of offensive weapons and for having entered Southern Rhodesia for the purpose of making war, received the death penalty in Salisbury High Court. The Court was told that the men had been captured by a patrol of the Rhodesian Light Infantry in the Zambezi Valley near the Zambia border.

60. Two Africans were each sentenced to ten years' imprisonment by the High Court in Salisbury on 8 November for illegal possession of two machine-guns of French manufacture and over 2,000 rounds of ammunition of Russian and Italian manufacture. A third African received a prison sentence of eight years for a similar offence.

61. Following an official report from Zambia that a Zambian woman had been shot while in a canoe on the Zambezi River near the Zambian shore, an official statement in Salisbury on 8 November said that Rhodesian security forces in the Chirundi area had surprised three Africans in a boat near the Rhodesian bank of the Zambezi and that the security forces had opened fire on the boat when the occupants, called upon to identify themselves, had paddled back across the river. The Rhodesian statement said it was possible that one person in the boat may have received fatal injuries, and emphasized that persons attempting to enter Rhodesia at places other than recognized border posts, particularly in areas known to be favoured by infiltrating terrorists, ran the risk of injury or possibly death.

62. The appeals of seven Africans, who had each been sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment on charges concerning the bringing of arms and explosive materials into Rhodesia with the intention of using them, were dismissed by the appellate division of the High Court in Salisbury on 19 November.

63. On 23 November, four Africans were convicted by the High Court in Salisbury on charges of carrying offensive weapons and attempted murder. They were stated to have been captured by a Rhodesian Light Infantry patrol operating near the Zambezi valley. The arms were reported to have included three Russian rifles, a Chinese rocket launcher with seven rockets, twelve American hand grenades and six British anti-personnel mines. The accused were all sentenced to death.

Reports on clashes

64. A pamphlet prepared by the illegal régime on "terrorist" activities entitled Nowhere to Hide was issued on 17 October 1966. According to the pamphlet, as of the

end of September 1966, twelve African "terrorists" had been killed and several scores captured by the security forces with the co-operation of the local African population. According to the pamphlet, the terrorist campaign had been a dismal failure.

65. Reports issued by both ZANU and ZAFU in 1966 claimed that their forces had killed large numbers of the security forces of the illegal régime in the past months.

Restricttees and detainees

66. On 21 June 1966 it was reported that the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole, leader of the banned Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and some of his lieutenants had been moved from their restriction camp at Sokombela, near Que Que to the remand prison in Salisbury. It was reported that this was believed to be a security precaution in view of recent outbreaks of violence which had been publicly claimed by the party.

67. Mr. Lardner-Burke, stated in the "Legislative Assembly" on 1 July 1966 that ninety-five people had been detained under the emergency measures since the declaration of independence in November 1965. Of these, six had been released on permit and three had had their orders revoked. He declined to reveal where they were being held. He also stated that 331 people had been in restriction camps before "independence".

68. Mr. Garfield Todd, a former Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, was released from restriction on 18 October 1966, upon the expiration of his one-year restriction order.

Africans awaiting hanging

69. As at December 1966, it was reported that there were about seventy Africans convicted of murder and offences under the mandatory "hanging clause" of the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act waiting indefinitely in the Salisbury death cells because of the constitutional and legal uncertainty surrounding the Ian Smith régime. Mr. Herbert Bowden, Commonwealth Secretary, and Sir Elwyn Jones, the Attorney General, were reported to have let it be known during their visit to Salisbury in September that the signing of a death warrant by Mr. Dupont under the present circumstances would have serious consequences for him and those concerned.

University College and the illegal régime

70. On 16 July 1966, a group of African students demonstrated against the illegal régime at the annual graduation ceremony of the University College of Rhodesia.
71. On 27 July 1966, the Southern Rhodesian police detained under the emergency regulations nine lecturers and an Asian student. Nine other students, three whites, one Asian, and five Africans, were also placed under restriction.
72. On 31 July 1966, eight of the nine lecturers detained were served with deportation orders and left Southern Rhodesia on 3 August. The ninth, a British-born Rhodesian citizen, was released on 31 July and escorted to the airport where he left for London on the same day. The Asian student who had been detained with the lecturers was also released and left for the United Kingdom by air on 2 August.
73. Of the nine restricted students, five of them - all African - were restricted at the Gonakudzinkwa restriction camp where the African nationalist leader, Mr. Josiah Nkomo is being held.
74. It was announced on 2 September that a number of persons had been detained under the emergency powers regulations; these included another lecturer from the University College, Mr. John Andrew Conradie. On 5 September, Mr. Conradie and an employee of an industrial firm, Mr. Dixon, were charged in the Salisbury magistrates' court with offences against the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act. The prosecution alleged "that the accused, with others at the University College, were members of a group responsible for the reception, storage and eventual distribution of offensive materials for use against the European community, their property and homes", and that the group was "responsible for maintaining contact with infiltrated terrorists". Another allegation involved the possession of Russian hand grenades. It was stated that warrants had been issued for the arrest of two former lecturers at the college, both of whom were reported to have left Southern Rhodesia.
75. On 20 February 1966, Mr. Conradie was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment for offences arising out of terrorist activities.

Exploratory talks between United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesian officials

76. It will be recalled that on 27 April 1966, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Mr. Harold Wilson, announced in the House of Commons that informal talks between officials of the United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesia had been arranged, directed only to see whether a basis for negotiations genuinely existed and that they were without commitment on either side.

77. Altogether, three rounds of informal talks were held between 9 May and 25 August 1966. The first round of the informal talks was held in London from 9 to 20 May 1966, followed by two sessions in Salisbury between 2 June and 5 July, and between 22 and 25 August 1966.

78. The talks were mainly directed, firstly, to the method and condition of a return to legality and constitutional rule in Southern Rhodesia, and the determination of the question of with whom official negotiations could subsequently take place; and, secondly, to an informal exploration in detail of constitutional problems to see what amendments to the 1961 Constitution would be needed to give effect to the six principles which had been the basis of discussions with the legal Southern Rhodesian Government up to 11 November 1965.

79. The six principles to which the United Kingdom Government was committed in the above and subsequent discussions with the Southern Rhodesian authorities were as follows:

(1) The principle and intention of unimpeded progress to majority rule, already enshrined in the 1961 Constitution, would have to be maintained and guaranteed.

(2) There would also have to be guarantees against retrogressive amendment of the Constitution.

(3) There would have to be immediate improvement in the political status of the African population.

(4) There would have to be progress towards ending racial discrimination.

(5) The British Government would need to be satisfied that any basis proposed for independence was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole.

(6) It would be necessary to ensure that, regardless of race, there was no oppression of majority by minority or of minority by majority.

80. The third round of informal talks ended on 25 August 1966, soon after the British officials were informed of the illegal régime's plans to introduce the Constitutional Amendment Bill in the Legislative Assembly (see paragraphs 25-30). The bill was described by a spokesman of the Commonwealth Relations Office as a most provocative act. Mr. Smith, however, was reported to have stated that his Government had not introduced the bill to end the talks, although the United Kingdom had used it for that purpose.

Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference

81. A Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference was held in London from 6 to 14 September 1966 and was primarily devoted to the problem of Southern Rhodesia. Twenty-two Commonwealth countries were represented.

82. In the separate communiqué issued on Southern Rhodesia at the close of the Conference, most of the Heads of Government urged that Britain should make a categorical declaration that independence would not be granted before majority rule was established on the basis of universal adult franchise and that this declaration should not be conditional on whether the illegal régime agreed to surrender or not. They further urged that Britain should refuse to resume discussions or to negotiate with the illegal régime.

83. According to the communiqué, the British Prime Minister stated that the British Government would not recommend to the British Parliament any constitutional settlement which did not conform with the six principles: that they attached particular importance to the fifth principle, namely that any settlement must be, and be seen to be, acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole; that they regarded it as implicit in this fifth principle that the test of acceptability must enable the people of Rhodesia as a whole to indicate whether or not they were prepared to accept any settlement which provided for the grant of independence before majority rule was achieved; and that there would be no independence before majority rule if the people of Rhodesia as a whole were shown to be opposed to it.

84. The Conference noted the following decisions of the British Government:

(a) After the illegal régime was ended a legal government would be appointed by the Governor and would constitute a broadly based representative administration. During this interim period the armed forces and police would be responsible to

the Governor. Those individuals who had been detained or restricted on political grounds would be released and normal political activities would be permitted provided that they were conducted peacefully and democratically without intimidation from any quarter.

(b) The British Government would negotiate, with this interim administration, a constitutional settlement directed to achieving the objective of majority rule, on the basis of the six principles.

(c) This constitutional settlement would be submitted for acceptance to the people of Rhodesia as a whole by appropriate democratic means.

(d) The British Parliament and Government must be satisfied that this test of opinion was fair and free and would be acceptable to the general world community.

(e) The British Government would not consent to independence before majority rule unless the people of Rhodesia as a whole were shown to be in favour of it.

85. The communique stated that the Heads of Government also noted that the British Government proposed immediately to communicate the British intentions, as indicated above, through the Governor to all sections of opinion in Rhodesia and to inform the illegal régime there that if they were not prepared to take the initial and indispensable steps whereby the rebellion was brought to an end and executive authority was vested in the Governor, the following related consequences would ensue:

(a) The British Government would withdraw all previous proposals for a constitutional settlement which had been made: in particular they would not thereafter be prepared to submit to the British Parliament any settlement which involved independence before majority rule.

(b) Given the full support of Commonwealth representatives at the United Nations, the British Government would be prepared to join in sponsoring in the Security Council of the United Nations before the end of 1966 a resolution providing for effective and selective mandatory economic sanctions against Rhodesia.

86. On 16 September 1966, Mr. Ian Smith was reported to have said that his regime was under no obligation to accept any decisions made at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference, as it had not been invited to attend.

Discussion of the United Kingdom Government's proposals

87. The Commonwealth Secretary, Mr. Herbert Bowden, and the Attorney General, Sir Elwyn Jones, visited Southern Rhodesia from 19 to 28 September 1966 for the purposes indicated in the Commonwealth Prime Ministers communiqué on Southern Rhodesia. During the course of their visit, they met under the aegis of the Governor, a cross section of representative opinion in the country, including Mr. Smith and members of the regime. In these talks they clarified the United Kingdom Government's requirements for a settlement of the Southern Rhodesian problem and what the consequences of the rejection of the United Kingdom proposals would be. Discussions of the proposals were continued during a visit to Southern Rhodesia in October by Sir Morris James, Deputy Under-Secretary of State, Commonwealth Office. Further discussions of the proposals took place when the Commonwealth Secretary, Mr. Bowden, paid a second visit to Salisbury between 25 and 27 November 1966, and had talks with the Governor and also met Mr. Smith. Following the return of the Commonwealth Secretary to London, Sir Morris James left for Salisbury on 28 November to see the Governor and under his auspices to clarify certain issues which had arisen from the Commonwealth Secretary's report on his discussions in Salisbury.

Meeting between the United Kingdom Prime Minister and Mr. Smith

88. Mr. Harold Wilson told the House of Commons on 1 December 1966, that he was leaving that afternoon, together with the Commonwealth Secretary and the Attorney General, for a meeting with the Governor of Southern Rhodesia and Mr. Ian Smith. The purpose of the meeting was to ascertain whether within the programme of action to which the United Kingdom Government was committed by the communiqué issued at the end of the meeting of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers, a settlement of the Rhodesian problem could be reached on the basis of the principles to which successive British Governments had throughout adhered.

89. The meeting of the British Prime Minister and Mr. Ian Smith took place aboard HMS Tiger off Gibraltar from 2 to 4 December. Also present were the Commonwealth Secretary and the Attorney General; the Governor and the Chief Justice of Rhodesia; and another member of the Rhodesian regime, Mr. Howman.

90. The meeting resulted in a working document setting out proposals for an independent constitution which would accord with the six principles, and arrangements within the requirements indicated in the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' communique for a return to legality.

91. A statement was signed by the Prime Minister and Mr. Smith, in the presence of the Governor, on 4 December, indicating that this document was without commitment on either side and that both sides would decide by 12 noon (Salisbury time) on 5 December, whether it was accepted in its entirety.

Proposals for a settlement

92. The working document was drawn up in accordance with the six principles and provisions were made for a return to legality and the testing of opinion.

93. As set out in the working document, Chapter III of the 1961 Constitution as modified, would be entrenched in the new constitution, subject to the increase of constituencies ("A" roll seats) called for by the normal increase of population. This increase would be effected by an agreed formula which would safeguard against diminishing African representation. In modification of the Chapter, the number of "A" roll seats would be reduced from fifty to thirty-three, the "B" roll seats increased from fifteen to seventeen, and a new block of seventeen European seats created. A Senate would be created composed of twelve European seats and fourteen African seats, eight popularly elected and six elected by the Chiefs' Council; entrenched provisions could be amended only by a three-quarters vote of both houses and amendments could not come into effect until the time-limit for appeals had expired. Appeals against amendments would be made first to a Constitutional Commission in Rhodesia and further to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. In addition, the "B" roll franchise would be extended to all Africans over thirty years of age and cross-voting would be retained.

94. Steps for a return to legality required the appointment by the Governor of a broad-based interim government with Mr. Smith as Prime Minister which would include

representatives of existing political parties, independents and Africans; the dissolution of the legislature; and the restoration of constitutional government based on the 1961 Constitution, modified (by Order in Council) to provide that during the interim period, which would last a minimum of four months, the ministers would be responsible to the Governor who would have legislative powers and would normally act on their advice in all internal matters. In cases involving law and order and protection of human rights the Governor would be advised, in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces, by a Defence and Security Council comprising the responsible ministers, the heads of the Defence Forces, the Chief of Police, and a representative of the British Government. Furthermore, during the interim period, the test of acceptability of the new constitution would be carried out and new elections held; if the constitution was found to be approved, a further election on the basis of that constitution would be held. Failing acceptance, however, alternative proposals for a new constitution would be devised by both Governments. Additionally, before any testing of opinion, censorship would be removed, prisoners detained on security grounds released, and normal political activities permitted. Regarding racial discrimination, a Royal Commission would be set up to study the question and make recommendations, especially with regard to land apportionment; a standing commission would keep the problem under regular review. Finally, the proposals called for the negotiation of a treaty guaranteeing the independence constitution under which, in the event that unilateral action against the constitution was again taken by the Government in power, Britain reserved the right to use force.

White Paper on proposals for a settlement

95. A White Paper issued on the proposals for a settlement (Rhodesia: Proposals for a Settlement 1966, Cmnd. 3159) stated that the document provided for unimpeded progress to majority rule (i.e., the first principle), while finding a means of introducing European reserved seats (to give effect to the sixth principle). It met the second principle by establishing an effective blocking mechanism in a Senate and Lower House voting together, and by providing a right of appeal against the amendment of specially entrenched clauses of the constitution, in the first instance to a constitutional commission in Rhodesia, and from that commission, as

of right, to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. It met the third principle (i.e., an immediate improvement of the political status of the Africans) by an extension of the "B" roll franchise to cover all Africans over thirty years of age; by increasing the "B" roll seats in the Lower House from fifteen to seventeen, and by a total of fourteen African seats in the Senate of which eight would be elected and six would be Chiefs.

96. Also, according to the White Paper, the fourth principle was met by a Royal Commission to study and make recommendations on the problems of racial discrimination and land apportionment. It also suggested satisfactory arrangements within the requirements indicated in the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' communique for a return to legality by means of the appointment by the Governor of a broad-based administration, and for the testing of the opinion of the people of Rhodesia as a whole as required by the fifth principle after constitutional government had been restored.^{6/}

Working document rejected by illegal regime

97. On 4 December 1966, the United Kingdom Government accepted the working document in its entirety. On the evening of 5 December 1966, the Ian Smith regime informed the United Kingdom Government that it was unwilling to accept the document in its entirety. According to the White Paper on the working document, as had been made clear to Mr. Smith on the HMS Tiger, and as he had recognized in signing the statement, the illegal régime had thus rejected the document.

98. In a subsequent statement on 5 December 1966, Mr. Ian Smith said that the Rhodesian Government was prepared to accept the constitutional proposals by Mr. Wilson which fulfilled the six principles as a basis for a constitution for an independent Rhodesia. He added, however, the British Government's expectation that the Rhodesian Government would abandon the 1965 Constitution before a new constitution had finally been secured and put to the test of public opinion, was utterly irresponsible. The proposals also envisaged by Mr. Wilson under the heading

^{6/} For details covering the whole range of talks, see United Kingdom: Rhodesia: Documents Relating to Proposals for a Settlement 1966, Cmnd. 3171.

"A Return to Legality" were repugnant to the Rhodesian Government involving as they did: (a) control of the armed forces and police being invested in the Governor; (b) the Governor being invested with discretion to appoint the ministers of the Crown, of whom no less than five were to be appointed outside the government party and not less than two must be Africans; (c) the dissolution of Parliament and the Governor being invested with legislative powers which in general would be exercised on the advice of his ministers, but which in certain cases might be exercised at his discretion.

Further action taken by the United Kingdom Government in pursuance of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers communique

99. On 5 December 1966, the United Kingdom Government requested an early meeting of the Security Council to propose certain additional measures to be taken against the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia (see para. 9).

100. On 20 December, Mr. Wilson stated in the House of Commons that the British Government was from that time withdrawing all previous proposals for a constitutional settlement and that it would not submit to Parliament any settlement involving independence before majority rule. By this declaration the United Kingdom fulfilled its final obligation under the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Communique of 14 September 1966.

101. In his statement Mr. Wilson explained that in the future a settlement could be brought about only by a legal government and that the settlement would consist of a return to the 1961 Constitution, the lifting of sanctions, and long-term progress to majority rule set out in the 1961 Constitution. At present, Mr. Wilson continued, there had been no change in the Government's position regarding the use of force, but if a change were necessitated by events the House would be informed.

Other developments between the United Kingdom Government and the illegal regime

102. The House of Commons on 10 November 1966 approved without a division the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965 (Continuation) Order 1966. The Southern Rhodesian Act, 1965

which empowers the United Kingdom Government to legislate for Southern Rhodesia by orders in council and provides for executive authority in Rhodesia to be exercised on behalf of the Queen by the Commonwealth Secretary,^{7/} was due to have expired on 15 November. It now continues in force.

Relations with South Africa

103. Throughout 1966, the Government of the Republic of South Africa maintained its policy of "non-intervention" in "the Rhodesian dispute" as laid down by Dr. Hendrick Verwoerd in his policy statement of 11 November 1965.^{8/} Accordingly, South Africa continued "to maintain the normal friendly relations" with both the United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesia. Within the period under review, the social activities and public appearances of Mr. John Gaunt, the illegal regime's "plenipotentiary diplomatic representative in the Republic" were given wide publicity in the local newspapers of South Africa.

104. Throughout 1966, the "Friends of Rhodesia" organization on South Africa (which was set up soon after the illegal declaration of independence to buttress the Ian Smith regime) continued to open offices and branches in the major cities of South Africa which openly identified the struggle of the illegal regime with that of South Africa and canvassed support and collected funds to aid the illegal regime. On 20 June 1966, Mr. Ian Smith sent a message to the Friends of Rhodesia in South Africa in which he said that it was impossible to express adequately the gratitude Rhodesians felt towards their friends in South Africa for the support they were giving in the struggle to preserve the standards of Western civilization in that part of Africa.

105. On 23 July 1966, the "Minister of Local Government" of the illegal regime, Mr. Mark Partridge, speaking in a suburb of Salisbury at the opening of a fountain built as a symbol of thanks to South Africa and Portugal, said that without the help of Portugal and South Africa after the declaration of independence, Southern Rhodesia could have lost everything.

^{7/} See A/6300/Add.1 (part I), appendix II.

^{8/} Ibid., para. 124.

106. The President of the Republic of South Africa, Mr. Charles Swart, in his speech opening the first session of the third Parliament on 29 July 1966, stated that his Government welcomed the resumption of talks between the British and Southern Rhodesian authorities and trusted that they would soon lead to beneficial results and the removal of sanctions.

107. On 15 September 1966, the former Rhodesian High Commissioner for the United Kingdom, Brigadier Skeen, told the Legislative Assembly in Salisbury that Southern Rhodesia's most important diplomatic mission was the one in South Africa, followed by those in Portugal and Mozambique, and appealed for increases in funds for the South African mission.

108. Following the assassination of the Prime Minister of the Republic of South Africa, Mr. Verwoerd, the Southern Rhodesian Legislative Assembly on 7 September 1966, unanimously moved a respectful address to Mr. Clifford Dupont, the "Officer Administering the Government", asking him to express its shock and deep sorrow at Mr. Verwoerd's tragic death to the Government and people of South Africa and to Mrs. Verwoerd and her family. Introducing the motion, Mr. Ian Smith said that the world was poorer for Dr. Verwoerd's passing and that the people of Southern Rhodesia would never forget him. On 10 September 1966, Mr. Smith flew to Pretoria to attend Dr. Verwoerd's funeral in what South African officials called a private capacity.

109. In a statement to the South African Parliament on 21 September 1966, the new Prime Minister of the Republic, Mr. Johannes Vorster, said that he wanted to correct any wrong impressions which might be created by published reports of a statement by Mr. Wilson on Mr. Verwoerd's role as adviser to Mr. Smith.

110. There had been an exchange of correspondence not only between Mr. Wilson and Dr. Verwoerd, but also between Mr. Smith and Dr. Verwoerd. He had gone through this correspondence and what the late Prime Minister had said in it was in large measure what he had said in public. There had been an appeal to both Mr. Wilson and Mr. Smith to try to see if they could, through discussion, solve a domestic difference which in the interest of all should be solved as a domestic matter.

111. Also in his statement, the new Prime Minister stated that he intended to follow the same policy towards Southern Rhodesia as had been followed by Dr. Verwoerd. Mr. Vorster further said that neither under pressure nor force would South Africa take part in boycotts or sanctions. His Government was determined to carry on its policy of normal trade with Southern Rhodesia even if this meant taking risks.

112. In an interview which was published on 5 December 1966, Mr. Vorster stated that although South Africa would welcome an agreement between the United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesia, it would in no circumstances take part in United Nations sanctions against Southern Rhodesia if agreement failed. South Africa's policy was absolutely clear. It would neither take part voluntarily in sanctions nor would it allow itself to be forced into them. Asked what South Africa would do if the United Nations decreed sanctions against it on account of Southern Rhodesia or South West Africa, Mr. Vorster said that South Africa had made all necessary preparations to defend what legitimately belonged to it and its rights.

Relations with Portugal

113. Portugal has continued to maintain normal relations with the illegal regime, which it describes as the "local government of Southern Rhodesia". Since 15 September 1965, Southern Rhodesia has had a "diplomatic representative" in Portugal who is officially referred to as "Chief of the Rhodesian Mission". He deals directly with the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning "all matters of interest to Portugal and Southern Rhodesia". Portugal has also continued to maintain its representation and its offices in Southern Rhodesia at the same level as before the illegal declaration of independence.

114. Speaking at a civic reception in Umtali on 21 May 1966, which was attended by people from Umtali and from Mozambique, Mr. Smith expressed the gratitude of "Rhodesians" for the tremendous support being given by the Portuguese, particularly those who lived in Mozambique. Mr. Smith said that after the little upset "Rhodesia" was now going through was completed, and he had no doubt that it would be completed in the right way as far as Rhodesians were concerned, the bonds of friendship between his country and the people of Mozambique would be far stronger than ever before. He added that through the links being now forged there would probably come a movement for greater unification between Rhodesia, Portugal and South Africa.

Zambia and Southern Rhodesia

115. Purported legislation to suspend in Southern Rhodesia the services of process and the execution of judgements made in the courts of Zambia was introduced in the "Rhodesian" Legislative Assembly in July 1966. The member of the regime responsible for justice, Mr. Lardner-Burke, said that the legislation was necessary as Zambia had recently repealed, as far as "Rhodesia" was concerned, the 1956 Federal Act which had made court judgements in one of the territories which at that time composed the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland applicable in the others. Zambia's action, he said, meant that judgements of the "Rhodesian" courts would not be operative in Zambia whereas those of the Zambian courts continued to be operative in "Rhodesia".

116. It will be recalled that in response to an appeal by the Government of Zambia to the United Kingdom Government to send troops to help Zambia to defend the Kariba Dam, a Royal Air Force squadron of Javelin aircraft was sent to Zambia on 3 December 1965. The squadron was withdrawn from Zambia at the end of August. A Commonwealth Office statement, issued in London on 24 August 1966, said that the Zambian Government had been recently asked whether it wished the squadron of Javelins to remain in Zambia. The Zambian Government indicated in its reply that the Javelins could now be withdrawn. The arrangements for the withdrawal were consequently put into effect.

Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the question of Southern Rhodesia

117. The Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, meeting in its Third Ordinary Session in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia from 5 to 9 November 1966, adopted a resolution on Southern Rhodesia. In this resolution, the Heads of State and Government bitterly and unreservedly condemned the current talks between the British Government and the rebel settler regime in Southern Rhodesia as a conspiracy aimed at recognizing the independence seized illegally by the rebel settlers; called upon all member States of the OAU and all other States to continue to refuse recognition to any independent regime which the present talks between Britain and the Southern Rhodesian rebels might bring about unless such a government was based on majority rule; strongly condemned Britain for her refusal to crush the Southern Rhodesian rebel regime and repeated its demands to the United Kingdom Government to

bring about the immediate downfall of that regime by any means including the use of force; reiterated the terms of paragraph 4 of its resolution of 5 March 1966, and accordingly recommended that the OAU, and all friendly Governments, give material and financial aid to the Zimbabwe people who were actually fighting inside Zimbabwe; condemned those States especially those of Portugal and South Africa which render support to the rebel regime in Southern Rhodesia; called upon all Member countries and all countries which wished to see human dignity and freedom in Africa and throughout the world to support a programme of mandatory and comprehensive sanctions against Southern Rhodesia under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations; repeated its calls upon all Member countries to contribute to a special Southern Rhodesia Liberation Fund to enable all Zimbabwe nationalists to intensify the fighting against the rebels; called upon Member States to give practical implementation to paragraph 3 of the resolution of 5 March 1966 by which it decided to establish a "Committee of Solidarity for Zambia composed of five members whose task shall be to seek appropriate measures of technical and economic assistance by Member States to Zambia", so as to enable Zambia not only to withstand the effects of the unilateral declaration of independence but also to help all Zimbabwe freedom fighters more effectively.

Relations with other States

118. On 19 August 1966, Lord Graham, the "Minister of External Affairs" in answer to a question in the Legislative Assembly regarding the representation of foreign countries in Southern Rhodesia since the illegal declaration of independence, said five countries - Denmark, France, Italy, Japan and the United States of America - had withdrawn their heads of mission, but had not closed their offices. Eight other countries - Austria, Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and Switzerland - had maintained their representation and their offices at the same level as before. Australia and Canada had closed their trade missions. Finland, Sweden and Turkey had closed their honorary consulates.

119. One of the two diplomatic missions in Salisbury, the United Kingdom, had withdrawn its High Commissioner and various members of his staff and closed its diplomatic office, but had left a residual mission in the city. The only other diplomatic mission, that of South Africa, had maintained its representation and its office.

B. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS (June-December 1966)^{9/}

120. According to figures published by the Central Statistical Office in Salisbury on 6 June 1966, Rhodesian trade reached record levels in 1965. Exports (including gold sales and re-exports) were worth £165 million (compared with £140.5 million in 1964) and imports, £120 million (£109.7 million in 1964). An economic survey, presented to the Rhodesian Legislative Assembly on 6 July 1966, stated that the country's gross domestic product was £354 million in the year ended 31 December 1965, an increase of 7 per cent over the preceding year. Per capita income had risen by £2.2s. to £84.

121. It will be recalled that by operative paragraph 8 of resolution 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965, the Security Council, inter alia, called on all States to refrain from any action which would assist and encourage the illegal regime and to do their utmost in order to break all economic relations with Southern Rhodesia, including an embargo on oil and petroleum products. The resolution also called upon the United Kingdom to enforce urgently and with vigour all the measures it had announced as well as those mentioned in paragraph 8 of the above resolution.

122. Pursuant to the above resolution and its own policy towards the illegal regime, the United Kingdom Government, by 30 January 1966, had imposed an oil embargo on Southern Rhodesia and announced the imposition of a total ban on all British exports to Southern Rhodesia with the exception of essential humanitarian needs, essential requirements of the joint Central African organizations, and goods on the quay-side already paid for. On the same date it also announced that the ban on imports of goods from Southern Rhodesia had been extended to cover all imports from Southern Rhodesia.

123. By the Southern Rhodesia (Prohibited Exports and Imports) Order, 1966, the United Kingdom Government was empowered to embargo Southern Rhodesia's trade in any specified product to cover also trade transactions with third countries. The United Kingdom expressed the hope that foreign Governments would recognize its legal

^{9/} For economic developments since the adoption of Security Council resolution 232 (1966) on 16 December 1966, see paragraphs 290-321.

authority to impose this embargo as they had done in the case of oil. Under this Order, the United Kingdom Government had by the middle of 1966 imposed an embargo on the export from Southern Rhodesia of essential commodities, including chrome, sugar, tobacco, pig iron, iron ore, copper and asbestos.

124. By the end of December 1966, seventy-four States had replied to the Secretary-General's notes transmitting the text of resolution 217 (1965) for appropriate action. In general terms, a substantial number of these replies showed a complete break in all economic relations with Southern Rhodesia, while a number of replies showed a gradual phasing out of economic relations based on the banning of trade in specified products.

125. Since the imposition of international sanctions, the internal economy and trade patterns of Southern Rhodesia have undergone some reorganization. Statements made by officials of the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia have confirmed that these changes have become necessary as a result of the international sanctions which have been imposed on Southern Rhodesia. Since February 1966, however, the Smith regime has suppressed the publication of relevant statistical information on the state of the national economy in addition to the imposition of censorship on economic news. Statements by the Smith regime regarding the state of the national economy in 1966 could not therefore be verified.

Rhodesian budget 1966-67

126. The Rhodesian budget, introduced on 21 July 1966 by Mr. John Wrathall, "Minister of Finance", provided for current account expenditure of £73.3 million (an increase of £500,000 over the previous year) and revenue of £71.4 million (£2.5 million lower than in 1965-66). Taking into account the previous year's surplus of £1.5 million, the deficit at the end of June 1967 was estimated at £400,000. Loan account expenditure was estimated at £26 million; £14 million of this was already available or certain to materialize and Mr. Wrathall said he was confident that the remainder could be raised locally. There were no increases in income tax or super tax rates, but the tax on undistributed profits was increased from 5s.8d. to 7s.6d. in the pound. The investment credit system was abolished.

127. The police, army and air force vote rose from £11.1 million in the original estimates for 1965-66, excluding the instalment of £500,000 for purchase of aircraft but including army and air force buildings, to £12.7 million. In the increase of £1.6 million, the major items were £785,000 for pay increases awarded during the past year and £303,000 for the extended National Service Scheme. The biggest increase in expenditure was in the army vote which rose by £600,000, or nearly 20 per cent. The police vote was increased by 6 per cent but the air force vote was reduced. Expenditure on health and education was estimated at £19.6 million, an increase of £1.5 million; provision for African education was increased by £590,000 to £6.97 million.

128. Mr. Herbert Bowden, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs, said in reply to a parliamentary question on 11 August, that the United Kingdom Government's conclusion, after a close study of such figures as the regime had thought fit to publish, was that the budget was a deliberately slanted and misleading document which was more noteworthy for what it omitted than for what it revealed.

Official report on the state of the economy

129. In the budget statement of 21 July, Mr. Wrathall gave what amounted to a progress report on the economic activities and achievements of the Smith regime since the illegal declaration of independence.

130. In his statement, Mr. Wrathall said that since 11 November 1965, foreign exchange had been allocated for the establishment of new industries, the value of whose fixed investment totalled almost £4 million. Of this, over £800,000 was in the food, drink and tobacco industries; more than £900,000 in the metal, metallic and non-metallic mineral manufacturing industries; £1.9 million in the textile, clothing and footwear industries; and about £300,000 in rubber, wood, paper, travel goods, furniture, chemicals and various other industries. These projects would give direct employment to over 200 Europeans and nearly 2,000 Africans.

131. The Government was also examining new proposals for a projected fertilizer factory, estimated to involve an investment of £10 million. A major nickel project involving an investment of £4 million would add very considerably to the foreign exchange earnings. There were many other interesting developments in the mining field.

132. New expenditures to combat the effects of sanctions included £325,000 to enable the Industrial Development Corporation to establish a confirming house and to provide it with additional capital for assisting with the diversification and development of industry, particularly industrial projects directed towards economically sound import substitution. The upsurge in cotton production made it necessary to bring forward the construction of the new ginnery at Bindura; this involved an additional allocation of £197,000 and £450,000 were made available to the Sabi-Limpopo Authority to finance the wheat scheme at Mkwesine in the lowveld, using water from Lake MacDougall, for growing about 2,600 acres of wheat.

133. According to Mr. Wrathall's statement, production continued at a high level in the first half of 1966 despite sanctions. Although 1965 had been a good year, the figures for the first five months of 1966 were even better for some industries, notably mining, food-stuffs, and electricity. Industrial production as a whole, however, fell by about 7.5 per cent during this period compared with the same period in 1965. In the early months of 1966 there was a setback in some types of retail business, but in the food, clothing, footwear, drapery and general merchandise trade business was at a higher level than in the corresponding months of 1965. The building societies had continued to improve their position. Deposits and share capital increased from £44.6 million to £46.8 million between 30 June 1965 and 30 June 1966.

