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**Seventy-first session**

Agenda item 134

**Programme budget for the biennium 2016-2017**

## **Estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council**

**Thematic cluster I: special and personal envoys and special advisers of the Secretary-General**

**Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen**

**Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General for Conflict Prevention, including in Burundi**

**Report of the Secretary-General**

### *Summary*

The present report contains the proposed resource requirements for the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen, and for the Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General for Conflict Prevention, including in Burundi, for 2017, amounting to \$27,414,400 net (\$29,489,400 gross).

The General Assembly is requested to approve the 2017 budgets for these two Offices and to appropriate an additional amount of \$28,385,700 (net of staff assessment) under section 3, Political affairs, after taking into account the estimated overexpenditure in 2016 amounting to \$971,300, and an amount of \$2,075,000 under section 36, Staff assessment, to be offset by a corresponding amount under income section 1, Income from staff assessment, of the programme budget for the biennium 2016-2017.



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## I. Special political missions

### A. Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen

*(\$15,487,300)*

#### **Background, mandate and objective**

1. Since the beginning of the uprising in Yemen in early 2011, the Secretary-General has used his good offices to promote peace and stability through dialogue and negotiations. In its resolutions [2014 \(2011\)](#), [2051 \(2012\)](#), [2140 \(2014\)](#), [2201 \(2015\)](#), [2204 \(2015\)](#) and [2216 \(2015\)](#), the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to continue and to intensify his good offices role. The Council receives regular briefings on Yemen in accordance with the current 60-day reporting cycle.

2. To ensure the full and effective implementation of Security Council resolutions [2014 \(2011\)](#) and [2051 \(2012\)](#), together with the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative and its Implementation Mechanism, the Secretary-General established the Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Yemen (see also [S/2015/283](#) and [S/2015/284](#)) in accordance with an exchange of letters with the President of the Security Council in June 2012 ([S/2012/469](#) and [S/2012/470](#)). As requested by the Yemeni parties, that Office supported the implementation of the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative and its Implementation Mechanism through political mediation and facilitation efforts and by promoting the inclusive participation of all constituencies in the political transition.

3. Since the establishment of the Office of the Special Envoy in 2012, the United Nations has provided support for the Yemeni-led political transition process and has promoted inclusive participation, including of previously marginalized groups, such as youth movements, women's groups, the Hiraak Southern movement and the Houthi movement. With the support and facilitation provided by the United Nations, Yemenis concluded a National Dialogue Conference in January 2014, which brought together 565 delegates from all the regions and political groupings of Yemen. The outcome document of the National Dialogue Conference provided a blueprint for the creation of a new federal State underpinned by a commitment to democracy, good governance, the rule of law, national reconciliation and respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all the people of Yemen. A constitution drafting commission was created in order to draft a new constitution based on the outcomes of the National Dialogue Conference.

4. Despite important progress in the political transition, conflicts between government forces, the Houthis and other armed groups over the draft constitution and power-sharing arrangements led to an escalation of military violence in mid-2014. Agreements brokered by the former Special Adviser notwithstanding, the Houthis and allied units of the armed forces seized control of Sana'a and other parts of the country in September 2014 and over the ensuing months.

5. The United Nations facilitated numerous rounds of negotiations in an attempt to resolve the political impasse, but these efforts were insufficient to halt the escalation of military confrontations. In March 2015, Houthi-allied air force units bombed the presidential palace in Aden, where President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi had taken refuge after fleeing Sana'a. At the request of the President, a coalition of

countries led by Saudi Arabia intervened militarily on 26 March 2015 in order to secure the return of the Government. Ground fighting between Houthi and allied forces against Government of Yemen forces and allied militias intensified and spread, triggering a humanitarian emergency. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and other such terrorist groups have actively exploited the absence of security on the ground, extending their control over significant areas and conducting frequent attacks against government and civilian targets in many areas.

6. In its resolution [2216 \(2015\)](#), the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to intensify his good offices role in order to enable the resumption of a peaceful, inclusive, orderly and Yemeni-led transition. Since then, the Special Envoy has facilitated successive rounds of consultations aimed at obtaining a negotiated settlement to end the conflict and resume the political transition process, including direct talks in Switzerland in June and December 2015, and in Kuwait from April to August 2016.

7. Despite these efforts by the United Nations, fighting continues between various parties throughout the country, including along the border between Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Concurrently, attacks claimed by Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and the Islamic State, as well as counter-insurgency operations against those groups, continue in southern Yemen where the overall security situation remains highly volatile.

8. To alleviate the humanitarian situation and create an environment conducive to the talks, a cessation of hostilities facilitated by the Special Envoy came into effect on 10 April 2016. In addition, the Special Envoy assisted the parties in establishing the De-escalation and Coordination Committee, a United Nations-supported body composed of military representatives from the parties directly involved in the military conflict. It aims to promote communication between the parties and to strengthen adherence to the cessation of hostilities. To complement the work of the Committee, local de-escalation committees were established in the six most conflict-affected governorates to provide additional support for the cessation of hostilities.

9. In the statement of 25 April 2016 by the President of the Security Council ([S/PRST/2016/5](#)), the Council called upon all Yemeni parties to develop a road map for the implementation of interim security measures, especially at the local level, withdrawals, the handover of heavy weapons, the restoration of State institutions and the resumption of political dialogue in line with relevant Security Council decisions, the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative and its Implementation Mechanism, and the outcomes of the comprehensive National Dialogue Conference. The Council also requested the Secretary-General to present a plan outlining how the Office of the Special Envoy could support the next phase of its work with the parties, in particular to support the elements set out above.

10. The response of the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council dated 24 May 2016 ([S/2016/488](#)), of which the Council took note in its letter dated 26 May 2016 ([S/2016/489](#)), set out a proposal to strengthen the Office of the Special Envoy to provide expanded support to the Yemeni-Yemeni talks and to the implementation of the resultant agreements. The Office would undertake the following main functions:

(a) Lead United Nations assistance in the peace talks in the provision of facilitation and technical advice on the negotiation and design of: (i) interim security arrangements, including the formation of security committees, the negotiated withdrawal of militias and armed groups and the orderly handover of heavy weapons to the State; (ii) the restoration of State institutions, including respect for the legally established lines of authority and the removal of any obstructions to the proper functioning of State institutions; and (iii) preparations for the resumption of political dialogue, including agreements for finalizing and adopting the draft constitution, undertaking electoral reform and holding general elections;

(b) Lead United Nations assistance with regard to expanded facilitation and the provision of technical advice to the Yemeni parties with the aim of ensuring greater respect for and compliance with the cessation of hostilities, including through support for the De-escalation and Coordination Committee, local committees and additional local mechanisms;

(c) Lead United Nations assistance for the implementation of initial stages of agreements concluded through negotiations and to plan and prepare for United Nations support for the implementation of more comprehensive agreements.

