

UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL
ASSEMBLY



Distr.
GENERAL

A/6300/Add.3 (Part I)*
8 November 1966

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Twenty-first session
Agenda item 67

REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE SITUATION WITH REGARD
TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF
INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES

(covering its work during 1966)

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CHAPTER V (Part I)

TERRITORIES UNDER PORTUGUESE ADMINISTRATION

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* This document contains part I of the chapter on Territories under Portuguese administration. The general introductory chapter of the report of the Special Committee will be issued subsequently under the symbol A/6300. Other chapters of the report are being issued as addenda.

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I. ACTION TAKEN IN 1965 BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL, THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

1. The Special Committee considered the Territories under Portuguese administration in May and June 1965 during its visit to Africa and again in October at Headquarters.
2. During the first part of its consideration the Special Committee heard a number of petitioners from Angola, Mozambique and Guinea under Portuguese administration. It also considered the situation of refugees from these Territories and measures taken to extend medical and other assistance to them by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and specialized agencies concerned in response to the Committee's resolution of 1964.^{1/}
3. The Special Committee on 10 June 1965 adopted a resolution (A/6000/Add.3) by which it reaffirmed the right of the population of the African Territories under Portuguese administration to self-determination and independence and recognized the legitimacy of their struggle to achieve the rights laid down in the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and appealed to all States to grant the African populations of these Territories the moral and material support necessary for the restoration of their inalienable rights. It also requested the High Commissioner for Refugees and the specialized agencies of the United Nations to increase their assistance to the refugees from those Territories. The Special Committee drew the urgent attention of the Security Council to the continued deterioration of the situation in the Territories under Portuguese administration as well as to the consequences of the threats made by Portugal against the independent African States that border upon its colonies.
4. The Secretary-General transmitted the text of the resolution, together with the records of the meetings held by the Committee on this question, to the President of the Security Council on 17 June 1965 (S/6460).
5. Continuing its discussions on the Portuguese Territories in October, the Special Committee had before it a report submitted by Sub-Committee I. This report had been prepared in accordance with a resolution adopted by the Special Committee on 3 July 1964 (A/5800/Rev.1, chapter V, para. 352) by which the latter had, among

^{1/} Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annex, Annex No. 8 (A/5800/Rev.1), chapter V, para. 352.

other things, requested the Sub-Committee, with the assistance of the Secretary-General, to study foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence in the Territories under Portuguese administration. On 28 October the Special Committee adopted the report of Sub-Committee I and endorsed its observations and conclusions. The Special Committee dealt with this matter in its report to the General Assembly (A/6000/Add.3, Part II) to which it annexed the report of Sub-Committee I, together with the two background papers prepared by the Secretariat for Sub-Committee I, on mining activities and concession, occupation and land settlement in Territories under Portuguese administration.

6. By letter dated 28 July 1965, the representatives of thirty-two Member States requested the Security Council to take up the question concerning the situation in Territories under Portuguese administration (S/5347). The Security Council discussed this question at eight meetings and on 23 November adopted resolution 218 (1965). Recalling General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1961, the Council affirmed "that the situation resulting from the policies of Portugal, both as regards the African population of its colonies and the neighbouring States seriously disturbs international peace and security". Once again, it deplored the failure of the Government of Portugal to comply with the previous resolutions of the Council and the General Assembly and to recognize the right of the peoples of the Territories to self-determination. It reiterated an urgent demand to Portugal to take steps towards granting independence to all the Territories under its administration in accordance with the aspirations of the peoples. The Council again requested all Member States to refrain from offering assistance to Portugal which would enable it to continue its repression of the peoples of the Territories and to take measures to prevent not only the sale and supply of arms and military equipment to the Portuguese Government for this purpose, including the sale and shipment of equipment and materials for the manufacture and maintenance of arms and ammunition to be used in the Territories. It asked all Members to inform the Secretary-General on measures they have taken towards the implementation of this provision.

7. As in its 1963 resolution, the Council requested the Secretary-General "to ensure the implementation of the provisions of this resolution, to provide such assistance as he may deem necessary" and to report to the Security Council not later than 30 June 1966.

8. The Fourth Committee of the General Assembly considered the question of the Territories under Portuguese administration on the basis of the Special Committee's report (A/6000/Add.3, Parts I and II) and two reports (A/5783 and Add.1 and A/6076 and Add.1-2) by the Secretary-General on the special training programme for those Territories.

9. On the recommendation of the Fourth Committee the General Assembly, on 21 December 1965, adopted resolution 2107 (XX) by which, in addition to reaffirming its previous resolutions and recommendations, it appealed to all States, "in co-operation with the Organization of African Unity, to render to the people of the Territories under Portuguese administration the moral and material support necessary for the restoration of their inalienable rights"; condemned the policy of the Government of Portugal which violates the economic and political rights of the indigenous population by the establishment on a large scale of foreign immigrants in the Territories and by the exporting of workers to South Africa; requested all States to prevent such activities on the part of their nationals in the foreign financial interests which are an impediment to the attainment by the peoples of their legitimate rights of freedom and independence. The General Assembly urged Member States separately or collectively to take the following actions:

(a) Break off diplomatic and consular relations with the Government of Portugal or refrain from establishing such relations;

(b) Close their ports to all vessels flying the Portuguese flag or in the service of Portugal;

(c) Prohibit their ships from entering any ports in Portugal and its colonial territories;

(d) Refuse landing and transit facilities to all aircraft belonging to or in the service of the Government of Portugal and to companies registered under the laws of Portugal;

(e) Boycott all trade with Portugal.

It also requested the Security Council to consider putting into effect against Portugal the appropriate measures laid down in the Charter for the purpose of carrying out its resolutions concerning the Territories under Portuguese administration.

II. INFORMATION ON THE TERRITORIES

A. The Territories in general

1. Constitutional and political

10. Since the repeal of the Native Statute in 1961 a series of legislative changes has been introduced to complete the institutional framework for the political and economic integration of the Overseas Territories with Portugal. With the publication in 1964 of the decree (No. 45,830, 25 July) increasing the membership of the Corporative Chamber, the envisaged constitutional transformation providing for "greater intervention of the Provinces in the direction of national policy" has been completed.

11. As will be seen below the Portuguese Government considers that Portugal and the Overseas Territories constitute one "pluri-continental and multi-racial nation" and that there can no longer be any discussion of a change in the relationship between them. In an interview on 4 August 1965, Prime Minister Salazar explained his Government's policy as follows:

"We could only agree to self-determination for the Overseas Territories, in the sense in which it is at present understood, if those Territories were to choose their destiny as a nation or their form as a State. The position is, however, that as a result of the integration which has been a principle of Portugal's overseas policy for centuries, those Territories as a whole already form a nation and a sovereign State. To admit at every time of political crisis that a part of a Territory has the right to self-determination in the above sense is to create a factor of instability and national disunion. While the problem may be relevant to dependent Territories or colonies desiring to achieve independence and define their relations with the State which exercised rights of sovereignty over them, it is not relevant in the case of Portugal.

"In the case of Portugal the only thing which matters is to determine whether the laws confer on the citizens of the Territories the same political rights, that is to say, those through which the individual influences the character of the organs of State. If those rights are the same in all the Territories, we do not have citizens and subjects, but only citizens, even though these only participate in certain functions according to their capabilities.

"This, however, is a matter of electoral law and not a political matter. The fomenters of the African revolution are attempting to evade the issue by

making one man, one vote, the basic demand. No one with a sense of responsibility will accept a thesis which is defended only for the achievement of certain results and not for its truth or justice."

12. In 1965, the most important political events were the presidential elections in July and the elections to the National Assembly in November. As these were the first "national" elections since the Overseas Territories were given wider representation in the central organs of Government under the Overseas Organic Law of 1963, they are described in some detail below.

(a) Election of the Head of State

13. As reported previously (A/6000/Add.3, part I, para. 5) in 1965 for the first time the Head of State of Portugal was elected through an electoral college, established under Decree No. 43,548 of 21 March 1961. This electoral college, when fully constituted, consists of the acting members of the National Assembly and of the Corporative Chamber, representatives of half the number of the municipal councils in each district or each Territory not divided into districts, and a specified number of representatives nominated by the legislative council of each Territory from among its own members.

14. The electoral college comprises 616 members when fully constituted. These are the 130 deputies to the National Assembly, 205 members of the Corporative Chamber, 211 representatives of municipal councils and 70 members of the legislative councils of the Overseas Territories. The seven Overseas Territories are represented by 135 members. These comprise 20 deputies to the National Assembly, 9 members of the Corporative Chamber, 46 members representing municipal councils, and 60 members from the Territorial legislative councils. The total membership of each of the Territories in the electoral college was: Angola 51, Mozambique 51,^{2/} Cape Verde 13, and Guinea under Portuguese administration, São Tomé and Príncipe, Timor and Macau each had five members.

15. Under the Constitution, candidates standing for election to the presidency have to be approved by the Supreme Tribunal of Justice, headed by the Prime Minister. In 1965 the only candidate was Rear Admiral Américo Thomaz, incumbent President,

^{2/} The Mozambique Press, however, listed 52 names of representatives.

chosen by the National Union as "a candidate of continuity in a period of national emergency". No Opposition candidate was put forward in 1965, because as Mr. Mário de Azevedo Gomez, one of the leaders of the Accção Democrático-Social was reported as saying, his group did not consider the presidential election by the electoral college as "a national act" since the new system of indirect suffrage excluded any possible representation of the Opposition.

16. On 7 July when the electoral college met, 585 members were present. The voting was: 556 for Admiral Thomaz, and 13 against. Sixteen members of the electoral college did not answer the roll call. Upon assuming office, President Thomaz, in exercise of his powers, appointed Mr. Oliveira Salazar to continue as Prime Minister. In his inauguration speech President Thomaz paid tribute to the armed forces for their intransigent defence of national Territory in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea under Portuguese administration where fighting continued on the borders with newly independent countries. He emphasized that "the fight must continue until our final victory, which a more realistic understanding of the West can hasten".

17. Although Angola, Mozambique and Guinea under Portuguese administration together had about 20 per cent of the seats in the electoral college, it does not appear that Africans had much voice in the presidential election.

18. Firstly, the deputies in the National Assembly representing the Territories had been elected in November 1961 on the basis of the electoral rolls compiled before the repeal of the Native Statute, and there was no indication that more Africans had been added to those rolls (Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventeenth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 54, document A/5160, para. 264). Secondly, in each of the legislative councils of the three Territories, apart from the limited number of Africans who qualified to vote in the direct elections under the new Electoral Law of 6 December 1963 (A/5800/Rev.1, chapter V, paras. 54-64), the rest of the African population is represented by only three members out of a total membership of 36 in Angola, 29 in Mozambique and 14 in Guinea under Portuguese administration (ibid., paras, 35-36, annex table 1). Thirdly, municipal councils are established only in concelhos where there are more than 500 registered voters (Decree 43,730 of 12 June 1961). These councils

comprise a president, who is generally the administrator, and four members representing public or private economic interests, moral (religious) or professional interests. Where such groups are absent, the members are chosen from among "individual taxpayers of Portuguese nationality whose direct tax liability is assessed at 1,000 escudos or more". Fourthly, the representatives of Angola and Mozambique in the Corporative Chamber are elected in each Territory by the Economic and Social Council, the members of which are representative of government administrative bodies and economic and professional interests (ibid., para. 43).

(b) Elections to the National Assembly

19. On 28 September, a few weeks after President Thomaz had assumed office for a second seven-year term, the Government announced that elections to the National Assembly would take place on 7 November. The names of candidates standing for election were to be submitted within a week (before 6 October) to the district governors concerned. A period of thirty days (6 October to 6 November) was set for the electoral campaign.

20. As political parties are not recognized in Portugal except for the government organization called the National Union, the only time when any organized Opposition opinion is given public recognition is during the thirty-day campaign period. Opposition groups do exist, however, and include some former government officials. Early in October one such group, under the name of Acção Democrático-Social decided to contest the National Union candidates in five (Lisbon, Oporto, Viseu, Leiria and Braga) of the thirty electoral districts in Portugal. No Opposition candidates were presented in the Overseas Territories.

21. On 14 October the group, referred to in the Press as the Opposition, issued a 5,000-word manifesto in which it protested government censorship of news and the lack of freedom of association and expression. Besides reaffirming the programme for the democratization of the country set out in an earlier manifesto issued by opponents of the régime in 1961, the Opposition placed on record its views on the Government's policy in the Overseas Territories (although according to a press report of 12 September, the Minister of Interior, Alfredo Santos, Jr., had warned that the Government would not tolerate disagreement over its policy of continued Portuguese rule in Africa).

22. The Opposition manifesto noted that although the war in Angola had officially ended in 1961, fighting was not only still going on there but had extended to Mozambique and Guinea under Portuguese administration and that there was no longer any expectation of an early end to the war. The manifesto opposed the solution of the problem of the Overseas Territories by military means, pointing out that "the country was exhausting itself by the loss of precious lives to obtain an unforeseeable goal and was risking an economic calamity... ". "We maintain", the Opposition stated, "that what is required without delay is a political solution based on the principle of self-determination, exercised through democratic means. This solution is imposed on us by our conscience as free men who... consider decolonization an irreversible phenomenon... ". The Government should carry out the process of self-determination in the Overseas Territories in such a way that the results would be accepted internationally so that the Territories would obtain the sympathy and possible aid of the United Nations which had so far been denied them because of the Government's policies.

23. The manifesto in protesting generally against government censorship, cited as a specific example, the Government's action on the background paper on Territories under Portuguese administration which the United Nations Secretariat had prepared for the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in 1965. The Opposition complained that whereas the Government had given wide publicity to the press release from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which characterized the United Nations document as containing "tendentious quotations from official texts" and "errors of fact"; the document in question had not been made available and therefore the Portuguese people could not even know the facts of the question.

24. When the Opposition manifesto was published in the Portuguese newspapers on 16 October, it was accompanied by numerous articles reporting protests from Angola and Mozambique and other Territories against the Opposition's support of the principle of self-determination for the Overseas Territories. On 17 October the Portuguese Press published a statement by the Minister for the Interior replying to various points raised by the Opposition manifesto and a statement by the National Union which dealt mainly with the question of the Overseas Territories.

/...

25. The National Union took issue with the Opposition's proposals for a "political" solution. The Union observed that although the Opposition was against a military solution because it was exhausting the nation, it had not denied that a military solution was possible. Whatever the price, Portugal would never abandon its legitimate defence of its national Territory against outside aggression.

26. According to the National Union the main reason why a "military solution" was to be preferred was because the so-called "political" solution to the problem of the Overseas Territories would lead inevitably to their secession from Portugal. Carried out under the auspices of the United Nations which was dominated by the Afro-Asian countries, the process of self-determination of the Overseas Territories could only lead to disintegration of the Portuguese nation and therefore, in the opinion of the National Union, the proposal of the Opposition amounted to treason.

27. On 20 October, the Opposition withdrew its candidates from four of the electoral districts and subsequently also from Braga. According to press reports their withdrawal from the last district was because government censorship and other restrictions denied them freedom to conduct their campaign.

28. In the following two weeks protests from branches of the National Union as well as various government civic and professional bodies in Portugal and in the Overseas Territories continued to be published daily in the Portuguese Press, expressing support for the Government's policy of political integration and affirming the Portuguese identity (portuguesismo) of the Territories and their inhabitants.

29. On 5 November, three other manifestos were published. The Monarchist League repudiated the Opposition's formula for the self-determination of the Overseas Territories and supported the Government's policy of decentralization consistent with the political administrative unity of the nation. The Independent Monarchist Movement protested that the wars in Africa were being continued by certain financial interests, in spite of the fact that a long war was not in the interest of the nation. A third manifesto was issued by over 100 Catholic laymen, not identified with any particular interests.

30. The Catholic manifesto, which had been sent previously to President Thomaz, protested against government censorship, measures taken against missionaries and

priests in Angola including their imprisonment and exile,^{3/} persecution of those who did not agree with the Government's policy, and "an electoral procedure without dignity or truth", since only one party was permitted. In particular, it protested against the Government's ban on public discussion of self-determination for the Overseas Territories. The Catholic group also criticized the Government for continuing the war, which it said "although supported from outside was not entirely the result of foreign efforts". The group took the position that the Government had failed to give the people of the Overseas Territories an opportunity for free and orderly expression of their views and had thereby pushed them into violence. It expressed support for a peaceful solution to the problem of the Overseas Territories and suggested that a free dialogue should take place between those Territories and Portugal. In this connexion, the Catholic group questioned why the Government did not consult the people as to their views on the Overseas Territories if it were confident, as it claimed to be, that its policy of integration was defended by the great majority of the people.

31. On the eve of the elections Mr. Salazar addressed the people over the radio and replied to the Opposition manifesto which he said merely contained sterile criticisms, as for instance the complaint against the Government's failure to translate the United Nations document, since the document was available in the official languages of the United Nations. As regards the Opposition's views on the Overseas Territories, he considered that the overwhelming manifestations constituted a real expression of the people, a plebiscite, showing that national unity was a fact; it was no longer any use to discuss it. He appealed to the people to vote as an affirmation of their Portuguese identity (portuguesismo) and a profession of their faith.

32. In the elections which took place on 7 November the National Union candidates were returned to all the 130 seats in the National Assembly. Although fairly detailed electoral results were published for the electoral districts in Portugal, little information is available on the actual number of voters in the Overseas

^{3/} At the time of the uprising in 1961, in Angola eight Roman Catholic priests were arrested. All of them were Negroes or mulattoes. Some were imprisoned in Angola though no formal charges were made. They are now in Lisbon and are prevented from returning to the Territory.

Territories. The most detailed figures are for Mozambique where out of a population of 6.6 million, some 74,000 (about 1.1 per cent of the population) were registered on the electoral rolls and about 64,000 took part in the voting (see below). In São Tomé, out of a total population of about 60,000 some 5,000 (or 8 per cent) were registered on the electoral rolls, and some 3,800 voted. For the other Territories the only figures available are the percentages of the electorate which took part in the vote. From various accounts it appears that in Portugal and the adjacent islands with a total population of under 10 million, probably between 1.2 and 1.5 million people voted;^{4/} in the Overseas Territories, with a total population of more than 13 million people not more than 2 per cent took part in the voting.

2. Military activities and expenditure in the Overseas Territories

33. At the inauguration of the newly elected National Assembly in December 1965, President Thomaz stated that the two main tasks facing Portugal were the defence of the integrity of national Territory and the economic development of the entire Portuguese realm (espaço português). Although Portugal found itself in a tragic dilemma, it had no choice but to continue along the path it had chosen for survival and it was not possible to foresee how long all the organs of government and the Portuguese people would be faced with the task of defending the Overseas Territories and their inhabitants. Side by side with this effort, economic development would be accelerated to increase the wealth of the Portuguese realm collectively so as to ensure its defence so long as the world situation made it necessary.

34. These two interrelated objectives are reflected in Portugal's budget for 1966 which provides for a total expenditure of 17,410.3 million escudos.^{5/} Of this, 11,026.5 million escudos are for the ordinary budget and 6,383.8 million escudos

^{4/} The Opposition charged in its manifesto that out of a total population of 23 million people in Portugal and its Overseas Territories, less than 900,000 people were eligible for the vote. In his reply the Minister for the Interior said that this was false, since in Portugal and the adjacent islands alone the electorate was several hundred thousands more than the figure cited by the Opposition.

^{5/} One escudo equals 3.5 cents; \$US1 equals 28.5 escudos.

for the extraordinary budget, comprising 4,011 million escudos for overseas national defence expenditure and 2,203.3 million escudos for "other investments". Defence expenditures thus account for 63 per cent of the extraordinary budget in 1966.

35. Overseas defence expenditures have steadily increased since 1961. The table below shows that in 1965 the allocations were 60 per cent higher than in 1961, and for the period 1961-1965 total allocations under this heading amounted to some 17,000 million escudos, or approximately \$US600 million.

Overseas military expenditures, 1961-1965
(million escudos)

	<u>Budgetary allocations</u>		<u>Total</u>	<u>Total as % of GNP at market price</u>
	<u>Initial allocation</u>	<u>Supplementary</u>		
1961	950	1,500	2,450	...
1962	1,500	1,796	3,296	4.1
1963	1,750	1,666.2	3,416.2	3.9
1964	1,750	1,851.4	3,601.4	3.8
1965	2,000	2,043	4,043	4.1

36. In 1965, Mr. Salazar put the cost of defending the Overseas Territories at 3,500 million escudos a year. Commenting on this, an article in "Portugal and Overseas Provinces, Economist Intelligence Unit, Quarterly Economic Review", April 1965, said: "This is certainly an underestimate and leaves out of account the deflationary effect on the metropolitan economy caused by loss of confidence (as in 1961/62), an increased tax burden and the fact that much of the finance for the war, raised in metropolitan Portugal, is spent in the provinces and abroad. Nevertheless, when compared with the advantages accruing to Portugal in the past from the Overseas Provinces, it can at present be justified, always assuming that a military victory can be secured and that the balance of power in Southern Africa does not alter. Indeed, in the three years 1961-1963 the amount accruing to the escudo area from the provinces' trade accounts and surplus on invisibles (chiefly transport and mining operation receipts) averaged 29.1 million escudos a year."

37. Although the introduction to the budget contains the statement that, in so far as possible, it is intended to finance defence expenditure from budgetary surpluses, almost 50 per cent of the 1966 extraordinary budget (which includes extraordinary defence expenditures) is financed by internal and external loans. In millions of escudos the separate items are: 1,901.1 (50 per cent of the total) from internal loans; 1,058.5 (16.5 per cent) from external loans; 232 from internal development bonds; 78.5 from money coining (amoedação); and as in 1965, 100 from the special overseas defence and development tax. There is no information on the source of the external loans envisaged in 1966.

38. As noted last year (A/6000/Add.3, part I, para. 17) both direct and indirect taxes have been increased in recent years to finance the ordinary budget. Since 1961, ordinary revenue has increased by 50 per cent, from 8,238.4 to 12,818.7 million escudos in 1966. Between 1960-1964, direct taxes rose 27 per cent, indirect taxes 33 per cent and special industrial taxes (including consumption taxes on beer and tobacco) increased 66 per cent. In 1966, revenue from direct taxes is estimated at 4,320.4 million escudos, from indirect taxes 4,093.6 million escudos and from industries under a special régime 946.4 million escudos. The total estimated revenue from these three sources is 865.3 million escudos more than in 1965.

39. In 1965, a number of newspaper articles reported that some economists in Lisbon believed that the African war had proved a "blessing" to Portugal, as industries were growing in response to military orders, ranging from munitions to food and textiles, and remittances from troops overseas had injected new money into the economy. Nevertheless the budget shows that while ordinary expenditure increased 32 per cent between 1961 and 1966 (health and welfare expenditures increased by 26 per cent, national education expenditures increased by 40 per cent), public debt service charges increased 122 per cent. In 1966 the public debt service amounted to nearly one fifth of the total ordinary budget compared with only one tenth in 1961. As reported previously the national debt on 30 September 1964 was already 29 per cent of the gross national product and moreover since the extraordinary defence expenditures are financed to a great extent by internal borrowing, the amount of funds available for development is limited. Part of the Transitional Development Plan is being financed by foreign investments in the Overseas Territories.

3. International relations of Portugal affecting the Territories under its administration

(a) Participation in international and regional organizations

40. Because of its overseas policy Portugal's right to membership and participation in the activities in various international and regional organizations continues to be challenged by other Member States.

41. In May 1965, the Executive Board of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization approved a resolution inviting "the Director General to carry out, with the authorization of the Portuguese Government, a study, in situ, with the aid of either qualified officials of the Secretariat or of appropriate eminent personalities, of the present situation of education in African Territories under Portuguese administration, from the point of view of the aims and general objectives of UNESCO as defined in its Constitution and in relevant resolutions of the General Conference". The resolution further requested the Director General "not to give effect, pending the results of this study and their examination by the Board, to any invitations to Portugal by virtue of decisions of the General Conference or of the Executive Board.

42. Portugal agreed to the education surveys on condition that its rights in UNESCO were restored and similar surveys were undertaken in other member countries. During 1965, however, Portugal was barred from the 28th International Conference on Public Education which was held in Geneva in July last year and the World Congress of Ministers of Education on the Eradication of Illiteracy in September at Teheran.

43. Portugal has since requested that the decision of the Executive Board should be referred to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion. In October 1965 UNESCO's Executive Board decided to postpone discussion of Portugal's request until its meeting in 1966 and Portugal remains barred from UNESCO conferences.

44. The question of Portugal's membership was also raised at the International Telecommunications Union and at the United Nations International Sugar Conference, both of which were held in September 1965.

45. Portugal participates in a number of international and regional activities which are of concern to the African Territories which it claims are its overseas provinces. Thus Portugal is a party to the Long-Term International Coffee Agreement as a producer country though the producer is Angola. Similarly Portugal was a member of the Inter-African Coffee Organization from its establishment until November 1965 when it was expelled because it is not an African country. It was made clear, however, that Angola would be welcome as a member as soon as it could comply with the obligations of the organization.

46. During the fifteenth session of the WHO Regional Committee for Africa, held in Lusaka, Zambia in September 1965, Portugal's right to participate was raised because of its colonial policy and reference was made to the health problems created by refugees from the Portuguese colonies in Africa. The Regional Committee subsequently adopted a resolution which pledges Member States of the region to do whatever is possible to protect and promote the health rights of the populations of the Portuguese colonies in Africa engaged in their struggle for national liberation. It also invites the African States where they are represented in the organs of WHO to consider every means calculated to lead the Government of Portugal to renounce once and for all its colonial policy of oppression. The resolution was transmitted to the Director General with the request that he bring it to the attention of the Nineteenth World Health Assembly which will meet in May 1966.

(b) Trade relations with Southern Rhodesia

47. On 24 February 1965, a trade agreement was signed between Portugal and Southern Rhodesia. This agreement replaced a former agreement dealing with trade between Mozambique and the now defunct Central African Federation. The agreement covers both Angola and Mozambique and provides that the two parties shall accord most-favoured-nation treatment for goods imported from the other except in so far as concerns: (i) special provisions relating to goods produced and traded within the escudo zone; (ii) special provisions relating to trade between Portugal and Spain or Brazil; (iii) special concessions applied by Southern Rhodesia under the GATT. The agreement also exempts from import duties a list of goods produced in one or other of the three Territories.

48. It may be noted that whereas there is an important transit of Southern Rhodesia trade through Mozambique, it is not an important trading partner of either Mozambique or Angola, which together account for less than 2 per cent of its total trade by value.

49. In addition to the above, however, there are agreements relating to the supply of hydroelectric power and crude oil from Mozambique to Umtali. These are discussed in the section on Mozambique. It is reported that no oil has been pumped through the pipeline from Beira to Umtali since 31 December 1965.

(c) Other

50. In a move towards fostering closer trade relations between Angola and Mozambique with South Africa, the Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd. with an initial capital of R2,000 million was established in Johannesburg in November 1965. The Portuguese interests are the Banco de Angola, the Banco Commercial de Angola and the Banco Nacional Ultramarino, which will each have a 25 per cent interest. The South African interest is the General Mining and Finance Corporation.^{6/} General Mining has a one-year option to increase its holding to 25 per cent. Press reports attach significance to the participation of the General Mining Corporation because South Africa is interested in oil exploration in Angola.

51. During the past year Portugal is reported to have strengthened its relations with Brazil, France, the Federal Republic of Germany and Spain. With Brazil it is in the course of negotiating a new treaty of friendship which would include the African Territories under Portuguese administration. Portugal is also interested in the establishment of a Luso-Brazilian community. France, which in April 1964 granted a long-term loan to Portugal for the construction of naval vessels and submarines (A/5800/Rev.1, chapter V, para. 82) was reported in the Press in 1965 to be supplying Portugal with Alouette Helicopters which are said to be used in Africa. Several agreements have been signed between Portugal and the Federal Republic of Germany; the subjects include trade, cultural relations and social security. According to press reports there is also an agreement between the two countries under which the Federal Republic of Germany is building a jet aircraft base at Beja and is to supply Portugal with jet combat aircraft for her African operations.

^{6/} See A/6000/Add.3, part II, appendix I, para. 199.

4. Economic integration and development

(a) Economic integration

52. Up to 1965 most of the measures that had been put into effect for economic integration of the Overseas Territories with Portugal were mainly of a financial and trading nature. According to the schedule, import and export duties on goods produced and traded within the "Escudo zone" are progressively being removed and are to be entirely abolished by 1972. The reduction of tariffs and lifting of import quotas have already resulted in a marked increase in trade between Portugal and the Overseas Territories. The removal of tariffs in the escudo zone assures to Portugal large and growing markets in the Overseas Territories for her manufactured goods so that some observers consider that the loss of the Territories would be a powerful blow to the Portuguese economy.

53. On the other hand, the liberalization of current invisible operations and the movement of capital which is dependent on the general economic conditions in the Territories, has made less progress. Exchange controls have remained in effect and the local currency of the Territories is not yet freely convertible into Portuguese escudos.

54. With the completion of the institutional framework for political integration, various new measures were introduced during 1965 to speed up economic integration and development. Among these new measures were: (i) regulations on foreign investments in the Overseas Territories; (ii) provisions for the establishment of Portuguese and foreign credit institutions; (iii) liberalization of conditions for establishing new industries; and (iv) the establishment of a national employment service and the intensification of measures to promote overseas settlement. These measures are described separately below (sections (a) to (f)). When fully implemented they are intended to bring about fundamental changes in the traditional dual role of the Territories as suppliers of raw materials and as captive markets for Portugal's manufactured goods^{7/} by making the Territories more self-sufficient. In the immediate future, as indicated in the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967, the main objective is to encourage revenue earning projects.

^{7/} This traditional relationship was typified by the cotton growing regime in Angola and Mozambique in the past and the changes that are being introduced are described in a separate paper.

(b) Financing of economic development in the Overseas Territories

55. As reported previously (A/6000/Add.3, part I, para. 36), for the Overseas Territories as a whole the envisaged investments under the Transitional Development Plan 1965-1967 are to be financed almost in equal parts by the Government (including territorial funds), private investors, and loans from abroad. In the past financial assistance provided by Portugal from the public sector to the Overseas Territories has consisted mainly of Treasury loans and loans by the National Development Bank (Banco de Fomento Nacional)^{8/} and the Caixa Geral de Depósitos, Crédito e Previdência. The following table, which gives a breakdown of financial assistance from the public sector for the years 1962-1964, shows the recent growth of such assistance. It will be seen that Treasury loans increased from 898 million escudos in 1962 to 1,243 million escudos in 1964, and that loans from the National Development Bank and Caixa Geral from 234 to 502 million escudos. Grants increased from 89 to 214 million escudos and other financial assistance from 500 to 841 million escudos.

Portugal's financial assistance from the public sector to the Overseas Territories, 1962-1964

	<u>1962</u>		<u>1963</u>		<u>1964</u>	
	<u>million</u> <u>escudos</u>	<u>percent-</u> <u>age</u>	<u>million</u> <u>escudos</u>	<u>percent-</u> <u>age</u>	<u>million</u> <u>escudos</u>	<u>percent-</u> <u>age</u>
Total loans	1,132	65.8	1,220	63.7	1,752	62.4
including						
Treasury loans	898	52.2	1,032	53.9	1,243	44.3
National Development Bank and <u>Caixa Geral</u>	234	13.6	188	9.8	509	18.1
Grants	89	5.1	253	13.2	214	7.6
Others	500	29.1	441	23.1	841	30.0
Total	1,721	100.0	1,915	100.0	2,807	100.0

^{8/} The National Development Bank provides financing and guarantees for both the public and private sectors; in 1964 about 76 per cent of the financing approved was for the private sector. Of the total credits granted during 1964 to the Overseas Territories, 649 million escudos was for financing (including Angola 452 million and Mozambique 70 million) and 381 million escudos in guarantees. In 1965, the Bank was authorized to issue bonds for development up to 250 million escudos (Decree 46,663, 23 November 1965).

56. In 1965 the Government of Portugal introduced two measures to mobilize local funds in the Overseas Territories for the purpose of financing projects envisaged in the Transitional Development Plan 1965-1967. One measure (Decree 46,380) authorized the Territorial Governments to raise loans from the local banks. This is to be done through the issue of special promissory notes (promissórias de fomento ultramarino) in the local currency of the Territory, of 1 to 10 million escudos each issue, at 2 per cent interest and redeemable in five years. The decree prescribes the amounts and the conditions under which the local bank of issue and other commercial banks must subscribe to these promissory notes. The other measure (Decrees 46,378 and 46,379, 11 June) was aimed at mobilizing local savings. Under these decrees the Governments of Angola and Mozambique were authorized to issue special Transitional Development Plan 1965-1967 Treasury bonds (obrigações do tesouro)^{9/} at 5 per cent interest, up to a maximum of 1,000 million escudos in the former and 500 million escudos in the latter Territory. These bonds are to be in the local currency of the Territory and are to be amortized at the rate of 6.7 million escudos per annum over fourteen years beginning the sixth year after issue. The local Governments may contract the placement (colocação) of these bonds by local credit institutions, or offer them for direct public subscription. In the Territory concerned, the bank of issue must guarantee loans when secured by these bonds. Within the escudo zone, the bonds may be used for settling of both visible and invisible accounts and when used for this purpose, the payment of interest on the bonds and their amortization outside the Territory of issue will receive priority over other transfers to the same area. During the year, both Territories issued the first series of the new Treasury bonds; the issue in Angola was 200 million escudos and in Mozambique 100 million escudos.

57. Later in December 1965 the Minister of Finance was authorized each year to grant automatically to the Overseas Territories (excepting Macau) loans up to the amounts fixed each year by the Council of Ministers for Economic Affairs for the implementation of the Transitional Development Plan. For Angola and Mozambique (Decree 46,750, 16 December) the loans are to be for twenty years at 4 per cent interest; for the smaller Territories (Decree 46,683, 3 December) the period is

^{9/} In Angola, for instance, these bonds are entitled "Obrigações do tesouro de Angola, 5 por cento, 1965, Plano Intercalar de Fomento para 1965-1967".

twenty-four years. For Guinea under Portuguese administration, Cape Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe, these loans will be the only source for the financing of the Transitional Development Plan. Cape Verde is exempt from paying interest so long as its financial situation remains unchanged. In January 1966, it was reported that total loans from the Central Government to the Overseas Territories to finance the Transitional Development Plan amounted to 1,021 million escudos for 1963: 101 million for Cape Verde, 35 million for Guinea under Portuguese administration, 36 million for São Tomé and Príncipe, 370 million for Angola, 423 million for Mozambique and 56 million for Timor.

(c) Regulations on foreign investments in Portugal and the Overseas Territories

58. In April 1965 (Decree 46,312, 28 April) new regulations were introduced easing conditions for foreign investment in the Overseas Territories. Whereas previously the Government had generally required a measure of Portuguese participation in the capital and in the administration of enterprises established with foreign capital, this will no longer be the case. Enterprises entirely or largely foreign owned by residents in Portuguese Territory or persons domiciled overseas may now be established in various economic sectors with the same rights to enjoy tax and duty exemptions as national enterprises. As a general rule, however, foreign enterprises will be excluded from public services, activities relating to the public domain, and activities of special importance to national defence. Although mineral resources belong to the public domain, mining is no longer in the restricted category. Foreign companies may not however acquire real rights in land in the Territories except with the authorization of the Overseas Minister. Foreign companies will also be able to remit freely all legally imported capital, as well as earnings from such capital and from other specified activities. National enterprises, on the other hand, may be authorized to contract, with the guarantee of national credit institutions, external loans not exceeding 2,500 million escudos or one third of their capital or their reserve fund.

59. The new regulations for co-ordinating industrial development in Portugal and the Overseas Territories, which are described in a later section, include the following activities in which free participation of foreign capital (either through

direct investment, loans or through the purchase of shares) will always be authorized: (i) agricultural improvements, land preparation, including irrigation projects, livestock and cattle raising and the processing of agricultural products; (ii) improvement and extension of industrial installations and reorganization of industries in accordance with the new law; (iii) development of extractive industries, including petroleum and other energy sources; (iv) fishing; (v) improvement of transport and communications; and (vi) development of tourist trade (Dispatch, 31 September 1965, Diário do Governo, Series I, No. 214).

60. In May a group of Portuguese businessmen and government officials visited various countries in the European Economic Community to interest them in opportunities for investment in Portugal and the Overseas Territories. Apart from various industrial and commercial interests, also represented on the mission were the Banco Burnay, the Bank of Lisbon and the Azores, the Banco Totta-Aliança, the Banco Português do Atlântico and the Banco de Angola. In the Overseas Territories the sectors suggested for foreign investments included mining (especially diamonds, petroleum and iron, see below and A/6000/Add.3, part II, annex I) and agriculture (especially coffee, cotton, sisal, tea and fibres). (These activities are discussed in a separate study on the role of agriculture in Angola and Mozambique which is in preparation.)

61. By the end of 1965, some new investments of foreign capital had been announced. These included in Angola new investments by Petrangol and by Mabor in a tyre factory (see paras. 117, 124). In Mozambique new investments were announced for production of sugar and cashew (see paras. 163-164).

(d) Banking and credit facilities

62. New laws (Decrees 46,243 and 46,492) were introduced in 1965 to make available to the Territories more commercial banking and credit facilities and at the same time to mobilize local domestic savings. Minimum capital and reserves required by law for banks or branches of banks established in the Territories have been reduced, and under the new law no Portuguese-owned institutions other than commercial and investment banks will be allowed to establish branches in the Overseas Territories. Foreign-owned credit institutions may operate in the Territories if the capital of the main branch in the Territory is not less than half of the minimum capital requirements specified.

63. In August 1965 an overseas commercial and industrial credit bank was established in association with the Banco Borges e Irmão. The bank will have its headquarters in Angola and a branch in Mozambique. Other partners in the credit bank include Manufatura Nacional de Borracha, Borges e Irmão Comercial, Lda., Star Imobiliária and Industrial Têxtil do Ave. The registered capital is 150 million escudos and can be raised to 200 million escudos. By the end of 1965, 75 million escudos had been paid up and transferred to the two Territories. Thirty thousand shares of 1,000 escudos each have been offered for sale to residents in the Territories. The special function of the bank, a private institution, will be to provide medium and long-term loans for industry and buildings, and short-term credit facilities, such as warrants for not longer than six months. The bank will also undertake economic and financial studies of a regional and technical nature. Up to the time of its establishment this was the third Portuguese bank in Angola; the other two are the Bank of Angola which is the official bank of issue of the Territory and the Commercial Bank of Angola, established over a year ago in association with the Banco Português do Atlântico. The only other Portuguese bank in Mozambique and in the other Territories under Portuguese administration is the National Overseas Bank (Banco Nacional Ultramarino)

64. In January 1966, the Banco Pinto e Sotto Mayor was reported to be establishing branches in Mozambique. Importance is attached to this move as a transfer of large sums of capital for use in the development in that Territory.

(e) Co-ordination of industrial development in Portugal and the Overseas Territories

65. In November 1965 new legislation (Decree 46,666) laid down conditions for the establishment of industries in the Overseas Territories and for the co-ordination of industrial development in the Portuguese realm.

66. Industries are divided into two categories: those which are of "national" interest and affect the economy of the entire Portuguese realm, and those which may be regulated by the Territorial Governments. Industries subject to national regulation (condicionamento) include the following: foods (including sugar factories but not including drinks and beverages); chemicals, metals, light engineering and metal parts, armaments, machinery, construction and various

transforming industries. The Government of each Territory will be free to authorize the establishment of industries not included in the national classification and to lay down plans for their development. Competition among industries is to be avoided and industries must observe health and labour regulations.

67. Conditions for the establishment of industries in Portugal and the Overseas Territories are to be gradually brought into uniformity. For the Territories this will mean that they will have the right to establish various industries (not on the "national" list) using imported primary materials, which previously, under Decree 26,509, 11 April 1936, were only approved after a lengthy process of examination and consideration by various Territorial authorities and competent bodies in Lisbon. Another advantage to the Territories is that they may now authorize the establishment of new industries, even if the products are not lower in price than similar products imported from other parts of the Portuguese realm. In particular, the Territories will no longer be restricted as regards the establishment of cotton textile factories.

68. At the same time, the new legislation introduces wider government control over various industrial activities. Licences are now required for new factory buildings or extensions, and government authorization is required for changes (as for instance of equipment) which affect production or change in location within the Portuguese realm. (In Cape Verde, the change in location from one island to another will also require government approval.) From press reports it appears that the new regulations also enable the Portuguese Government to restrict the establishment of foreign companies in Portugal when this appears necessary as a protective measure for home industries.

(f) Settlement in the Overseas Territories

69. As reported previously (A/6000/Add.3, part II, appendix II), European settlement of the Overseas Territories, especially of Angola and Mozambique, has always been a cornerstone of Portuguese colonial policy. Following the uprising in Angola in 1961, new emphasis was given to the need for "the creation of multi-racial communities and the implantation overseas of new Portuguese tropical civilizations" as the "sole buttress of the national presence in those lands as factor of peace..." (ibid., para. 158).

70. New Provincial Settlement Boards were created in both Angola and Mozambique to co-ordinate plans and to accelerate settlement mainly of Portuguese families in the Territories. Though in Angola the Settlement Board was successful in establishing a chain of small nuclear settlements, the average rate of settlement overseas was only about 10,000 persons each year.

71. When the Transitional Development Plan was drawn up last year (A/6000/Add.3, para. 36), it became evident that with the anticipated natural annual increase of the active population by 43,000 persons, the gradual displacement of labour into industry, and the concurrent mechanization of agriculture, one of the main problems would be to find jobs for the surplus labour of Portugal. During 1965 the whole question of overseas settlement was reviewed in the National Assembly and in the Overseas Council and the political, economic, social and administrative aspects were carefully examined.

72. At its October meeting the Overseas Council, which is the highest policy-making body for the Overseas Territories (see A/5800/Rev.1, chapter V, paras. 25-28) emphasized especially the political importance of the settlement of the Overseas Territories from the point of view of both Portugal's internal situation and external relations: settlement of population from Portugal would not only provide the Territories with labour and stimulate economic development but would also play an important role in national defence and the establishment of Portuguese civilization there.

73. Among other aspects, the Overseas Council considered the question of the most desirable "national level" of settlement overseas, the organization of settlement services and the type of settlements, questions relating to the economic and social welfare of the local population arising from such settlements, and the functions of the existing settlement boards.

74. As a first step towards stemming the emigration of labour from Portugal to other European countries, a National Employment Service was established on 11 December 1965 (Decree 46,731). This agency will set up public employment placement bureaux, establish rosters of technical and professional personnel, carry out studies of the needs of the labour market and facilitate transfers within the professions. It will also work with the Overseas Ministry in defining and supervising emigration to foreign countries.

75. Later, in a press conference held on 22 December, the Under-Secretary of State for Overseas Territories explained in some detail the Government's position on this question, which was based on provisions in the Constitution (article 133) and

the Overseas Organic Law of 1963 (article LXIX). In recent years out of every four persons emigrating from Portugal only one went to settle in the Overseas Territories. It was therefore necessary to improve conditions in the Territories in order to attract those who were now migrating elsewhere. The Government considered that increased migration would help to accelerate the social and cultural progress of the "less evolved" indigenous inhabitants (nativos menos evoluídos) of the Overseas Territories because it would bring them in closer contact with "more civilized" (mais civilizados) peoples.

76. Intensified settlement would not be limited to increasing the number of Portuguese in the Territories in Africa, but would include the "fixing" of Africans in agricultural settlements for the dual purpose of replacing shifting agriculture with more modern techniques and of opening up new areas for farming and substantially increased production, especially of some crops now imported from foreign countries. (A more detailed account of recent developments of African agriculture settlements is given in the study on the role of agriculture in Angola and Mozambique which is being prepared.)