134. Mr. Wrathall also stated that the dark cloud over the agricultural industry could not be attributed primarily to sanctions. Sanctions might have brought matters to a head more quickly than would otherwise have been the case, but this meant that the problem was being tackled sooner rather than later, which was all to the good. The banking system and the money market were in a particularly sound position, and were braced to meet any further assaults which might be made upon them. The Government's own financial position was also highly satisfactory. On loan account it was probably in a stronger position than ever before; and on revenue account, without any further increase in taxation, it expected to reach 30 June 1967 with a small accumulated deficit which could quite well be extinguished entirely by fortuitous savings and underspendings throughout the votes.

135. Claims that the economy was on the point of collapse were obviously arrant nonsense. On the other hand, the economy might well be subjected to more serious stresses and strains before it resumed the rapid rate of progress achieved in 1965.

Employment situation

136. According to the illegal régime, at the end of June 1966, the number of African registered work-seekers stood at 4,586 or 11 per cent lower than at the same date in 1965. Africans in employment at 31 March 1966, the latest date for which statistics were available, numbered 655,000, the highest number ever achieved in Southern Rhodesia's history. In recent months the gap between the 1965 and 1966 numbers of European work-seekers had narrowed considerably. At the end of June the number stood at 768, only fifty-eight higher than at the same date in the previous year. The number in employment at 31 March was 1,300 higher than in 1965.

137. On 4 September 1966, the "Minister of Internal Affairs", Mr. William Harper, stated in the Legislative Assembly that since the assumption of "independence", nearly 3,000 appointments had been made in the public services. This had been a major influence in keeping down unemployment and had helped the morale of the country.

138. On 25 October 1966, the Commonwealth Secretary, Mr. Bowden, stated, in reply to a question in the House of Commons, that no detailed employment statistics had been published in Salisbury since February 1966, nor had the régime mentioned any figures which the United Kingdom Government could accept as accurately representing the extent of African unemployment. The increase in African unemployment was entirely the responsibility of the régime which could remedy the situation by making a return to constitutional rule.

Commerce and industry

139. In his statement delivered at the opening of the Legislative Assembly on 22 June 1966, Mr. Clifford Dupont, "Officer Administering the Government", stated

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that the imposition of sanctions had led to the introduction of import controls. The resultant inconvenience to the people of Southern Rhodesia, and more particularly to the merchants, had been accepted in a most generous and co-operative manner. These controls had not been without positive advantages, which industrialists had been quick to exploit. Clear evidence was already to be seen of the accelerating development of industry, new products in substitution of imports constantly coming on the market. Industrialists were continuing to expand and diversify, and were producing goods now which they would not have thought possible to make a few months ago. His "Government" would continue to provide to the maximum possible extent such foreign currency for capital goods and raw materials required for new investment projects.

140. In the budget statement referred to above, Mr. Wrathall stated that import control was one of the steps being taken by the régime to safeguard the balance of payments and the value of the "Rhodesian" pound. Although these measures had been successful, it remained vital to Southern Rhodesia's economic strength to continue to husband its resources.

141. The President of the Associated Chambers of Commerce of Rhodesia, Mr. C.J. Hughes, in a foreword to the Chamber of Commerce Annual Report which was published on 2 June 1966, stated that while the ingenuity shown by the Rhodesian businessmen in their efforts to overcome sanctions was outstanding, it would be unrealistic not to acknowledge that sanctions had had some effect. Mr. Hughes added that as at June 1966, the distributive sector of the economy had been hardest hit and some of the weaker and less efficient organizations in this section had succumbed. Mr. Hughes forecast that in the long term this cutting out might result in an over-all strengthening of the distributive sector of the economy. In reply to the régime's appeals to commerce in 1966 to try to help agriculture in Southern Rhodesia by supplying farmers hit by sanctions or drought with credit over a difficult period, the annual report stated that repeated warnings had been issued that, because merchants' credit facilities had been curtailed, the amount of money which it would be possible to advance to the agricultural sector would be extremely limited.

142. At the annual general meeting of the Associated Chambers of Commerce of Rhodesia in Salisbury on 8 June 1966, Mr. Hughes was reported to have repeated that it would be dishonest and dangerous for members to delude themselves that sanctions were not having an effect on the economy. The distributive sector had been hard hit and the position was not improving. Commerce was bearing the main burden. Many firms were incurring heavy losses to keep people in employment. They could not continue this holding operation indefinitely. Mr. Hughes was also quoted as having said that the savings campaign launched by the Government, by transferring money from the private to the public sector was almost "robbing Peter to pay Paul". If it was the "Government's" objective to reduce private spending as a matter of over-all economic policy, then there was no point in many firms carrying on with the present holding operation.

143. On 19 August 1966, the president of the Salisbury Chamber of Commerce, Mr. G.J. Sichel, in a message published in the organization's annual report, was reported to have warned that sanctions against Southern Rhodesia would "take yet a larger toll of casualties". The message also stated that it would be foolish for members to allow themselves to be lulled into a sense of false security on the strength of short-term achievements and early successes in the economic war. He stressed the need for forward planning to counter long-term problems arising out of sanctions and added that tomorrow's problems would undoubtedly be more intractable than those facing Southern Rhodesia today.

144. On 1 September 1966, Mr. Sichel, speaking at the group's annual meeting, criticized the "Government" for withholding statistical information needed by businessmen for planning. He stated that the withholding of external trade and tobacco statistics was understandable but he seriously questioned the need for an embargo on such items as the retail sales index for motor vehicle sales and the cost-of-living index.

Finance

145. Prior to the illegal declaration of independence, Southern Rhodesia's principal source of credit and finance was the United Kingdom. Almost all the major financial and banking institutions in Southern Rhodesia were net borrowers in London and net lenders in Southern Rhodesia. Credit facilities from London were the main prop of Southern Rhodesia commerce and industry, and agriculture. Credit from London was particularly important for financing the tobacco crop which normally accounts for over 30 per cent of the domestic exports of Southern Rhodesia.

146. Following the illegal declaration of independence, the Government of the United Kingdom imposed financial sanctions on Southern Rhodesia to reinforce its economic sanctions. These financial sanctions involved the cessation of all aid, the removal of Southern Rhodesia from the sterling area and a ban on the export of United Kingdom capital to Southern Rhodesia. Southern Rhodesia was denied access to the London money market and exchange control regulations were introduced against it. A stop was placed on practically all current payments by United Kingdom residents to residents of Southern Rhodesia, except for those arising out of the very limited trade in goods permitted and certain minor specified remittances. By the end of December 1965, virtually all Southern Rhodesia's accounts in London had been blocked or frozen and a new Board of Directors of the Reserve Bank of Rhodesia appointed to ensure that the assets of the Reserve Bank of Rhodesia held abroad were safeguarded in the interest of the people. Other sources of credit which were open to Southern Rhodesia in third countries outside Africa were also reported to have been closed as a result of representations from the United Kingdom Government.

147. Pursuant to the above policy, the United Kingdom Government by the end of 1966 had issued five major warnings to would-be subscribers to loans floated by the illegal regime. These warnings stated that the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia was not capable of incurring legal obligations on behalf of the Government of Southern Rhodesia. Any person who lent money or otherwise gave credit to the regime or any agency or purported agency thereof did so entirely at his own risk. No permission would be granted to United Kingdom residents to subscribe.

148. Following the imposition of these sanctions, the Smith regime resorted to floating "Rhodesian Government" loans through the Reserve Bank of Rhodesia to be used in financing maturing debts and government development plans. By the end of

October 1966, four such loans had been floated locally and fully subscribed to the value of £20 million. Sales of "independence bonds", introduced on 1 February 1966, were also reported by the "Minister of Finance" to have exceeded the target of £1 million by June 1966. He also stated that sales of saving certificates for the financial year ending 30 June 1966 amounted to £1.8 million, well over double the previous year's figure.

149. In addition to the above, it was reported that in 1966 Southern Rhodesia also had access to an estimated £10 to £13 million by its corresponding counter-financial sanctions against the United Kingdom. According to these estimates, Southern Rhodesia, by also blocking the payments of interest, dividend and profit payments etc. to the United Kingdom, gained a net of between £10 to £13 million over the United Kingdom in the two-way blockade of interest, dividend and profit payments between the two countries.

150. Further financial counter-measures announced by the Smith regime on 18 July 1966 stated that Southern Rhodesian merchants would not be allowed to make payments to British and sterling area exporters for goods shipped to "Rhodesia" before 18 December 1965. It was stated that this step had been taken because the British Treasury was not prepared to release from the blocked account of the Reserve Bank of Rhodesia in London funds needed by Rhodesian merchants to pay for goods shipped from Britain and other sterling area countries before that date.

151. In his budget statement of 21 July, Mr. Wrathall stated that because of the financial and economic sanctions imposed by the United Kingdom Government, foreign bodies whose loans were under United Kingdom Government guarantee had been advised that they should look to the United Kingdom Government for satisfaction. "Rhodesia's" debt obligations to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) are guaranteed by the British Government under the Colonial Loan Acts.

152. On 14 November 1966, the Chancellor of the Exchequer stated in the House of Commons that since the illegal declaration of independence, £1,854,860 had been paid by the United Kingdom Government as guarantor of the service of these loans to Southern Rhodesia. The United Kingdom Government has also stated that the money paid would be recovered from Southern Rhodesia when constitutional government was restored.

153. The Minister of Finance of the Smith regime also stated that the skill with which the banks had met the nation's requirements had done much to stabilize the economy. Bank deposits at 31 May 1965 amounted to £75 million and advances to £49.1 million, giving a ratio of advances to deposits of 65.5 per cent. The comparable percentage for May 1966 was 58.4 per cent, which left a reasonable margin towards financing the coming agricultural season. Loss of the London market credit facilities had not had the effect which had earlier been assumed; nevertheless the loss of credit had brought problems. Credit would be made available to enable the agricultural industry to continue.

154. It will be recalled that by a joint arrangement reached between the Reserve Banks of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia on 18 November 1965, negotiations were concluded by which "permissible financial and trade transactions" between South Africa and Southern Rhodesia were resumed immediately on the same basis as before 11 November 1965. Since then no statement has been made by the Ministry of Finance of South Africa on South Africa's financial relations with the Smith regime, although it has been reported that South Africa has become the main source of credit to Southern Rhodesia.

Agriculture in Southern Rhodesia

General

155. Agriculture is Southern Rhodesia's biggest and most important industry, and the largest single contributor to the national income as well as the largest single earner of foreign exchange and employer of labour. In 1965, it accounted for 40 per cent of all Africans in employment and contributed about 20 per cent to the gross domestic product which was larger than any other sector.

156. Sales of the principal agricultural commodities in 1965 amounted to £63 million. Southern Rhodesia's main export crops, tobacco and raw sugar, together in 1965 accounted for £50 million, or about 35 per cent, of total domestic exports. In 1966, Southern Rhodesia was reported to have faced a farm crisis as a result of drought in nearly the whole of Matebeleland and in part of the Midlands. The drought was reported to have affected Southern Rhodesia's agriculture, although to what extent was not known.

157. At the opening of the annual congress of the Rhodesia National Farmers' Union on 21 June 1966, the President, Mr. Tim Mitchell, said that, with the possible exception of the 1930's and the war years, agriculture in the country had never been in a worse position. This position, he said, had not been caused by drought and the actions of the United Kingdom Government. It had arisen because of an accumulation of many factors, including a number of past policies which in some instances had unwittingly increased the cost of production. Mr. Mitchell said the present situation in agriculture was that there was no over-all profit in the industry. The return on investment capital, he added, was undoubtedly less than 5 per cent. "Rhodesian" farmers were not only tired of receiving prices which were satisfactory to everyone but themselves, they were also in no mood to allow such a position to continue.

158. On 21 July 1966, the "Minister of Finance", Mr. Wrathall, stated in a broadcast that the agricultural industry was facing problems which had arisen from causes other than sanctions. Sanctions had brought them to a head somewhat earlier than would otherwise have been the case. In order to assist in stabilizing the situation and to help the industry to regain its confidence in the future, he stated that he had included an amount of £1,250,000 in the estimates for 1966-67 to enable assistance to be given to those sound farmers who were in financial difficulties for reasons beyond their control, and particularly to enable them to come to a settlement with their creditors. Furthermore, credit would be made available to enable the industry to continue to operate during the new season.

159. On 4 September 1966, the Que Que Farmers' Association sent a resolution to the Rhodesia National Farmers' Union, saying that, despite assertions in parliament, agriculture in Rhodesia was "bankrupt". The resolution demanded that the "Government" take immediate steps to forestall the complete collapse of the industry before it was too late. A similar resolution had been sent from the Lomagundi West farmers and another resolution had been sent to the Midlands branch of the Union calling for a £1 rise per bag for the price of wheat.

160. The "Minister of Agriculture", Mr. George Rudland, announced on 23 November 1966 two measures designed to assist farmers. The first of these was a subsidy on nitrogenous fertilizers purchased between 1 April 1966 and 28 February 1967. This subsidy, together with a rebate of £8.10s. per ton recently announced by the

fertilizer companies, would reduce the total expense by farmers on fertilizers by about £450,000. The second measure was a rebate of 3d. per gallon in respect of diesel fuel purchased in bulk by farmers during the same period. The Minister said that this particular form of assistance had been chosen because it would give help over a wider field than any others. He regretted that the concessions could only apply to the 1966-67 season and were therefore holding measures, but added that longer-term planning was not being neglected.

161. It was reported that the above subsidies brought the total allocation of government funds to farmers in 1966 (excluding special supplements for tobacco) to about £3 million; £460,000 for drought relief, £500,000 for irrigation development; £1,250,000 for the Graylin Committee to provide interest-free loans to farmers in financial difficulty; a supplementary payment for maize expected to amount to £500,000; and subsidies of £330,000 for fertilizers and £100,000 for fuel.

Tobacco crop for 1966

162. Total exports of unmanufactured Southern Rhodesian tobacco in 1965 amounted to £47 million or roughly 30 per cent of the total value of domestic exports (£142,455,433). The major portion of this consisted of 246 million pounds of Virginia flue-cured tobacco auctioned for £33.8 million in Salisbury. The total crop for 1965 sold on the auction floors of Salisbury for about £35 million.

163. The Southern Rhodesian tobacco crop for 1966 was estimated at around 250 million pounds. The State Tobacco Corporation handled the sale of the tobacco crop.

164. On 7 February 1966, the United Kingdom Government made an order which banned the export of tobacco from Southern Rhodesia and the sale of tobacco in Southern Rhodesia with a view to its being exported. Under the order, it became an offence under United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesian law for traders or speculators to buy Southern Rhodesian tobacco and stockpile it until the return of lawful government.

165. In an official statement issued on that day, the Commonwealth Relations Office announced that, under the order, purchasers of tobacco in contravention of the order would have no legal right to it and would also not be able to get their money back once lawful government was restored. At that time, stocks of tobacco that had

been illegally transacted would have to be re-auctioned before they could be exported. Only lawfully sold tobacco would be exported, under an export licence system; equally, only lawfully sold tobacco would be allowed into the United Kingdom.

166. By the end of March 1966, all the major consumers of Southern Rhodesian tobacco, namely, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, the Benelux countries, the Scandinavian countries, and Australia, had announced that they would not buy any more tobacco from Southern Rhodesia while the Smith regime remained in power. In terms of the 1964 trade figures, over 90 per cent of Southern Rhodesia's tobacco had already been placed under an embargo by exporting countries before the auction sales of the crop for 1966.

167. On 19 January 1966, the Rhodesia Tobacco Marketing Board announced new regulations for Southern Rhodesia's tobacco auction sale. A statement by the Tobacco Marketing Board said that all tobacco would be pre-classified and a reserve price fixed for each grade. Classification would be carried out by two independent classifiers, checked by a senior classifier. During classification, the classifiers would be completely isolated. There would be no appeal by buyers or growers against the classification. There would be elaborate precautions to ensure that classifiers had no idea whose tobacco they were grading. Once graded, the tobacco would be vested in a Tobacco Corporation. The leaf would then be offered on one or two tobacco auction floors at the reserve price or a price above it, and bales not bought would be taken by the Corporation at the reserve price. The Corporation would hold this in the pool and be responsible for its disposal. It would then be responsible for distributing the proceeds equitably among growers. Even if a grower's leaf was sold above the reserve price, he would only be paid the reserve price in the first instance. The surplus would be credited to a pool and shared among growers. There would be a separate pool for flue-cured and burley tobacco.

168 On 24 March 1966, the "Ministry of Agriculture" announced a list of reserve prices for different grades of tobacco. The crop would be classified into 273 grades for each of which a price ranging from 1d. to 48d. per pound was fixed. The announcements emphasized that these prices were those on which payments to growers would be based and did not represent the figure which would be the purchase

price to tobacco merchants. On the whole, the reserve prices announced averaged around 26d. (about 31 cents (US)) per pound. The average price of the Southern Rhodesia leaf in 1965 was 33d. (about 39 cents) per pound.

169. When the tobacco sales opened in Salisbury on 29 March 1966, the regime abandoned the traditional public auction system for private treaty sales by which the buyer would decide what grade of tobacco he wanted and then make an offer to the Tobacco Corporation. This was reportedly done to protect the identity of the buyers. The sales were held in secret.

170. On 15 July 1966, Mr. Bottomley, then Commonwealth Secretary, stated that at the prices fixed by the Tobacco Corporation, the farmers could have expected to receive an average of 24d. per pound. But on the best evidence available, the prices paid by the "Government" had been averaging no more than 20d. per pound and there had been numerous complaints from farmers that the Tobacco Corporation had been deliberately down-grading the tobacco sent for sale to depress farming receipts. Since the regime had abandoned public auctions for private treaty sales, the farmer had no redress. If he did not sell to the Tobacco Corporation, he could not sell to anyone else, and if he did not sell he could not live.

171. The member of the Rhodesian regime responsible for agriculture, Mr. George Rudland, announced in the Legislative Assembly on 23 August that the Tobacco Corporation was to increase by 5 per cent the fixed prices paid to farmers for tobacco of all grades, except the lowest. The increase applied to tobacco already bought by the Corporation as well as to future purchases. Mr. Rudland said that the increase would cost about £1 million. On 8 November, he announced that the Tobacco Corporation would make further supplementary payments to tobacco growers. The scale of payments was reported to be 6.8 per cent on the grade price for Virginia flue-cured tobacco, 10 per cent for burley tobacco and 15.6 per cent for oriental tobaccos. It was estimated that the above supplementary payments would amount to £1.5 million, bringing the total value of bonuses for 1966 to £2.5 million. With these payments, it was calculated that the Tobacco Corporation's total payments to the industry for the 1966 crop would amount to £24 million. In 1965, the crop sold for £35 million on the Salisbury auction floors.

172. On 9 November 1966, the President of the Rhodesia Tobacco Association, Mr. Carol Heurtley stated that the "Government's" 6.8 per cent payment to flue-cured

tobacco growers meant that the national average cost of production (about 24d. per pound) had now been covered. While not every grower had received his cost, he was pleased that the Government had completed its promised obligations.

173. The deliveries of Virginia flue-cured tobacco from growers to the Tobacco Corporation ceased on 17 October 1966. There had been various reports about the proportion of the over-all crop sold. However, the reports agree in estimating that the majority of the crop bought by the corporation remained unsold.

Tobacco crop for 1966-67

174. On 14 July 1966, Mr. Rudland announced that the target for 1966-67 flue-cured tobacco production would be 200 million pounds. He gave an assurance to growers that if sanctions made a return to free unfettered auction impracticable, the "Government" would guarantee the market for the crop at grade prices calculated to return to the growers an average of 28d. per pound. Mr. Rudland said this target was indicative of the "Government's" determination that the country would continue to produce its tobacco which had gained its place in the world markets on quality and price considerations alone. Buyers could therefore be assured that Rhodesian tobacco would continue to be available. A control scheme would be introduced, he said, and the details of this would be announced by the President of the Rhodesian Tobacco Association, Mr. Heurtley.

175. Mr. Rudland stated that the control scheme had been devised by the Rhodesian Tobacco Association in consultation with his Ministry, and had the full support of the "Government" and would remain in force for the coming season. The administration of the control scheme would be undertaken by the Tobacco Marketing Board and not by the Ministry. It would be possible, said Mr. Rudland, for all farmers to plan their individual production programmes for the coming season. He advised farmers to plan for maximum individual profit according to their own capabilities and that of their land.

176. Mr. Heurtley welcomed the announcement of the 200 million pound target figure which he said should be sufficient to guarantee continuity of supply to the country's established markets. The average price of 28d. per pound, he said, had been calculated to provide the grower with the possibility of regaining something above production costs.

177. On 15 July 1966, Mr. Heurtley stated that he felt confident that, following the Government announcement, commerce would react favourably towards Southern Rhodesia's 2,600 farmers by granting them credit facilities for planting the next crop.

178. Commenting on the announced target for the 1966-67 crop, Mr. Bottomley, then Commonwealth Secretary, said in London on 15 July that if the new target were to be realized, the farmers would receive between £23 million and £24 million, compared with £32 million to £35 million which they normally received. This represented a drop of some £10 million in the farmers' receipts from tobacco. But the new figures were merely target figures. Credit was the life blood of the tobacco farmers and they would need credit immediately for the seeds, fertilizers and equipment for the next twelve months.

179. Mr. Bottomley also stated that the new policy directive, to the extent that it was accepted by the tobacco farmers, would only put off the inevitable day of reckoning. Though a policy of internal subsidies would further delay the full impact of sanctions on the farmers, this in turn must raise many problems of economic management. Not the least of these would be the difficulties caused by the storage of the greater part of the 1966 crop and the effect on future demand should a large part of the 1966 crop be left unsold in the hands of the Tobacco Corporation.

180. On 24 July 1966, the Rhodesian Ministry of Agriculture announced that the target for the 1966-67 burley tobacco crop had been set at 6 million pounds. Provision was made to guarantee to growers an average of 23d. per pound of tobacco. On 31 August 1966, the Ministry further announced that it would, if necessary, provide financial support for a crop of 1.5 million pounds of Samsun Oriental tobacco for the 1966-67 crop at grade prices designed to give an average return of 26d. per pound.

181. On 20 October 1966, Mr. Rudland warned tobacco growers not to produce a crop in excess of their allocated quotas. He said any such action next season would be irresponsible and would upset present marketing arrangements. Plans had been made, he said, to ensure that no grower who ignored the requirements of the tobacco control scheme would benefit by so doing.

Sugar crop for 1966

182. Southern Rhodesia's sugar industry has expanded almost tenfold during the last six years. The 1965 crop before the illegal declaration of independence was estimated at 250,000 tons and the total export of raw sugar in 1965 earned £3,482,435.

183. On 17 March 1966 the United Kingdom Government announced a ban on all exports of sugar from Southern Rhodesia. According to the order, which is effective under both United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesian law, it is now "illegal for speculators or others to buy Rhodesian sugar and hold it in Rhodesia or elsewhere in the hope of selling it at a profit when legal government is restored". Those who bought Rhodesian sugar in contravention of the order would acquire no legal right to it and would also not be able to get their money back. Furthermore, all transactions that took place in Southern Rhodesia aimed at the export of sugar were invalid whether the export was to take place immediately or in the future.

184. By February 1966, the main buyers of Southern Rhodesian sugar, namely the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States, had already placed an embargo on sugar imports from Southern Rhodesia. United Kingdom authorities hoped that Zambia and Malawi, which have been dependent on Southern Rhodesia for their sugar supplies, would co-operate as well.

185. It was announced on 19 July 1966 that Japanese orders for about 50,000 tons of Southern Rhodesian sugar had been cancelled. The orders were placed before the illegal declaration of independence and their cancellation was reported to represent a foreign exchange loss of £750,000.

186. Hippo Valley Estates, one of Southern Rhodesia's main sugar producers, reported on 19 July a loss of £372,345 for the year ended 31 March 1966. The chairman, Sir Raymond Stockil, was reported to have said that the loss was due primarily to low world prices and difficulties in commissioning a new sugar mill; he added, however, that the Zambian market had already entirely lost and the market in Malawi, where the planting of cane had started, would be lost also.

187. It has been reported that cotton and citrus fruits have become alternative crops in place of sugar.

Cotton

188. It was reported from Salisbury on 30 September 1966 that official sources had estimated that a record crop of 120 million pounds of cotton would be grown in the 1967 season. This followed a recent government recommendation to double the size of the cotton crop which was estimated at 60 million pounds for the 1966 season. (In 1965 the crop was 40,102,000 pounds.) The report stated that the indications were that this increased amount of cotton could be readily marketed both in Southern Rhodesia and in neighbouring countries. The actual price would be announced before the ginning season started about May 1967. The "Government" was reported to be analysing proposals put to it by the cotton marketing committee for future marketing policy. The growers' committee had reached agreement in principle on government proposals.

Maize

189. On 23 August 1966, Mr. Rudland announced bonus payments to maize growers by which they would receive a supplementary payment of 2s. per bag (200 pounds) of maize on top of the basic price of 29s.6d. per bag already announced from the government Grain Marketing Board. It was announced that the supplementary payment would cost £500,000 which meant that the present maize crop sold to the Board had totalled 5 million bags. In 1964-65, the Grain Marketing Board had bought 2,569,183 bags of maize from Europeans and 254,452 from Africans.

Mining

General

190. Mineral exports of Southern Rhodesia earned £32,353,669 in 1965, the highest ever attained. Asbestos remained Southern Rhodesia's most valuable mineral followed by gold and copper, these three accounting for over two thirds of the total value of all minerals mined. Coal and chrome ore were the next most important minerals. These two minerals, together with asbestos, gold and copper accounted for 89 per cent of the total value of mineral production. Other minerals which accounted for the remaining 11 per cent of the mineral exports included iron (3 per cent), tin metal (2 per cent), limestone and lithium (1 per cent) and others (4 per cent).

191. By the end of July 1966, the United Kingdom Government, under the Southern Rhodesia (Prohibited Exports and Imports) Order, had imposed embargoes on the export of chrome, pig iron, iron ore, copper and asbestos, which together constitute the main mineral exports of the country.

192. No figures are available from within Southern Rhodesia on the operation of the mining industry since the illegal declaration of independence. However, activities within certain sectors of the mining industry were reported in 1966 by the "Government" and the mining companies themselves. While these do not provide an over-all picture, they are worth noting as indications of the state of the industry.

Copper

193. Despite sanctions, the operation of the copper mining industry was considerably extended in 1966. Southern Rhodesia's normal copper production is about 24,000 tons a year.

194. On 3 March 1966, the "Deputy Minister of Mines", Mr. I.B. Dillon, stated in an interview that three new copper mines would probably be opening in the northern area of Southern Rhodesia within the next twelve months, and that the ministry was aiming at 30,000 tons within the next two years. If that figure were reached then consideration would be given to the installation of a copper refinery.

Consideration had already been given to a possible site for the refinery and it was hoped that its establishment would lead to another industry producing copper piping, sheeting and other products. Mr. Dillon also stated that sanctions would not affect Southern Rhodesian sales of copper. The current emphasis on copper mining in Southern Rhodesia was dictated simply by demand and value.

195. At the end of August 1966, the "Ministry of Information" announced that a new high-grade copper mine, the first of its kind in Southern Rhodesia, had begun full operation in the Sabi Valley, 150 miles south-east of Salisbury. The first sample of the mine's cathode copper had already been accepted abroad at 99.9 per cent of purity and the first long ton fetched £600. Known as the Elephant Mine, it had been developed by private enterprise with government assistance. The ministry said it believed that the plant installations and processes used could now be duplicated on several other known copper-bearing properties in Southern Rhodesia. The

statement added that at a conservative estimate of future copper prices, the new mine development could mean an increase of at least £250,000 in annual export figures.

196. On 20 September 1966, it was reported that Lonrho, Ltd., was to undertake a new drilling programme aimed at establishing the extent and value of the copper deposits in the Inyati block, a few miles northeast of Headland. The area to be explored covers about sixty square miles. Lonrho would operate through a subsidiary company.

Gold

197. Gold has been one of Southern Rhodesia's main exports. Net gold sales in 1965 amounted to £6,794,000.

198. According to the Barclays Bank, D.C.O. Overseas Review for April 1966, the Anglo-American Corporation had sunk three new shafts at its mines on the Felixburg gold belt, near Umvuma. Another shaft at the Tchargwa mine, which was abandoned some years ago because of water difficulties, was being deepened and developed.

199. In June 1966, the Chairman of the Anglo-American Corporation, Mr. Oppenheimer, stated that an exploratory shaft was being sunk at the Champion mine in the region of Odzi, where bore holes indicated the possibility of mineable tonnages of both gold and silver ore.

200. It was reported in August 1966 that the country had launched its biggest gold prospecting programme to date, with most of the large mining companies throwing all their resources into an all-out bid to find new gold-fields and develop existing ones. Mr. D.A. Pretorius, Director of the Economic Geology Research Unit of the Transvaal and Orange Free State Chamber of Mines, who had returned to Johannesburg after discussions with the régime and mining leaders, was reported to have said that Southern Rhodesia was determined to go it alone and intended to offset losses through boycotts by increasing gold production. The régime was well aware that gold was its most secure foreign currency earner and that little effort was required to sell it at an international level. Gold's countering effect against inflation, its lack of price fluctuation and the possible devaluation of sterling provided an ideal climate for the easy selling of gold.

Nickel

201. It was reported in May 1966 that a further £2.2 million a year was expected to be added to the country's foreign exchange income when the Trojan nickel mine, at Bindura, had been developed to full production. It was further reported that the Anglo-American Corporation had bought an 85 per cent interest in the mine and was to invest £4 million (including the purchase price) to expand production to 600,000 tons of ore a year. Behind the plan to expand the Trojan mine was the growing demand for nickel. On 20 September 1966, it was further announced that Anglo-American Corporation would examine the economic potential of base mineral claims owned by the Shamva Nickel Mines under an option agreement between the Corporation and that company. The Shamva Mine is located about forty miles from the Trojan mine.

Iron ore

202. Following the embargo on the export of iron ore and pig iron, it was reported that the output of the Southern Rhodesian Iron and Steel Corporation (RISCO) had decreased. RISCO was declared a "designated industry" by the Southern Rhodesian régime to prevent it from being closed, and a manpower control order was issued to prevent dismissal of employees. In February 1966, it was reported that RISCO had shut down two of its three blast furnaces and one of its two open-hearth steel furnaces and had abandoned a £7 million expansion and modernization scheme. This had made about 400 workers, including 100 Europeans, redundant. However, an official industrial review published in Salisbury in July 1966 stated that RISCO had three blast furnaces with a combined annual capacity of more than 400,000 tons and two open-hearth furnaces which could produce 165,000 tons of ingots a year.

203. In October 1966, it was reported that the régime had lifted the manpower provisions on RISCO and on Richard Costain (Africa), who had a contract at RISCO. No explanation was offered officially, but it was understood that RISCO had managed to replace lost pig iron markets, though at lower prices than in the past.

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Coal

204. The Wankie Colliery Company's preliminary profits statement for the year ending 31 August 1966 showed that over-all sales were maintained during the year at 3,369,870 tons, compared with 3,348,455 tons in 1964-65. The statement added, however, that sales for June and July had been adversely affected by the Rhodesia Railways dispute between Southern Rhodesia and Zambia which had resulted in a truck shortage for the transport of coal to the Copperbelt. In September 1966, sales amounted to 227,009 tons, comfortably above the July low of 127,009 tons, but still almost 100,000 tons less than those for September 1965. The monthly average in 1964-65 was 280,822 tons.

205. On 15 November, Sir Keith Aucutt, Chairman of the Wankie Colliery Company, stated that as a result of reduced sales to Zambia one of the two coal mines the company operated might have to be put on a care-and-maintenance basis by the middle of 1967.

206. Wankie coal sales for November 1966 were later reported to have dropped by about a third in comparison with sales for November 1965. The report stated that the Anglo-American Corporation had attributed the drop in sales mainly to rail transport difficulties with Zambia.

Scheelite

207. The "Ministry of Mines" announced at the beginning of October 1966 that two new scheelite mines were to come into production. Scheelite, a strategic mineral, is the basis for tungsten, and was reported to be in world demand.

208. One of the mines, known as the Tact Mine, owned and operated by the Rhodesian Selected Development Company, Ltd., was said to be already producing a high grade of scheelite, and was hoping to produce six tons of refined mineral from every 1,000 tons of ore each month when a second mill comes into operation. The second mine, the Killarney, located in Filabusi, was expected to go into production within three or four months.

Graphite

209. The Industrial Development Corporation announced in May 1966 that the new graphite mining project near Karoi, 120 miles north of Salisbury would go into production soon.

210. The statement said that the construction of the plant at the £50,000 project was almost complete and would be officially opened in the near future. I.D.C. was backing the project in conjunction with Rhodesian Graphite and a Federal Republic of Germany company based in Munich. It was planned to produce about 500 tons of graphite a month, worth £150,000 a year.

Other reported developments

211. It appears from statistics compiled by the Port of Beira authorities that exports of Rhodesian chrome through Beira in the first five months of 1966 totalled some 94,000 tons, compared with 100,000 tons in the corresponding period of 1965. Sundry ores exported totalled 183,000 tons, compared with 202,000 tons in the comparable period of 1965, and asbestos exports through the Port of Beira totalled 7,000 tons, 2,000 less than in 1965. It was reported, however, that in the past asbestos had mainly been exported through Lourenço-Marques.

Economic relations with Zambia

212. In 1965 the total value of exports, including re-exports from Southern Rhodesia to Zambia, amounted to £46 million, of which domestic merchandise accounted for £36.1 million; imports from Zambia amounted to £4.3 million.

213. Since the illegal declaration of independence, Zambia has imposed a license system whereby only certain commodities can be imported from Southern Rhodesia. The permitted imports from Southern Rhodesia are mainly essential commodities for which alternative sources of supply have not been found. Trade figures between the two countries for 1966 are not available, although, according to press reports, Zambia has cut its imports from Southern Rhodesia by an estimated 30 per cent.