11. The overall aim of the Office is to provide support to the Yemen peace process, the cessation of hostilities (through the de-escalation and coordination mechanisms) and the implementation of agreements resulting from the peace process so as to enable the resumption of a peaceful, inclusive, orderly and Yemeni-led transition.

#### **Cooperation with other entities**

12. The Department of Political Affairs of the Secretariat is responsible for providing substantive backstopping support to the Office of the Special Envoy.

13. The Department of Field Support of the Secretariat will continue to provide strategic guidance on field support issues relating to the Office in Yemen and in Amman. Advice on safety and security for the Office, as well as for other United Nations entities in Yemen, is regularly obtained from the Department of Safety and Security of the Secretariat. The Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia and other United Nations offices in the region provide support through the provision of close protection security officers to supplement the existing close protection team, on an ad hoc, cost-reimbursable basis, if a surge in these requirements occurs. The Kuwait Joint Support Office will continue to provide transactional support in the areas of finance, human resources and travel.

14. In fulfilling its tasks, the Office of the Special Envoy works closely with United Nations departments, agencies, funds and programmes, as well as the Resident Coordinator and the United Nations country team in Yemen. System-wide information-sharing and coordination at the working and senior levels is organized through meetings of the Inter-Agency Task Force on Yemen.

15. In implementing the Secretary-General's good offices role, the Special Envoy and his Office engage closely with Member States and the Security Council, as well as international and regional organizations, including the League of Arab States, the Gulf Cooperation Council and other international partners.

16. Work on the draft constitution, electoral reform and other transition tasks are to be conducted in close coordination with the Electoral Assistance Division in the Department of Political Affairs, the Resident Coordinator and the United Nations country team.

**Performance information**

17. The establishment of the mission in Yemen in mid-2012 enabled the launch of the transition process through political facilitation, monitoring and the provision of technical expertise.

18. An important achievement was the successful conclusion of the inclusive National Dialogue Conference in January 2014. It established the framework and principles for the creation of a new federal and democratic State and allowed for the launch of the constitution-making process. With the facilitation and mediation efforts of the Special Envoy, the Constitution Drafting Committee reached consensus on a first draft of the new constitution, submitted to the national body for oversight of the implementation of the National Dialogue Conference outcomes in January 2015, for review and approval in the future.

19. Subsequent steps necessary to finalize the draft constitution, including public consultations, the adoption of the constitution, the amendment of relevant electoral legislation and preparations for elections, remain pending. It is expected that extensive political debate and intensive mediation efforts by the Special Envoy would be required. Following the breakdown of the political transition and military escalation in early 2015, these activities are expected to commence as soon as an agreement to end the military confrontations is concluded.

20. Throughout the period since the escalation of the conflict, the Special Envoy has been engaged in efforts to promote a peaceful, negotiated settlement. Mediation activities to enable the resumption of a peaceful, inclusive, orderly and Yemeni-led political transition process that meets the legitimate demands and aspirations of the people have included bilateral and multilateral consultations with local, regional and international stakeholders as well as the facilitation of direct talks between the Yemeni parties (Geneva in June 2015; Biel, Switzerland, in December 2015; and Kuwait City from April to August 2016). The Special Envoy facilitated two agreements on the cessation of hostilities in December 2015 and April 2016 and the establishment of the De-escalation and Coordination Committee and local de-escalation committees for overseeing its implementation. During the Kuwait talks, he supported a working group on the release of prisoners and facilitated agreement among the warring parties on the formation of key bodies for the implementation of a peace agreement. Mediation efforts continue in order to finalize the details and sequencing of a comprehensive peace agreement.

**Planning assumptions for 2017**

21. Since the conclusion of the Kuwait talks, the Special Envoy has been engaged in extensive consultations with the Yemeni parties, the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council and the wider international community. Subsequently, he presented the Yemeni parties with a draft road map that addresses security and political arrangements consistent with the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative and its Implementation Mechanism, the outcomes of the comprehensive National

Dialogue Conference and the relevant Security Council resolutions. The road map contains a set of sequenced political and security steps, to be implemented in parallel, which would help Yemen to return to an inclusive, peaceful and orderly Yemeni-led transition. Further consultations and negotiations would be required to build on the road map presented by the Special Envoy in order to reach a comprehensive negotiated settlement.

22. It is expected that the engagement of the Security Council will remain active and high, including regular reporting requirements to the Council (every 60 days). The reports are presented to the Council by the Special Envoy, and, given the expected challenges to the peace process, frequent ad hoc briefings by the Special Envoy can be anticipated.

23. The Office will continue to mediate between the Yemeni parties to the conflict in an effort to facilitate a negotiated settlement based on the road map. The parties are expected to continue to need substantial support in the negotiations with the design of mechanisms and processes that will form part of an agreement or series of agreements to end the conflict, including with regard to ceasefire monitoring, the withdrawal of forces and the handover of heavy weapons, the establishment of other interim security arrangements, the restoration of State institutions and the resumption of the political transition process (finalizing and adopting a draft constitution, undertaking electoral reform, holding general elections).

24. The Office will continue to support the parties in the De-escalation and Coordination Committee, and at the governorate level, the local de-escalation committees. They will continue to need substantial technical and facilitation support to ensure the effective functioning of the bodies in order for the committees to contribute to a de-escalation of fighting and the strengthening of the cessation of hostilities. While the Yemeni parties are expected to remain committed in principle to the cessation of hostilities, it is likely to be fragile and periodically strained by tensions in the talks and military confrontations. The De-escalation and Coordination Committee will be based in Dhahran Al-Janoub, Saudi Arabia.

25. The security conditions in Yemen are expected to remain very challenging for United Nations staff, such that the Office and most of its staff will be based outside of Yemen with periodic travel to Yemen, as and when required, and as security and operational conditions permit. In his letter dated 24 May 2016 addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2016/488), the Secretary-General expressed his intention to move the Office of the Special Envoy from New York to Amman. From there it would serve as an initial hub for the provision of support to Yemeni parties and operations in Yemen. The presence of the Office in Sana'a would remain limited initially, but would increase over time as the security and operational conditions permit to enable more effective monitoring and reporting on the situation, as well as closer engagement with the Yemeni interlocutors, particularly in connection with the peace process, activities in support of the cessation of hostilities and the early implementation of agreements resulting from the peace talks.

26. Military operations against violent extremists will continue. Extremist groups will continue to present a hostile threat to United Nations personnel and other actors. The threat to the safety and security of staff will therefore be very high in areas where such risks exist, and the freedom of movement of staff outside of Sana'a will be greatly constrained. The implications of both the nature of the

evolving security concerns and the principle of local ownership will require that the Office will adopt an approach that supports the Yemeni parties mainly through the provision of technical advice and facilitation assistance on the negotiation and design of elements for eventual agreement or agreements, the functioning of de-escalation mechanisms and the implementation of the resulting agreements.