77. It was recently reported in the Press that the National Assembly early this year "put new pressure on the authorities to increase the flow of settlers to Angola and Mozambique as a counterpart to the military effort to hold on to the African Territories". One of the deputies from Mozambique (Mr. Moreira Longo) stressed the need "to increase the civilized population" in Mozambique especially in the interior. He also proposed that the Government should encourage soldier settlers in the Territories, a scheme which has been in effect in Angola for some time (A/6000/Add.3, part II, appendix II, paras. 181-183). Another deputy from Mozambique, Dr. Henriques Nazaré, took a somewhat different view. Drawing attention to the fact that Africans in urban areas lived largely in sub-standard dwellings on the periphery of urban communities, he believed that first priority should be given to improving African housing in urban areas and eliminating what amounts to housing segregation (isolacionismo habitacional) of the races. He believed that the resentment created by this problem was among the causes of the war and that the importance of its solution had not been sufficiently recognized. He said that he was against "ready-made solutions" among which he included attempts to settle European farmers in Angola and Mozambique.

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78. Experience has shown that one of Portugal's main difficulties in increasing European settlement in the African Territories has been the high cost involved. Recently the Vice-President of the Overseas Council, José Bacelar Bebian, was said to have estimated that it costs the Government about 300,000 escudos (\$US10,500) to settle a single family in Africa with the necessary land, housing and general living facilities (see also A/6000/Add.3, appendix II, para. 121).

79. In 1965, it was announced in the press that the Mozambique authorities had offered farms of 5,000 ha. each in the Tete district to farmers from drought-stricken areas in South Africa. The settlers would be required to pay a foro of 0.50 escudos per hectare for twenty years and would be required to undertake all costs of development. In November 1965, it was reported that eighty South Africans, mostly from the West Transvaal, had signed contracts.

(g) Reorganization of technical services in the Territories

80. Because of the important roles agriculture and mining are expected to have in the future economic development of the Territories, during 1965 the agriculture and forestry services and the geological and mines services in the Overseas Territories were reorganized and strengthened. As noted below, training facilities for agricultural staff are being expanded in both Angola and Mozambique. The two larger Territories will each have a Geological and Mines Department with five divisions, for licenses, supervision (fiscalização) and geological survey, mining development, applied geology, general services and administrative services. In the smaller Territories there will be Geological and Mines Bureaux.

5. Education

81. In September 1964 (Decree 45,908, 10 September), following the extension of compulsory primary education to the Overseas Territories, the special adaptation courses for African children which had existed before were formally integrated into the overseas primary school system, which is now the same for all children, except that for those who do not speak Portuguese there is a pre-primary class. The 1964 reform made it mandatory for all schools in rural areas (where they are known as postos escolares) to provide not only the pre-primary but also the first three elementary classes. This has made it necessary to upgrade many of the former adaptation classes for Africans which used to be mainly entrusted by the Government to the Catholic missions.

82. During 1965 considerable sums were allocated in both Territories for teacher-training (monitors) and the expansion of school buildings, which are urgently needed if compulsory primary education is to be implemented. Pending the provision of adequate facilities, under the 1964 reform, children of school age may be excused from attending if they live more than 5 km. from a school and no free transportation is provided. In July the school inspection system for the Overseas Territories was revised and strengthened (Decree 46,447, 20 July) to enable it to better supervise and co-ordinate all educational activities.

83. Greater emphasis is being given to education in general and agricultural education in particular with a view to increased production. Under a decree (46,464) of 31 July 1965, agricultural education in the Overseas Territories has been reorganized. Courses will be provided at three levels: elementary, secondary and vocational (médio). Secondary agricultural education is to be provided in escolas práticas and in the industrial schools. Vocational training for agricultural officers (regentes) will be provided in separate institutions and will include more advanced training in agronomy. Agricultural education at the secondary and vocational levels will be under the supervision of the Education Services as regards administrative and pedagogical aspects and the special departments concerned will be responsible for the technical aspects and the supply of materials and specialized personnel. Special courses are also to be offered to adults working in agriculture.

84. No changes were reported during the year in the organization of the academic secondary schools (liceus) which have always been based on the same pattern as their counterparts in Portugal. Further details on educational facilities including the Estudos Gerais Universitários and enrolment are given in the relevant sections below.

85. As reported previously (A/5800/Rev.1, chapter V, para. 104) since 1963 more scholarships have been made available to students in the Overseas Territories. In 1964 (Decree 45,769) a system of reimbursable scholarships was introduced consisting of loans granted on the basis of merit and repayable in instalments after completion of the course. A total of 302 outright scholarships and 33 "scholarship-loans" were granted in 1964 to students from the six Territories (excluding Macau). The number of scholarships and scholarship-loans respectively granted to each Territory were as follows: Cape Verde, 27 and 8; Guinea under Portuguese administration, 48 and 4; São Tomé, 15 and 4; Angola, 116 and 14; Mozambique, 37 and 2; Timor, 26 and 1.

86. In May 1965 (Order 21,310) national awards for secondary education were extended to include students in Guinea under Portuguese administration, São Tomé and Príncipe and Timor. As a result of the increased number of students in the Overseas Territories during recent years, it was reported in March 1966 that the scholarship system for secondary students was being revised. Currently the total value of scholarships is 14.7 million escudos, of which 5 million is for students in Angola, 4.8 million for Mozambique, 507,000 for Guinea under Portuguese administration, 450,000 for Cape Verde, 105,000 for São Tomé and Príncipe and 48,000 for Timor.

B. Angola

1. Constitutional and political

(a) Election of the Head of State

87. The election of the Head of State occasioned little comment in the Angolan Press. Out of a total membership of 616 representatives in the electoral college, Angola had 51 composed as follows: 7 deputies to the National Assembly, 2 members of the Corporative Chamber, 24 members from the Legislative Council appointed from among themselves, and 18 representatives of the municipal councils.

88. It is significant that Angola, with a total population of 4.8 million at the 1960 census and an estimated population of 5.5 million in 1965 had only 18 representatives of municipal councils (out of 51 members) whereas Portugal and the adjacent islands had 158 representatives of municipal councils (out of 438 members). As reported previously, for each district or each Territory not divided into districts, the number of representatives in the electoral college is equal to half the number of municipal councils (when this is an odd number, the number of representatives is half the next even number). Furthermore, under the 1963 electoral law, municipal councils are established only in concelhos where there are more than 500 qualified voters. Presumably for this reason less than half the administrative units in Angola (67 concelhos and 22 circunscrições) were represented.

(b) Elections to the National Assembly

89. In the elections to the National Assembly, there was only one list of seven candidates presented by the National Union. There were no Opposition candidates. An editorial in the Angolan Press said that this showed that there were no differences of political opinion in the Territory on the need for the defence of Portugal's overseas "patrimony". It urged the people "to vote en masse to shout to the world that Angola is Portugal, and that it will always be Portugal".

90. Only four of the National Union candidates were persons born in Angola; the other three were born in Portugal. Two out of the seven were persons actually holding government posts in Angola (Provincial Secretary of Education, director of the State Pharmacy in Moçâmedes). One was the representative of Angola in the Overseas Council, concurrently a member of the Economic and Social Council

in Angola and the director-general of ANGOL. The others included: a lawyer who was president of the Commercial Association in Lobito; a member of the Economic and Social Council elected by the economic interests in the Territory; a journalist who had been on official missions; a director of an important company with interests in coffee, who is concurrently a member of the governing council of the Coffee Institute.

91. The proposal by the Opposition in Portugal that the Overseas Territories should have the right of self-determination was denounced by various public figures and press editorials as traitorous and as an insult to the people of Angola who were giving their lives and fighting for a greater Portugal. For several days the Press carried a message that was also being broadcast calling on all Portuguese of Angola to affirm their loyalty to Portugal on 19 October by covering the whole Territory with the Portuguese flag. The message said that on that day every vehicle, every entrance and every window must fly the Portuguese flag; no one should fail to do so if he were a loyal Portuguese. The Lisbon papers reported the demonstration on 19 October as a spontaneous expression of Angola's loyalty to Portugal and a denunciation of any relationship with Portugal other than complete integration and identity.

92. Press reports of the elections on 7 November described the voting stations as crowded with lines of people and cars drawn up in front. No figures were published of the number of registered voters or of the number of votes cast. The voting results were given in terms of the percentage of registered voters who voted. The Lisbon newspaper of 8 November carried a report from Luanda saying "We can affirm, without a shadow of exaggeration, that all Angola voted". Preliminary figures published in the Press showed that, in Angola, the voting percentages of the electorate by district was as follows: Cabinda, 84 per cent; Cuando-Cubango, 91 per cent; Luanda, 71.6 per cent; Uíge, 95 per cent; Benguela, 77.8 per cent; and Malanje 89.7 per cent. However, since only about 1 per cent of the total population voted in Mozambique (see paras. 146-147), it is probable that the percentage in Angola was less than 5 per cent of the total population.^{10/}

93. In a statement issued on 11 November the MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola) said that the Portuguese Opposition proposal was for self-

^{10/} The qualifications for voting are set out briefly in A/6000/Add.3, para. 9.

determination at a fixed date for the colonies, with an autonomous transitional government in which half the members would be Portuguese who would safeguard the interests of their compatriots. This was unacceptable. The MPLA would oppose "any attempt at implanting a neo-colonialist system in Angola". Armed resistance would end only when conditions were established which guaranteed the exercise of power by the Angolan people. These conditions were: (i) recognition of the right to self-determination and independence and to national and international sovereignty for Angola; (ii) withdrawal of all armed forces to their bases of origin; (iii) the safeguarding of the nation's unity and territorial integrity; (iv) unconditional release of all political prisoners and the repatriation to Angola of all political refugees and exiles; (v) guarantees for the exercise of democratic rights and freedom for political and trade union activities; (vi) establishment of principles and guarantees for the election of a national parliament on the basis of universal, direct and secret suffrage; (vii) elections for organs of government in all towns.

(c) Local administration

94. During the year, following discussions in the Economic and Social Council and the Legislative Council, some changes were made in the local administrative structure of the Territory as it was previously reported (A/5800/Rev.1, chapter V, paras. 46-53). Municipal councils and municipal commissions were given identical powers and functions, and the administrative posts (postos de circunscrição) were abolished. In December, the Boletim Oficial de Angola (No. 50) published a list of the new administrative divisions of the Territory which, it reported, had been "made necessary by population or administrative requirements due to economic and social progress". Over twenty new concelhos were created, a number of administrative posts were changed to circunscrições and the corresponding municipal councils and municipal commissions were established. New elections will be held to these bodies.

2. The military situation in Angola

95. From the published reports and statements by Portuguese officials and Press, it is difficult to ascertain what the real situation is in Angola. On the one hand, there are claims that the war in Angola is over. Thus the Minister for

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Foreign Affairs of Portugal, speaking in the Security Council in November 1965, cited reports of visitors, one of whom described Angola as a country of "real peace and progress" (S/PV.1253, p. 22). On the other hand, the President of Portugal and other officials now emphasize that Portugal is waging a war on three fronts, in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea under Portuguese administration.

96. On one point nearly all reports agree that there are still some 50,000 Portuguese troops in Angola. In January 1966, for instance, it was reported in the Press that "military posts are strung around the perimeter of Luanda, linked in some sections by miles of wire and lit at night by searchlights. Troops man checkpoints on the roads leading inland and special passes are needed to go through areas of strategic importance". Reports also indicate continued concern in the Territory with political security measures. In March 1966, for instance, the Government closed the Cultural Society of Angola (Sociedade Cultural de Angola) on grounds that it had allowed "infiltrations" and activities not provided for in its charter.

97. In addition to the regular armed forces, there are now not only the civil defence and volunteer corps, the militia and local troops (forças de quadrícula) but since the end of 1964 a new public security police force of over 7,000 men has been created. In 1965, a commando-troop training centre was set up in Luanda which provides a three-month course of specialized training followed by one month of experience.

98. In November, the structure of the Civil Defence and Volunteer Corps, which has grown substantially, was formalized. Under Decree 46,656 the Corps includes permanent, general and special staff. The permanent staff consist of the corps leaders and commanders. The general staff are divided into (a) self-defence and service units, comprising the local population, public servants and employees of private enterprises; and (b) forças de intervenção made up of volunteers, whose task is to destroy armed bands of guerrillas.

99. Since early January the Diario de Noticias of Lisbon has carried a series of articles entitled "Three fronts in three months. All the truth about the war against terrorism in the Overseas Territories". The articles give descriptions of military actions against "terrorists" both from past accounts and from the author's own observations. There are descriptions of the air force base in Luanda, which

has over 1,500 men, of the helicopter force which searches out guerrillas in the forest areas, of the parachute troops who are air-lifted to areas of activity... The articles are accompanied by pictures of commando-troops in training, troops returning from a day's action and of wounded soldiers in the military hospital in Luanda. Some of the articles are about the countryside that is said to have been restored to peace since 1961, describing the newly settled villages which have schools in the open air when no school building is available; and describing the activities of the volunteer corps or the soldiers stationed on farms to protect them.

100. For a period during 1965 there appears to have been a lull in military activities; one report said that military action against the terrorists appeared to have reached a stalemate. Later, in August, there was a report by the Gouvernement Révolutionnaire d'Angola en Exil (GRAE) that poison gas and napalm bombs were being used by the Portuguese troops in a region about eighty miles east of Luanda. A Portuguese Defence Ministry spokesman said, however, that chemicals have not been used in Angola, that there had been no action in 1965 in the region mentioned, and that the situation in Angola "was now almost completely under control".

101. Towards the end of the year the official military communiqués, still issued every week, began to reveal increased activity. The communiqué for the week 29 December 1965 to 5 January 1966 was headlined "Intensive activity of the Armed Forces in North Angola". Action was reported (in the region of Bula, Fazenda Riquinha, Camacume, Dongo, Menga, Mifume and Quingina) by land, air and naval forces against groups of guerrillas near the frontier as well as in the Dembos and Uíge regions against "the criminal action of outlaws".

102. Significantly, in May 1965, residents and farmers in the districts of Uíge, Zani, Cabinda and Cuanza North were exempted from payment of licence fees for the use and carrying of weapons, for defence, war and recreation (hunting). (Angola, Legislative Instrument 3,550 1 May). In July (Legislative Instrument 3,560, 10 July) this provision was extended to Luanda district, the concelhos of Ambriz and Nambuangongo, the administrative posts of Ucuva, Quicabo, Barra do Dande and the concelho of Dande.

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3. Economic conditions

103. The Lusitania News Agency reported in January that Angola's estimated budget for 1966 at nearly 4,000 million escudos is the highest the Territory has ever had, and there will be a surplus balance of 5.5 million escudos. The total estimated revenue for 1966 is 3,958.9 million escudos, which is only 12.3 million more than that for 1965. There has been only a slight increase in the ordinary revenue from 3,815.2 million in 1965 to 3,829.9 in 1966, but extraordinary revenue dropped from 131.4 million to 128.9 million. In contrast, in 1966 the estimated ordinary expenditure has increased by 20 million escudos, so that the anticipated surplus will be 5.3 million less than that in 1965.

104. In 1966, revenue from State enterprises and participation in private enterprises is expected to increase by 47.3 million escudos and from indirect taxes by 51.7 million escudos. In spite of the fact that the minimum general tax was revised in September 1965 (Governor General's Despatch, 4 September, Boletim Oficial de Angola, No. 200) and is levied at an average rate of 200-250 escudos in most districts and 350 escudos in the more economically developed areas, the 1966 estimated revenue from this source is 11 million escudos lower than in 1965.

105. The 1966 Angola budget provides for an estimated expenditure of 626 million escudos for the armed forces which is 30 per cent higher than the original 1965 estimates. Angola's actual share in national defence costs last year for overseas military forces was 554.9 million escudos, or approximately 14 per cent of the total estimated expenditure, with 380.8 million for the army, 52.1 million for the navy and 122.0 million for the air force. Of the total, about one half (282.6 million escudos) was from the Territory's ordinary revenue in accordance with a 1959 provision (Decree 42,559); 14 per cent was from the special tax introduced in 1961 on Territorial services with an "autonomous" budget; about 7 per cent from the Territory's surpluses; 20 per cent from the revised tax on profits introduced at the end of 1964; and the remainder from the Defence Fund and the Territory's extraordinary revenue.

106. The revised defence tax on profits (Decree 46,112, 29 December 1964) which came into effect in 1965 applies to individuals or companies, national or foreign, who have annual profits exceeding 500,000 escudos. It applies to income from trading industries, urban real estate or from exploitation of natural resources. Under the

earlier provisions (Decree 45,067, 7 June 1963) which were found to produce insufficient revenue, the tax had applied only to companies established in the Territory for more than five years, earning profits of more than 1 million escudos and which were subject to the industrial or exploitation tax, but did not apply to companies exempt from income tax under their contracts. Reports indicate that companies such as Tanganyika Concessions, which owns the Benguela Railway, and which was previously exempt, may now have to pay the profit tax. Another innovation is that the profits tax now applies also to interest and dividends of 500,000 escudos or more, or which, together with earnings from other operations listed above, yield an income over that amount. As a means of ensuring full collection of the new tax, the Angola Government in August ordered (Boletim Oficial de Angola, No. 34, p. 1143) that all companies, foreign or Portuguese, operating in the Territory, irrespective of the location of their headquarters, should submit a list of their shareholders together with information on the number of shares held and interest and dividends paid.

107. Defence expenditures in Angola are not limited to the allocations for the three armed forces. The Civil Defence and Volunteer Corps, for instance, which is an integral part of the Territorial defence forces, is supported mainly by special taxes. In addition, much of the development expenditure on infra-structure has been allocated to projects of immediate need for defence, such as airports, radio communications, etc. Although Angola pays for a large share of the defence costs out of its budget, some of the costs are also paid for by the Portuguese Government. In 1964 the Government of Angola loaned 104 million escudos to the Defence Ministry in Portugal for the local military region (Decree 46,760, 20 December 1965).

108. As already reported, under the Transitional Development Plan 1965-1967 for Angola, a total investment of 7,210 million escudos is to be made, over the three-year period (A/6000/Add.3, para. 62). About 34 per cent will be from external sources (including a private loan from the General Trade Co., a company with headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland, of \$US35 million for equipment). Of the remaining 4,360 million escudos which is to be financed by "national sources", loans from Portugal will provide 1,000 million escudos, the Government of Angola will provide 750 million escudos from revenue, 600 million will be raised by the

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issue of development bonds, 200 million will come from financing companies^{11/} and 1,607.5 million from private investment. The Territory is expected to finance its annual share of 250 million escudos from (a) budgetary surpluses of 100 million escudos, (b) an equal amount from the 2.5 per cent Development Fund tax on exports and (c) 50 million escudos from the sobrevalorização export tax, mainly on coffee.^{12/}

109. Full details on the implementation of the Plan during 1965 are not yet available. It was reported in September that an allocation of public sector funds of 955 million escudos was made for development expenditure during the year. This is 11 million escudos more than the average annual investment envisaged in the Territorial Development Plan and greater recourse is made to Angola's own finances than was originally envisaged. Despite the tight financial situation and the small surplus in the budget last year, budgetary surpluses will provide 240 million which, together with 60 million from the sobrevalorização tax and 20 million from the Development Fund, brings Angola's contribution from its own revenues up to 320 million escudos. The remaining 635 million is to be provided as follows: 370 million by loans from Portugal, 65 million from credit institutions and financing companies, and 200 million by the issue of development bonds.

110. Allocated development expenditure during 1965 amounted to 1,040 million escudos as follows: agriculture and livestock, 14 per cent; roads, railways, ports and airports, 29 per cent; Cunene Valley development and hydro-electric power development, 16 per cent; industries, 14 per cent; health, education, social welfare and radio communications, 13 per cent; studies of natural resources, 8 per cent; fishing, 3 per cent; and improvement of local housing, 3 per cent.

111. In his New Year's speech, the Governor General noted that the economic situation in 1965 had not fulfilled expectations; there had been a drop in prices of agricultural products, exports of petroleum as well as of iron both fell below the 1964 level, and the Territory continued to suffer from the exchange situation (a pressão cambial).

^{11/} Participação privada no capital das previstas sociedades de financiamento e de desenvolvimento (see Development Plan).

^{12/} This tax is levied on the difference in the current export price of certain commodities as compared with the 1949 price.

112. Detailed trade and production statistics are not yet available for 1965. Reports indicate that compared with the previous year, production of coffee dropped by 16 per cent due to bad weather, sisal remained at the same level but there were some gains in the production of maize, cotton, oilseeds and tobacco, and sugar production was reported to be around 70,000 metric tons, against 68,200 in 1963-64, and 73,200 tons in 1962-63. According to some sources, the 1966 harvest is expected to show greater gains as a result of the intensified efforts in recent years to increase agricultural production.

113. It may be noted that while the Transitional Development Plan places greater emphasis on the expansion of African agriculture, no large investments are planned in this sector. The Government hopes to stimulate African production of such crops as maize and cotton mainly by improving the price to growers, which hitherto has been low, and by reducing export duties on these crops. As such measures would reduce Territorial income, it was at first planned in July 1965 to raise export duties on coffee and sisal and to introduce certain taxes on consumer goods to compensate for the anticipated loss but these were later withdrawn when the exports of those two crops proved to be less encouraging than had been expected. A new tax on consumer goods has however been reintroduced.

114. In the mining sector, increased diamond production in 1965 is expected to compensate for the lower output of iron, petroleum and salt. Diamond production totalled 1,149,068 carats in 1964, and the Angola Diamond Company reported a profit of 192.3 million escudos out of which a dividend of 110 escudos per share was paid. (The shares have a nominal value of 170 escudos.) The value of diamonds produced in the first ten months of 1965 was reported to be 74 million escudos more than in the corresponding period of 1964.

115. There is continued interest in diamond prospecting. In the first nine months of 1965, twenty-five new requests for prospecting concessions were filed. A new concession was granted to the Sociedade Angolana de Pedras Preciosas e Diamantes, (DIPETRA), a Portuguese company. The concession granted to the South African Angola Exploration Company was revoked in April (Order 21,220, 14 April) for having failed to meet the required conditions.

116. Crude petroleum production increased from 800,000 tons in 1963 to 905,000 tons in 1964, but fell short of the previously anticipated 1 million tons (A/6000/Add.3, part I, para. 55). Exports of crude oil totalled 361,000 tons (compared with

313,000 in 1963), of which 292,000 went to Portugal where a new refinery has been established, and 70,000 tons to foreign countries. Early in 1965, the Government ordered that all excess fuel oil produced by the refinery in Luanda should be absorbed by the Portuguese domestic market. However, output of crude oil during the year was reported to have dropped to 700,000 tons, due to technical reasons. 117. At the end of 1965 Petrangol signed a new contract with the Portuguese Government (Decree 46,822, 31 December). This contract replaces all previous ones, and it is reported that, in consequence, Petrofina's contract with Petrangol as an associated concessionary company will also be cancelled.^{13/} Petrangol is authorized to increase its capital from 150 to 900 million escudos and the duration of its contract is extended to 1970. Petrangol will undertake to invest 1,250 million escudos in prospecting and development of new deposits, with an annual average of 100-150 million escudos to be spent in the Cuanza district concession, and 50 million in its concession in the Congo district. It may reduce the annual expenditures only with the approval of the Government and provided discovered reserves are not less than 75 million tons. The Government will receive a 12.5 per cent royalty on surface value of oil extracted, and 50 per cent of the profits of Petrangol and of such companies operating with it on a "joint venture" basis. The Government controls the choice of such companies. The Government will receive a bonus of 30 million escudos on signing of the contract, an annual sum of 1 million escudos which will be paid into the Mining Development Fund which is being set up, and it will also receive two loans, one of 250 million escudos at 4 per cent interest for three years, and another of 40 million escudos at no interest for ten years.

118. During the year there were conflicting reports as to the ability and possibility of Angola supplying oil to South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. In October 1965 the Diario de Noticias in Lisbon carried a report from Lourenço Marques that a well-informed source in Johannesburg had revealed that negotiations for the supply of Angolan oil to South Africa were in progress and that supply would start soon. In November, an official of Petrofina in Brussels said that Petrangol "for technical and contractual reasons" would not be able to supply

^{13/} For details of relations of Petrangol with Petrofina see A/6000/Add.3, part II, appendix I, paras. 179-181.

Southern Rhodesia with oil if sanctions were imposed. The participation of the General Mining Corporation in a joint banking enterprise with Portugal (see para. 50 above) is reported to indicate Federale Mynbou Beperk's continued interest in Angolan oil since the two companies are closely connected.

119. During the year, Alfred Krupp made a visit to Angola where his company is participating in the development of the Cassinga iron mines operated under concession by the Companhia Mineira do Lobito (A/6000/Add.3, part II, appendix I, para. 207). Machinery and equipment for use at the Cassinga Mines have been granted special tariff privileges and a new government body has been established to co-ordinate the development of road, rail and port facilities at Moçâmedes in connexion with the Cassinga Mine project. In June 1965 (Decree 46,372) the Portuguese Government gave its guarantee to the 1,300 million escudo loan previously contracted by the Companhia Mineira do Lcmbige and the Sociedade Mineira do Lcmbige with the consortium headed by Krupp (of Essen, Germany). The Yawata Iron and Steel Company of Japan is reported to have already concluded an agreement for 6 million tons of iron ore to be delivered in six years, at an agreed price of \$US8.14 per ton C.I.F. Japan. In 1965, it was reported that Japanese industrialists, with the backing of the Bank of Japan, were ready to invest up to \$US120 million in Angola for the establishment of a metal industry.

120. Following reports in 1964 of the discovery of new deposits of manganese, nickel and platinum at the Bay of Tigers, copper deposits were discovered in 1965 near Mina River in the Benguela district. Because the copper deposits are relatively near the Benguela Railway, the ore could be easily exported.

121. A new mining company has been formed to exploit the manganese deposits in the Mexico district. The newly established Sociedade Mineira do Cassai, Ida. will co-operate with the Spanish Steel Group and expects to produce 100,000 tons annually for ten years. The Spanish interests will finance the equipment, construct a 70 km rail link and provide the rolling stock. Various companies in the United States of America, South Africa and the Federal Republic of Germany are reported to be interested in the purchase of the manganese ore.

122. Apart from the mining sector, several other new foreign investments were reported during the year. One is an investment of 130 million escudos by the Interamerican Capital Corporation of New York for the hydroelectric power station

at Alto Catumbela. Interamerican has financed other projects in Angola, including roads, the Luanda Airport and factories. It has also financed the Sal Airport in the Cape Verde Islands. The president of Interamerican is Frederick J. Evans, who is also president of Evans and Dell Company which has supplied all the equipment and construction materials used.

123. During the first six months of 1965, traffic on the Benguela Railway through Lobito port was equal to that of the entire previous year. As a result of increased loads, early in 1966 Tanganyika Concessions Ltd. announced a plan to double the Benguela Railway's westward capacity from 1.5 million tons to 3 million tons annually within two years, at a cost of £5 million. The plan involves the construction of a second line between Cubal and Lobito. At present the Benguela Railway is a single-track line with wood-burning engines. The Company's concession on the railway has thirty-five more years before it expires.

124. From 1962 to 1964 an average of some 1,300 new transforming industries have been registered each year. The capital invested annually has averaged around 150 million escudos, providing employment for an additional 3,500 persons each year. By the end of 1964 there were a total of 17,316 establishments with a combined investment of 2,560 million escudos, employing some 58,000 persons. New investments in transforming industries already made or planned include 200 million escudos by the Companhia de Celulose mainly for paper pulp; 138 million escudos for the manufacture of ferrous ingots (ferro-ligas); 250 million escudos for a foundry and sheet metal works; and the aluminium industry already reported which was established with a capital of 10 million escudos, but may increase this to 500 million escudos. New industries reported established in 1965 include a 30 million escudo sisal rope factory, Companhia de Fiação e Cordaria de Angola (CCFIANG) by a group of sisal interests in the Benguela district; the investment by the Companhia do Açúcar de Angola of 95 million escudos to increase the capacity of its factories at Donde and Loge; the establishment of a new tyre factory, Mabor, with a registered capital of 60 million escudos which may be increased to 150 million; a new plant to build farm tractors and other agricultural machinery; a new bicycle and motor-cycle manufacturing factory; a match factory (15.7 million escudos); a yeast factory by a Dutch group which already has interests in Portugal; a Swedish car assembly

plant; a joint French-Angolan wine bottling and manufacturing plant; a fertilizer plant (50 million escudos); a battery factory (300 million escudos); a factory for making mining explosives; and a cotton spinning mill.

125. The largest increases in output of the transforming industries were beer (with an increase of 3.7 million litres in the first ten months), flour, biscuits and soft drinks. These gains, mainly of non-essential consumer goods could be due to a rising standard of living, and could be due, at least partially, to the increase in the number of troops from Portugal and the European settlers. (In 1965 it was estimated that the total population of Angola was 5.5 million and there were 300,000 Europeans.) There were increases in the output of textiles and refined petroleum, which account for respectively one tenth and one third of the total industrial output. There were also increases in the output of chemicals and cement.

126. Despite these increases Angola remains dependent on Portugal for a large range of imports of both durable and non-durable goods. During the first nine months of the year the adverse trade balance was 1,000 million escudos higher than in the corresponding period in 1964, due to a simultaneous increase in imports and a drop in exports. As a result, Angola's balance of payments deteriorated. Towards the end of the year a series of editorials appeared in the Angolan Press suggesting that curbs should be reintroduced on imports.

127. In November, in a speech at the opening of the new sisal factory, COFIANG, the Angola Provincial Secretary of the Economy took the opportunity to explain that the balance of trade had deteriorated mainly due to essential imports, that any restrictions on imports would necessarily have an impact on the standard of living in the Territory and have an adverse effect on the economy of Portugal and the taxable capacity of the nation (capacidade tributária da Nação).

128. At the beginning of this year, the Angola Government issued a more detailed statement on the trade situation. It pointed out that under the existing legislation, regulating the economic integration of the Portuguese realm (espaço português) it was not possible for Angola to take measures to restrict imports from other "national" Territories; such measures can only be made by the Council of Ministers for Economic Affairs in Lisbon for limited periods, after consulting the competent organs, especially the Monetary Fund of the escudo zone

(Fundo Monetário da Zona do Escudo). Nor could Angola take measures against foreign countries with which Portugal had special trade agreements, as for instance the EFTA and GATT countries.

129. The official statement showed that during the period from January to August 1965, as compared with the same period in 1964, imports of essential consumer goods increased by 205 million escudos, non-essential consumer goods by 71 million, and production goods by 440 million. Of the essential consumer goods only 37 million had been for durables, mainly refrigerating units, and of the non-durables, almost two thirds had been for clothing, about one fifth for food, and 12 per cent for drugs. Of the production goods, 55 per cent was for equipment and 45 per cent for various primary materials, intermediate or semi-manufactured goods. The Government stated that as the adverse balance of trade was due mainly to production needs, the effect on the balance of payments was a small price to pay for the future economic growth of the Territory. With the new industries which the Territory would be able to establish under the new regulations, including textile factories, Angola would in a few years' time become more self-sufficient and would be able to improve its balance-of-payments situation.

130. According to the study on the Transitional Development Plan, 1965-1967, Angola's invisible transfers amounted in 1962 to 576 million escudos (of which 121 million represented transfers of profits, and 455 million private transfers). In 1965, according to one report, invisible transfers to Portugal of rents, profits and office maintenance costs, which alone amounted to some 808 million escudos, had contributed to the balance-of-payments difficulties. It was reported in July 1965 that new exchange control measures were envisaged on all transfers of over 60,000 escudos including transfers within the escudo zone; these would have to be submitted to the Exchange Council (Conselho de Câmbios) in Luanda.

4. Land concession and settlement

131. As has already been reported (A/6000/Add.3, part II, appendix II, paras. 73-79), with the influx of new settlers from Portugal from the mid-1950's onwards, procedures for granting land concessions broke down. One of the main causes was the lack of adequate staff to survey the areas to be concessioned. The geographical and cadastral survey services of the Territories have since been reorganized and

in October 1965, a new Inspector of the Cadastral Survey was appointed in Angola. On that occasion, the Provincial Secretary for Rural Development noted that during the ten-year period 1950-1959, there were over 13,000 requests for concessions, and that at the end of December 1964, there were 14,769 requests for concessions pending action. He stated that while some of the delays had been due to the applicants themselves who failed to reply to requests for further information, government measures were needed to deal with the situation. The inspection teams had an important role to play in helping the concessionaires fulfil their obligations. They would be particularly important in the rural areas where non-compliance with the law was often due to the fact that the inhabitants had hardly any means of knowing it, and strict enforcement would only be possible when they were better informed. In urban areas it was also important to speed up the process of granting charters to the local government bodies in respect of the land within their competence.

132. As noted above (paras. 72-77) the whole question of intensifying settlement in the Overseas Territories, the reorganization of the settlement services and the role of the Provincial Settlement Boards in Angola and Mozambique, have been under discussion in Lisbon. On his visit to Lisbon in February, the Governor-General of Angola said that, in spite of its defects and mistakes, the Angola Provincial Settlement Board was in fact the most experienced body in the whole country in matters concerning population, reorganization (reordenamento) and settlement of persons from various parts of the nation. While Angola did not have the most fertile soil, there was plenty of work for all who came. (For 1966, however, the estimated budget for the Angola Provincial Settlement Board is only 145 million escudos, compared with 160 million in 1965.)

133. Because of recurrent earthquakes in the Azores, the Portuguese Government has drawn up plans for settlement of families from the islands in Angola. A new group of sixty families with some 356 persons is being settled in Angola. Twenty of the families will be settled at Cela and forty will be in the area of Bela Vista. These families will engage in dairy farming.

134. A new proposal for the establishment of soldier-settlers in "defensive settlements" in Angola appeared in an official publication in 1965. The principal areas suggested for these settlements include the northern frontier and other strategic locations linked by major lines of transport. Estimated costs of settlement of each family is 200,000 escudos.

5. Education

135. A pamphlet published by the Angola Provincial Education Services describes in some detail the present school system and the organization of the Territorial Education Services. Statistics given in the pamphlet show that between the school years 1960-1961 and 1962-1963 the number of official and private primary schools increased from 2,011 to 2,329; the number of teachers from 2,890 to 3,356; pupils from 105,781 to 123,641; expenditures on education increased from 35.5 million escudos in 1961 to 62 million in 1963. For 1966 the estimated expenditure of the Education Services is 242 million escudos. In addition 22.5 million escudos is allocated for the Estudos Gerais Universitários and 31.2 million as a subsidy to the Catholic Missions.

136. The latest school statistics for the school year 1963-1964, which was before the unification of the primary system (see A/6000/Add.3, part I, paras. 37-41), are given below:

Angola School Statistics, 1963-1964

<u>Type of school</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Number of teachers</u>	<u>Number of pupils</u>	<u>Expenditure million escudos</u>
Adaptation	1,241	1,954	98,615	...
Primary	50,000 a/	...
Elementary professional	7	100	2,094	...
Technical primary	24	460	10,205	27.7
<u>Liceu</u> (secondary)	51 b/	542	10,403	20.9
Post-primary vocational training (<u>médio</u>):				
Industrial and commercial	4	53	208	...
Primary teacher training (<u>escolas de magistério primário</u>)	3	...	97	...
<u>Estudos Gerais Universitários</u>	-	...	273	...

a/ Based on the 1964 information that total primary enrolment was around 150,000.

b/ Nine official, 42 private.

137. The new "unified" primary school system was introduced in 1964-1965; no detailed statistics are yet available. During 1965, 485 school "posts" (postos escolares) were established in twelve of the districts. (The school post provides the first three primary grades and the preparatory language instruction class.) In addition, eleven school posts were raised to the elementary primary level (with four out of the five primary grades). The school posts are located by districts as follows: Benguela, 35; Bié, 45; Cabinda, 56; Cuando Cubango, 12; Cuanza North, 64; Cuanza South, 39; Huíla, 14; Lunda, 56; Malanje, 3; Moxico, 28; and Uíge, 23.

138. With the expansion of the rural school posts as a means of eliminating illiteracy, there is a recrudescence of interest in the training of an "élite", and the provision of the necessary facilities. A number of new post primary and secondary schools were established during the year. Up to September 1965, these included one liceu (academic secondary school); two elementary technical schools at Henrique de Carvalho and at Cubal; the elementary technical school at Novo Redondo was up-graded to an industrial and commercial school, as was the commercial school at Lobito.

139. According to the information contained in the Transitional Development Plan, the average rate of increase of secondary school enrolment including both academic and technical schools during the period 1953-1962, was 16 per cent per year. It was envisaged that with the expansion of primary education, the number of secondary pupils would be 26,000 in 1967-1968, 46,000 in 1972-1973, and 82,000 by the school year 1977-1978. Of this total it is expected that about half of the students will be in the academic secondary schools. The Transitional Development Plan therefore envisages that the Territory will require 58 secondary schools by 1967-1968, increasing to 102 and 136 respectively in the two following quinquennial periods. Assuming the total population of Angola to be 5.5 million in 1967-1968, the secondary enrolment will then be approximately one per 2,000 population.

140. The main objective of the Estudos Gerais Universitários de Angola begun in 1963 (A/5800/Rev.1, chapter V, para. 102), as the Minister of National Education noted in 1965 when he visited the Territory for the opening of the new school year, is to create a teaching staff at the higher level for the preparation of the qualified technical personnel needed. Courses are provided at three centres. The

medical and surgical training, and a wide-range of engineering courses are at Luanda, where there is also a National Laboratory for Civil Engineering. The higher school for veterinary studies and the higher institute for agronomy are at Nova Lisboa, and during the year new courses in agronomy were added. The courses for the training of technical professional teachers, including those in agriculture and forestry are at Sá da Bandeira. A centre for the study of Humanities is to be added later.

6. Public Health

141. Under the Transitional Development Plan 1965-1967 for Angola, while provision is made for the extension of available medical facilities, emphasis is mainly on preventive medicine and other measures for improving public health. These include special campaigns, increased training of technical personnel, public health education, and measures against communicable diseases. Annual expenditure envisaged under the Development Plan amount to some 80 million escudos.

142. During 1965 work was begun to enlarge the hospital in Luanda. The first phase involves an expenditure of 23 million escudos and an increase of 300 beds; the second phase will cost 50 million escudos and raise the total capacity to 1,000 beds. Two new rural hospitals are being built, one in Vila General Machado, the other in Vila Teixeira de Sousa.

143. The 1966 budget for Angola shows that Government medical services consisted of 2 central hospitals, 13 regional hospitals, 3 sub-regional hospitals, 57 rural hospitals, 97 health delegacias, and 258 sanitary posts. The estimated expenditure of the Public Health Services amounts to 200.4 million escudos.

C. Mozambique

1. Constitutional and political

(a) Election of the Head of State

144. Although a local press report lists the names of fifty-two persons, Mozambique was officially represented by fifty-one members in the electoral college which elected the Head of State (see paras. 13-17). They were the seven deputies to the National Assembly, two members of the Corporative Chamber, twenty-four members of the Legislative Council, chosen by election within that body, and eighteen representatives of the municipal councils.

145. It is significant that Mozambique, with a total population in 1960 of 6.6 million had the same number of representatives as Angola, with a population of 4.8 million whereas Portugal and adjacent islands, with a population of 8.9 million, had 438 representatives.

(b) Elections to the National Assembly

146. In the election of Mozambique's seven deputies to the National Assembly, held on 7 November 1965, 64,034 persons voted, representing 87.17 per cent of the registered electorate.

147. The qualifications for voting in the elections to the National Assembly are briefly set out in the previous report of the Special Committee (A/6000/Add.3, para. 9), where it was pointed out that the two alternative requirements, literacy in Portuguese or payment of a minimum amount of certain taxes, would restrict the numbers of the indigenous people eligible to vote. The results show that out of an estimated population of over 6.6 million (including about 97,000 Europeans and 31,000 mistos),^{14/} only 1.1 per cent were registered and less than 1 per cent actually voted. The following table shows the number of voters in each district, compared with the estimated population in 1960:

^{14/} These figures are provisional estimates for 1960 published in the Anuário Estatístico of 1963. It is unofficially estimated that the European population had increased to 150,000 in 1965.

<u>District</u>	<u>Population^{a/}</u>			
	<u>Number of voters</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Europeans</u>	<u>Voters as % of population</u>
Cabo Delgado	2,979	542,165	1,482	0.5
Gaza	5,652	675,150	7,422	0.8
Inhambane	3,982	583,722	1,913	0.7
Lourenço Marques	17,892	441,363	48,182	4.0
Manica e Sofala	14,801	781,070	19,668	1.9
Moçambique	9,016	1,444,555	8,074	0.6
Niassa	1,512	276,810	992	0.6
Tete	2,663	470,100	2,169	0.6
Zambézia	5,546	1,363,619	7,436	0.4

a/ Population figures are for 1960 (provisional).

148. As in Angola, the results of the elections, in which there were no Opposition candidates, were hailed as "a reaffirmation of the people's confidence in the policy of intransigent defence of national Territory". The pre-electoral campaign period had been mainly devoted to public discussion of the manifesto published by the Opposition in Portugal, in particular the proposal for self-determination of the Overseas Territories, which had been denounced as "a traitorous attempt to disintegrate the Portuguese nation" in numerous press commentaries, statements by public figures and organized bodies and at mass public rallies.

149. Of the seven candidates of the Government organized National Union who were elected without contest, only three were born in Mozambique, three of the others having been born in Portugal and one in Macau. Three were re-elected as deputies, a fourth was already a member of the Overseas Council. By occupation, they included a businessman and sisal producer, a secondary school teacher, a lawyer, a doctor of medicine, two company directors, one of them a director of the Companhia do Boror, the Sociedade de Estudos e Investimentos de Moçambique and the Companhia Industrial de Fundição e Laminagem (CIFEL) and also a member of the Legislative Council, and the seventh a former executive of the Sociedade Hidroeléctrica do Revuè and now president of the municipal council of Beira.

2. The military situation in Mozambique

150. As noted in the previous report of the Special Committee (A/6000/Add.3, paras. 83-86), there has been fighting between the Portuguese armed forces and insurgents led by the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), since September 1964 when the latter declared an insurrection in the Territory.

151. The fighting is of a guerrilla nature and it is difficult to ascertain the real situation because of conflicting reports. According to Portuguese military bulletins, the hostilities have been confined to clashes with small armed groups of guerrillas in restricted areas of the northern and northwestern parts of the Territory, near the frontier of Tanzania and more recently in the Tete district on the border with Zambia. According to these reports, the principal areas of insurgent activity are the Maconde plateau, between the Rovuma and Massalo rivers and the country adjacent to Lake Nyasa. Early in 1965, fighting was reported in the region of Milange, but it is reported that insurgent forces in this area have been liquidated. FRELIMO sources, in contrast, stated in October and December that the fighting was widespread and that large areas in Northern Mozambique were under their control.

152. It appears from reports that the fighting, consisting mainly of small-scale clashes, was sporadic at the outset but grew more frequent after mid-1965 when Portuguese forces, numbering 20,000 under a newly appointed commander, Brig. Gen. António dos Santos, began extensive military and air operations from a chain of combined air and land bases established since 1961 near the northern borders of Cabo Delgado and Niassa districts. It appears that Portuguese forces were reinforced during the year. In August, the Portuguese military commander stated in a press interview that the armed forces in the Territory, presumably including military, mobile police and militia, numbered between 40,000 and 50,000, a substantial increase over the 25,000 troops reported a year earlier. In November 1965 and February 1966 there were press reports of further large reinforcements, the latter report being denied in Lisbon.

153. From about September 1965 onwards Portuguese forces, including parachutists, special fusiliers (an elite corps of specially trained commandos), police and militia, supported from the air, have been engaged in a series of combined

operations to track down groups of guerrillas in the Messalo River area, near the Tanzania border, and in the Maniamba area near Lake Nyassa. The local population is being grouped in specially constructed village settlements (aldeamentos) defended by military units, while, at the same time, camps of "recuperated" Africans suspected of aiding the guerrillas are being established near military centres. As a result of the increased military operations, the number of clashes has become more frequent as can be seen from the conflicting reports of casualties from both sides. According to Portuguese official sources, Portuguese military casualties between the outbreak of hostilities in 1964 and March 1966 were eighty-five while in the month of January 1966 alone it was claimed that 187 insurgents had been killed, wounded or captured. A FRELIMO communiqué on the other hand claimed that in January 100 Portuguese troops were killed or wounded against eight insurgents.