214. It will be recalled that following the Southern Rhodesian oil embargo against Zambia on 18 December 1965, the Governments of the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States together started a regular airlift of oil and petroleum products to Zambia to beat the embargo. The Canadian and United States airlifts to Zambia ceased at the end of April 1966. The airlift by British civil aircraft to Zambia also ended on 29 May 1966. However, the airlift by Royal Air Force aircraft to

Zambia partly to meet the fuel requirements of the air defence force there and partly to supply oil products to the civil economy ended on 31 October 1966. According to United Kingdom sources, the total cost of these British airlifts to the United Kingdom Government was nearly £6 million. The cost of the oil itself except for that used by the R.A.F. itself had been met by the Zambian Government.

215. In 1966 the Governments of Zambia and the United Kingdom held a series of talks on intensification of sanctions against the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia and the maintenance of the Zambian economy in all circumstances arising from the Southern Rhodesian rebellion. The discussions covered a great deal of ground concerning practical and technical problems associated with the changing pattern of Zambian trade.

216. On 1 November 1966, the Commonwealth Secretary, Mr. Bowden, stated in the House of Commons that the United Kingdom Government had offered the Zambian Government further aid up to a total of £13.8 million for expenditure up to 30 June 1967. The United Kingdom Government later stated that this was assistance for the intensification of sanctions and would cover any contingencies that arose during the coming months. Most of the assistance offered was intended to assist Zambia in developing alternative routes whereby one of the indirect outcomes would be a steadier supply of copper in the future. Since the illegal declaration of independence, £3.8 million had been provided by the United Kingdom towards the cost of alternative supply routes besides the £13.8 million on offer for the development of new import and export routes and new sources of supply.

217. On 1 February 1966, an agreement was signed in Lusaka between the Governments of the United Kingdom and Zambia for the provision by the United Kingdom of £13.8 million in contingency aid to Zambia for the above-stated projects. The agreement provided for the United Kingdom Government to join the Government of Zambia in the implementation of the above-listed projects.

218. On 23 February 1966, the Government of Zambia informed the Secretary-General (S/7783) that since the unilateral declaration of independence by the minority white régime in Southern Rhodesia, Zambia had spent well over \$US90 million implementing its policy of severing its trade and economic ties with Southern Rhodesia.

219. In his address before the General Assembly on 15 November 1966, the President of Zambia, Dr. Kenneth Kaunda, stated that the common services owned jointly by Zambia and Southern Rhodesia, namely the Rhodesia Railways, the Kariba Hydro-electric scheme and the Central African Airways^{10/} which provide Zambia with its vital power supplies and its communications and external trade links and whose headquarters were all in Southern Rhodesia and for all practical purposes were controlled from Salisbury could not be properly operated and administered in the absence of a legal government in Southern Rhodesia.

220. In a letter dated 23 February 1967 (S/7783), the Government of Zambia informed the Secretary-General that:

(a) Negotiations to separate the jointly owned Rhodesia Railways were going on;

(b) Similar negotiations to separate the jointly owned Central African Airways were also going on;

(c) Payments received by the Kariba Power Corporation from Zambia were being blocked and not allowed to go over to Southern Rhodesia to supplement their foreign exchange.

Rhodesia Railways

221. The chairman of the board of Rhodesia Railways (jointly owned by Rhodesia and Zambia) said on 18 May 1966, after a two-day meeting of the board, that although the three Zambian members of the board had cast dissenting votes, a decision had been made on future operations of the railways. The member of the Southern Rhodesian régime responsible for transport, Brigadier Andrew Dunlop, said on 20 May that Rhodesia Railways needed to move about £1 million a month from Zambia to Southern Rhodesia in order to continue their operations. No such transfers had been authorized by the Zambian authorities for the month of April and he understood that they had refused to authorize any further transfer. This meant that there would be no contribution from Zambia towards the costs of operating that part of the railway system outside Zambia.

^{10/} Malawi is a third partner in Central African Airways.

222. It was later announced that from 24 May the Southern Rhodesian authorities would require payment to be made in advance in convertible currency for Zambian traffic by rail through Southern Rhodesia unless the Zambian Government agreed to the transfer of railway funds from Zambia to Rhodesia.

223. The President of Zambia, Dr. Kenneth Kaunda, announced on 21 May his Government's rejection of the arrangement whereby payment should be made in advance for Zambian rail traffic through Southern Rhodesia. On the same day, a spokesman for the Zambian Ministry of Transport in Lusaka was reported to have said that it might become necessary for the railways in Zambia to be operated as an independent system.

224. On 10 June 1966, the Government of Zambia introduced regulations which empowered an Administrator of Railways, appointed by the President, to control the movement of locomotives, rolling stock and railway equipment from Zambia to Southern Rhodesia.

225. On 11 June 1966, the illegal régime issued an emergency order signed by its "Minister of Transport", Brigadier Dunlop, which provided for impounding Zambian goods in transit through Southern Rhodesia for which freight payments had not been guaranteed. Following the issuing of the order, it was reported on 20 June 1966 that Southern Rhodesia was holding £10 million worth of Zambian copper destined for Mozambique ports. A Rhodesia Railways spokesman was reported to have confirmed that the copper had still not been moved through Southern Rhodesia because confirmation had not been received from the Portuguese authorities that payment had been made for railing the copper through Mozambique to Lourenço-Marques or Beira.

226. On 22 June 1966, the Government of Zambia decided to authorize the copper companies to send a limited quantity of copper through Southern Rhodesia, on condition that the buyers would be responsible for paying the freight charges in hard currency as the Southern Rhodesian authorities had demanded. The transport of copper by that route was accordingly recommenced in August 1966.

227. It was reported that as a result of the dislocation in rail services, a stock-pile of about 60,000 tons of Zambian copper had accumulated inside Zambia. Zambia's monthly production of copper is about 58,000 tons.

228. Coal supplies to Zambia from the Wankie Collieries in Southern Rhodesia continued to be transported by rail, but it was reported that since August trucks were being sent north by the Rhodesia Railway authorities only as trucks arrived from Zambia, on a truck-for-truck basis. This affected the coal supplies of the mines.

229. It was reported that Rhodesia Railway's report for the financial year ending June 1966 showed a loss of £383,000, compared with a profit of nearly £2 million in the previous year, despite an increase in traffic and total revenue.

Kariba Dam

230. The Central African Power Corporation, in its annual report published on 13 December, stated that, despite the Rhodesian crisis, the Kariba hydro-electric dam made a record profit of £1,010,810 in the year ending 30 June. Zambian purchases during the year increased by 5.8 per cent and accounted for 51.4 per cent of the sales. Purchases by Southern Rhodesia increased by 4.4 per cent and accounted for 48.6 per cent of the sales.

Central African Airways

231. The Central African Airways announced a record profit of over £600,000 for the year ending 30 June 1966. All its subsidiary airlines - Air Malawi, Air Rhodesia and Zambia Airways - realized operating profits for the year.

Economic relations with Malawi

232. In 1965 total exports including re-exports from Southern Rhodesia to Malawi, amounted to £9.5 million, of which domestic merchandise amounted to £7.7 million; imports amounted to £1.4 million.

233. The Government of Malawi, between November 1965 and December 1966, imposed some trade restrictions in Southern Rhodesia. It continued, however, to trade with Southern Rhodesia in essential commodities while it appealed to importers to find alternate sources of supply outside Southern Rhodesia. Trade figures for 1966 between the two countries are not yet available.

Economic relations with Bechuanaland

234. In 1965 total exports, including re-exports, of Southern Rhodesia to Bechuanaland amounted to £2.3 million, of which domestic merchandise amounted to £1.6 million; imports amounted to £72,000. Bechuanaland became independent as Botswana on 27 September 1966. By the end of 1966, no reports regarding economic measures against the illegal régime were available.

Economic relations with South Africa

235. In 1965 the total value of exports, including re-exports, from Southern Rhodesia to South Africa amounted to £14.4 million, of which domestic merchandise accounted for £12.8 million. Total imports from South Africa amounted to £27.5 million.

236. Pursuant to its declared policy of not participating in any form of sanctions and boycotts, the Republic of South Africa has, since the illegal declaration of independence, continued to maintain "normal trade" relations with the Smith régime. In clarification of the term "normal trade relations", the Government of the Republic explained that this did not mean continuing to sell the same commodities or quantities as before. It meant that everybody in competition tried to sell what and as much as he could. It also meant trade without inhibitions and without breaks.

237. In a statement to the South African Parliament on 21 September 1966, the new Prime Minister of the Republic, Mr. Johannes Vorster, stated that he intended to follow the same policy towards Southern Rhodesia as had been followed by his predecessor, Dr. Verwoerd.^{11/} Mr. Vorster further said that neither pressure nor force would compel South Africa to take part in boycotts or sanctions. His Government was determined to carry on its policy of normal trade with Southern Rhodesia even if this meant taking risks.

238. Although South Africa has not published any trade statistics on Southern Rhodesia since the illegal declaration of independence, it has been openly acknowledged by official sources in Salisbury that the Republic is the main economic prop of the Smith régime. In a speech on 3 May 1966, the Southern Rhodesian

^{11/} A/6300/Add.1, paragraph 279.

"Minister of Local Government" was reported to have stated that it might well be no exaggeration to state that if it had not been for the steadfast and responsible attitude adopted by both the Republic and their Portuguese neighbours, Southern Rhodesians would have lost not only their possessions but also their liberty and perhaps their lives.

239. On 16 August 1966, the South African Minister of Economic Affairs, Dr. N. Diederichs, was asked in the Assembly for a break-down of import-export values between South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique for each month since June 1965. In reply to the question, Dr. Diederichs stated that he did not regard it as being in the national interest to give the statistics separately. In a further question as to whether the monthly abstract of trade statistics included figures of trade between the Republic and each African country, the Minister said that it did not because he did not regard it in the national interest to have these figures published separately.

240. According to trade figures released by the South African Department of Customs and Excise in September 1966, trade figures for the first eight months of 1966 showed that while South Africa's exports as a whole had risen about 12 per cent over the same period in 1965, exports to the rest of Africa increased by 30 per cent to a little over £60 million. Imports from the rest of Africa for the first eight months of 1966 reached about £35 million. The Department of Customs and Excise ceased some time ago to provide detailed break-downs, by countries of destination, of exports to African countries.

241. Although no details were given, it was reported that the bulk of the increase in exports of about £15 million to the rest of Africa was in the main due to a sharp rise in the flow of goods to Southern Rhodesia. Imports from the rest of Africa at about £35 million were reported to be around the same level as in 1965 although imports as a whole had fallen by 15 per cent. The difference in the general trend was also attributed mainly to an increase of imports from Southern Rhodesia.

242. Quite apart from South Africa's own trade with Southern Rhodesia, it has been persistently reported that South Africa had been providing cover for clandestine trade between third countries and parties with Southern Rhodesia. According to

these reports, goods ostensibly directed to South Africa from third countries eventually find their way into Southern Rhodesia under prearranged contracts. Conversely, South African ports were reported to have increased their tonnage of Southern Rhodesian exports which pass through the ports under cover of South African goods. It should here be noted that since the illegal declaration of independence, South Africa has ceased to differentiate between its exports and re-exports.

243. Since the illegal declaration of independence, Southern Rhodesian industrialists have embarked on a sales promotion campaign in South Africa with a view to increasing sales in the Republic. There have also been exchanges of visits between manufacturers and industrialists of the two countries to discuss marketing problems and how best to facilitate the flow of trade between the two countries.

244. One of the most important such visits to be publicly announced was that of a six-man delegation from the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut in June 1966, at the invitation of the Rhodesian Promotion Council. The Handelsinstituut is the most important organization in South Africa of Afrikaans-speaking leaders of industry, mining, commerce and finance. While in Southern Rhodesia, the party met with the régime's "Minister of Commerce and Industry", Mr. Musset and other officials. They also met leading personalities in the business and financial sectors of the country's economy and visited Salisbury, Bulawayo, Umtali, the Midlands and the Lowveld. On 22 June 1966, the Director of the Handelsinstituut, Dr. Van den Berg, stated in Johannesburg that the delegation had returned with a proposal to the Government of South Africa that factories in Southern Rhodesia should be granted quotas to export goods to the Republic duty free, or under rebate. In this way, Southern Rhodesia would help to ensure that South African productive capacity would not be fully expanded at a time when such expansion was not in the Republic's interest. At the same time, South Africa would be helping Southern Rhodesia to adjust to the loss of the Zambian export market.

245. The delegation was also reported to have recommended to the Government that South Africa should enter into a common market arrangement with Southern Rhodesia so that the origin of Southern Rhodesia products exported through South Africa could not be known; that South African capital should be used to help Southern

Rhodesia industries lessen the force of sanctions; and that South Africa should provide £3 million for a sixty-mile rail link across the Limpopo joining the South African and Rhodesian Railways.

246. Among other important visitors to Southern Rhodesia was Mr. Hobson, the General Manager of the Durban Chamber of Commerce (South Africa), who was in Southern Rhodesia in the second week of November 1966. He was reported to have said in Salisbury that South African industrialists were more favourably disposed towards imports, especially those from Southern Rhodesia, than before. He added that Southern Rhodesian exporters should not be slow to take advantage of opportunities in the South African market. Also, a group of prominent South African businessmen led by the Chairman of Sasol and the South African Gas Distribution Corporation, Dr. Ettis Rousseau, visited Southern Rhodesia in the third week of November 1966, at the invitation of the Rhodesian Promotion Council. The visitors were reported to have seen various aspects of economic development in Southern Rhodesia and to have met a number of leading businessmen.

247. On 6 June 1966 it was reported from Johannesburg that a new trading link between Rhodesia and South Africa had been forged with the formation in Johannesburg of Rhodesian Industrial Confirming (Private), Limited. The company is a subsidiary of Industrial Confirming (Private), which is backed by the Industrial Development Corporation of Southern Rhodesia, and commenced operations in April. In addition to ordinary confirming or export guarantee business - in both directions - Industrial Confirming and its subsidiary assist potential importers and exporters to promote trade between the two countries. The Johannesburg manager, Colonel R. Jones, was reported to have said that his company was also interested in guaranteeing trade between Rhodesia and other markets.

248. In order to facilitate trade between the two countries, Rhodesia Railways introduced a new fast freight service to Johannesburg and the South African ports. On 26 August 1966, a spokesman for Rhodesia Railways announced that a new fast goods service to be known as Rail Trader would come into operation on 27 August 1966. The new service would link Salisbury and Bulawayo with Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth, East London, Durban and Cape Town. Trains from Salisbury would take four days to Johannesburg and six days to the ports. Trains

from Bulawayo would take a day less to the ports. Negotiations were also under way to introduce a similar service from South Africa to Southern Rhodesian centres.

249. On 26 September Rhodesia Railways took over the control and operation of the rail line through Bechuanaland, which is the most direct rail link between South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. Control of the 400-mile line was formerly split between South African Railways and Rhodesia Railways, with the South Africa railways operating the line from Mafeking up to the half-way point at Mahalapye, and the Rhodesia Railways operating it over the rest of the distance to Plumtree, on the Southern Rhodesian border. According to a statement issued by the Bulawayo headquarters of the Rhodesia Railways, the entire Bechuanaland section of the railway line in question had been owned by the Rhodesia Railways since it was built in the 1890's although one half of it had been managed by the South African Railways.

250. In May 1966, the Smith régime appointed a three-man commission of inquiry to investigate an alternative rail link between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa through Beit Bridge. The commission, which held its first sitting on 15 June 1966, is composed of three South African experts, Mr. W.G. Muller, an advocate of Johannesburg, and two economists, Mr. H.G. Ashworth of Cape Town and Dr. M.D. Marais of Pretoria. The two possible connexions being considered by the commission are either from West Nicholson or from Rutenga to join the South African Railway line from Beit Bridge. Any one of the two proposed connexions would give Southern Rhodesia a direct rail link with South Africa. According to South African sources, whichever route the alternative rail link would take, it would help to strengthen trade bonds between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa.

251. On 20 September 1966, a new road was opened between the Cape Province and Southern Rhodesia through Bechuanaland. The Bechuanaland Government worked on the section between the Cape Province border and the Southern Rhodesian border while the South African Government worked on the connexion inside the Republic. The new road is reported to facilitate travel between Cape Town and Southern Rhodesia.

Economic relations with Portugal

252. Portugal has also continued to maintain trade relations with Southern Rhodesia, having declared on many occasions that it would not take part in sanctions that would affect the flow of trade in Southern Africa. Although trade between Southern Rhodesia and Portugal and the Territories under Portuguese administration is almost negligible, Portugal occupies a predominant position in controlling the external trade routes of Southern Rhodesia, Zambia and Malawi, through the seaport of Beira and Lourenço Marques in Mozambique. It also has rail links to all the three landlocked countries and South Africa. Southern Rhodesia's principal export and import outlet is the seaport of Beira in Mozambique which also handles the main bulk of the external trade of Zambia and Malawi.

253. Portugal's policy of maintaining trade relations with Southern Rhodesia has therefore offered the illegal régime a most valuable outlet for exports and imports. Figures published by the Portuguese authorities in Mozambique show that Beira has maintained its position as the main export-import outlet of Southern Rhodesia since the illegal declaration of independence. According to press reports Portugal has become an outlet for re-exporting embargoed Southern Rhodesian commodities, primarily tobacco and sugar.

254. According to statistics compiled by the Port of Beira authorities in November, total tonnage handled at the Port of Beira dropped 24 per cent in the first ten months of 1966. It was estimated that about half the drop in tonnage represented the cut-back in the supply of crude oil to Southern Rhodesia, but no figures on individual traffic were available. It was reported that the changes which have taken place in Southern African trade and communications since the illegal declaration of independence rule out precise interpretation of the Beira figures.

255. In a letter dated 10 February 1967, addressed to the Secretary-General (S/7735/Rev.1), the Government of Portugal stated that as a result of the carrying out of a number of measures envisaged in the resolutions of the Security Council, voted upon on 9 April and 16 December 1966, the economy of Mozambique was suffering severe financial and economic losses which the Portuguese Government estimated at about £10 million sterling, up to the end of 1966. Annexed to the letter were particulars of this amount by various items.

256. Within the year 1966, Southern Rhodesia and the Territories under Portuguese administration in Southern Africa were brought closer together economically through visiting trade missions. In early April 1966, a delegation of the National Export Council of Southern Rhodesia visited Lourenço-Marques. The Chairman of the Council was reported to have said that the contacts made by the delegation in Mozambique indicated possibilities for increased exports from Southern Rhodesia. In May 1966, a six-man delegation representing the Associated Chambers of Commerce of Mozambique visited Southern Rhodesia at the invitation of the National Export Council. In June 1966, a seven-man trade delegation from Angola visited Southern Rhodesia for a seven-day tour at the invitation of the National Export Council of Southern Rhodesia. The leader of the delegation was reported to have said at Bulawayo that Angola had many markets which could be exploited by Southern Rhodesian manufacturers. The best openings in Angola were for the manufacturers of cotton goods, electric cabling and canned foods. He said that Southern Rhodesian goods appeared to be very competitive and would hold their own in any overseas market.

257. On 8 July 1966, the régime's Minister of Commerce and Industry, Mr. Musset, opened the Southern Rhodesian pavilion at the Mozambique trade fair in Lourenço-Marques. In his statement, he said that the time had come for countries in Southern Africa to support each other. In 1965 visible trade between Mozambique and Southern Rhodesia left Mozambique with a favourable balance of £180,000, but when invisible transactions, primarily transit, were taken into account, the balance was increased to £6 million. For this reason, he said that he would like to see a greater level of purchases of Southern Rhodesian goods in Mozambique.

258. According to official figures released in Lisbon, Portugal's imports from Southern Rhodesia for the period January to September 1966, amounted to \$942,000 of which tobacco and sugar accounted for \$349,000 and \$111,000, respectively. Other imports included meat of bovine products, asbestos, copper and skins and hides. Exports from Portugal to Southern Rhodesia for the period January to September 1966 amounted to \$809,000.

259. A six-man trade mission from Southern Rhodesia headed by Mr. Maltas, Chairman of the National Export Council of Rhodesia visited Portugal in the first week of November 1966. The mission included Mr. Graylin, chairman of the Rhodesian Tobacco Export Council.

Southern Rhodesia and the oil embargo

260. It will be recalled that the United Kingdom Government imposed a total oil embargo on Southern Rhodesia on 17 December 1965. By the Southern Rhodesia (Petroleum) Order, 1965, the United Kingdom, in exercise of powers conferred upon it by the Southern Rhodesia Act, 1965, prohibited the import of oil and oil products into the Territory. It prohibited United Kingdom nationals from supplying or carrying oil products for Southern Rhodesian use.
261. The Commonwealth Secretary on 6 June 1966 made regulations under the Southern Rhodesia (Petroleum) Order, 1966, permitting certain specified quantities of specialized lubricants (mainly greases) to be imported into Southern Rhodesia for the use of Rhodesia Railways. This was reported to be in keeping with the British Government's policy of excepting from its embargoes, goods essential for the continued running of the Central African Common Services. In view of the uncertainty concerning the future of Rhodesia Railways, the regulation, which can be revoked at any time, permits the import by Caltex Oil (S.A.) Ltd., at monthly intervals, of quantities sufficient for only one month's consumption.
262. On 9 May 1966, the Smith régime increased the price of petroleum products. The price increases, which with one exception were uniform throughout the country, were as follows: petrol, both regular and premium grades, was increased by 1/3d. a gallon; diesel fuel by 7d. per gallon; power paraffin by 9d. per gallon; illuminating paraffin by 5d. per gallon; aviation turbine fuel by 10d. a gallon and aviation gasoline by 1/2d. a gallon. The one exception was the area within a radius of twelve miles of Beitridge where prices remained the same.
263. Rhodesian motorists at Umtali who in the past were able to purchase petrol over the border in Mozambique at very low prices without paying any tax, were affected by these restrictions for the first time. All Rhodesian registered vehicles which entered Southern Rhodesia after an absence of less than two nights were required to pay a special import duty of £1 for motor vehicles and 2/6d. for motorcycles. Only vehicles used for the carriage of passengers or goods across the border for hire or reward, and vehicles of persons resident in Mozambique who worked in Rhodesia or vice versa were exempt from the special import duty.

264. To ensure the successful implementation of the new regulations, petroleum products were removed from the open general licence category and could henceforth only be imported under licence. Any persons who imported or took out of bond any of the fuels enumerated above under authority of a licence issued by the "Secretary for Commerce and Industry" and under such conditions as the Controller of Customs and Excise might approve would pay the old rate of duty.

265. Some exceptions to the new regulation that petroleum products could only be imported under licence were also announced on 9 May 1966, by which the Controller of Customs and Excise was given a blanket authority to admit all gifts of motor fuel without the production of an import licence, subject to the payment of an increase of 3d. per gallon customs duty on all those products imported, with the exception of illuminating paraffin.

266. On 10 June 1966, the ration of diesel fuel to farmers which was fixed at 50 per cent of the 1965 consumption was raised to 70 per cent for the months of June, July and August. The additional 20 per cent was issued at the discretion of the oil companies.

267. Effective from the first week of July 1966, "off ration" petrol coupons were made available to the public by which any person who needed extra petrol beyond the normal allowance could buy extra coupons at an additional price of two shillings a unit for six pints. This in effect meant that while petrol would cost the regular coupon holder 6s. for first grade and 5s.8d. for second grade petrol, the "off ration" coupon holder would, in terms of over-all cost, pay 8s.8d. a gallon for premium brands and 8s.5d. for regulars. Effective from 4 August 1966, off-ration petrol coupons were also made available for the purchase **of aviation fuel at the additional rate of 2/- a unit for six pints.**

268. Statements made by Mr. Musset on 9 May and 28 June 1966 in explanation of the price increases and the introduction of "off ration petrol" coupons give some indication of the impact of the oil embargo on the economy. In his justification of the increase of the price of petroleum products on 9 May 1966, which according to him was inevitable, he stated that the Southern Treasury could not be expected to absorb the enormous additional costs involved in the supply and transport of fuel. On 28 June 1966, he also stated that prior to the introduction of formal rationing and with the disruption of the

normal methods of obtaining supplies, an initial deficit was incurred. This was not being recovered in the present price of petrol. The Government therefore felt justified in asking the ordinary motorist who wished to obtain more petrol (under the "off ration" petrol coupon system) to make a contribution towards this deficit.

269. On the basis of the above references, these measures were interpreted to reflect the extra cost to the Smith régime of importing refined petroleum products from South Africa and through Mozambique. In the past, the government oil procurement agency, GENPA, had been bearing the extra cost of these imports with prices remaining the same at the retail level.

270. In his statement in Parliament on 28 June 1966, Mr. Musset also stated that since the introduction of the coupon system consumption of petroleum products had dropped and this had naturally added to the difficulties which were already facing the motor trade and ancilliary activities. The only practical way of alleviating the petrol ration at this stage was through the "off ration" petrol coupons.

271. Following the increase in prices, the President of the Rhodesia National Farmers Union, Mr. T. Mitchell, was quoted as saying that the 7d. a gallon rise in the price of diesel fuel would raise the cost of agricultural production by £500,000 a year.

272. On 17 June 1966, the President of the Rhodesian Motor Trade Association was reported to have said in a speech at Umtali that petrol rationing had been catastrophic for the trade and to have spoken of the possibility of a breakdown. Since petrol rationing had been introduced, he said, new car sales had dropped by more than 40 per cent and commercial vehicle sales by more than 50 per cent. Workshop revenue and the sale of spare parts were also down.

273. In his statement before the Rhodesian Front Party Congress on 23 September 1966, Mr. Ian Smith made reference to what he called "the battle for fuel, petrol and the oils". He said that there had been one or two sticky moments but that his régime was in the happy position of having more petrol than it did at the commencement of that exercise and that was a measure of its success.

274. Although no figures are available on imports of oil and petroleum products, an indication of the increased volume of oil reaching the country is given by the expansion of storage tank facilities. On 26 August 1966, it was reported

that a request from the Smith régime to the Salisbury City Council to relax petroleum storage by-laws and thus enable oil companies to build more storage tanks had reached the committee stage. Similar requests had either been made or approved by other municipal authorities in Southern Rhodesia. It was reported on 1 August 1966 that three international oil companies were extending their storage facilities at Gwelo, a town 170 miles from Salisbury. According to the report, included in the monthly municipal building figures was the news that Shell, Mobil and Caltex had had building plans approved for storage tanks.^{12/} 275. According to press reports, petroleum and oil products reaching Southern Rhodesia from across the borders daily were far in excess of the amount required under rationing. Petrol tankers on the roads and the railways had become acceptable features of the Southern Rhodesian scene. Refined petrol continued to be railed up from South Africa through the then protectorate of Bechuanaland and from Mozambique. In addition, long convoys of trucks continued to carry thousands of gallons of petrol across the South African border town of Beitbridge into Southern Rhodesia.

South Africa and the oil embargo

276. From January to November 1966, the Rhodesia Broadcasting Corporation gave wide publicity to the arrival in Southern Rhodesia of consignments of refined petroleum products from South Africa. They were described as "gifts" from the "Petrol for Rhodesia" movements in South Africa which are spearheaded by the Friends of Rhodesia Organization. According to the radio reports, these consignments of petroleum products varied from a few hundred gallons to 4,000 gallons per shipment by road. However, it was estimated that these "Petrol for Rhodesia" movements were only making a modest contribution to the Smith régime's stocks as compared with the gigantic exercise organized by the illegal régime in 1966 to bring in petroleum products from South Africa. It was estimated that the petroleum products reaching Southern Rhodesia from South Africa reached the level of 35,000 gallons per day from February 1966

^{12/} On 21 December 1965, the oil companies operating inside Southern Rhodesia were put under the Emergency regulations, giving the Ian Smith régime control over their operations.

to May, when supplies were reported to have jumped to 140,000 gallons per day.^{13/} It was stated that these reported huge daily supplies of petrol were not due to the "petrol for Rhodesia" movements; they were mainly attributed to GENFA, a petrol haulage and procurement agency of the Smith régime. The statement by the Minister of Commerce and Industry of Southern Rhodesia on 9 May 1966 that the Southern Rhodesian Treasury "could not be expected to bear the enormous additional costs involved in the supply and transport of fuel" clearly indicated the Smith régime's role in the above-mentioned shipments of oil. Since the "enormous additional costs involved in the supply and transport of fuel" continued to be passed on to the consumer throughout 1966, it was obvious that the bulk supplies of petroleum products reaching Southern Rhodesia in 1966 were not "gifts" from South Africa but rather officially controlled exercises.

277. On 8 August 1966, Mr. Harold Wilson stated in the House of Commons in reply to a question that oil had been going through from South Africa to Southern Rhodesia although at a very high price and was very costly to the régime. He stated that the South African Government had explained that it was its policy to allow normal but not abnormal trade, whether on oil or anything else, to Southern Rhodesia. Mr. Wilson was also asked a further question on stories which were circulating that large quantities of oil were being exported from South Africa to Southern Rhodesia via Bechuanaland. In reply, Mr. Wilson stated that the United Kingdom Government had been watching this very carefully. Some of the stories and figures which he had seen were vastly exaggerated compared with the relatively small amounts going through Bechuanaland.

Portugal and the oil embargo

278. Since the illegal declaration of independence, the Government of Portugal has reiterated its policy of keeping transit facilities through Mozambique open to Zambia, Malawi and Southern Rhodesia, and of not interfering with goods destined to any of those countries. The Government of Portugal has also stated that it has not taken any initiative tending to ensure the supply of oil to Southern Rhodesia nor purchasing it in the name of that country nor transporting

^{13/} A/6300/Add.1, para. 216 and 734.

it in Portuguese ships. It would not, however, permit any consignment of oil to be diverted to a country different from the one for which it was destined.

279. It will be recalled that in the first quarter of 1966, it was reported that oil and petroleum products had continued to reach Southern Rhodesia from South Africa by rail through Mozambique at the rate of about 100,000 gallons daily. In addition, it was also estimated that Mozambique was itself supplying Southern Rhodesia with 10,000 gallons of refined petroleum products daily.

280. In a press release dated 12 May 1966, the Government of Portugal "categorically rejected" reports stating that Mozambique had become the chief source of oil supply for Southern Rhodesia. In the statement, which was repeated on subsequent occasions in 1966 to counteract press and other reports, the Government of Portugal stated that Mozambique was not an oil producing country and that its own annual requirement of crude oil amounted to 200,000 tons as against 400,000 tons for Southern Rhodesia. According to the statement, since the amount of crude oil imported into Mozambique had not increased since 11 November 1965, and further considering that no measures of austerity rationing of gasoline and oil products had been introduced since that date, it was difficult to see from where the stocks needed for the so-called supply of Southern Rhodesia could have been provided by Mozambique.

281. On 8 August 1966, Mr. Harold Wilson stated in the House of Commons in reply to a question that one of the big problems (of the oil embargo) had been oil going through Lourenço-Marques, passing from there into South Africa and from there to Southern Rhodesia.

282. On 7 June 1966, it was reported that bulk consignments of refined petroleum products from the SONAREP refinery in Lourenço-Marques were believed to be reaching Bulawayo and Salisbury weekly by way of South Africa and the main Mozambique railway. Observers believed that the rate of supplies from Mozambique might average as much as 20,000 gallons a day - twice what it was in April 1966. According to this report from South Africa, the biggest single consignment was understood to have been dispatched in the first week of June 1966. It consisted of nineteen tankers, each carrying a maximum load of 8,020 gallons of petrol - a total of 152,380 gallons. Rail and refinery officials were reported to have maintained that these consignments were bound for Beira. It was pointed out,

however, that the Port of Beira was usually supplied by sea - a cheaper and more direct route.

283. On 17 May 1966, the Commonwealth Secretary, Mr. Bottomley, stated in reply to a question in the House of Commons that the United Kingdom Government had agreed for the time being to help with the expenses of the Companhia do Pipeline Moçambique - Rodésia and in particular the expenses of maintaining and repairing the pipeline installations, since the pipeline was out of use. The agreed contribution was £54,000 a month for a minimum period of three months from 7 April 1966. On 13 September 1966 the United Kingdom Government announced that it had decided to terminate the payments of £54,000 monthly to the Companhia do Pipeline Moçambique - Rodésia. The termination of payments took effect from 7 October 1966.

Foreign trade

284. According to figures published by the Central Statistical Office in Salisbury on 6 June 1966, total exports in 1965 amounted to £164.690 million of which domestic exports accounted for £142.55 million; re-exports £15.145 and net gold sales £6.794 million. Total exports in 1964 amounted to £140.55 million. Imports in 1965 amounted to £119.8 million as compared with £108.2 in 1964. Foreign trade for 1965 thus showed an increase of 17 per cent in total exports and 10.7 per cent in imports.

285. The main customers of Southern Rhodesia maintained their order of importance as in 1964 and took domestic exports in 1965 as follows: Zambia (£36.1 million); United Kingdom (£31 million); South Africa (£12.8 million); Federal Republic of Germany (£12.8 million); Malawi (£7.7 million) and Japan (£7.4 million). The main suppliers for imports were the United Kingdom (£36.4 million); South Africa (£27.5 million); United States of America (£8.2 million); Japan (£6.6 million); Federal Republic of Germany (£4.9 million) and Zambia (£4.3 million).

286. The visible balance of trade after making allowances for stocks and internal freight showed an improvement over 1964. It rose by £5.3 million from £36.5 million in 1964 to £41.8 million in 1965. After deduction of net payments abroad for visible items, the current account balance amounted to a favourable £14.0 million.