27. The expansion of the Office of the Special Envoy resulted from calls by the Security Council, in its presidential statement of 25 April 2016 (S/PRST/2016/5), for the Secretary-General to present a plan, within 30 days, to strengthen the Office to provide support to the Yemen peace process, the cessation of hostilities and the implementation of agreements resulting from the peace process so as to enable the resumption of a peaceful, inclusive, orderly and Yemeni-led transition. In his response (S/2016/488), the Secretary-General outlined a plan that included the necessary strengthening of capacity as well as the relocation of the Office's headquarters from New York to Amman. The Security Council responded on 26 May 2016 (see S/2016/489), acknowledging the plan.

28. Subsequent efforts to strengthen the Office of the Special Envoy have been staged in line with progress in the design and facilitation of the negotiations of peace agreements and efforts to reduce the levels of violence in Yemen. The Special Envoy and his team are currently leading intensive bilateral consultations with both parties to the conflict and with other stakeholders in the region and beyond. This includes negotiations on interim security measures and the extension of the United Nations-brokered cessation of hostilities, which came into effect on 19 October, so as to create a conducive environment for a long-lasting peace in the country.

29. To fulfil the new responsibilities and tasks endorsed by the Security Council, the Office of the Special Envoy will require additional staff with expertise in political mediation and facilitation, electoral affairs, ceasefire, disengagement, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and other security sector issues. The increase in these requirements would put a strain on the existing mission support staff and safety and security capacities that would require augmentation in order to support the good offices of the Secretary-General.

30. The Special Envoy will travel regularly to Yemen and to the region to maintain close contact with all stakeholders, including the President, the Prime Minister, the Government (based in Riyadh since March 2015), all political parties, the Houthis, the Southern Hiraak movement and other key stakeholders, including women's groups, the youth movement and civil society.

31. The need for the Special Envoy to engage frequently with regional actors will remain. Regular visits to the region are expected, including to the capitals of several countries, in support of international engagement and coordination.

32. The objective, expected accomplishments, indicators of achievement, and performance measures of the Office are set out below.



**Table 1**  
**Objective, expected accomplishments, indicators of achievement and performance measures**

*Objective:* Inclusive peace process in Yemen is advanced, while levels of violence are reduced

| <i>Expected accomplishments</i>   | <i>Indicators of achievement</i>   |          | <i>Performance measures</i> |                |                |
|---|--|----------|-----------------------------|----------------|----------------|
|   |  |          | <i>2017</i>                 | <i>2016</i>    | <i>2015</i>    |
| (a) A negotiated solution is agreed that meets the legitimate will of the Yemeni people | (i) Agreement on the road map signed by both parties to the conflict   | Target   | Yes                         | Not applicable | Not applicable |
|   |  | Estimate |                             | No             | Not applicable |
|   |  | Actual   |                             |                | No             |
|   | (ii) Number of meetings of representatives of parties to the conflict in an inclusive and comprehensive process (bilateral meetings, facilitated talks)                            | Target   | 50                          | Not applicable | Not applicable |
|   |  | Estimate |                             | 50             | Not applicable |
|   |  | Actual   |                             |                | 10             |
|   | (iii) Number of instances of technical advice provided on the negotiation and design of elements for the road map or initial agreement (capacity-building, options papers)         | Target   | 50                          | Not applicable | Not applicable |
|   |  | Estimate |                             | 50             | Not applicable |
|   |  | Actual   |                             |                | 10             |
|   | (iv) Number of cases in which women, youth and civil society organizations are meaningfully included in the political process (memberships in political bodies, capacity-building) | Target   | 80                          | Not applicable | Not applicable |
|   |  | Estimate |                             | 30             | Not applicable |
|   |  | Actual   |                             |                | 5              |

*Outputs*

- Regular engagement and consultations and provision of technical advice on the negotiation and design of interim security arrangements, including the formation of security committees, the negotiated withdrawal of militias and armed groups and the orderly handover of heavy weapons to the State (100)
- Consultations and provision of technical advice on the restoration of State institutions, including respect for the legally established lines of authority and the removal of any obstructions to the proper functioning of State institutions (40)
- Consultations and technical advice on the resumption of the political dialogue, including agreements for finalizing and adopting the draft constitution, undertaking electoral reform and holding general elections (60)

| <i>Expected accomplishments</i>           | <i>Indicators of achievement</i>  |          | <i>Performance measures</i> |                |                |
|---|---|----------|-----------------------------|----------------|----------------|
|   |   |          | <i>2017</i>                 | <i>2016</i>    | <i>2015</i>    |
| (b) Strengthened cessation of hostilities | (i) Number of reported hostilities decreases  | Target   | Yes                         | Not applicable | Not applicable |
|   |   | Estimate |                             | Yes            | Not applicable |
|   |   | Actual   |                             |                | No             |
|   | (ii) Number of technical support initiatives provided to relevant security committees and local mechanisms (capacity-building, advisory products) | Target   | 100                         | Not applicable | Not applicable |
|   |   | Estimate |                             | 100            | Not applicable |
|   |   | Actual   |                             |                | 5              |

*Outputs*

- Assistance with regard to expanded facilitation and technical advice to the Yemeni parties with the aim of ensuring greater respect for and compliance with the cessation of hostilities, including through support for security committees and additional local mechanisms (50)

### External factors

33. The objective is expected to be achieved provided that there is sufficient political will, support and engagement from the various stakeholders and there is continued support from the international community.

### Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 2  
Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

| Category                 | 1 January-31 December 2016 |                       |                  |                    | Requirements for 1 January-31 December 2017 |                            |                      |  |
|--------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------|------------------|--------------------|---|----------------------------|----------------------|--|
|                          | Appropriation              | Estimated expenditure | Variance         | Appropriation 2016 | Total requirements                          | Non-recurrent requirements | Variance (2017-2016) | Net requirements for 2017 <sup>a</sup> |
|                          | (1)                        | (2)                   | (3)=(1)-(2)      | (4)=(1)            | (5)   | (6)                        | (7)=(5)-(4)          | (8)=(5)-(3)                            |
| Civilian personnel costs | 3 804.8                    | 4 480.4               | (675.6)          | 3 804.8            | 8 912.9                                     | –                          | 5 108.1              | 9 588.5                                |
| Operational costs        | 2 925.3                    | 3 436.0               | (510.7)          | 2 925.3            | 6 574.4                                     | 1 382.0                    | 3 649.1              | 7 085.1                                |
| <b>Total</b>             | <b>6 730.1</b>             | <b>7 916.4</b>        | <b>(1 186.3)</b> | <b>6 730.1</b>     | <b>15 487.3</b>                             | <b>1 382.0</b>             | <b>8 757.2</b>       | <b>16 673.6</b>                        |

<sup>a</sup> Net requirements after taking into account the estimated underexpenditure or overexpenditure for 2016.