154. The disturbances in these northern areas were accompanied during late 1964 and early 1965 by large movements of African refugees, first across the Rovuma River into Tanzania and later, in smaller numbers, into Malawi and Zambia. As reported previously (A/6000/Add.3, para. 86), the refugees in Tanzania were being cared for in camps by the Tanzanian authorities with supplementary assistance from the UN/FAO World Food Programme. In July 1965, it was announced by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees that a tripartite agreement had been signed with the Government of Tanzania and the Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service for settling 10,000 refugees at Rutamba in southern Tanzania. The project would take three years to complete and would cost a total of \$US1.8 million. The Government of Tanzania would make available at least three acres per family unit and would supply goods and services to the value of \$US43,000. The UN/FAO World Food Programme would supply \$US500,000 worth of commodities. The High Commissioner had been asked to contribute \$US412,300 and \$US278,000 would be made available by religious and other sources.

155. In July 1965 it was reported that about 2,000 refugees from Niassa district had taken refuge at a missionary centre on Likoma island in Malawi and subsequent information indicated that their numbers had increased to over 3,000 by September, although many refugees had already returned to Mozambique. In February 1966, it was reported in the Press that about 3,500 refugees were housed in two government camps in eastern Zambia.

3. Security measures

156. In early 1965, a number of non-Portuguese newspapers carried reports suggesting that there had been widespread arrests for political reasons in Mozambique. These reports were officially denied by the Government, which, however, admitted that eight persons, among them the former editor of a local newspaper and three other well-known intellectuals, had been arrested for political activities. In August 1965 the chief of the policial police PIDE (Polícia Internacional de Defesa do Estado) was quoted in the Press as stating that these arrests were part of an action taken to eliminate a subversive group established by FRELIMO in southern Mozambique. It was reported that a number of other arrests had been made in connexion with the case and that in consequence the Centro Associativo dos Negros da Província de Moçambique, a cultural and educational association and centre for Africans in Lourenço Marques, with a membership of 15,000 had been closed. It was later disclosed that the association had been banned because members of its directorate were accused of subversive political activities but that, after an interruption, the centre would be permitted to resume its educational activities.

4. Economic conditions

157. Mozambique's defence expenditures continue to rise as the result of the hostilities which began in 1964. The amount allocated in 1965 to the armed services was 578,730,000 escudos,^{15/} of which 437.7 million was for the army, 108 million for the air force and 33 million for the naval forces. The bulk of this, 510 million, was to be paid by the Territory, to be derived from (a) ordinary revenue (195.8 million); (b) the receipts of autonomous parastatal bodies (205.2 million); (c) the Government's share in the receipts of the Beira Railway (48 million); and (d) a public loan (61 million).^{16/} The remaining 68.7 million escudos was to be derived from the Overseas Military Defence Fund in Portugal. It may be noted that these military expenditures, which represent

^{15/} Orders Nos. 21, 243-5, 26 April 1965.

^{16/} Decree No. 46,236, 18 March 1965.

only part of the total cost of defence, comprise about 12 per cent of the Territory's budget and are increasing at the rate of about 80 million escudos yearly. In 1965 (Legislative Instrument No. 2,614, 10 July) a new National Defence Stamp tax was introduced, payable on all receipts over 100 escudos and on all other legal documents. It was estimated that the new tax would yield about 16.5 million escudos from automobile licences alone. Apart from increased taxation, however, the main source of defence funds are additional appropriations from the receipts of the "autonomous services", particularly the government-controlled railways, ports and harbours which derive their revenue largely from the important transit trade of Mozambique's neighbours. The fact that this major sector of Mozambique's economy is controlled by the Territorial Government permits a degree of flexibility in public financing which is not obtainable in Angola where revenue increases must come primarily from increased taxes or contributions from the private sector.

158. Increased contributions from the "autonomous services" and, to a lesser extent, increased revenues from direct and indirect taxes resulting from the growth of economic activity, have enabled total government expenditure to grow more rapidly than expenditure on defence and so have not prevented increased expenditure in other sectors. Thus, the estimates of ordinary revenue and expenditure for 1966, amounting to 4,143 million escudos, show an increase of 293.6 million over the preceding year and nearly 400 million over 1964. The main sources are: receipts from "autonomous services", 1,695.4 million (an increase of 176.2 million over 1965); indirect taxes, mainly customs duties, 731.3 million escudos (an increase of 32.6 million); and direct taxes, 648 million (increased by only 4.9 million). It may be noted that direct taxes yield less than one sixth of ordinary revenue.

159. Under the various headings of ordinary expenditure for 1966, the following allocations may be noted: public debt servicing, 240.5 million escudos (increased by 34 million over 1965); national defence, 549.4 million (increased by 80.2 million); ports, railways, and transport, 1,340 million (increased by 120 million); agriculture and forestry, 33.7 million (increased by 0.2 million); and health and welfare, 175.1 million (increased by 17.8 million). For education the 1966 allocations included: government education services, 158.2 million

(increased by 14.5 million); assistance to Portuguese Catholic missions, 69.5 million; and Estudos Gerais Universitários, 19 million. Thus, despite increases, expenditure on education represents less than 6 per cent of the ordinary budget, health and welfare about 4 per cent and agriculture and forestry less than 1 per cent, not including expenditures from separate funds which exist for certain regulated crops.

160. The Transitional Development Plan, 1963-1967 (see A/6000/Add.3, paras. 89-90), provided in the case of Mozambique for an investment target of 5,400 million escudos over the three-year period, to be financed as follows: external loans, 1,500 million escudos; Government of Portugal, 1,120 million; Territorial funds, 750 million; private sector, 1,980 million; and credit institutions, 50 million. The division by major sectors was: transport and port facilities, 1,771 million; industries, 1,436 million (including 1,350 million for transforming industries); agriculture, 760 million (including 500 million for irrigation and settlement schemes); education and health, 500 million; electricity, 400 million; fisheries, 328 million; and housing and tourism, 144 million.

161. Under the Plan the yearly target contribution from the public sector amounts to about 624 million escudos, of which 250 million was to be furnished by the Territory and about 374 million by the Government of Portugal. In 1965 public expenditure under the Plan amounted to 611 million escudos, only slightly less than the target. Of this total, 423 million consisted of loans from Portugal and 100 million was obtained from an issue by the Territorial Government of treasury bonds at 5 per cent interest. The bond issue was made under a general authorization announced in July permitting the Mozambique Government to issue bonds up to a maximum of 500 million escudos. As yet no information is available on Portugal's contribution under the Plan for 1966, but in February it was announced that the Territorial Government had been authorized to borrow 200 million escudos at 2 per cent interest from the Banco Nacional Ultramarino, which will be used mainly to finance the development of transport communications. It was also announced that credits amounting to 23 million escudos had been opened for agricultural, irrigation and settlement schemes to be financed under the Development Plan.

162. As may be expected, a large part of the public funds are being used to improve the Territory's road, railway and port facilities. The opening in late 1964 of the Swaziland railway, increasing transit trade and tourism, which are Mozambique's main source of foreign exchange, and also continuing growth of its own foreign commerce, have placed a heavy burden on the existing port and transport facilities. This is reflected in the volume of goods handled at Mozambique ports and by the volume of traffic on the railways, which in both cases was more than 15 per cent greater during the first eight months of 1965 than during the corresponding period of 1964. To cope with this extra burden, 140 million escudos were spent during 1965 on additional port facilities at Beira and substantial sums on similar improvements at Lourenço Marques. At the latter port work was begun on the construction of large loading and storage installations which will handle Rhodesian sugar exports and eventually exports of sugar to be produced in the Lourenço Marques area. The cost of the project which includes storage capacity for 80,000 tons of sugar, will be 66 million escudos. Work was also completed on a new mineral ore loading quay designed to handle iron ore from Swaziland, on the construction of a new railway terminal at Beira (costing 50 million escudos) and contracts were issued (totalling 64.7 million escudos) for the purchase of new rolling stock for the Mozambique railway where existing wood-burning locomotives are also being replaced by diesel at a cost of 125 million escudos. A major undertaking, which is being financed under the Development Plan, consists of a crash programme of road development, including especially the construction of an important road linking Lourenço Marques and Beira, for part of which contracts totalling 200 million escudos were announced in 1965, and the extension and improvement of roads in the north.

163. According to reports, Mozambique is entering upon a period of significant expansion in several sectors of its domestic economy. In the field of sugar production, three new companies, involving capital investments in the region of one-half billion escudos each, have been, or are being formed. This combined output should, within a few years, increase the Territory's sugar production (totalling 181,775 tons in 1963/64) by about half. Two of these are Portuguese companies, the third, located in the lower Zambezi Valley, being a subsidiary of the Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa (which also has interests in cashew

processing, fishing and prospecting for diamonds at Pafuri). In addition, the Sena Sugar Estates, Ltd., which is the largest of the existing producers, began in January 1965 a capital investment programme involving approximately 360 million escudos, which will increase its output by about 25 per cent. (Details of these developments will be contained in a separate study on the role of agriculture in Angola and Mozambique which is in preparation.)

164. The most notable development in the past few years has however been the growth of cashew production and processing. For the first time cashew exports assumed first place among the Territory's exports in 1964, producing an export revenue of 608 million escudos compared with 565 million for raw cotton which was formerly Mozambique's leading export. This represented a 38.5 per cent increase in the value of cashew exported over 1963. Because the export value of cashew is about twice that of the unprocessed nut, recent investment has centred on the establishment of processing factories. In 1965 work was begun on the construction of an important decorticating factory in the district of Gaza with funds (20 million escudos) provided jointly by South African (mainly Anglo-American Corporation), Italian and local Portuguese interests. The factory is linked with a large-scale project for the development of cashew farming in an area of 30,000 ha. to be allocated to European settlers and Africans. Also in 1965, a subsidiary of the Companhia União Fabril of Portugal obtained authorization for the construction of three processing factories, at Nacala, Nampula and Porto Amélia, with a combined processing capacity of 70,000 tons of raw cashew.

165. Although manufacturing and transforming industries play only a minor role in what is predominantly an agricultural economy, these sectors also show signs of increasing activity. Most notable were a 29 per cent increase in building construction from 1963 to 1964, increases of 26.7 and 23.3 per cent in the values respectively of non-electrical and electrical machinery imported and a marked increase in the number of new industrial enterprises registered (from 431 to 647) in the two years. Much of the new investment is, however, in consumer goods, notably clothing and textiles, breweries, flour milling and other foodstuffs, furniture and light metal and electrical equipment. Among the most important new investments announced during 1965 was a fertilizer factory to be constructed near Nova Sofala at a cost of 200 million escudos, the contractual work being undertaken

by a French firm, Sodeix. French contractors are also engaged, on behalf of local financial interests, in the construction of a bicycle factory which will produce 35,000 bicycles and 3,000 motor-bicycles yearly. Other new investments include a brewery (70 million escudos), a meat processing and dairy products factory (20 million escudos), a bedding factory (30 million escudos) and a flour mill (25 million escudos). Negotiations are in process for the construction of factories to produce automobile tires and light aluminium goods.

166. In the more basic sector of electricity supply, it was announced in December 1965, that contracts had been signed for the construction of a thermal electricity plant to supply the town of Nacala, the work to be completed by the end of 1966 at a cost of 150 million escudos. Investigational work is proceeding on a proposed hydroelectric project on the Elefantes River, one of the main tributaries of the Limpopo, from which power would be supplied to Lourenço Marques. The Sociedade Hidroeléctrica do Revuè is also increasing its productive capacity at Vila Pery by constructing a new dam at Chicambe to cost 80 million escudos. In December, a new agreement was signed between Portugal and Southern Rhodesia extending until July 1971 the existing arrangements whereby part of the power produced by Revuè is supplied to Umtali.

167. Also in 1965, the pipeline constructed to supply crude oil from the port of Beira to the Rhodesian refinery at Feruka (Umtali) came into operation. As noted in the Special Committee's previous report (A/6000/Add.3, para. 93), the pipeline is owned by a mixed company in which British interests hold 62 per cent of the stock, but which has, under Portuguese law, a majority of Portuguese directors. Following the "unilateral declaration of independence" in Southern Rhodesia, supplies of oil through the pipeline ceased owing to the embargo on oil shipments destined for Southern Rhodesia imposed by the United Kingdom on its nationals and also by other Governments acting in pursuance of Security Council resolution 217 (1965). Though reports indicate that no oil has been delivered to the pipeline terminal since December 1965, press reports in March 1966 noted the construction of new petroleum storage tanks at the port of Beira. Portugal is reported to have informed the United Kingdom Government that these tanks are being built by a Portuguese company as a precautionary measure to avoid dependence on existing facilities which are owned by foreign interests. There have also been

reports of the passage of petroleum products in railway tank cars from South Africa to Southern Rhodesia through Lourenço Marques. (For more detailed information on this matter, see A/6300/Add.1 (Part I), paras. 270-277.)

168. Mozambique, as has been noted before, suffers from a chronic deficit both in its balance of trade and in its balance of payments with the exterior. Despite substantial increases in the export value of cashew and wood products, which increased by 38.5 and 48.9 per cent respectively in 1964, the value of exports increased by only 5.1 per cent, from 2.9 billion escudos in 1963 to 3.0 billion escudos in 1964, whereas imports increased by 10.2 per cent, from 4.1 billion escudos to 4.5 billion escudos, leaving a net deficit of 416 million escudos. This growing trade deficit was partly attributable to a sharp decrease in sugar exports due to adverse weather conditions and to the re-equipping of the Sena plantations, as well as the continuing low level of cotton exports since 1961. The main cause, however, was a marked increase in the importation of industrial equipment and consumer goods. Preliminary statistics for the first eight months of 1965 show a similar pattern in the relative growth of imports and exports. Commenting on this situation, the writer of an article in a Mozambique newspaper observed that one of the reasons for the slower increase in the value of exports was the failure of some of the main agricultural producers to take advantage of the higher export prices which they could obtain by further processing of their products locally. He referred in particular to the absence in the Territory of any industrial processing of sisal^{17/} coconuts and sugar by-products.

169. The increased deficit in the balance of trade for 1964 was partly offset by greater revenue derived from the transit trade of neighbouring territories. As a result the deficit in the balance of payments decreased from 386 million escudos in 1963 to 223 million in 1964. Data for the first four months of 1965 indicate that this trend was continuing.

170. On the other hand, Mozambique's exports in 1966 will probably show the effects of a severe cyclone accompanied by flooding which struck the Territory in early January. Newspaper reports indicate widespread and severe damage, particularly to cashew plantations in the district of Gaza and to banana and wheat crops in the districts of Inhambane and Lourenço Marques.

^{17/} It has been reported in the Press that the construction of a sisal rope factory at Nacala is under consideration.

5. Educational conditions

171. An analysis of the educational situation in Mozambique presents certain difficulties owing to the limited information available and to the redefinition of the term "primary school" according to Decree-Law 45,908 of September 1964 (see section A.5 above) whereby the term is now restricted to schools which provide at least the pre-primary class and the first three elementary classes (postos escolares). In Mozambique many rural schools provide less than this minimum and hence since 1964 are not included in the statistics of primary enrolments.

172. On the basis of the earlier definition, it can be seen that in the past five years there has been a large relative increase in education at the primary level. Thus, in 1963, there were 3,600 officially recognized primary teaching establishments of all kinds, with 5,600 teachers and a pupil enrolment of 400,000. Compared with 1955, this represents an increase of 1,400 establishments, 3,200 teachers and 130,000 pupils.^{18/}

173. Statistics published by the Government of Mozambique,^{19/} compiled presumably on the basis of the new definition of primary schools contained in Decree-Law 45,810, show a primary school enrolment of 44,725 in 1963-64. The following table shows their composition by major ethnic groups in comparison with population figures for the respective ethnic groups in 1960:

<u>Ethnic group</u>	<u>Primary enrolments</u>	<u>Percentage of population group</u>
African	23,093	0.35
Chinese (<u>anarelos</u>)	294	14.
European	10,358	10.6
Indian	2,412	13.9
Mestiços	7,020	22.3
Not specified	1,548	-

^{18/} Boletim Geral do Ultramar, January-February 1965.

^{19/} Mozambique: Serviços de Estatística Geral, Estatística do Ensino.

174. According to the same source, the number of pupils enrolled at the secondary level in 1963-64 was 18,415. The following table shows their composition by ethnic group in comparison with the population figures for the same groups in 1960:

<u>Ethnic group</u>	<u>Secondary enrolments</u>	<u>Percentage of population</u> <u>group</u>
African	2,781	0.04
Chinese (<u>anarelos</u>)	794	37.8
European	10,914	11.2
Indian	1,381	8.0
Mestiços	2,291	7.2
Not specified	254	-

175. It may also be noted that in relative terms, the rate of increase has been greater for secondary than for primary education. Thus enrolments at grammar (liceal) schools increased from 1,106 in 1956-57 to 4,124 in 1963-64, while enrolments in technical professional schools (i.e., including commercial and trade schools and training institutions for the public service) increased from 2,285 in 1955-56 to 8,639 in 1963-64.

176. There is very little information concerning the development of primary and secondary education during 1965, though it may be noted that under the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967, 220 million escudos were allocated for the construction of new schools and teacher training. It was reported in the Press at the end of 1964 and in January 1965 that the building of five new primary schools and one elementary technical school had been authorized, at a total cost of nearly 8 million escudos. Later in 1965, it was announced that two new secondary schools (liceus) were being constructed at Vila Cabral and Nampula.

177. Particular emphasis is apparently being given to the expansion of agricultural training as a result of decree 46,464 of 31 July 1965 (see section I-5 above). In early 1965 the Territory possessed one school of agriculture at the secondary or technical level (escola práctica de agricultura) in the Limpopo Valley and three training institutions run by the Agricultural Department; in addition, three elementary agricultural schools were being established and one post-secondary vocational training centre for agricultural staff (regentes) was in the planning

stage.^{20/} It was subsequently reported in the Press that as a first step in implementation of decree 46,464, measures were being taken to institute courses in agriculture and agricultural mechanics in the industrial (secondary) schools.

178. Progress was made during 1965 in the development of the General University Studies (Estudos Gerais Universitários) at Lourenço Marques which has a planned enrolment of more than 3,000 students by 1970-75 and an ultimate target of 8,000 by 1980. Opened in November 1963 with an enrolment of 282 students, it now has, according to press reports, a student body of nearly 600. In the last academic year, 1964-65, the enrolment totalled 329 (of whom 75 were training as secondary school teachers, 167 were studying engineering, 53 medicine, 19 veterinary science and 15 were in the institute of agronomy and forestry, these being the only departments then functioning). The institution has so far been housed in temporary quarters and the pace of expansion depends mainly on the availability of funds for construction and equipment. Capital expenditure up to 1965 amounted to 132 million escudos and included the construction of laboratories for agronomy, biology and chemistry. In 1965 the teacher-training courses were extended to include the training of assistant teachers for the eighth (agriculture) and eleventh (forestry) groups in the technical professional schools.

179. Admission to the Estudos Gerais Universitários requires a two-year course beyond the level available at present in the secondary schools and students who do not obtain a scholarship (of which there are about 100) pay fees at a standard rate of about 1,500 escudos yearly. It may be noted that, of 291 students undertaking higher studies (Estudos Gerais Universitários) and (Institute of Social Assistants) in 1963-64, 269 were reported to be Europeans, 15 Indians, 5 Africans and 2 mestigos.

^{20/} Boletim Geral do Ultramar, January-February 1965.

D. Guinea under Portuguese administration

1. Constitutional and political

(a) Election of the Head of State

180. For the election of the Head of State, held in July 1965, Guinea under Portuguese administration was represented in the electoral college by five members as follows: the deputy to the National Assembly; the member representing the Territory in the Corporative Chamber; one representative of municipal councils; and two members from the Territory's Legislative Council.

(b) Elections to the National Assembly

181. Dr. Pinto Bull, the Secretary-General and incumbent deputy in the National Assembly, was again the National Union candidate. He was re-elected. The Portuguese Press reported that 85 per cent of the registered voters took part in the election.

2. The military situation in the Territory

182. Fighting, which first broke out in 1963 (A/5800/Rev.1, chapter V, paras. 180-181) continued in 1965, and in fact most news reports speak of the Territory as being in a state of war. As in Angola and Mozambique, there are conflicting accounts of the actual military situation, but all accounts seem to indicate that the guerrilla war will not end soon.

183. Almost every Portuguese military bulletin issued in 1966 refers to fighting on the northern, eastern and southern borders of the Territory with descriptions of the operations of the army, navy and air force. North of the Cacheu River, there is almost continuous guerrilla activity, around Susana, S. Domingos, Bigene and Farim. Activities are also reported around Bissorã and Mansabá and other communities which lie some 30 to 50 km inside the border; but Bissorã is not much more than 100 km in a straight line northeast of Bissau, the capital of the Territory. Similarly along the eastern and southern frontiers, almost every week there are reported activities of Government forces in many locations against "bandits". In the south,

however, there is also activity around Catió and Buba, which are not along the border. From the frequency of reports of canoes seized, it seems that the rivers and other waterways are also important areas of fighting.

184. During 1965, PAIGC (Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde) claimed that a significant proportion of the Territory's estimated 800,000 population is now included within the "liberated areas" where it is setting up villages with widened self-rule on democratic lines and economic and social services are being organized. In November 1965, a spokesman for the Portuguese Defence Ministry denied that guerrillas controlled the regions of Bué in the north-east and S. Domingos in the north-west.

185. In a recent newspaper article, a British Member of Parliament said that reports of "rebel domination of two thirds of the Territory" were unfounded, and that Bissau Island and Bijagós archipelago have been immune from fighting. "Elsewhere", he said, "deep penetration by land or water is hard to stop". After describing the medical and educational work by the Portuguese troops in the villages, the article goes on to say "The scale of warfare has grown on both sides", and reports the existence of a "people's army" larger than previous guerrilla groups, with main bases in Como Island and the Central Oiό region. The guerrilla fighters are reported to be well armed. (There have been frequent Portuguese reports of arms captured from them.) The Portuguese, on the other hand, have "distributed thousands of mausers and grenades to village volunteers, and sub-machine-guns to their leaders. Villages are wired and fortified...".

3. Economic conditions

186. For 1965, expenditures on the armed forces in Guinea under Portuguese administration were: 31.3 million escudos for the army, of which 4.6 million came from the Territory's revenue, 24.5 from complementary payments by Portugal under the extraordinary budget; and 2.1 million for the Overseas Defence Fund; 16 million escudos for the navy; and 20.6 million for the air force. The Territory's total share in these expenditures was 30.6 million escudos (Orders 21,216, 21,215 and 21,218, April 1965). This was almost 20 per cent of the Territory's estimated revenue for 1965 which was 151,750,079 escudos (A/6000/Add.3, part I, para. 105), and as estimated expenditures totalled 151,750,791 escudos, no surplus was anticipated.

187. Since 1957 the Territory's budget has remained around this figure (150.1 million in 1957; 150.9 million in 1958; 151.1 million in 1959; 141.0 million in 1960). As noted by the Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the Territory, General Arnaldo Schulz in 1965, because of its small budget, the Territory cannot afford the necessary staff and administrative services it needs, including education. He said that what the Territory required to consolidate a military victory was more staff, private investments, industrial development and more education. He was confident that better days lay ahead when Portugal would give greater support to the Territory.

188. As reported last year (A/6000/Add.3, para. 108) an allocation of 180 million escudos is made to the Territory under the Transitional Development Plan 1965-1967. Because of the tight financial situation of the Territory^{21/} and the uncertainty of any definite private investments, the entire allocation is to be financed from public funds from Portugal (Projecto de Plano Intercalar de Fomento para 1965-1967).

189. There is very little information on the extent of the implementation of the Transitional Development Plan. During the year two allocations totalling 19 million escudos were made to the Territory from the Portuguese Treasury (under Decree 43,519, 28 February 1961. This amount is to be included in the extraordinary budget for 1965 of the Overseas Ministry, but is in fact a loan at 4 per cent interest repayable in twenty years). More than half of the 19 million escudos is for development of transport and communications (9.1 million) and ports and harbours (2.5 million). The remainder is for development of fishing, 1.8 million; industries, 0.5 million; education, 2.2 million; water supplies, 2 million; and tourism, 1 million.

190. In December 1965 the Ministry of Finance was authorized (Decree 46,683) (see para. 57 above) to grant the Territory each year loans up to the amounts determined by the Council of Ministers for Economic Affairs for the implementation of the Transitional Development Plan. According to a report of January 1966 loans from the Central Government to the

^{21/} According to the study made in the preparation of the Transitional Development Plan, it was envisaged that the Territory would have a surplus balance totalling 19 million escudos during the period 1965-1967, and a surplus of 4 million escudos at the end of 1964. From this 23 million, however, 12 million were to be allocated for other extraordinary expenditures and only 11 million escudos would be available to finance the Plan. As seen above, the 1965 budget had no surplus. Details of the 1966 budget are not yet available.

Territory for the Development Plan amounted to 35 million escudos in 1965. This represents a little over one half of the average annual investments envisaged in the Transitional Development Plan.

191. A new contract has been signed between Portugal and Esso Exploration Inc. of New York which is to take over the concession for petroleum prospecting formerly held by the now extinct Esso Exploration Guinea Inc. The former company is reported to have spent close to 250 million escudos (\$US8.5 million) in prospecting but has not located any commercially exploitable deposits.

192. The new contract grants the New York company a concession of about 50,000 km² which includes all the land area of the Territory (33,700 km²) and the sea, lake and river shores. The initial period of the contract is for five years. The company undertakes to spend in prospecting 24 million escudos in the first year, 59 million in the second year, 78 million in the third year and 68 million in each of the last two years. Within three months of the signing of the contract the company will pay the Government of Guinea under Portuguese administration a sum of \$US40 million, constituting an advance payment of the first year's rent and a 25 per cent advance payment of the rent of the four subsequent years. If the area as later determined is greater, the Territory will be entitled to receive an additional payment. If, however, the area is smaller, no refund will be made.

193. Among other developments during the year were the establishment of a Technical Commission for Economic Planning and Co-ordination and the establishment of a new agriculture and livestock credit fund to provide long-, medium- and short-term loans for agriculture, livestock, industry or property. As reported previously (A/6000/Add.3, part I, paras. 35 and 109) under the Transitional Development Plan 1965-1967 about 15 per cent (33.2 million escudos) is for special projects for the production of rice, manioc, oil palms, bananas and cashew.

194. There are no recent trade statistics or information on agricultural production for 1965. In December 1964 the main exports to Portugal were 280 tons of coconuts, valued at 896,000 escudos; hides and skins, 300,000 kilos, valued at 222,893 escudos; unshelled peanuts, 32,028 kilos, valued at 140,603 escudos; and 6,866 kilos of beeswax, valued at 122,353 escudos. Main imports during that month were 1.2 million litres of gasoline, 226,994 kilos of sugar, 229,900 kilos of potatoes, and 214,102 litres of wine. The Territory, which since 1960 has had to import rice,

was authorized in 1965 to import up to 10,000 tons from any source, free of import duty. Rice prices were also revised, and the purchase of hand processed rice was permitted in four concelhos.

4. Education

195. The latest available school statistics for the Territory are for 1963, when there were 163 government primary schools with 212 teachers and 12,000 pupils. (Total population of the Territory at the 1960 census was 530,380, of which about 40 per cent are Moslems.) In addition there was one academic high school with 20 teachers and 272 students; one commercial and industrial (vocational) school with 26 teachers and 308 students; an elementary professional school with 4 teachers and 19 students and 79 other (Koranic) schools with 81 teachers and 718 students. There were 105 persons in government-training programmes: 65 studying land survey and topography (agrimensura e topografia) and 40 undergoing technical training for work in the ports and harbours.

E. Cape Verde

1. Constitutional and political

196. For the election of the Head of State, held in July 1965, Cape Verde was represented in the electoral college by thirteen members as follows: two deputies to the National Assembly, one member of the Corporative Chamber, six representatives of the municipal councils and four from the Legislative Council of the Territory. Cape Verde has two representatives in the National Assembly and there were only two candidates of the National Union. The Portuguese Press reported that 86.5 per cent of the registered voters took part in the elections.

2. Economic and financial

197. For 1965, expenditure on the armed services for Cape Verde amounted to 23.8 million escudos. This included an allocation of 10.4 million for the army of which 1 million was from the Territory's ordinary budget, 7.6 million from Portugal, and 1.8 million from the Overseas Military Defence Fund; expenditure on the navy amounted to 2.1 million escudos and on the air force to 1.3 million escudos. The Territory's share of total defence expenditure was 1.7 million escudos, including 400,000 escudos for the navy and 300,000 for the air force (Orders 21,157, 21,158, 21,159, 10 March 1965).

198. Cape Verde's estimated budget for 1965 was balanced at 84,673,000 escudos, compared with 70.9 million in 1963, 65.0 million in 1962 and 61.2 million in 1961. Whereas ordinary expenditure has been increasing there has been a marked decline in extraordinary expenditures, for which the budget estimates allowed only 2,690,000 escudos in 1965. This may be compared with the allocations of 38.7 million in 1963, 67.3 million in 1962 and 71.6 million in 1961.

199. Estimated ordinary expenditure for 1965 included the following allocations: 2.9 million escudos for servicing the Territory's public debt (the same amount as in previous years); 27 million escudos for administrative services (including approximately 10 million for education, in contrast to 9 million in 1963); 3.5 million for national defence, 9.2 million for maritime services and 13.4 million for various general expenditures.

200. As reported previously (A/6000/Add.3, part I, paras. 35 and 113) a total of 500 million escudos is to be invested in Cape Verde under the Transitional Development Plan 1965-1967. The Plan originally envisaged that about half of the total investments would be from external sources, mainly for the development of fisheries. It appears that for 1965 at least, the only source of investments was from funds provided by Portugal.

201. In February 1965 (Order 7,224, 27 February), Portugal made available to the Territory a "reimbursable subsidy" (subsídio reembolsável da Metrópole) of 73 million escudos for various projects under the Transitional Development Plan. Of the total, more than half (43 million escudos) was for improvement of transport and communications. The other main items were: agriculture, 8.5 million; industry, 5.5 million; health and welfare, 6 million; education, 2.5 million; housing and local improvements, 3.3 million; and energy, 2 million escudos. Fisheries, in which Krupp of the Federal Republic of Germany is still reported to be interested but has not yet committed any investments, was allocated 1.5 million escudos.

202. In July 1965, Cape Verde also received a loan of 3,075,000 escudos from Portugal under the provisions governing the Territory's budget (Decree 40,712 of 1 August 1956). This was allocated as follows: roads, 2,008,000; ports, 20,000; airport, 764,000; education, 224,000; and health, 54,000.

203. At the end of the year the Ministry of Finance in Portugal was authorized to grant the Territory loans needed for the implementation of the Transitional Development Plan; such loans were to be without interest (see para. 57 above). In January 1966 it was reported that total loans to Cape Verde for 1965 amounted to 101 million escudos.

204. Cape Verde chronically suffers from drought and in the past has experienced serious famines. Under the Transitional Development Plan investments in the agricultural sector are concentrated on irrigation, reafforestation, and reorganization of farms so as to make the best use possible of the available water supplies. During 1965 the special team which had been set up to improve agriculture was replaced by a temporary Brigada Técnica de Fomento Agrário with increased staff. This new team is to promote agricultural co-operatives, draw up plans for land use, ensure the maximum use of existing and new irrigation installations, and encourage reafforestation and soil conservation. The team

comprises three agricultural officers, one veterinary doctor, thirteen technical personnel and other administrative staff. In August (Order 21,473, 17 August) a special credit of 690,000 escudos was made for setting up a large irrigated collective farm.

205. The traditional crops of the Territory are maize, beans and sugar cane. The only export crops of any importance are purgueira (physic-nut), coffee and bananas. In 1959 (Decree 42,390, 15 July) coffee growing was made compulsory in certain irrigated areas on the islands of Santiago, Santo Antao and Fogo to increase the Territory's exports. At the time the measure led to a protest to the Overseas Ministry that this interfered with the food production of the Territory; this protest was rejected by the Overseas Ministry as groundless because in the case of Santiago and Santo Antao the compulsory measures applied only to one quarter of the irrigated farming land in the areas marked for coffee growing; in the case of Fogo where rain is more plentiful, although all designated areas had to be planted with coffee, the farmers none the less were able to grow food crops between the coffee trees.

206. According to available information, in 1965 the Territory imported rice and was authorized to import 12,000 tons of maize from Angola free of import duties (Order 7,209, 13 February).

207. Since 1962, the Portuguese Government has sponsored the settlement in Angola of a considerable number of people from Cape Verde, partly as a means of solving the problem of over-population in the islands. The present population of Cape Verde is estimated to be approximately 215,000 and is expected to increase to about 268,500 by 1970. According to official information, the latter figure would be 100,000 persons more than the Territory could support. As reported previously (A/6000/Add.3, Part II, Appendix II, paras. 178-180) the settlers are chosen from rural workers in Cape Verde with special aptitudes for farming and the conditions for their settlement are different from those for farmers migrating from Portugal. The Cape Verde heads of family migrate first; they may not be more than forty-five years old and are organized into groups under a cabo chefe. The rest of the family may proceed to Angola only after the head of family has been able to provide for their installation. Some of the migrating groups are settled as peasant farmers, but others are apparently sponsored as rural workers, of whom the authorities in Angola consider the Territory to be in need.

208. There are no trade statistics available for 1965. During the first three quarters of 1964, the main exports, comprising mainly pozzuolana earth (agglomerated silica-containing earth used for cement and concrete manufacture), salt, fresh, canned and brine pickled tuna, amounted to 1.7 million escudos. Imports for the same period comprised mainly fresh, condensed and evaporated milk, 1.1 million escudos; butter, 1.4 million escudos; and potatoes, 1.2 million escudos.

3. Education

209. The latest available education statistics for the Territory are for 1963 (Boletim Geral do Ultramar, May 1965). In that year, there were 307 primary schools (183 government and 124 private) with 378 teachers and 18,593 pupils; five secondary schools (2 liceus and 3 technical professional schools) with 75 teachers and 1,491 students, of whom 1,076 were in the two liceus. In addition there were 2 elementary vocational schools with 7 teachers and 83 students. There were also 185 civil service personnel in training.

F. São Tomé and Príncipe

1. Constitutional and political

210. For the election of the Head of State in July 1965, the Territory was represented in the electoral college by five members as follows: the deputy to the National Assembly, the member in the Corporative Chamber, one representative of municipal councils, and two members from the Territory's Legislative Council.

211. For the elections to the National Assembly, which were by direct suffrage (see para. 32), the number of registered voters was 5,024 or about 10 per cent of the total population. Of these, 3,804 persons voted, representing 76.6 per cent of the electorate.

2. Economic and financial

212. For 1965, total expenditure on the armed services for São Tomé and Príncipe was 8.8 million escudos. This included an allocation of 5.9 million escudos for the army, of which 2 million was derived from the Territory's own budget, 2.7 million from Portugal and 1.2 million from the Overseas Military Defence Fund; expenditure on the navy and air force amounted to 2.3 million and 627,100 escudos respectively. The Territory's share in these defence expenditures was 3 million escudos.

213. The new airport in São Tomé, which was completed in 1964 and can be used by jet planes in an emergency, is jointly maintained and operated by funds from Angola, Mozambique and São Tomé and Príncipe (Decree 45,745, 1 June). In 1964 the share of costs was 1 million escudos each for the larger Territories and 300,000 escudos for the islands. For 1966 the cost is estimated at 4 million escudos, of which Angola and Mozambique are each to pay 1.7 million escudos and the Territory 600,000 escudos.

214. There is no information on the 1965 budget or the estimated budget for 1966. As in the case of Cape Verde, whereas ordinary revenue increased from 59 million escudos to 67 million escudos between 1960 and 1963, the total budget, including extraordinary revenue, showed an opposite trend, decreasing from 117 million escudos in 1961 to 111.7 million escudos in 1962 and 104.5 million escudos in 1963.

215. Although there was a budgetary surplus in each of the years 1961-1963, development expenditures under the extraordinary budget decreased from 51.8 million escudos in 1961 to 40.4 million in 1962 and 34.5 million in 1963. Between 1961 and 1963 the public debt servicing charge rose by 30 per cent from 6.1 million to 7.8 million escudos. Expenditure on public education services rose from 6.2 per cent to 6.8 per cent of the ordinary budget but public health services dropped from 22.8 per cent to 11.8 per cent.

216. As reported previously (A/6000/Add.3, part I, paras. 35, 120 and 121), a total of 180 million escudos is to be invested in the Territory under the Transitional Development Plan 1965-1967. However, as the Territory has no financial resources of its own, the Plan envisages that the total amount is to be financed from the Central Government of Portugal.

217. During 1965, special allocations amounting to some 21 million escudos were made to finance various projects under the Transitional Development Plan. Of this total, 7.1 million escudos was for ports, navigation and transportation; 2.9 million escudos for electric power; 5.7 million escudos for housing and local improvements; over 2 million escudos for cartography; 1.1 million for health and welfare; and 750,000 for education.

218. At the end of the year the Ministry of Finance was authorized to grant the Territory each year the necessary funds for the implementation of the Transitional Development Plan. In January 1966 it was reported that loans to the Territory amounted to 36 million escudos for the year 1965. Among other measures, a Technical Committee for Planning and Economic Integration was set up to co-ordinate development projects, and the Territorial Government was authorized to establish a special loan fund (Caixa de Crédito de São Tomé e Príncipe) (Decree 46,358, 28 May 1965) to provide loans for agriculture, industry (including fishing and mining) and building construction, including housing. This fund is to be financed from the Territory's own resources and it is also hoped that it will provide a channel for mobilizing local savings. One of the main objectives of the fund is to encourage the introduction of new crops for export, especially bananas and pineapple, in view of the continuing drop in world market prices of the traditional export crops of the Territory.

219. The Territory's principal export crops are cocoa, coffee, palm oil, coconuts and copra. However, as reported in the Transitional Development Plan, cocoa production, grown on about 27,000 ha. remained almost stationary between 1953 and 1962; coffee which is grown on some 2,500 ha., slightly decreased, especially during the period 1960-1962; coconuts (grown on 4,000 ha.) and palm oil production in 1962 were 66 per cent and 38 per cent respectively of the volume produced in 1953. Although about 90 per cent of the production is from large plantations, output has remained low partly because of exhaustion and an insufficient rate of renewal of the palms.

220. In 1965, three lectures in the University Extension course in Lisbon on the Overseas Territories drew attention to the urgent need in São Tomé and Príncipe to improve the agricultural situation and to reorganize land use in order to increase productivity and reduce costs of production. The possibility of large-scale banana growing is under study, but it is not yet certain that it would be sufficiently profitable.

221. The islands also have a population problem. The Transitional Development Plan estimates that only 3,500 persons are employed on the plantations and about 20,000 persons are engaged in agriculture on their own account. As the population of the Territory is expected to increase from an estimated 50,200 in 1965, to 66,500 in 1975, and the active population from 28,100 to 37,200, the Transitional Development Plan envisages opening up new opportunities in agriculture through changes in the labour regulations. There is also a project for settling 200 families over the period 1965-1967 on available land on the island of São Tomé. The cost of settling each family is estimated at 70,000 escudos.

222. In March 1966, one of the deputies told the National Assembly in Lisbon that, despite the loans made by the Central Government, the Territory was finding it difficult to implement the Development Plan, and might not be able to fulfil the targets because of the financial burden involved. It was suggested that the Central Government should relieve the Territory of the interest charges on the loans granted to it for development.

3. Education

223. The latest available statistics concerning education in the Territory are for 1963. School facilities then included 30 primary schools (14 government and 16 private) with 120 teachers and 4,992 students; one secondary school (liceu) with 37 teachers, and 583 students; and one elementary vocational school with 9 teachers and 91 students. The total school enrolment was 5,732, including 66 pupils in kindergarten.

G. Macau

1. Constitutional and political

224. At the presidential elections in July, the Territory was represented by five members in the electoral college; the deputy to the National Assembly, the member in the Corporative Chamber, one representative of municipal councils and two members from the Territory's Legislative Council.

225. Macau has one member in the National Assembly. There is no information on the results of the election to the National Assembly in November.

2. Economic and financial

226. For 1965, total expenditure on the armed services for Macau was 24.7 million escudos. The allocation for the army was 23.9 million escudos, of which 13.3 million was from the Territory's own budget, 1.3 million escudos from "autonomous services", 4.7 million from Portugal and 3.2 million from the Overseas Military Defence Fund. The allocation for naval forces was 829,800 escudos from the territorial budget (Orders 21,077, 21,179, 21,180). The total share of these costs borne by the Territory was 14.2 million escudos. In September 1965 it was reported that there were some 4,000 troops from Angola and Mozambique in the Territory. There is no information on the 1965 budget and the 1966 estimated budget. In contrast to Cape Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe, both the ordinary and extraordinary revenues increased during the period 1960-1963. The ordinary revenue increased from 113.1 million escudos in 1960 to 195.1 million in 1963, and the extraordinary revenue from 12.5 million to 42 million escudos. During this period ordinary expenditure rose from 103.4 million to 167.2 million escudos; public education expenditure doubled, and public health expenditure increased by more than 50 per cent, from 7.6 million escudos to 11.6 million escudos. In 1963, the Territory's public debt service charge was slightly over one per cent of the ordinary expenditure, education was 3.3 per cent and public health about 7 per cent.

227. During 1965 the defence tax in Macau was abolished (Decree Law 46,167, 20 January) and in its place 25 per cent of the imposto complementar was earmarked as a receipt of the Overseas Military Defence Fund.

228. As reported previously (A/6000/Add.3, part I, paras. 35 and 126) a total of 660 million escudos is to be invested in the Territory, with almost one third allocated to develop tourism. In contrast to the other smaller Territories, the Transitional Development Plan envisages that the Territory will be able to finance the entire programme without recourse to external sources. Eighty per cent of the total is expected to come from private sources and 18 per cent (120 million escudos) is to be financed from the Territory's budget (20 million from the ordinary budget and 100 million from the extraordinary budget).

229. In recent years tourism has increased; in 1964 the Territory had over one million visitors. A considerable number of new industries have been established in Macau, and though it is reported that foreign trade has increased and exports exceeded 600 million escudos in 1964, there are as yet no detailed figures available. Gold remains an important item in Macau's trade, and in 1966 it was reported that 1.4 million ounces were imported. The tax on gold was increased in 1965 and now provides the Government with a guaranteed minimum revenue of \$US1.4 million a year. In 1965 total imports, including gold, were valued at \$US46 million, and exports at \$US21 million. The main exports are textiles and fish.

3. Education

230. The latest available school statistics are for 1963. There were 43 primary schools (14 government and 29 private) with 403 teachers and 13,775 students; 13 academic secondary schools (one government and 12 private) with 258 teachers and 4,705 students; 3 technical vocational schools with 34 teachers and 521 students. In addition the Chinese Community had 158 primary schools with 36,737 students, 35 secondary schools with 5,205 students and one special school with 18 students. The total school enrolment in 1963 was 59,714 which included 3,977 children in kindergarten and 105 civil service personnel in training.

H. Timor

1. Constitutional and political

231. At the presidential elections in July, the Territory was represented by five members in the electoral college: the deputy to the National Assembly, the member in the Corporative Chamber, one representative of municipal councils and two members from the Territory's Legislative Council.

232. Timor has one representative in the National Assembly. There is no information on the size of the electorate or the number of persons who voted in the November elections to the National Assembly.

2. Economic and financial

233. For 1965 total expenditure on the armed services for the Territory was 27.8 million escudos. The allocation for the army was 26.1 million escudos, of which 3.5 million was from the territorial budget, 22 million from Portugal and 534,500 from the Overseas Military Defence Fund. The allocation for the navy was 1.7 million, of which the Territory's share was 1 million escudos. The total cost to the Territory for the armed forces was 4.5 million escudos.