287. Sanctions imposed on Southern Rhodesia by most of its normal trading partners outside Africa, in terms of Security Council resolution 217 (1965), generally, exempted contracts concluded before the illegal declaration of independence, or, in certain cases, before the States concerned went through the necessary legislative processes to give effect to these sanctions. Other States put their trade with Southern Rhodesia under a licensing system by which trade in specified commodities was permitted pending their availability from other sources at competitive prices.

288. External trade statistics for 1966-67, in conjunction with other relevant statistics since February 1966, have been suppressed by the illegal régime on the grounds that publication of such reports were detrimental to the national interest because they would aid and encourage opponents to take counter measures and embarrass the friends of the régime. However, data on the trade of Southern Rhodesia for 1966 were reported by certain countries of destination and origin. The data reported as of 23 February 1966 (S/7781/Add.1) is in no way complete and does not include any data from some of the normal major trading partners of Southern Rhodesia, namely, Zambia, South Africa and Malawi who together accounted for about 40 per cent of the total domestic exports and about 30 per cent of total imports in 1965. Data provided by countries of destination and origin for the foreign trade of Southern Rhodesia as contained in the addendum to the Secretary-General's report (S/7781/Add.1) did not cover a uniform period of time. Full information on the trade of Southern Rhodesia is not at present available and may not be available for some time.

289. As far as the Smith régime is concerned, the only statement of substance on foreign trade for 1966, was made by Mr. Wrathall, the régime's Minister of Finance, on 21 July. He said in his budget statement that with the imposition of sanctions, it was inevitable that there would be some decline from the high levels of exports achieved in the period July-December 1965. The drop for the six months to June 1966 was not nearly so large as had been predicted in some quarters. This was because of the efforts made by industrialists to search out and open up new markets and because of the ingenuity with which they had circumvented sanctions. During the six months to the end of June 1966, the

value of exports other than tobacco was £46.4 million, or 17 per cent lower than that for the comparable period of 1965. Imports were reduced to the desired level without causing any widespread hardship or impairing the effectiveness of essential industry. For the six months to June 1966, the total value of imports was limited to £40.1 million, or 32 per cent below the 1965 figure. The substantial reductions in imports and the much smaller decline in the value of exports had a profound effect on the balance of trade and, in respect of trade other than tobacco, produced a favourable visible balance of £6.3 million, compared with an adverse balance of £2.9 million for January-June 1965.

C. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS (January-April 1967)

Question of separate development of the races in Southern Rhodesia

290. On 27 January 1967, Mr. Ian Smith stated in the "Legislative Assembly" that his régime would establish an independent commission to advise on a new constitution for the country. He stated that the "ideal" after which his régime was striving was a system that acknowledged the different communities of Southern Rhodesia and provided safeguards which would enable the different communities to live according to their own wishes and with adequate protection for their rights and freedoms.

291. Commenting on Mr. Smith's statement at a press conference on the same day, the newly elected leader of the United Peoples Party (UPP), Mr. Percy Mkudu, stated that Mr. Smith's statement presaged Southern Rhodesian constitutional developments in the direction of South African apartheid.

292. On 30 January 1967, the Rhodesia Herald in a leading article forecast a move by the Smith régime towards apartheid. According to the article, the "ideal" announced by Mr. Smith was something more akin to South African policies than any previous Southern Rhodesian Government had contemplated.

293. On 17 February 1967, Mr. Smith stated in an interview on the Rhodesian Broadcasting Corporation that it was the belief of his régime that the chiefs and tribal structure were more suited to represent the views of the Africans than the African members of the Legislative Assembly. The democratic system of government was new to the African, and it was something which took time to adjust oneself to. He believed that for as long as there was separate development, it was more necessary to educate the African than otherwise. Without separate development he could live under the wing of the European, but if the African was expected to develop his own areas - the tribal trust areas - to the maximum there was all the greater need to educate him. The evidence he had from Africans was that they preferred to live according to their own customs in the same way as the Europeans did. What they wished to have was equal opportunity with the Europeans.

294. On 21 February 1967, Mr. Smith stated in the Legislative Assembly that the crux of the problem in Southern Rhodesia was to devise a constitution which would assure the rights of both the African and the European people. All the evidence showed that the Europeans were deprived of their rights under African majority rule. It was obvious from evidence inside and outside Southern Rhodesia that the African was manifestly unable to govern himself. One of the roles of the European in Southern Rhodesia was to protect the African from himself. Referring to suggestions from the opposition that the régime intended to introduce a policy of separate /...

development, Mr. Smith stated that the new Constitution must provide adequate protection for rights. This did not mean taking anything away from the African.

Developments in the tribal trust land areas

295. At the end of February 1967, the Legislative Assembly purported to have given second reading to the tribal trust land bill. The bill which was subsequently signed by the "Officer Administering the Government" made certain changes in the administration and distribution of land in the tribal trust land areas by which the chiefs and tribal leaders were given responsibility for the administration, distribution and parcelling of land under their jurisdiction. The various tribal land authorities to be formed under the act were given powers to make their own by-laws, subject to the approval of the "Ministry of Internal Affairs". The tribal land authorities would operate according to local custom. The purpose of the act, according to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, was to enable the Africans to develop their own tribal areas.

296. During the debate on the bill, some members of the United Peoples Party criticized the bill for providing for separate racial development. Mr. J.M. Gondo, UPP member for Nganda, stated that the bill appeared to have been copied from the South African Bantu Authorities Act of 1951.

297. The "Tribal Trust Land Act" was a follow-up to the "Constitution Amendment Act" of 14 September 1966. In the course of the debate on the bill, Mr. William Harper, the régime's Minister of Internal Affairs, stated that in addition to the changes in the administration of the tribal trust lands, the bill would empower the régime to introduce legislation to give the African chiefs greater powers in the administration of their areas. Among other powers, the proposed legislation would give the chiefs or their courts powers for dealing with certain criminal offences. The legislation would not force the tribal courts to adhere to the Declaration of Rights in so far as legal representation was concerned. It would also give powers to the chiefs for the removal of certain people from one tribal trust area to another. The legislation would also make some changes in relation to tribal trust lands.

298. On 19 April 1967, Mr. Clifford Dupont, the régime's Officer Administering the Government, stated in the Legislative Assembly that the régime would introduce legislation to clarify the field of African law and to specify the areas of civil and criminal jurisdiction for tribal courts.

Appointment of "Constitutional Commission"

299. On 28 February 1967, the Smith régime announced the composition and terms of reference of the Constitutional Commission to advise on a new constitution for the country. The chairman of the Commission is Mr. W. Whaley, a Salisbury lawyer. The other members are Mr. R.H. Cole, a Bulawayo lawyer, Mr. S.E. Morris, the chairman of the Public Service Board, Mr. L.C. Mzingeli, an African businessman, and Chief Simon Sigoda. The secretary of the Commission is Mr. Peter Claypole, a Salisbury senior magistrate.

300. Mr. Whaley is a member of two government statutory bodies and a member of the Rhodesian Front Party (RFP). Mr. Morris, a former Chief Native Commissioner, was a member of the Rhodesian team of officers which took part in the informal talks with United Kingdom officials in 1966. Mr. Mzingeli took part in the 1961 Constitutional Conference.

301. The terms of reference of the Commission are:

"To examine the provisions of the constitution of Rhodesia, 1965, and, having regard to any other constitutional precedents and to views and opinions made known to you, to advise the Government of Rhodesia on the constitutional framework which is best suited to the sovereign independent status of Rhodesia and which is calculated to protect and guarantee the rights and freedoms of all persons and communities in Rhodesia and ensure the harmonious development of Rhodesia's plural society, having regard to the social and cultural differences amongst the people of Rhodesia, to the different systems of land tenure, and to the problems of economic development."

302. The Commission was to conduct its inquiries in private. It was empowered to present interim reports to Mr. Dupont.

Developments in security matters

303. On 26 January 1967, Mr. Desmond Lardner-Burke, "Minister of Justice and Law and Order", stated in the Legislative Assembly that nearly 100 trained African terrorists had been captured, or killed by the Southern Rhodesian security forces during the past nine months.

304. On 7 February 1967, Mr. Lardner-Burke announced that eight former students at the University College of Rhodesia had been released from restriction to enable them to continue their studies outside Southern Rhodesia.

305. The annual report of the "Secretary for Law and Order" was tabled in the Legislative Assembly on 15 February 1967. The report stated that apart from a sharp increase in the number of cases of housebreaking and theft, and offences under the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act, there was a considerable drop in serious crime

last year. The number of cases of arson fell from 99 in 1965 to 24 in 1966, culpable homicide from 102 to 72, and murder from 166 to 156. Law and order cases rose from 47 in 1965 to 60 in 1966, and housebreaking and theft from 136 to 195. During the year, 927 persons, including 21 Europeans, were charged with 1,086 crimes. 306. On terrorist activities, the Secretary said the state of emergency existing in Southern Rhodesia in 1966 had provided an essential weapon in dealing with the many threats to the maintenance of law and order. During 1966, a maximum of 159 detainees and a minimum of 52 at any one time were held under ministerial order. The number of restrictees, while constantly changing, showed a maximum of 444 and a minimum of 306. By far the most serious threat was the infiltration of trained terrorists from neighbouring territories. Arrests had proved that these terrorists had received their training in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the People's Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as well as in certain African States such as Algeria, Ghana and the United Republic of Tanzania. 307. The report stated that as a result of the extraordinary powers given by the emergency regulations in force throughout the year and many successful persecutions of subversionists, the internal threat to law and order in the country had not been as great as in preceding years.

308. On 31 March 1967, the Smith régime set up a tribunal to review the cases of all detainees. Mr. M.F. Garnett, provincial magistrate for Mashonaland, was named as chairman of the three-man tribunal. The sittings of the tribunal would be held in camera and the régime's Ministry of Justice, Law and Order would not be bound by its recommendations. On 19 April 1967, the Ministry announced that the 170 people in detention had all received letters inviting them to submit their cases to the review tribunal.

309. On 8 April 1967, Mr. Lardner-Burke stated that there had been no known cases of terrorist infiltration into Southern Rhodesia since September 1966. He stated that radio broadcasts from Zambia had caused a number of attacks on farms and crops but believed that this had now ceased. A total of 115 people had been arrested by the security forces while attempting to enter the country with illegal intent and had since been prosecuted.

310. On 19 April 1967, Mr. Dupont, the régime's Officer Administering the Government, in his speech to the third session of the "Eleventh Rhodesian Parliament", stated that the régime would introduce legislation to provide for preventive detention without the need for a state of emergency by making the necessary provision in the ordinary statute law of the country. Press censorship would be maintained but the régime would continue to keep it under review. /...

311. On 25 April 1967, the state of emergency in Southern Rhodesia was renewed for a further three months by the Legislative Assembly, effective from 30 April.

312. Among other developments, the Smith régime launched a "Guard Against Gossip Campaign" (GAG) on 19 March 1967 to prevent people from indiscreetly passing on vital information to strangers and so-called spies. Advertisement and posters aimed at curtailing free speech, particularly on economic issues, carried slogans such as "Loose tongues lose battles". Introducing the campaign on 18 March 1967, the "Minister of Information", Mr. Jack Howman, stated that secrecy and security must become increasingly Southern Rhodesia's watchword. He appealed to Rhodesian journalists to be security minded.

313. On 14 March 1967, two members of a "terrorist gang" who were reported to have been caught in a running fight with Rhodesian security forces near the Zambian border on 18 July 1966, were each sentenced to twenty-four years' imprisonment.

Rhodesian Front Party Congress

314. On 22 April 1967, a special congress of the Rhodesian Front Party was called in Salisbury to consider, among other things, amendments to the list of the party's principles.

315. At the congress, the first principle of the party was amended to read:

"The party affirms its loyalty to the independent country of Rhodesia."

The first principle of the party prior to the above amendment had read:

"The party affirms its loyalty to the Queen but rejects the principle of subordination to any external government."

A further amendment urging the immediate assumption of republic status by Southern Rhodesia was defeated. Mr. Smith was reported to have opposed the amendment but to have urged that the question should await the report of the Constitutional Commission.

316. Other principles of the party adopted by the congress ran completely counter to the United Kingdom Government's six principles for a constitutional settlement which Mr. Smith had accepted at the talks with Mr. Wilson on the HMS Tiger (see paras. 88-98).

317. The second principle stated that the party "will ensure that the Government of Rhodesia remains permanently in responsible hands". It was reported that there was a move to amend this to read "permanently in European hands" but that this was considered not necessary.

318. The sixth principle stated that the party would uphold the principle of land apportionment. The Land Apportionment Act of 1941 is the key legislation on racially discriminatory practices in the Territory.

319. The eighth principle presaged legislation on separate African and European communities. It reads: "The party opposes compulsory integration and believes that the peaceful coexistence of people can only be achieved when communities have the right and the opportunity to preserve their own identities, traditions and customs." It also refers to "the obligation of the Government and the respective communities where necessary to ensure the provision of such separate facilities as will make this possible".

Resolution adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity (OAU)

320. The Council of Ministers of the OAU, meeting at its eighth ordinary session in Addis Ababa from 27 February to 4 March 1967, adopted a resolution on the question of Southern Rhodesia. In this resolution, the Council of Ministers again condemned unreservedly the Government of the United Kingdom for shirking its moral and constitutional responsibilities to the people of Zimbabwe by allowing the illegal Smith régime to consolidate its position in defiance of the rights of the people of Zimbabwe and world opinion; reaffirmed that primarily the responsibility of toppling the illegal régime in Rhodesia rested with Britain and remained convinced that the only way to do this was the use of force; strongly reaffirmed the right of the people of Zimbabwe to freedom and self-determination; called upon the nationalist movements in Zimbabwe to unite their ranks, co-operate and intensify their efforts against the common enemy in order to expedite the liberation of their territory and also on African States to give every assistance to the nationalist movements to ensure the liberation of the territory and the establishment of majority rule; once again called upon the African members of the Security Council to continue to sponsor the necessary measures which would strengthen and complete the implementation of the Security Council resolution 232 (1966), including the invocation of Article 42 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

Visit of Mr. Smith to South Africa

321. On 1 March 1967, Mr. Smith arrived in Cape Town on a visit to South Africa "to enjoy his first holiday since becoming Prime Minister". He was met on arrival by the Foreign Minister of the Republic, Dr. Muller, and "the accredited diplomatic representative of Rhodesia in the Republic", Mr. John Gaunt. On 21 March 1967, Mr. Smith, accompanied by his wife, paid a courtesy call on the South African Prime Minister, Mr. Vorster, at his official residence in Cape Town. According to official South African sources, Mr. Smith and his wife had lunch with Mr. and Mrs. Vorster and returned to their holiday resort immediately afterwards. No details of the meeting were available. However, Mr. Smith was reported to have stated on his return to Salisbury that he had been greatly encouraged by his meeting with Mr. Vorster. Speaking at a newspaper interview on 26 March 1967, he was reported to have stated that he had found among South Africans an incredible amount of goodwill, a desire to assist in every possible way and at the same time a tremendous realization of the problems ahead.

D. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS (January - April 1967)

Official published figures and statements on the economy of Southern Rhodesia

322. On 9 February 1967, the "Minister of Finance", Mr. John Wrathall, made a statement in the Legislative Assembly on the economic situation of Southern Rhodesia in 1966. He described the economic situation, after twelve months of sanctions, as being far more satisfactory than most people had believed. There had been a drop of less than 5 per cent in the gross domestic product compared with the figures for 1965. The gross domestic product for 1965 was officially quoted at £351.6 million. Regarding employment, he stated that the indications were that the monthly average of European, Coloured and Asian persons in employment had remained on the same level as in 1965 but that there had been an increase of some 2,500 in the monthly average of African employees. There had been a net loss of Europeans by immigration of just under 1,000, compared with a net gain of 4,000 in 1965.^{14/} Mr. Wrathall also stated that in 1966 the consumer

^{14/} Figures issued by the Bureau of Statistics of South Africa on 17 January 1967, vary from Mr. Wrathall's quotation by a wide margin. The figures showed that Southern Rhodesia in 1966 lost on balance 3,000 residents to South Africa.

price index increased by 2.5 per cent in the case of Europeans and by 2.3 per cent for Africans.

323. On 14 April 1967, the Smith régime reported that retail trade had recovered steadily throughout 1966 from a low level of turnover in the first quarter and was on the average 9 per cent below the average for 1965. Industrial production declined by 6.8 per cent to a level which was still above that of 1964. Since March 1966, the consumer price index had risen from 108.5 to 110.9, or a little over 2 per cent. There had been a net loss of 1,421 European emigrants in the first nine months of 1966. Since September 1966, there had been a reversal of the trend and Southern Rhodesia had experienced a net gain of 1,158.

324. On 17 April 1967, Mr. Wrathall stated that although retail trade in 1966 was 9 per cent below the average for 1965, this decline was not a fair reflection on the majority of trades. Addressing the annual general meeting of the Bulawayo Chamber of Commerce, he stated that motor trade turnover in 1966 fell to 73.5 per cent of the 1965 figures. If this item were not included in the index, the level of turnover for all other retail trade would be only 1.6 per cent below the 1965 level. Explaining figures released on the cost of living, he pointed out that among increases in food-stuffs was a rise of more than 24 per cent in the cost of a four-pound packet of sugar, but other increases were small and some, including pork and butter had declined in price. Thus, the over-all index for food-stuffs had risen by only 5.6 per cent since October 1965.

325. Mr. Wrathall also stated that seven of nine major groups of items in the household budget had increased since 11 November 1965. These increases were: 11.2 per cent for vehicle expenses; 10.6 per cent for drink and tobacco; 5.6 per cent for food-stuffs; 3.3 per cent for miscellaneous items; 2 per cent for clothing and footwear; 1.6 per cent for household stores; and 0.5 per cent for fuel and light. The other two groups, servants' wages and rents and rates, showed no change.

326. On 5 April 1967, Mr. Wrathall announced that, effective from the middle of the month, the Smith régime would resume publication of selected economic statistics in a quarterly digest. It will be recalled that although a number of statistics had been disclosed from time to time in statements by officials of the régime, there had been a ban on the regular publication of economic information since November 1965.

Foreign trade

327. Following the above statement by Mr. Wrathall, the Central Statistical Office in Salisbury, on 14 April 1966, issued a report on foreign trade figures and economic trends in 1966. According to the report, exports in 1966, despite sanctions, amounted to £104.7 million. Imports totalled £84.2 million, showing a visible trade balance of £20.5 million.^{15/}

328. On 17 March 1967, Mr. Wrathall stated that Southern Rhodesia had benefited by nearly £20 million, as a result of the two-way blockade of payments such as interests, dividends and debts between Southern Rhodesia and the United Kingdom. According to Mr. Wrathall, the value of interest on debts and debt repayments not being paid in the United Kingdom had so far been £9 million. Current investment income which was due to residents in the United Kingdom but which was now blocked in Southern Rhodesia amounted to over £10 million.

329. It was reported that if the Southern Rhodesian statistics were accepted it would mean that the country's economy had been able to withstand sanctions with a much smaller reduction in its import bill than would otherwise have been necessary. In 1965, Southern Rhodesia ran a visible trade surplus of £42 million, but a deficit of invisibles of £28 million. The elimination by the United Kingdom of £20 million of this "invisible" bill - even taking into account the loss of dividend income due to Southern Rhodesia - must have meant that a favourable visible trade surplus of only £15 million would have been adequate to prevent any drawing on Rhodesian reserves.

330. On 15 March 1967, Mr. Wrathall stated that according to Southern Rhodesian figures, United Kingdom exports to Southern Rhodesia in 1966 amounted to £11 million, while United Kingdom figures amounted to £2.7 million.^{16/} He gave a list of total imports from the United Kingdom, of which £7.1 million was represented by various forms of machinery and transport equipment. He stated that if the United Kingdom figure of £2.7 million was correct, then British exporters

^{15/} In 1965, total exports including re-exports and gold sales amounted to £164.7 million; imports amounted to £119.8 million.

^{16/} According to Southern Rhodesia figures, domestic exports to the United Kingdom in 1965 amounted to £31 million; imports amounted to £36.4 million.

had obviously made an effort to bring their goods into Southern Rhodesia by devious means. In a subsequent statement on 17 March 1967, Mr. Wrathall stated that Rhodesian figures for British imports in 1966 were £25.4 million less than in 1965. The British overseas trade account showed a greater fall, namely, £28.8 million.

331. According to figures released in Zambia on 11 April 1967, Zambia's trade with Southern Rhodesia for 1966 was as follows: domestic imports from Southern Rhodesia amounted to £23.1 million, compared with £35.5 million in 1965; exports to Southern Rhodesia amounted to £2.5 million, compared with £5.4 million in 1965. It was reported that Zambia had achieved the reduction in trade with Southern Rhodesia through strict control of imports of non-essential items, among them clothing, footwear and food-stuffs for which alternative sources of supply have been found.

332. According to trade figures released by the Republic of South Africa in January 1967, exports in 1966 to "the rest of Africa" rose by 32 per cent to R 194 million (about £100 million). The South African Government has not published a geographical breakdown of its trade with the rest of Africa since mid-1965. However, assuming that exports to Southern Rhodesia rose by a corresponding proportion, it is estimated that, on a conservative basis, exports and re-exports to Southern Rhodesia would have amounted to about R 100 million (£50 million). South Africa's imports from the rest of Africa increased by 18 per cent in 1966. On the assumption of past performances, imports from Southern Rhodesia can be estimated at R 50 million (£25 million), repeating the 1964-65 increases.

Other developments in foreign trade

333. Effective from 9 February 1967, Mr Wrathall, announced that Southern Rhodesia would adopt a single column customs tariff system. All provisions for automatic preference, and in particular the remaining Commonwealth preferences, would be permanently abolished, but South Africa, Portugal and its African territories, Malawi Botswana would all continue to enjoy preferential treatment as would Lesotho, Swaziland and South West Africa. Mr. Wrathall stated that he believed the change would do much to consolidate the new pattern of trading relations which had emerged in the past fifteen months.

Agriculture

334. General. It was reported in February 1967, that sanctions were changing the farming pattern of Southern Rhodesia. According to press reports, about 160 million pounds (about two-thirds) of the 1965-66 tobacco crop bought by the tobacco corporation remained unsold and had been stockpiled in Salisbury. The sugar crop which together with the tobacco accounted for over 30 per cent of domestic exports in 1965 (£50 million) was also reported to be in serious difficulties as a result of sanctions and low world market prices. Hippo Valley Estates, one of the main sugar producers, reported a net loss of £372,345 on 19 July 1966 and the Chirundu Sugar Estates, another big producer of sugar, ceased production in February 1967. In April 1967, Rhodesia Sugar Refineries Ltd. announced that it would no longer continue to subsidize the growing side of the industry by paying over all of its profits.

335. According to press reports, present diversification trends in Southern Rhodesia, necessitated by sanctions, show that tobacco is now giving way to beef, wheat and maize as principal agricultural crops.

336. The cattle industry had been expanded in acreage and production and was estimated in May 1966 by the regime's Ministry of Agriculture to be worth £200 million. In March 1967, it was reported that beef was "booming" and that the cattle industry had gone ahead of tobacco as the main agricultural produce. The value of the cattle industry in 1967 was estimated to be well in excess of the £200 million quoted for 1966.

337. The local usage of wheat in Southern Rhodesia is in excess of 700,000 bags annually. In 1965, wheat production amounted to 43,300 bags, compared with 20,900 bags in 1964. It was therefore pointed out that there was ample scope for increased production in Southern Rhodesia in 1966-67. In a joint statement issued in Salisbury in April 1967, the "Department of Water Development" and the "Ministry of Agriculture" declared that a number of tobacco growers had indicated their intention of growing wheat. It was further stated that this was in the national interest.

338. On 7 March 1967, the regime's Minister of Agriculture, Mr. G.W. Rudland, announced the prices that the Smith régime would pay to farmers to encourage the diversification of agriculture. He stated that for the 1967 maize crop agreement

had been reached with the Rhodesian National Farmers' Union on a price of between 27s. 6d. and 28s. per bag. He emphasized that farmers would get less than 30 shillings per bag. In 1966, farmers were paid 31s. 6d per bag of maize. For crops that would be planted at the end of 1967 and reaped in 1968, he gave a set of prices as follows: A grade ground-nuts, from 90 to 110 shillings a bag; B grade ground-nuts, from 78 to 85 shillings per bag; soya beans, from 50 to 80 shillings per bag; and wheat, from 60 to 67 shillings per bag. Mr. Rudland stated that the wheat prices would come into effect in 1967 but that the prices for soya beans and ground-nuts would apply to crops to be reaped early in 1968. He also stated that it had been decided to discontinue the £430,000 a year subsidy on diesel fuel and fertilizers to farmers, and to put the money available on to the end prices of the above-mentioned crops. Mr. Rudland gave an assurance to tobacco growers that there would be a crop in the coming year and that this would go on in perpetuity. In referring to the tobacco crop for the coming season, he stated that he wanted to make it quite clear to tobacco producers that he had not mentioned that he would announce the price and quantities of the crop in July 1967, as he had done in the previous year.

Tobacco crop

339. Secret tobacco sales of the 1966/67 crop opened in Salisbury on 29 March 1967. The Smith régime had guaranteed the farmers a minimum price of 28d. per pound for Virginia flue-cured tobacco. The production target of the crop for the season was fixed by the régime at 200 million pounds. It was presumed that most of the sales were likely to be concluded on the basis of private negotiations, as was done in 1966, rather than auction sales, as was the case before the unilateral declaration of independence. Elaborate security arrangements were reported to have been made to protect the identity of buyers. Under the system introduced last year, the leaf was offered to buyers with a minimum guaranteed government price. If buyers were not prepared to meet this minimum price, the leaf was then bought in by the Tobacco Corporation which undertook to dispose of the leaf itself.

340. On 11 April 1967, Mr. Carol Heurtley, President of the Rhodesia Tobacco Association, stated that a further cut in the size of the tobacco crop could bring financial ruin to hundreds of growers, wholesale unemployment to the rural areas, impugn the livelihood of many people in commerce, and adversely affect the

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marketing of other crops due to over-reproduction. The foundation of the country's agricultural industry would be rocked if the tobacco target for next season was cut below 200 million pounds. He further stated that there were about half a million people dependent on the tobacco industry - most of them Africans - and another cut in the size of the crop would jeopardize the livelihood of everyone connected with the industry.

Commerce and industry

341. On 3 March 1966, the "Minister of Commerce and Industry", Mr. B.H. Musset, gave figures for the country's industrial growth for the previous eighteen months. He stated that since "independence" more than 200 new industrial projects involving a fixed capital investment of £4,750,000 and a sales potential of £13 million had been approved. Many of these projects were now either in operation or about to be put into operation. On the future of Rhodesian industry, he stated that the continued use of import controls would be necessary to achieve expansion.

342. On 18 February 1967, the chairman of the Board for Industrial Development, Mr. Sears, stated in Salisbury that more than £6 million was available for investment in Southern Rhodesia to local and overseas investors. The Board wished to hear from industrialists and potential industrialists who needed money for expansion or new ventures.

343. On 5 April 1967, Mr. Wrathall announced tax concessions for industrialists to help to stimulate Southern Rhodesia's export trade. The concessions related to bigger allowances for export market promotional expenditure.

344. On 6 April 1967, the Smith régime was reported to have drastically reduced import quotas for non-essential goods in an attempt to preserve the country's foreign currency reserves. Figures on the new import quotas were not released but it was reported that cuts on some luxury items were as high as 75 per cent. Imports hardest hit included clothing, table-ware, perfume, glassware and chocolate and other food-stuffs. The cuts were reported to be a move by the régime to carry out its pledge to protect local industry through quota cuts on goods which were once imported but could not be produced locally.

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345. In his opening address to the third session of the "Eleventh Parliament of Rhodesia", Mr. Dupont, the regime's Officer Administering the Government, paid tribute to the industrial sector of the economy for the expansion and diversification of its products. He stated that import substitution, exports and the maintenance of employment had benefited from these endeavours. Mr. Dupont also stated that the régime acknowledged that the impressive achievements of the mining industry had been a major factor in the maintenance of the country's economic equilibrium.

Finance

346. On 24 February 1967, the régime's Minister of Finance, Mr. Wrathall, stated in the Legislative Assembly that the Smith régime considered itself to be entirely absolved from the responsibility for servicing all London market debts which were listed as debts due to the United Kingdom Government and its agencies and debts under United Kingdom Government guarantee. He stated that Southern Rhodesia had been relieved of obligations totalling £160 million, excluding sinking funds, which were under the control of the United Kingdom Government. There could be no question of Southern Rhodesia resuming responsibility for this obligation unless and until the United Kingdom Government had made adequate reparation for the damage done to the Rhodesian economy by sanctions. Holders of this debt must look to the United Kingdom Government for satisfaction.

347. On 31 March 1967, the Smith régime floated a new £7.5 million three-year loan at 5 per cent which was almost immediately over-subscribed when subscription lists opened. The loan was to be used to pay for government development projects and to finance maturing debts. It was the sixth such loan to be floated by the régime, bringing the total to £27 million, since the illegal declaration of independence. The United Kingdom Government as in the case of previous loans floated by the régime, issued a warning to investors informing them that the illegal régime was not capable of incurring legal obligations on behalf of the Government of Southern Rhodesia and that anyone subscribing to the loan did so entirely at his own risk.

Rhodesia Railways

348. On 23 March 1966, the "Ministry of Transport and Power" announced that discussions had taken place between Rhodesian and Zambian senior government officials relating to the dissolution of the Rhodesia Railways. It had been agreed that, progressively, operational control of the sections of the railway within each country would respectively be taken over by the authorities to be established in each country, and that this process would be completed by 30 June 1967. It was intended that Zambia, Southern Rhodesia and the Railway Board would co-operate in bringing this about. Negotiations would continue until all aspects of the dissolution of the railways had been resolved. It was hoped these would be completed as soon as possible after 30 June 1967.

349. The Government of Zambia also issued a statement on 23 March 1967 in which it announced that it had started negotiations with Southern Rhodesia for breaking up the jointly owned Rhodesia Railways system.

350. On 6 March 1966, Rhodesia Railways started a new fast freight rail service between South Africa and Southern Rhodesia to speed up imports to Southern Rhodesia through South Africa's ports. In an official statement it was stated that initially the service would be available for urgent goods dispatched from the main ports and Reef complex to Bulawayo and Salisbury. Traffic for these centres in Southern Rhodesia would go forward from Bulawayo and Salisbury by the daily internal express goods service. Goods from the Johannesburg area should be available for delivery in Bulawayo in five days and in Salisbury in six days. A similar fast freight service has already been in operation from Salisbury and Bulawayo to Johannesburg and the South African ports.

351. On 30 January 1967, the ~~three-man~~ Commission of Inquiry which was appointed by the Smith régime to investigate an alternative rail link between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa submitted its report to the régime's Officer Administering the Government. The report of the Beit Bridge Rail Link Commission, which was composed of three South African experts, recommended a direct rail link from Rutenga to Beit Bridge to join the South African railway. On 3 February 1967, Mr. Smith stated in the Legislative Assembly that his régime had no intention of rushing in to implement the recommendations "on this vital issue".

Other developments

352. In January 1967, it was reported that the French textile company, Boussac, had made a barter deal with the Rhodesia Tobacco Corporation to import textiles to Southern Rhodesia in exchange for £2 million worth of Rhodesian tobacco. A company spokesman was reported to have confirmed reports that Boussac material was on sale in Salisbury but denied that the company had agreed to take Rhodesia tobacco at below world market value in return. The textiles were being paid for in sterling by normal commercial means.

353. On 8 February 1967, the Ford assembly plant in Salisbury which had held the leading share in the market for the industry, closed down as a result of lack of parts. The British Motor Corporation plant at Umtali, the second major producer, was also reported to be running out of parts.

354. It was reported that on 16 February the British consul at Beira prevented the ship Clan MacInnes from unloading a cargo of automobile parts destined for Southern Rhodesia.

355. On 8 March 1967, it was reported that the Union Carbide Company of the United States of America had established a new company incorporated in South Africa to take over responsibility for the Southern African interests of the Union Carbide group. The new company - Union Carbide Southern Africa - would assume control of eight companies, three of them Rhodesian chrome mines. The three Rhodesian chrome mines affected were Rhodesia Chrome Mines of Selukwe, African Chrome Mines and Union Carbide Rhomet of Que Que. It was reported that the move was viewed as an effort to avoid any embarrassment for the parent company owing to the fact that the Rhodesian mines were attempting to evade sanctions on chrome exports from Southern Rhodesia.

Effects of the oil embargo

356. On 27 April 1967, Mr. Musset, the régime's Minister of Commerce and Industry, announced that the present form of fuel rationing would continue after 30 April 1967. Rationing has cut petrol consumption by about one third since the oil embargo. Under the present rationing system, motorists get a basic ration calculated on the weight of the vehicle and a supplementary ration calculated on the distance from home to work. However, the public can buy as much petrol as they want through the off-ration petrol (and aviation fuel) coupon system by

which they pay an extra 2 shillings for additional coupons outside their normal ration allocation. Under the off-ration petrol system, premium petrol costs 8s. 8d. as against 6s. per gallon for normal allocation under the ration system; the regular brand of petrol under the off-ration system costs 8s. 5d. as against 5s. 8d. for the officially allocated ration.

357. On 23 March 1967, Mr. Mussett announced that the validity of the off-ration petrol coupons was to be extended indefinitely. It had originally been announced that the validity of the coupons would expire on 30 April 1967. The statement added that while it was hoped that there would be no need in the foreseeable future to cancel the off-ration coupon system, the public would appreciate that the Government must reserve the right to do so should circumstances make it necessary.