Table 3  
Positions

|               | Professional and higher categories |     |     |     |     |     |     |     | General Service and related categories |                         |                 | National staff      |                  |             | United Nations Volunteers | Total |
|---------------|------------------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|--|-------------------------|-----------------|---------------------|------------------|-------------|---------------------------|-------|
|               | USG                                | ASG | D-2 | D-1 | P-5 | P-4 | P-3 | P-2 | Subtotal                               | Field/ Security Service | General Service | Total international | National Officer | Local level |                           |       |
|               | Approved 2016                      | 1   | –   | 1   | –   | 4   | 5   | 3   | –                                      | 14                      | 13              | 1                   | 28               | 2           |                           |       |
| Proposed 2017 | 1                                  | 1   | –   | 4   | 8   | 18  | 14  | –   | 46                                     | 27                      | 2               | 75                  | 8                | 30          | –                         | 113   |
| <b>Change</b> | –                                  | 1   | (1) | 4   | 4   | 13  | 11  | –   | 32                                     | 14                      | 1               | 47                  | 6                | 21          | –                         | 74    |

34. The anticipated overexpenditure for 2016 is attributed mainly to additional requirements for international and national staff costs, as well as operational costs, to facilitate the implementation of Security Council resolution 2216 (2015), and of the recent consideration by the Council of the Secretary-General's proposal to strengthen the Office of the Special Envoy and to provide expanded support to the Yemeni-Yemeni peace talks and to the implementation of the resultant agreements. The additional expenditures are covered through a commitment authority concurred to by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions on 3 October 2016 in the amount of \$1,186,300 under the terms of General Assembly resolution 70/250. Appropriation for the expenditures against the commitment authority will be sought in the context of the overall requirements for special political missions for the biennium 2016-2017.

35. The estimated requirements for the Office of the Special Envoy for 2017 amount to \$15,487,300 (net of staff assessment) and will provide for civilian personnel (\$8,912,900) comprising salaries and common staff costs for international staff (\$8,168,800); national staff (\$744,100); and operational costs (\$6,574,400), including official travel (\$1,059,800); facilities and infrastructure (\$2,814,400); ground transportation (\$1,194,700); air transportation (\$192,800); communications (\$260,700); information technology (\$375,900); medical (\$40,200); and other supplies, services and equipment (\$635,900).

36. The total proposed staffing complement for the Office of the Special Envoy for 2017 includes a total of 113 positions, including 74 proposed new positions, with 49 positions based in Amman, 57 positions based in Sana'a, 2 positions based in Kuwait and 5 positions based in New York. In relation to the implementation of Security Council resolution 2216 (2015), and in the outline presented by the Secretary-General in his letter (S/2016/488), it is proposed that 74 new positions be established.

37. The Office of the Special Envoy proposes the following changes:

(a) Proposed new positions — 74 positions (47 international staff and 27 national staff):

*Proposed establishment of 39 new substantive positions, including:*

- (i) Three D-1 (2 positions based in Amman and 1 position based in Sana'a);
- (ii) Four P-5 (3 positions based in Amman and 1 position based in Sana'a);
- (iii) Seven P-4 (5 positions based in Amman and 2 positions based in Sana'a);
- (iv) Six P-3 (3 positions based in Amman and 3 positions based in Sana'a);
- (v) Three Field Service, based in Amman;
- (vi) Five National Professional Officer, based in Sana'a;
- (vii) Eleven Local level (6 positions based in Amman and 5 positions based in Sana'a);

*Proposed establishment of seven new security-related positions, including:*

- (i) Five positions (1 P-4, 1 P-3, 2 Field Service and 1 Local level), based in Sana'a;
- (ii) Two positions (1 Field Service and 1 Local level), based in Amman;

*Proposed establishment of 25 new mission support-related positions, including:*

- (i) One D-1, based in Amman;
- (ii) Four P-4, based in Amman;
- (iii) Three P-3 (2 positions based in Amman and 1 position based in Sana'a);
- (iv) Eight Field Service (5 positions based in Amman and 3 positions based in Sana'a);
- (v) One National Professional Officer, based in Amman;
- (vi) Eight Local level (4 positions based in Amman, 2 positions based in Sana'a and 2 positions based in Kuwait);

*Proposed establishment of three new backstopping-related positions, based in New York, including:*

One P-4, one P-3 and one General Service (Other level);

(b) Proposed redeployment (locations) for the following positions:

(i) From New York to Amman: four substantive positions (1 Under-Secretary-General, 1 P-5, 1 P-4 and 1 P-3);

(ii) From Sana'a to Amman: three substantive positions, including two positions (1 P-5 and 1 P-4) and one position to mission support (1 Field Service);

(c) Proposed reclassification and redeployment:

Proposed reclassification of one D-2 position to the level of Assistant Secretary-General and the redeployment of the same position from Sana'a to Amman;

(d) Proposed establishment of new substantive sections, including the Office of the Chief of Staff, the Office of the Deputy Head of Mission, the Security Sector Section and the Public Information Section, to meet the requirements of the Office of the Special Envoy.

38. The outline presented by the Secretary-General to the Security Council in his letter ([S/2016/488](#)) also indicated his intention of moving the Office of the Special Envoy for Yemen from New York to Amman. From Amman, the Office of the Special Envoy would serve as a staging ground to provide support to the Yemeni parties and operations in Yemen, with a forward presence in Sana'a. A presence in Sana'a would remain limited initially, but would increase over time as the security situation and operational conditions permit. The Secretary-General also indicated that the expanded Office of the Special Envoy would require staff with expertise in political mediation and facilitation, electoral affairs, ceasefire, disengagement, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and other security sector issues, and the accompanying administrative, security and support services. Two substantive support positions (1 P-4 and 1 General Service (Other level)) of the Office of Special Envoy will continue to remain in New York to support the Office by engaging with the Security Council, Member States and other stakeholders in New York.

### **Substantive positions**

39. Under the substantive component, the establishment of 39 new positions (3 D-1, 4 P-5, 7 P-4, 6 P-3, 3 Field Service, 5 National Professional Officer and 11 Local level) is proposed, increasing the existing substantive staffing complement from the existing 16 positions approved for 2016 to 54 proposed positions in 2017, and an outward redeployment of 1 position (Field Service) from the Office of Political Support in Sana'a to the Office of the Chief of Mission Support in Amman. It is also proposed that following new sections be established: the Office of the Chief of Staff; the Office of the Deputy Head of Mission; the Security Sector Section; and the Public Information Section. Noting the challenges that the Office of the Special Envoy is expected to address in terms of its complex mandate and difficult political and operating environment, it is proposed that the position of Director of Political Affairs (D-2) be reclassified to the level of Assistant Secretary-

General, as the Deputy Head of Mission. It is also proposed that a position of Chief of Staff (D-1) be established to ensure cohesion and coordination in strategic planning and operations across the mission components. A position of Principal Security Sector Reform Officer (D-1) is proposed to head the Security Sector Section and a position of Principal Political Affairs Officer (D-1) is proposed to head the Political Affairs Section.