234. There is no information available on the Territory's 1965 budget or the estimated budget for 1966. In 1964, the ordinary budget was 70 million escudos compared with 66.5 million in 1963, 65.2 million in 1962 and 54.6 million in 1961. However, in 1964 only 59 million escudos was from the Territory's own revenues and the balance was made up from budgetary surpluses of previous years and subsidies from Angola, Mozambique and Macau.

235. In each of the years 1961-1963 the Territory's extraordinary revenue, which was nearly all used for basic development projects, was almost as much as the total ordinary revenue. The Territory has very little public debt and the debt servicing charge in 1963 was less than 1.5 per cent of the ordinary expenditure. The Governor of the Territory stated at the opening of the session of the Legislative Council in 1965 that the Territory's small resources are insufficient to provide adequately for its administrative and development needs. Without outside subsidies, the Territory could only afford the most basic administrative services.

236. In 1963 the cost of maintaining armed forces in the Territory was 5.1 million escudos, about 8 per cent of the total ordinary expenditure; direct expenditure on public education services was 2 million escudos and subsidies to the Catholic Missions for education to 3.1 million escudos. Public health expenditure was 6.4 million, or just over 10 per cent of the total ordinary expenditure.

237. As reported previously (A/6000/Add.3, part I, paras. 35 and 129-132), under the Transitional Development Plan 1965-1967, a total of 270 million escudos is to be invested. When the Plan was drawn up it was originally envisaged that the Territory would have a 5 million escudos budgetary surplus at the end of 1964 and an additional 27 million escudos from surpluses between 1965 and 1967, but because of prior commitments on these funds, only 11 million escudos would be available for development projects. It was accordingly decided that the entire amount of 270 million escudos would have to be financed by the Central Government of Portugal.

238. In June 1965 a special allocation of 12 million escudos was made in the form of subsidies from the Central Government to the Territory for various projects under the Transitional Development Plan. Of the total, 10 million was for transport and communications including: roads, 1.3 million escudos; ports and navigation, 4 million; telecommunications, 4.8 million; 711,000 for agriculture, forestry and livestock development; 526,000 for industries; 272,000 for education; and 73,000 for public health projects.

239. Legislation authorizing the Minister of Finance to grant loans to the Territory for the Transitional Development Plan was approved at the end of 1965 (see para. 57 above). In January 1966 it was reported that Portugal had made a loan to the Territory of 56 million escudos for the implementation of the Transitional Development Plan in 1965. This represented less than two thirds of the average annual investments envisaged under the Plan.

240. The Territory's major exports are coffee, copra and rubber, which respectively made up 73, 11 and 9 per cent of the value of the total exports in 1962. Because of increased imports, especially for construction, in 1964 the Territory had a trade deficit of 22 million escudos. A contributory cause of this trade deficit was the drop in coffee exports to 1,332 tons, compared with 2,523 tons in 1963. In addition, due to bad weather and a poor harvest, the Territory had had to import some 1,000 tons of maize and 40 tons of rice.

241. As was pointed out in the Transitional Development Plan, the Territory has very few industries and other enterprises apart from those engaged in trading, and as a consequence only some 3,000-6,000 persons (out of the total population of 517,000 at the 1960 census) are in paid employment outside the traditional sector. To encourage agricultural development, in 1965 the land concession legislation of 1961 (A/6000/Add.3, part II, appendix II) was extended to Timor (Order 21,283 of 11 May). Land concessions may now be granted free of charge to settlers as well as to military personnel or indefinite leave (militares licenciados) even if they are not stationed in the Territory.

242. In November 1965 the Timor Government was authorized to set up a special farm credit fund (Caixa Agro-Pecuária de Timor) to promote medium and long-term loans for agriculture and livestock schemes. Exceptionally, the Fund may also grant short-term loans as working capital. The Fund is also to provide other services such as rentals of farm equipment and breeding stock.

243. In December 1965, one of the deputies told the National Assembly that although subsidies and loans from the Central Government had provided the Territory with certain facilities, including the international airport at Baucau, which is reported to have cost \$US5 million, the expansion of the port at Dili, electricity supply for the capital of the Territory and new roads, the Territory was still faced with serious economic problems. He suggested that greater efforts were needed, especially, for instance, to increase tourism.

3. Education

244. In 1963 there were 165 primary schools (120 government and 45 private) with 494 teachers and 16,500 students; there was one secondary school with 23 teachers and 368 students. In addition there were 18 primary and one secondary schools outside the official school system, with 1,423 pupils. The total enrolment in 1963 was 18,426 which included 12 pupils in kindergarten, 79 civil service personnel in training, and 44 ecclesiastical students.

III. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

Introduction

245. The Special Committee considered the Territories under Portuguese administration at its 418th, 419th, 420th, 427th, 436th, 450th-455th meetings held in Africa between 25 May 1966 and 22 June 1966.

246. On the question of refugees from the Territories under Portuguese administration, the Special Committee had before it a note by the Secretariat (A/AC.109/L.293 and Add.1) concerning the situation with regard to refugees from Angola, Mozambique and Guinea under Portuguese administration, and the measures taken to extend material and other assistance to them by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, specialized agencies concerned, and Member States in response to operative paragraph 5 of the resolution on Territories under Portuguese administration adopted by the Special Committee on 10 June 1965 (A/6000/Add.3, part I, para. 415) and resolutions 2107 (XX) and 2040 (XX) adopted by the General Assembly on 21 December 1965 and 7 December 1965 respectively.

247. During its consideration of this item, the Special Committee had before it, as its 452nd meeting, a document (A/AC.109/168) containing a note dated 7 June 1966 from the Permanent Mission of Portugal to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, transmitting comments on the working paper prepared by the Secretariat on the Territories under Portuguese administration.

248. Following a statement by the Representative of the Secretary-General concerning the circumstances in which the note was circulated as an official document, the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania proposed that the Special Committee should request the Secretary-General to withdraw from circulation the document in question and that in future similar communications be not circulated as official Committee documents without prior consultation with the Committee.

249. Speaking in favour of the proposal, several representatives pointed out that in its note the Portuguese Government had again advanced arguments regarding the status of the Territories under Portuguese administration which had been specifically rejected by the United Nations organs concerned. They also stated that addressing the Secretary-General instead of the Special Committee was an expedient by the Portuguese Government to divert attention away from its repeated violations of Charter principles and United Nations resolutions concerning the

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Territories. Further, by accusing the Secretariat of inaccuracies, misleading statements and political bias, the Portuguese Government was in effect attacking the Committee while at the same time refusing to acknowledge the validity of its work and to co-operate with it. One of these representatives suggested that the Committee should also recommend that the General Assembly adopt the procedure proposed by the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania with regard to similar communications.

250. In opposing the proposal, some other representatives stated that they believed in the right of every Member State to have its communications circulated as official documents regardless of the acceptability to other Member States of the views contained therein. In their opinion, to depart from established practice in this respect would constitute a dangerous precedent which could operate to the disadvantage of all delegations.

251. At the same meeting, the Committee adopted the proposal of the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania by a roll-call vote of 15 to 4, with 2 abstentions.

A. Written petitions and hearings

252. The Special Committee circulated the following written petitions concerning the Territories under Portuguese administration:

Petitioner

Document No.

Angola

Mr. Nzoimbengene, Information Bureau, Mouvement de
Interests de l'Angola (MDIA)

A/AC.109/PET.427

Mssrs. Lukoki Lunzinga, Muanza Fernandes,
Tshingani Mingiedi, Ntobako Angola

A/AC.109/PET.428

Mssrs. Matondo Afonso-Proença, President, Makumbi
Edouard, Secretary-General, Putuulu José Milton,
Director of Foreign Affairs, Front Patriotique
pour l'Indépendance du Kongo dit Portugais (FPIKP)

A/AC.109/PET.429

Mr. José Paulo Chiringueno, President, Partido Nacional
Africano (PNA)

A/AC.109/PET.430

Mr. Carlos Pinto Nunes Vunzi, General Chairman, União
Progressista Nacional de Angola (UPRONA)

A/AC.109/PET.447

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<u>Petitioner</u>	<u>Document No.</u>
Mssrs. Carlos Pinto Nunes Vunzi, General Chairman, David Muanza, General Secretary, <u>União Progressista Nacional de Angola</u> (UPRONA)	A/AC.109/PET.447/Add.1
Mr. Daniel Julio Chipenda, Representative, <u>Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola</u> (MPLA)	A/AC.109/PET.460
Mr. Luis d'Almeida, Representative in Algeria, <u>Mouvement Populaire de Liberation de l'Angola</u> (MPLA)	A/AC.109/PET.460/Add.1
Mssrs. François Lele, General Chairman, Fernando António, Deputy Chairman, Kuta Francois, Secretary for Education, <u>Nto-Bako Angola Party</u>	A/AC.109/PET.471
Mesdames Anne Mfidi, President General, Marie Luyindula, Vice-President General, Roseline N'Simba, Secretary- General, Ida Mavinduanga, Representative, <u>Union des Femmes Angolaises</u> (UFA)	A/AC.109/PET.472
Mr. José M.E.B. Ervedosa	A/AC.109/PET.509
Mr. Mário Moutinho de Padua, <u>Frente Patriótica de Libertação Nacional</u> (FPLN)	A/AC.109/PET.513
Mr. Manuel Sertório, <u>Junta Revolucionária Portuguesa, Frente Patriótica de Libertação Nacional</u> (FPLN)	A/AC.109/PET.513/Add.1
Mr. Johnny Eduardo, Representative, <u>Gouvernement Revolutionnaire de l'Angola en Exil</u> (GRAE)	A/AC.109/PET.514
<u>Mozambique</u>	
Mr. Uria T. Simango, Vice President, <u>Frente de Libertação de Moçambique</u> (FRELIMO)	A/AC.109/PET.459
Mr. Narciso Mbule, Secretary for External Affairs, <u>Union Democratique Nationale de Mozambique</u> (UDENAMO)	A/AC.109/PET.481
<u>Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea</u>	
Mrs. Dulce Almada-Duarte, <u>Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde</u> (PAIGC)	A/AC.109/PET.511
Mr. Abílio Duarte, Representative, <u>Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde</u> (PAIGC)	A/AC.109/PET.511/Add.1
Mr. Gerard Chaliand	A/AC.109/PET.516

Petitioner

Document No.

São Tomé and Príncipe

Mr. Virgílio Sousa Carvalho, Comité de Libertação de S. Tomé e Príncipe (CLSTP)

A/AC.109/PET.512

Mr. Mário de Andrade, Conferência das Organizações Nacionalistas das Colónias Portuguesas (CONCP)

A/AC.109/PET.510

253. The Special Committee heard the following petitioners concerning Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea:

Petitioner

Meeting

Angola

Mr. Daniel Júlio Chipenda, Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA), representative in Dar es Salaam
(A/AC.109/PET.460)

420th

Mr. Luis d'Almeida, Mouvement Populaire de Liberation de l'Angola (MPLA), representative in Algiers
(A/AC.109/PET.460/Add.1)

453rd

Mr. José M.E.B. Ervedosa, Frente Patriótica de Libertação Nacional (FPLN), (A/AC.109/PET.509)

450th

Mssrs. Mário Moutinho de Pádua and Manuel Aligre, Frente Patriótica de Libertação Nacional (FPLN),
(A/AC.109/PET.513 and Add.1)

454th

Mr. Johnny Eduardo, Gouvernement Revolutionnaire de l'Angola en Exil (GRAE), (A/AC.109/PET.514)

454th

Mozambique

Mssrs. Eduardo Mondlane and Marcelino dos Santos, Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO), (A/AC.109/PET.459)

418th-419th

Mr. Narciso Mbule, União Democrática Nacional de Moçambique (UDENAMO), (A/AC.109/PET.481)

Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea

Mr. Amílcar Cabral, Secretary-General, Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC), and four associates: Mrs. Joyce Lussu, Mssrs. Justin Vieyra, Isídio Romeco, and Piero Nelli (A/AC.109/PET.511 and Add.1)

451st-452nd

Petitioner

Meeting

São Tomé and Príncipe

Mr. Thomas Medinos, Comité de Libertação de São Tcmé e Príncipe
(CLSTP), (A/AC.109/PET.512)

Other

Mr. Mário de Andrade, Conferência das Organizações Nacionalistas
das Colónias Portuguesas (CONCP), (A/AC.109/PET.510)

Petitioners concerning Angola

254. Mr. Chipenda, speaking on behalf of MPLA, stated that in the present phase of the struggle for the immediate and complete independence of Angola, the whole Angolan population looked to MPLA for its salvation. MPLA was the only nationalist movement directing the armed struggle in Angola to destroy the colonial system, to defend the people against the atrocities of the Portuguese army and establish a regime controlled by the working peasant masses who constituted the **overwhelming** majority of the population.

255. It was true that MPLA's principal field of action was the national territory. The whole orientation and planning of its activity reflected the demands of the liberation struggle.

256. The MPLA leaders having given priority to the development of activities inside rather than outside the country, a systematic campaign was being waged to mobilize and politicize the masses. To hasten the process, MPLA had created the Centre d'instruction révolutionnaire (CIR) to provide its members with politico-military training and a thorough knowledge of their country with a view to training revolutionary cadres and winning over more of the masses to their cause. Depending on their aptitudes, the persons thus trained would be called on to undertake university studies, would continue their secondary studies only, or would become direct participants in the politico-military struggle. The MPLA had also established political commissariats to work in its guerrilla units and co-operate with the traditional authorities of the people.

257. As the illiteracy rate in Angola was 99 per cent, in fighting for the total and complete independence of their country MPLA was also trying to eliminate

illiteracy as soon as possible. It had procured textbooks, established schools and planned to give higher education to those best qualified to benefit from it in MPLA itself. MPLA had already sent almost 350 young Angolans to secondary and higher educational establishments abroad to ensure the training of its future cadres. The revolution proposed to transform all the structures set up by colonialism. Only by eliminating illiteracy among the Angolan people could that objective be attained.

258. Despite the prohibition of all political and revolutionary activity imposed by the repressive forces of Portuguese colonialism on the Angolan population, MPLA had succeeded in establishing and dispersing throughout the national territory numerous action committees which engaged in the clandestine work of mobilization, politicization, sabotage, reporting the movements or manoeuvres of the colonialist army and supporting the guerrillas.

259. The military action proper was going on mainly in the Cabinda district, in the north of Angola, where MPLA units were engaged in guerrilla operations, harassment and sabotage to hold down the Portuguese forces. In the Cabinda district the guerrillas completely controlled almost 30 per cent of the territory, including the zones situated between Miconge and Luali. There were also outposts deeper in the interior, particularly in the Nambuangongo and Dembos regions, where commandos tried to intercept new enemy columns and supplies on their way to the Portuguese forces operating in the Cabinda region.

260. During the past year, the MPLA guerrilla units had carried out over 300 actions against the colonialist troops in the Cabinda district; 2,165 enemy soldiers had been killed and more than 300 wounded; 7 traitors who had served the Portuguese colonialist forces as guides in the bush had been eliminated, and 53 military and civil vehicles had been completely destroyed. P-19 radios of United States make, G3 and FN weapons of Belgian make, UZI machine-guns of Israel make and other weapons manufactured in the Federal Republic of Germany, as well as a large quantity of war matériel of various origins, had fallen into the hands of the MPLA fighters.

261. It was estimated that there were 50,000 Portuguese forces in Angola including Africans, but the disarray in the enemy ranks was growing daily, as was proved by the numerous desertion attempts, which forced the enemy security police to keep a

very strict watch. Several Angolans had succeeded in deserting from the colonialist army and were now serving among the MPLA revolutionary troops. Only five more African soldiers of the Portuguese army had been reported as deserters.

262. In an attempt to stop the gradual escape of the Angolan people to the liberated zones under MPLA control, the Portuguese army was now trying to settle the people around its military barracks, which to some extent impeded the MPLA troops. MPLA was making successful efforts to overcome that difficulty.

263. As a result of MPLA's guerrilla activities, the Portuguese colonialists had been forced to abandon their forestry operations at Cabinda, and this had seriously affected their economic situation. The saw-mills were at a standstill, and their operatives were now looking for work in the large towns of Angola.

264. The Angolan populations integrated in the liberated zones and the refugees took an active part in the struggle, either by constituting people's militias, or by participating in agriculture in those zones. Other groups helped the information networks and took part in the sabotage of colonialist enterprises.

265. To meet the requirements of the liberation struggle, MPLA was doing everything possible to step up the military training of new members both in the liberated zones and in friendly countries, thanks to which its military strength was growing considerably. The essential conditions and the material means required for that purpose more or less existed. But the lack of freedom of action in the countries bordering on Angola and the impossibility of transporting weapons and men through those countries were preventing the creation of new battle areas and, in consequence, the extension of the national liberation struggle to the whole of Angola.

266. The Portuguese colonialists had recently strengthened their repressive measures. They had stepped up their military training with the aid of their allies, already well known in Angola by the acts of banditry perpetrated against the local population.

267. Press and radio continued to appeal to the settlers to take part in training, repeating the proverb: "Forewarned is forearmed". The training of civilian volunteer paratroopers, intended to protect the Portuguese settlers, had also been stepped up.

268. At the same time Portugal was still trying to implement a policy of settlement in Angola, Mozambique and so-called Portuguese Guinea. Its aim was to turn each of those countries into a sort of new Brazil. A law enacted in 1961 made provisions for European families to go and settle the overseas territories. Numerous nationals of other countries were to be or already had been settled alongside the Portuguese settlers. According to some estimates, about 10,000 Portuguese left Portugal every year for Angola, Mozambique and so-called Portuguese Guinea. Settlers sent to Angola were offered land and all the necessary facilities to farm it. In the two principal settlement regions, thousands of settlers had seized the best lands by force, leaving wretched Angolan areas which were far from sufficient to sustain the indigenous population. The settlers were established mainly in Madale and Ansela and were assisted by foreign technicians. Portugal had concluded an agreement to that effect with the Federal Republic of Germany, whose nationals enjoyed very great influence in Angola.

269. Although elections had been held in 1965 to the National Assembly, in view of the way elections were conducted in Portugal and Angola no importance should be attached to the results. In every case they were a Portuguese manoeuvre designed to give a false idea of the stability of the Salazar régime. Actually all forms of struggle and political organization were forbidden in Angola. The fascist police (PIDE) had been introduced in Angola, where it infiltrated the people to spy on them and to try to learn the secrets of their activities on behalf of liberation.

270. In the towns, the prisons were filled with Angolan patriots; the colonialists had recently arrested 400 Angolans in the towns of Luanda, Lobito, Benguela and Nova-Lisboa. In April five boys and two girls accused of being MPLA members had been arrested and tried. Three of them had been given prison sentences ranging from three and a half to eight and a half years. It was the same in Portugal. Blood flowed in Salazar's prisons. Two freedom fighters had had to be committed to psychiatric hospitals. Three others had been condemned to prison sentences ranging from three and a half to eight and a half years. The crimes of PIDE, as they cruelly persecuted the people to prevent them from taking part in the struggle for independence, were beyond reckoning.

271. All those repressive measures had had no influence on the Angolan people, who were only too well aware of the enemy's intentions. The Angolan people continued to fight vigorously for the national independence of Angola.

272. There was another extremely important aspect of the struggle which went beyond the purely national framework: the close co-operation between MPLA and the revolutionary organizations of the other Portuguese colonies in the Conférence des organisations nationalistes des colonies Portugaises (CONCP). That body, to which only truly revolutionary organizations genuinely representing the peoples of the Portuguese colonies belonged, now constituted a powerful force in the fight for the liberation of Angola, so-called Portuguese Guinea, Mozambique and São Tomé and Príncipe. CONCP acted as a catalyst, prompting the popular forces to unite in the struggle against Portuguese colonialism and at the same time strengthening domestic unity. For the first time in the history of the liberation movements, MPLA, PAIGC, FRELIMO and CLSTP presented a solid and united bloc.

273. It seemed strange that a small country like Portugal could maintain so vast a colonial empire, where it was now fighting on three fronts. In fact, the situation was explained by the massive support which the imperialist countries of NATO were giving the Portuguese Government. As was known, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Belgium and the United States were interested in exploiting the wealth of the Portuguese colonies, particularly Angola. The Portuguese colonial domination enabled them to continue and even intensify their policy of plundering the country's wealth.

274. The imperialist countries' assistance to Portugal took two principal forms: direct assistance to Portugal in its policy of repression, and sabotage of the national liberation movement.

275. The direct assistance, which enabled the Portuguese Government to confront the national liberation struggle in its colonies, took three principal forms: military support, political-diplomatic support and economic support.

276. The war matériel (aircraft, napalm bombs, tanks, weapons of all kinds, etc.) used by Portugal came from the Federal Republic of Germany, the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Belgium. In part that assistance was provided through NATO, since Portugal as a member of NATO has a right to military assistance from that organization; in part it was provided under bilateral agreements between

Portugal and its allies. Under cover of assistance to a member country of NATO, the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany were thus providing large quantities of matériel to the Portuguese colonialists.

277. The politico-military support given Portugal by its allies could be seen, for example, in the United Nations, where the United States, France and the United Kingdom sabotaged the resolutions, adopted by an overwhelming majority, which condemned Portuguese colonial policy; it was also displayed in the international organizations where those Powers sought to prevent the adoption of measures against Portugal; it was further revealed by the powerful pressure brought to bear on the countries adjacent to the Portuguese colonies to impel them to prohibit the activities of nationalist movements in their territory.

278. As an example, he recalled the hostile attitude adopted by the Democratic Republic of the Congo towards MPLA. Since July 1963 the Congolese authorities had shown by the difficulties they made for MPLA that they took no account of the resolutions adopted by the Organization of African Unity. That organization, meeting in regular session at Accra from 21 to 25 October 1965, had adopted a resolution asking all States bordering on the Portuguese colonies to grant greater freedom of action and movement to the men and matériel necessary for the rapid success of the liberation movements.

279. Replying to questions, the petitioner said that the military and political co-operation between the African colonialist Powers was becoming ever closer. A tripartite pact had been signed between Portugal, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. Portugal had been the first country in the world to allow the Government of Ian Smith to establish diplomatic representation in its territory. That fact alone sufficed to show that there actually was an alliance between South Africa, Portugal and Southern Rhodesia. Southern Rhodesia could get petroleum from Angola because Portugal had concluded an alliance with Southern Rhodesia which enabled it to assist the Government of Ian Smith. Moreover, the Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs had recently stated that every State Member of the United Nations was free to apply the decisions of the Security Council and the specialized agencies as it thought fit.

280. Moreover, Portugal's allies, including the Federal Republic of Germany, were continuing to give Portugal material and military assistance. The MPLA was in a

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position to prove the collusion which existed between the Federal Republic of Germany and Portugal, since it had undertaken a thorough study of the question and could point to specific cases of co-operation between those two Powers. The co-operation revealed itself in all spheres. The Federal Republic of Germany had recently given Portugal \$40 million. It had sent it sixty military aircraft. It supplied Portugal with large quantities of weapons. It had built a large military base in Portugal, where the instructors were German. It had built hospitals in Portuguese territory where the wounded of the Portuguese army were cared for, and also a large munitions factory near Lisbon whose technicians were German. He would give the Secretariat a document setting forth all those facts, and showing that the Portuguese army received direct technical assistance from the Federal Republic of Germany. The Portuguese Government was able to send troops to Angola to the degree that the Federal Republic of Germany sent German troops to ensure the security of Portugal. The strength of the German forces was difficult to evaluate.

281. As far as economic support was concerned, it was given to the Portuguese Government in exchange for important concessions. That support enabled Portugal to overcome many obstacles, while foreign capital was invested in Portugal and in its colonies. Portugal did not only seek military aid from its allies with which to fight the liberation movements; it was also trying to develop the settler economy.

282. As to the sabotage of the national liberation movement by the imperialist forces, it revealed itself in two principal ways: struggle against the action of the authentic nationalist forces, and support of political groups or individuals attracted by the neo-colonialist compromise and hostile to the armed revolutionary struggle. Imperialism in its multiple forms sought particularly to destroy MPLA or to prevent it from intensifying its struggle for the liberation of Angola;

283. He was convinced that all the international organizations would one day be obliged to support the struggle of his people. He paid a tribute to the efforts of the United Nations and the Special Committee to help the liberation movements. He hoped that the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly would continue its work

and oblige States Members of the Organization to comply with the resolutions of the General Assembly. It was true that for the moment certain international organizations were hostile to the liberation movements. The reasons for that hostility were well known and had been described. On the other hand, the Angolan people received the unconditional support of the OAU, the Organization of Afro-Asian Peoples and, since recently, the Tri-continental Conference. The higher deliberative bodies of Africa had come out in favour of MPLA. Thus, the Conference of the Organization of Afro-Asian Solidarity had recognized MPLA as the only valid representative of the Angolan people fighting for national liberation. The same position had been taken by the Tri-continental Conference, which again confirmed that MPLA was recognized as the only revolutionary force in Angola.

284. On 10 June 1965 the United Nations Special Committee on Colonialism had adopted at Dar es Salaam a resolution calling upon all States Members of the United Nations, and "in particular the military allies of Portugal" in the Atlantic Alliance, to refrain from supplying that country with arms and munitions "so long as the Portuguese Government fails to renounce its policy of colonial domination". That resolution had been adopted by 18 votes to 2 (United States and United Kingdom) with 3 abstentions (Australia, Denmark and Italy).

285. As the Portuguese Government continued, MPLA was obliged once again to appeal to the members of the Special Committee to see to it that the decisions of the United Nations concerning the sanctions applicable to Portugal were complied with.

286. MPLA dedicated itself to defending the interests of the peasant and working masses of Angola. MPLA considered that its duty was to intensify the armed struggle, which was the only way of bringing the Angolan people to total and complete independence. It therefore asked the United Nations Special Committee to see to it that all countries bordering on the oppressed territories received material and assistance enabling them to give effective support to all the liberation movements.

287. Mr. D'Almeida, speaking on behalf of MPLA said that, as the previous petitioners had said practically all that there was to be said about the present situation in Angola, he would not speak at any length on the subject, especially

since a draft resolution on the question had already been submitted to the Special Committee.

288. On behalf of his people under arms, however, he wished to express his joy and pride at appearing before the Special Committee on the eternally illustrious soil of Algeria. The Angolan people and the MPLA were among those who had derived the greatest benefit from Algeria's devotion to the ideal of national liberation.

289. A people's liberation must, above all, be the work of the people themselves. Liberation from the criminal grip of colonialism and imperialism depended on their spirit, their revolutionary ability and their confidence in themselves. The time for lamentation was past; it was useless to denounce the oppressive régimes, because they paid no heed. The only way of countering colonialism was to inflict mortal blows upon it. The Angolan people did not like war but they would continue to fight to the end, until every inch of Angolan territory was free.

290. Some days earlier, the freedom fighters had extended their front and taken it to the centre and the east of the country. So far the Portuguese forces had met armed resistance in the north only, since the previous May, Angolan troops had blown up several strategic bridges and inflicted serious losses on the Portuguese colonial army. In particular, the freedom fighters had inflicted terrible blows on the Salazar army in the regions where the great foreign mining companies' exploitation of the indigenous people was at its harshest. Those companies maintained Belgian, Portuguese, South African and West German mercenary troops, which terrorized the peasant population.

291. He wished to draw the Special Committee's attention to the permanent danger of South African intervention in Angola. A military pact had been concluded between Verwoerd, Salazar and Ian Smith, all champions of fascism. The pact provided for direct intervention by the signatories in the event of revolutionary activity spreading. The South African daily newspaper The Star of Johannesburg had stated in November 1964 that the defensive system of South Africa on the ground depended at present on the possibilities of local defence in Mozambique, Angola and Southern Rhodesia, and that Africa would certainly not remain inactive if one of those bastions were to be threatened.

292. As if to illustrate the military pact between imperialist criminals, groups of armed police from South West Africa had recently crossed the southern frontier of Angola and carried out massive arrests among the political and military personnel in the area. It was probable that those arrested had subsequently been massacred by the Verwoerd police.

293. His party hoped that, in order to put an end to Portuguese aggression, the Security Council would decide to place a complete embargo on the sale and provision of arms and ammunition to Portugal by its allies and friends.

Recently two villages in the Republic of the Congo had been bombed by Portuguese aircraft as a reprisal: in fact, the brother countries on Angola's borders which harboured the leaders of revolutionary movements - Senegal, Guinea and the Republic of the Congo - were all threatened by the Portuguese criminals. For example, in February 1966 Salazar, infuriated that Zambia, Tanzania and Malawi were giving support to the revolutionary movements, had threatened those countries with military intervention.

294. The MPLA also hoped that the United Nations and its specialized agencies, such as UNICEF, WHO, UNESCO and the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees, would give refugees and the people of the territories which were already liberated assistance in health, education and economic and social development.

295. In conclusion, he affirmed his faith in the future of the Angolan people, who in the prisons, the bush and the forests of Angola were already building the Angola of tomorrow - a free, democratic and fraternal Angola.

296. Mr. Eirvedosa, a member of the Patriotic National Liberation Front of Portugal, speaking as a petitioner from Angola, said that he had spent exactly 663 days in Angola, from 21 April 1961 to 10 February 1963, as an officer of the Portuguese air force. During that time he had acted as assistant operations officer at the headquarters of the Second Regional Air Command (Angola) and, during the last two months of that period, as commander of squadron 91 of Lockheed "HARPOON" PV-2 tactical bombers (Luanda). Although he was, like the overwhelming majority of Portugal professional army staff, apolitical, his awakened conscience had led him into active opposition to the colonial war. Having been denounced by one of his comrades, he had been illegally discharged from the army and kept in custody for eight and a half months in the Aljube political prison at Lisbon during the

inquiry. As the political police had been unable to discover political motives for his act of rebellion, he had not even been tried.

297. The Patriotic National Liberation Front of Portugal was an organization which was composed of Portuguese opponents of fascism and colonialism of varying political views. He had not joined that organization until he had emigrated clandestinely from Portugal with the intention of actively opposing the colonial war and bearing witness to all the facts which had led him to put into practice the grave decisions which had ended his army career.

298. He would confine himself to the facts he had ascertained directly, without going into detail. Nevertheless, in the day-to-day contact he had had with the social environment in which he had lived, the evidence he had been able to gather was both varied and eloquent; it was, generally speaking, in the form of personal confidences and such testimony was both convincing and necessarily anonymous.

299. He wished to present to the Committee the testimony of people who had experienced the war in Angola and had learnt in Angola to detest war.

300. It was true that all the horrors, all the crimes committed in Angola by the Portuguese fascists could not be described otherwise than in statements in which subjective considerations and the weight of the evidence were contradictory, but the internal revulsion, the implicit or explicit rejection of complicity, the pure horror of oneself, acquired a most important documentary value. The evidence he had been able to collect in Angola led to the following three major conclusions, which the supreme tribunal of the United Nations could not ignore: in the Portuguese Territories a war was being waged which the generality of the Portuguese nation condemned; an inhuman and anti-national political régime forbade the Portuguese nation to express that reprobation; and, in the middle of the twentieth century, the States united under the United Nations banner could not achieve unanimity in condemning Portuguese fascism and bringing it to an end, despite the fact that the methods and objectives of that political régime differed only in scope from those of nazism, which had plunged the world into the most murderous war mankind had ever experienced.

301. Turning to the facts that he himself had verified, he said that, according to a report by the information section of the headquarters of the Second Air

Region (Angola), the number of Angolans killed as a result of military, police and civil repression from 16 March to 30 June 1961 was between 50,000 and 80,000.

302. During the same period the mission instructions issued by the Second Regional Air Command had ordered attacks on and the destruction of the people in the rebel area. Attacks had been launched against and destroyed almost all the villages in that area.

303. From the end of June 1961 onwards the mission instructions had ordered attacks on people camouflaged in the jungle, which had been carried out methodically and systematically in the form of "armed reconnaissance" (patrol flights over specific areas, with attacks on clandestine villages discovered during the mission) and "localized attacks" (attacks by groups of aircraft against targets of the same type).

304. On the subject of the equipment used and its origin, he said that reconditioned Lockheed "HARPOON" PV-2 tactical bombers from the 1960 NATO allocation, sold at a nominal price to the Portuguese Government, were permanently stationed in the Territory. There were also North American "HARVARD" T-6 training aircraft, adapted for tactical support, Dornier DO-27 communications aircraft, with 37 m/m rocket launching systems, and Republic "THUNDERJET" F-84 tactical support aircraft, which again were recently reconditioned aircraft from the NATO allocation sold at a nominal price to the Portuguese Government.

305. Lockheed "NEPTUNE" P2V-5 long-range patrol aircraft from the NATO allocation assigned to air base 6 at Montijo, Portugal, had been used for regular missions.

306. The weapons had included containers of napalm, mainly of United States origin, and 20-lb., 100-lb., 500-lb. and 750-lb. high-power bombs, some originally supplied by NATO, some of local manufacture and some supplied by the Republic of South Africa. The Portuguese air force also had depth charges (which had replaced napalm in attacks on the people in the jungle, since they were the only effective weapon in areas of dense vegetation), which were part of the NATO allocation and were stored at air base 6, at Montijo, Portugal.

307. On the subject of alliances, he stated that in February 1962 two working meetings had been held, one at Salisbury and one at Luanda, between the headquarters staff of the Second Air Region and the Command of the Royal Rhodesian Air Force. Those meetings had led to the exchange of operational information,

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the planning of joint co-ordination arrangements and the study of methods of operational co-operation, the sole purpose of which was the repression of nationalism in both Territories.

308. The operational orders given by the High Command to the Second Regional Air Command in the period from 16 March to 30 June 1961 had been to crush every sign of rebellion and annihilate all Angolans found in the rebel area.

309. In conclusion, he said that he was prepared to provide the members of the Special Committee with any additional information on the facts he had described and on any other matter relating to Angola in the period from 21 April 1961 to 10 February 1963.

310. Describing the weapons used, the petitioner said that he had never seen the brand on the recoilless guns at close quarters but he presumed that they were of United States origin. Generally speaking, however, the weapons were manufactured outside Portugal, since that country was not equipped for arms production on a large scale. There was, however, a small arms factory at Luanda.

311. All the information he was in a position to supply related to the period from April 1961 to February 1963 and concerned air force operations. The order had been to attack and destroy any group of Angolans found outside the areas controlled by the Portuguese. The weapon used had generally been napalm, but when people had taken refuge in the jungle that weapon had become ineffective and had been replaced by depth charges.

312. He did not know the exact procedure as to the allocations of NATO weapons granted to Portugal. Some of the aircraft were not based in Angola. The Portuguese had resorted to the subterfuge of using them in rotation as if for manoeuvres. The same observation applied to the F-86 aircraft in so-called Portuguese Guinea, which were also part of the NATO allocation. Some depth charges from the NATO allocation had been supplied by a NATO country, but he did not know which. He had also noted the presence of Lockheed "NEPTUNE" P2V-5 long-range patrol aircraft, which were of United States manufacture. The propagation of shock waves from depth charges was less violent on land than on sea. That type of bomb, however, caused internal haemorrhages and killed all persons within a radius of twenty metres. It was, however, not possible to estimate the number of persons actually killed in bombing operations. No check could be made on the spot,

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because the nationalists carried off the bodies of all those killed. In areas of dense vegetation, however, that type of explosive caused considerable damage.

313. At the first meeting of air staff officers at Salisbury, the general staff of the Royal Air Force had tried to obtain information on the type of weapons used and on existing means of co-ordination.

314. Some fifty diagrams had been brought to Salisbury and the officers responsible for security services at the bases had been briefed on the defence systems of the bases, the type of weapons and the smallest details of the whole defence system.

315. At the time when he had been on a tour of duty in Angola, there had been twelve twin-engined Lockheed "HARPOON" PV-2 bombers at the air base and six at Luanda, and four of those aircraft had later been sent to Beira, in Mozambique. There had also been some twelve or fourteen Republic F-84 "THUNDERJETS" and about twenty North American T-6 aircraft, in addition to Lockheed P2V-5 "NEPTUNE" patrol aircraft.

316. He had no information after 10 February 1963 as to the extent NATO countries had trained Portuguese army officers and pilots for combat duty. Up to that time some Portuguese army officers had received training in the United States under a NATO co-operation programme. He thought, however, that Portugal was in a position to train its own air personnel for the purpose of repression. The Portuguese were present in Angola in sufficient numbers and did not need reinforcements from outside. Portugal did, however, receive considerable financial assistance from its allies which was far more valuable to it than assistance in manpower.

317. As to air attacks the method had varied according to the type of weapon used. In the case of some bombs there had been a compulsory safety altitude; for the depth charges, the altitude had been slightly lower; machine-gun attacks had been made at a fairly low altitude and for the dropping of napalm bombs the aircraft had skimmed two or three metres above the tallest obstacle.

318. There had been indiscriminate bombings except in the controlled zones. Up to 30 June 1961 the north of Angola had been entirely controlled by the nationalist forces, except for a few very small centres of population. After 30 June 1961 the Portuguese had increased their forces by about 50,000 men. Some of the people had taken refuge in the forests and others had surrendered to the Portuguese. The zone not controlled by the nationalists was jungle. Nevertheless, the heavy

bombardments had had no effect on the morale of the freedom fighters. Nothing could now damage the morale of the nationalist forces and they were prepared to fight to the end to obtain independence for their country.

319. Asked whether he thought that, after the Salazar régime, there would be a more liberal régime in Portugal, particularly with regard to colonial matters, and that that régime would grant the Portuguese Territories the right to self-determination, the petitioner said that there was already a very strong anti-colonialist opposition in Portugal. Thousands of political detainees in Salazar's gaols were anti-colonialists and there were also clandestine movements working against the present Government.

320. If the Salazar Government continued to receive all manner of assistance from its allies, the existing fascist apparatus might be able to retain power. If such assistance were eliminated immediately, the Government which succeeded the Salazar Government would probably adopt a different attitude. Sufficient proof of that was provided, in his opinion, by the number of Portuguese who emigrated daily and the rebellion of some soldiers who refused to leave on operational duties, not to mention the many deserters who took refuge in France, Belgium and the Federal Republic of Germany.

321. Mr. de Pádua, speaking as a member of the Frente Patriótica de Libertação Nacional, stated that he had been a medical officer with the rank of second lieutenant in the Portuguese army. He had been sent to Angola about the end of April 1961 and had deserted in late October 1961. He was a member of the Portuguese FPLN and had been engaged in anti-fascist activities in Portugal long before going to Angola. His purpose in testifying was to supply the members of the Special Committee with some facts concerning the beginnings of the war in Angola and the terrible repression inflicted on the Africans in that country.

322. He was also making a written contribution concerning that war, in the form of a work entitled Guerre en Angola, which had been published in Brazil in 1963 and had recently been translated into Russian in the Soviet Union. The greater part of the book, in diary form, had been written in Angola with a view to publication abroad. Some apparent contradictions in the book were in fact clarifications due to a better knowledge of the facts. In view of the limited time allotted to him for his statement, he would not dwell on a description of the

tortures he had witnessed, on the course of the war or on the feelings of the settlers and of the troops. Instead, he wished to give the members of the Committee a brief account of the beginnings of the Angolan revolution which he had witnessed.

323. A knowledge of how the war had begun in Angola was very important. The workers in the Baixa do Cassange, a plateau where cotton was grown as the single crop, had gone on strike. Their annual wages had been about 150 escudos, or approximately 30 new francs. While it was true that the purchasing power of 150 escudos in Angola was greater than the purchasing power of 30 new francs in Paris, those figures gave some idea of the extreme financial straits of the Angolan workers. The fascist colonialist rulers had responded to the strike by bombing villages with napalm. On 4 February 1961, Angolan nationalists had attacked a police barracks and a military fortress at Luanda. During the following days, while the police and military casualties were being buried, the settlers, with the support and approval of the army, had attacked the Angolans and, according to the most moderate estimates, had killed 3,000 of them.

324. It was difficult to imagine the atmosphere which had prevailed in Angola at that time among the settlers and the fascist colonialist authorities, especially following the operations of 15 March in northern Angola. The atmosphere had been one of homicidal mania and complete lack of respect for the lives of the African people or for their most elementary rights. He had himself been able to gauge the extent and the systematic nature of the devastation which had been ordered when he had been sent into the heart of the area of military operations in the north. His unit command, for instance, had received orders, on entering the area in revolt, to "kill every living creature, including animals!". He had seen villages bombed, or rather razed, with napalm, after being ransacked. He had seen settlers furiously brandishing the severed heads of Angolans on pikes; he had seen and heard things which would trouble the sleep of any normal man anywhere in the world. Those members of the Special Committee who would like to know the facts might refer to his book. He wished, however, to stress the assistance given by the army to the settlers, its accomplices.

325. The colonialist army was obviously racist despite all the statements made by self-proclaimed "multiracialists". No further proof was needed than the talks

which had been given to the Portuguese troops on board the transports taking them to Angola. They had been commanded to fight the Angolans on the pretext of preventing the loss of markets, not to mention statements designed to give them a superiority complex.

326. The weapons used by the parachutists and special troops which he had seen with his own eyes had formed part of the armaments of the Portuguese NATO division. Some of the napalm bombs had come from South Africa through NATC. According to some senior officers - as Manuel Alegre could confirm - Israel, acting as an intermediary for the Federal Republic of Germany in that instance, had supplied the Portuguese with USI sub-machine-guns. Bomb fragments found in the encampments of the fighting units bore inscriptions in English. A colonialist and fascist régime capable of using such methods for the avowed purpose of genocide would never, if left to itself, come to its senses and embark seriously on a process of decolonization. It was therefore necessary to take extremely strong measures, which alone might force the Portuguese Government to relinquish the Territories it occupied.

327. Referring next to the case of the Portuguese people, he pointed out that it was too often forgotten that the régime in Portugal was a particularly savage fascist régime which imprisoned Portuguese by the thousand, that the régime did not give even the Portuguese the right to elect their representatives freely and democratically, and that young Portuguese were not asked whether or not they wanted to go to war. As the Committee was already aware, most Portuguese soldiers had little enthusiasm for the idea of going to their deaths in Africa to defend the interests of Portuguese or foreign monopolies. That had been demonstrated by the Portuguese people on a number of occasions. The Portuguese army numbered thousands of deserters who had been forced to leave their country. Lastly, it appeared beyond any doubt that the Portuguese Government was a government of traitors to the Portuguese people and a growing threat to the whole of mankind. He emphasized that he was not the only deserter from the Portuguese army - far from it. In Algiers itself, other deserters or servicemen who had revolted against fascism were taking advantage of revolutionary Algeria's very generous welcome. They included his colleague, Manuel Alegre, who would address the Committee with a view to informing its members of the living conditions of Angolan and Portuguese patriots detained in Angolan prisons towards the end of 1963.

328. Mr. Manuel Alegre, speaking as a member of the Frente Patriótica de Libertação Nacional, said that the colonial war was an outgrowth of fascist oppression in Portugal. The bombings with napalm, the massacre of women, children and old people, the concentration camps, the tortures, and all the atrocities committed in Angola, Mozambique and "Portuguese" Guinea were the corollary of the tortures and political murders perpetrated day after day in Portugal by the forces of repression of the Salazar régime. Everything which occurred in Angola was simply the extension, in a colonized country, of the activities of the fascist régime which had been oppressing the Portuguese people for forty years.

329. He had been a law student at the University of Coimbra when he had been inducted into the fascist army in 1961. Before that date, he had participated in the students' struggle to gain freedom of association and he had taken a militant part in the clandestine democratic organizations fighting against fascist power in Portugal. He had arrived in Angola on 19 July 1962. Everything he had seen there had confirmed his belief that the colonial war was a crime, not only against the peoples of the colonies, but also against the Portuguese people.