358. On 8 March 1966, the Johannesburg Star reported in a leading article that since the beginning of the oil embargo Mozambique had supplied Southern Rhodesia with enough refined fuel to enable the Smith régime to stockpile against two years of sanctions. It stated that this was the minimum estimate of foreign observers who had kept a close watch on "clandestine" petrol and oil trains from Lourenço Marques to Southern Rhodesia since the initiation of the fuel run in November 1965. The observers calculated that at least 70 million gallons of petrol alone had reached Salisbury and Bulawayo from the SONAREP (Sociedade Nacional de Refinação de Petróleos) refinery in the past twelve months. The estimate did not take into account the supply from South Africa which on its own had probably covered most of Southern Rhodesian requirements since the unilateral declaration of independence.

359. The article stated that observers along the Mozambique rail route north of Lourenço Marques reported that up to four but never less than three fuel trains a day passed through their check points with supplies for Southern Rhodesia. Each train consisted of ten or twelve tankers with a carrying capacity of 5,000 gallons a tanker. As a conservative estimate, the article stated, this would constitute a daily supply of 150,000 gallons, reaching nearly 240,000 gallons on certain days.

360. On 10 March 1967, the Portuguese oil company of SONAREP denied in Lisbon that its refinery at Lourenço Marques had supplied Southern Rhodesia with 70 million gallons of petrol. A spokesman for the company was reported to have said that a Cape Town newspaper, the Cape Argus and the British Broadcasting Corporation had

recently implied that SONAREP had furnished Southern Rhodesia with that amount of petrol. He explained that such quantities of petrol were quite incompatible with the production of the Lourenço Marques refinery, and stated that Southern Rhodesia had never been a client of SONAREP. He added that foreign newspapers had for some time been trying to implicate Lourenço Marques refineries with the Southern Rhodesian question.

361. Under the Southern Rhodesia (Prohibited Trade and Dealings) (Amendment) Order, 1967, which came into operation on 15 March 1967, the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs, Mr. Herbert Bowden, on the same day barred the United Kingdom firm of Lonrho, Ltd. from negotiating the sale of its shares in the Beira-Umtali pipeline company without the approval of the British Government. A communiqué issued by the Commonwealth Secretary invoked the above law which empowered the Secretary of State to prevent or restrict the transfer of ownership of property overseas, where such a move might lead to contravention of the embargo on oil for Southern Rhodesia. The ban followed confirmed reports that the Portuguese directors of the company had expressed the desire to sell the pipeline to an unnamed buyer. Lonrho, Ltd. owns 62.5 per cent of the shares of the Companhia do Pipeline Mozambique - Rodésia, but the Portuguese directors outnumber the British.

362. On 12 March 1967, the Johannesburg Sunday Express reported that South Africa was supplying Southern Rhodesia with large quantities of aviation fuel from a new Rhodesian-built depot on South African soil. The reporter of the paper stated that he had seen the depot and interviewed Mr. Ben Van den Berg, an employee of the Rhodesian oil-supplying organization, Genta, who ran the depot.

363. Also, according to the report, observers estimated that each day an average of eighteen road tankers, carrying various fuels, crossed the Limpopo bridge into Southern Rhodesia at the small town of Messina. The reporter of the paper described the dump near Messina as a dozen big tanks fed from rail tankers, each holding about 8,000 gallons which came daily from coastal refineries and occasionally from an oil pipeline in Johannesburg.

IV. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE^{17/}

Introduction

364. The Special Committee considered the question of Southern Rhodesia at its 521st to 523rd, 525th, 527th to 528th and 536th meetings held in Africa between 5 and 15 June 1967.

A. Written petitions and hearings

365. The Special Committee had before it the following written petitions concerning Southern Rhodesia:

<u>Petitioner</u>	<u>Document</u>
Mr. Carl-Axel Vater, Secretary-General, World Assembly of Youth	A/AC.109/PET.548
Mr. Omer Becu, Secretary-General, International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU)	A/AC.109/PET.595
Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), Publicity Department	A/AC.109/PET.596
Mr. Omer Becu, Secretary-General, International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU)	A/AC.109/PET.597
Mr. H. Imhof, General Secretary, International Transport Workers' Federation Secretariat, World Assembly of Youth	A/AC.109/PET.598 A/AC.109/PET.599
Miss Susan Bennet, Secretary, Irish United Nations Students Association	A/AC.109/PET.600
Mr. Gregory Calvert, National Secretary, Students for a Democratic Society	A/AC.109/PET.612
Mr. G.H. Coombs	A/AC.109/PET.629
Mr. Jyorti Shankar Singh, General Secretary, World Assembly of Youth (WAY)	A/AC.109/PET.695

^{17/} This section includes those portions of the statements made on Southern Rhodesia in the Special Committee which relate to the question in general: those portions which refer specifically to the draft resolution are included in the succeeding section. It should be noted that additional comments on the question of Southern Rhodesia were contained in the statements made at the opening of the Special Committee's meetings at Kinshasa, Kitwe and Dar es Salaam. These statements are included in chapter II of the present report.

366. The Special Committee heard the following petitioners concerning Southern Rhodesia:

Mr. T.G. Silundika, Secretary for Publicity and information, ZIMBABWE AFRICAN PEOPLES UNION (ZAPU) (A/AC.109/PET.681) (521st and 522nd meetings)

Mr. W.H. Chitepo, National Chairman, Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) (A/AC.109/PET.596/Add.1) (523rd meeting)

Rev. Bernard H. Zulu (A/AC.109/PET.689) (523rd meeting)

Mr. P.L. Chihota, Chief Representative, Tanzania, Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) (A/AC.109/PET.596/Add.2) (536th meeting) 18/

367. Mr. Silundika (Secretary for Publicity and Information, Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU)) thanked the Special Committee for having decided to look at the Southern Rhodesian case from close range, for its continuous vigilance over the situation and for permitting him to contribute to its work.

368. Since the presentation of evidence on the Southern Rhodesian question to the Special Committee in 1966, political developments had shown that the situation had worsened: the settler régime had adopted a more defiant attitude towards the international world community and had introduced far more oppressive measures towards the majority of the country's inhabitants. Moving along that disastrous path, it had established a commission to prepare a constitution - with the encouragement of South Africa and the connivance of the United Kingdom Government - for the permanent entrenchment of a minority dictatorship and racism. The commission was engaged in a fake exercise of receiving evidence from all over the country, but had not had, and would not have, evidence from the genuine leaders of the African people of Zimbabwe. It was an instrument for the implementation of an idea conceived by the United Kingdom Government for imposing the plans made during the conspiracy on HMS Tiger in December 1966. The constitutional commission could not therefore be divorced from the imperialist tactics of the United Kingdom Government.

369. In adopting measures to oppress and suppress the undaunted African people, the régime was assuming powers to make Rhodesia a permanent police State. Following the Law and Order Maintenance Act, under which brave sons of Zimbabwe had been

18/ This petitioner was heard after the Special Committee had adopted its resolution concerning Southern Rhodesia (see para. 609 below) at its 528th meeting, on 9 June 1967.

massacred, imprisoned, and thrown into death cells and detention camps, there was now a Preventive Detention Amendment Bill, under which the régime could detain for any length of time any number of people for any allegation conjured up by a policeman, without a state of emergency being declared or a report being made to Parliament.

370. The régime was whittling down the allocation for African education at a rapid pace, expenditure on it being limited to 2 per cent of the gross national product. African teachers were being dismissed in their hundreds, so that thousands of African children were cast into the streets and the remaining teachers had to take over about three classes each. There was a restriction on the development of new schools, and missionary bodies were being deprived of several that they had been operating. More than 75 per cent of the schooling for Africans had for long been provided by missionaries on their own initiative and at considerable cost to themselves, and the régime was taking action to discourage that development. The intention clearly was to add to African suffering and to the reservoir of cheap labour.

371. Africans were being ousted from types of employment earmarked for white workers, a measure aimed to ensure full employment for, and the elimination of discontent among, the white population. The discontent was thus transferred to the Africans, who then encountered force and oppression.

372. The most significant political development introduced by the régime was open apartheid. The mask of multiracialism used by the United Kingdom Government for many years had been removed, and the régime had prescribed separate facilities for various tribal and ethnic groups - a direct copy of the Group Areas Act and the Bantu Authorities Act of South Africa. Under that scheme, housing for Africans settled in towns was to be provided according to the areas of their original villages and chiefs. Education was planned in accordance with the language and cultural habits of the tribal group, but the syllabus was to be drawn up on the advice of industrialists in terms of the cheap labour required. In the rural areas, further measures were being implemented to increase the punitive powers of the puppet chiefs. To give them a semblance of authority, a Local Authorities Act had been promulgated authorizing chiefs to collect taxes, from which allocations would be made to them for implementing some of the régime's measures. They enjoyed the protection of the settler army and the police and were instructed to deport from their areas and hand over anyone who disagreed with the régime.

373. The régime had continued to expand its armed forces, on which it had spent in 1966 a total of £11 million - an increase of £5 million over 1965. In that connexion, the international conspiracy in support of the régime was very evident: military experts from the Federal Republic of Germany, Turkey and Taiwan had been brought in to train the régime's armed forces in their war preparations against the African masses of Zimbabwe. The Rhodesian army was equipped largely with United Kingdom arms, for which spares continued to pour in. Under the alliance between South Africa, Portugal and Southern Rhodesia, there was an interchange of security officers for various operations. South African regular troops had been brought in to reinforce the régime's offensive line along the Zambezi border. Between 19 and 23 March 1967, 525 South African soldiers had entered Southern Rhodesia in civilian clothes and changed into uniform at Bulawayo before being sent to points on the Southern Rhodesian side of the border with Zambia. Of that number, 225 under Colonel Dries Kotzenberg were stationed near Chirundu, and the remaining 300, led by Daan Pretorius, were in the Zambezi Valley. In addition, five South African army officers had been seconded to the Southern Rhodesian armed forces during the first three weeks of April: Colonels J.A. du Plooy, H.F. van der Spuy and T.M.C. Diederichs, and Commanders M. Rupert and H.P. Brand. During the same period, 317 South African recruits had entered the Salisbury Police Training Depot for paramilitary training for the Southern Rhodesian fascist minority dictatorship.

374. In considering measures to solve the Southern Rhodesian problem, which was a threat to international peace, the United Nations had been led by the United Kingdom along the path of economic sanctions, on the assumption that the United Kingdom, as one of the great Powers and a Member of the United Nations, would finally respect and honestly implement the United Nations resolutions. It had been demonstrated beyond doubt that those assumptions had been wrong from the start, and that the programme of sanctions could never be a success. The United Kingdom, backed by its allies, had sponsored the programme of sanctions as a decoy and a device to give it sufficient time to make a success of the unilateral declaration of independence.

375. Meanwhile, the economy of Southern Rhodesia continued to flourish, without the slightest sign of collapse or any possibility of bringing about a political change. South Africa, which backed up all of Southern Rhodesia's international trade, was a haven for United Kingdom money, and trade had gone on between Southern Rhodesia and United Kingdom firms. United Kingdom commercial banks - Barclays, National Provincial and Grindlays - and the Standard and Ottoman Banks

were continuing to operate in Southern Rhodesia. The United Kingdom was permitting the entry of capital under cover of necessary items for the University of Rhodesia and other schemes. The British - Dutch combine, Unilever, based in and controlled from London, had recently authorized the expenditure of £135,000 for the extension of its Southern Rhodesian subsidiary. Sixty per cent of the ships carrying oil to the port of Lorenzo Marques in Mozambique were British. The British Petroleum Company was supplying oil to Southern Rhodesia and continuing its business. It was clear, therefore, that the first defaulter in the programme of sanctions was the United Kingdom itself, which while advocating a programme of sanctions in the United Nations, was adopting measures to undermine them in Southern Rhodesia itself. The conclusion was that it had in fact introduced sanctions in the full knowledge that they would harm not Southern Rhodesia but the economy of Zambia. If to that were added the conspiracy of the big international capitalistic combines to prop up the economy of Southern Rhodesia, it became clear that the United Kingdom and its allies were intent on foiling any possible effect that sanctions might have because the economy of Southern Rhodesia was not so much in the control of the settlers as of those international financial combines. For example, the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey handed over oil from the Middle East to the French Company, Total, which carried the oil to Southern Rhodesia through depots in Lourenço Marques, and transferred the oil to British Petroleum, Shell and Caltex for direct sale to Southern Rhodesia. That was the pattern for many companies dealing in various lines. Those sustaining the Southern Rhodesian dictatorship by revenue included such companies as Lonrho, Anglo-American and Rio Tinto Union Carbide Corporation, all of them based in the United Kingdom or the United States. Since it was impossible for them to refrain from expanding or diversifying the economy of Rhodesia, it was impossible for sanctions to have the required political effect.

376. The régime had established agencies to handle the sale of its products to international markets, some based in Southern Rhodesia and others in Mozambique, Angola and South Africa. The Manica Trading Company, for example, was connected with several shipping lines, and delivered Southern Rhodesian goods. Sugar was sent to Mozambique where it was given a Portuguese label to conceal the source, and attempts were made to sell it even to African countries. Perhaps the best

indication of the strength of the Rhodesian economy, in spite of sanctions, was the loan of £7.5 million floated in April, and over-subscribed within minutes.

377. It was clear that sanctions had a chance neither of being fully and effectively applied nor of bringing about a political change in Southern Rhodesia - their supposed original objective. Since Southern Rhodesia continued to be a threat to international peace, a change of strategy was imperative on the part of the progressive nations which were determined to liquidate the racist dictatorship and establish a popular African government in the interests of justice and peace.

378. In view of that enormous problem, the African people of Zimbabwe continued to resist the oppressive régime. They had always been convinced that the Rhodesian settler régime depended on force and could only be eliminated by the use of force. They were therefore being mobilized to sacrifice their lives in waging an armed fight against the enemy. The courageous sons of Zimbabwe were rallying to that fight within the country. The rigorous measures being taken by the racist régime through its enormous army to repress the African people were evidence of its awareness of the growing strength of the African people.

379. ZAPU therefore called upon the Special Committee to condemn the United Kingdom and its allies for deliberately misleading and deceiving the United Nations about the programme of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, to regard the United Kingdom as the real enemy, to recognize that the sanctions programme was a fraud which could never bring about the required political effect, and to encourage all nations that genuinely supported the African fight for the elimination of the racist minority dictatorship and the establishment of an African popular government, to support, by all means within their power, the African people of Zimbabwe in their armed fight to attain their objective.

380. The international finance companies operating in Southern Rhodesia were putting pressure on the Smith régime and on the United Kingdom Government to impose their own policy. The financial magnate Oppenheimer, for example, had recently suggested that the United Kingdom Government should enter into talks with the régime for that purpose, and it had been announced that day that Smith had made a request to the United Kingdom Government for the resumption of talks.

381. He thanked the members for their words of support and encouragement, which he would convey to the African people.

382. In reply to a question concerning the number of people in imprisonment or detention in Southern Rhodesia, the petitioner said that his latest information was that there were about 100,000, though the official figure for those in prison was given as some 34,000. There were a large number of detention camps in remote areas under more than 250 chiefs, in which many freedom-fighters were detained. Most of the prisoners were taken to the small townships in remote parts of the country in order to conceal their true number.

383. With regard to the treatment meted out to prisoners, he said that various methods of torture were used. When a person was arrested he was taken to some remote area and interrogated by as many as ten policemen. Several had lost their sense of hearing from the treatment they had received. Some were given electric shocks, and electric sticks were sometimes used to frighten them into giving information. Other methods were to strip prisoners and drive pins through the penis, or hang them face down and beat their genitals in order to force them to sign statements prepared by the police. Another way of attempting to force them to give information was to tie them to a tree and light a stick of gelignite that had been fixed to it. Many had died rather than submit. A number of resisters in the countryside had been rounded up and shot, having been taken to European farms by white-settler constables, and the African police were not allowed in the area. Other prisoners were starved, some for as long as a month, though sixteen days was considered the normal period.

384. Asked what further help could be given to the freedom-fighters by the international community, the petitioner thanked the international community for having recognized the legitimacy of the fight and replied that the Southern Rhodesian problem could only be solved by force. The members were aware of the support being given to the Southern Rhodesian army by a number of countries, particularly those of the NATO bloc, to enable it to entrench the racist policy. Since force could only be eliminated by force, those countries able and willing to assist could help by making equipment available to carry on the armed fight. It should be understood that the people of Zambia were threatened not only by the crippling of their economy, but were also faced with bayonets from South Africa and Angola. Since Zambia had taken a stand for justice, it should be given the full weight of international support.

385. Asked what aid the international community could give in respect of the refugee question, he replied that his organization's view was that everyone in

Zimbabwe was required to share the burden of the fight, and refugees were therefore not encouraged. Should the question arise, however, any material and educational assistance that could be offered through the international refugee agencies would be appreciated.

386. Asked for further details concerning the so-called Preventive Detention Amendment Bill and the introduction of the apartheid system, he said that the bill was intended to bring into permanent effect an act introduced, supposedly for five years, in 1959, when the African National Congress had been banned and hundreds of leaders placed in custody. It empowered the régime to imprison an individual without trial, but the minister was supposed to report to Parliament within three months. Under the amendment, however, that would not be necessary, and detentions could continue almost indefinitely. The Law and Order Maintenance Act enabled the police to search any house or arrest anyone without warrant.

387. Southern Rhodesia had in practice been applying apartheid for many years, in the shops, in the provision of separate residential areas, and in the division of land under the Land Apportionment Act. It was now being extended, not only on the basis of colour, but tribally. Africans were to be settled in the towns according to their area of origin or the tribe from which they came, while all whites regarded themselves as one community. The plan followed the same lines as the Group Areas Act of South Africa. Chiefs would have their representatives in the townships, so that, if a township was divided into, for example, six tribal groups there would be six different representatives to identify those regarded as undesirable by the régime, and to send them to the rural areas under their respective chiefs. Such divisions were being introduced in order to create tribal conflict. It was intended to introduce total apartheid, including the provision of separate windows for the buying of bus tickets.

388. Asked whether anything could be done by the international community, through such agencies as UNESCO, to offset the restrictive measures adopted in respect of African education, the petitioner replied that the international community could play a part with regard to higher education. A number of countries had for many years been helping to fill the gap in education by taking students into their respective institutions, and further assistance in that respect would be useful.

389. Asked whether the establishment of some form of supervisory commission by the Security Council might help in the more effective application of sanctions,

he replied that, although the aim of such a commission would be well intentioned, it could not, as a merely supervisory body, ensure that mandatory sanctions were effective. The fact that such sanctions were selective would give the régime a breathing space in its economy. What was missing was an enforcement measure, which could only be applied by the use of force to prevent the interflow of trade across the borders of Southern Rhodesia, particularly through Mozambique and South Africa. Sanctions themselves were not likely to be effective, and the idea of a supervisory commission was merely academic.

390. Asked to what extent the effectiveness of stricter mandatory sanctions would be enhanced if they were expanded into a complete and comprehensive system, incorporating all exports, imports communications and transport, coupled with the setting-up of a co-ordinating agency, the petitioner recalled the words of the President of Zambia to the effect that nothing short of complete and mandatory sanctions coupled with force would bring about the fall of the régime in Southern Rhodesia and the establishment of a popular Government. That view was correct. There was no need to follow the United Kingdom line of applying piecemeal sanctions while preparing for representing the world with a fait accompli.

391. Elaborating further on the statement he had made concerning the constitution being framed by the illegal régime with the co-operation of South Africa, he said that the five-man constitutional commission had failed to evoke any response from the African population because it was part and parcel of the system they rejected. The régime had recently obtained the assistance of a professor sent by the South African Government at its request to help to draw up the so-called constitution, which was being done with the connivance of the United Kingdom Government, whose agent Smith was. The meeting on HMS Tiger had been a conspiracy disguised by a show of disagreement on whether the suggested commission should be appointed by Wilson or by Smith. It had now been appointed by Smith, and the United Kingdom Government had not taken a position on the matter. The United Kingdom Conservative Party had been used to appear to put pressure on the Government for a further meeting with Smith. Mr. Bowden had said in the House of Commons that, if Smith took the initiative for a meeting, the United Kingdom Government would be willing to resume talks. Oppenheimer had since remarked that such talks should take place, and that had been followed by an initiative by Smith, to which the United Kingdom Government's reaction, already forecast by Mr. Bowden, was awaited.

392. In reply to a request for further examples of how the United Kingdom Government had permitted the entry of capital into Southern Rhodesia in the guise of necessary items, the petitioner said that, in the case of the University of Rhodesia, the United Kingdom Government was contributing £250,000, and that it had stated that it would not impose sanctions upon such items as medical supplies for international welfare agencies like the British-based Amnesty International, for which welfare funds were also allowed in. Under cover of humanitarianism, the United Kingdom was thus able to transfer capital into the country.

393. Asked whether he thought that the United Kingdom and United States oil companies had expanded their activities after the so-called declaration of independence by Southern Rhodesia, the petitioner replied that those companies that had formerly competed against each other were now working in co-operation to promote and defend their business interests in Southern Rhodesia, and their activities appeared to be expanding. The Rio Tinto Union Carbide Corporation, for example, had recently purchased the Bronton Gold Mine, which had known overseas reserves of £11 million. A notice in the Rhodesian Government Gazette of 11 March 1967 disclosed that another large monopoly, Lonrho Ltd., had applied for an exclusive order in respect of an area of 253 square miles to prospect for coal, mineral oil and natural gas. There were many more examples of the extension of such companies in the country. Oil companies had further been diversifying their activities since the unilateral declaration of independence by building storage tanks in various places.

394. With regard to the sources of the arms used by Southern Rhodesia, he said that the Southern Rhodesian régime had inherited almost the entire military equipment of the defunct Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Most items were of United Kingdom make, though some had also been supplied by the United States. Since the unilateral declaration Southern Rhodesia had continued to receive arms through Portugal, whose supplies came from NATO countries, and through South Africa, assisted by the Federal Republic of Germany. Spares from the United Kingdom were still being received. Japan and Turkey had also furnished supplies, and the United Kingdom was continuing to do so through a factory in Brussels.

395. Asked whether he had any information concerning the reported increase in the income of the foreign monopolies which were mining minerals in Southern Rhodesia,

the petitioner said that copper, asbestos and chrome were produced in Zimbabwe. Italy bought copper concentrates and asbestos, and the United States chrome. The largest buyer of copper concentrates was the Federal Republic of Germany, which also bought asbestos. The United Kingdom bought all three. According to recent figures, the Federal Republic of Germany had increased the value of its purchase of copper concentrates from £3 million to £5 million.

396. Mr. Chitepo, Zimbabwe African Nation Union (ZANU), said that, in 1966, his organization had had occasion to present to the Special Committee a document outlining the grave situation then existing in Southern Rhodesia, a situation which had subsequently been described by the General Assembly and the Security Council as constituting a very serious threat to international peace and security. The current visit of the Committee and the hospitality offered to it by the President and Government of Zambia were continuing evidence of the concern felt by that country and by the international community at the dangerous situation existing in Southern Rhodesia. He extended a welcome to the Special Committee on behalf of the people of Zimbabwe, in the sincere hope that it would be able to study at closer range the problems arising from the Rhodesian crisis. The people of Zimbabwe and, indeed, the international community were faced with a crisis that had been deliberately created, encouraged, aided and abetted not only by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland but also by a number of other Governments and nations. The United Kingdom Government, in flagrant violation of its obligations under the Constitution of its own colony of Southern Rhodesia and under the Charter, had made use of naked falsehood, shameless pretence and every conceivable stratagem to deceive the world community concerning its role in the Rhodesian situation.

397. Some time before the unilateral declaration, when it had been well known that the crisis was approaching and the United Kingdom had already warned that any such action would be regarded as treason, the Prime Minister of that country had gone to Salisbury and carefully assured the would-be rebels that, whatever happened, he would not resort to force. It had been the first time in history that a duly constituted authority had given its permission to commit treason. The world had subsequently watched in amazement the antics and falsehoods of the Prime Minister in his attempts to camouflage the real intention and role of his country in the

crisis. There had been the rush to the United Nations to demand limited and voluntary sanctions, followed by fanciful statements that the rebel régime would fall within a matter of weeks; the pretended blockade of the port of Beira and finally, after a year had passed with nothing to show for voluntary sanctions, the request to the Security Council for mandatory sanctions.

398. In that connexion, it would be recalled that the United Kingdom had objected to the inclusion of oil and it had been only at the insistence of many other Members of the United Nations that oil had, in fact, been included. The reason for the disinclination to include oil among the mandatory sanctions was to be found in subsequent actions by the United Kingdom organizations. Another and more serious act of deception at the time of the application for mandatory sanctions had been the warning delivered by the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom that there should be no provocation or general confrontation in southern Africa - a clear preparation for things to come. Voluntary sanctions were already being applied and it was notorious that voluntary associations had been formed in South Africa to supply oil to Southern Rhodesia, and that oil was also being obtained from Mozambique.

399. The United Nations and many of its Member States, both individually and collectively, had emphasized to the United Kingdom that the only way to suppress the rebellion was by force. The United Kingdom, which had thousands of its troops committed to the so-called defence of Malaysia and the Far East, thousands of others in the Federal Republic of Germany, and yet others to defend its colonial interests in the Middle East and Aden, had shuddered at the thought of using force to suppress the most blatant rebellion against its rule in modern history. The chief representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations had solemnly warned that the threat of racial conflict was the greatest danger currently facing the world. The President of Zambia had reminded the Special Committee and the world at large of the danger, not only of racial conflict but of ideological conflict also, in southern Africa. Nevertheless, the racist handling of the Rhodesian rebellion courted the very conflict that the United Kingdom pretended to fear. It had seen fit to treat the Rhodesian rebels with kid gloves for two reasons, the "kith and kin" idea and its own economic interests in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa.

400. The United Kingdom claimed to be one of the greatest champions of United Nations authority. It had clamoured for United Nations action in the Middle East,

because its oil supplies had been threatened. It was all too evident that, like other major Powers, it wished to make use of the world body when its interests were threatened and when it could not find sufficient cover to enable it to act unilaterally contrary to the principles of the Charter. What did it matter to the United Kingdom that newly independent Zambia was, in some respects, more severely affected by the sanctions than Southern Rhodesia? When the United Kingdom had asked for mandatory sanctions, it had been well aware that the supply of oil to Zambia had ceased, while Southern Rhodesia was still obtaining supplies from South Africa and Mozambique. What did it matter to the United Kingdom that the black man in Southern Rhodesia was the greatest victim of the incidence of sanctions and that Zambia was living under the constant threat of Rhodesian sabotage, provided that United Kingdom interests and its kith and kin in Southern Rhodesia and southern Africa continued to be safeguarded?

401. Subsequent to the unilateral declaration, the Smith régime had amended the notorious 1961 Constitution - itself imposed by the United Kingdom against the wishes of the people of Zimbabwe - and was currently drafting a so-called "separate development constitution" which would institutionalize apartheid under another name.

402. Measures were being taken in Southern Rhodesia to link that country ever more closely to South Africa, not only administratively but also in philosophy and social attitude. The danger was not simply that of a group of racists desperately trying to hold its position, but a more sinister threat of a new outgrowth of that Herrenvolk doctrine which had already produced one of the world's greatest tragedies.

403. Although the United Kingdom had sanctimoniously urged the world to co-operate in the sanctions campaign, it was itself one of the chief blockade-runners. Sixty per cent of the ships carrying oil to Mozambique sailed under the flag of that country, although it was common knowledge that oil delivered to Mozambique was intended for Rhodesia as well. The United Kingdom continued to trade with Rhodesia through middlemen and third parties. What faith could the world continue to place in the Government of that country after such pretences and violations of solemn pledges?

404. The race issue pervaded the atmosphere of all southern Africa. Apartheid was spreading and growing in intensity. It had made deep incursions into the rights

of the indigenous people of South West Africa, in utter defiance of United Nations guarantees. The rebel Rhodesian Government had seriously embarked on a programme of racial discrimination more intense even than the South African one since in that country the whites were outnumbered by sixteen to one. It was clear that where such a small minority possessed all power, privilege and authority, it would have an even greater fear of democracy and thus make greater use of oppression. There was indeed a serious threat of racial conflict in southern Africa, not because Africans were racialisists, but because the great Powers, devoted to their own narrow interests, were prepared to stand by and watch while the latter-day "Hitlers" of southern Africa propagated and implemented policies that were very little different from those of the nazis. Mr. Wilson, the modern Chamberlain of United Kingdom politics, had "done a Munich" in Southern Rhodesia, an act the bloody repercussions of which would surely spread beyond the confines of Zimbabwe.

405. On two occasions since the unilateral declaration of independence, the United Nations had been stampeded by the Government of the United Kingdom into imposing economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia and, on both occasions, it had been adamant in resisting the full and comprehensive measures that alone might have guaranteed some limited success. It had solemnly promised that the measures contemplated would bring down the rebel régime and, trusting in that undertaking, the United Nations had acquiesced. Nineteen months had since passed and nothing had happened. The reasons were plain to see. The calculated forewarning given by the United Kingdom had enabled the Smith régime to prepare counter-measures. Even the voluntary United Kingdom sanctions had been introduced individually, after due warning. It was hardly surprising that the rebels had been able to prepare for them. Furthermore, the refusal of South Africa and Portugal to co-operate in the sanctions programme had guaranteed easy channels for Rhodesian exports and imports. In fact, the missing link in the sanctions programme had been the failure to introduce enforcement machinery under Chapter VII of the Charter. When it was known that South Africa and Portugal would refuse to comply with the resolution, the decision should have been accompanied by the establishment of enforcement machinery. The Smith régime had defied the United Kingdom, but South Africa and Portugal had defied the United Nations.

406. Any effect that sanctions might have produced had been softened for the régime and its white supporters by the mass dismissal of African workers, including more

than 500 school teachers. White workers, on the other hand, were protected from dismissal by new legislation under the emergency regulations. It was difficult to assess whether sanctions were in fact having any real impact. The United Kingdom pointed to the closure of the Ford factory, to a certain decrease in exports and to a fall in the Rhodesian gross national product as evidence that they were. However, the purpose of sanctions was not to reduce the gross national product or ruin the Rhodesian economy but to produce political changes, and no favourable political changes had resulted. That was due to the basic nature of the situation: a small number of white settlers were crushing 4 million Africans. Under such circumstances, even a complete break-down of the economy would not necessarily produce the desired political change, namely, the replacement of a hierarchical society by an egalitarian one, which, of course, would mean majority rule. It was doubtful whether even a well-enforced sanctions programme could produce such a change. It was no longer a question of desire for white domination among rebel supporters but a definite growth of racist philosophy. Such a community might well resist until everything lay in ruins about it.

407. The Smith régime had switched to home industries to replace whatever imports had been effectively blocked, and the viability of the Rhodesian economy was such that a certain degree of diversification and reorientation had taken place.

408. Apart from the recalcitrance of South Africa and Portugal, other Members of the United Nations had, like the United Kingdom, merely paid lip-service to mandatory sanctions and continued to trade in embargoed goods with the rebel régime. Following reports that a Swiss consortium had bought Rhodesian tobacco and sold it overseas, the Swiss Government had stated that it was unable to restrict private Swiss companies and was maintaining a strictly neutral attitude towards Southern Rhodesia. France had exported £2 million worth of Marcel Boussac textiles to Southern Rhodesia, paid for under a tobacco barter arrangement, and there were plans to build a Peugeot assembly plant at Salisbury. United States exports to Southern Rhodesia in 1966 had totalled £2 million, as against £8 million before the unilateral declaration. The Federal Republic of Germany continued to trade with Rhodesia "to the extent of existing contracts", which earned Rhodesia £1 million in foreign exchange. Southern Rhodesia's exports to the Federal Republic of Germany under so-called "existing contracts", totalled £13 million, including £7 million

worth of tobacco, £3 million worth of copper and £1 million worth of asbestos. Rhodesian imports from the Federal Republic, which were worth £5 million, covered a wide range of products sorely needed in Rhodesian markets.

409. United Kingdom trade with the rebels, also under so-called existing contract arrangements, exceeded £15 million. Other countries shielded under similar arrangements were Switzerland, Japan and the Netherlands.

410. A host of repressive legislative measures had been taken to prevent African workers from economic action which could have supplemented sanctions from within, including: the detention, restriction and imprisonment of more than 10,000 political activists and trade-unionists excluding those detained by sentence of the courts; a perpetual state of emergency restricting people's movements; the establishment of a harsh police régime; and rigorous censorship of news, and control by the régime of all news and information media.

411. In view of the foregoing facts, the United Nations must realize that only full and effective measures against South Africa and Mozambique could produce a solution by way of sanctions. Southern Rhodesia was linked with both those Territories by first-class road and rail connexions and, even if it were impossible to impose a blockade on those Territories, it was certainly possible to block the points of entry, either by the physical presence of United Kingdom or United Nations forces on Rhodesian territory, or else by bombing.

412. The crux of his argument was that selective mandatory sanctions had proved ineffective mainly through the resistance of South Africa and Mozambique and the lack of enforcement machinery. In calling for sanctions under Chapter VII, the United Kingdom had pledged its honour but, by adopting that resolution, the United Nations found itself in a position where it had to salvage its own reputation and not merely that of the United Kingdom. He therefore urged the United Nations to concern itself with enforcement measures as of right, since its own reputation - and possibly even its survival - were at stake. It had, in fact, been led into a trap by the United Kingdom. Any enforcement measures introduced should not be dependent on the United Kingdom's willingness or otherwise to implement them. Two methods were possible: either the application of sanctions against both South Africa and Mozambique, which had been feebly and deceptively tried when the United Kingdom had asked for authorization to intercept any tanker carrying oil destined

for Southern Rhodesia, or the physical removal of the channels through which those two countries continued to trade with Southern Rhodesia.

413. He would dwell for a moment on the conditions inside Zimbabwe, since the rebel régime had made many propaganda claims concerning its work for the benefit of all the people of that country.