#### **Security-related positions**

40. Under the security-related staffing, the Office of the Special Envoy proposes the establishment of seven new positions (1 P-4, 1 P-3, 3 Field Service and 2 Local level), increasing the security-related staffing complement from 13 positions approved for 2016 to 20 positions in 2017. The proposed establishment of seven additional positions relate to (a) facilities protection, consisting primarily of vehicle and pedestrian searches at access control points; (b) the provision of close protection to the Head of Mission and other senior United Nations officials in Yemen; and (c) other activities to ensure the best safety and security for the personnel, operations and assets.

#### **Mission support-related positions**

41. Under the mission support component, the Office of the Special Envoy proposes the establishment of 25 new positions (1 D-1, 4 P-4, 3 P-3, 8 Field Service, 1 National Professional Officer and 8 Local level) and an inward redeployment of one position (1 Field Service) from the Office of Political Support in Sana'a to the Office of Chief Mission Support in Amman, increasing the mission support-related staffing complement from 10 positions approved for 2016 positions to 36 proposed positions in 2017.

42. It is proposed that one new position of Chief of Mission Support (D-1) be established to head the mission support component, reflecting the level of operational risk and complexity of the Office's operations, spread across multiple locations with challenging operating parameters. Furthermore, the civil strife and the breakdown of government institutions pose administrative and logistical challenges in scaling up operations in Yemen. Additional positions are proposed to be established in the areas of administration, human resources, procurement, finance, communications and information technology, movements and transport. These positions are required to support the Office of the Special Envoy in its operations and activities in Amman and Sana'a. The provision of a mission support component will be based on the principles of a light, flexible multifunctional footprint, integrated delivery of mission support with the United Nations country team inside Yemen and continued reliance on the Kuwait Joint Support Office to provide support for transactional human resources, travel and finance. In continuing the Office's small footprint for administrative services, two new Local level positions in finance and human resources are proposed to be established to continue transactional support by the Kuwait Joint Support Office. Core human resources and finance responsibilities are location-dependent and are proposed to be established within the mission support component of the Office of the Special Envoy. The positions proposed under communications and information technology took into account the remote delivery of services that can be provided by both the Middle East Regional Information and Communications Technology Services and the

United Nations Global Service Centre in Brindisi, Italy, and Valencia, Spain. The proposal also took into consideration all services that are location-dependent and require the presence of expert personnel in situ, such as on-site network administration, information and communications technology, security, videoconferencing services, user support, radio programming and interaction with local providers. The proposed staffing was made in order to address the minimum operational requirements necessary for the smooth conduct of operations, including establishing the operational resilience of the mission.

#### **Backstopping-related positions**

43. It is also proposed that three backstopping positions (1 P-4, 1 P-3 and 1 General Service (Other level)) be established in New York, including (a) two positions in the Department of Field Support (1 position of Human Resources Officer (P-4) and 1 position of Acquisition Planning and Logistics Officer (P-3)) to provide Headquarters-based guidance efforts for the Office of the Special Envoy in the areas of human resources and logistics; and (b) one position of Programme Budget Assistant (General Service (Other level)) in the Programme Planning and Budget Division of the Department of Management to ensure the provision of timely and adequate support in the review and preparation of budgetary documents and the monitoring of budget utilization by special political missions.

44. The variance (increase) between the proposed resources for 2017 and the approved budget for 2016 is attributable to (a) the proposed establishment of 74 positions (47 international staff and 27 national staff); (b) an increase under facilities and infrastructure, including for the rental of premises; alteration and renovation services, to meet the minimum operating safety standards and seismic-standard requirements; and the acquisition of prefabricated facilities, generators and water treatment equipment for the new office spaces; and (c) the acquisition of vehicles for the Office of the Special Envoy; offset in part by the decrease under air transportation, including requirements for special chartered flights and official travel costs, as the Special Envoy would be based in the region in 2017.

#### **Extrabudgetary resources**

45. In 2016, extrabudgetary resources estimated at \$437,000 have been utilized to support the Office of the Special Envoy to assist in the strategic planning for the mission's added responsibilities and tasks. In 2017, necessary funding amounting to \$666,000 has been secured to provide support to the De-escalation and Coordination Committee and the negotiations on security arrangements.

### **B. Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General for Conflict Prevention, including in Burundi**

*(\$11,927,100)*

#### **Background, mandate and objective**

46. The political and security situation in Burundi remains precarious. The Security Council has expressed concern about the persisting political crisis, as well as an increase in reported cases of violations and abuses of human rights, including

acts of torture, arbitrary arrests and detentions, the restriction of fundamental freedoms, as well as the indiscriminate use of grenade attacks, especially against civilians. The attendant socioeconomic and humanitarian consequences are severe. More than 315,000 refugees have fled the country since the onset of the crisis in April 2015.

47. The Security Council visited Burundi twice in less than a year (March 2015 and January 2016). There have also been visits by the Secretary-General, a delegation of five African Union Heads of State and, in late June 2016, a delegation of the African Union Peace and Security Council. Despite this high-level diplomatic attention, the political crisis in the country remains unresolved.

48. On 6 July 2015, the East African Community designated the President of Uganda as mediator of the inter-Burundi dialogue. On 2 March 2016, the former President of the United Republic of Tanzania was nominated by the East African Community to facilitate the mediation, with the aim of convening a genuine and inclusive dialogue process to forge an agreement between the Burundian stakeholders to end the crisis. Initial dialogue meetings took place in Entebbe, Uganda, on 28 December 2015 and in Arusha, United Republic of Tanzania, from 21 to 24 May and from 12 to 14 July 2016.

49. In its resolution [2248 \(2015\)](#), the Security Council welcomed the decision by the Secretary-General to appoint a special adviser to work with the Government of Burundi and other concerned stakeholders, as well as subregional, regional and other international partners, in support of an inclusive Burundian dialogue and the peaceful resolution of the conflict, and in support of national efforts to build and sustain peace.

50. In the same resolution, the Council requested the Secretary-General to deploy a team in Burundi to coordinate and work with the Government of Burundi, the African Union and other partners to assess the situation and develop options to address political and security options.

51. In his letter dated 1 December 2015 addressed to the President of the Security Council ([S/2015/926](#)), the Secretary-General presented options for a future United Nations presence in the country, which included the deployment to Burundi of a multidimensional integrated peacekeeping operation under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, or a fully-fledged integrated special political mission.