330. Two days after his arrival, a settler born in Angola had told him how he had violated an Angolan girl with his knife. In the officers' mess of the infantry regiment at Luanda, he had often heard war criminals boast of their exploits. Second Lieutenant Machado Querido, for instance, had used a special method for interrogating prisoners by sinking his knife very slowly into their heads. Second Lieutenant Linhares had practised what he called political culture by trying to strike off the heads of the prisoners at one blow. He had also seen Lieutenant Mendonça walk the streets of Luanda wearing a belt decorated with human ears. That was an odious symbol of a frightful war. On the road from Luanda to Nambuangongo, all the villages through which he had passed had been destroyed. He had seen only Portuguese soldiers. The Angolans had been dead. At Nambuangongo, a Portuguese captain had explained to him that chemical warfare must be used, expressing the view that that was the only effective solution. A few days later, the soldiers under the command of the same captain had refused to continue waging war. The captain had found no way of forcing them to obey except by killing one of them. The troops had then mutinied. The PIDE had accused him (the petitioner) of having been the ringleader of the mutiny, but that was not true. The soldiers who had mutinied had done so as a violent expression of their dissatisfaction and despair.

331. At that time, he had been working with his commanding officer and other comrades in organizing a military revolt to overthrow fascist power in Angola. He had succeeded in recruiting many comrades and in establishing a revolutionary military junta to co-ordinate the actions of all the clandestine groups inside the armed forces themselves. The military junta had, of course, been set up with the participation of some senior officers. Unfortunately, some indiscretions had been committed, and the commanding officer and several other officers had been sent back to Portugal, where they had been dismissed from the army and then arrested by the PIDE.

332. On 17 April 1963, he had been arrested at Luanda, in defiance of all civilian or military law. The fascist military authorities had demobilized him and handed him over to the PIDE at Luanda itself. He had been imprisoned in the São Paulo fortress, where he had been interrogated for fifteen days and fifteen nights without a break. He had spent two and a half months alone in a cell. Nevertheless, he considered his situation relatively privileged, since the São Paulo fortress had housed other prisoners who were neither whites nor Portuguese. They had been treated like animals. Day and night, from his cell, he had heard the cries of tortured prisoners. The torturers had not even made an attempt at secrecy. To them, the Angolan prisoners had not been human beings. They had not realized that he (the petitioner) would one day tell the world all he had seen in the living hell of the São Paulo fortress. To the PIDE agents, nothing had been more normal than to torture an Angolan. For instance, while walking in the prison yard, he had seen a man lying naked on the ground, with his feet and hands tied, while the PIDE agents burnt him with cigarette-ends. They had asked him, laughing, whether he would like to join in the fun. His reply had been that the only way in which he could imagine joining in was by taking the place of his Angolan comrade.

333. Three Angolans - Luandino Vieira, António Jacinto and António Cardoso - had been imprisoned in the cells next to his own. They had been completely isolated from the other prisoners. They too had been tortured, and they had been awaiting trial for twenty-nine months. One day, they had succeeded in passing to him the following message: "Take heart, comrade! We are in this struggle together. Our peoples will overcome. Long live free Portugal! Long live free Angola!" That letter had given concrete proof of the solidarity of the Portuguese democrats and the Angolan patriots, fighting for one and the same cause.

334. Luandino Vieira, Antonio Jacinto and Antonio Cardoso had been sentenced to fourteen years' imprisonment. They were now serving their sentence in the Tarrafal concentration camp in the Cape Verde Islands.

335. By the admission of the prison warden himself, about 2,000 Angolan prisoners had been rotting in the government gaols at Luanda in 1963. After being tortured, those prisoners had been sent, without ever being brought to trial, to concentration camps in southern Angola. In December 1963, he himself had been taken back to Portugal, where he had been placed under restriction at Coimbra. Five months later, he had left Portugal secretly, in order to avoid being rearrested and deported to Angola, where he would have been tried by a military tribunal.

336. He would not conclude without emphasizing that the true representatives of his homeland were not the delegates of Salazar. Those delegates represented no one but the boards of directors of certain monopolies. The true representatives of his country were in Portugal, in the political prisons, where they were being tortured by Salazar's police tormentors. They were the Portuguese men and women who were fighting for freedom, the deserters, and the thousands of emigrants living in every country of the world except Angola, Mozambique and "Portuguese" Guinea.

337. A régime which had never respected the most elementary rights of its own people could hardly respect the right of the colonized peoples to independence. The oppression of the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and "Portuguese" Guinea was an outgrowth of the oppression of the Portuguese people themselves. The men inflicting tortures in the Portuguese colonies were the same men who were inflicting tortures in Portugal, and that was why all the natural allies of the Portuguese people in their fight for freedom were the sister peoples of Angola, Mozambique and "Portuguese" Guinea. The Portuguese people could not be free so long as the peoples of the colonies were not free. The fight which the Frente Patriótica de Libertação Nacional (FPLN) was waging against the colonial war was a matter not only of solidarity, but also of patriotism. In fighting for recognition of the right of the colonized peoples to independence, FPLN was at the same time fighting for the national independence of its homeland.

338. By an overwhelming majority, the Portuguese people were opposed to the colonial war. Those feelings found expression in many desertions, in demonstrations at railway stations and instruction centres, in the fact that thousands of workers

refused to contribute part of their wages to military expenditures, and in political statements by representatives of the opposition ranging from Catholics to communists. On 1 May 1962, in the streets of Lisbon, 100,000 persons, courageously defying the forces of the police, had shouted: "Peace in Angola!" 339. The fascist Government had dissolved the Association of Portuguese Writers because it had awarded the highest Portuguese prize for literature to Luandino Vieira. The members of the governing body of that renowned institution had been arrested and accused of betraying their homeland. Yet who were the traitors? Those who were fighting for freedom and human dignity, or those who for so long had daily been doing freedom and dignity to death in Angola, Mozambique, "Portuguese" Guinea and Portugal itself?

340. Those who lent their assistance to Salazar to enable him to retain power should not forget that they were making themselves the accomplices of an unlawful régime, condemned by history, and that a day would come when the Portuguese people and the peoples of the colonies would be able to distinguish between those who had been the friends of Salazar and those who had been with the Frente Patriótica de Libertação Nacional in its fight for freedom.

341. Replying to a question, one of the petitioners reaffirmed that at the time when he had deserted in 1961 he had seen some sub-machine-guns which, according to a colonel in his unit, were of Israel manufacture. It would appear that, in that instance, Israel had served as an intermediary for the Federal Republic of Germany.

342. Mr. Eduardo, speaking on behalf of the Gouvernement révolutionnaire de l'Angola en exil (GRAE), said that, since 1961, the problem of Angola had been given particular attention by the United Nations and was one of the problems that were almost permanently on the agenda of the Organization's sessions. Consequently, the historical background of the question had been recounted on a number of occasions by, among others, petitioners from his movement (immediately before and ever since the beginning of the armed insurrection by the Angolan peasants and workers) before the various United Nations bodies, and he would confine himself to highlighting the systematic refusal of the Portuguese colonialists to comply with United Nations recommendations.

343. The Portuguese colonialists, flouting all the Organization's recommendations concerning the granting of independence to the peoples under their colonial domination, were continuing their massacres, particularly in Angola, where villages

were continually being razed and burnt and old people, women and children were being murdered. That was the reason for the ever-increasing exodus of Angolans to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as indicated by a recent report by the United Nations Secretariat, which noted that the number of Angolan refugees in the Democratic Republic of the Congo since the beginning of the war in Angola was more than 220,000 and that 20,000 refugees had arrived in the Congo during 1965 alone. However, the figure of 600,000 Angolan refugees given by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo was much nearer the truth.

344. The colonialists, not content with dropping waves of napalm bombs which caused unspeakable havoc among innocent people, had from time to time since May 1965 (as reported by the Angolan Press and Information Agency on 8 June 1965) been using poison gas which spread death far and wide.

345. The Angolan refugees constantly streaming into the Democratic Republic of the Congo bore in their flesh the traces of the atrocities committed by Salazar's "Christian" army, and it was regrettable that the Special Committee had not visited the area in order to assess the depth of the grief and misfortunes heaped on the most numerous and most sorely-tried refugees at present to be found in Africa (if not the world). Nevertheless, he hoped that the United Nations would no longer be satisfied simply to record the movement of the Angolan refugees into the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and that in the near future those hundreds of thousands of human beings would be assured of the actual and effective material assistance and support of the Organization.

346. He therefore categorically denied the allegations by Portuguese officials that conditions in Angola were "normal"; for conditions which were claimed to be "normal" did not justify the constant despatch of military reinforcements, massacres of the population, regular weekly communiqués on the war in Angola by the high command of the Portuguese colonialist army or the award of decorations, for their crimes (which were called "heroism"), to the Portuguese troops who had so woefully distinguished themselves in the savage slaughter of defenceless human beings.

347. According to the reactionary Portuguese newspaper O Primeiro de Janeiro of 7 May 1966, the Portuguese Minister for the Armed Forces had decorated the following soldiers: António Júlio Salgueiro Gonçalves, José Francisco de Oliveira, António Coelho da Silva, Jorge Cláudio Cabrita, João Manuel de Carvalho Margarido and Desidério Trindade Vilas (to mention only those) for "services rendered to the (Portuguese) nation in defence of its territorial integrity". Salazar himself,

speaking at Braga on 28 May 1966 on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of what the Portuguese called the "national revolution", had reaffirmed: "I have no intention of relinquishing power, since such a decision would be interpreted as a relinquishment of the policy which Portugal has hitherto pursued to safeguard its territorial integrity." He had added: "Such a decision might jeopardize the position which Portugal has been able to establish overseas through the combat waged by thousands of anonymous heroes."

348. All those gestures, all those statements, required no comment.

349. It sufficed to say that the Portuguese troops, with such encouragement, were redoubling their savagery, in the knowledge that decorations would in future be awarded to them on the basis of the number of Negro heads they collected "in defence of the Portuguese homeland". The exact number of Negro heads sent by Portuguese soldiers each week to their relatives and friends back in Portugal would never be known. The Angolan National Liberation Army had captured hundreds of letters from Portuguese soldiers giving evidence of that macabre traffic which, in many cases, was carried on through official channels, namely, by ordinary mail. GRAE would provide the General Assembly of the United Nations with some specimens at its forthcoming session.

350. The number of summary executions committed in cold blood could not be counted. On 18 November, for instance, the Angolan Press and Information Agency had reported the odious execution by Portuguese "paras" (on 15 November 1965) in the stadium at Carmona (Uíge) of some thirty Angolan patriots who had been arrested on the day following violent clashes between Angolan resistance forces and Portuguese troops. The victims of that act of barbarism had included Ambrósio H. Dinganga, Carlos Pinto Abreu, Simão B. de Vasco, Júlio Ginga, Silva Luhando, Dionísio de Vicente, and an eighteen-year-old girl, Formosinha Artur.

351. In addition, no one now knew exactly how many Angolan patriots were huddled together and dying in the countless colonialist prisons. He would not mention any names, for the names, in his view, were not important. Thus, there could be no distinguishing between the many heroic brethren who were suffering and dying in Salazar's gaols for having demanded their right to freedom. He would simply state forcefully that he demanded the release of all of them, whether one or ten, one thousand or ten thousand. He was not begging for their release, since he knew that the colonialists could not refuse it indefinitely; the struggle which the freedom fighters were waging would inevitably lead to the release of those brethren

in the not very distant future. However, he had constantly denounced in the past, and would never cease to denounce, the dastardly murders and other cruelties inflicted on such political prisoners or prisoners of war by the Portuguese colonialists.

352. GRAE, while placing its trust in the United Nations and expressing its deep gratitude for all the steps taken by sister non-aligned countries and by all the other friendly countries in support of the Angolan people's right to self-determination, would continue the armed struggle with unshakable determination for as long as it was forced to do so by the rulers at Lisbon. The Angolan National Liberation Front (the parent body of GRAE), which was the movement of the exploited masses in Angola and the guarantor of their unity of action in the armed struggle, intended to liquidate the colonial past and to open the way to a genuinely national future. The Angolan people would therefore fight to the end or, in other words, until colonialism and its vestiges were completely eliminated.

353. It was for that reason that the Angolan people, through the voice of their combat organization, rejected the Portuguese schemes for the introduction of spurious social and economic "reforms" in Angola, such as the bogus abolition of native status - which would be tantamount to making the integration of Angola into Portugal a fact - the wage "increases" for Africans, the spurious ending of forced labour, the construction of schools, hospitals and roads, and the inclusion in some administrative bodies of Africans who were tools of colonialism.

354. All such transparent schemes deceived no one but their authors, the Portuguese colonialists; for the Angolan masses were not fighting to "reform" colonialism or to sit, symbolically, side by side with their tormentors in institutions set up precisely for the purpose of subjugating them. The Angolan people knew that colonialism did not "reform"; it did not improve. Consequently, the Angolan people would never fall into that absurdity, into that trap. The Angolan masses were fighting for the freedom of every Angolan, because they would never be granted freedom under any colonial administration, whether traditional or reformed. The reform to which the Angolan people aspired was self-determination, which meant the return of Angolan soil to the Angolans. As everyone was aware, however, such reform was not possible under colonial law.

355. The Portuguese colonialists described the use of poison gas and the systematic slaughter of innocent people as "legitimate" because, as they put it, that was part of their policy of defending their "historic rights". GRAE had taken up arms on 15 March 1961 in order to have the right to life, for there should be no other right in Angola than the right to life, liberty, dignity and self-determination. Injustice could not be legitimate. What was legitimate was a people's refusal to allow itself to be exterminated, a people's refusal to continue to live in slavery; what was legitimate was, in short, its resistance in the face of the aggressor; hence the legitimacy of its fight.

356. Taking advantage of the present opportunity, he wished vehemently to denounce the assistance given to Portugal in its colonial war by imperialism. Day after day, dozens of innocent Angolans were being savagely cut down by Salazar's horde of killers with the help of United States sub-machine-guns and dollars, French and German bombers and tanks, Belgian rifles, and the material and political support of several other NATO countries. The experience of five years of resistance showed that, without help from those countries, Portuguese colonialism would long since have succumbed to the blows struck by the Angolan freedom fighters.

357. He wished to denounce with equal force the racist alliance between Salazar, Verwoerd and Ian Smith. That alliance constituted a serious threat to peace in Africa and a great danger to millions of human beings. The problems of Southern Rhodesia, Angola, Mozambique and South Africa were now inseparable, since only concerted action aimed at those countries together, and not separately, would determine the final success of the struggle against racism and colonialism in the southern part of the African continent.

358. In a speech to the Sociedade Histórica da Independência de Portugal on 11 May 1966, the President of that society, Abel de Abreu Sotto-Mayor, after paying tribute "to the ability of the Portuguese soldier, his high racial qualities - superior to those of any other people - his courage and his discipline", had stated: "Our soldiers are not fighting for Portugal alone; they are fighting for the West also... for Portugal is today in Africa one of the last bastions of Western freedom and civilization. With South Africa and Rhodesia, we constitute a defensive bloc against Russian and Chinese cupidity in Africa..." (the Portuguese newspaper O Primeiro de Janeiro of 12 May 1966).

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359. In the minds of the Portuguese colonialists, as could be seen, the right of peoples was a legal fiction, or rather a passport for communism.
360. The United Nations, exercising its moral force, must bring Portugal to its senses, or it would stultify itself. For that reason, the United Nations must show greater firmness in 1966. Portugal must not continue to flout the Organization's recommendations and to scorn the almost universal censure of its policies.
361. He reaffirmed that he was categorically opposed to the sending to Angola - as requested by the Portuguese Government - of a United Nations commission to "appraise" what the colonialists called the "imposing work" accomplished by Portugal over five centuries. He was aware, and the world was aware, that a guided tour of that kind would not enable any such commission to see what really was to be seen - the misery of the people, their aspirations, the areas where showers of napalm bombs were falling continually, the villages razed to the ground, the concentration camps, all the political prisoners and prisoners of war, and the common graves heaped with the bones of hundreds of thousands of Angolans foully murdered by soldiers who proudly received decorations from Salazar for their actions.
362. Moreover, GRAE felt that world opinion did not need to send a commission to Angola in order to know that the Angolans did not enjoy fundamental freedoms, as enunciated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Petitioners concerning Mozambique

363. Mr. Mondlane, speaking on behalf of the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), said that the people of Mozambique welcomed the opportunity to address the Special Committee again and thanked the Government of Tanzania for inviting the Committee to meet again in Dar es Salaam, thus demonstrating to the whole world its determination to fight for the complete elimination of colonialism and imperialism in Africa.
364. FRELIMO considered the Special Committee an important vehicle for imparting the views of the peoples of non-independent Africa to the United Nations. Consequently, it was very eager to present all the information which might be of some use in the preparation of the resolutions which had to be adopted by the United Nations before the necessary steps could be taken to force Portugal to stop its criminal activities in Africa.
365. He recalled that, in June 1965, the representatives of the United Nations had been informed of the situation, problems and needs of FRELIMO. The reasons for

launching an armed struggle against the Portuguese army and police in Mozambique had been explained and reference had been made to the privations which the people of Mozambique were suffering under the ruthless Salazar. The Special Committee had also been informed of the difficulties faced by the ordinary African citizens of Mozambique and of the fact that the Portuguese authorities were forcing hundreds of thousands of Mozambican men to seek employment in the neighbouring racist States of South Africa and Rhodesia, leaving their wives and children alone and, earning only a bare living wage, to work for the white settlers and the international economic interests which were making huge profits. The Committee had learnt that thousands of Mozambican men and women were being herded monthly into forced labour (which the Portuguese Government cynically termed contratados) to work for European and Asian settlers in private homes, factories, railways and harbours, and on farms and plantations. Mention had been made of what some foreign observers of Portuguese colonialism had called "modern slavery", whereby the Portuguese Government, in collusion with concessionary companies, forced African peasants to produce cotton, rice, ground-nuts and other marketable crops and to sell them ultimately to those companies at a price far below the cost of production. As a consequence of those practices, hundreds of thousands of Mozambican men had had to leave to seek employment in the neighbouring countries. Representatives might recall hearing two African elders, one a farmer and the other a school teacher and radio transmission specialist, who had presented evidence from their own personal experiences corroborating those charges against Portuguese colonialism. Lastly, the Committee had been told of the steps which the people of Mozambique had been forced to take to correct the situation: they had to form a single national liberation movement, the Mozambique Liberation Front, or FRELIMO, and had pledged themselves to seek redress.

366. That had been in June 1964. At that time the African people of Mozambique had still believed, however mistakenly, that the United Nations, through its trusteeship system, would bring about the final emancipation of the colonial peoples peacefully. Since then, however, they had learned an unhappy lesson. After sending their

representatives to every session of the United Nations General Assembly to present their views and getting no action except platitudinous resolutions, they had decided to take direct action. Thus, in September 1964, an armed insurrection had been launched in Mozambique against Portuguese colonialism.

367. Since December 1965, when the United Nations had been presented with information on the atrocities perpetrated by the Portuguese against the people of Mozambique, the armed struggle of its Liberation Front had been developed. The number of trained and armed freedom fighters had been increased from a few hundred to a few thousand. They had been able to force the Portuguese army and police into a defensive position in at least two fifths of the country and the people of Mozambique could now boast of semi-liberated areas covering about one fifth of the country. In those areas, the people were, for the first time in more than seventy years - and in some areas for more than a hundred years - able to handle their own affairs without the haunting persecution of the Portuguese police and administration. Thus, in spite of the frequent attacks of the Portuguese air forces, the people were now organizing their own schools, clinics, courts and, where possible, even marketing their own produce. Unfortunately, those who were unable to provide sufficient military protection for their crops and stock had been forced to migrate to more uncomfortable sections of the country, and some had even had to emigrate to neighbouring independent African States, such as Tanzania, Zambia and Malawi, in tens of thousands, thus causing them to seek international humanitarian assistance, as representatives would recall from the annual reports of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

368. Of course, the Portuguese were not alone in their determination to maintain white supremacy in southern Africa. They were supported by the settler-controlled Republics of South Africa and Rhodesia which, together with the fascist Salazar regime of Portugal, had formed a racist alliance, intent on keeping the white man in power. Late in 1965, an agreement had been signed between Portugal and South Africa, allegedly to settle several thousand South African white farmers in the Tete Province of Mozambique. That information had been publicized, in South African and Portuguese papers, as an arrangement to help to relieve South Africa of

population pressure by sending white farmers to Mozambique. However, it had been discovered that the real intention of the two Governments was to cover up a much more sinister scheme, namely, to provide the Portuguese army with South African white mercenaries to help to stamp out the Mozambican liberation struggle. The Committee's attention was called to that situation in Mozambique because, in the opinion of FRELIMO, it was a violation of international law and constituted interference in the internal affairs of Mozambique.

369. In that connexion, the Committee might be interested to know that Mr. Ian Smith had been quoted by the BBC towards the end of the previous week as having boasted of the intimate co-operation existing between the three racist Governments of the alliance: Portugal, South Africa and Rhodesia. According to the report, he had thanked the Portuguese Government specifically for continuing to provide transportation and other facilities to Rhodesia in an effort to frustrate any effect which the so-called oil blockade by the United Kingdom Government might have. It was, of course, obvious that under the present circumstances the Mozambique Liberation Front had no alternative but to take the necessary steps not only to destroy the Portuguese colonialists within her own territory but also to do everything in its power to support the struggle of the people of Zimbabwe and South Africa in their efforts for national liberation.

370. Referring again to the role being played by a number of Western European and North American Powers, members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), in the question of colonialism, he said that under the guise of participating in an alliance for the defence of democracy, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, France, the Federal Republic of Germany and a few other Powers were supplying Portugal with some of the most deadly modern weapons and training her soldiers in the techniques of counter-guerrilla warfare. When convincing arguments against that anti-democratic alliance with a fascist regime such as Salazar's Portugal were presented, the answer given was that there was a clause in the NATO Agreement stipulating, inter alia, that no weapons acquired through the NATO Agreement should be used for the maintenance of a colonial Power anywhere in Africa south of the Tropic of Cancer. Yet, in the same Agreement, nothing was said about the deployment

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of military personnel trained and/or maintained under NATO auspices in colonial Africa; nothing was said about prohibiting the same NATO Powers from giving or selling their own weapons to Portugal outside the NATO Agreement, nor about an outright exclusion of a State whose attitude towards self-determination, self-government and independence was as fascist as that of Portugal. The Mozambican people often asked themselves, in view of that situation, what kind of democracy the Western Powers intended to defend. In the absence of any satisfactory answer, its people could only conclude that the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Federal Republic of Germany and their allies in NATO were aware of and agreed with Portugal's anti-democratic position on her colonies, and knowingly wished to maintain their support for the continuation of colonialism in Africa.

371. Finally, since those same Powers, with the exception of the Federal Republic of Germany, were Members of the United Nations and consequently subscribed to the principles guiding the world body, which stood for the complete emancipation of all peoples from colonialism, the Mozambique Liberation Front appealed to them to consider their role vis-à-vis their ally, Portugal. While nothing on earth would deter the people of Mozambique from continuing to struggle for their complete liberation, they wished to appeal to the United Nations to try to find a formula which would force those NATO Powers to withdraw their support from Portugal.

372. Mr. dos Santos, speaking on behalf of FRELIMO, described the development of the struggle for national liberation in Mozambique during the past six months.

373. He said that the struggle for national liberation was growing and the areas controlled by FRELIMO were increasing in extent and importance. Large areas of the provinces of Cabo Delgado, Niassa, Zambézia and Tete were outside Portuguese control. In the first two provinces, the greater part of the population lived under the control of FRELIMO guerrillas. In the provinces of Zambézia and Tete, the areas under the authority of FRELIMO were not so great. In those semi-liberated areas, FRELIMO was engaged in reconstruction activities. It had increased agricultural output and established hospitals where combatants and the civil population were cared for. The literacy campaign was progressing satisfactorily.

374. There had been much fighting, particularly in the regions of Mueda, Diaca, Muidumbe, Chai, Macomia, Mueembe, Valadim, Catur, Nova Freixo, Marrupa and

Massangulo. In the course of those engagements Portuguese troops had suffered heavy losses: several hundreds had been killed or wounded, while the guerrillas had seized a large number of arms, machine-guns, rifles, offensive and defensive grenades, mines, motor vehicles and other military equipment. One aircraft and one helicopter had been shot down, bridges and railways had been sabotaged and lorries destroyed. In addition, many African soldiers had deserted to join FRELIMO.

375. The campaign of oppression by Portuguese forces had compelled several thousands of people to take refuge in Tanzania, Malawi and Zambia. Their situation remained difficult, particularly in Malawi, where they were bereft of everything, or almost everything.

376. In the face of the popular struggle, Portuguese colonialism was reacting like a wounded beast. The army and the PIDE (political police) worked in close co-operation, in particular during military operations. The Portuguese troops received precise and official instructions: they had orders to massacre the population of the villages or to intern them by force in concentration camps built for the purpose near military and administrative posts. Peasants' houses were systematically burnt and crops and livestock were stolen or destroyed.

377. In the previous January, the Régulo (traditional chief) of Maniamba had been arrested because he had been found carrying a FRELIMO membership card. The soldiers had buried him alive up to his neck. When interrogated, he had refused to speak. After two days, he had decided to do so, but only to say "Yes, I am a member of FRELIMO and I supply FRELIMO guerrillas with food. FRELIMO will free Mozambique." That brave man died. The Portuguese had cut off his head.

378. The Portuguese often practised another kind of torture, which consisted in bursting the ear drums and putting out the eyes of persons they suspected of supporting the fighters. The soldiers then abandoned their victim in a lonely place, saying "Now go back to FRELIMO and get your eyes and ears back." They murdered pregnant women, opened their stomachs and tore out the foetus. In order to force prisoners to speak, they used a special apparatus which crushed their fingers one by one. Since the beginning of May, 7,500 soldiers had arrived from Portugal in three troop ships to reinforce those already there.

379. He assured the Committee that the many atrocities committed by the Portuguese army and PIDE would never lead the Mozambican militants to follow their example. that was neither naivety nor idealism on their part. If FRELIMO held to its

principles, if it declined to confuse the colonialist or fascist Portuguese Government with the Portuguese people, to murder civilians or torture prisoners, that was because its cause was just and its action revolutionary. In Mozambique, it was the Mozambican people who were defending the great principles of humanity and not the fascist and colonialist Government of Portugal, even if that Government enjoyed the support of NATO. FRELIMO was sure of winning. It intended to continue its fight, to develop its activities and to improve its methods in order to liberate its country and its people once and for all.

330. In reply to questions, Mr. Mondlane and Mr. dos Santos said that the Portuguese medical services in Mozambique were unsatisfactory, to say the least. In a country whose population totalled more than 7 million, the first medical training programme, for Europeans and Asians alone, had been established three years previously.

However, it only provided training at the lower level, and would not reach the standard of a full medical school for another ten to fifteen years. Assuming that Mozambique was a province of Portugal, as claimed by that country, the treatment it received differed considerably not only from that of the internal provinces, where both medical training and hospitals were provided all over the country, but also from that in such overseas provinces as Goa where, despite the fact that it had a population of only half a million, the Portuguese Government had established a medical school some twenty years previously.

331. Throughout the whole of Mozambique, there was not one African doctor. Of the 200 European doctors, two thirds were concentrated in the capital, where over half the European population was to be found. While two or three hospitals existed for the training of nursing assistants, there were no plans to train African nurses.

332. In areas where the armed struggle for independence was taking place, there were only mission clinics and, when they were closed because communications had been cut, FRELIMO had to set up its own clinics. In that connexion, the Mozambique Liberation Front had drawn up in Dar es Salaam a programme for training nurses outside the Portuguese system. The first class would be graduated that month and the nurses would be sent to serve the civilian population in clinics throughout Mozambique.

333. The Portuguese Government's assimilation policy was a bluff. There was no assimilation and there never had been. It was enough to recall the nature of

Portuguese colonization and of colonization in general to realize that any idea of assimilation was alien to it. In the mind of the colonizer, there could be no question of absorbing the colonized people, of whom nothing was asked but to be slaves and to produce. Until the past few years, Portuguese statements of policy had laid down a policy of assimilation. According to those texts, a Mozambican who aspired to become Portuguese must know how to read and write, have a job compatible with Portuguese citizenship (i.e., a job which enabled him to be well dressed, to eat in the Portuguese manner, etc.), and forget his African traditions in favour of a culture imported from Portugal. He was asked, in short, to stop being Mozambican, without being offered anything in exchange but the assurance of complete depersonalization. The present policy went still further. The idea was to make all Mozambicans Portuguese without going through the intermediate stage. Only the liberation struggle could put an end to that intolerable situation.

384. According to statistics compiled towards the end of the previous decade, only 4,500 Africans had been assimilated out of a total African population of 6.5 million. It was hardly likely, therefore, that the existing African population of 7 million would be absorbed by 150,000 Europeans. In his opinion, assimilation, to which constant reference was made in Europe and elsewhere, was merely an instrument of propaganda. A journalist of repute, in a serious article in The New York Times, had even referred to Portuguese policy in that connexion as the one hopeful sign among all the problems in southern Africa. Such a statement did not deserve to be taken seriously.

385. There was in fact no material difference between South African apartheid and the racial discrimination practised by the Portuguese Government, since so long as a person was not Portuguese he was not a citizen and so long as he was not a citizen he had no rights. In Mozambique there was no law on race, but the inhabitants were regimented in the same way as in South Africa. There were practically no cultural amenities for Africans. The Portuguese advocated intermarriage to solve the race problem but there were only 150,000 Europeans out of a population of 7 million. He observed that wherever there were white minorities they were bound to establish systems of segregation. For instance, the whole of the capital city was segregated into luxury European, mediocre Asian and slum African quarters. All professional positions were occupied by Europeans, and

Asians kept the shops and did clerical work. There was no sincerity of intention in the invitation extended to the United Nations. Although the Portuguese had invited the United Nations to make an on-the-spot inspection, any mission it sent would be guided and given a false impression.

386. Subsequently, with reference to an extract quoted from The Economist of 23 April 1966 which commented on the difference between Portuguese rule in Africa and that of South Africa, the petitioners said that, while The Economist generally presented a truer analysis than many other newspapers, the campaign of the Portuguese to make propaganda out of those facts had caught on among many people abroad, including those responsible for such an objective newspaper as The Economist.

387. An important factor in the colonial situation was the system of exploiting the production of marketable products. Up to 1942, more than half the country had been in the hands of concessionary companies, which had controlled not only the land but the people living on it, who had to work at wages set by them. In 1942 the Portuguese Government had decided to take direct control. Its policy from that time had been to give Africans the nominal ownership of the land but to stipulate what must be grown on it. A number of concessionary companies had been set up to determine what land was most suitable for various crops and the local population was forced to grow those crops and sell to the companies at prices fixed by the Government. The result was a system of modern slavery.

388. Answering a question on FRELIMO's activities, the petitioners said that their organization was carrying out extensive programmes in the social field. Much of the support received in that connexion had been contributed as a result of information it had circulated to representatives at the General Assembly and contacts made, through the Organization of African Unity (OAU), with the Afro-Asian countries.

389. FRELIMO's programme of general education was divided into three parts. In the first place, it was educating people to prepare them for civil service and administrative posts when the country gained its independence. Most of the students were sent abroad for their higher education.

390. Secondly, it was endeavouring to provide secondary education for the population: a secondary school, currently attended by more than 120 Mozambican students, had been established in Dar es Salaam. In Mozambique, there was not even one secondary school for Africans, whose only chance of such education was,

therefore, to gain admission to a European school. Out of a total African population of 7 million, fifteen had completed their secondary education. The only institutions which made any efforts in that direction were Roman Catholic seminaries for training priests, and it was there that most of the students sent abroad received their earlier education. Apart from the medical school, to which he had already referred, FRELIMO was also planning to establish a school for teachers.

391. Thirdly, programmes had been initiated in the bush areas of Mozambique to deal with the problem of illiteracy and primary schools had also been set up. However, there was no permanency about such establishments, which had to be moved according to the position of the Portuguese army.

392. At the basic level, which was the literacy level, progress was still weak owing to lack of qualified personnel and premises. However, foreign appeals had been launched. Secondary and technical education was available and schooling was provided by United Nations Member States in all parts of the world. The third level of education could only be obtained abroad. Some forty Mozambique pupils went abroad annually, mostly for technical education. The Patrice Lumumba Friendship University in Moscow had special arrangements to enable students to complete their secondary education before beginning university courses. Similar arrangements were made by three United States universities, but it was impossible for those pupils to enter Western European universities. The country needed more scholarships abroad and would be able to engage all graduates on their return. It could also provide students for short training courses of one to six months in any country that was willing to help Mozambique.

393. FRELIMO required extensive aid in the establishment of literacy programmes but, despite the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, assistance did not appear to be forthcoming from the specialized agencies. They offered various excuses but, since the United Nations had pronounced itself on the matter, they should have no difficulty in providing such assistance. It would also be valuable if the Special Committee could encourage States Members of the United Nations to offer FRELIMO facilities for training its members in the techniques of teaching.

394. Asked whether students from Mozambique who went abroad to study did in fact return to provide the leadership for which they had been trained, the petitioners

said that no problem had arisen in absorbing Mozambique students who had returned after graduating. The country was in dire need of teaching staff; it had already received teachers from various European countries and had appealed for more. There was also a great need for medical staff: there was as yet no African doctor in the country, but the first medical student was in the process of finishing his studies. Economists also were badly needed. There was therefore no reason for any Mozambique student to fail to find his place in the country on finishing his studies, and the Governments of the countries in which the students had been working were willing to help them to return. He did know of one case of a student in the United States who had had psychological problems, and on whose behalf an appeal had been made that he be allowed to remain in that country to receive the mental treatment that was not available in Tanzania, but that was a special case.

395. In reply to a question regarding the attitude of the churches in Mozambique, the petitioners observed that Portugal considered itself a bastion of Christianity. A new agreement between Church and State further strengthened the Church, which handled all education of African children. They were even obliged to attend school at different times of the year from European and Asian children, to whom the stringent regulations did not apply. The Portuguese Government gave a little money for the education of African children, and since the Church wanted the exclusive right to handle education it had no alternative but to support the Government. It was, however, to their credit that there was currently a more liberal policy in the Vatican and that missionaries now showed less enthusiasm for maintaining colonialism.

396. As to the concrete assistance that could be provided by the Special Committee and the United Nations, the petitioners felt that the terms of the resolutions adopted by the Special Committee and the General Assembly respectively expressed many of the wishes of the African people in Mozambique. However, there was no clear indication of any action having been taken to implement those resolutions, and the countries which had voted against them continued to support Portugal, South Africa and Rhodesia. Also, apart from the United Nations scholarship programme, no positive contribution had been made by other agencies, with the sole exception of the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

They hoped the specialized agencies would be requested to indicate what action they were prepared to take.

397. The situation of refugees in Malawi was desperate. For more than a year, since the arrival there of the first group of refugees, the problem had been increasing. FRELIMO had done everything it could to make the plight of the refugees known to the Government of Malawi, and although that Government was doing what it could, no clearly defined plans had been made to relieve the situation. Most of the refugees had gone to the islands in the Lake of Malawi, the waters of which were officially considered to belong to Mozambique, although the islands themselves were Malawi territory. There were now over 3,000 refugees, most of them still on the two islands, with a few also in the border area of south Malawi.

398. With regard to possible further help from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Special Committee itself should ask the High Commissioner what approach the Malawi Government had made to him, what relationship, if any, had developed, and what problems had prevented the refugees in Malawi from being given the same assistance as those, for example, in Tanzania. Religious and other humanitarian bodies were not being given the same facilities to help refugees in Malawi as they were in other countries. The petitioners appealed to the Special Committee to see that such facilities were made available.

399. In reply to a question as to how the United Nations could also help to spread the truth on the behaviour of the Portuguese and of the countries which supported Salazar, the petitioners said that, although a number of excellent publications on the Portuguese colonies had been issued by the United Nations, they were not made available to the public. The working papers prepared by the Secretariat for the Special Committee were thorough and factually accurate, but the annual reports which were issued to the public included only a few references to those Territories. They therefore suggested that the United Nations should draw up a document, for distribution either to the general public or to the General Assembly, to include all the relevant facts and to demonstrate why so many Members of the United Nations had condemned Portuguese policy.

400. In spite of General Assembly resolution 2107 (XX) the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Federal Republic of Germany and Belgium were supplying weapons to Portugal either through NATO or through other channels. FRELIMO had

been able to establish with certainty, and had a list of weapons captured from the Portuguese army with serial numbers to prove it, that the Portuguese army was in possession of weapons (rifles, automatic rifles and machine-guns) originating in Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the United States and the United Kingdom. In addition, the Portuguese forces had recently taken delivery of Italian aircraft built in the Federal Republic of Germany.

401. Before General Assembly resolution 2107 (XX) could be implemented, those Powers would have to withdraw their support to Portugal. They would also have to put a stop to the training of its officers under NATO auspices, which they alleged, was carried out in the normal process of their programme for defending Europe. However, it could safely be assumed that all Portuguese senior staff officers had received special training at NATO, especially in view of the known concern of certain Western Powers at the extent of guerrilla warfare throughout the world.

402. Although the official position of the NATO Powers was that they undertook no activity south of the Tropic of Cancer, there was evidence of indirect aid; according to the testimony of a Portuguese prisoner, there were Portuguese paratroops in Mozambique which had been equipped by NATO. The reason for their presence was unknown; but the Portuguese Government would certainly never admit publicly that they were there to fight. The prisoner had also said that the construction of air bases was continuing, and eight jet airplanes had been bought from the Federal Republic of Germany. It was evident that NATO aid alone enabled Portugal to foot its military bills.

403. The tactics of the Western Powers were camouflaged; had they been genuinely opposed to colonialism and sympathetic to the people's struggle for liberation, they would at least, in the light of resolution 2107 (XX), have withdrawn all aid tending to strengthen Portugal's position.

404. A further violation of the terms of resolution 2107 (XX) was the financial assistance rendered by Western European and United States banks to Portugal, which could not otherwise have continued the war in Africa since it already absorbed over half of its national budget. The Western Powers should therefore withdraw their aid to Portugal.

405. In reply to a request for details of Portuguese atrocities in Mozambique, which should be drawn to the attention, in particular, of those countries represented in the Special Committee which still afforded indirect assistance to Portugal, the petitioners said that the Portuguese Government had to resort to torture in order to maintain its colonial rule in Mozambique. FRELIMO intended to submit a detailed report to the Special Committee on the tortures to which the people of Mozambique were subjected by the Portuguese.

406. As to Portugal's attitude to the rebel regime in Rhodesia, it had not been unexpected in view of the arrangements made earlier to establish an embassy in Lisbon and to continue traffic communications between Beira, Lourenço Marques and Salisbury.

407. The petitioners said that the situation in Rhodesia would only be changed by a force from within, and the Mozambique Liberation Front would do its utmost to effect that change, as soon as its material resources permitted. The Europeans in Rhodesia were well aware that FRELIMO intended to demolish the oil pipeline as soon as possible and, for that reason, it was kept under constant surveillance, both on the ground and from the air. FRELIMO would support the Africans in Rhodesia in every possible way, since no real freedom could be gained for Mozambique while Rhodesia and South Africa remained in the hands of foreign Powers.

408. There was also co-ordination among South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Portugal with regard to their political policies for control of the African populations. There was also military co-ordination. Every six months Portuguese officers went to Salisbury for discussion, and a high-ranking officer paid regular visits to Mozambique. Further, South Africa was committed to support Mozambique.

409. The three countries aided one another economically. For instance, Mozambique provided Southern Rhodesia and South Africa about 300,000 labourers each year under contract.

410. The economic relations between Portugal and Mozambique constituted an obstacle to the liberation of the people of Mozambique. One of the objectives of FRELIMO's struggle was to break up the old economic structures imposed by colonialism and to replace them with others which would permit the people of Mozambique to develop their potentialities freely.

411. The flow of capital from the Western world to Portugal and its colonies continued. In addition to the Colonial Bank of Portugal, there were two other well-known banks still operating in the country: the Standard Bank of South Africa and Barclays Bank, both of which had very close links with South Africa and Southern Rhodesia.

412. Although the Portuguese Government had established an import-export organization in Mozambique, such activities had for many years been in the hands of foreign companies. Portuguese participation had developed only since the Second World War.

413. The import-export business of Mozambique was linked directly with the hinterland of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. There was an agreement between Portugal and South Africa under which nearly 50 per cent of the goods exported from the Witwatersrand area had to go through Mozambique, in exchange for which 150,000 Mozambique labourers were sent each year to work as cheap labour in the mining and other industries in South Africa. The Portuguese Government in Mozambique was also, under that agreement, given financial assistance by South Africa for running its railways. A similar situation prevailed vis-à-vis Southern Rhodesia.

414. Under the present circumstances, opening the Territories further to foreign companies would only be detrimental and delay independence. In the past three years some western European companies had also obtained large concessions, particularly in Angola. The people of the country should be given freedom to use their energies to satisfy their own basic needs. If foreign companies were to be invited it must be by a government freely elected by majority. They disagreed strongly with the views of the anti-Salazar Portuguese white settlers, who only wanted freedom from Portugal in order to gain control themselves.

415. Recalling operative paragraph 5 of General Assembly resolution 2107 (XX) which "condemns the policy of the Government of Portugal which violates the economic and political rights of the indigenous population by the establishment, on a large scale, of foreign immigrants in the Territories and by the exporting of workers to South Africa", the petitioners said that the question of white settlement affected Angola - which was nearer to Portugal and more wealthy - to a greater degree than Mozambique, which did nevertheless have thousands of European settlers.

416. The question of exploiting the land for the benefit of European companies was exacerbated by the fact that when Africans had developed certain areas of the

country from forest swamp the Government took them for so-called civilized settlement, mostly by Europeans. There was one such area in which, among a total of more than 15,000 families, no more than fifteen to twenty were Africans. The policy of the Portuguese Government was to bring in more Europeans so that it could be claimed that the area was preponderantly white. In June 1960 when the peasants in the north of Mozambique had disputed the right of the Portuguese authorities to repossess by force the fertile lands of the Macondes plateau, they had been massacred by the Portuguese administration. It was Portugal's policy to settle a white population in those territories, particularly in the Limpopo valley. It seized land from the Africans and drove out the local inhabitants, replacing them with white settlers.

417. In reply to a question the petitioners said that recent estimates put the number of Portuguese soldiers in Mozambique at approximately 50,000. That did not, however, take account of a further 7,500 men who, according to Portuguese information agencies, had arrived in the past month, nor of a further 6,000 who were known to have arrived in Mozambique only a few days previously. At that rate, the number of Portuguese soldiers could be expected to reach 75,000 by the end of 1966.

418. The Portuguese had issued propaganda statements throughout the world in which they claimed to have closed all borders to prevent infiltration. They had then, however, apparently contradicted themselves by stating, according to the article in The New York Times to which he had referred earlier, that any terrorists who were caught while endeavouring to cross the border between Tanzania and Mozambique were sent back to Tanzania by the police. That would hardly have been possible if their first claim was true. However, every effort was being made by the Portuguese forces to guard all borders between Mozambique and neighbouring countries.

419. The Portuguese Government had also been conscripting Africans, but many of them had deserted. Ninety-five per cent of them were mere youngsters unaware that they were going to a war. Whenever there was an armed clash they were threatened with execution if they did not fire on their own people. It was therefore difficult to assess the morale of the Portuguese, but as their army was adequately replenished and equipped it was probably fairly high. Nevertheless, how long Portugal could continue, despite support from its allies, was an open question. Since 1961,

increasing proportions of its national budget had been devoted to military expenditure. At the same time, vast sums accrued from the companies operating in the colonies.

420. He asked to comment upon the allegation of the colonial Powers that the imposition of sanctions would harm Africans most of all, the petitioners said that there was an apparent lack of sincerity on the part of the colonial Powers; the suggestion that Africans would be harmed most by the imposition of sanctions was not to be taken seriously. So far as Mozambique was concerned, the European population would be most affected by such action since they were the consumers of the goods concerned. The African population produced its own goods in sufficient quantity and ultimately, it was even intended to export such produce to neighbouring countries.