414. The movement towards full apartheid was clearly reflected in the data concerning the yearly expansion of African education. In the period 1946-57, that expansion had, in terms of expenditure averaged 35 per cent per year. That period had seen the downfall of Todd, who had doubled the personal tax for Africans and had planned to step up the rate of expansion. In the period 1957-61, the rate had fallen to 28 per cent. That also had been considered excessive by the white community, and by 1961 the Rhodesian Front, which had pledged to lower the rate, had been voted into power. The Front had kept that pledge, and the rate for the period 1961-66 had fallen to 9 per cent while, in the current financial year, it had dropped to 6.5 per cent. In 1966, only 66 per cent of the hundreds of thousands African children of school age had been enrolled, 15 per cent of whom were in the final year of the eight year primary-school course and less than 1 per cent in secondary schools. The rebel régime had spent annually less than £10 on each African school child and more than £110 on each white school child. Education for whites was compulsory and free up to the age of sixteen while African children had to pay school fees. African schools were understaffed and poorly equipped, yet the régime was currently implementing a scheme to dismiss some 3,500 of the less qualified teachers. It had cut the intake into training colleges by one half, the intake into secondary schools from one fifth of primary school leavers to one eighth, and had stopped equipment grants to African schools. A so-called registration fee of 50 shillings per child had been imposed which raised the average African parent's expenditure on education for each school child from 14 to 17 per cent of his annual income.

415. Still harsher measures were to be imposed. As in South Africa under the so-called Community Development Plan, African education was going to be financed almost completely by the African communities themselves, which would be responsible for running the schools. That was designed to reduce the missionary contribution

to African education which, in the past, had amounted to more than 75 per cent. African communities were situated in the most barren parts of the country, and the schools open to Africans in the European suburban areas had been closed to enforce segregation and disguise the injustice of the so-called open franchise based on stiff educational and income qualifications.

416. With respect to employment and working conditions, there had been marked and crippling discrimination against Africans. In theory, they could rise to any rung of the employment ladder but, in practice, settler employers and the settler régime had made sure that Africans were employed only in unskilled and in a limited number of semi-skilled jobs. No apprenticeship was available to Africans and even the handful trained outside the country could not find employment. During the period of partnership under the Federal Government, a Technical College for Africans had been established at Luveve, but it had been closed by the Smith régime. Where qualifications were equal, the African received about half the wage paid to his white counterpart. The average wage for an African was £140 per annum and that for a white employee £1,700 per annum. African workers were poorly housed and had to travel long distances to work from areas badly served by an inadequate transport system. To restrict the growth of African trade unionism, the régime had passed oppressive legislation which it ruthlessly enforced, e.g., the Industrial Conciliation Act which, by categorizing sources of employment as "essential services", could forbid strike action. Since the imposition of sanctions, virtually every capacity in which Africans were employed had been so categorized. African trade union organizations were subjected to close scrutiny and financial control, it being forbidden for them to use their funds for certain stipulated purposes, e.g., for political activities. Under current conditions, any strike action was regarded as political and the organizers subject to prosecution. The régime, having registered puppet minority unions, in which the votes were so weighted that the white workers could outvote much greater numbers of Africans, had decreed that only one union was permitted for each trade and that strikes by unregistered trade unions were illegal. Most Africans could only belong to unregistered trade unions.

417. African farm labour in Rhodesia was hardly distinguishable from slave labour. The Industrial Conciliation Act had been supplemented by the Law and Order Maintenance Act which provided that any person who advised, encouraged, incited, commanded, aided or secured any act likely to hinder or interfere with the carrying out of an essential service would be prosecuted.

418. The whole system was designed to maintain the status quo, with its appalling low wages and poor working conditions for the African. Since the imposition of sanctions, redundant white workers had begun to fill the unskilled and semi-skilled jobs previously held by Africans, since the law made it illegal to dismiss white workers. Under the Vagrancy Act, unemployed Africans were either forced into overcrowded rural areas or condemned to detention and restricted areas as vagrants.

419. The Land Apportionment Act, like the Group Areas Act in South Africa, was the cornerstone of the system of land discrimination which affected trade, commerce, industry, residence and education. The whole subject had been fully covered in documents submitted by ZANU to United Nations bodies in the past. All that remained to be said was that, since it had come to power the Rhodesian Front had been implementing that act more viciously and intensively than ever before.

420. Since it was currently a crime in Rhodesia to reveal trade figures or any other statistics, it was extremely difficult to obtain full details of what was happening, so that the shocking picture he had just revealed was only a partial reflection of the grave situation that had developed. In the inevitable clashes that had taken place, many people had been killed and whole villages razed to the ground as reprisals for their sympathy with or active participation in the war against the régime. The rigid censorship imposed since the unilateral declaration hid many such happenings, but much more was known than the rebels would admit.

421. Conditions in the restriction and detention camps where many thousands were confined were appalling, inhuman and calculated to break the morale of the prisoners. Inmates were confined in small crowded huts which were surrounded by barbed wire and heavily guarded by armed soldiers. Floodlights played on them all night. Their wives and families were not told of their whereabouts. They were not permitted reading material or news from outside. There were no sanitation or washing facilities. All visits even by the clergy, were forbidden. Permission had

been denied even to the Archbishop of Mashonaland. Photostats had been submitted to the Special Committee telling part of the story of the gallant resistance of his people to the régime. Their faith in peaceful solutions betrayed, the people had taken to arms. As soon as the first major battle had been fought at Sinoia in May 1966, the régime had imprisoned all ZANU leaders, who were detained at Sikombela near Gwelo. The situation had developed to the point where any white man was "licensed" to shoot an African on sight and to go scot-free merely by pleading that he had suspected him of being a guerrilla. Both the President and the Vice-President of ZANU had been brutally assaulted by white prison warders. In an effort to cover up the facts of the fighting, the régime had publicized only such incidents as would give the impression that it had the situation under control.

422. In the meantime, it was using special hospitals - usually military barracks - to treat its wounded, the doctors being sworn to secrecy. The régime's special service police patrolled the African residential areas night and day to arrest anyone caught loitering or listening to foreign broadcasts. It had become common practice to imprison a person for a month without trial on mere suspicion. It was the height of cynicism for a régime that had held people who had never been convicted in a court of law in prison for more than five years to be considering a Preventive Detention Bill.

423. The people of Zimbabwe had taken a solemn pledge to fight to the bitter end. They had no illusions that the fight would be an easy one; their enemy was highly equipped and resolute. His was not only a racist régime but a military one also. In addition to the regular white army of 25,000 men (including reserves) the whole civilian white population was undergoing military training. All white men between eighteen and fifty-five years of age were liable to conscription. All white Rhodesians were armed, even the women. Every policeman had unrestricted powers to arrest on suspicion.

424. Apartheid in housing had virtually existed since 1923 and every African area had recently become a prison all but in name. Police were to be seen everywhere. People were constantly being questioned and interrogated and road blocks were commonplace.

425. Despite all that display of apparently insuperable power, the people of Zimbabwe had not faltered in their decision to fight to the last. ZANU had reached that decision long before. The Rev. Sithole had taught its members that they were their own liberators and that, with the unilateral declaration of independence, all Zimbabwe might well be required to take up arms. The people had answered the call. The only language that the settlers understood was that of force and ZANU considered that force was legitimate when it was used to regain one's birthright. Had there been any doubts concerning the legitimacy of the fight, they would have been dispelled by the United Nations declaration that the cause of the people of Zimbabwe was a just one. That people was gratefully aware of the declarations by the Special Committee and the General Assembly calling upon all Member States to support them in their fight for liberation.

426. He had listened with interest to the opening statements by many representatives to the effect that the only solution to the Rhodesian problem was the use of force. He warned the Special Committee that it would be futile to expect the United Kingdom to provide force. The only possible force that could be used was that of the people of Zimbabwe themselves. The United Nations, having committed itself to sanctions, might find itself obliged to make some use of force to vindicate its authority. For its part, ZANU would use force to vindicate the dignity of the people of Zimbabwe. All ZANU required of the Committee was, in the first place, that it should repeat its call to all Member States to support the Zimbabwe liberation movement.

427. There had been a conspiracy between Wilson and Smith on H.M.S. Tiger to betray Zimbabwe. By a miraculous accident, the deal had not been accepted by the rebels. He was nevertheless sure that further attempts would be made by Smith and Wilson to reach a private agreement. Despite recent denials, he was sure that further talks were in the offing. The danger was that the United Nations might find itself faced with a fait accompli, i.e., a return to legality on the part of the rebels in exchange for a minority-oriented constitution from Wilson.

428. The second thing which ZANU required of the United Nations was that, under no circumstances, would it accept as justifying a grant of independence any constitution arrived at through private negotiations between Smith and Wilson. The

only valid constitution would be one drafted or approved by the duly elected and acknowledged leaders of the people of Zimbabwe. It was vital that the Special Committee should expose the machinations of the United Kingdom and stick firmly to principle. There had been much talk after the failure on H.M.S. Tiger to the effect that all that was needed was for the Smith régime to return to the 1961 Constitution and sanctions would be lifted. ZANU hoped that the purpose of the sanctions was not to restore a mere technical legality but to ensure the establishment of majority rule.

429. He expressed his own gratitude and that of the Executive of ZANU for the opportunity afforded him to inform the Special Committee of the situation in Zimbabwe, a situation that should arouse the conscience of every Member of the United Nations. He assured the Committee that his people would not lay down their arms until they were able to work and live freely and be masters of their own destiny.

430. Asked to enlarge on the details he had already supplied on the fate of the Zimbabwe prisoners in Southern Rhodesia, the petitioner said that figures for the political and other prisoners in Southern Rhodesia could not be assessed with any degree of accuracy since strict censorship had been imposed immediately after the unilateral declaration. His organization did, however, have contacts and sometimes direct correspondence with certain prisoners, and the figures published by the rebel régime bore no relation to the number of prisoners actually detained.

431. The figure of 10,000 to 15,000 which he had quoted referred to political prisoners only, i.e. people against whom warrants had been issued either for detention or restriction but against whom no charges would be brought. The régime had powers of summary arrest and there might be many other persons arrested for interrogation on trumped-up charges or on suspicion.

432. Political prisoners in detention were usually confined to prison: a number of them were in Salisbury Maximum Security Prison. Other prisoners were held under restriction, which merely meant that their area of confinement was larger than a prison cell. Restriction was generally ordered for people in remote areas, after incidents such as the recent Zimbabwe National Liberation Army's attack at Karoi. Africans were detained for long periods in appalling conditions, often with no medical facilities available, close surveillance by police and the armed forces, and severe restrictions on visits and mail.

433. The old Preventive Detention Act had provided for the holding of some kind of tribunal to make recommendations to the Government, but since the unilateral declaration no such tribunals appeared to have been held.

434. Asked to comment on the press reports that certain countries had not withdrawn all the technical experts who had been working in Southern Rhodesia prior to the usurpation of control by the Smith régime, he said that it was common knowledge that the Federal Republic of Germany and South Africa were providing military assistance in the form of experts to Southern Rhodesia. According to information available to his organization, since the inception of armed resistance, Japan had been invited and had agreed to send experts in guerilla warfare to help the rebels in Southern Rhodesia; it had also sent experts in steel and iron manufacture. He believed that the United Kingdom still gave technical assistance openly, by providing a certain amount of money for the University. He believed that France had also provided some technical experts. Other countries might also be giving technical assistance, but the situation was fluid.

435. Asked which countries were represented, diplomatically or otherwise, in Southern Rhodesia, he said that the United States maintained a consul at Salisbury and that the United Kingdom had a "residual mission". Other countries such as France, Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany were represented by trade commissioners. Portugal and South Africa were strongly represented and had exchange diplomatic personnel with Southern Rhodesia.

436. Asked what particular difficulties the freedom-fighters were encountering and how they thought the international organizations could help the people of Zimbabwe, the petitioner said that medical facilities and other assistance were needed to help those who had taken up arms. Even more important, however, was the plight of the refugees. The definition of refugees used by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees did not seem to include persons who were endeavouring to end the situation or system that caused them to become refugees; by taking up arms they ceased to be refugees for the purposes of the High Commissioner. Moreover, the families of the freedom-fighters did not count as dependants of genuine refugees under the High Commissioner's definition. That definition was unfortunate, particularly in view of the General Assembly's decision that the fight of the Zimbabwe people was legitimate.

437. Asked about the possibility of the people of Zimbabwe organizing a passive resistance movement, the petitioner recalled that passive resistance had been made famous by the late Mahatma Gandhi in India and had been followed to some extent in other parts of the world. Such resistance could succeed in cases where the authority at which it was directed had some conscience that could be appealed to. The rebel régime in Southern Rhodesia, however, was devoid of conscience, and it had therefore been necessary to resort to armed resistance.

438. Asked about his reaction to the establishment of a co-ordinating and supervisory commission to ensure full implementation of comprehensive sanctions, to include communications and transport, he recalled that, in his main body of evidence, he had stated that, if sanctions were to be applied, they must at least be comprehensive. He would have no objection to the setting up of a co-ordinating and supervisory body of the United Nations, provided that there was in addition effective enforcement machinery. If the aim of such a supervisory body was merely to give information to the Security Council concerning breaches of sanctions, it would be of little use, since the culprits were, to a large extent, already known and, in the case of comprehensive sanctions, any breaches would be even more obvious.

439. When questioned about the kind of assistance that could usefully be provided by such agencies as UNESCO for the promotion of education among the Zimbabwe people, he replied that the rebel régime had embarked upon a dehumanizing and cruel policy designed to ensure that the African people of Zimbabwe would always be available as cheap labour for the menial services required by the settlers. In the prevailing state of affairs, ZANU considered the fight for independence to be the primary objective. The provision of education relevant to the fight for independence would be welcome. If the Iranian representative's question referred to general education, however, he envisaged difficulties. The rebel régime had ensured that Africans were educated only to the level necessary for providing intelligent service, and few possessed the necessary qualifications to proceed to higher education. When the fight for independence had been brought to a successful conclusion, there would be a serious shortage of manpower in the higher administrative and technological grades, and ZANU would then welcome assistance in those fields from UNESCO or individual Governments.

440. Asked of what type the twenty aircraft were to which he had referred, and when they had been delivered, the petitioner replied that they were mainly of United Kingdom manufacture and all of the military type. They had been delivered during 1966.

441. Asked to furnish a comprehensive list of the foreign commercial interests operating in Southern Rhodesia, with their countries of origin, the petitioner said that he would like to have time for research in order to provide as comprehensive a list as possible. Meanwhile, he could name some of them: Lonrho, Anglo-American, Lever Brothers and Rio Tinto. He later provided the following list:

<u>Companies</u>	<u>Headquarters</u>	<u>Type of business</u>
Anglo-American	South Africa	Mining, Breweries and other industries
Lonrho	United Kingdom	Mining estates
Reupert	South Africa	Tobacco (Peter Styuvesant, Rembrandt, etc.)
Rothmans	United Kingdom United States	Tobacco
B.A.T.	United Kingdom United States	Tobacco
Gallaher	United Kingdom	Tobacco
Fraser and Chalmers Monarch Steel	United Kingdom	Steel and steel construction
British Insulated Callender's Cables	United Kingdom	Steel and steel construction
Stewards and Lloyds	United Kingdom	Steel and aluminium tubes, pumping equipment
Supersonic	United Kingdom	Radios
Phillips	Netherlands	Radios
Bush	Federal Republic of Germany	Television and radios
United Transport Co.	United Kingdom	Heavy vehicles (Leyland Albion, buses and lorries)
G.E.C.	United Kingdom	Electrical equipment and parts

<u>Companies</u>	<u>Headquarters</u>	<u>Type of Business</u>
Shell	Netherlands	Petroleum
B.P.	United Kingdom	Petroleum
Caltex	United States	Petroleum
Mobil	United States	Petroleum
Unilever	Netherlands	Soap, edible oils, toilet preparation
Ford	United Kingdom	Cars
	United States	
G.M.C.	United States	Cars
B.M.C.	United Kingdom	Cars
Peugeot	France	Cars
British Metal Corp.	United Kingdom	Metal processing and engineering
B.S.A.	South Africa	Land holdings and other investments
	United Kingdom	
Coca Cola	United States	Soft drinks
Schweppes	United Kingdom	Soft drinks
Dunlop	United Kingdom	Rubber
English Electric	United Kingdom	Electric equipment
Fiat	Italy	Cars
Ozalid	Federal Republic of Germany	Photocopying equipment
Boots	United Kingdom	Medicine and drugs
I.C.I.	United Kingdom	Medicine and drugs
Kodak	Federal Republic of Germany	Photographic equipment
Burroughs	United Kingdom	Business machines and computers
C.B.R. Bental	United Kingdom	Diesel engines (Perkins Diesel, etc.)
Elna Sewing Machines	Switzerland	Sewing machines
Nestle	Switzerland	Dairy products
V.W. Car Parts	Federal Republic of Germany	Cars and parts

He stated that many of the companies listed were subsidiaries of South African companies, which were also subsidiaries of other international companies.

Rhodesian companies were kept alive by supplies from the South African companies.

442. The Reverend Zulu said that the description he would give of the situation in Southern Rhodesia was a first hand account of what he had seen. As a minister of religion he had moved among the Zimbabwe people and lived the same life. Conditions in the country were of grave importance not only to the people of Southern Rhodesia but to the world at large.

443. There were sixty-five parliamentary seats, fifty of which, known as "A" roll seats, were held by European members of the Rhodesian Front. Fourteen of the "B" roll seats were held by Africans, and the other by a Mr. A. Palley, who had polled only sixteen votes. As only a two-thirds majority was required for constitutional change, the fifty white voters held effective control. To qualify for the franchise, educational, property-holding and income requirements had to be met. Few Africans considered it worth while to register for the "B" roll vote, and African "A" roll voters were so widely spread across the country that it was doubtful whether they could win a single seat in parliament. It was very difficult for an African to obtain sufficient education to qualify for the "A" roll, and the income qualification was almost impossible except for the few favoured puppets. With the land-holding potential of the African strictly limited under the Land Apportionment Act, the fixed property qualification was also extremely difficult to meet. In 1965, an African with a Cambridge School Certificate plus two years' teacher training would not have qualified as an "A" roll voter on his starting salary as a teacher.

444. Under the terms of the Land Apportionment Act, 37 per cent of the land was reserved for about 200,000 Europeans, and 46 per cent for almost 4 million Africans. Only 17 per cent of the 40 million acres of African Tribal Trust land was suitable for annual crops, and 9.5 per cent, or nearly three fifths, was in fact under cultivation. That represented reasonable maximum use, since there were limiting factors such as the grazing of cattle on small plots and the presence of poorer

soils fit only for such crops as tobacco. Of the 33.4 million acres in European areas, 52 per cent was suitable for annual crop cultivation, yet only 2.8 per cent was cultivated. Ninety-eight per cent of the land in which the optimum conditions of good soil plus high rainfall were to be found was in European areas, and only 2 per cent in African areas.

445. Over ten times as much money was spent annually on the education of each European child as on that for the African - approximately £110 and £10 respectively. There was compulsory education for European children until completion of secondary school, while a large proportion of African children were eliminated from further training, owing to lack of facilities, and had less than a 5 per cent chance of obtaining a post-primary school certificate. Education was completely segregated, except in a few private schools, which helped to maintain the barrier between the races and prevent the development of mutual trust and understanding among Rhodesian youth. At the end of 1965 the Government had been moving against integrated schools in the European areas, basing their action on the Land Apportionment Act. The Smith régime was planning to pass the control of local village schools to chiefs' councils, taking them out of the hands of the missionary bodies that had established and developed them. As the majority of the chiefs were only semi-literate at best, the quality of the schools would thereby be downgraded. The chiefs, who were subsidized Government servants, were, through government propaganda, becoming increasingly suspicious of the better-educated and more politically minded Africans.

446. The Government had recently stated that the amount to be spent on African education would in future be limited to the tax money received from Africans - a ridiculous excuse to cut back government expenditure and keep the African in his subservient position. Moreover, at local school level, it was the African community that had to erect and furnish the school buildings and provide housing for the teachers, while no European parent was ever called upon to make such a contribution.

447. Both of the two main African locations outside Salisbury were surrounded by high fences topped with barbed wire. Each location had two main gates, and had become a virtual concentration camp. Africans leaving them to go to work had their hands stamped with indelible ink to identify them as workers, and on return

they had to approach with upraised hands to enable the police at the gates to see the mark. At night, police and army units went from door to door checking on house occupants. All children from the age of fifteen, whether gainfully employed or not, had to pay fifteen shillings a month to be allowed to stay with their families.

448. Beer halls were fenced with brick walls, twelve feet high, with broken glass affixed along the top. The walls had two small gates that allowed the passage of only one person at a time. The halls were more like fenced cattle kraals than drinking places. If any checks were to be made, the two gates were closed while police carried out their searches. The beer halls thus became useful devices for police dragnets.

449. Since 1965, the Government had relied heavily on bribery and coercing of the chiefs, paying them increased gratuities and telling them that the younger and better-educated Africans would rob them of their power. The success of that manoeuvre was questionable. The first chiefs' indaba in 1965 had almost completely robbed the chiefs of any influence they might have held over the younger people. In one large area in south-eastern Rhodesia, not one of the paramount chiefs had dared to consult his people before attending the Domboshawa indaba. They were kept in power and safety only by the continued movement of police and troops in the Tribal Trust areas.

450. The government-controlled radio had a programme called "PaDare" - an African forum for discussing the newly independent African States in a disparaging way, emphasizing the troubles in Ghana, the Congo and the East African States. It also denounced the leaders of ZANU and ZAFU.

451. The blatantly discriminatory legislation and action described had inevitably led to dissatisfaction and unrest, to deal with which the Government had been forced to the extreme measures embodied in the so-called Law and Order (Maintenance) Act. Under it, anyone could be deprived of his liberty without trial for periods up to five years, which could be renewed indefinitely at the discretion of the minister. Hundreds of Africans were thus deprived of their liberty with no formal charge being made. Under the hanging clause, the death sentence was mandatory in certain cases, even for attempted arson. The clause had been

condemned by world legal authorities. While many countries were moving to abolish capital punishment, Southern Rhodesia was extending its use, and there were almost 100 Africans under sentence of death in its prisons.

452. There were probably more than 10,000 Africans in detention and restriction in the country, though the exact figure was a government secret. Conditions were appalling. He had visited one of the detainee camps, Gonokudzingwa, at the time when Joshua Nkomo and others had been arrested. It was in a remote area previously occupied only by wild animals. Detainees could not escape because on the east there were Portuguese soldiers, on the south-west, South African soldiers and to the north a game reserve. The detainees lived in inhuman conditions. There was no water system and water had to be carried in. The huts were of sheet metal and resembled ovens during the hot seasons; they provided no protection against the cold during the winter. There was no access road and no communications with the outside world, merely a Landrover track into the area. There were no recreational, educational or medical facilities. Detainees had had to start their own educational programmes, some money for the purpose having been provided by church groups. Those self-help projects had often been discouraged by the Government, and Mr. Josiah Chinamano had been moved from Gonokudzingwa to Wha Wha for his part in organizing them. Conditions in other camps - Marandellas, Gokwe and Wha Wha - were similar, except that those places were not so remote. In most cases, the leaders had lost contact with the people, many of whom did not even know where the leaders were. No visitors were allowed at Gonokudzingwa, and detainees were completely cut off from the outside world. Visitors to the other areas were strictly controlled.

453. The families of the detainees were breaking up because of the indefinite absence from home of husbands and fathers. Children had become fatherless and had no means of support. Families had been evicted for failure to pay rent. Wives were not allowed to see their husbands, and children did not know where their fathers were. The Christian Action group had tried to help them with money received from the World Council of Churches - their only source of assistance - but even that organization had come under the scrutiny of the rebel Government.

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454. Mr. Chihota (Zimbabwe African National Union) thanked the Special Committee for the opportunity of presenting his organization's views. Since his colleagues in Zambia had already appeared before the Committee at Kitwe and had given a full picture of the situation in Southern Rhodesia, he would be brief. Moreover, most, if not all, the members of the Committee were well aware of the problems in Southern Rhodesia and he therefore proposed to give only his organization's views on what it expected of the Committee and the United Nations as a whole.

455. He and his colleagues were appearing before the Special Committee on behalf of their President, the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole, who was languishing in prison, and on behalf of the ZANU Central Committee and the masses who were suffering under the yoke of United Kingdom imperialism. He was also speaking on behalf of the fighting forces currently engaged in military operations in various parts of Southern Rhodesia and of the men in cells awaiting execution for their activities in the Chimurenga (war of national liberation).

456. He was glad of the opportunity provided to put the record straight and to expose the blatant lies of the United Kingdom imperialists at the United Nations in their attempt to perpetuate and justify their colonial policies in Southern Rhodesia.

457. He was also grateful to the President, Government and people of the United Republic of Tanzania for inviting the Special Committee to meet in the revolutionary atmosphere of Tanzania, whose people were in the forefront of the fight for the liberation of all southern Africa. The Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa was based in Tanzania, which was also a spring-board for ZANU's fight for the liberation of Zimbabwe.

458. It was well over sixteen months since selective sanctions had been imposed by the Security Council after the Salisbury rebels had declared unilateral independence. The sanctions had been imposed against the better judgement of ZANU, which had warned the Special Committee from the start that they would not succeed. ZANU had already told the Committee that South Africa and Portugal would continue to trade with Southern Rhodesia, and those countries were in fact still trading with Salisbury rebels in defiance of the Security Council's resolution. ZANU was not surprised: it had told the Committee that economic sanctions as an international offensive against the Smith régime must be supervised by the United Nations. But its recommendations had been ignored.

459. ZANU had a few suggestions to make concerning sanctions, not because it had any faith in them, but because it felt that the United Nations, to be worthy of its name, must carry out its own resolutions. ZANU still believed that force was the only solution to the Rhodesian problem and the people of Zimbabwe would continue to use force against the settlers under the leadership of ZANU and President Sithole.

460. The proposals of ZANU were as follows: sanctions must be made mandatory and comprehensive; South Africa and Portugal must be forced to comply with the United Nations decisions and, if they refused, as they had already done, sanctions must be imposed against them; the United Nations should send an observer force to the Rhodesian-South African border and the Rhodesian-Portuguese-Mozambican border to check all traffic to and from Rhodesia; the Security Council should adopt a resolution condemning the Western Powers and other United Nations Members for continuing to trade with the rebel colony. In that respect, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan and Belgium were the main culprits. The Chimurenga was steadily developing. In 1966, ZANU had informed the Special Committee of its military operations inside Southern Rhodesia, which were being intensified. They were being further intensified with the resources available. The Chimurenga forces had harassed and killed many settlers in Southern Rhodesia. A week before, forty-nine settler soldiers had been killed in an ambush near Karoi; nine others had been killed about eight miles from Banket on the Salisbury road. Another gun battle had taken place at Que Que between ZANU freedom fighters and members of the Rhodesian security forces, in which many settlers had been killed. Numerous other fights and incidents were erupting, but much more needed to be done.

461. ZANU was determined to use force against the settler community until Zimbabwe was free. ZANU asked the Special Committee to request the United Kingdom, that arch-imperialist and colonialist Power, to declare publicly:

(a) that it would not engage in any military intervention in Southern Rhodesia under the pretext of maintaining law and order when the African nationalists were on the point of liberating their country. The United Kingdom had already refused to use force against the Salisbury rebels because of "kith-and-kin" considerations. If it tried to interfere after realizing the strength of the liberation movements, ZANU would not hesitate to fight even the United

Kingdom itself. So far as ZANU was concerned, Smith and Wilson stood for the same thing: the perpetuation of United Kingdom imperialism and settlerism in the country;

(b) that there should be African majority rule immediately after the downfall of the present illegal régime;

(c) that there should be no period of direct colonial rule after the termination of the present illegal Salisbury régime;

(d) that independence should be granted to Southern Rhodesia as soon as possible after the establishment of African majority government in that country.

462. If the above conditions were not met there would, he warned, be trouble inside the country. It should be clear that ZANU was not fighting Smith in order to establish another colonial régime administered from London.

463. The people of Southern Rhodesia under the leadership of ZANU had made up their minds to use armed force to win African majority rule and independence. They were convinced that that was the only effective way of recovering their birthright and human dignity in the land of their forefathers. ZANU was taking steps to ensure that every Zimbabwean was armed to meet the counter-revolutionary resistance of the settlers. Any attempt to intervene in Southern Rhodesia under the guise of maintaining law and order would be met with armed force.

464. He did not wish to leave the Special Committee with the impression that ZANU was happy with the performance of the United Nations in regard to the Rhodesian problem: far from it. ZANU was very disappointed indeed. The United Nations had regrettably turned itself into a debating society. It was capable of adopting resolutions, but incapable of implementing them. ZANU was appearing before the Committee but the matter always ended in the conference room. It was sad to have to say so in public, but there was no need for ZANU to hide its true feelings. The mission of liberating Southern Rhodesia was the responsibility of its people alone, but the United Nations could help the oppressed and exploited inhabitants of Southern Rhodesia to liberate themselves. While the United Nations claimed to stand for peace and human dignity and equality, ZANU would continue to bring its problems before the Committee. But there was no point in adopting resolutions which the United Nations could not implement, for it made a mockery of the world body.

465. He appealed to the major Powers, and to the Western Powers in particular, to cease all trade with Southern Rhodesia. He also called on all the freedom-loving and peace-loving peoples represented in the United Nations and elsewhere to give support, moral and otherwise, to the struggling masses of Southern Rhodesia in their fight against the United Kingdom imperialists and settlers in their fatherland. ZANU was asking the United Nations to help it to help itself, and whatever support was given by Member States and other friendly countries would supplement ZANU's own efforts and local resources.

466. The United Nations had a moral obligation towards the oppressed masses all over the world, and the Special Committee had a special responsibility towards them.

467. Failure to grant independence to the Zimbabwe masses would mean the continuation of racial war in Southern Rhodesia and indeed in all southern Africa. ZANU would not lay down its arms until its objective of African majority rule was realized. In the meantime the war of liberation would continue and would be intensified throughout the country.

B. General statements

468. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania said that, by their thorough and well-documented statements, the petitioners had shown that the usurpation by the illegal racist minority régime was a continuation of the same colonial system by which the people of Zimbabwe had been oppressed by the United Kingdom Government. They had also shown that the so-called sanctions were a farce and an impotent way of dealing with a serious problem. The petitioners had also revealed what amounted to a conspiracy on the part of Western capitalist monopolies which were upholding the illegal régime against the interests of the African people.

469. Colonialism was not an adventure arising from the rrcrantic whims of eccentric explorers; it was the accumulation of capital in the industrialized nations of Europe and the quest for new markets and raw materials which led to the colonization and annexation of land. That interpretation of the historical development of society was fully applicable to the colonization of Southern Rhodesia and to the situation prevailing there.

470. The acquisition of the colony of Southern Rhodesia by the United Kingdom had been followed by the systematic institution of racial segregation. In order to

exploit the rich resources of Zimbabwe, the United Kingdom, through colonial legislation and force, had systematically driven the African people from their lands and introduced the white settlers who, in order to continue that usurpation, had established themselves as the "super race", maintaining the Africans as an inferior commodity - cheap labour. It was the systematic colonial policy of the United Kingdom which had not only denied freedom and land to the African people, but had established the domination of the racialist settlers who were the kith and kin of the colonizers. Thus the usurpation of State power by the illegal racist minority régime of Ian Smith was nothing but the continuation of the colonial policies of the United Kingdom.

471. It was abundantly clear that sanctions had failed. They had failed partly because they were being subverted by the very Powers that claimed that they would succeed. The leaders of Africa had said in advance that sanctions would not work. Why could not the Western Powers listen to the voice of Africa? And why was it, despite the fact that the representatives of many Western countries had spoken of what their parliaments had done to stop their trade with Southern Rhodesia, that Southern Rhodesia was still trading freely with those same countries? The socialist countries had had no dealings with the illegal régime. Socialism, in fact, was absolutely incompatible with everything that was going on in southern Africa.

472. The reason why Western countries continued to trade with the illegal régime was very simple: it was because those countries put profits above human values. They did what they did not so much for love of Smith and what he stood for but for love of the profits they could derive from him. The profits of the white minority were more important to them than the feelings of 4 million Africans. It was not surprising that the African people of Zimbabwe were bewildered by such policies. The Tanzanian delegation had been shocked to hear that some United States and United Kingdom companies were not only still trading with the illegal régime, but were also expanding their installations. He singled out those two countries because they had been loudest in the Security Council in calling for sanctions.

473. He affirmed once again the conviction of Africa that only force would bring down the illegal régime. While African history was stained with the blood shed

by colonizers on very flimsy excuses, it was deplorable that force was not being used to crush the selfish, racist settlers. He hardly needed to remind the Special Committee of the thousands who had died in Africa to water the tree of freedom. In Tanganyika, during the Maji Maji war, the Germans admitted to having murdered 150,000 people. The story was the same in Algeria, Kenya, Zambia, Angola, Mozambique, Guinea (Bissau), South West Africa and South Africa and, last but not least, Aden.

474. How long would the Western countries, especially the United Kingdom, continue to apply those double standards? He appealed to the people of the United Kingdom and of the United States to practise abroad what they practised for their own people.

475. He assured the people of Zimbabwe of Tanzania's unqualified support. The Tanzanian people felt that the fight, suffering and humiliation of the people of Zimbabwe were their own fight, suffering and humiliation, and they would stand by them to the bitter end. Its stand had made Tanzania a target for propaganda and slander; that would never be a source of discouragement but rather of encouragement since it showed that the friends of colonialism were afraid.

476. The representative of Zambia, speaking at the Chairman's invitation, thanked the Special Committee for allowing a Zambian delegation to attend its meeting as an observer and said that his delegation was reassured by the concern with which the Committee was approaching the problems of southern Africa. He was very grateful for the goodwill which the members had shown towards Zambia in its present difficulties. The President of Zambia had already dealt with the problems of southern Africa in great detail in his address and there was very little to add.