52. In its resolution [2279 \(2016\)](#), the Security Council requested the Secretary-General, through the good offices of his Special Adviser, to support the inter-Burundian dialogue and, in that regard, to coordinate and work with the East African Community-led, African Union-endorsed Mediator and his Facilitator, as well as with the high-level delegation from the African Union, and to provide technical and substantive support to the mediation. Following the announcement of the launch of the East African Community dialogue to start on 21 May 2016 in Arusha, the Office of Special Adviser has undertaken discussions with the Community to establish a joint East African Community-African Union-United Nations mechanism to support the process.

53. In its resolution [2279 \(2016\)](#), the Security Council also requested the Secretary-General to enhance the United Nations engagement in Burundi through

strengthening the team of the Special Adviser in order to work with the Government of Burundi and other concerned stakeholders to support the inter-Burundian dialogue, and in the areas of security and rule of law.

54. At the request of the Security Council, on 15 April 2016, the Secretary-General submitted options for the deployment of a United Nations police contribution to increase the United Nations capacity to monitor the security situation, promote the respect for human rights and advance the rule of law (see [S/2016/352](#), annex). The options included a police protection and monitoring presence (approximately 3,000 personnel), a police monitoring presence (228 personnel), and a police assessment presence (20 to 50 personnel).

55. On 29 July 2016, the Security Council adopted resolution [2303 \(2016\)](#), in which it authorized the deployment of a United Nations police component under the authority of the Office of the Special Adviser. The police component has an authorized ceiling of 228 individual police officers to be deployed in Bujumbura and throughout the country, with the mandate to monitor the security situation and support the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in monitoring violations and abuses of human rights.

56. In the same resolution, the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to carry out a risk assessment and, on the basis of that assessment, take the steps necessary for the protection of United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, including the United Nations police component in Burundi.

57. In the resolution, the Security Council also requested the Secretary-General to swiftly implement the strengthening of the Office of the Special Adviser, as referred to in paragraph 10 of resolution [2279 \(2016\)](#) and paragraph 7 of resolution [2248 \(2015\)](#), by substantially increasing the number of political officers in Burundi in order to carry out the following tasks: (a) engage with all stakeholders to the crisis, including the Government, opposition, political parties, civil society, religious leaders and others; (b) provide substantive support to the inter-Burundian dialogue; and (c) work with all Burundian parties to develop confidence-building measures to improve the human rights and security situation, and foster an environment conducive to political dialogue.

58. In the resolution, the Council further requested additional reporting, including quarterly reports of the Secretary-General on the situation in Burundi, including on any public incidents of incitements to hatred and violence, and on possible adaptations of the United Nations police component, as well as immediate written reports, as necessary, on grave security incidents, violations of international humanitarian law and violations or abuses of human rights.

#### **Cooperation with other entities**

59. The Office of the Special Adviser liaises and coordinates with United Nations regional political offices, including the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa, the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region and the United Nations Office to the African Union to ensure adequate support to regional and subregional initiatives on Burundi. The Office also closely cooperates with the Peacebuilding Commission Configuration on Burundi, OHCHR



and the Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide, to promote coherence on Burundian political issues.

60. The Office of the Special Adviser collaborates closely with the office of the United Nations Resident Coordinator and the United Nations country team in Burundi. Where appropriate, synergies have been found with ongoing programmes and projects that are relevant to the implementation of the mandate of the Office. In particular, the Special Adviser continues to rely on technical advice and support from the OHCHR country office to ensure that the respect for human rights is mainstreamed into all activities.

61. In its resolution 2303 (2016), the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to develop options to enable the United Nations to facilitate the deployment of African Union human rights and military observers and modalities for cooperation between the United Nations police component, under the authority of the Office of the Special Adviser, and the African Union observers. At the Headquarters level, the Special Adviser has regularly chaired the Inter-Agency Task Force on Burundi, which includes representatives of all relevant Secretariat departments and United Nations agencies, funds and programmes. The Special Adviser has convened coordination meetings with the numerous international envoys to Burundi, as well as with regional and subregional partners based in Addis Ababa and elsewhere.

62. To promote efficiency and avoid duplication, the staff members of the Office of the Special Adviser deployed in Burundi is serviced by the Regional Service Centre in Entebbe. The small office support team deployed in Bujumbura supports the day-to-day administrative and logistical needs of the team, undertaking those functions that cannot be performed remotely and providing an administrative link with the Regional Service Centre.

### **Performance information**

63. The Special Adviser's team deployed to Burundi in January 2016. The team started working in the country, building relations with the key stakeholders. The Office of the Special Adviser has received full cooperation from the Government and other stakeholders. On 24 January 2016, the President of Burundi wrote to the President of the Security Council to indicate that he had given instructions to the officials of the national authorities concerned to make themselves available to the Special Adviser and to cooperate closely with his team in order to jointly determine the assistance required to support the inclusive national dialogue process and efforts in the areas of disarmament, security, human rights and development.

64. The Office of the Special Adviser has established a close working relationship with the Office of the East African Community Facilitator and discussed technical and substantive support to the mediation. The former President of the United Republic of Tanzania convened a dialogue session with Burundian stakeholders from 21 to 24 May, with the aim of reaching a decision on the agenda, venue and participation in the process. The Government of Burundi, former presidents of Burundi and representatives of political parties and civil society organizations, including religious groups, attended the dialogue session. However, not all key stakeholders participated in the meeting. The Office of the Special Adviser is

expected to continue to provide technical and substantive support for additional dialogue sessions projected to take place during the remainder of 2016.

65. Following a series of high-level visits from, respectively, the Security Council, an African Union delegation of four sitting presidents and one prime minister, and the United Nations Secretary-General, to Burundi in the first quarter of 2016, there is significant international support for the East African Union-led, African Union-endorsed mediation and for the conduct of an inclusive and genuine inter-Burundian dialogue.

66. On 23 February 2016, during the Secretary-General's visit, the President of Burundi announced that the Government would release political prisoners, allow two independent media stations to resume operations, and suspend the arrest warrants of some opposition figures. These measures are viewed as important confidence-building measures to promote dialogue. The Office of the Special Adviser, in collaboration with OHCHR, continues to monitor their implementation.

67. In response to a request from the Security Council in its resolution [2279 \(2016\)](#), the Secretary-General, on 15 April 2016, provided options for the deployment of a police contribution in Burundi, as detailed above. The Council subsequently adopted resolution [2303 \(2016\)](#), in which it authorized the deployment of up to 228 individual police officers to be deployed in Bujumbura and throughout the country.