421. The allegations of Portugal, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia that all African liberation movements were communist inspired had not affected the popularity of FRELIMO abroad. Such statements carried weight only in Europe and America. The Portuguese efforts to brand FRELIMO as communist would only result in increased popularity in some African countries. Furthermore, such efforts provided the communist States with excellent propaganda since FRELIMO, which was fighting for the freedom of the people, was identified within Africa with the ideology and goals of world communism. In the mind of the average Mozambican, therefore, the peoples of the communist nations were genuine fighters for the cause of freedom in Mozambique. Whether FRELIMO was communist or not was immaterial to the African people, who did not question its ideology or principles but only the attitude of those who supported Portugal.

422. Asked whether information on FRELIMO's activities reached the occupied zone in Mozambique, thus forming a core of passive resistance throughout the whole population, the petitioners said that FRELIMO gave the people as much information as possible, in order to encourage them to prepare for passive resistance. Thus the bulletin La Voix de la revolution was distributed throughout the country, as were numerous tracts. Use was also made of the radio services of independent African States to disseminate as much news as possible. Furthermore in Africa, the "bush telegraph" still operated and messages travelled fast by word of mouth to all parts of Mozambique. FRELIMO was making every effort to provide the people with the true facts, particularly since it wished to counter the Portuguese allegation that its members were merely terrorists bent on slaughter.

423. FRELIMO's activities were carried out by both civilian and military personnel. All non-military programmes, whether educational, economic or administrative, were carried out primarily by civilians. The main role of the military, which were engaged in an unemotional and rational fight, was to protect the population from the Portuguese army.

424. Replying to a question as to the possibility of a significant increase in the number of eligible voters under the prevailing system, the petitioners said that new legal measures were intended to favour white settlers, whose average age was higher than that of the African population. Those settlers therefore had a far greater proportion of eligible voters on that score alone. However, that did not fully account for the figures of 2,000 African votes out of a total vote of 64,000. Even if there were to be a rapid increase in the number of African voters under the present system, FRELIMO rejected the idea of unity with Portugal. The people of Mozambique wanted a parliament in their own country and not in Lisbon. What was needed was a radical change of direction in legislation.

425. Mr. Mbule speaking on behalf of UDENAMO said that when the Portuguese settlers had arrived in Mozambique five centuries ago, they had introduced a policy of "divide and rule" by creating misunderstandings amongst the various tribes.

426. It was well known that Portugal was a small, poor, backward and militarily weak nation, which had been under British protection since 1173, as a safeguard against Spanish ambitions. That alliance had also served to protect Portugal's colonies in Africa, although Portugal had never done anything for the benefit of the African population in those Territories except to exploit them. Despite condemnation by world opinion that situation still prevailed. Not being content with setting tribe against tribe, they had gone one step further by introducing in 1928 Salazar's infamous policy of "assimilation" - the division of the people by class. That policy had crushed the morals and integrity of the people and was aimed at a small elite of Africans with a limited knowledge of Portuguese. Those people isolated themselves from the masses and tried to lead a Portuguese way of life by attempting to adopt Portuguese customs and habits; they were even ashamed to speak their mother tongue. They thus acquired the status of Portuguese

assimilados, which entitled them to discriminatory salaries and special privileges designed to make them feel true "black" Portuguese citizens. It was in the hands of the assimilados that Portugal had placed her last hope of remaining in Africa. Their presence made any attempt to liberate the country useless, and they were more dangerous than the Portuguese themselves in the struggle for freedom and independence.

427. By means of that system Portugal intended to set up another white racist State along the lines of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, and it was with that end in mind that in 1951 they had revised the Constitution by changing the word "colony" to "overseas Portugal". However, it had not brought about the desired change in the lives of the people; on the contrary, Portugal had persisted in its defiant attitude and had continued to deprive the population of their human rights and legitimate aspirations for freedom and independence.

428. In an attempt to appease world opinion and deceive the United Nations, Portugal had in 1961 proclaimed some reforms, but those reforms not only failed to meet the aspirations of the people but put the white settlers in a better position to assume political responsibility if Portugal was eventually forced to accede to the people's demand for self-determination.

429. On announcing those reforms in 1961, the former Minister for Overseas Provinces, Mr. Moreira, had said that his Government believed it necessary to increase the settlement of the African Provinces by European Portuguese who would make their home there and that measures were being taken to deal realistically and firmly with that problem, which was of the highest priority. The influx of settlers and the efforts made to decentralize the internal administration were all part of the scheme to turn the colony into countries like South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. Portugal's "multi-racial integration" policy was aimed at deceiving the world; Portugal had no wish to be on close terms with the African people - it was only interested in making its home there by force and in denying the people their right to the land it had acquired by perfidy and treachery.

430. Portugal's idea was, by abolishing the 1954 Native Statute, to suppress the people's claim for independence; it intended to interpret Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter as it wished and refused to co-operate with the United Nations. It was therefore somewhat surprising that Portugal was still a full Member of the United Nations.

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431. Since 1961 the African population had been facing systematic extermination, designed to enable the Portuguese settlers to take possession of their property and settle in their homeland. For that purpose a terrorist racist organization, similar to the OAS in Algeria, had been established in connivance with the Government. What, then, had been the use of abolishing the Native Statute and declaring Mozambique an Overseas Province whose inhabitants were automatically Portuguese citizens, if the people were to be persecuted and exterminated?

432. One of the methods used to scatter the people in densely populated areas was to instil fear and terror. In August 1964, 20,000 people from Mueda had fled to Tanzania; again in March and August 1965 refugees had fled from Niassa to Malawi; many thousands had been arrested, among them Dr. Domingos Arono José Craveirinha a well-known journalist; the Portuguese had sent 3,000 soldiers to crush a nationalist demonstration at Tete which had resulted in the massacre of many hundreds of innocent people, the arrest of many others and the fleeing of some 12,000 to Zambia. Those were but a few examples of the atrocities which were occurring daily. The number of refugees was constantly increasing and would continue to do so as long as the Portuguese were allowed to sabotage and suppress the liberation struggle in Mozambique. Portugal preached equality but practised discrimination.

433. In 1961, after the uprising in Angola, fearing its repercussions in other Territories, especially Mozambique, Portugal had taken preventive measures by forming, in April, the Polícia Internacional da Defesa do Estado (PIDE). That organization was composed of murderers, bandits and ex-criminals to whom Salazar had granted pardons on condition that they co-operate with his criminal policy. The headquarters of PIDE was set up in Laurenço Marques and Beira. Many people, including Dr. Agostinho Illunga, Dinis Mondlane and Tomás Nyatumba, had been charged with high treason against the Government. In 1962 they had been sentenced to five years' imprisonment in Lisbon plus fifteen years' residence in Portugal and, deprived of all political rights.

434. Innumerable arrests were planned by the "black" Portuguese and their network of informers and executed by the white man. PIDE was a terrorist organization modelled after the Gestapo. Some PIDE members succeeded in joining liberation

movements for the purpose of betraying them. They tried to expel freedom fighters from the Party and even from the host country; they had gaols where nationalists were kept indefinitely; with the money they obtained from Portugal they enticed nationalist leaders to return to their homeland where they faced immediate arrest, as in the case of Daniel Mahlayeye, Matias Mboa, Bomba Tembe, José Cavane and many others. They called themselves the "Mozambique Liberation Front" and three years ago had proclaimed a fictitious armed struggle to confuse world opinion. Recently they claimed to control two thirds of Mozambique, yet they were reluctant to unite with the people. That situation was a major obstacle in the struggle for liberation but it did not lessen the determination of the oppressed people of Mozambique to fight colonialism, racism and neo-colonialism to the bitter end.

435. Southern Rhodesia provided a concrete example of imperialist manoeuvres; Ian Smith would never have dared to proclaim the unilateral declaration of independence had he not been assured of the support of the "Unholy Alliance" - Verwoerd, Smith and Salazar.

436. Since 1961, when Portugal had announced its intention to encourage the immigration of white settlers, there had been a large increase in the white population, especially in the north. A substantial number of troops had settled there after the Angola uprising. That was part of a plan to make it virtually impossible for nationalist forces trained outside the country to penetrate into Mozambique.

437. Although Portugal was a poor country, it boasted of being able to resist 12 million Africans. That was thanks to the material support of NATO, which was encouraging the creation of a racist empire in southern Africa.

438. In Mozambique, the Portuguese forces consisted of divisions of the regular army, with artillery, engineers, and army medical corps, infantry, cavalry and an army service corps, a special army of hunters, a volunteer corps, an air force, a police force and a reserve force. All those forces were well equipped with modern weapons and unlimited supplies of ammunition. In the previous year they had numbered 45,000 men, but that figure had been increased to 60,000 last December.

439. As a result of Portugal's colonial policy, Mozambique had become a police State, a land of gaols and concentration camps and a battlefield where the African people lived in terror.

440. As for the authentic opposition groups, UDENAMO had been the first party of the kind formed outside Mozambique.

441. In 1962 a liberation front had been created. In 1963, however, several members of the front had been expelled and had gone to Cairo and formed UDENAMO. In spite of meetings in Cairo with FRELIMO leaders in 1963 and 1964, UDENAMO had not rejoined FRELIMO. UDENAMO members, like those of FRELIMO, were freedom fighters; but to liberate Mozambique through an armed struggle would be impossible without unity.

442. On behalf of UDENAMO the petitioner appealed to the Special Committee, since all possible means of moral pressure and persuasion had been exhausted and since all the United Nations resolutions concerning Portuguese administration in Mozambique had been ignored by Portugal, to place the problem before the Security Council. The Security Council should adopt strong measures to prevent Portugal from terrorizing and exterminating the African population from Mozambique and should force Portugal to implement all previous United Nations resolutions in order to restore peace and respect for the lives and property of the people.

443. He also renewed UDENAMO's protest against Portugal's violation of the Declaration of Human Rights and requested the Special Committee to bring the case before the Security Council.

Petitioners concerning Guinea under Portuguese administration

444. Mr. Amilcar Cabral speaking on behalf of the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC) said that the situation in Guinea had developed considerably in the past year, but the crucial problem unfortunately remained unchanged. The armed struggle was continuing in Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands. The people of Guinea hated war, but war was being forced upon them by Portugal's refusal to recognize their most elementary rights. Moreover, by their struggle the people of Guinea were defending the cause of the United Nations, which was the cause of all mankind. Three years of armed combat had convinced the fighters that they were fighting not only Portuguese oppression but all regimes in which man was still being oppressed by man.

445. He was appearing before the Special Committee as a freedom fighter and not as a politician. His country's struggle, however, was a political struggle: its purpose was not to kill all the Portuguese soldiers or to win a war, but just to be free, and that was a political objective.

446. In order to assist the Committee in its work, he had brought with him several impartial witnesses who had no special connexion with so-called Portuguese Guinea and who were prepared to testify. He had also brought with him, as in the previous year, some documentary films which would do more to enlighten the members of the Special Committee on what was really happening in his country than any oral testimony.

447. The Chairman of his party had again been sentenced to solitary confinement, other leaders had recently been tortured and arbitrary arrests were still increasing.

448. On the morning of 5 June, ten bombers and four jet aircraft had bombed a small village in Guinea where a meeting of active leaders had been held the previous day. The village had been completely destroyed, seven persons had been killed and fifteen seriously wounded. The aircraft had been American B-26s and Fiats manufactured in the Federal Republic of Germany. Portugal, which was an under-developed country ranking last among the European nations, did not manufacture aircraft. Why, then, were the Western countries helping to bomb the people of Guinea? He did not understand the contradictions in the attitude taken by the United States, which proclaimed itself the friend of Africa but continued to help Salazar and the Portuguese criminals. The legitimate aspirations of the people of Guinea were in no way incompatible with those of the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany.

449. He expressed the hope that the Special Committee - since it could not provide arms for the people of Guinea - would use its influence to see that they received international assistance for purposes of strengthening their economy and improving public health and education. The areas of the country which had already been liberated were in urgent need of such assistance.

450. The PAIGC had already liberated almost half the Guinean territory, so much so that the enemy forces were obliged to keep to the confines of their barracks. All that the eye-witnesses who were with him had seen of the Portuguese had been their aircraft. Throughout the liberated regions, the people were in no danger of being arrested or massacred by Portuguese troops. It was only the air-raids that claimed victims.

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451. In the rest of Guinea, large areas were outside Portuguese control. Some people regarded them as liberated. The PAIGC was less categorical, because it was not yet in control of them. The actual situation was that in the south the liberated regions were Catió, Fulacunda, about half the Xitoli region and the Boé region; in the north, the PAIGC controlled the Oio and Farim regions, about half the São Domingos region, approximately 30 per cent of the Canehungo region and approximately 25 per cent of the Gabu region. At Bissau the Portuguese no longer exercised any political or military control. In fact, all they held now was their own towns.

452. In reply to questions, he said that the PAIGC did not yet control a single inch of the territory of the Cape Verde Islands. It was confining itself at present to consolidating its local organization in order to launch the armed struggle as soon as possible, since Portugal's attitude left it no other choice. Starvation and the brutality of the occupying Power had in fact become intolerable.

453. The administrative problems of the Territories of which he was the spokesman were, indeed, fundamental issues. The Portuguese had been in so-called Portuguese Guinea for five centuries, and for five centuries the Portuguese had systematically acted in such a way as to prevent the local people from administering their own affairs. The population was 99.7 per cent illiterate. The problem of key personnel was therefore crucial. Efforts were being made to solve it with the help of the few national elements available and the experts supplied by African nations. The liberated regions had been divided into zones administered by the PAIGC. At the regional and zonal levels, the party was endeavouring to settle the administrative, health, education, economic and other problems.

454. In the public health field the main problem was that of doctors and medical supplies. During the last session of the Special Committee, the petitioners had asked the United Nations to intervene with the International Red Cross and other competent organizations to obtain medical assistance from them. They had also requested that the World Health Organization (WHO), either directly or through the agency of the neighbouring African countries, should find the means of sending doctors to their liberation movement. At present, the situation with regard to doctors and medical supplies was still very grave. His party was trying to solve

the problem. It had set up health centres at its bases for treatment of the less serious casualties and the general population. It had established a military hospital in the south and another in the north. Some medical orderlies who had been trained by the Portuguese as Bissau were in turn giving medical training to young volunteers of both sexes.

455. With regard to education, the party had established nearly a hundred schools in the liberated regions; it now had four times as many primary schools and pupils as under the Portuguese: there were over 8,000 children enrolled at school as against 2,000 at the time when education had been the responsibility of the occupying Power. The party was engaged in training cadres, both inside and outside the country. It was receiving foreign aid for that purpose. For the coming July it had organized a teachers' finishing course in Guinea. The country's universities had all been mobilized to ensure the development of literary and scientific education. The problem of teachers was acute, since for language reasons there could be no question of making use of foreign instructors. The lack of text books and school equipment was also a very serious problem. The party had published reading books, out of its own resources, and had bought some scientific works and mathematics textbooks, but its requirements in the way of books and educational equipment were still considerable. If UNESCO, for which he had the greatest admiration, could help his movement in that field, it would thereby be making a most effective contribution to the struggle against illiteracy.

456. As far as the country's economy was concerned, it could not even be called under-developed. It was not developed at all. Portugal had made Portuguese Guinea a colony whose business was slaves first and then factories. Monoculture had been the rule until now. Efforts were now being made to encourage new crops, in particular ground-nuts. Up to the present he himself had been the only agricultural expert in the country but was awaiting the arrival of three colleagues from abroad.

457. The economy of so-called Portuguese Guineas was basically agricultural. The party had drawn up a report on the possibilities for the development of that economy and was starting to put the conclusions of its report into effect. Besides ground-nuts, the cultivation of other oil-bearing crops, manioc and sweet potatoes was being developed. There were now some people's shops where they could obtain

manufactured goods from abroad in exchange for the agricultural products at their disposal. It was a barter system into which money did not enter. The manufactured goods of prime necessity came mainly from gifts.

458. The school children were going to carry out a tree-planting programme. Furthermore, the Territory possessed unexploited petroleum and bauxite resources. The party was counting on the co-operation of foreign countries and the United Nations to help it to exploit its resources and thus gradually to raise the level of living of the population, which was at present extremely low.

459. In reply to questions he said that Portuguese reprisals mainly took the form of bombing isolated villages from the air, while in the big centres, the Portuguese settlers were still arresting and torturing patriots. One of his associates who had been on an assignment for Jeune Afrique in the north of the country and had gone into a bombed village near the Farim River after some aircraft had flown over and would later describe his experience to the Committee.

460. The morale of the Portuguese troops was very low. They were taking part in the war because they did not know how to get out of it. Many soldiers deserted and turned up with the forces of the liberation army. More recently, one of the deserters had said that at least 60 per cent of the soldiers in his barracks were tired of the war and wanted only to see the end of it. In that atmosphere there were constant conflicts between soldiers and men. For at least a year and a half the Portuguese had been on the defensive. In fact, their only offensives were directed against the civilian population, whom they bombed relentlessly. The liberation army, on the other hand, had made a point of constantly taking the offensive. That was the very principle of its struggle. His country would fight to the end to achieve independence.

461. He quoted an extract from an article by the Portuguese journalist, Martinho Simoes, that had appeared in the Diario de Noticias for April 1966:

"I think 'sad' is the word that best describes the mission of the men who make up the mobile fighting units. Indeed, they must expect the most hostile living conditions. Clearing a way for themselves through the capim, tearing their flesh on the rough tarrafo (tamarisk), getting bogged down in the mud which covers large areas of the Guinean soil (how many times are they not forced to advance hand in hand or else 'swim' over the viscous substance), they have only themselves to rely on.

"They know that the enemy is on the watch for them, hidden in the dense vegetation. They know that the attack will come at any moment - or rather, in the worst circumstances: when some obstacle immobilizes them or when some mishap lowers the efficiency of their security system. They know that if the terrorists decide to take the offensive, it is because they have calculated beforehand that the situation is favourable to them, either because of their numerical superiority, or because of the quantity and quality of the arms at their disposal, or else because they occupy a favourable position. They know that ambush is an imminent danger. They know that they will not have a single moment of rest, however long the expedition lasts... .

"... Meanwhile, in the barracks, the garrisons must constantly keep on the alert. The 'bandoleiros' (brigands) are cowards. They come, under cover of silence and the dark of night, hurl the instruments of death supplied to them in abundance by the Communists and flee back to their encampments in the neighbouring countries."

462. To supplement the information he had provided he asked the Committee to hear his four associates, Mrs. Joyce Lusso, Mr. Justin Vieyra, Mr. Isidro Romero and Mr. Pierfo Nelli, whom he had included in his request for a hearing (A/AC.109/PET.511 and Add.1) and who would each describe what he had personally seen in Guinea. Two of them were film-makers, one French and one Italian, and two were Italian journalists.

463. Mrs. Joyce Lusso said that she had recently returned from a journey to the southern part of so-called Portuguese Guinea. She had been mainly interested in the civil organization of the region. The war there was a harsh necessity and it was proceeding, all things considered, in circumstances which gave every ground for hope. It was still necessary, however, to establish a society capable of administering its own affairs in those areas. The Portuguese had so far prevented that. The 99.7 per cent of the population who were illiterate were ipso facto deprived of their civil rights. Under Portuguese law, Guinea was not a colony but a province, the inhabitants of which had the same rights as Portuguese citizens provided that they fulfilled the required conditions, which it was quite impossible for them to do. In fact, in order to vote, every Guinean citizen had to know Portuguese, be familiar with Portuguese custom and culture and submit financial

guarantees. That being so, the vast majority of the population were actually governed by a colonial statue which had quickly reduced them to slavery, inasmuch as they were forced to accept inadmissible work contracts and in some cases were liable to deportation.

464. With the support of the population, the liberation army had managed to keep Portuguese troops out of the liberated zones. The occupying Power had no recourse but bombing. In fact, reconnaissance aircraft and bombers were the only vestiges of mechanization that the country owed to the Portuguese. Whose towns and villages were bombed, either once or repeatedly, and rather than seeking safety in flight the local population was persisting in rebuilding them, with admirable **tenacity**.

465. The administration of the liberated regions was entrusted to two inter-regional administrative committees, subdivided into four regional committees in the north and six in the south. The regions were subdivided into sectors or provinces, each covering a certain number of villages or communes and administered by five party members and five representatives elected by the people. The whole population, men and women, took part in administrative activities and in the organization of production and distribution at the village level.

466. At the inter-regional and regional committee levels, the administrative heads were appointed by the party. At the sectoral and communal levels, some administrators were appointed by the party, while others were elected according to democratic procedures. The relationship between the administrative services, the armed forces and the party was an extremely flexible one. There was no hierarchical crystallization, but constant osmosis between the military life and civilian life. It was an extremely interesting phenomenon to observe, to which men and women contributed equally. The regular army had been formed with the help of foreign countries. It was supplemented by groups of partisans in the maquis and by popular militias. Justice was dispensed by democratically elected committees, except in cases which called for the establishment of a special court.

467. The local economy was still a subsistence economy, which sufficed to feed the population. Each committee organized communal work in the territory under its jurisdiction. There, as elsewhere, the women worked side by side with the men.

468. Education at all levels was one of the prime concerns of the committee, which was building schools in the forests to try to protect their pupils against enemy bombing, for it should be stressed that the Portuguese showed a predilection for attacking school sites.

469. She had visited several schools in the liberated regions. The buildings were primitive: roofs of foliage and branches, tree trunks for tables and benches. Textbooks were lacking. The whole village, however, was taking part in an amazing way in the literacy campaign that had been undertaken. The teachers were very young people who had just completed their secondary education and were devoting two years to teaching before leaving for advanced study abroad.

470. She appealed to all to help those bush schools to obtain school equipment, paper and cotton fabric to make pinafores for the children.

471. To sum up, she had been able to see for herself that the foundations of a future democratic society were already laid and that that society was developing coherently, on the basis of exchanges between doctrine and experience.

472. Replying to a question, the petitioner said that there was no lack of food. The people of the southern regions were industrious and despite the lack of modern equipment they used highly advanced methods. Rice was cultivated as in Italy and production was so abundant that it was possible to build up stocks in the people's shops and the silos. The rice might be used as trading currency if the lack of communications did not make it impossible to transport. The country also produced ground-nut oil and palm oil. There was an abundance of livestock and poultry. The people were well fed, strong and healthy. The party was planning the country's agriculture in order to replace the monoculture system established by the Portuguese by a subsistence economy.

473. The liberation army had at its disposal a more than satisfactory supply of arms and, in particular, anti-aircraft batteries, bazookas and very efficient mortars, which enabled the fighters to drive off enemy bombers. The army was very well organized. It was closely linked with the population and there was no trace of hierarchical crystallization in it. The fighters had no ranks. They were not professional soldiers. The cadres were locally recruited and there were no foreign volunteers in the liberation army. Its advance was rational and coherent. Around the liberated zones, the popular army had the upper hand and

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the Portuguese avoided engagements. The Portuguese bases had been reinforced, but they were completely isolated and cut off, so much so that their provisions were brought by helicopter. The regular army, with the help of advance actions carried out by the partisans, made frequent forays into enemy territory. It should not be forgotten that the war had started only four years ago. Soon the liberation army would pursue its advance and seize the large towns; that would present not only military problems but political problems which all the forces of democracy would have to help in resolving.

474. Mr. Justin Vieyra said that he had spent three days in the Guinean maquis, from 5 to 8 June 1966. He had been with some maquis leaders when, at about 5 o'clock on the morning of 5 June, his friend Nino had told him to run and lie down in the grass to escape the bombers. His terror had been such that he had been able to count only four bombers, but there had certainly been more of them. An hour later, he had gone into the bombed village. He had counted seven dead or dying, one of whom had been disembowelled. He had seen the corpses of a four-year-old child, a young woman and so forth, and a village devastated by bombing, for the aircraft had returned to the attack several times. While he was on the river, in the open, he had seen two jet aircraft machine-gunning the bombed village. The next day the same village had been looted.

475. During the four days he had spent on Guinean territory, it had been the atrocities which had struck him most of all. He appealed to those Africans who were unaware that war was at their door. A mistake was all that was needed for Dakar or any of the Guinean towns to suffer the same fate as the martyred village he had passed through. It should be noted above all that the Portuguese were not attacking soldiers but the civilian population in the villages, which showed the atrocity of that inhuman war.

476. Mr. Isidro Romero, a French film-maker, said that he had travelled through northern and southern Guinea. In the southern part of the Territory he had been able to take some interesting shots. The group he was with had been waiting for a column coming to get arms. The column had arrived bearing on a stretcher two wounded, a man and a child, the sole survivors of a village that had been attacked by the Portuguese. The child had tried to run away. He had been shot down by a bullet in the heel, and then a Portuguese officer had come and given him what he

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had thought was the finishing stroke. The deadly bullet, passing through the child's ear, had torn out his cheek, but unfortunately for the Portuguese the child has survived to bear witness to their atrocities. The film that was to be shown to the Committee would illustrate that story.

477. He recalled the case of the wounded man he had seen beside the child of whom he had already spoken. The man, who was middle-aged, had received bazooka splinters in his leg ten days earlier. As the liberation army had no anti-gangrene serum, the man's leg was slowly rotting and the wound was crawling with huge worms. The members of the Special Committee would be able to see in the film that was to be shown to them some pictures that were not easy to stomach, dramatically illustrating the fighters' lack of medical supplies.

478. As a film-maker, he had taken part in an ambush organized by the detachment of the liberation army which had launched an attack on the Portuguese town of Mançoa. The detachment had taken a road that some African workers were repairing under the supervision of Portuguese soldiers. At about 1 p.m. it had attacked the lorries taking the Portuguese soldiers back to their barracks and had set fire to eleven enemy lorries and two automatic machine-guns. It had, of course, spared the lorry carrying the African labourers.

479. Mr. Piero Nelli, an Italian film-maker, said that he and his team had made their first stop in a village which the Portuguese had bombed immediately after their departure. The bombing had left a number of dead, including five girls. During its northward march, the team had passed through another village that had been completely destroyed by the Portuguese. While shooting the film they had seen aircraft bombing a third village a few miles away and had managed to film the bombing. They had later gone to the headquarters of the army of the north and had visited field hospitals there, where the wounded partisans were given treatment. It was true that the sight of soldiers wounded in a war had shocked him less than seeing the deliberate butchering of innocent women and children, so implacable were the laws of war.

480. Describing the films that were to be shown to the Committee which had been shot during fifteen days in the maquis, he said that he had managed to take some shots inside a field hospital in the north which was devoted mainly to the treatment of war casualties. He had seen some amazing things there: the morning

was devoted to the medical care usually given to the wounded, injections, dressings and so forth. Then, young student nurses attended in rotation two-hour courses dealing not only with nursing and first aid but also with general therapy. He himself had been present at a clinical lecture on angina pectoris. On the night of 2-3 February 1966, immediately after he had crossed the frontier between Senegal and so-called Portuguese Guinea, he had seen a school in a forest where a sixteen-year-old youth was teaching soldiers and children to read.

481. The aspirations of the people had been expressed in very simple and naive terms by a peasant woman during a meeting held at the northern headquarters of the Guinean liberation army: "We want to open people's shops in the north of the country where purchases can be made by barter. We want our men to come back and work the land. We want the war to end, but we also want to win it, because this war is a just one, because this war has given us hospitals, schools and freedom, because this war gives us back the land that belongs to us."

482. Replying to a question on the morale of the Portuguese troops, he recalled two episodes at which he had been present in person. Firstly, he had taken part in the fighting near Mansoa, where the Guinean army had laid an ambush for the Portuguese troops. The troops had arrived. All their heavy fire had been concentrated on the liberation army detachment facing them, but they had confined themselves to remaining on the defensive. A group of about thirty freedom fighters had attacked a hundred men, four armoured trucks and two tanks. They had destroyed two trucks and put thirty to forty men out of action. The reason for the Portuguese failure to counter-attack was that they were not sure of the morale of their troops. Secondly, he had seen Portuguese troops disembarking on the other side of Farim and embarking in a gunboat guided by a helicopter. The soldiers had made their way through the bush, shooting at random. They had advanced in disarray, but had made no attempt to attack.

483. In reply to further questions the petitioner, Mr. Cabral, said that the question of the Territories under Portuguese domination should be brought before the Security Council and that the United Nations specialized agencies should give the nationalist liberation movements assistance. It was essential that the Security Council should declare the sanctions against Portugal obligatory and place an embargo on the supply of arms, if the resolutions were to be really effective.

It should also be recognized that the nationalist movements were creating the necessary conditions for the implementation of the principles of the Charter, the Declaration on Human Rights, self-determination and independence. Assistance from the specialized agencies, such as UNICEF, UNESCO, WHO and UNHCR, could be provided through the intermediary of CONCP.

484. The nationalists' various movements were already preparing themselves to take over responsibilities of government after independence and a new experiment was in progress in Guinea and Cape Verde. The planning had to be by progressive stages, taking account of the economic, social and cultural situation of the region. Although extensive areas had been liberated, there was no question, for the moment, of setting up a provisional government; nevertheless, in all the liberated regions administrative organs were being created and gradually separated from the party structure. As an example, he mentioned the establishment of a civil registry office and health services, and arrangements for a census during the current year. All the leaders of the struggle and all educated people were devoting themselves to economic, social and cultural studies, in order to be able to assume all responsibilities after independence.

485. In the years since 1950 the patriots in the different territories had begun to become aware of their position as men and Africans. They had first of all created combined movements for the common struggle. From 1956 onwards, national organizations had been set up in each Territory. In 1961 the first conference of nationalist movements had been held in Casablanca, following which it had been possible to establish a Secretariat. The second conference, which had been held at Dar es Salaam, in 1965, had made it possible to establish concrete bases for co-ordination at the political and military level with a view to the reconstruction of the countries. At that conference it had been decided, among other things, that one person would represent the Portuguese Territories at international conferences in future. Another meeting was to be held at Brazzaville in the near future with a view to strengthening that co-ordination. A military commission was engaged in co-ordinating military activities in the various countries and a social commission was dealing with questions of education and health assistance. There was also a joint programme for primary

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schools. Other bodies had been established to promote the exchange of experience, for the struggle was the same for all; every nationalist was aware of himself as an African and was fighting for the liberation of his country and his people.

486. Not only the Portuguese Territories but all the African States and all peace- and freedom-loving States throughout the world were concerned about the establishment of a fascist régime in South Africa and in Southern Rhodesia. The consequences were in part subjective and in part objective. From the subjective point of view, the fact that a racist régime was developing with impunity in Africa strengthened the hopes, the illusions and the machinations of the Portuguese colonialists. From the objective point of view, it was clear that Portugal, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa were taking practical steps to persecute, arrest and massacre the African. In Guinea, for example, Portugal in agreement with South Africa, was building a large airport on an island, to replace the African airports from which South Africa was barred. The airport would also give Portugal a secure base from which to bomb the people of the Cape Verde Islands and Guinea.

487. After three years of struggle, the people had discovered the secret of the colonial war being waged by Portugal, a poor and backward country. Portugal was in fact using American arms, as a journalist had written in the Washington Post. The people had realized that Portugal was receiving aircraft, napalm bombs and automatic weapons from its NATO allies. The States members of NATO replied that they did not authorize Portugal to use those weapons. If, however, you gave a knife to a madman bent on killing, how could you expect him not to use it? He also pointed out that the ESSO Company had renewed a contract with Portugal. At the start of the war of liberation the company's technicians had been dismissed, but after three years of fighting, when it was realized that the struggle would continue, the American company had concluded a new contract. He had asked a United States Embassy representative in Conakry the reason for that and had been told that the company was no doubt anxious to keep its leading position. In the present situation, that act was regarded as an unfriendly one, since it put more funds at Portugal's disposal for the continuation of its struggle.

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488. As to the reported delivery of Italian FIAT aircraft by the Federal Republic of Germany to Portugal, that was because within the framework of the Common Market and the agreements between Italy and the Federal Republic, FIAT aircraft were being assembled in the Federal Republic of Germany. There were twenty of those aircraft operating in Guinea. Thus aircraft designed by Italian brains and built by German manpower were being delivered for use in the Territories under Portuguese domination to exterminate the people, whose sole desire was to build their country in peace, like the Italian people.

489. Besides the aircraft and arms from the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States, other arms had been found, such as machine guns and grenades, for example, made in Italy and Belgium. Furthermore, it was almost certain that the helicopters being used in Guinea were French-manufactured Alouettes.

490. Up to four months earlier the total strength of the Portuguese troops in the Territory had been about 20,000 men but, following the many losses it had suffered, Portugal had raised that figure to 25,000. He could not say whether there were any mercenaries among them. With respect to aviation, there were technicians at Bissau hidden in a villa some distance from the town who were probably not Portuguese, for they did not look Portuguese and did not speak that language. He did not know what their nationality was but he supposed they were South Africans. It was quite likely that the countries which were supplying planes to Portugal were also sending it technicians to look after them.

491. The Portuguese had on several occasions violated the air space of Guinea and Senegal, and both countries had brought complaints of the violation of their frontiers before the Security Council. Such violations were a common occurrence. The previous month, on 6 May 1966 if he was not mistaken, the Portuguese had crossed the Guinean frontier in order to go and set fire to a village and to capture the chiefs of the village because the nationalist forces had made a mortar attack on one of their barracks in Buruntuma. There had followed an exchange of fire between the Portuguese troops and the Guinean troops, but Guinea had not brought that incident before the Security Council for it considered it to be part of the daily struggle. He understood that Portuguese aircraft had been brought down in the Congo (Brazzaville), too. Portuguese troops had also repeatedly crossed the Senegalese frontier to burn down villages.

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492. Replying to a question on armaments used by his movement, he said that every national liberation struggle had its own laws. The arms used had to correspond to the actual needs of the struggle. At the beginning the fighters had had only traditional and primitive weapons, lances and pistols. Subsequently, they had managed to obtain rifles, machine pistols and even small cannon. Aircraft and sophisticated weapons would be necessary, but technical staff able to use them would also be needed. Although the nationalist forces had captured some tanks they did not keep them, because they were unable to use them. They therefore destroyed them with mines or bazookas. The tanks were usually of American origin or from the Federal Republic of Germany. In the fighters' day-to-day struggle it was the men who counted above all, and there were many ready to sacrifice their lives for the triumph of their cause.

493. The system of colonial justice in the Territory was the same as in all colonial countries. Guinea was regarded as a comarca, i.e. as a division of the Portuguese judicial system, subject to the authority of Lisbon. There was one system of justice for the Europeans and the assimilados and another for the indigenous population. The latter were dealt summary justice by the local administrator. They were arrested and given no possibility of defence, and their fate depended on the arbitrary wishes of that administrator. In general they were sentenced to prison, corporal punishment or forced labour. He suggested that for fuller information on that question the representative of Sierra Leone might consult the report which had been submitted to the Special Committee on Territories under Portuguese administration at Conakry in 1962. The report, entitled "The People of so-called Portuguese Guinea before the United Nations" gave some very precise details on the way in which justice was administered in that Territory.

494. PAIGC did not consider that there were really any Guinean representatives in the Portuguese National Assembly. The Portuguese Government chose the representatives of so-called Portuguese Guinea itself, in order to be able to claim that there were representatives of that country in the National Assembly. There were at present four so-called Guineans among the members of that Assembly but only one of them was really a Guinean and the PAIGC regarded him as a traitor. There were no real elections in so-called Portuguese Guinea.

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495. As to the attitude of the PAIGC, if Mr. Salazar no longer held power and Portugal's colonial policy subsequently changed and became favourable to independence for Guinea called Portuguese Guinea, the petitioner said that his party was not struggling against the Portuguese people, but against Salazar's fascist régime. It was not certain whether the disappearance of that régime would necessarily lead to a change of attitude on the part of the Portuguese Government. If, however, such were the case, the PAIGC would be ready to collaborate with the Portuguese Government if that Government recognized its just claims. The Guineans did not like war; they had been impelled to fight, against their will.

496. PAIGC was at present making efforts to spread the idea of liberty among the Portuguese soldiers, so that they might appreciate the liberation movement and ultimately defect and enlist in its ranks, and it had already achieved some results. In fact, a good many of the Portuguese troops were illiterate and understood nothing about the struggle they were forced to engage in. Portugal was trying to keep them in ignorance, to prevent them revolting. The Political Commissioner of the nationalist army had prepared leaflets for the Portuguese soldiers, to be planted on the route the soldiers were to take. The leaflets, however, never included any words of hatred of the Portuguese. Some leaflets had been planted in the north of the country encouraging the Portuguese soldiers to desert.

497. One deserter, a twenty-year-old Portuguese, who had been in Guinea for ten months, when asked whether he knew why he was fighting a war, had replied that the Portuguese officers told their troops they were to go and disperse the bandits. The deserter had said, moreover, that the exit of his barracks was guarded and that the supply of provisions was very bad. On being asked whether he thought the nationalists had any chance of winning the war, the soldier had replied in the affirmative, pointing out that the Portuguese did not know the terrain well and that that was why they always put their African recruits in forward positions.

Petitioners concerning São Tomé and Príncipe

498. Mr. Medeiros, speaking on behalf of the Comité de Libertação de São Tomé e Príncipe (CLSTP), said that the fact that the Special Committee, in the closing stage of its journey, had included the question of the Portuguese Territories in

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its agenda signified that the struggle of those peoples was now one of the most important events in the African continent.

499. That event, which was unprecedented in the history of Portuguese colonialism, showed that in the present circumstances the people of São Tomé and Príncipe, regardless of their geographical situation, the size of their Territory and the number of their population, was determined to liquidate colonial domination completely.

500. It caused him particular joy to see, in the Special Committee, delegates representing peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America which, in equally difficult circumstances, were waging a struggle to consolidate their political and economic independence.

501. Three years had elapsed since the last contact between the representative of São Tomé and Príncipe and the Fourth Committee of the United Nations.

502. An understanding of the various problems created by the Portuguese presence in that country revealed that the relationship between colonizer and colonized continued to be dominated by a pattern in which the colonizer was the landowner and the African a mere instrument of production.

503. While the roça (a huge agricultural property) was still the nucleus of agrarian activities in the island, which were tied to the exploitation of the productive land, great changes had been made in its physiognomy for the purpose of concentrating everything in the hands of two large Portuguese monopolies, Banco Nacional Ultramarino and Companhia União Fabril.

504. Those huge agricultural properties occupied 93 per cent of the arable land, and their internal configuration gave the archipelago the appearance of a collection of "micro-states" in which the periphery was occupied by the indigenous population. Their economic activities were quite limited, and they entailed subsistence agriculture in an area representing 7 per cent of the arable land and monopolizing 52 per cent of the population of the archipelago.

505. The annual national income of the inhabitants of São Tomé and Príncipe was about \$US25. The standard of living of the population was one of the lowest in the world, and the infant mortality rate was 42 per thousand. In addition, tropical diseases, illiteracy, which was about 85 per cent, and malnutrition were facts of everyday life; hence the conflict which was daily becoming more bitter owing to the scarcity of manpower.

506. The emergence of a revolutionary spirit, resulting from the conditions in which the Portuguese presence had been imposed (colonization, slavery, oppression and resistance to oppression), and the patient action of the Comité de Libertação de São Tomé e Príncipe had caused Portugal to strengthen its military apparatus; a complete war machine had been established and was being perfected, in order to stifle at birth the aspirations of the people of São Tomé and Príncipe to independence.

507. In December 1965, a group of seventeen patriots in São Tomé, including the very well-known poetess Alda de Espírito Santo, had been arrested.

508. The PIDE (political police) were using unhappily traditional methods of torture on them. In particular, a young student, António Lamba, had had to be admitted to a psychiatric clinic because of the ill-treatment inflicted on him.

509. The historical perspective and the importance of the struggle of the people of São Tomé and Príncipe might not be appreciated if geographical size alone was considered. Whereas in the past the islands of São Tomé and Príncipe, owing to their geographical situation, had functioned as depots for slaves, the archipelago was now actually becoming, in view of the expansion of the struggles for liberation in Angola and Mozambique, a military base against the nationalist movements in those countries, as well as in São Tomé and Príncipe.

510. The archipelago was gaining importance in the context of air communications between Portugal and its Territories, especially since the independent African countries had closed their harbours and airports to the Portuguese colonialists.

511. The archipelago functioned as a supporting and supply base for aircraft flying from Lisbon to Angola and Mozambique. In addition, the struggle by the imperialist Powers for the reconquest of Africa made the archipelago a supporting base for any future punitive operations against neighbouring countries. For instance, the Bonn militarists and revanchistes were toying with the idea of establishing a military base in the island of São Tomé.

512. It was for that reason that the airport at São Tomé had been improved in the light of new military needs. As a result of the improvements, Angola and Mozambique were required to contribute 1.7 million escudos each, and São Tomé 600,000 escudos, to the operational budget of the airport, under the terms of Decree No. 45,745 of 1 June 1965.

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513. Armed struggle was the only solution to the colonial conflict in São Tomé and Príncipe, and CLSTP was fully aware of the risks involved in that solution. Portugal's attitude both towards the peoples of the archipelago and towards the neighbouring African States were such that the Portuguese Government must be regarded as an aggressor. That being so, the Security Council must apply obligatory sanctions against Portugal and, in particular, must place an embargo on the supply of arms and military matériel.

514. He was glad that that point and others raised by all the representatives of the peoples of the Portuguese Territories had been included in the draft resolutions of the Special Committee (A/AC.109/L.315 and A/AC.109/L.313).

515. The people of São Tomé and Príncipe had been living for five centuries under the weight of Portuguese colonial domination, and the history of their struggle showed that decolonization could be achieved only by the will of the people, guided exclusively by the revolutionary ideal.

516. In conclusion, he wished to pay ardent tribute to the Algerian people, whose struggle for liberation was a lesson to all and formed part of the heritage of progressive men everywhere.

517. Mr. de Andrade, speaking on behalf of the Conferência das Organizações Nacionalistas das Colónias Portuguesas (CONCP), said that the formation of the Committee on Decolonization was the culmination of a prolonged struggle within the United Nations to have colonialism condemned, one of the most significant landmarks of which had been the adoption of resolution 1514 (XV) on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples.

518. The time had passed when reports of the violence practised by the colonial administration were drowned by the many other conflicts in which the great imperialist Powers were involved. The whole world was now aware that Portugal was exploiting its colonies and rejecting the demands and aspirations of the indigenous populations. The reports drawn up by the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly described, not a "Portuguese oasis of peace", but battlefields of national liberation wars.

519. The spirit and letter of the United Nations Charter provided a legal basis and moral support for the war of liberation being waged by the peoples of the Portuguese colonies. The General Assembly resolution of 20 December 1965 recognized

the legitimacy of the means employed to make the right to self-determination and independence prevail. It was for that reason that one of the leaders of the nationalist movements had rightly declared that those who were fighting were anonymous United Nations fighters. In confronting that just people's war, Portugal had the advantage of the complicity and the diplomatic, military and economic support of the members of NATO. Those countries were contravening the principles of the Charter, of which they were signatories.

520. The Conferência das Organizações Nacionalistas das Colónias Portuguesas described itself as a unified fighting front for the elimination of Portuguese colonialism. It had grown out of the need to co-ordinate the efforts of various existing organizations with a view to enabling them to attain their immediate objective: the conquest of national independence. The Conference had reorganized itself in December 1965 in order better to co-ordinate the political and military action of its member nationalist movements. The Conference played the part of a catalyst of the popular forces and organized concerted action at the international level. Since the meeting at Casablanca in April 1961 at which it had been formed, CONCP had been in touch constantly with the United Nations, OAU and the African States. It had been lobbying for an economic and diplomatic boycott of Portugal. The adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 1514 (XV) had placed the problem of eradicating colonialism in a new light and provided wider scope for international action by nationalist movements. The CONCP mission which had visited New York in November 1965 had submitted to the Fourth Committee specific proposals, the spirit, if not the letter, of which was reproduced in the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its previous session.