477. The problem of Southern Rhodesia was far more a creation of the United Kingdom than a white settlers' conspiracy. With the unlamented break-up of the Central African Federation in 1963, the United Kingdom had deliberately given almost the whole of the Federation's air force to Southern Rhodesia. That addition of considerable military strength to an already defiant white settler régime had made the Rhodesian question much more complex. The United Kingdom Government had deliberately strengthened Southern Rhodesia so that a unilateral

declaration of independence could be made and white minority rule perpetuated in order to buttress the United Kingdom's economic and racial policies in southern Africa. If that was not so, then the politicians in Whitehall had been guilty of culpable political miscalculation and blindness. That was partly the reason why his country had always maintained that only force could solve the Southern Rhodesian problem and that the United Kingdom was under an obligation to destroy what it had created. Southern Rhodesia was not only a threat to international peace and security, it was also a grave security problem for Zambia. The machinations of its intelligence activities had recently been exposed in the Press, in which connexion a significant fact had emerged from the evidence obtained namely that Zambia was being made to pay by the rebels and their allies for its human and noble principles both economically and in terms of security risks. Nevertheless, while he deplored those hardships he considered that more than a fight for survival was involved. It was a political as well as a humane crusade and his people were proud to be active in the arduous but noble task of reclaiming lost human rights in southern Africa. Even if his country's geographical position had been different, it would still have applied itself with equal zeal to the liberation of mankind in Africa and throughout the world. It was an oasis of racial harmony and political and democratic justice in a desert of racism and oppression. His people believed that the Special Committee was charged with the responsibility of reclaiming that desert for all men, irrespective of colour, race or religion. He hoped that the Committee's stay in Zambia had helped the members to form a clearer picture of the situation and to realize how seriously Zambia regarded it.

478. The representative of India said that it was regrettable that, in spite of so many appeals, resolutions and condemnations, the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia continued to hold sway over 4 million African people, condemning them to slavery and subjugation. The petitioners who had appeared before the Special Committee had provided very useful and material evidence which painted a dark and gloomy picture of the situation. His delegation thanked them for their efforts in collecting such valuable information and for presenting it in such an able and comprehensive manner.

479. The sole responsibility for encouraging the Rhodesian racists lay with the Government of the United Kingdom. It was pathetic to see how that Government had, over a period of more than forty years, allowed itself to be pressured by the white settlers in Southern Rhodesia who had compelled it to grant them so-called self-government in 1923. Since that date they had demanded more power and had as constantly received it. In 1953 they had forced the United Kingdom Government to create the Central African Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, against the wishes of the African populations of the three federating units. The Federation had been dissolved at the end of 1963, thanks to the persistent and effective opposition of the African populations, but the whites in Southern Rhodesia had managed to obtain control of such essential services as the air force, the railways and the vital Kariba Dam.

480. While the performance of the United Kingdom Government before November 1965 had been regrettable, its actions since that period had been inexcusable. It had announced that force would not be used against the Smith régime if it made a unilateral declaration of independence. The announcement made without any provocation or justification had eliminated whatever slight deterrent effect the United Kingdom statement of 23 October 1964 might have had on the minority régime at Salisbury. The United Kingdom Government had declared the action of the Smith régime to be rebellion but had failed to take effective measures to crush it. The sanctions adopted so far had failed to produce the desired results. They might have had some effect on the economy of Southern Rhodesia but, as one of the petitioners had pointed out, their aim was to bring about the downfall of the Smith régime and in that they had failed miserably. They had, in fact, tended to unite the settlers behind the Rhodesian Front under the leadership of the fanatical Ian Smith who had stated, at the Party's annual congress in September 1966, that

his régime would never deviate from the principles for which the Party stood and the promises it had made to the electorate. He had proudly told his co-gangsters that they were carrying out one of the most incredible exercises in contemporary history by standing up not to one great country only but to virtually the whole world.

481. Even on the economic front, sanctions had not been effective and were proving a blessing in disguise for the rebel régime. Many new industries had been established to reduce dependence on imports and the illegal régime had ready access to the world markets through South Africa and Portugal. He agreed with several delegations that the really effective and speedy means of bringing down the rebel régime was the use of force by the Government of the United Kingdom. As the President of Zambia had stated in his inaugural address, sanctions, to produce the desired result, needed to be comprehensive and mandatory and backed by force on the part of the administering Power, which was fully competent to take such action. His delegation and others had been accused of adopting double standards when the Committee had been discussing another item in New York but, if anybody was adopting double standards, it was the United Kingdom Government which had never before hesitated to use force in colonial Territories. The reason for the unwillingness of that Government to resort to force in Rhodesia was, of course, the fact that the rebels were whites and "kith and kin". In other words, the United Kingdom Government had one set of rules for whites and another for non-whites. The failure of the United Kingdom Government to crush the Salisbury rebellion would go down in history as its great betrayal of African interests.

482. All the petitioners had referred to collusion between Southern Rhodesia, South Africa and Portugal, an unholy alliance that had recently become both official and public. The defence ministers of South Africa and Portugal, at their recent conference, had proclaimed their common objective of resolutely pursuing the defence of their common objective of resolutely pursuing the defence of their common positions in Africa. The aim of that alliance was to preserve the last bastion of white supremacy in Southern Africa.

483. His delegation had been concerned to hear the recent rumours of renewed negotiations between the United Kingdom Government and the Smith régime. Any arrangement so made, without consulting the majority African population and on any basis other than that of the independence of Zimbabwe with universal suffrage, would be unacceptable to his delegation.

484. He supported the Chairman's appeal to the freedom fighters to unite. Their enemies, the minority régime at Salisbury and the Governments of South Africa and Portugal, had realized that their own survival depended on closing their ranks. That was doubly true for the freedom fighters since they lacked the resources which each of those three parties individually possessed. He paid a tribute to the nationalist movements for their untiring efforts and sacrifices in the face of the inhuman and barbarous methods adopted by the Rhodesian racists, who seemed to be trying to compete with their Portuguese allies in that respect.

485. The sanctions, completely meaningless and ineffective in their main objective, had caused immense hardship to the young Republic of Zambia. His delegation and Government greatly admired the resolution of the President, Government and people of Zambia and their determination to aid in the liberation of Zimbabwe. As the Indian representative had said in the Security Council, a concerted programme of aid to Zambia to counteract those effects would have to be pursued as a matter of highest priority. His Government which had already made a modest contribution for that purpose was ready and willing to participate in such a programme to the full extent of its resources.

486. The course of history was irreversible and irrevocable. Nothing could prevent the forces of freedom in Africa from advancing to their goal. The Special Committee should direct its efforts towards speeding up the process. The cost might be heavy but the stakes were high - the freedom and independence of the 4 million people of Zimbabwe and the peace of the African continent.

487. The representative of Ethiopia said that the position of his country with regard to the problem of Southern Rhodesia was too well known to require any detailed elaboration. It was, as ever, united with the other African countries, and with all countries dedicated to the cause of freedom, in the fight to liberate the people of Southern Rhodesia from the rebellious, colonial, racist régime that was currently holding them in cruel bondage. The role and responsibility of the United Nations in the liberation of colonial peoples had been clearly affirmed in the Charter and reaffirmed in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). The question of Southern Rhodesia had been under constant consideration by the Special Committee and had been the subject of numerous General Assembly resolutions. It had also been considered by the Security Council both before and after the illegal declaration of independence. The Council was expected to take up the question once again in June 1967 when it

considered the Secretary-General's report on the implementation of its resolution 232 of 16 December 1966.

488. The General Assembly, at its twenty-first session, had adopted two resolutions on the recommendation of the Fourth Committee. In resolution 2138 (XXI) it had condemned any arrangement reached between the administering Power and the illegal racist minority régime which did not recognize the inalienable rights of the people of Zimbabwe to self-determination and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), and reaffirmed the obligation of the administering Power to transfer power to the people of Zimbabwe on the basis of universal adult suffrage, in accordance with the principle of "one man, one vote". In its resolution 2151 (XXI) the General Assembly, while reaffirming the inalienable right of the people of Zimbabwe to freedom and independence, deplored the failure of the United Kingdom Government to put an end to the illegal racist régime in Southern Rhodesia, and condemned the activities of those foreign financial and other interests which, by supporting and assisting the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia, were preventing the African people of Zimbabwe from attaining freedom and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). In the same resolution, the General Assembly had also drawn the attention of the Security Council to the grave situation prevailing in Southern Rhodesia in order that it might consider whether to apply the necessary enforcement measures provided for in Chapter VII of the Charter. Between 8 and 16 December 1966, the Security Council, at the request of the United Kingdom Government, had met to resume its consideration of the matter and, on 16 December 1966, had adopted resolution 232 (1966) in which it reaffirmed its previous resolution and, acting in accordance with Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter, had determined that the current situation in Southern Rhodesia constituted a threat to international peace and security and had called on all States to take a number of measures laid down in operative paragraphs 2 and 5. The United Nations resolutions to which he had just referred were only a few of the very recent ones.

489. When the United Nations had begun discussing the question of Southern Rhodesia, the United Kingdom Government has opposed intervention by the world body in that Territory on the ground that it was self-governing. When in 1965 the Smith régime

had declared its independence unilaterally, the United Kingdom Government had assured the world that the rebels would be forced to surrender in a matter of weeks. Nearly two years later, the preposterous Smith régime was still holding fast. Had the United Kingdom been serious in giving its assurance? Certainly the assurance was in complete contradiction to what appeared to be the current policy of the United Kingdom Government, namely "to pass the ball" to the United Nations under conditions which would make any United Nations action either impossible or ineffective. Its policy had, from the outset, been characterized by contradictions and by what President Kaunda had described as "prohibitive procrastination". As if its indecisive attitude were not enough to encourage the rebellious spirit in Southern Rhodesia, it had continued to vacillate, engaging in negotiations with Smith while endeavouring to absolve itself of any responsibility for the situation and to convince the world that everything possible was being done to restore constitutional rule. The rebels had put the interval to good use. They had created a political vacuum by imprisoning opposition leaders and had strengthened their monopoly of power by introducing repressive measures aimed at keeping the 4 million Africans in a permanent state of servitude.

490. The current intolerable state of affairs was the sole responsibility of the United Kingdom Government and not of the United Nations, which had inherited the problems in southern Africa from that country. Most, if not all, of those problems would not have existed if the United Kingdom had faithfully discharged its responsibilities towards the majority of the people living in that unhappy region. A rebel régime had been in control of Southern Rhodesia for nearly two years and the administering Power was obliged to use all possible means, including the use of force, to suppress that rebellion. India had learned from bitter experience that half-hearted measures could not thwart aggressive designs. It was only when they were faced with determined and decisive action that aggressors gave up their evil plans. It was time the United Nations "passed the ball" back to the United Kingdom Government and appealed to it to live up to its grave responsibilities.

491. The representative of Iran said he had studied with the utmost care and attention the information given by the petitioners about developments in Southern Rhodesia and the information contained in working papers prepared by the Secretariat. Those sources, together with the brilliant and descriptive analysis by the President of Zambia, had given him a very clear and complete picture of the problem in Southern Rhodesia (see chapter II), a picture that was indeed unhappy and disheartening. The continuation of the sordid tyranny inflicted upon the people of Zimbabwe had only been made possible by a combination of political, economic, military and social factors operating in favour of the rebel régime. The challenge to the United Nations was indeed serious.

492. Although Iran was geographically very distant from Southern Rhodesia, the determination of its people to eradicate colonialism, racism and all other forms of injustice made them comrades-in-arms of the people of Zimbabwe, and his Government under the dynamic leadership of His Imperial Majesty Shahanshah Aryamehr had laid down as one of the foundations of its foreign policy the pursuit of world peace through justice. He stressed that the word used was "justice" and not "law" for the reason that the latter was a static concept primarily intended to maintain the status quo, while the former was a dynamic concept which offered the best hope of a lasting peace. To illustrate his meaning, he quoted the following passage from Shahanshah Aryamehr's book The White Revolution:

"Is it not a truism that the more rigorous the execution of the laws promulgated in a country where power is in the hands of a racist minority régime, the greater the injustice prevailing in that society? Is it not a truism also that under a fully democratic system where all political precepts are established but where a democratic distribution of wealth is lacking, those people who enjoy greater economic advantages are much better placed to secure for themselves the passage of laws necessary for the continuation of their existing conditions and advantages? Man's real progress in this day and age depends primarily on loosening the fetters with which, over the centuries, the privileged few have tied the hands and feet of the deprived masses. It is the duty of every Government and State to make its contribution to human society and world peace, through the establishment of justice in all its aspects, whether social or judicial, political or economic."

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493. Southern Rhodesia was a vivid example of the type of society to which his sovereign referred. The laws enacted, or to be enacted, by the racist minority régime of Salisbury, such as the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act or the proposed Preventive Detention Amendment Bill were among the most oppressive in the world. Peace could only return to the Territory with the establishment of justice. United Nations efforts to obtain majority rule by persuasion had been of no avail. Selective mandatory sanctions had produced no results and, under existing conditions, there was no hope of their toppling the minority régime. The only effective means of restoring the legitimate rights of the Zimbabwe people was the use of force by the authority responsible for the Territory, namely, the United Kingdom. That Power was morally bound to use every means at its disposal to discharge its responsibilities towards the population of Zimbabwe and the use of force in this case would be nothing more than a police action.

494. In accordance with its policy of opposing colonialism as a threat to world peace, his delegation had constantly sponsored or supported every resolution calling for an end to the Smith régime. Despite heavy financial losses, Iran had been the first to respond to the Security Council's call for economic sanctions against the rebel régime while, since the adoption of selective mandatory sanctions, all its commercial ties with Southern Rhodesia had been broken. If sanctions were to be effective, they needed to be complete and comprehensive, while the establishment of a co-ordination or supervisory machinery would be most valuable to implement and enforce them.

495. The African population of the Territory should also play its part in the joint effort to topple the Smith régime and the intensified activities of its two major political parties were very encouraging. He joined with the Chairman in appealing to them to redouble their efforts until freedom was won, in which connexion his delegation had suggested the organization of a passive resistance movement. He wished them every success and assured them of the full support of his Government and people as evidenced by his delegation's sponsorship of the draft resolution.

496. The representative of Chile said that he would not speak at length on the problem of Southern Rhodesia, the various aspects of which he had already discussed during a previous statement and when he had made the proposal, adopted by the Special Committee, to transmit the petitioners' statements to the Security

Council and to appeal to the United Kingdom to secure the release of political prisoners and to prevent the introduction of the apartheid system in Southern Rhodesia. He merely wished to draw attention to a fundamental fact emerging from the petitioners' statements, namely that the selective economic sanctions had failed and that the rebel régime was in control of the situation and was in the process of consolidating the hateful yoke of tyranny and racial discrimination which it had imposed on the African majority of the population. The responsibility for that failure lay not only with South Africa and Portugal but also with certain companies and certain States which were co-operating with the minority régime.

497. When his country had supported the resolution on Southern Rhodesia adopted at the twenty-first session of the General Assembly, he had explained that the traditional attitude of the Latin American countries which opposed the use of force in international relations, did not run counter to the appeal to the United Kingdom to use all means, including force, to re-establish legality. Southern Rhodesia was not a State recognized by the international community. It was a Territory under British administration which had rebelled against the administering Power and installed a régime which was offensive to the international community. It was therefore proper for the administering Power to put an end to the rebellion. The failure of the sanctions justified the stronger and more effective measures recommended by the Committee, namely the use of force by the administering Power.

498. The representative of Finland recalled that he had expressed the views of his Government on Southern Rhodesia in his opening statement a few days before (see chapter II), namely, that it was strongly opposed to the illegal Smith régime, which, in defiance of virtually unanimous world opinion, continued to oppress the African people.

499. His delegation considered that no peaceful effort should be spared to rectify the situation and enable the African people of Zimbabwe to choose their own future in their own country. In accordance with the Security Council's resolutions, trade between Southern Rhodesia and his country had ceased. It was very regrettable that the mandatory sanctions had not yet produced decisive results, and his delegation deeply deplored the fact that Portugal and South Africa, whose participation in the sanctions was of particular importance, had

continued their political and economic relations with Southern Rhodesia, in defiance of Security Council resolution 232 (1966) which was legally binding on all Member States.

500. Sanctions, in order to be effective, needed to be comprehensive and to receive the full support of Member States, all of which should stand behind the Security Council's decision and should be prepared to take further and bolder measures if the sanctions produced no results. That was of vital importance not only for the people of Zimbabwe but also for the prestige and effectiveness of the United Nations. It should, however, be borne in mind that it was the first time the world body had resorted to mandatory economic sanctions in accordance with Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter.

501. He thanked the petitioners for the valuable information they had furnished to the Special Committee. He had listened with great care and deep emotion to what they had said concerning their devoted struggle for freedom and the sufferings of their people. His country greatly sympathized with their noble cause and hoped that the day would soon come when they would be able to take their place in a society free from discrimination.

502. The representative of Poland said that the question of Southern Rhodesia had first come before the United Nations almost five years before. In 1962, the predecessor of the present Committee, the Committee of Seventeen, had established that Southern Rhodesia was a Non-Self-Governing Territory under Article 73 e of the Charter. Since then, Southern Rhodesia had become a regular item on the agenda of the General Assembly and of the Special Committee. Many resolutions had been adopted requesting the administering Power to implement within that Territory the provisions of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

503. Until 1965, however, the United Kingdom had denied the right of the United Nations to consider the problem of Southern Rhodesia and had asserted that developments there were well under its control. It had ignored all recommendations and requests that it should use its residual powers to grant independence to the people of Zimbabwe. Events had shown that the passive inaction of the United Kingdom had given the white settler minority time to strengthen its position and to prepare for a unilateral declaration of independence. Its policy of

non-compliance with United Nations resolutions on Southern Rhodesia had paved the way for Smith's usurpation of power. Although the United Kingdom had stigmatized the unilateral declaration of independence by the Southern Rhodesian front as an act of rebellion, it had taken no effective steps to quell it but had adopted a hesitant and a weak attitude and had thus encouraged the settlers in their defiance by assuring them that, in no circumstances, would force be used against them. Despite warnings from African and many other Member States that half measures would never bring down the rebel régime, the Security Council had, at the instance of the United Kingdom, adopted a programme of selective mandatory sanctions. The evidence given by the petitioners and the working paper prepared by the Secretariat showed that South Africa and Portugal were assisting the régime in Southern Rhodesia to defeat the selective sanctions and that Southern Rhodesian minerals and crops were being sold to major international concerns established in Japan, the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany and other Western countries. Sanctions had, in fact, proved to be a failure and the racist régime was continuing its illegal course in defiance of the administering Power and of various United Nations resolutions.

504. Since the General Assembly had last discussed the matter, the situation in the Territory had taken a turn for the worse: the régime had consolidated itself and had intensified its oppressive measures against the 4 million Africans of Zimbabwe. It was assuming new powers and moving even further in the direction of a full police State with institutional apartheid. It was introducing legislation on separate development that would divide the country along racial and tribal lines. It was expanding its armed forces and increasing its military allocations by about 20 per cent. The petitioners had informed the Special Committee that military experts from the Federal Republic of Germany, and other countries had been brought to Southern Rhodesia to train the Rhodesian armed forces:

505. It had always been his delegation's view that the question of Southern Rhodesia could not be considered in isolation from the other colonial and racial problems in southern Africa. The collusion between Vorster, Salazar and Smith in perpetuating white supremacy in southern Africa supported that contention. The whole area was covered by a network of foreign financial monopolies which

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ruthlessly exploited its wealth and provided an umbrella for the illegal Southern Rhodesian régime. In fact, the foreign companies and industrial combines were keeping the colonial régime in being since they considered that it created a favourable climate for their investments. The responsibility for that situation lay entirely with the administering Power and its allies, which, either directly or indirectly, were violating United Nations resolutions despite the fact that it was the duty of the United Kingdom Government to crush the rebellion and make it possible for the people of Zimbabwe to exercise their inalienable right to self-determination and independence.

506. The representative of the United States of America said that few issues in the history of the United Nations had produced such near unanimity among Members as the unilateral declaration of independence by the Smith régime in Southern Rhodesia. Previous speakers had emphasized that the United Kingdom must bear the heaviest responsibility for that situation, as was recognized by the Security Council and acknowledged by the United Kingdom itself.

507. Despite that clear-cut assignment of responsibility, most Members of the United Nations had viewed the matter from the outset as being of individual concern to themselves. The majority had dedicated themselves to attaining establishment of majority rule in Southern Rhodesia and to taking specific action, in concert, to achieve those goals, in many cases at considerable sacrifice.

508. The reasons why the unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) had evoked such a determined response from so many nations was because a basic moral issue was at stake: the principle of "respect for human rights and for fundamental freedom for all, without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion". The rebel régime was committed to the violation of that principle.

509. His delegation could well understand the apprehensions of the African countries, especially Zambia, concerning developments in Southern Rhodesia. Zambia had chosen to evolve a multiracial society, in which the majority ruled but where the rights of minorities were protected. His delegation considered that to be the only formula for political and social evolution which would further peace, freedom and progress.

510. When the efforts of the United Kingdom to bring majority rule to Southern Rhodesia had failed, the United Kingdom had called upon the United Nations in

the belief that its co-operation was necessary if a peaceful solution were to be found. The basic aim of the United Nations action had been to make the illegal Smith régime understand that the international community would not tolerate the establishment in Southern Rhodesia of a discriminatory political system based on minority rule. The United Nations had sought to fulfil its aims by peaceful means, in accordance with its Charter. His Government had supported all the measures adopted by the Security Council and had scrupulously seen to their implementation. United States reaction to UDI had been quick and unequivocal. Immediately after the event the United States representative in the Council, Mr. Goldberg, had said: "The event which has brought us into this Council this morning is one of the most shocking that has transpired since the dawn of the present era of decolonization, and is fraught with the gravest of consequences. A small, stubborn and sadly mistaken minority has seized sole power in an effort to dominate the lives of the vast and unwilling majority of the population of Southern Rhodesia." He had concluded his statement by exhorting the Council "to make resoundingly clear the conviction that a small and forlorn group of men cannot for long reverse the historic trend of twentieth-century Africa toward self-determination and freedom".

511. Since that statement had been made, the Smith régime had intensified its discrimination against the African majority. Under the extended Emergency Powers Act, new laws conferring broad powers of arrest, censorship and other curtailments of human rights had been introduced that were shocking to anyone concerned about civil liberties. Vivid evidence had been provided by the petitioners on that subject.

512. The United States Government had given unstinting support to the increasingly strong measures adopted by the United Nations. It was irrevocably dedicated to the principle of self-determination by and for the people of Southern Rhodesia and independence on a basis acceptable to the people of the country as a whole. His own country had experienced the agonies of civil war a century before as the result of an effort to legitimize the principle of racial superiority, and had worked long and hard to rid itself of that false hateful doctrine; it could hardly pretend to ignore overseas the very inequality it had fought at home.

513. In ordering, for the first time in the history of the United Nations, mandatory economic sanctions of a substantial nature, the Security Council had taken a historic step. That step meant that for the first time in the history of the United States, certain activities in international trade were to be prohibited pursuant to a Security Council order. As a major trading and investing country, the United States had had a wide variety of economic links with Southern Rhodesia before the unilateral declaration.

514. The process of economic disengagement had of necessity involved a complex series of economic controls. His delegation had reported to the Special Committee in 1966, in considerable detail, on the steps taken to carry out the Security Council's resolution of November 1965. The Council's action of 16 December 1966 had immediately led to a new series of measures by the United States Government to broaden and tighten controls.

515. The Executive Order to carry out the Security Council's resolution had been signed on 5 January 1967. On 1 February 1967 the United States Commerce Department had issued an order to implement the terms of the resolution with regard to the transport of Rhodesian goods, and on 2 March 1967, the Treasury Department had issued orders covering restrictions on imports. Action to control exports had already been taken by the Commerce Department.

516. The United States sanctions programme was in full effect, with no loop-holes, and violation was a serious criminal offence carrying penalties of up to ten years' imprisonment, a \$10,000 fine, or both.

517. The process of economic disengagement had involved a loss of trade worth many millions of dollars to the United States. It had posed problems for United States industry because of the loss of an important source of some critically needed raw materials, and the dislocation of trade and investment patterns would no doubt have lasting effects. He mentioned that not to claim any credit for the steps taken by his Government, for as a member of the Security Council, his Government had strongly supported their adoption and implementation. Other countries, including Zambia, had suffered far more seriously, accepting very considerable sacrifices.

518. He had referred to the disruption of United States trade and investment because he had observed that, whenever the question of Southern Rhodesia was

discussed, delegations representing countries whose trade with Southern Rhodesia was small or non-existent boasted of their supposed "full compliance" with the Security Council resolutions and levelled unfounded charges at countries that had had substantial economic links with Southern Rhodesia before the unilateral declaration of independence, and were therefore encountering problems in implementing those resolutions. Some delegations had even claimed to see a sinister capitalist plot behind recent developments, arguing that the process of economic disengagement was in reality an effort to entrench capitalist interest in Southern Rhodesia. The fact was that the United States had reduced its exports to Southern Rhodesia from \$23 million to \$7 million, i.e., 65 per cent, between 1965 and 1966, before mandatory sanctions had been put into effect.

519. The steps taken by his Government were specific and significant actions, not hollow statements. The United States was one of the twelve countries which by 15 May 1967 had supplied the Secretariat with full information on their trade. His Government was taking those steps willingly because it wished to play an active part in finding a peaceful solution to the problem of Southern Rhodesia under the Charter. As President Kennedy had declared to the General Assembly in 1961: "Within the limits of our responsibility in such matters, my country intends to be a participant and not merely an observer, in the peaceful expeditious movement of nations from the status of colonies to the partnership of equals. That continuing tide of self-determination, which runs so strong, has our sympathy and our support." That was still his Government's policy.

520. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics thanked the Zambian representative, who had taken part in the Special Committee's work and had outlined the deplorable situation prevailing in Southern Rhodesia, where 4 million Africans were suffering under the control of the Smith régime.

521. The statements of a number of representatives and petitioners had drawn attention to the machinations of the Western Powers, South Africa and Portugal, which were directed towards maintaining the racist régime in Southern Rhodesia.

522. The situation in Southern Rhodesia continued to be an abnormal one. If the United Nations resolution concerning the Territory was not implemented, the responsibility would rest with the United Kingdom and with those NATO countries which were supporting the United Kingdom's policy with regard to Southern Rhodesia.

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The statements of many delegations, including those of the representatives of Tanzania, India, Bulgaria, Chile and Poland, showed clearly that the Western Powers, while urging implementation of the Security Council's decisions, continued to maintain economic relations with the rebel régime. The United States representative had attempted to justify his country's failure to apply sanctions. He had spoken of the economic relations between the United States and Southern Rhodesia. Nevertheless, the arguments advanced would convince no one. It was sufficient to refer to an article in the current issue of the Times of Zambia, entitled "Rhodesia Laughs at Sanctions", which plainly stated which countries were giving assistance to the Smith régime. The United States representative's arguments merely emphasized the fact that the Western Powers' main reason for not implementing the United Nations resolution was to protect the interest of the monopolies. His delegation unreservedly condemned the activities of those foreign interests which were preventing the people of Zimbabwe from attaining independence.

523. The representative of Sierra Leone said that all members of the Special Committee were aware that the sanctions imposed by the United Nations at the request of the Government of the United Kingdom after the unilateral declaration of independence had failed miserably. Oil flowed into Southern Rhodesia from South Africa and Mozambique; Southern Rhodesian sugar and tobacco were sold all over the world; and ships of countries claiming to uphold the sanctions were taking goods to and from Southern Rhodesia. Machinery and spare parts banned under the Security Council resolution were supplied to the rebel régime by Portugal and South Africa. However, modern machinery was designed to last a long time and the effect of an embargo on spare parts would only make itself felt after years. Many Governments had stated that they would not ship arms or machinery to the rebel régime, but it was well known that Southern Rhodesia was receiving such goods. What, in fact, had those Governments done to check and to ensure that the goods banned under the Security Council's resolution were not sent?

524. Sanctions alone had failed, but his delegation believed that they could have been effective if they had been total and mandatory, and combined with the use of force. The rebellion had come about because of the intransigence of the United

Kingdom Government, which had never really wished to give up Southern Rhodesia to the people of Zimbabwe. The Smith régime had been given time to consolidate its position. Industries were being diversified and items previously imported were being produced. The only group that had suffered were the Africans, who had been thrown out of jobs and whose educational facilities had been reduced, while employment and education for white men were safeguarded. In fact, sanctions had only hurt the Africans, and those countries that declared themselves against the use of force would make sure that the Africans continued to suffer.

525. Ian Smith was turning the Territory into another South Africa: a bill to that end was in the Southern Rhodesian Parliament. It was hard for the Special Committee when meeting in New York to be aware of the radio and other propaganda carried out by the Smith régime; but during its visit to Zambia, members had been able to see for themselves the régime's attempts to influence the minds of Africans within and outside the Territory.

526. He had been impressed by the contrast between the Zambian and Rhodesian sides of the border. On the Zambian side the control post was some way away from the bridge; on the Rhodesian side it was at the very end of the bridge, and any movement towards the Rhodesian side aroused the attention of armed guards. No one was to be allowed to observe the crimes committed in the Territory. The situation had arisen because of the intransigence of the United Kingdom Government. Moreover the sword of Damocles was hanging over Zambia in the shape of the Kariba Dam, on the Rhodesian side of the border. The administering Power could not shirk its responsibility by attempting to turn it over to the United Nations. Mr. Wilson should have the courage to take a decision, however unpopular, to use force to end the rebellion. The United Kingdom must be bold if it wished the United Nations to have faith in it. Africans had fought and lost their lives for the United Kingdom in two world wars, for a cause that was not their own. The United Kingdom should show its willingness to fight for a cause for which it alleged support, and take the necessary steps to quell the rebellion. However, the main issue was not rebellion but independence for the Zimbabwe people.

527. The representative of Yugoslavia thanked the petitioners who had provided vivid new evidence of the further crimes committed by the evil racist régime of Ian Smith against the gallant people of Zimbabwe. His Government and people would continue to support their just struggle for full independence and freedom.

528. In reviewing the problem of Southern Rhodesia, it was essential to bear in mind the fact that all measures thus far taken to liquidate the illegal Smith régime had been in vain. Indeed there was growing evidence that the régime was fortifying itself and extending its evil policies by introducing a new constitution and the abhorrent policy of apartheid. The racist régime had begun to follow in the footsteps of South Africa. Its reasoning was clear; the United Nations during the past twenty years had failed to overcome the racist policies of South Africa and there was every reason to believe that the Smith régime would obtain similar protection from the same countries. Those calculations had, regrettably, been justified.

529. The crux of the matter did not lie in the resistance of the Smith régime to the steps taken by the United Nations. The efforts of the countries responsible for the present situation to limit the issue to that resistance constituted an attempt to mislead public opinion and thus gain time to consolidate the régime. The real question at stake in the case of all the racist régimes in southern Africa was the wider interests of colonialists and neo-colonialists, forces and monopolies, who wished illegally to exploit the wealth of Africa, and to secure political and military outposts from which to exert pressure against the newly liberated countries and jeopardize their development. Such a policy, based as it was on the use of force, constituted a threat to the emancipation and free development of the world as a whole, and President Kaunda, in his wise and comprehensive address, had warned the Special Committee of the consequences of continuing it.

530. His delegation considered that the Special Committee's basic function was to shed light on the situation faced by the international community in Southern Rhodesia, and to take measures to eliminate the causes of that situation. Responsibility for the situation in Southern Rhodesia fell upon the United Kingdom under General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), with which that country had not complied. The delaying tactics of the United Kingdom had enabled Smith to carry out his plan. After the unilateral declaration of independence, the Government of the United Kingdom had stated that it would be responsible for crushing the rebel régime. The majority of States Members of the United Nations had stressed the need for military force as the only way to put down the régime, but the

United Kingdom and other Western Powers had insisted that other methods could be used. The majority of Member States were doubtful, however, as to the sincerity of the United Kingdom Government's intentions to eliminate the Smith régime, and the continuance of the racist régime in Salisbury had proved that those doubts were justified. The present situation and the failure of the measures taken by the United Kingdom could only lead to the conclusion that certain Western countries with economic and political interests in southern Africa had, from the very beginning, wanted the sanctions to fail.

531. The majority of the Special Committee members, including his own delegation, had from the very beginning pointed out that economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia could be effective only if they were carried out by all countries. The racist régimes of Portugal and South Africa had, of course, ignored the decisions of the United Nations and given Southern Rhodesia full economic, moral and political assistance. In view of the circumstances, belief in the effectiveness of economic sanctions would be extremely naive. As the petitioners had confirmed, Southern Rhodesia continued to receive supplies; new industries were being established; more foreign investments were being made; and companies with capital from the West were continuing to co-operate. The fact that Southern Rhodesia had a two-year supply of oil was the best indication of the support received by the Smith régime.

532. In view of the failure of the measures taken, it was clear that only the use of military force could destroy the illegal racist régime. It would be quite in order to ask the United Kingdom Government what measures it intended to adopt since those which it had already taken had proved a failure. Judging from a statement by the United Kingdom Foreign Minister, Mr. Brown, to the Security Council on 8 December 1966, it would be logical to infer that the United Kingdom would in the end decide to use military force. But in view of the fact that there were no indications that the United Kingdom was ready to take such an action, his delegation felt that sponsors of the draft resolution on Southern Rhodesia were fully justified in recommending that the Security Council undertake the necessary measures under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. Reluctance to undertake extreme measures would jeopardize the prestige of the United Nations.