#### **Planning assumptions for 2017**

68. The Office of the Special Adviser has developed its support plan to the political dialogue process, on the basis of consultations with key stakeholders in Burundi and in the region, as well as with the East African Community and the African Union, and drawing on lessons learned from previous dialogue initiatives in Burundi and elsewhere. The plan identifies preparatory steps, options for format, participation and agenda as well as modalities for providing technical and substantive support.

69. The Office of the Special Adviser has also developed its workplan for 2016, which sets out the deliverables, timelines and division of responsibilities, relating to the assessment of the situation, supporting dialogue and engaging on security issues, and ensuring complementarity with regional partners.

70. The Office of the Special Adviser will reinforce its capacity to support the East African Community-led, African Union-endorsed mediation, particularly in the key areas of substantive and thematic expertise, conference services and public information.

71. The Office of the Special Adviser will also regularly review its analysis, including in support of contingency plans, consistent with resolutions [2248 \(2015\)](#) and [2279 \(2016\)](#), to enable the international community to respond to any further deterioration in the situation. The Office will reinforce the quality and scope of its analysis and outreach through the deployment of political officers to the local offices of the country team in Gitega, Ngozi and Makamba to monitor the situation and engage with local actors.

72. Major cost drivers that would affect planning include logistics arrangements, more frequent travel within Burundi, the region and internationally, as required, as

well as other staff and operational costs to meet the requirements of the mandate as the Burundi political dialogue progresses. Cost drivers are also associated with plans to move to a new compound in Bujumbura in 2016.

73. The support component will continue to ensure timely management and coordination and the provision of administrative and technical support for the successful implementation of the mandate of the Office of the Special Adviser. The Office will ensure the effective use of videoconferencing services to reduce the cost of travelling and benefit through the remote training services provided by United Nations Headquarters, the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi and the United Nations Support Base in Valencia. The Office will continue to utilize the supply chain, cashier, finance, and procurement services of the Regional Service Centre in Entebbe as much as applicable in order to exploit the capabilities and expertise of the Centre.

74. The objective, expected accomplishments, indicators of achievement and performance measures of the Office are set out below.

**Table 4**  
**Objectives, expected accomplishments, indicators of achievement and performance measures**

*Objective:* To support the Government of Burundi and other stakeholders in establishing a credible and inclusive political dialogue process that is nationally owned, while security and rule of law institutions are strengthened.

| Expected accomplishments   | Indicators of achievement   |          | Performance measures |      |      |
|--|---|----------|----------------------|------|------|
|  |   |          | 2017                 | 2016 | 2015 |
| (a) Establishment of a credible and inclusive political dialogue process that is nationally owned and internationally accepted   | (i) Agreement on process, structure and timeline for a political dialogue process   | Target   | Yes                  | Yes  |      |
|  |   | Estimate |                      | No   |      |
|  |   | Actual   |                      |      |      |
|  | (ii) Dialogue sessions are convened with the participation of key stakeholders  | Target   | 6                    | 4    |      |
|  |   | Estimate |                      | 4    |      |
|  |   | Actual   |                      |      |      |
|  | (iii) Key international and regional partners jointly support the process   | Target   | Yes                  | Yes  |      |
|  |   | Estimate |                      | No   |      |
|  |   | Actual   |                      |      |      |
| (b) Successful maintenance of political interaction between United Nations and Burundian counterparts with the goal of promoting respect for the Constitution and the Arusha Agreement | (i) Efforts are undertaken by the United Nations to work with all Burundian parties to develop confidence-building measures to engage in political dialogue   | Target   | Yes                  |      |      |
|  |   | Estimate |                      | Yes  |      |
|  |   | Actual   |                      |      |      |
|  | (ii) The Security Council receives regular reports by the Secretary-General on the implementation of applicable resolutions and is informed immediately, as necessary, on grave security incidents, violations of international humanitarian law and violations or abuses of human rights | Target   | Yes                  |      |      |
|  |   | Estimate |                      | Yes  |      |
|  |   | Actual   |                      |      |      |

*Outputs*

- Promotion of a political solution to the Burundian crisis with key stakeholders through visits to Burundi and regional countries (6)
- Meetings with the African Union and the East African Community, with a view to operationalizing a joint mechanism in support of the Burundian dialogue process (6)
- Provision of support to the joint mechanism in the areas of substantive and thematic expertise, conference services and public communications
- Coordination meetings chaired together with international partners to develop consensus on international responses (12)
- Consultations with national authorities, political parties and civil society organizations, including representatives of women and youth groups and media outlets, to engage all segments of Burundian society in the national dialogue process (6)
- Provision of advice to national authorities and other stakeholders on issues pertaining to the national dialogue
- Briefings to the Security Council, the General Assembly and other relevant United Nations bodies, as well as to regional organizations, on the political and security situation in Burundi and the efforts of the Special Adviser (6)
- Public awareness-raising initiatives for the Burundian population, including public information activities that stress the importance of political dialogue and an end to violence and human rights violations
- Consultations with national authorities to raise concerns relating to the security and rule of law situation (10)
- Consultations with national authorities on measures to enhance accountability and to mainstream human rights (10)
- Meetings with political parties and civil society organizations, including representatives of women, youth and media, to ensure that their security concerns are taken into consideration (6)
- Meetings with representatives of national security and defence forces to identify risks and seek appropriate solutions (12)
- Meetings with representatives of national security and defence forces to integrate gender into the security and defence architecture (12)
- Coordination meetings with bilateral and multilateral partners that are undertaking security sector programming to ensure coherence in approaches (12)

**External factors**

75. The objective is expected to be achieved provided that there is no delay in or failure of the East African Community-led dialogue process, no withdrawal of cooperation from the Government of Burundi and no deterioration in the security situation that would reduce the ability of the Office of the Special Adviser to operate in Burundi; and there is continuing support from the international community.

**Resource requirements (regular budget)**

Table 5

**Financial resources**

(Thousands of United States dollars)

| Category                 | 1 January-31 December 2016 |                       |              | Requirements for 1 January-31 December 2017 |                    |                            |                      |  |
|--------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------|--------------|---|--------------------|----------------------------|----------------------|--|
|                          | Appropriation              | Estimated expenditure | Variance     | Appropriation 2016                          | Total requirements | Non-recurrent requirements | Variance (2017-2016) | Net requirements for 2017 <sup>a</sup> |
|                          | (1)                        | (2)                   | (3)=(1)-(2)  | (4)=(1)                                     | (5)                | (6)                        | (7)=(5)-(4)          | (8)=(5)-(3)                            |
| Civilian personnel costs | 3 202.8                    | 3 289.8               | (87.0)       | 3 202.8                                     | 5 555.1            | –                          | 2 352.3              | 5 642.1                                |
| Operational costs        | 4 560.9                    | 4 258.9               | 302.0        | 4 560.9                                     | 6 372.0            | 426.8                      | 1 811.1              | 6 070.0                                |
| <b>Total</b>             | <b>7 763.7</b>             | <b>7 548.7</b>        | <b>215.0</b> | <b>7 763.7</b>                              | <b>11 927.1</b>    | <b>426.8</b>               | <b>4 163.4</b>       | <b>11 712.1</b>                        |

<sup>a</sup> Net requirements after taking into account the estimated underexpenditure or overexpenditure for 2016.