521. The national liberation movement in Portuguese colonies had always had a dual aim. Firstly, it sought to destroy the Portuguese colonial structures and to gain effective control of vast regions of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea; secondly, it was engaged in national reconstruction in all spheres of political, administrative, economic, social and cultural life. Where terror and arbitrary rule, ignorance and disease had formerly prevailed, it established the democracy inherent in the nature of nationalist movements and set up schools and health centres. That factor introduced a new dimension into the task of decolonization. From the moment when armed struggle had come to be seen as the only means of

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securing the right to self-determination, nationalist movements had had to alter the emphasis of their efforts. Decolonization should, in fact, deprive Portugal of any opportunity of establishing another type of domination after independence was achieved. It should be noted, in that connexion, that the Portuguese Government had never shown any inclination for a negotiated solution to the problem of its colonies on the basis of the right to self-determination. There was abundant proof that Portugal did not recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of the Territories under its domination were paramount; the nationalist movements had therefore had to undertake the responsibility of themselves administering the peoples in wartime. The liberation movements played a peaceful part in that sphere: they respected the culture of the peoples and provided for their political, economic and social advance. The international consequences of that state of affairs were obvious. By speaking the language of justice, law, democracy and culture, the liberation movements were helping to strengthen international peace and security. In the light of that new information on the situation in the liberated areas, Chapter XI, and particularly Article 73, of the Charter relating to Non-Self-Governing Territories no longer appeared to have any meaning.

522. He expressed appreciation of the work done by the High Commissioner for Refugees. That problem was sufficiently important to form the subject of a seminar in which the leaders of the nationalist movements could participate.

523. CONCP, which acted on behalf of the Comité de Libertação de S. Tomé e Príncipe, the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique, the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola and the Partido Africano da Independência de Guiné e Cabo Verde, considered that the question of the Territories administered by Portugal should not only appear on the agenda of the twenty-first session of the General Assembly but be brought before the Security Council. The implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples could have no meaning unless the Special Committee took into account the new situation created by the nationalist movements, which already controlled extensive areas. The nationalist movements considered that, in accordance with the spirit and the letter of General Assembly resolution 2105 (XX), operative paragraph 10, they were entitled to recommend the Special Committee to determine, in agreement with the national liberation movements, the types of priority assistance to be given to the struggling peoples. Although

the practical help which might be given by the specialized agencies to nationalist movements would have to be discussed, he thought the most effective help would undoubtedly be that affecting education and would be provided by UNESCO and the High Commissioner for Refugees. In this connexion he hoped that the Committee would endorse the idea of holding a seminar on the refugee problem. A number of African countries were accepting refugees and nationals of countries which were fighting against Portugal. It would be desirable for the nationalist movements and CONCP to take part in the organization of the seminar and to contribute to it by providing information.

524. On the other hand in pursuance of operative paragraph 11 of the same resolution, he felt that the Committee should recommend the expulsion of Portugal from the specialized agencies of the United Nations.

525. The United Nations, and the Special Committee in particular, had aroused immense hopes among the peoples under Portuguese administration and had created an atmosphere of confidence among the leaders of the political movements. In appealing to the Committee, CONCP had been prompted by the desire to help, however modestly, in making international peace, justice and co-operation prevail throughout the world.

526. In reply to a question, the petitioner said that CONCP, comprising the organizations he had named before, had been established in April 1961, two months after the start of the armed struggle in Angola. The Union des populations de l'Angola was not a member of the unified organization, although it had been invited to the constituent assembly of CONCP in April 1961. The Union had said at that time that it was materially impossible for it to send a representative to Casablanca. CONCP had repeated its appeal and had stated that it was prepared to welcome any movement which was fighting to achieve specific aims.

527. CONCP was the catalyst of the peoples' forces and its role was to co-ordinate all political and military action, in order to hasten the defeat of the common enemy. Each nationalist organization had to make a contribution to it. CONCP was headed by the Conference, which met every two years. Between meetings of the Conference, the Governing Council, composed of the leaders of the four political parties which were members of CONCP, was responsible for interpreting the

resolutions of the Conference and putting them into effect. The executive body, which acted as a permanent secretariat, comprised four sections, under the direction of officials of the nationalist movements. CONCP had its own sources of information. It had drawn up a programme of action, approved by the Council, which was divided into two parts: the political and military struggle, and national reconstruction. Action to promote national reconstruction was the responsibility of a special committee for education and culture, and was carried out both in areas which had been wrested from the colonial administration and in the frontier areas which gave shelter to the nationalist movements.

528. Many areas were already controlled by the nationalist movement; in Cabinda, for instance, the area controlled represented 30 per cent of the territory. The administrative system set up in those areas reflected the structure of the parties.

529. In order to make the Conference better known, it had drawn up a plan of action and propaganda. The Governing Council was at present strengthening the permanent secretariat, which would have an information section large enough to cover various regions. As the nationalist movements were having difficulties in connexion with their information services, particularly in countries which were hostile to them. The information and propaganda section was going to try to arrange for the various supporting committees of the nationalist movements to represent it in Latin America and even in Western countries.

530. In his opinion it was not true that sanctions would cause most suffering to the Africans, and the policy of sanctions against Portugal should be continued. He expressed satisfaction with the efforts of the Special Committee and of all peace-loving Members of the United Nations to make sanctions against Portugal and the commercial and political boycott of that country a reality. With regard to operative paragraph 7 of resolution 2107 (XX), approaches had been made to the African States which were best placed to respond favourably. It was encouraging to note that many recommendations made to the Fourth Committee had been included in draft resolutions submitted to the General Assembly. In the matter of the commercial boycott the role of the great Western Powers was obviously decisive. That boycott was linked with the alliance between Portugal and its NATO partners. That important problem might be reviewed, not only by the General Assembly, but also by the Security Council.

531. Although the United States and other Western Powers had rejected allegations that they were providing assistance to Portugal through NATO, there was ample proof that help existed, in the form of military equipment and weapons captured by fighting members of the national movements. That evidence required no comment. Other petitioners from nationalist movements which operated in the maquis would provide material proof. Those movements had prepared several reports on the matter. It was well known that German instructors were being sent to Portugal under the co-operation arrangements between Portugal and the Federal Republic of Germany.

532. The Federal Republic of Germany was also providing military, political and economic assistance to Portugal. The pact between the Federal Republic of Germany and Portugal showed that the fascist spirit which still prevailed in that country was in harmony with the fascist tendency of the Portuguese Government. That problem would be difficult to solve except by intensifying the struggle, which would eventually make it possible to break the alliance between the Federal Republic of Germany and Portugal.

533. In reply to a question he said that he had no exact figures of loans and investments made by the Federal Republic of Germany. The representatives of the nationalist movements which had documents available on the subject would, however, willingly supply them. He assured the Committee that those documents would be placed before it in the near future.

534. Summing up CONCP's position he said that it hoped the Security Council would continue to keep the question of the Territories under Portuguese administration before it, because Portugal's attitude was a threat to international peace. Since the Security Council was the only international body which could adopt resolutions of a mandatory nature, it was the Council's responsibility to deal with that question and to decide, if appropriate, to expel Portugal from the United Nations. The second demand submitted concerned the development of the conflict between CONCP and the administering Power. As matters stood, it was the nationalist movements which should direct the work of decolonization; for that they needed assistance from the United Nations and the specialized agencies. It was the opinion of CONCP that the assistance which, in accordance with resolutions of the United Nations, should be refused to Portugal should logically be transferred to the liberation movements.

B. General statements by members

535. The representative of Ethiopia said that the problem regarding the question of Territories under Portuguese administration had never been and never would be lack of clarity in the objectives and intents of those interested, but rather want of rigour in the measures adopted to make Portugal realize its folly and to force it to respond favourably to the demands of the indigenous people of its Territories and to civilized world opinion.

536. The conditions of the unfortunate millions of African brothers in Angola, Mozambique, so-called Portuguese Guinea and other Territories under the yoke of Portuguese colonial domination were too well known to require detailed treatment. Portuguese tyranny and the cruelty with which the African majority in the Portuguese Territories was being repressed was a well-known tragedy that had shocked the conscience of mankind. The Committee at a previous meeting had had a first-hand account of the methods of repression used by the Portuguese fascists against innocent people struggling for freedom. His delegation wished to express once again its appreciation to Mr. Erredosa who, because of lofty humanitarian motives and high moral conscience, had resigned from the ranks of the Portuguese Army in protest against the barbarous acts perpetrated by Portugal. He hoped that the world would see more Portuguese of his calibre and sense of dedication taking the side of justice in the future.

537. He had no intention of repeating the atrocities of the crime Portugal was committing against humanity. Neither would it be necessary for him to review the various concrete recommendations made by the Committee and various other organs of the United Nations on the matter. Nevertheless, inasmuch as it was the Committee's duty to make constant use of that forum to keep concerned world opinion informed on the developments of those Territories, he felt obliged to recall some salient features of the measures so far adopted.

538. In recognition of the large-scale human tragedy involved in the problem of Portuguese colonial administration, the General Assembly of the United Nations and its various organs had on several occasions considered and made clear proposals and recommendations concerning those Territories which were mercilessly being exploited by Portugal. There was no doubt in anybody's mind that those Territories were

non-self-governing within the meaning of Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter. Therefore, the claim made by the Portuguese authorities that Portugal and its so-called overseas Territories constituted one "pluri-continental and multi-racial nation" was without any foundation and had been rejected beyond doubt. The situation resulting from the highly unrealistic position held by Portugal, both as regards the African population of its Territories and the neighbouring States, seriously disturbed international peace and security.

539. Prime Minister Salazar, explaining his Government's policy regarding its Territories, said that in the case of Portugal the only thing that mattered was to determine whether the laws conferred on the citizens of the Territories the same political rights, i.e., those through which the individual influenced the character of the State.

540. If one asked whether that had been achieved in Portuguese Territories, the answer was a definite no. Judged by any moral standard, Portugal could not escape condemnation for the outmoded policy it was perpetrating in its Territories.

541. The General Assembly, the Security Council and the Special Committee had time and again requested the Government of Portugal, among other things, to recognize the inalienable rights of the people of the Territories under its administration to self-determination and independence in accordance with the provisions of the Charter and resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, which solemnly proclaimed the necessity of bringing to a speedy and unconditional end colonialism in all its forms and manifestations.

542. From what the Committee had heard from the petitioners and from the various reports in the Territories, it was obvious that the situation in the Portuguese Territories had taken a turn for the worse. Each passing day marked atrocious crimes committed against humanity. Each day more and more Africans were exiled from their homes, imprisoned and tortured. Thousands were put to death by one of the most brutal military forces the world had ever known.

543. For that cruel and inhuman operation, Portugal was spending millions of dollars to maintain its overseas army. During the period 1961-65, its expenditure had amounted to about \$US600 million. For a country as poor and backward as Portugal, that was not a small sum to raise. It was clear how and from what sources Portugal

drew its supply to carry out the shameful war it was conducting against the African people in its Territories. A number of resolutions had been passed by the Committee requesting all Member States to refrain from offering assistance to Portugal which would enable it to continue its repression of the peoples of the Territories, and to take measures to prevent not only the sale and supply of arms and military equipment to the Portuguese Government for that purpose, including the sale and shipment of equipment and materials for the manufacture and maintenance of arms and ammunition to be used in the Territories. It was his delegation's earnest hope that all Members would comply with that request and, as recommended, inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations on measures they had taken towards the implementation of all the recommendations.

544. Years had passed since the Portuguese had begun their open colonial war in Angola, Mozambique and so-called Portuguese Guinea. In that conduct, they had proved themselves to be most cruel and merciless in brutally suppressing all manifestations of national sentiment among the populations.

545. Nevertheless, the outcries of the millions of Africans would not remain unheeded for much longer. The sooner Portugal realized that it could not reverse the course of history, the better for its own good. No matter how barbarously the Portuguese instrument of oppression was intensified, no matter how generous her allies, no matter how well calculated her social, economic and psychological warfare against the African people, Portugal could not endure the might of the wave of history and the awakened African spirit. Moreover, systems of human oppression such as that set up by Portugal were doomed to collapse by the forces of their own evil.

546. The representative of Afghanistan recalled that over five years had elapsed since the adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 1514 (XV), but that Portuguese Territories were still being subjected to the most ruthless form of colonial exploitation. Portugal's action in holding to those Territories by force of arms had aroused world-wide indignation. It had shown that it had no intention of implementing the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly or even of preparing the Territories for self-determination, giving as an excuse that they were part of metropolitan Portugal. However, similar policies followed in the past by other colonial Powers had always failed.

547. Portugal itself was a poor country and was striving to attain a higher level of development. But for five years it had been carrying on an expensive colonial war. It was obvious that Portugal could not wage that war alone and that it was receiving assistance from its allies, in particular from South Africa and Southern Rhodesia.

548. Paragraph 8 of General Assembly resolution 2107 (XX) of 21 December 1965 requested all States and in particular Portugal's NATO allies to desist from supplying it with arms; if that resolution was implemented it would help to paralyse Portugal. Collusion between Portugal, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia had, however, assured impunity for Portugal.

549. The petitioners whom the Committee had heard in Dar es Salaam had testified to the fact that several thousand whites had been settled by South Africa in Mozambique and that Portugal was forcing thousands of Mozambicans to seek employment in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. The economic implications of such action were revolting: those three countries were forming a sort of common market of cheap mobile labour.

550. There was a spark of hope in that desperate situation: the freedom fighters, who had not only liberated large tracts of Portuguese-dominated Territories but were even administering them. That was significant in view of the fact that Portugal was maintaining that the liberation movement was not an organized force but a band of foreign agents. Another important fact was that the Conferência das Organizações Nacionalistas das Colónias Portuguesas (CONCP) grouped all the nationalist movements.

551. The Committee had to decide upon the best course of action for it to adopt. His delegation believed that, because of the explosive situation in the Portuguese Territories, and because of Portugal's non-compliance with the United Nations resolutions, the Committee should recommend that the Security Council make implementation of resolution 2107 (XX) obligatory and should also urge the High Commissioner for Refugees and the specialized agencies to do their utmost to assist refugees and others in the Portuguese Territories. That was the least the Committee could do to help the valiant people of those Territories.

552. The representative of Mali said that the petitioners had given the Special Committee an objective account of the inhuman behaviour of the forces sent by the Portuguese Government to subdue Angola, Mozambique and so-called Portuguese Guinea and also convincing proof of the conspiracy hatched against the African people by the big international financial monopolies supporting the reactionary Government in Lisbon. His delegation denounced such support and vigorously condemned it, because it was contrary to the United Nations Charter and ran counter to the resolutions already adopted by the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Special Committee asking all States to break off economic relations with Portugal and to refrain from giving it financial aid so long as it failed to respect the United Nations resolutions.

553. In the working paper prepared by the Secretariat (paragraphs 1-244 above), reference was made to a statement by Salazar that the Territories of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea were an integral part of Portugal and there could be no question of self-determination for the inhabitants. He rejected such allegations. Geographically, those Territories could not be an integral part of Portugal, which was situated in Europe. The legal tie binding those countries to Portugal must be sought; to that end he quoted a statement by Mr. Ramani of Malaysia, who had said in the Security Council on 9 November 1965 (S/PV.1254):

"...Therefore, if the substance of this relationship can be established between Portugal and its Territories in Africa and Asia, it matters not the slightest whether you call it a colony or an overseas territory or an overseas province. Anyone who takes the trouble to examine the Portuguese constitutional documents I referred to a short while ago will have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the Territories about which we are concerned in this debate are, in the commonly accepted parlance, the colonial non-self-governing Territories of Portugal.

"If I may illustrate: chapter VI, in part II of the Portuguese Constitution, carries in its title the term 'Metropolitan Portugal'. Chapter VII is entitled 'Overseas Portugal'. Article 133 is extremely significant, and with your permission I shall read it to you from the Constitution:

'It is intrinsic in the Portuguese nation to fulfil its historic mission of colonization in the lands of discoveries under their sovereignty, and to diffuse among the populations inhabiting them the benefits of their civilization, as also to exercise the moral influence enjoyed upon it by the Patronage of the East.'

And there you find that dreadful word 'colonization' nakedly and unashamedly standing out.

"Article 134 states that the Overseas Territories of Portugal described in article I, II-V, shall be known as Provinces and that 'their political and administrative organization shall be appropriate to their geographical location and stage of social development'. That nomenclature alone - calling them provinces - will not in fact and in truth make the Overseas Territories provinces of metropolitan Portugal, even though they form, in constitutional terms, an integral part of the Portuguese State for the purposes of the Constitution, as article 135 provides."

554. If it were accepted, then, that the Territories of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) were colonies, they came under Chapter XI of the Charter and should be examined in the light of Article 73 of the Charter, which made it an obligation for administering Powers to lead the peoples under their administration towards the management of their own affairs. It was the duty of the United Nations to take action against the Portuguese Government and to oblige it to respect the Charter. A date should be set for Portugal to liberate all its colonies and withdraw its military bases. He denounced the conspiracy between the Governments of Portugal, South Africa and the United Kingdom, on account of the iniquitous regime they had deliberately set up in Salisbury. Those forces of evil were helping one another by ruthlessly repressing the slightest impulse of the African people towards independence. In the elections that had just taken place, for example, Portugal had provided by law for one deputy for every 80,000 inhabitants in the national Portuguese territory, one for every 650,000 in Angola and one for every 900,000 in Mozambique. Such arbitrary distribution not sufficing, the law further stipulated that to vote in the elections the indigenous inhabitants must fulfil the following conditions: under the legislation in force, the people entitled to vote were male Portuguese citizens who had attained their majority

and who (a) had been emancipated and could read and write Portuguese; (b) although unable to read or write, nevertheless had legal and political capacity and contributed to the State or to the administrative bodies a sum not less than 100 escudos in payment of any of the following taxes: property tax, industrial tax, professional tax or tax on the use of capital. Thus, although the Portuguese Government maintained that the right to vote was granted to all under conditions of equality, there were still at least two barriers - one relating to personal competence, the other to property assessment - which deprived the majority of the indigenous population of the right to vote. The same law existed under different names in Rhodesia and South Africa, in all its arbitrariness and iniquity. In such circumstances the indigenous people had no choice but armed struggle to recover their legitimate right to be men.

555. Driven back to the wall, imperialism was supporting Salazar's fascist régime with all its forces, in order to perpetuate a domination condemned by history and doomed to failure. Mr. Salazar had excluded the possibility of a "political solution" to put an end to the fighting in the Territories under Portuguese administration in Africa. He had stated, moreover, that the prosecution of the military effort was the only means of ensuring order in those Territories and the peaceful advancement of their inhabitants.

556. The Secretariat's report showed a progression in the military allocations in the Portuguese budget. Some taxes had been increased. It was clear, however, that those resources were insufficient, for nearly all the imperialist Powers were giving financial support to the Portuguese Government. Their assistance was not confined to the financial domain but also took the form of armaments, within the framework of NATO. It mattered little whether the NATO countries supplied arms to the Portuguese Government on a multilateral or a bilateral basis; what should be denounced was the use that the Salazar Government was making of them in Africa. Thousands of Africans were falling under the murderous blows of those arms. Portugal and its allies should be condemned, because the war being waged against the population of the Territories under Portuguese administration was unjust and ran counter to human rights. The reason for those heinous crimes was to be found in the conclusions of Sub-Committee I, which had studied the economic aspect of Portuguese colonization in the African Territories. Sub-Committee I had concluded

that, by their material and financial support of the Portuguese Government, the foreign economic activities and financial interests in the Territories under Portuguese domination were preventing the various Territories from attaining independence. Thus, under the cover of laws promulgated in Lisbon, for the sole purpose of boosting the Portuguese economy, it had been declared that the mineral resources and natural wealth did not form part of the patrimony of the Overseas Territories. That wealth was being cynically exploited and dispatched to Portugal or other European countries which, through the Portuguese Government, had acquired mining concessions with the power of life and death over the peace-loving African inhabitants. Thus the indigenous inhabitants, robbed of their land, were reduced to slavery by the settlers who had moved from Portugal to Africa. Various European companies had been formed for plundering the Angolan subsoil. The political aspect of that exploitation was obvious: it enabled the Portuguese Government to realize substantial profits, while sparing it any reverberations at the social level and opening outlets for it in Europe and the United States. Petroleum extraction had not been overlooked; it involved not only Portuguese capital, but also a whole conglomeration of trusts. It was odd that the petroleum companies had only become interested in petroleum extraction there at the moment when the liberation movements had started their struggle.

557. There seemed reason to think that Portugal by itself had neither the resources nor the economic potential needed to resist for long the revolutionary movement unfolding in the countries that were still subject to its domination. Those examples showed the evils of the investments made by the monopolies to the profit of the Portuguese Government.

558. The capitalists should be made to realize that they must give fresh thought to their method of investment in the Territories under Portuguese domination while waiting for the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea to rid themselves of the Portuguese colonial yoke. They must respect the various resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and the Security Council and tell their ally, Portugal, to withdraw its military forces and liberate its colonies, in implementation of the Declaration appearing in resolution 1514 (XV).

559. Unfortunately, it was not possible to believe the statements of the imperialist Powers when they were daily offering 10 million escudos to Portugal, thus enabling

it to finance its genocidal war against the African people. It was not possible to believe the United Kingdom's statements when, according to the Johannesburg Star, the special brigade of the Southern Rhodesian secret police was co-operating with the Portuguese Secret Service in tracking down rebels passing through the country on their way to Tanzania and repatriating them to Mozambique. Mr. Mondlane and the newspaper agreed on that point. In his statement, Mr. Mondlane had said that a truck carrying seventy-five persons had disappeared on the Swaziland border. It was obvious that the secret police had done their work and no one should be surprised to learn that the seventy-five persons were in South Africa in some reserve, or even that they had been sold in the coal mines, enabling Portugal to collect the 50 per cent profit on deals involving Mozambican workers handed over to the South African racists by the Portuguese administrators.

560. It was the disgrace of the mid-twentieth century that a State that was economically poor, the poorest State in Europe, should hang on desperately in Africa, robbing the inhabitants, plundering the wealth of the sub-soil and leaving the natural and rightful owners sunk in poverty and ignorance. Human rights were scoffed at, the United Nations Charter was trampled underfoot by the very people who had drawn it up to prevent any fresh crime against humanity.

561. The Special Committee should make definite recommendations to the General Assembly and the Security Council; the latter should enforce the sanctions that had already been adopted against Portugal. Mali, for its part, was already implementing all the resolutions adopted by the United Nations.

562. A recommendation should be made to the Secretary-General to give and increase aid to the nationalists, who had freed a large part of their country and were devoting themselves to the task of national reconstruction. He assured the nationalists of the unconditional support of the people and Government of the Republic of Mali. The struggle for liberation was a just one and was in step with the march of history. His delegation would give its support to any resolution setting forth such measures, which represented the minimum that could be done pending the complete liberation of the Territories under Portuguese domination - which could not be long in coming.

563. The representative of the Ivory Coast said that the information given by the petitioners showed that the situation in the Territories under Portuguese domination had not improved and was still extremely serious. Those Territories

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were the scene of an armed struggle imposed on peace-loving inhabitants by Salazar's fascist regime. The people of the Territories in question had for hundreds of years been suffering poverty, affliction and ignorance.

564. For years the United Nations had been trying, by means of appropriate resolutions, to persuade the Portuguese authorities to abandon their anachronistic concept of self-determination and acknowledge the right of the people in the Territories under their domination to freedom, to self-determination as universally defined, in particular in United Nations resolution 1514 (XV), and to independence. To those efforts should be added the collective or individual approaches made by States friendly to Portugal. Unfortunately, the Portuguese authorities replied only with disdainful refusals; what was more, they were continuing and intensifying the armed struggle with the help of the equipment they received through NATO. It would therefore be desirable for NATO members to take practical steps to prevent Salazar using the arms placed at his disposal and stored in Portugal.

565. The testimony of journalists and films provided further proof of the atrocities that Portugal was inflicting on the peoples under its domination. In the eyes of his delegation, those crimes were more shocking than those of the Nazis, who in their day had aroused the indignation of the whole world.

566. He considered that the States and financial monopolies which were enabling Salazar to continue his war of extermination should be denounced.

567. After being informed of the mass exodus of the inhabitants of Mozambique, Angola and so-called Portuguese Guinea, the Committee should press for increased aid to be given to the refugees.

568. Portugal, which wanted to identify itself with a certain civilization, should realize that the course of history was irreversible and that, despite the perfection of the arms it possessed, its colonial empire would suffer the same fate as all the other colonial empires.

569. His delegation was ready to give its support to any resolution reaffirming the inalienable right of the peoples of the Territories under Portuguese domination, condemning the barbarous actions of the Salazar regime and urging all States, and in particular Portugal's allies, to refrain from giving Portugal military and financial aid. The Security Council should make the sanctions that had been

adopted against the Lisbon Government compulsory. If such measures were applied, Salazar's regime would be unable to survive.

570. He repeated his appeal to the great Powers, in particular the NATO Powers, to refrain from helping Portugal. In turning a deaf ear to the Africans' appeal, they were conniving in the genocide committed in the Territories under Portuguese domination. He hoped that after the direct and precise evidence that had been produced there would be no more abstentions in the ranks of the Committee and that Portugal would finally be isolated.

571. The Ivory Coast, in unison with all the other States that loved peace and freedom, would do all in its power to free Angola, Mozambique and so-called Portuguese Guinea from Salazar's iniquitous regime.

572. The representative of Iraq said that, among the various colonial problems with which the Special Committee and the United Nations were faced, that of the African Territories under Portuguese administration presented special aspects which had far-reaching consequences. Portugal continued to deny the African people's right to self-determination and independence, at the same time refusing to recognize that the Territories in question were in fact colonies for which it was accountable both before the United Nations and before the world. Unlike the Verwoerd regime in South Africa, which openly advocated the evil policy of apartheid, Portugal professed to practise no policy of discrimination against the indigenous population and endeavoured to dismiss the whole matter under the guise of assimilation. Portugal's assertion that the nationalist struggle in the Territories under its domination was instigated from abroad was completely belied by the fact that, in Angola, the African people had been fighting heroically for independence for more than five years - a fight for which Portugal had had to obtain help from its friends, including Israel. As the petitioners in Dar es Salaam had informed the Committee, the armed struggle was spreading to the remaining Portuguese Territories, including Guinea and Cape Verde. But Portugal's desperate efforts to maintain a foothold in Africa would ultimately collapse before the rising tide of African nationalism. Every United Nations Member State, and particularly those with special relations with Portugal, would have to shoulder their responsibilities by helping to bring about the speedy liquidation of the Portuguese colonial empire in Africa.

573. The representative of Poland said that the question of the African Territories under Portuguese administration had been under consideration by the United Nations for over a decade, and many recommendations had been made on the subject. Nevertheless, Portugal, like the racist regimes in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, persisted in refusing to implement the terms of the relevant United Nations resolutions and to comply with the provisions of the Charter and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

574. Portugal's attitude was unique, since it was the only administering Power which still maintained that its Territories were overseas provinces forming an integral part of the metropolitan country. That attitude was, however, dictated by economic interests, since the Territories earned foreign exchange, and particularly hard currency, which Portugal used to offset its balance-of-payments deficit. The export of coffee and diamonds provided the main source for such earnings, which were further increased by the revenue received from the railways in Angola and Mozambique, and from the services rendered by the East African ports of Beira and Lourenço Marques. The significant fact about Angolan coffee was not that it was the largest exported commodity but that, since it was purchased mainly by the United States, it earned US dollars and other foreign exchange. As for Angola's next largest exported commodity - diamonds - in 1962, total production amounted to approximately 986,000 carats, which had been sold to the United Kingdom at an average price of less than \$US22 per carat. Even in the Portuguese Press there had been indignant comments, since that was far below the world market price at which diamonds were sold by South West Africa. Furthermore, Angola and Mozambique supplied raw materials such as oil, iron ore, gold and uranium, and Portuguese companies were making huge profits from their sale as well as from the sale of copper, cocoa, sugar, cotton, meat, textiles and glass. The Portuguese Government even derived a considerable income from the sale of African labour in South Africa, where workers were forced to migrate to work in the mines. Most of the industries in Angola and Mozambique were subsidiaries of parent companies in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. From the Special Committee's study in that connexion, it was evident that the monopolies to which Salazar had granted concessions for the exploitation of Angolan and Mozambican wealth, were reaping huge profits at the expense of the local population. Such companies included the Angola Diamond Company, the Belgian Petrofina Trust, the Gulf Oil Corporation of America, the

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Mozambique Gulf Oil Company, the Rockefeller Trust, Standard Oil of New Jersey and the West German Krupp Trust. Portuguese colonialism had powerful allies in those monopolies which controlled the economy of southern Africa from the Cape to Katanga. To protect the interests of the monopolies and to maintain white supremacy and colonialism in Africa, certain Western Powers were providing Portugal with financial, political and military aid so that it was able to defy United Nations resolutions. Mr. Luís Almeida, the representative in Algeria of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), had recently revealed that the large American, West German, Belgian and British companies had even established private armies of mercenaries to protect their interests.

575. The fact that Portugal continued to receive aid from its allies, and was thus enabled to withstand a war on three fronts, had been unanimously confirmed by the petitioners who had appeared before the Committee. The petitioners had considered that the United Nations could contribute most to the liberation of the suppressed African peoples under Portuguese rule by requiring the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom to withhold all military and economic support from Portugal. The Committee had heard evidence, time and again, that Portugal had used weapons manufactured in those countries in Angola, Portuguese Guinea and Mozambique, which further went to prove that it was intensifying the war of extermination against the African people. In the Portuguese Territories, the most inhuman conditions existed: tens of thousands of Africans had died either from ill-treatment or from bombing and other attacks with modern arms. The Committee had heard from Mr. Cabral, the leader of the African Independence Party for Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC), of an air attack carried out by bombers and jets of American and German make against the innocent and peaceful inhabitants of a village. Dr. Mondlane, the leader of FRELIMO, had also informed the Committee that West Germany not only supplied Portugal with weapons but had also established a military base in Portugal where armed forces of the NATO Powers were trained in guerrilla warfare. All appeals by the various organs of the United Nations, requesting States to withhold from the Portuguese Government any assistance which would enable it to continue its suppression of the African people in the Territories under its domination, had been ignored by West Germany and other members of the NATO alliance.

576. A letter had been addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic on 23 March 1966. It referred to resolution 218 (1965) adopted by the Security Council, in accordance with which all States were required to report upon the measures taken to implement operative paragraph 7 of that resolution. He would quote the following paragraphs from that letter:

"Proceeding from its principled attitude, the Government of the German Democratic Republic has always strictly adhered to all decisions taken by the United Nations with regard to the Portuguese colonial policy. On this point the German Democratic Republic is fundamentally different from the West German Federal Republic, whose moral and material support for Portuguese colonialism was sharply condemned during the debates of the Fourth Committee of the twentieth session of the United Nations General Assembly.

"The German Democratic Republic maintains neither diplomatic nor consular relations with the Portuguese colonial regime.

"It does not grant any assistance that could be used by Portugal to suppress the people in the territories under its administration.

"Nor has it, in the past, ever sold or delivered to Portugal weapons, ammunition, military equipment or other materials for the production and maintenance of weapons and ammunition, nor will it in the future supply the Portuguese colonial regime with any such objects.

"Moreover, in instructions issued by the Ministry of Foreign and Inter-German Trade on 5 April 1965, all foreign trade enterprises of the German Democratic Republic were directed that no deliveries whatever, neither direct nor indirect, of the German Democratic Republic be made to Portuguese enterprises in the territories still under Portuguese colonial rule."

577. Portugal not only stubbornly refused to implement United Nations resolutions but was actually stiffening its policy of oppression and using military force to prevent the people from attaining their inalienable right to self-determination and independence. His Government had consistently condemned Portugal's colonial policy and had, on many occasions, denounced those Western Powers of the NATO Alliance which continued to provide Portugal with active political, moral and

military support. It was the view of his Government that Portugal's NATO allies were responsible for its continued domination over vast tracts of the African continent. The existing explosive situation in the Portuguese Territories, which constituted a threat to peace, originated in the community of interests among a group of neo-nazi countries which were opposed to the independence and development of Africa. The questions of the Portuguese-dominated Territories in Africa, of Southern Rhodesia and of South Africa could not be dissociated from one another; and the situation in each would have been very different, had the United States, West Germany and the United Kingdom complied with the relevant United Nations resolutions.

578. Long-term action was required: the United Nations, in accordance with the principles of freedom and justice enshrined in the Charter and in the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, should take effective measures. The time had come to isolate Portugal, economically, politically and militarily so that it would be forced to abandon its intransigent and defiant policy. It was the Special Committee's duty to ensure that positive action was taken to put an end to the inhuman suffering of the unhappy peoples of the Portuguese-dominated Territories in Africa who, for almost 500 years, had lived in virtual slavery, a prey to poverty, disease and ignorance. The Polish people considered the struggle of the peoples of Angola, Portuguese Guinea and Mozambique to be just and right, and those people and their leaders were to be congratulated for having already liberated a part of their homeland. It was to be hoped that the various national liberation movements would join their efforts in the heroic struggle against Portugal and its allies.

579. He agreed with the suggestion made by the petitioners that the Committee should request the Security Council to examine General Assembly resolution 2107 (XX) and Security Council resolution 218 (1965) with a view to making the action envisaged therein mandatory, in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter. He also wished to reiterate his request that the specialized agencies should be asked to increase their assistance to the national liberation movements in the Territories under Portuguese domination and to the people who had suffered, and were still suffering, from the war waged by the Portuguese colonial forces.

580. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania expressed his delegation's gratitude to the petitioners for the information which they had

provided to the Special Committee both in Algiers and in Dar es Salaam and which had thrown further light on the atrocities perpetrated against the African people in the Portuguese-dominated Territories. The Committee had rightly always considered those Territories in conjunction since colonialism, no matter where it existed, inevitably meant subjugation and oppression. The African people who were resisting the Portuguese aggressors, striking blow for blow, waged a struggle which would not only liberate their homelands but which would also, in his delegation's opinion, uphold and strengthen the United Nations Charter and the aims of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

581. Analysing the general situation, he said that the fact that Portugal was a poor and backward nation helped to explain the origin of its colonial aggression. With the support of powerful allies, it had been able to maintain its policy of subjugating African peoples. Despite the terms of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, the Portuguese imperialists persisted in denying independence to the Territories under their domination and had in fact increased their aggressive and criminal activities against the people who had, as a result, been forced to take up arms to defend themselves and to free their lands.

582. Referring to an extract from Mr. Ronald Segal's foreword to Professor James Duffy's book Portugal in Africa, he said that it illustrated the futility and inhumanity of Portuguese colonialism in Africa and served as a warning to Portugal's allies.

583. In considering the question of the Territories under Portuguese administration, three basic factors had to be taken into account: first, the atrocities committed by the Portuguese armed forces; secondly, the support Portugal received from regional groupings abroad and which it used, with the knowledge of those who supplied such support, against the African people; and thirdly, the role played by foreign elements and financial monopolies in the Territories concerned.

584. With regard to the first factor, while colonial oppression was always to be condemned, that perpetrated against the people of Angola, Portuguese Guinea and Mozambique was in a class by itself. The petitioners who had appeared before the Committee had revealed that entire villages had been razed by Portuguese bombers, and had furnished documentary evidence of the dismemberment of children.

Furthermore, Mr. Ervedosa had informed the Committee that the Portuguese air force in Angola were under orders to bomb African villages indiscriminately. The objective was obviously to annihilate the heroic African people who were resisting colonial oppression. Needless to say, as a result of such brutal crimes, Mr. Ervedosa had revolted against the Portuguese regime. That same petitioner, who had only provided information on events to which he himself had been an eye-witness, had also stated that between March and June 1961 thousands of Africans had been killed, the majority women and children. It was to be hoped that such scandalous facts would stir the conscience of those nations which still refused to recognize the evils perpetrated by Portugal.

585. The fact that Portugal, poor and backward as it was, could afford to continue to wage an aggressive war against the African people brought him to the second basic factor to be taken into account. As the Committee had been informed by the petitioners both in Dar es Salaam and in Algiers, Portugal received arms from NATO members. The petitioners had even been able to name their make. While it was undoubtedly true, as the United States representative had stated at the time, that those arms were obsolete weapons from the Second World War, they were nevertheless instruments of destruction, capable of taking a heavy toll of lives. Moreover, in an article in The New York Times of 25 October 1964, reference had been made to the fact that the Federal Republic of Germany was selling arms and equipment to Portugal and Mr. Cabral, one of the petitioners, had informed the Committee only the day before that the Federal Republic of Germany was also assembling Italian-designed FIAT 91 aircraft, under licence, for Portugal to use in its war against the African people. In a further article in The New York Times of 16 March 1965, it had been stated that France was to sell sixty jet fighters to Portugal and was negotiating the construction of warships for that country. All the petitioners from the Portuguese-oppressed Territories in Africa had testified to the presence there of many types of weapons, including tanks, aircraft, rockets and bombs.

586. Despite the denials which would undoubtedly be heard, all evidence pointed to the fact that certain members of NATO, for example the United States, France and the Federal Republic of Germany, materially aided the aggressive forces of the Portuguese colonialists. Nevertheless, those countries repeatedly asserted that, under the NATO Pact, such armaments were intended only for Portugal's use in

Europe. They should not delude themselves, however; the Portuguese régime would never honour a commitment not to use such weapons against the African people and, in fact, was flouting world opinion simply because it had the support of Western countries. Ironically enough, arms supplied under NATO auspices were also used within Portugal against those who opposed not only colonialist wars but also Salazar's fascist régime. Certain Western countries, while loudly proclaiming their support for democracy, were therefore nevertheless helping to strengthen that totalitarian regime. The only conclusion to be drawn by Africans was that such countries were prepared to support Portugal so long as it remained white and anti-communist; a crime against the African people was not so serious as a crime against their financial interests. Thus it was evident, as clearly demonstrated by the representatives of the peoples of Angola, Portuguese Guinea and Mozambique who had appeared before the Committee as petitioners, that Portugal was only able to pursue its war against the African people because it received a vast amount of material support from its allies. And such support was granted because Portugal co-operated in the exploitation of Africa's rich natural resources.

587. The third basic factor to which he had referred concerned the economic exploitation of the Territories under Portuguese domination. There would, of course, be much talk of the value of investments and of the need for free trade in the development of such Territories. However, no matter what advantages might be involved, there was no doubt that investments in colonized Territories, and the activities of the financial monopolies there, would act as an impediment to the attainment of freedom and independence by the peoples of those Territories. That fact had been clearly demonstrated in the study carried out by Sub-Committee I - a study which had been adopted by the Committee and upheld by a majority in the General Assembly. The working paper prepared by the Secretariat in that connexion had also shown that the foreign companies operating in the Portuguese colonies contributed a part of the profits for the "defence" of those Territories; in effect, that meant the criminal war waged against the African people by the Portuguese colonialists in their futile attempt to cling on to African lands. But Portugal only needed to defend itself against the Salazar regime. In Africa, neither Portugal nor its allies had anything to defend, since the resources of that continent belonged to the Africans alone.

588. Quoting an extract from the book Mission to Portugal by a former Brazilian Ambassador to Portugal, he said that it illustrated the exploitation by a minority group of Portugal's riches which by right belonged to the people. Similarly, it was the lust for the rich resources of the African Territories under Portuguese domination which drove certain financial monopolies to attain their ends at any price. According to the information bulletin "Free Angola" No. 3 (1965), such financial monopolies included the Angola Diamond Company, a branch of the Anglo-American Diamond Corporation Ltd., the Teresa Berman Company, associated with Lay Frères and the Sociedade Comercial João Fernandes, which dealt in manganese production. That ore was entirely monopolized by the Companhia Mineira do Lobito, Krupps of Essen, Germany, Jojgaard and Schultz A/S, Denmark, and Lagos e Irmao, Portugal. It was further stated in the information bulletin that the complicity of such financial interests in the Portuguese colonial war in Angola was unquestionable, as would be seen upon an examination of the aims and tax policy proclaimed by the territorial Government in 1962, in which reference was made to a defence tax payable by all firms established for over five years with a net profit of 1 million escudos and over. Those facts, collected by the people of Angola, were further documented in other records and had been corroborated by the freedom fighters from Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea.

589. It was the opinion of his delegation that there were only two ways in which a solution to the problem could be found. Either Portugal, and all those countries which had not hitherto done so, should accept and implement the provisions of the relevant United Nations resolutions, and those who claimed to oppose Portugal's colonial policies, yet nevertheless assisted it materially, should withdraw all such support; or, alternatively, force should be used. Portugal was intensifying its criminal policy with the support of its allies and, in the face of that situation, the gallant people had had to take up arms to defend themselves and to free their land. African people did not want war but it had been forced upon them, and their legitimate struggle would ultimately be crowned with victory.

590. Lastly, his delegation considered that the Security Council should meet in Africa to hear the views of the freedom fighters who had appeared before the Committee during its current session.

591. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that each time the questions of Angola, Mozambique and so-called Portuguese Guinea were

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considered by the Special Committee, reference was made to new crimes perpetrated by the colonizers against the population. The cruel oppression to which the people of the Territories under Portuguese domination were subjected did not merely affect Africa: it was also a threat to world peace and security. The police régime of the colonialists could be compared to the hateful Hitler regime. The responsibility for that criminal policy lay not only with the Salazar regime but also with his NATO allies, who were providing substantial assistance of various kinds to Portugal. Thanks to that assistance, Portugal, which was one of the poorest and most backward countries in Europe, was able to go on sending armed forces equipped with ultra-modern weapons to its Territories. According to the information provided by the petitioners, Portugal, in a desperate effort to avoid defeat, had increased its military forces in Guinea. Mr. Mondlane had stated that the number of troops in Mozambique had been increased by 7,500 and that Portugal planned to have a total of 70,000 men there. Thus Portugal had more than 100,000 men with modern equipment in its Territories. Furthermore, Portugal had embarked on the construction of military bases, aerodromes and strategic roads which threatened the independence of other African States. The facts which the petitioners had laid before the Committee proved that the States members of NATO were helping the Portuguese regime. In recent years the United States had given Portugal financial and military aid amounting to several hundred million dollars. United States aircraft had been used and were still being used to bomb the indigenous people in the Portuguese Territories. 592. There was also the aid given by the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany, which was constantly increasing. Mr. Cabral had referred to the delivery of FIAT aircraft to the Portuguese Government and there had recently been a newspaper report that Bonn planned to deliver forty jet fighters, built in Italy under United States licence. The States belonging to NATO continued to deny that they were helping Portugal and alleged that Portugal promised not to use the weapons and equipment that it was given. The Portuguese colonies were a source of profit not only to Portugal but also to the international financial monopolies with headquarters in New York, London and Frankfurt. In return for privileges which enabled them to amass enormous profits, the financial monopolies were supporting Portugal by granting it large sums of money. Thus the international monopolies had openly concluded an alliance with Portugal in order to stamp out the nationalist

movements. The monopolies were the main obstacle on the road to the liberation and independence of the people suffering under the colonial yoke. The strategic position of the Portuguese colonies was also one of the reasons underlying the behaviour of the States members of NATO. In that connexion, he recalled a statement by the United States Secretary of State to the effect that Portugal was the only ally which had made and was making an important contribution to mutual security. That statement had been quoted in a Portuguese newspaper, which had written that the frontiers of the United States and the Western countries passed through the Azores, Angola, Mozambique and Guinea. There was more assistance, however, than that of NATO. Portugal was receiving more and more effective assistance from Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. Those facts showed that the reactionary forces of colonialism and racism, united in an unholy alliance, were constantly increasing, with the support of their Western allies. In the hands of Portugal and its partners, the African Territories were being used as fortresses and military strongholds. The representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany were trying to influence their young allies to prevent them from taking steps against the Verwoerd, Salazar and Ian Smith regimes. In the above-mentioned statement the United States Secretary of State had also said that to sacrifice the interests of Portugal by supporting, in one way or another, the attacks on Portugal in the United Nations was productive only of disaster. An article had appeared in the newspaper Le Monde concerning a statement by the Minister of Justice of the Federal Republic of Germany to the effect that the Portuguese policy in its overseas Territories had always been and still was the most modern policy pursued by a European country. The New York Times had recently published a statement by the Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs pointing out that, following negotiations with United States statesmen, everything seemed to indicate that the United States had adopted a more realistic attitude to Portugal's policies in its African Territories.