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533. The case of Southern Rhodesia had demonstrated that the action of the United Nations against racialism would not be effective in isolation. The Special Committee should, therefore, work out a series of measures to be undertaken in concert by all Member States against all racist régimes at the same time. Only thus would it be possible to prevent some racist Governments from helping other racist Governments. His delegation was confident that such action would finally end the growing danger in southern Africa and contribute to the removal of colonialism from the face of the earth.

534. The representative of Australia said Australia had been one of the first countries to impose economic sanctions on Southern Rhodesia after the illegal declaration of independence; its action had preceded Security Council resolution 217. His Government's policy was to oppose minority rule and the denial of basic democratic rights to the African population of Southern Rhodesia. It considered the present Government to be illegal and would support all peaceful measures to hasten the restoration of legal government. Australia would not consider equitable a situation in which any one group, majority or minority, imposed its will upon the other. In the Chairman's own thoughtful words: "The Europeans in Rhodesia must be prepared to live side by side with the Africans." In the words of the distinguished petitioner from Zanu, Australia would not consider equitable a situation in which any one group, be it large or small, imposed its will upon the other, denying it the elementary freedoms.

535. The Australian Government and people did not condone the practice of imprisoning one's political opponents, and condemned it even more severely when the opponent was denied the right of fair trial and had no recourse to due process of law based on the principle that all men were equal. His Government's opposition to the policy of apartheid, moreover, had been made clear on many occasions. It regarded the concept that one man was inherently inferior to another as quite untenable.

536. The representative of Italy said that the position of Italy on the question of Southern Rhodesia was very clear. The answers given by the petitioners had confirmed his delegation's concern about the situation created by the determination with which the Salisbury régime was persevering in its defiance of the United Nations and, according to the most recent news received, the progressive application of measures to enforce discrimination, apartheid, and the denial to the

African majority of the benefits of education, social welfare, justice and equal employment opportunities. That was why the Italian Government had had no hesitation, even before the mandatory decision of the Security Council, in taking action to ensure the economic isolation of the Salisbury régime when persuasion and negotiation had apparently failed.

537. The representative of Iraq said that the petitioners' statements had shown beyond any doubt that the strategy of the imperialist and racist régimes was to stand together economically, financially and militarily in the face of the powerful tide of nationalism in Africa, the Middle East and other parts of the world. It had also become obvious that the cause of freedom was the same in Angola, South West Africa, South Africa, Mozambique, Palestine, Aden, Oman and every other land where the forces of exploitation were striving to ensure their continued existence in the subjugated areas. The fact had also been established that the United Kingdom and its business-minded allies applied a double standard of behaviour and values in their relations with the oppressed peoples and with the United Nations itself. Some leading countries had mastered the art of hiding behind what was described as "private" activities in continuing the flow of capital and material support to the bastion of racism, prejudice and fascism in southern Africa. Such tactics had preserved that bastion and had practically nullified the effects of sanctions under a well-calculated plan of action. Seventy-two countries had already declared their support of sanctions and others were in the process of doing so, including all Southern Rhodesia's major trading partners. But the colonial Powers had turned about and made even greater investments in the areas subject to sanctions.

538. All means of bringing about a peaceful change had failed and force was the only possibility left. It was high time that all freedom-loving nations started thinking of boycotting the colonial Powers that continued to deal with the racist Governments. Those Powers needed the markets, natural resources and goodwill of the freedom-loving peoples: they should be shown that those peoples stood by their fundamental objectives, which could not be sacrificed. Those Powers should be made to realize their need of the assistance and co-operation of the freedom-loving peoples. Such action would require much sacrifice and self-denial but, together with the use of force and the local mobilization of national liberation movements, it could bring the day of victory much nearer. It was no use waiting any longer

for the imperialists and business-minded Powers to further the cause of freedom. Their assistance was only weighed against calculations of the material return on the transaction. Human misery and sufferings had no place in their ledger books or cash registers. He appealed to the liberation movements to work together in Africa, the Middle East and wherever the fight for freedom and independence was going on. He assured them of Iraq's total and continuous support until the day that the victory over colonialism, racism and all types of exploitation was won.

539. The representative of Tunisia said that he had already stated his Government's views on the question of Southern Rhodesia at a previous meeting. His delegation had been much interested to hear the evidence of the petitioners who had appeared before the Special Committee. It was grateful to them for the valuable information they had given and assured them of the Tunisian Government's support. Their evidence had confirmed that there must be urgent and effective action if the situation in Southern Rhodesia was to be rectified and if the 4 million Africans were to be given back the rights of which they had been illegally deprived by the white minority. The sanctions so far applied had proved ineffective. The endless negotiations with the Ian Smith government appeared to have encouraged it to harden its position and intensify its repressive measures. All the peaceful solutions recommended by the United Kingdom had been unworkable. Recourse to force seemed now to be the only way to rectify the situation so that a referendum, based on the principle of "one man, one vote", could be held in the Territory. Such a referendum would allow the majority to express their wishes and choose their future. The United Kingdom, which had consistently claimed responsibility for Southern Rhodesia, must take the measures necessary for the restoration of the rule of law. The resolution co-sponsored by his delegation did no more than describe the situation in Southern Rhodesia and recommend solutions which were still possible. All States Members of the United Nations, and more especially the developed countries, should bring pressure to bear on the United Kingdom so that it might finally take the steps required to restore order in Southern Rhodesia and enable the Zimbabwe people to recover their legitimate rights and exercise their sovereignty.

540. The representative of Venezuela said that he had already explained his delegation's position on the question of Southern Rhodesia: it had condemned the illegal racist minority régime of Ian Smith in the most categorical manner: it had spoken of the United Kingdom's responsibility, as administering Power, for the failure of the sanctions imposed by the Security Council, and had pointed to the flagrant violation of those sanctions by South Africa and Portugal. Venezuela had no relations whatever with the illegal régime and had applied, and would continue to apply, all the requisite measures, just as it would continue to support the fight of the Zimbabwe people for self-determination. In conclusion, he thanked the petitioners for the new evidence of colonial oppression they had provided. The importance his delegation attached to their statements was shown by the support it had given to the Chilean proposal that the records containing the petitioners' evidence should be sent to the Secretary-General for transmission to the Security Council. Venezuela unreservedly supported the people of Zimbabwe in its fight for liberation.

541. The representative of Madagascar said that the Malagasy people were closely following the course of events in Southern Rhodesia. The additional proofs furnished by the petitioners had strengthened the already strong case against the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia, which constituted a threat to international peace and security.

542. The policies of racial discrimination and segregation pursued in Southern Rhodesia, which rode roughshod over the rights and dignity of an entire people, had been unreservedly condemned by international opinion, as the resolutions of the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Special Committee amply demonstrated.

543. The peoples committed to peace and freedom were determined to support the Zimbabwe people in their heroic struggle. His delegation, in conjunction with the other delegations represented on the Special Committee, would spare no effort to seek appropriate ways and means to enable the Zimbabwe people to obtain their freedom and independence without delay.

544. The Malagasy Republic appreciated the United Kingdom's efforts to solve the Rhodesian problem at their true worth. His country had never believed in the efficacy of selective economic sanctions, and events had proved it right. The

sanctions were not being applied by all States, and in particular not by South Africa and Portugal. His delegation considered, moreover, that economic sanctions should also be taken against those two countries.

545. Now that it was realized that selective economic sanctions did not work, the United Kingdom Government should be asked to take immediately, by resorting to force if necessary, whatever action was needed to end the illegal Ian Smith régime and ensure the immediate implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

546. The Malagasy Republic had consistently advocated a policy of non-violence and had always favoured the peaceful settlement of colonial crises. In the case of Southern Rhodesia, however, no peaceful solution was possible, and there was thus no alternative but to resort to force. Furthermore, his Government was surprised at the present inertia of the United Kingdom Government, which, in other colonies, had no hesitation in using force to crush nationalist movements.

547. It was for the United Kingdom, and for no other country, to use force to crush the Rhodesian rebellion. The United Kingdom was entirely responsible for the situation in Southern Rhodesia and had a duty to lead the Zimbabwe people to independence.

548. The representative of the Ivory Coast said that his delegation considered the situation in Southern Rhodesia extremely serious and a threat to international peace and security. The United Kingdom itself had recognized that that was so by twice appealing to the United Nations for help in finding ways to ensure the effectiveness of the economic sanctions. Those appeals to the international community had seemed sincere, and there had been grounds for believing that the administering Power was ready to use all the means at its disposal to restore order in Southern Rhodesia. Unfortunately, developments had proved the contrary to be the case. The economic sanctions had not worked, and the Ian Smith régime even appeared to have strengthened its position. His delegation still believed that the Rhodesian problem was a matter for the United Kingdom to deal with, and it was surprised that the administering Power remained passive, displaying not the slightest intention of using other means.

V. ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

A. Consensus adopted by the Special Committee concerning recent developments in the Territory

549. At its 523rd meeting, on 6 June 1967, the representative of Chile referred to the statement by Mr. Chitepo (ZANU), particularly that part of the statement (see paragraphs 396-441) dealing with mandatory sanctions and a new system of apartheid in Southern Rhodesia and proposed that the Special Committee should draw the Security Council's attention to it and to the debate on it. The Council must be informed that, in many cases, the mandatory sanctions which it had decided to apply remained a dead letter. Moreover, the fact that Southern Rhodesia was promulgating legislation on apartheid similar to that in force in South Africa was a development with irreparable consequences.

550. He therefore asked whether the Special Committee was ready to adopt a formal resolution on the matter, or at least to take a majority decision on the three following possible courses of action: sending copies of the record of the petitioners' statements and of the debate on them to the Secretary-General of the United Nations; appealing to the administering Power to secure the immediate release of political prisoners in general, and Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Sithole in particular; and asking the administering Power to oppose the promulgation of legislation to institute apartheid. The adoption of those three courses of action would by no means preclude the Committee's taking a decision on the problem of Southern Rhodesia as a whole.

551. The representative of Venezuela endorsed the Chilean representative's proposal.

552. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania endorsed the remarks of the representative of Chile, and supported his very constructive proposal. It was high time that all evidence concerning the flouting of the Security Council's resolutions by countries which played lip-service to them was submitted to the Council. The evidence collected would help the Council to take effective measures and show which nations were adopting a hypocritical attitude and which were in favour of freedom and peace.

553. The Chairman suggested that the Special Committee might reach a consensus on the basis of the Chilean proposal which had been supported by the representatives of Venezuela and Tanzania.
554. The representative of Italy said that he would be willing to go along with that kind of proposal, which he thought might be useful.
555. The Chairman read out the text of a draft consensus on the question of Southern Rhodesia (see paragraph 564 below).
556. The representative of the United States of America supported by the representative of Australia said that his delegation could agree to the transmission of the records to the Security Council, but for practical reasons he would have to reserve its position on paragraphs 2 and 3. The United Kingdom Government was not in control in Southern Rhodesia and did not therefore have the power to secure the release of Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Sithole.
557. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania said that there was no question of challenging the right of any delegation to reserve its position. It was common knowledge, however, that the United Kingdom Government had always claimed sole responsibility for the situation in Southern Rhodesia. The consensus called directly upon the United Kingdom Government as administering Power, to take measures to ensure the release of all political prisoners. As long as the United Kingdom was the administering Power for Southern Rhodesia, it must be called upon to take those measures; no other country could be expected to do so.
558. The whole world had refused to recognize the illegal minority racist régime of Ian Smith and, if the United Kingdom Government did not take suitable action, it should be requested to join with the world community in taking effective measures to remedy the situation and to ensure the liberation of the African people in Southern Rhodesia.
559. The representative of Venezuela agreed with the representative of Chile that the release of political prisoners and the promulgation of laws on apartheid were matters within the exclusive purview of the administering Power, the United Kingdom.
560. The representative of Bulgaria asked for clarification of the United States representative's reservation. To whom was the Special Committee to address its appeal if not to the United Kingdom as administering Power.

561. The representative of the United States of America replied that he had not questioned the right or propriety of the Special Committee to reach a consensus or to transmit the records of its meetings to the Security Council; he had merely reserved his delegation's position, as had been done in the past. His reservation was based on the fact that it would be impracticable to address such an appeal to the United Kingdom Government, since that Government was no longer in control of affairs in Southern Rhodesia.

562. The representative of Italy said that his delegation construed paragraphs 2 and 3 of the proposed consensus as an appeal to the United Kingdom Government to do what it could to implement the Special Committee's request.

563. The representative of Finland said that he would like to associate himself with interpretation given by the representative of Italy.

564. On the basis of the proposal of the representative of Chile, the Special Committee, at its 523rd meeting, on 6 June 1967, adopted a consensus on the question of Southern Rhodesia, it being understood that the reservations expressed by some members would be reflected in the records of the meeting. The full text of the consensus adopted by the Special Committee at its 523rd meeting on 6 June 1967, reads as follows:

"The Special Committee,

"1. Decides to transmit to the President of the Security Council the records of its debates on the question of Southern Rhodesia, including the testimony submitted by the petitioners, following the conclusion of its consideration of that question;

"2. Urges the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to prevent the passage of the bill now before the so-called Parliament of the illegal racist minority régime, which would have the effect of entrenching apartheid policies in Southern Rhodesia;

"3. Appeals to the Government of the United Kingdom to ensure the release of all political prisoners and detainees held by the illegal racist minority régime, particularly Mr. Joshua Nkomo and the Rev. Ndabaninge Sithole."

565. The text of the consensus, together with the records of the debates on the question in the Special Committee, was transmitted to the President of the Security Council on 10 June 1967 (S/8006).

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B. Adoption of resolution on the question of Southern Rhodesia

566. At the 525th meeting, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, United Republic of Tanzania and Yugoslavia submitted a draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.407).

567. Introducing the thirteen-Power draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.407), the representative of Yugoslavia said that although the text was self-explanatory, he wished to comment briefly on the paragraphs that the sponsors considered to be of particular importance. Referring to the preamble, it appeared logical to the sponsors to regret the absence of the administering Power, namely the United Kingdom, from the present deliberations of the Committee, since the administering Power alone was responsible for the present situation in Southern Rhodesia and had an obligation to bring down the illegal régime in the Territory. It was also logical to recall General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), which was the basis of the Committee's deliberations, as well as all other relevant resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and the Security Council, and in particular Security Council resolution 232 (1966). With reference to operative paragraph 1, which reaffirmed the legitimacy of the people's struggle for their liberation, he recalled that the United Nations had on previous occasions confirmed that the struggle for liberation of the colonial peoples was both legitimate and justified. In the course of the Committee's meetings in Africa, many delegations and petitioners had underlined that point as being one of the most important ways in which the final liquidation of colonialism in Africa and other parts of the world could be achieved. Operative paragraphs 2 to 7 were directed to the United Kingdom as the administering Power in an effort to induce it to take the only effective action which the racists of Southern Rhodesia would understand, namely, military force. In formulating the draft resolution, the sponsors had been particularly mindful that all the measures so far taken to liquidate the illegal minority régime of Ian Smith had been in vain. Not only had the racist régime of white settlers not capitulated, but there was instead a growing body of evidence that it was doing everything possible to strengthen itself and to enlarge its arsenal of criminal and illegal policies. The main reason for such a situation was the failure and refusal of the administering Power to take effective action to bring down the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia. The sponsors considered that

the proposed measures constituted the minimum which the Committee could recommend to the General Assembly and the Security Council, and they therefore hoped that the draft resolution would obtain the full support of all members of the Committee. 568. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania said that the draft resolution recommended that the Security Council should take action under Chapter VII of the Charter. If the international community was to maintain its self-respect, action under Chapter VII was absolutely necessary.

569. He drew attention to operative paragraph 7 which called upon the administering Power, in any future consultation, to consult with the representatives of the African political parties and not with the illegal régime. To continue negotiating with the illegal régime would completely destroy the faith that people had in the rule of law.

570. The draft resolution reaffirmed the legitimacy of the struggle of the people of Zimbabwe and appealed to all States to render them moral and material support. In his delegation's view, such support should be of a kind that could help them in their armed struggle against the forces of colonialism and neo-colonialism.

571. The draft resolution would show the people of Zimbabwe who was really on their side. He appealed to all delegations to support it for, in doing so, they would be telling the illegal racist minority régime in Salisbury with one voice that the days of its suicidal policy were numbered.

572. The representative of Bulgaria suggested three amendments to the draft resolution for consideration by the co-sponsors.

573. First, the notion of a crime against humanity had been introduced during the general debate in the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly and had been included in General Assembly resolution 2189 (XXI) and into resolution 2184 (XXI) on Territories under Portuguese administration. He suggested that the same idea should be included in the resolution on Southern Rhodesia, possibly as a new operative paragraph 2, to read:

"Declares that the continuation of colonial rule and the practice of apartheid as well as all forms of racial discrimination and oppression in Southern Rhodesia constitute a crime against humanity".

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574. Second, the Secretary-General should be requested to take all necessary steps to ensure that the truth about the situation in Southern Rhodesia and the fight of the people of Zimbabwe for liberation was disseminated as widely as possible. Such a request might be included in a new paragraph 13 to read:

"Requests the Secretary-General to promote through the various organs and agencies of the United Nations the continuous and large-scale publicizing of the work of the United Nations concerning this question in order that world opinion may be sufficiently aware of the situation in the colonial Territory of Southern Rhodesia and of the continuing struggle for liberation waged by the people of Zimbabwe".

A similar text was contained in General Assembly resolution 2189 (XXI).

575. Thirdly, he suggested that operative paragraph 12 of the draft resolution should be supplemented to take into account some ideas put forward by representatives of the liberation movements and also of the consensus adopted at Kinshasa containing an appeal to the specialized agencies. The addendum might read:

"... in consultation with the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and, through it, with the national liberation movements in the colonial Territory of Southern Rhodesia".

576. The representative of Yugoslavia, speaking on behalf of the sponsors at a subsequent meeting, thanked the representative of Bulgaria for the three helpful and constructive suggestions he had made which the sponsors gladly accepted in principle. The revised text was contained in document A/AC.109/L.407/Rev.1, with some minor textual changes.

577. The representative of Bulgaria thanked the Yugoslav representative and the other sponsors of the draft resolution for adopting his suggestions, which was a further example of the friendly co-operation between the African and Asian countries and the socialist countries represented in the Special Committee.

578. The representative of Ethiopia said that the draft resolution, of which his delegation was a sponsor, covered all the points which the petitioners had so ably brought to the attention of the Special Committee, and he was convinced that its adoption would encourage efforts to alleviate the plight of the people of Zimbabwe.

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579. Several eminent spokesmen had appealed to the Zimbabwe nationalists to forget their differences and close their ranks in the face of the common enemy, but their appeals had gone unheeded. He, nevertheless, appealed to them once again to do so, if they wished their fight to be a successful one.

580. He thanked all the petitioners who had appeared before the Special Committee and assured them that the day of their liberation was not far off. They should redouble their efforts, strong in the knowledge that Africa and the whole freedom-loving world were behind them in their fight.

581. The representative of Chile said that the facts amply justified the strong language in which the draft resolution submitted by twelve members of the Special Committee was couched. His delegation therefore supported the draft resolution and congratulated the delegations sponsoring it.

582. The representative of Bulgaria said that the draft resolution reflected in a concise manner the position of the majority of States Members of the United Nations and also the demands of the Zimbabwe people. It reaffirmed the legitimacy of that people's fight for independence and, with the addition of the new operative paragraph 2, declared that racial discrimination and segregation in Southern Rhodesia constituted a crime against humanity. Reflecting the frequently expressed attitude of the majority of Member States, it declared that the United Kingdom Government bore full responsibility for the establishment of the Smith régime and called upon it to take all necessary measures to bring it down and to execute General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and the other relevant resolutions.

583. The draft resolution contained a very important new element which went to the heart of the matter: it condemned the foreign financial interests and international monopolies which, by supporting and assisting the illegal régime, were preventing the people of Zimbabwe from obtaining freedom and independence.

584. A major preoccupation of most delegations during the session at Kitwe had been the role of the United Nations specialized agencies in assisting the national liberation movements. His delegation had always been intensely interested in the problem and had frequently submitted suggestions concerning it. He was satisfied that paragraph 13 of the revised draft opened the way for the specialized agencies to assist the refugees from Zimbabwe, and all those suffering from oppression in connexion with the national liberation movement, through the

Organization of African Unity. At the same time, the paragraph would help the General Assembly to formulate clear directives and recommendations to the specialized agencies at its twenty-second session. Paragraph 14 reflected the general feeling of most delegations that the United Nations could do far more to publicize the situation in the colonial Territory of Southern Rhodesia and the fight for the liberation of Zimbabwe. The request to the Secretary-General could undoubtedly improve United Nations activities in that respect.

585. His delegation's position on the Southern Rhodesia problem was well known so it was unnecessary to elaborate on it further. The draft resolution, in its amended form, reflected his delegation's position on the problem and he therefore intended to vote for it.

586. The representative of Finland said that his delegation fully shared the aims of the sponsors of the draft resolution but had certain misgivings with regard to operative paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 11. Many speakers had advocated the use of force as the only means of solving the problem but, in the opinion of his Government, all international conflicts should be settled by peaceful means. Despite the seriousness of the situation, he could not believe that all possibilities of a peaceful solution were exhausted and did not think that the means the United Nations had at its disposal to impose mandatory economic sanctions should be completely discounted.

587. Paragraph 11 recommended that the Security Council should take the necessary measures under Chapter VII of the Charter. At a stage when the Security Council was about to begin its own study of the Southern Rhodesian problem, it would have been preferable, in his opinion, to submit the relevant information to the Council for its consideration rather than to make a recommendation. He would not go into further detail concerning his objections to other operative paragraphs, since time was short but regretted that his delegation would have to abstain from voting on the draft resolution as it stood.

588. The representative of Poland said that his delegation welcomed the draft resolution as amended to incorporate the suggestions made by the Bulgarian representative (A/AC.109/L.407/Rev.1). The time had come for the United Kingdom Government to crush the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia and to replace the racist 1961 Constitution by a new one based on universal suffrage. He wished, however, to make a slight suggestion for the modification of operative paragraph 4: the

words "without further delay" should be inserted in the second line after the word "power". The time factor was all the more important in view of the "Tiger conspiracy" which had clearly shown that Southern Rhodesia might be granted independence after a period of ten or fifteen more years. His delegation considered that the people of Zimbabwe should have been granted independence long before, at the same time and in the same manner as had been done, in the case of Zambia and Malawi, the other members of the former Federation.

589. He expressed his gratitude for the appreciative words used by the representative of Tanzania in commenting on the positive stand taken by the socialist countries with respect to colonialism and racialism in general and Southern Rhodesia in particular.

590. The representative of the United States of America said that his delegation supported the chief goal of the draft resolution and shared the deep concern at the apparently slow rate of progress towards it. However, as a responsible Member of the United Nations, his country believed that continued attempts must be made to find a solution by peaceful means. It did not feel that all peaceful means of solving the problem in Southern Rhodesia had been exhausted and for that reason and others his delegation would be obliged to abstain in the vote on the draft resolution. His Government would continue in the determined search for a just and peaceful solution. Its constant objective remained, in the words of President Johnson, "to open the full power and responsibility of nationhood to all the people of Rhodesia". The past fifteen years had witnessed remarkable progress towards self-determination and independence in Africa; his Government was convinced that that progress could and would not long be denied to the people of Southern Rhodesia.

591. The representative of the USSR said that his delegation supported the twelve-Power draft resolution and the Bulgarian amendments to it. The draft resolution could be improved by adding a provision concerning the political and military ties between Portugal, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, which were a threat to the neighbouring new African States.

592. The Security Council resolution of 16 December 1966, providing for economic sanctions against the racist régime, had proved ineffective and inadequate. That

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was the reason for operative paragraph 10 of the draft resolution, which condemned South Africa and Portugal in strong terms. It would be logical to add West Germany to the list, since it supported the racist policies of those countries and flouted United Nations decisions, thus pursuing a policy which was directly opposed to the interests of the peoples of Africa.

593. His delegation unreservedly supported operative paragraph 9 of the draft resolution which condemned the activities of those foreign interests which were preventing the people of Zimbabwe from attaining independence.

594. Although certain provisions of the draft resolution might usefully have been clarified or strengthened, his delegation was prepared to support the resolution since his country had always favoured the final elimination of colonialism and racism from the African continent.

595. The representative of Australia, explaining his delegation's position on the draft resolution, said his Government believed sincerely and earnestly that the possibilities of a peaceful solution to the Rhodesian problem had not yet been exhausted. He wondered whether the draft resolution was practical and whether it might not create more problems than it solved. It was also relevant that the Security Council would shortly be reconsidering the matter.

596. The natural strength and potentialities of Southern Rhodesia should be preserved. If force were employed at that stage, his delegation felt that it would involve such a great cost in lives, suffering and material damage that the country would take years to recover from it. Indeed, a number of petitioners had expressed the hope that bloodshed could be avoided. Moreover, the use of force would have as its inevitable aftermath an atmosphere of such bitterness, spreading far beyond the borders of Southern Rhodesia, that it would take generations to restore any semblance of inter-racial harmony. Was it not a corollary of the Special Committee's principal aim that the problem of colonialism should be solved in a manner that would enable every man to live in harmony with his fellows? Could any member view with equanimity a course of action that might destroy the prospects of such a solution for many years to come?

597. His delegation, while agreeing with many points in the draft resolution and sympathizing with the motives of the co-sponsors, felt compelled to vote against it. That did not mean, however, that his country was opposed to the exercise of the right of self-determination to the attainment of complete freedom.

by all the people of Southern Rhodesia. His delegation believed that freedom, equality and the full exercise of human dignity were the rights of all men everywhere, and this belief had been confirmed by the moving testimony of the petitioners.

598. The representative of Italy said that the draft resolution combined many of the provisions contained in General Assembly resolutions 2138 (XXI), 2151 (XXI) and 2189 (XXI), with some important additions referring to the use of force. At the Kitwe meetings, statements had been made by other delegations and by petitioners on the need for the use of force: some had asserted that the force should be applied by the United Kingdom, and others that it should be applied by the international community through the United Nations. Others again had advocated the stricter enforcement of sanctions. That had strengthened his delegation's conviction that, given the different views on future action, the most reasonable attitude would be not to prejudice in any way the debates in the Security Council or any ensuing decisions that it might adopt when it took up the question of Southern Rhodesia in a few weeks' time. He was not minimizing the value of the Special Committee's recommendations, but stressed that the Council, responsible under the Charter for the maintenance of peace and security, was in the best position to appraise the situation on the basis of the information supplied by the Committee. He had no doubt that the Council, whose present composition rightly reflected the membership of the United Nations and the weight of African opinion, would deal with the problem most effectively and decide on the appropriate measures.

599. That was why his delegation considered that the wording of operative paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 11 of the draft resolution was such that the Special Committee could not adopt them without limiting the Council's freedom of action. Moreover, it considered that those paragraphs would debar other methods which could still produce fruitful results; they even implied that negotiations should be regarded as an evil per se and something to be condemned.

600. His delegation could not accept the paragraph which declared colonial rule, racial discrimination, apartheid and oppression in Southern Rhodesia to be a crime against humanity, owing to the legal implications of the expression "crime against humanity". It could accept the wording as an expression of moral condemnation; from the legal standpoint, however, it was not in a position either to affirm or to

exclude that such policies pursued by a given country were a crime against humanity within the definition of such crimes by the Nuremberg Tribunal and the London Convention of 1946. It might be correct to affirm that some specific results of apartheid, such as genocide, aggression or cruel repression, fell within the definition of crimes against humanity. But it was not appropriate for a political body, such as the Special Committee, to take a decisive stand on a point of legal interpretation; that was a matter for an appropriate judicial body.

601. Those were the reasons why the Italian delegation was not in a position to vote for the draft resolution and would abstain. He deeply regretted that necessity since his delegation supported the principles of freedom, self-determination and respect for the fundamental rights of man which would be upheld unanimously by the Special Committee and by the United Nations.

602. The Chairman said that he did not agree that the adoption of paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 11 of the draft resolution would restrict the Security Council's freedom. Paragraph 14 of General Assembly resolution 2189 (XXI) "Requested the Special Committee to apprise the Security Council of developments in any Territory examined by the Committee which might threaten international peace and security and to make any concrete suggestions which might assist the Council in considering appropriate measures under the Charter of the United Nations". The relevant paragraphs of the draft resolution had been put forward as recommendations suggesting appropriate action which the Council might take. An identical paragraph condemning apartheid as a crime against humanity had been included in General Assembly resolution 2202 (XXI).

603. The representative of Iraq said that his delegation had sponsored the draft resolution because it thought it reflected the desires of the Zimbabwe people. His delegation hoped that the draft resolution provided the answers to the serious problems created for the international community by the continued existence of the racist Smith régime.

604. Operative paragraph 13 was of vital importance, since all the political groups with which the Special Committee had been in contact had stressed the need for help from the specialized agencies and other international organizations. That help should be provided in the shortest possible time because the effects of war, disease, illiteracy, etc., could not wait.

605. The representative of Venezuela said that the draft resolution coincided, generally speaking, with the Venezuelan delegation's position on the Southern Rhodesian régime, which it regarded not only as illegal but also as contrary to the basic principles of the civilized world. It would therefore vote for the draft resolution on the understanding that the reservations entered by his delegation in respect of paragraph 8 of General Assembly resolution 2151 (XXI) also applied to it.

606. Venezuela was opposed to the unilateral use of force owing to the bitter experience of Latin America in that connexion. It would agree, however, with such a measure if ordered by the competent body, i.e., the Security Council, in which case it would be multilateral action carried out by the United Nations in accordance with the explicit provisions of the Charter.

607. The representative of the Ivory Coast said that the provisions of the draft resolution before the Special Committee represented the minimum that the Zimbabwe people were entitled to expect. The draft resolution as a whole, and more especially operative paragraphs 3, 5 and 7, did no more than remind the United Kingdom of the precise extent of its responsibilities. His delegation hoped that the draft resolution would be adopted by a large majority and that the voice of the international community would be heeded so that justice might be done in that part of Africa.

608. At its 528th meeting, the Special Committee adopted the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.407/Rev.1) as orally revised, by a roll-call vote of 17 to 1, with 3 abstentions as follows:

In favour: Bulgaria, Chile, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.

Against: Australia.

Abstaining: Finland, Italy, United States of America.

609. The text of the resolution on Southern Rhodesia (A/AC.109/248) adopted by the Special Committee at its 528th meeting on 9 June 1967, reads as follows:

"The Special Committee,

"Having considered the question of Southern Rhodesia,

"Having heard the statements of the petitioners,

"Regretting the absence of the representatives of the administering Power

"Recalling General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

"Recalling further all the relevant resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, by the Security Council and by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia,

"Recalling further that the situation in Southern Rhodesia has been declared by the Security Council in resolution 232 (1966) of 16 December 1966 as constituting a threat to international peace and security,

"Recalling further that the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland has declared, on several occasions, that the racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia is illegal, and that it would not negotiate with that régime on the future of Southern Rhodesia, and that the Government of the United Kingdom has also declared that it would not grant independence until majority rule is established in the Territory,

"1. Reaffirms once again the legitimacy of the struggle of the people of Zimbabwe for the achievement of their inalienable right to freedom and independence;

"2. Condemns the policies of racial discrimination and segregation practised in Southern Rhodesia, which constitute a crime against humanity;

"3. Deplores the failure and the unwillingness of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to take effective measures, in its capacity as the administering Power, to bring down the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia;

"4. Reaffirms the obligation of the administering Power to transfer power without further delay to the people of Zimbabwe on the basis of elections conducted according to the principle of "one man, one vote";

"5. Expresses its conviction that sanctions, in order to bring about the downfall of the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia, must be comprehensive and mandatory and backed by force on the part of the administering Power;

"6. Further reaffirms that the only effective and speedy way of bringing down the rebellion in the Territory is through the use of force by the administering Power;

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"7. Calls once again upon the Government of the United Kingdom to take immediately all necessary measures, including the use of force, to put an end to the illegal racist minority régime of Southern Rhodesia and to ensure the immediate application of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and other relevant resolutions;

"8. Considers that any future consultations undertaken by the administering Power to determine the future of Southern Rhodesia must be carried out with representatives of the African political parties and not with the illegal régime;

"9. Condemns the activities of those foreign financial and other interests which, by supporting and assisting the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia and their exploitation of the human and material resources of the Territory, are preventing the African people of Zimbabwe from attaining freedom and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), and calls upon the Governments of the States concerned to take all necessary measures to bring to an end such activities;

"10. Condemns in the strongest terms the policies of the Governments of South Africa and Portugal of continued support for the illegal racist minority régime in blatant defiance of the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions;

"11. Urges all States, as a matter of urgency, to render all moral and material assistance to the national liberation movements of Zimbabwe through the Organization of African Unity;

"12. Recommends to the Security Council, in accordance with its decision contained in resolution 232 (1966) of 16 December 1966, and, in particular, paragraph 1 thereof, to take the necessary measures under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations;

"13. Appeals to the specialized agencies concerned and other international assistance organizations to aid and assist the refugees from Zimbabwe and those who are suffering from oppression by the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia in consultation with the Organization of African Unity and through it with the national liberation movements in the colonial Territory of Southern Rhodesia;

"14. Requests the Secretary-General to promote through the various organs and agencies of the United Nations the continuous and large-scale publicizing of the work of the United Nations concerning this question, in order that world public opinion may be sufficiently aware of the situation in the colonial Territory of Southern Rhodesia and of the continuing struggle for liberation waged by the people of Zimbabwe;

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"15. Calls upon the administering Power to report on its actions in the implementation of the present resolution to the Special Committee;

"16. Decides to keep the question of Southern Rhodesia on its agenda."

610. The text of the resolution was transmitted to the President of the Security Council on 13 June 1967 (S/8005).