Table 6  
Positions

|               | <i>Professional and higher categories</i> |            |            |            |            |            |            |            | <i>General Service and related categories</i> |                                |                        | <i>National staff</i>          |                         |                    | <i>United Nations Volunteers</i> | <i>Total</i> |
|---------------|---|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|---|--------------------------------|------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------|----------------------------------|--------------|
|               | <i>USG</i>                                | <i>ASG</i> | <i>D-2</i> | <i>D-1</i> | <i>P-5</i> | <i>P-4</i> | <i>P-3</i> | <i>P-2</i> | <i>Subtotal</i>                               | <i>Field/ Security Service</i> | <i>General Service</i> | <i>Subtotal inter-national</i> | <i>National Officer</i> | <i>Local level</i> |                                  |              |
| Approved 2016 | 1   | –          | 1          | 2          | 6          | 6          | 2          | –          | <b>18</b>                                     | 7                              | 1                      | <b>26</b>                      | 2                       | 5                  | –                                | <b>33</b>    |
| Proposed 2017 | 1   | –          | 1          | 2          | 8          | 13         | 4          | –          | <b>29</b>                                     | 12                             | 2                      | <b>43</b>                      | 3                       | 7                  | –                                | <b>53</b>    |
| <b>Change</b> | –   | –          | –          | –          | <b>2</b>   | <b>7</b>   | <b>2</b>   | –          | <b>11</b>                                     | <b>5</b>                       | <b>1</b>               | <b>17</b>                      | <b>1</b>                | <b>2</b>           | –                                | <b>20</b>    |

76. The unencumbered balance in 2016 reflects mainly (a) a reduction in travel owing to a lower tempo of political discussions; (b) a limited movement of staff by ground transportation as the result of a heightened security situation in the region; and (c) a delay in the deployment of communications assets owing to the prioritization of the deployment of assets to Bujumbura and postponing deployment to the regions, offset in part by an increase under civilian personnel as the result of actual vacancy rates for all categories of positions that are lower than budgeted.

77. The proposed resources for 2017 for the Office of the Special Adviser amount to \$11,927,100 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for the salaries and common staff costs for the continuation of 33 positions and the proposed establishment of 20 additional positions (1 Under-Secretary-General, 1 D-2, 2 D-1, 8 P-5, 13 P-4, 4 P-3, 12 Field Service, 2 General Service, 3 National Officer, 7 Local level) (\$5,555,100), as well as for operational costs (\$6,372,000), comprising consultants (\$370,600), official travel (\$1,797,000), facilities and infrastructure (\$2,049,100), ground transportation (\$364,300), communications (\$589,200), information technology (\$550,400), medical (\$247,200), and other supplies, services and equipment (\$404,200).

78. The Security Council, in its resolution 2303 (2016), requested the Secretary-General to swiftly implement the strengthening of the Office of the Special Adviser by substantially increasing the number of political officers in Burundi and to carry out a risk assessment and, on the basis of that assessment, take the steps necessary for the protection of United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, including the United Nations police component in Burundi. Accordingly, the Office of the Special Adviser for 2017 proposes to include a total of 20 new positions (2 P-5, 7 P-4, 2 P-3, 5 Field Service, 1 General Service (Other level), 1 National Professional Officer and 2 Local level).

### New York

79. Three new positions (1 P-4, 1 P-3 and 1 General Service (Other level)), to be based in New York, are proposed for the Office of the Special Adviser, for planning for a United Nations police contribution and analysis of information. Furthermore, one new position (P-3), to be located in the Africa I Division of the Department of Political Affairs, is proposed to provide backstopping support to the Office of the Special Adviser.

**Burundi — Office of the Head of Office**

80. One new position (National Professional Officer), to be based in Burundi, is proposed for the protocol function and liaison with national counterparts.

**Burundi — Dialogue Support Unit**

81. Five new positions (1 P-5 and 4 P-4), to be based in Burundi, are proposed for the purpose of coordination, mediation support, and presence in three regional offices (Gitega, Ngozi and Makamba) for engaging with local-level stakeholders.

**Burundi — Security and Rule of Law Unit**

82. Five new positions (1 P-5, 2 P-4 and 2 Field Service), to be based in Burundi, are proposed for the Security and Rule of Law Unit, for liaising with the Government of Burundi and other stakeholders and advising on the development, implementation and evaluation of rule-of-law activities in line with international norms and standards, information analysis related to security and the rule of law.

**Burundi — Mission Support Section**

83. Three new positions (1 Field Service and 2 Local level), to be based in Burundi, are proposed for managing transport and maintenance, and administrative and information technology support.

**Burundi — Staff Security and Safety Unit**

84. Two new positions of Security Officer (2 Field Service), based in Burundi, are proposed for strengthening the Staff Security and Safety Unit and liaising with the Department of Safety and Security of the United Nations Secretariat in order to apply the standards of the United Nations Security Management System in Burundi.

**Redeployment (between locations)**

85. It is proposed that two Political Affairs Officers (1 P-5 and 1 P-4) of the Mediation Support Team be redeployed from Nairobi to Burundi. The Mediation Support Team contributes to efforts of the Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General for Conflict Prevention, including in Burundi, to provide technical and substantive support to the mediation.

86. The variance (increase) between the requirements for 2017 and the approved budget for 2016 is attributable mainly to (a) the proposed increase in the number of positions; (b) the recruitment of additional consultants; (c) the increase of official travel owing to a growth in the number of expected consultations and dialogue meetings; (d) the increased number of locations that the rental of premises have to be provided for; (e) the acquisition of new information technology equipment; and (f) the usage of information technology personnel that are contracted internationally and locally.

**Extrabudgetary resources**

87. No extrabudgetary resources were available in 2016 or are projected for 2017 for the Office.

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## II. Action requested of the General Assembly

88. The General Assembly is requested:

(a) To approve the budgets for the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen and the Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General for Conflict Prevention, including in Burundi, for 2017 amounting to \$27,414,400, net of staff assessment;

(b) To appropriate, under the procedures provided for in paragraph 11 of annex I to resolution [41/213](#), an additional amount of \$28,385,700 (net of staff assessment) under section 3, Political affairs, of the programme budget for the biennium 2016-2017, after taking into account the estimated overexpenditure in 2016 amounting to \$971,300;

(c) To appropriate an amount of \$2,075,000 under section 36, Staff assessment, to be offset by a corresponding amount under income section 1, Income from staff assessment, of the programme budget for the biennium 2016-2017.

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