593. No assistance could prevent the collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire, as was shown by the increasingly relentless struggle of the African people under the Portuguese colonial yoke to achieve recognition of their inalienable rights. He welcomed the victories gained during that just struggle and the liberation of certain areas, where a new life based on democracy, independence and freedom was

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being established. The United Nations and all countries which opposed colonial regimes should give all possible moral and material assistance to those fighting for peace. The specialized agencies should be asked to provide multilateral assistance to nationalist organizations and movements, in such matters as education and health, for example. The Special Committee should denounce the colonialist bloc consisting of Portugal, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, as also the NATO members who were assisting Portugal. It should ask the Security Council to take specific steps to ensure the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and to make the sanctions envisaged compulsory. The Security Council should insist upon Portugal withdrawing its armed forces from the Territories under its domination and dismantling its bases and military installations. The Special Committee should also recommend to the Security Council and the General Assembly that they should set a date for the independence of the Portuguese colonies. The Soviet Union would support the draft resolution if it took those comments into account. Lastly, he gave the Committee a very important piece of information which he had just received from New York. The United Nations Secretariat had announced in a press release that the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development had granted Portugal two loans amounting to \$30 million to enable it to expand its network of electric power stations. That decision ran counter to the decisions of the Committee and the General Assembly and to resolution 2107 (XX), which appealed to the Bank to refrain from granting Portugal any financial, economic or technical assistance so long as the Government of Portugal failed to implement General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). The Special Committee should examine the Bank's decision and ask for it to be cancelled.

594. The representative of Denmark noted with regret that the situation had scarcely changed since 1965. The party responsible for that deplorable situation was Portugal, which was stubbornly pursuing a disastrous and anachronistic colonial policy. The Danish Government absolutely condemned Portugal's policy, which was unworthy of the present day. Denmark had always complied with the request in the Security Council resolution of 31 July 1963 for an arms embargo. He deplored the fact that not all countries had done the same. Apart from any moral considerations, all countries in the world should realize that the situation in the Territories under Portuguese domination could have extremely serious consequences.

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595. There was no need to dwell any further on the activities of the Portuguese colonialists. The members of the Committee were already fully informed on that subject. It was indeed a matter for astonishment every time that the Lisbon Government repeated that everything was calm in the Portuguese Territories. There was much evidence to enlighten world opinion on what was going on in the Territories administered by Portugal; furthermore, the Portuguese Government had itself confirmed that the indigenous populations were putting up serious resistance. In December 1965 Salazar had stated that one of the main problems facing Portugal was the defence of its national territorial integrity and that it was not possible to forecast for how long the Portuguese Government and people would have to defend their overseas Territories. That was tantamount to stating that the Africans were still being deprived of their most elementary rights and that the armed struggle of Portugal against the indigenous people would be continued. That was a dead end, for the course of history was in the direction of self-determination.

596. The representative of India said that the situation in the Territories under Portuguese domination had long been under consideration in various organs of the United Nations. When the United Nations had had a preponderance of colonial Powers and of countries supporting them, Portugal had evaded any critical examination of its policies. In the late 1950's, and particularly since 1960, the situation had changed with the emergence to independence of many countries in Africa and Asia and their admission to the United Nations. Thereafter Portugal could no longer be protected, at least in discussion, by its allies.

597. It was a matter of great regret, however, that in spite of continuous exhortation by the United Nations to Portugal to alter its policies and to recognize the inevitable success of the freedom struggles of all colonial peoples, the lot of the subject peoples in Portuguese Territories had remained unchanged. Indeed, from the testimony given by the petitioners in Dar es Salaam and in Algiers, it was clear that the situation in the Portuguese Territories had worsened and that repression had become more ruthless. One could only marvel at the ingenuity of the colonial authorities in devising new and more inhuman methods of suppressing the legitimate struggle of the people under Portuguese domination. Words could scarcely express the suffering of those brave people; and Indians could well appreciate that anguish through their own experience of the tyranny of Portuguese colonialism.

598. Though a small and backward country, Portugal was able to defy the United Nations in oppressing the people of its Territories, which were many times the size of Portugal. Two factors explained that state of affairs.

599. The first was the notorious unholy alliance between the forces of colonialism and racism in southern Africa, where the dictatorial régimes of South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and the Portuguese Territories were acting in concert to perpetuate white supremacy in that part of the world. The rulers in those Territories fully realized that their strength lay in unity. The readiness with which the authorities of Portugal and South Africa had gone to the rescue of the racist regime in Southern Rhodesia was clear evidence of collusion among the three bastions of colonialism, which had to be dealt with as an entity.

600. The second reason was the direct and indirect help which Portugal continued to receive from its allies and friends. Without such assistance, it would never have been able to maintain the massive military operations which it had to mount in order to keep its colonies in check. A study made by Sub-Committee I of the Special Committee had clearly brought out the close relationship between colonial rule and economic exploitation by foreign interests. Several countries apart from Portugal had joined in the bid for substantial but unjust returns. It had been asserted in certain quarters that the economic activities of those foreign interests only contributed to the well-being of the indigenous inhabitants. Those who proffered such flimsy justification certainly counted on the ingenuousness of others. There had been great reluctance on the part of those friends and allies of Portugal to co-operate with the United Nations in practical measures. They clearly satisfied themselves with mere pious expressions of high principles.

601. The dictator of Portugal had frequently made it clear that he would never relinquish his strangle-hold over its Territories. The ruling National Union had declared that, whatever the price, Portugal would never abandon the legitimate defence of its national territory against outside aggression. The Portuguese dictator had said in an interview on 4 August 1965 that "the position is, however, that as a result of the integration, which has been a principle of Portuguese overseas policy for centuries, these Territories as a whole already form a nation and a sovereign state.... While the problem may be relevant to dependent territories or colonies desiring to achieve independence and define their relations

with the State which exercises rights of sovereignty over them, it is not relevant in the case of Portugal." The reasons for that desperate clinging to its overseas colonies were clear. The African war had proved a blessing to Portugal as its industries were growing in response to military orders ranging from ammunition to food and textiles, and remittances from troops overseas were injecting new money into the Portuguese economy.

602. General Assembly resolution 2107 (XX) had condemned Portugal's violation of the economic and political rights of the indigenous population through the large-scale settlement of foreign immigrants in the Territories and the transfer of workers to South Africa. European settlement had been the corner-stone of Portugal's colonial policy. The Portuguese authorities believed, and would have the world believe, that increased white immigration would help to accelerate the social and cultural progress of the "less evolved" indigenous inhabitants by bringing them in closer contact with "more civilized" peoples. The pressure in the Portuguese National Assembly on the authorities to increase the flow of settlers to the overseas Territories, in conjunction with the military effort, had increased. A deputy from Mozambique had proposed that the Government should encourage soldier settlements in the Territories. In 1965, the Mozambique authorities had offered 5,000-hectare farms in the Tete district to farmers from drought-stricken areas in South Africa. It had been reported in November 1965 that eighty South African farmers had already signed contracts. All that was in open defiance of General Assembly resolution 2107 (XX). Therefore Portugal should once more be strongly condemned on that score.

603. There was poverty and misery among Africans in the Portuguese Territories, where forced labour continued to be used. Starvation and famine were rife, and educational opportunities for Africans were virtually non-existent. In Mozambique, for example, only .35 per cent of the African population was enrolled in primary schools, and only .05 per cent of the population had been admitted to secondary schools. The evident policy of the colonial Power was to keep African people in economic and social servitude.

604. An excuse frequently put forward by some Governments which had refused to implement United Nations resolutions on Portuguese Territories had been that sanctions would hurt the Africans more than anyone else. That argument was just an attempt to evade the issue; for the people of Portuguese Territories had

constantly declared their readiness to suffer any hardships in order to attain independence. If the allies of Portugal were sincere in their professed concern for the interests of the indigenous people in Portuguese Territories, they should implement the General Assembly resolution fully and promptly so that the oppressive rule of Portugal might be ended without delay. The history of colonialism and the experience of the newly independent countries showed political independence to be a prerequisite for economic progress.

605. His delegation had warned the Special Committee several years previously that if the people of the Portuguese Territories were not granted their right to freedom, they would have no alternative but to resort to violence. It was unfortunate that the only language which Portugal understood was that of force. In Angola, the nationalists had declared an open revolt in March 1961; in Mozambique the nationalist fighters had opened their armed struggle in September 1964; and in so-called Portuguese Guinea the forces of freedom and progress had made substantial gains in their fight against the colonial authorities. The Portuguese authorities themselves admitted the presence of some 50,000 Portuguese troops, including army forces, mobile police and militia, in Mozambique alone. Those troops, fully trained and equipped with the most modern weapons, were combating ill-fed and ill-equipped people. Yet those imperialist forces were unable to make much headway against freedom-fighters with justice and truth on their side.

606. His delegation had supported and co-sponsored all the resolutions on the problem of Territories under Portuguese administration in the past and would continue to do so because it believed that a peaceful solution to the problem could be found if the entire international community joined forces against that stubborn and ruthless dictatorial regime. The Security Council had an important role to play, having already established, in its resolution 218 of 23 November 1965, that the attitude of Portugal towards the African populations of its Territories and the neighbouring States constituted a threat to international peace and security. It therefore had to follow up its earlier decision and to take such measures as mandatory economic sanctions against Portugal. His delegation would like to see such a provision included in the draft resolution to be submitted to the Committee.

607. India condemned the brutal methods of repression used by the Portuguese authorities and recognized the legitimacy of the independence struggle of the brave

people in the Portuguese Territories. It had offered its full co-operation to the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in ending Portuguese colonialism, and would dutifully do all in its power to help those valiant soldiers of freedom. The Foreign Minister of India had said "We have, in a very persistent and consistent manner, always worked for ending these last vestiges of colonialism, and we think that having ourselves attained independence from colonial rule, it is also our duty - and we would not consider any sacrifice too great - to discharge our responsibilities and our obligations to those brethren who are still groaning under foreign domination."

608. The representative of Bulgaria said that the evidence from the petitioners of Mozambique, Angola and so-called Portuguese Guinea had clearly shown the imperative need for the Special Committee to hold sessions in Africa regularly.

609. The Bulgarian delegation had been greatly impressed by the new impetus in the struggle of the peoples still subjected to foreign domination. He had been touched by the conviction and determination with which the freedom fighters, not content with carrying on a courageous armed struggle, were starting to build the basis of their future independent State. It was inspiring to hear the petitioners speak of the efforts which they were making in the parts of the Territory already liberated to fight illiteracy and disease and to build, on the foundations of the ancient cultural values of their people, a new civilization and society based on democracy, justice and social progress.

610. The representatives of the Territories under Portuguese domination had movingly expressed their thanks to the Governments and peoples who were helping them. The Bulgarian delegation had greatly appreciated the thanks of Mr. Cabral, the Secretary-General of the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC), who, speaking of the assistance given by the socialist countries, had said that the solidarity of those countries with the peoples fighting against Portuguese domination gave a new dimension to the concept of solidarity between peoples. He thanked the petitioners for the feelings which they had expressed concerning Bulgaria's assistance to them and assured them of the sympathy and unconditional support of the entire Bulgarian people.

611. It was only the assistance which Salazar received from the United States, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and other Western countries,

including, of course, the members of NATO, that enabled him to continue his criminal fascist activities. The indignation of the oppressed peoples was all the more justified in that those countries made hypocritical statements of sympathy towards them and nevertheless continued actively to aid the colonialist regime of Salazar. It was impossible to over-emphasize the abominable role played by the Federal Republic of Germany, which had apparently not learned the lesson of the Second World War, as the world had been entitled to hope it would. Fortunately, there was another Germany, the German Democratic Republic, a peaceful democratic State which could be proud to count itself among the most faithful friends of the peoples fighting against colonialism and imperialism.

612. The petitioners' suggestion about the role of the United Nations seemed to him particularly important. The petitioners appeared to realize the importance of resolution 2107 (XX) but they had been disappointed by the practical results of the adoption of that resolution. The petitioners were unfortunately correct: colonialism was being unleashed anew; it had allies and openly declared that it did not intend to comply with a single provision of resolution 2107 (XX), especially operative paragraphs 7 and 8. It was therefore quite clear that the Security Council's appeals were no longer enough.

613. The representative of Yugoslavia said that the situation in the Portuguese Territories remained unchanged, despite exhortations from the United Nations in the form of resolutions and concrete demands on Portugal. The most regrettable fact was that the people continued to be denied their fundamental rights to freedom and independence. In Dar es Salaam petitioners had said that in a short space of time the number of Portuguese troops in Mozambique alone had increased from about 35,000 to 50,000, and that the figure was likely to reach 75,000 by the end of 1966. Likewise, Portuguese troops in Guinea were using new and better weapons. The additional troops, new weapons and intensified repression showed Portugal's intention to hold on to its Territories. Indeed, it had declared that it would never abandon the defence of its legitimate Territories against outside aggression.

614. However, to maintain its military operations Portugal relied on its friends and allies, who flouted United Nations exhortations by continuing to help Portugal in order, principally, to maximize their own investment yields. It was therefore in their interest to maintain the status quo.

615. All Portugal's efforts to crush the steady progress of the nationalist forces had failed. It was the responsibility of all, and especially of Portugal's allies, to make it change its short-sighted policy; and it was the duty of the Special Committee to recommend measures to the General Assembly and the Security Council. The draft resolution reflected Yugoslavia's views and deserved the unanimous support of the Committee.

616. The representative of Syria said he would not dwell upon the atrocities which Dr. Salazar's reactionary regime was committing against the innocent peoples of Mozambique, Angola and Guinea. The evidence given by the petitioners, the objectively thorough working papers of the United Nations Secretariat and the testimony of African and European, including Portuguese, personalities whose consciences rebelled against injustice, made it clear that Portuguese colonialism was growing in its ruthlessness, its defiance of world opinion, and its anti-African, inhuman fanaticism. Portugal cynically claimed that Mozambicans, Guineans and Angolans had become - by decree no doubt - Portuguese. By what miracle could people with their own history, their own geography, their own society and their own traditions and culture be transformed into another? That colonization of human souls flouted the essential principles embodied in the United Nations Charter. A perverted regime was shamelessly professing to speak on behalf of civilization; yet on behalf of civilization it was dropping napalm bombs from the most modern military aircraft on innocent African villages. On behalf of civilization it kept 99.7 per cent of Guinean Africans illiterate, and on behalf of civilization it installed Portuguese settlers to usurp African lands and property. The strongest condemnation of those acts was naturally a primary duty to which no member of the Committee could logically object.

617. In the life-and-death struggle of those brave African peoples, there could be only one fundamental choice: to be a friend or a foe of Africa. Those who befriended Portugal could not possibly be friends of Africa. Once that axiom was translated into action, a satisfactory solution would be brought nearer. Only then would the declared or tacit supporters of Portugal know that their alliance necessarily entailed losing the friendship of Africa. The Salazar regime would then either be isolated, in which case its days would be numbered, or it would retain the staunch support of many loyal friends. In either case, the demarcation lines of that legitimate struggle would become crystal clear.

618. The representative of Tunisia said that the Tunisian Government had compiled a voluminous dossier on the Territories under Portuguese domination since 1963, when the Tunisian Minister for Foreign Affairs, together with his counterparts from Liberia, Madagascar and Sierra Leone, had been duly entrusted by the Conference of Heads of African States and Governments with the task of following closely the question of the Territories under Portuguese domination.

619. The Tunisian Government, faithful to the resolutions adopted by the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations, had also used its influence with the countries diplomatically accredited to Tunisia to draw their attention to the explosive nature of the situation in those Territories. Finally, both through its deep conviction and in order to implement the various resolutions adopted on the question, Tunisia had never hesitated to provide substantial and unconditional assistance to all the liberation movements which appealed to it, and it was prepared to go on doing so.

620. During the Special Committee's third series of meetings in Africa, the Tunisian delegation had been particularly struck by the seriousness, clarity and moderation of the petitioners. It wished to express to them the deep solidarity of the Tunisian Government and people and to assure them of its full support. In their replies to the questions put to them by members of the Special Committee, the petitioners had shown themselves to be worthy people, devoid of any bitterness or hatred. They had given further proof of the maturity of the genuine representatives of the African people fighting for independence. Mr. Mondlane, for Mozambique, and Mr. Cabral, for so-called Portuguese Guinea, were living examples of the dignity to which he was referring.

621. The colonial problem of so-called Portuguese Guinea was of a very special nature. The Special Committee should therefore find special means to combat the morbid stubbornness of the Portuguese Government, which continued to reject any peaceful solution calculated to lead the people of those Territories to independence. The Tunisian delegation was convinced that the draft resolution before the Special Committee included some particularly constructive elements for safeguarding the interests of the African inhabitants of the Territories under Portuguese domination. There was not a single delegation which could deny the truths set forth in the draft resolution. If those truths appeared bitter to some delegations, that was

unfortunate, but if it was to be faithful to itself and to the task which had been entrusted to it the Special Committee could not pass over them in silence, for in so doing it would be failing in its duty and disappointing the millions of human beings who had placed all their hopes in the United Nations

622. Tunisia would continue to demand specific and realistic steps to give effective assistance to the oppressed African inhabitants. It had always acted in that spirit and would continue to do so as long as Portugal persisted in opposing the complete implementation of the United Nations resolutions and as long as a single piece of African territory remained under foreign domination.

623. The representative of Iran said that the situation in the Portuguese Territories had gone from bad to worse. Oppression, poverty and exploitation were increasing daily, and Portuguese financiers thrived on African misery. Famine was widespread, and health measures virtually non-existent; and an atmosphere of tension and insecurity prevailed.

624. Portugal was trying to perpetuate subjugation in concert with South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. Only through repression was Portugal able to refuse the right of Africans to independence; otherwise, it would be voted out of the Territories. However, as Africans did not have the use of the ballot box, they had to resort to arms in order to defend their dignity and reassert their identity. The majority of the Portuguese people were opposed to their Government's policies, and the opposition party had advocated the principle of majority rule in the overseas Territories. At any event, Portugal's days in Africa were numbered.

625. He concluded by suggesting the provision of aid to all nationalist movements from such specialized agencies as UNESCO and WHO.

626. The representative of Venezuela said that his country did not accept the contention that the Portuguese Territories in Africa were overseas provinces of Portugal and an integral part of its Territory. General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) was entirely applicable to those Territories. Venezuela condemned Portugal's colonial policy, its intransigent attitude, its obstinate refusal to implement the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, its indefensible position in denying the inalienable rights of the people to self-determination, and its colonial war, which had already been responsible for

thousands of deaths. It unreservedly supported the aspirations of the people still under that country's colonial domination, and would continue to give its support to any action directed towards the ending of the anachronistic situation prevailing in the Territories. Conversely, it would oppose any action that would limit the Special Committee's mandate or the powers of other competent organs, or that was not in accordance with the terms of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

627. Commenting on the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.313), he said that his delegation was in full agreement with most of its paragraphs. It could accept only with reservation the sixth paragraph of the preamble and operative paragraphs 4 and 5, and would be unable to vote in favour of operative paragraphs 6, 7 and 8. His delegation's position in that respect had been explained on previous occasions, particularly in connexion with the vote on General Assembly resolution 2107 (XX) of 21 December 1965. He would accordingly appreciate it if those three operative paragraphs could be voted upon separately, to enable his delegation to support the remainder of the draft resolution. He also requested a roll-call vote.

628. The representative of Italy said that one wondered, when considering the problem of the Portuguese Territories, how in 1966 there could still exist a European Government and a European public opinion which believed it possible to maintain a colonial relationship between a metropolitan country and Territories geographically, ethnically, economically and politically so remote from it.

629. The policy in question was an outmoded one which could only have negative consequences and entail countless sufferings for all concerned, whether for the colonial peoples forced to take up arms in defence of their rights or for the families in the European country whose sons were sent to Africa to fight an unpopular, unjust and hopeless war. It was for that reason that whenever the question of the Portuguese Territories had been considered in the United Nations his delegation had protested against the Portuguese Government's colonial policy. It was for that reason also that the Italian Government had informed the Portuguese Government that it was very concerned at developments in the Portuguese Territories and deplored its refusal to co-operate with the United Nations in the matter.

630. In addition, the Italian Government had prohibited any exports of arms to Portugal and it was refusing any form of economic or technical assistance to that country. He wished to state, in that connexion, that any arms of Italian origin

which might have been found in the Territories under Portuguese domination had arrived there without the consent of the Italian Government and, indeed, in violation of the prohibition which it had imposed.

631. There were some who advocated such radical measures as the expulsion of Portugal from the specialized agencies, the application of economic and military sanctions and the breaking-off of all relations with Portugal within NATO and outside it. While he appreciated the motives and shared the views of those who advocated such measures against Portugal, he felt obliged to express reservations with respect to measures which would contravene the provisions of the United Nations Charter; for, in his view, the Organization was not yet sufficiently developed to put an end to injustice wherever it prevailed or to re-establish law and order where it had ceased to exist.

632. He would give an example to clarify his meaning. In 1965, at the twentieth session of the General Assembly, a resolution on the Portuguese Territories had been adopted although only 58 votes had been cast in its favour and there had been almost as many negative votes or abstentions. The countries which had voted against the resolution or had abstained had included Argentina, Mexico, Austria, Chile, Finland, Jamaica, Norway and Sweden, which no one could say were joined to Portugal by any alliance or by bonds of sympathy. As a result of the adoption of that resolution, the impression had been created that the Portuguese Government received support from certain Western and Latin American Powers, which was far from the truth. In fact, Portugal, despite its membership of NATO, to which it represented a considerable burden, was isolated in the world, and its only real allies were South Africa and Southern Rhodesia.

633. What could the Special Committee do to facilitate the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) in the Territories under Portuguese administration? Firstly, it should continue to draw the attention of world public opinion to the problem which the maintenance of an outdated colonial system in Africa constituted. Secondly, the United Nations should not only supply the peoples of the Portuguese Territories with material aid in the form of medicines, food and clothing, but should also help them to train the personnel who would lead them after the Territories became independent. Thirdly, those countries which, for historical or geographical reasons, still maintained relations with Portugal

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must be urged to express to the Portuguese Government once more their serious concern at conditions in its Territories. Fourthly, those same countries should be urged to adopt effective measures to prevent the armaments supplied to Portugal within the framework of NATO and for defensive purposes in Western Europe from being used to repress nationalist liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies.

634. Before concluding, he wished to make some comments concerning the role which NATO, according to some speakers, was playing in the Portuguese problem. The attacks which had been made on NATO at the current session of the Special Committee were simply the result of a propaganda campaign designed to discredit an alliance that had played an essential role in the maintenance of international peace. He hoped that the African members of the Special Committee would be able to draw a distinction between the condemnation of Portuguese colonialism which was on the Committee's agenda and the petty polemics against the Atlantic alliance. He deplored the fact that some speakers had seen fit to make use of such a forum and of the debate on so serious a subject as conditions in the Portuguese Territories to raise problems which were related to the military and political balance in Europe and had nothing to do with the matter currently under discussion.

635. The representative of Australia said that his Government's attitude was one of rejection of Portugal's present policies and of support for the principle of self-determination. It was concerned about Portugal's failure to meet its obligations under the Charter and its refusal to submit information to the United Nations on the Territories under its control. His Government had not hesitated to express to the Portuguese Government its concern and disagreement. Australia did not supply arms or military equipment to that country. It was implacably opposed to forced labour, restriction of civil liberties and limitation of franchise, as perpetuated by Portugal.

636. During the Special Committee's meetings in Dar es Salaam and Algiers, he had put certain political questions to the petitioners, and had been impressed by the answers, the import of which had been substantially the same in both places. He had been left with the feeling and the hope that there was much fertile ground that the Portuguese Government could cultivate for the happiness and prosperity of the countries and people concerned.

637. The representative of the United States of America recalled that in Dar es Salaam, when the Special Committee had last discussed the question of the

Territories under Portuguese administration, she had summarized the major elements of United States policy on the question. That policy had been fully and frankly stated in the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Committee, and in Washington and Lisbon directly to the Portuguese Government.

638. Her Government had made it clear that it did not agree with Portugal's policy towards its Territories. It upheld the view that the Territories were clearly non-self-governing and were subject to the provisions of Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter. The United States of America had repeatedly urged Portugal to fulfil its obligations as an administering Power in respect both of the territorial administration and of the submission of information to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. It supported the right of the people of the Territories to full and genuine self-determination: they should be free to choose the kind of institutions and forms of government under which they wished to live. It did not believe that self-determination meant the agreement and consent of the population only to a particular political or administrative structure, or to a certain type of State, and it had urged Portugal to accept the principle of self-determination and give it practical effect. There was no conceivable step that would contribute more than that to the peaceful solution of the problem: it would break a stalemate that was fraught with danger, and that would indeed be broken, if not by consent, then by violence. It was the Committee's task to explore realistic means whereby that process could take place peacefully.

639. One step that the Security Council had recognized as desirable was to prevent the export of arms to the administering Power for use in its African Territories, and the question had been subject to extensive discussion in the Committee. Since Portugal was a member of NATO, the discussion had provided a convenient opportunity for some members who, for reasons unconnected with the well-being of the peoples of the Territories, wished to attack that organization. So far as her Government was concerned, she could state unequivocally that NATO as an organization did not supply arms to Portugal for use in the Territories. She also stated that the United States, in accordance with operative paragraph 6 of the Security Council resolution of 31 July 1963, neither supplied nor permitted the export of arms or military equipment to that country for use in the Territories. It had for many

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years forbidden such provision without the specific assurance that the material would not be so used. That was the firm and publicly stated policy to which her country would continue to adhere.

640. A number of petitioners had cited Portugal's use of military equipment allegedly of United States manufacture. She had made it clear in Dar es Salaam that the weapons concerned were of Second World War vintage, available all over the world, and had been part of existing arms stocks in a number of countries for many years. She repeated that they were not available in the United States for use in the Territories.

641. Her delegation deplored the resort by Portugal to violence in the area, and particularly its bombing of defenceless villages and people. She pointed out, however, that the period of time cited by the former Portuguese pilot - 21 July 1961 to 10 February 1963 - had been prior to the adoption of the Security Council's resolution on the subject. She also pointed out that, despite the attempt by some delegations to persuade that petitioner to indict certain countries as having co-operated with Portugal in its colonialist policy, he had failed to do so.

642. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania, commenting on the statements made by the Italian and other delegations with regard to the question of financial interests, said that for Africans the question was not one of ideological differences: they were interested only in being Africans and in independence. The reference to financial interests had been made because the petitioners had stated repeatedly that those interests contributed towards the war and provided the Portuguese with the necessary funds to buy weapons. It was regrettable that an attempt had been made by certain delegations to inject ideological arguments. He would have preferred to hear them deny that American and West European companies were contributing to the war that was responsible for the massacre of the African people. Evidence had been given, even by the Portuguese themselves, regarding the activities of such financial monopolies.

643. The representative of Italy had stated that the NATO alliance had played an important part in keeping the peace of the world. He pointed out that there had been no conflict in any part of the world since the Second World War in which NATO had stepped in to defend world peace. As long as there was evidence that

NATO arms were being used against the African people they would continue to raise objections. The petitioner who had appeared before the Special Committee the previous day had given evidence that NATO arms had been supplied to Portugal at a nominal charge, and as he had himself been serving at that time in the Portuguese army, there was every reason to believe that what he said was true.

644. The reassertion by the representative of the United States that her Government agreed with the principle of self-determination was not enough: what was wanted now was implementation of that principle. The African people considered it a contradiction to claim to agree to that principle while at the same time helping the Power concerned to undermine it.

645. He quoted from an Indian newspaper a passage under the headline "Military Weapons to Salazar", which stated that at the beginning of May 1966 the United States customs authorities had discovered a large quantity of arms illegally destined for Portugal, and had arrested the pilot of the aircraft on which they were to have been carried, who had defended himself by saying that he was acting not for individual but for national interest. He had declared in court that he was an agent of the CIA charged with the carriage of arms to Angola and Mozambique, and that he had also delivered to Portugal seven B-52 bombers and other equipment.

646. What his delegation was interested in was not the declaration of an arms embargo but of actual effective control of arms to Portugal. The representative of the United States had stated that the arms her Government supplied to Portugal were only for the defence of Europe. After a lapse of twenty years since the Second World War there was no threat of war in Europe, yet it was being said that Portugal was being given arms for its defence.

647. His delegation would have been glad to hear NATO members in the Committee state categorically that NATO arms would never be used by Portugal against the African people.

648. The representative of the United States of America, commenting on the statement made by the representative of Tanzania, said that he himself had showed that measures had been taken by the United States of America to prevent the export of arms to the Portuguese Territories. The fact that the persons concerned had had to resort to illegal acts showed that her Government did enforce its declared policy and that any violation of it was subject to prosecution in its courts. Regarding the claim that United States agencies had collaborated with the pilot of the aircraft concerned, she was authorized by her Government categorically to deny that allegation.

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IV. ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE^{1/}

649. At the 452nd meeting, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, United Republic of Tanzania and Yugoslavia, submitted a draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.313).

650. Introducing the draft resolution on behalf of the sponsors, the representative of India said that operative paragraph 4 reflected the viewpoint expressed by a large majority of members of the Special Committee and by the petitioners who had appeared before it. It was well known that the assistance Portugal received from such financial interests was one of the main props for its obduracy, and the drafters of the resolution had considered it necessary to express strong disapproval of them.

651. The other new idea was that contained in operative paragraph 6 which recommended that the Security Council should make it obligatory for all States to implement the measures contained in General Assembly resolution 2107 (XX) of 21 December 1965, and in particular those in paragraph 7 of that resolution, which he read out to the Committee. The enforcement of those measures on a voluntary basis had been urged for a long time, but the response of some Member States had been bitterly disappointing. The Security Council must now assume the vital role with which it had been entrusted under the United Nations Charter. If it made such measures obligatory, the excuse of Portugal's friends and allies that they could not compel action by their nationals would be removed.

652. Some delegations might have misgivings about the sixth preambular paragraph. He would point out, however, that the threat to international peace and security as a result of Portugal's policy had already been confirmed by the Security Council, and the reference to aggravation of the situation as a result of the racist rebellion in Southern Rhodesia was merely a recognition of the facts.

653. Although it had been argued by some delegations that it was unrealistic for the Special Committee to recommend measures that were unlikely to be accepted and

^{1/} Action taken by the Special Committee on the question of Territories under Portuguese administration in connexion with General Assembly resolutions 2105 (XX) and 2107 (XX) is contained in chapter I of the Special Committee's report which will be issued as A/63CO.

implemented by everyone. The co-sponsors believed, however, that the Committee should not be discouraged by the obstacles put in the way of implementing effective measures against Portugal, and that it was its duty to continue its attempt to induce those who had not so far found it possible to support the measures envisaged to realize their mistakes and fall into line. With regard to the suggestion that those measures would encroach upon the Security Council's authority, he pointed out that the Special Committee was merely recommending the enforcement of mandatory sanctions in regard to the threat to international peace and security already confirmed by the Security Council in its resolution 218.

654. The situation in the Territories under Portuguese rule was a grave and deteriorating one. The brave people suffering under it were carrying on their fight against heavy odds, but Portugal was bound to lose in the end. The co-sponsors hoped that it would realize that fact and mend the situation before too much blood had been shed, and it was in that spirit that they had presented the draft resolution. He hoped all members of the Committee would find it possible to support it and to implement it fully and promptly. The sponsors would welcome any suggestions for improving the draft, but must reject any that would be likely to weaken the text.

655. The representative of Madagascar, speaking on behalf of the Afro-Asian sponsors and Yugoslavia, said that the draft resolution endeavoured to sum up, in a few words, what the African countries thought they were entitled to expect from the international community in order to confront the danger threatening the Territories administered by Portugal, and hence threatening Africa and the whole world. The sponsors had wanted to demonstrate once again their uneasiness and concern about the situation in those Territories. They considered the situation "critical" and "explosive", for they were convinced that if it went on it could constitute a serious threat to peace and security, which were the objectives and the *raison d'être* of the United Nations. The Special Committee had been able to hear evidence about what was happening in the Territories under Portuguese domination: those Territories were the daily scene of military operations and repressive measures, which claimed many victims among the civilian population. Portugal had acquired the habit of repeating constantly that there was no war in the Territories it occupied. In so doing, it not only denied the truth but...

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encouraged bloodshed, and no one could remain indifferent in face of the ever-increasing number of victims shot down by Portuguese bullets. The draft resolution also expressed the sponsors' concern about the presence of certain financial interests which were operating in the Territories under Portuguese domination, to the sole advantage of Portugal and not of the African population.

656. It was not as a matter of routine that the sponsors of the draft resolution had wished to reaffirm the inalienable right of those people to self-determination and independence. The Committee knew what definition of the term "self-determination" Portugal sought to impose. That question had been the subject of lengthy debates both in the Security Council and in other United Nations bodies. He need merely recall that the States Members of the United Nations were unanimous in recognizing that Portugal's thesis was characterized by the bad faith that prompted it.

657. In view of Portugal's persistent refusal to conform to reason and good sense, the sponsors of the draft resolution had made a point of reaffirming their position on the legitimacy of the struggle which the inhabitants of those Territories were being forced to wage, solely with a view to recovering their sovereignty and independence. It went without saying that the sponsors of the draft resolution did not thereby intend to give the green light for violence and bloodshed, but merely to point out that the peoples of those Territories had been compelled to resort to force to face a war that Portugal had imposed on them. Before taking up arms, their representatives had tried every means of finding a basis for agreement with Portugal. Not only had Portugal met them with total intransigence but it had launched military and repressive operations against the local population. In that connexion, and in view of the intensification of the attacks on the civilian population, the sponsors of the draft resolution had been led to express their concern over the assistance and arms which Portugal was receiving from its allies and was using against the people of the Territories under its domination. That was why they were appealing once more to Portugal's allies to reconsider their attitude and to take the steps set forth in paragraph 7 of the draft resolution. Moreover, practically all the petitioners whom the members of the Committee had heard in the course of the present session had confirmed that Portugal was indeed using the arms and war material it received from its allies.

658. Similarly, the sponsors of the draft resolution had not wished to pass over in silence the occupying Power's odious policy of encouraging foreign immigration into those Territories for equally reprehensible ends. That settlement policy showed clearly that Portugal was firmly resolved to maintain its hold over the Territories under its domination, to perpetuate its policy of atrocities and to continue to persecute innocent people who had committed no crime but that of demanding freedom and independence.

659. In the light of the Indian representative's comments and the observations he himself had made on behalf of the members of the Afro-Asian group and Yugoslavia, he considered the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.313) fully justified. He hoped that all the members of the Committee who were against war and bloodshed, who professed tolerance and valued freedom and sought to promote understanding and brotherhood among peoples, would be willing to make their contribution to the joint effort by isolating Portugal from the rest of the world until such time as the Government of that country renounced its contemptible colonial policy.

660. The representative of Iraq said that in co-sponsoring the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.313) on the Portuguese Territories which was before the Committee, it was the hope of his delegation that it would be adopted unanimously. The Committee's moral support for the cause of the African people in those Territories would contribute to the liberation of millions who had long suffered from inhuman treatment and countless indignities.

661. The representative of Denmark said that, to its great regret, the Danish delegation could not vote in favour of the draft resolution. It found several paragraphs unacceptable. In particular, operative paragraph 6 was not acceptable, because paragraph 7 of resolution 2107 went far beyond the General Assembly's competence. Furthermore, the situation did not seem to justify such radical measures. Finally, the seventh preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 4 exaggerated the role played by foreign interests.

662. In conclusion, he doubted whether measures as radical as those recommended in the draft resolution could effectively assist the indigenous peoples.

663. The representative of Bulgaria said that his delegation had often expressed the opinion that only if compulsory sanctions were adopted against Members of the United Nations which contravened United Nations resolutions would it be possible

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to put Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter into effect. He was glad that the draft resolution reflected that urgent necessity. Operative paragraph 6 in particular was a notable example because it stressed the obligation of all States, whether or not they were Members of the United Nations - he had in mind the Federal Republic of Germany in particular - to implement the measures set forth in paragraph 7 of resolution 2107 (XX), which provided among other things for the rupture of diplomatic and consular relations and the boycott of all trade with Portugal.

664. All the petitioners had stressed the fact that the United Nations, and more particularly the specialized agencies, could give them effective assistance. The Special Committee had therefore been justified in asking those agencies how they had complied with the General Assembly resolutions.

665. In the draft resolution before the Committee, the specialized agencies, and in particular the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund, were asked to refrain from granting Portugal any financial, economic or technical assistance. The specialized agencies were also asked to increase their assistance to the refugees and to the victims of military operations. He was glad that the draft resolution included such provisions, for some of the specialized agencies were showing little enthusiasm for the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. For that reason, it might perhaps be useful to prepare a still more explicit text.

666. He considered that the draft resolution would represent a step forward and would make it possible to give those who were fighting against Portuguese colonialism more effective aid. The Bulgarian delegation thanked the sponsors for their efforts and would whole-heartedly support the draft resolution.

667. The representative of Syria said that because it was not enough to condemn Portugal the draft resolution rightly recommended to the Security Council to make the implementation of measures provided for in paragraph 7 of General Assembly resolution 2107 (XX) mandatory on all Member States. Equally crucial was paragraph 7 of the draft resolution requesting all States, and particularly the military allies of Portugal, not to supply the régime with arms, not to provide it with material designed to facilitate its own production of arms, and not to assist

it in any other way. The grounds for that request had been the clear evidence given that Portugal did receive, directly or indirectly, arms and equipment from certain States which, however, publicly condemned the regime. That contradiction was at the heart of the tragedy, which was further aggravated by the enthusiastic support tendered to the regime by financial concerns in a bid for quick and illicit profits.

668. The representative of Italy said that in the light of considerations he had stated previously and in view of the instructions which he had just received from his Government, he would be unable to support the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.313). He had already expressed his views of foreign economic interests, and he was obliged to make very serious reservations concerning operative paragraphs 6 and 7. Paragraph 6 referred to a General Assembly resolution which many Members of the United Nations considered unconstitutional. Moreover, he did not believe that the General Assembly or any of its committees could recommend definite measures to the Security Council. The wording of paragraph 7 was tantamount to the imposition of sanctions, and any such decision was the sole prerogative of the Security Council.

669. The representative of Australia said that his delegation was unable to support the draft resolution in its entirety. The last three paragraphs of the preamble did not give an adequate and sufficiently balanced description of the facts to sustain the operative paragraphs that followed. Operative paragraph 4 had the same defects to which he had referred in Addis Ababa concerning the resolution on South West Africa, in that it made no attempt to differentiate between those commercial interests that exploited the people and those that did not.

670. Operative paragraph 6 contained a new element with regard to the Portuguese Territories, but one with which the Committee had become familiar in other contexts. His delegation was bound to oppose its form of words, which usurped the Security Council's authority and would give rise to a set of circumstances to which Australia was strongly opposed.

671. The same remarks applied to operative paragraph 7, which was perhaps even more important, since there were far-reaching implications hidden in it that went beyond the tragedy of the Portuguese Territories. His delegation would therefore abstain from voting on the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.313).

672. The representative of the United States said that her delegation did not believe that the language used or the measures called for in the seventh paragraph of the preamble and in operative paragraph 6 of the draft resolution were justified even in the serious situation existing in the Portuguese Territories. Nor could it agree with the generalized and doctrinaire statements in regard to foreign investment in the eighth paragraph of the preamble and in operative paragraph 4. Her delegation would be unable to support the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.313).

673. The representative of Chile said, that the position of Chile had not changed. For years Chile had condemned the colonial policy of Portugal and unconditionally supported the nationalist movements whose object was to establish decent government in the Territories under Portuguese domination. The Chilean delegation did not object to the sixth preambular paragraph, although it had some reservations about the wording. It would abstain in the votes on operative paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 for reasons which had already been stated many times in the General Assembly and in the Special Committee.

674. At its 455th meeting the Special Committee voted on the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.331) as follows:

Operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution was adopted by a roll-call vote of 20 to none, and no abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Australia, Bulgaria, Chile, Denmark, Ethiopia, India, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.

Against: None.

Operative paragraph 6 of the draft resolution was adopted by 15 votes to 3, with 2 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Ethiopia, India, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia.

Against: Australia, Denmark, United States of America.

Abstaining: Chile, Venezuela.

Operative paragraph 7 was adopted by a roll-call vote of 16 to 2, with 3 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia.

Against: Australia, United States of America.

Abstaining: Chile, Denmark, Venezuela.

Operative paragraph 8 of the draft resolution was adopted by a roll-call vote of 16 to none, with 5 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Australia, Chile, Denmark, United States of America, Venezuela.

The draft resolution as a whole (A/AC.109/L.313) was adopted by a roll-call vote of 18 to 1, with 3 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Chile, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.

Against: United States of America.

Abstaining: Australia, Denmark, Italy.

675. The text of the resolution on the question of Territories under Portuguese administration (A/AC.109/187) adopted by the Special Committee at its 455th meeting on 22 June 1966, reads as follows:

"The Special Committee,

"Having examined again the question relating to Angola, Mozambique, so-called Portuguese Guinea and other Territories under Portuguese domination,

"Having heard the statements of the petitioners,

"Recalling General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

"Recalling also Security Council resolutions 163 (1961) of 9 June 1961, 180 (1963) of 31 July 1963, 183 (1963) of 11 December 1963 and 218 (1965) of 23 November 1965,

"Recalling further General Assembly resolutions 1807 (XVII) of 14 December 1962, 1819 (XVII) of 18 December 1962, 1913 (XVIII) of 3 December 1963 and 2107 (XX) of 21 December 1965,

"Deeply concerned at the critical and explosive situation which is threatening peace and security arising from the intensification of the measures of repression and military operations against the African people of these Territories, which is further aggravated by the racist minority rebellion in Southern Rhodesia,

"Noting with deep concern that the activities of the foreign financial interests in these Territories which impede the African people in the realization of their aspirations to freedom and independence continue undiminished,

"Further noting with deep concern that Portugal continues to use the aid and weapons that it receives from its military allies against the populations of these Territories,

"1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the peoples of the African Territories under Portuguese domination to freedom and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and recognizes the legitimacy of their struggle to achieve this right;

"2. Condemns the colonial policy of Portugal and its persistent refusal to carry out the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council;

"3. Condemns the policy of the Government of Portugal which violates the economic and political rights of the indigenous population by the settlement on a large scale of foreign immigrants in the Territories and by the exporting of workers to South Africa;

"4. Condemns the activities of the financial interests operating in the Territories under Portuguese domination which exploit the human and material resources and impede the progress of the people of the Territories towards freedom and independence;

"5. Appeals to all States to give the people of the Territories under Portuguese domination the moral and material support necessary for the restoration of their inalienable rights and to prevent their nationals from co-operating with the Portuguese authorities especially in the field of foreign investment;

"6. Recommends to the Security Council to make it obligatory for all States to implement the measures contained in General Assembly resolution 2107 (XX), in particular those mentioned in paragraph 7 thereof;

"7. Requests all States and, in particular, the military allies of Portugal within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, to take the following steps:

"(a) To desist forthwith from giving the Portuguese Government any assistance which would enable it to continue its repression of the African people in the Territories under its domination;

"(b) To take all the necessary measures to prevent the sale or supply of arms and military equipment to the Government of Portugal;

"(c) To stop the sale or shipment to the Government of Portugal of equipment and materials for the manufacture or maintenance of arms and ammunition;

"8. Appeals once again to all the specialized agencies, in particular to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), to refrain from granting Portugal any financial, economic or technical assistance so long as the Government of Portugal fails to implement General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);

"9. Requests the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the specialized agencies concerned and other international relief organizations to increase their assistance to the refugees from the Territories under Portuguese domination and to the people who have suffered and are still suffering from military operations;

"10. Decides to maintain the question of the Territories under Portuguese domination on its agenda."

676. The text of the resolution was transmitted to the President of the Security Council on 1 July 1966 (S/7394).