



Twenty-first session
Agenda item 69

REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE SITUATION WITH REGARD TO THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE
TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES
(Covering its work during 1966)

Rapporteur: Mr. A.H. ALJUBOURI (Iraq)

FIJI

CHAPTER VIII

CONTENTS

	<u>Paragraphs</u>
I. ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE IN 1964 AND BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS TWENTIETH SESSION	1 - 2
II. INFORMATION ON THE TERRITORY	
Introduction	3 - 4
Political and constitutional developments	5 - 30
III. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE	
Introduction	31
General statements by members	32 - 98
IV. ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE	99 - 120

* This document contains the chapter on Fiji. The general introductory chapter of the report of the Special Committee will be issued subsequently under the symbol A/6300. Other chapters of the report are being issued as addenda.

I. ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE IN 1964 AND BY
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS TWENTIETH SESSION

1. After considering Fiji at its meetings in October and November 1964, the Special Committee, at its 302nd meeting on 5 November 1964, adopted a resolution in which it requested the administering Power to implement without further delay the provisions of General Assembly resolutions and in particular operative paragraph 2 of resolution 1951 (XVIII) which invited the administering Power to work out with representatives of the peoples of Fiji, a new constitution providing for free elections conducted on the principle "one man, one vote", and the creation of representative institutions; to take immediate steps to transfer all power to the people of Fiji, in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire, without any conditions or reservations; to endeavour, with the co-operation of the people of Fiji, to achieve the political, economic and social integration of the various communities.^{1/}

2. At its twentieth session, the General Assembly, after considering the parts of the reports of the Special Committee concerning Fiji, adopted resolution 2068 (XX), of 16 December 1965, the text of which reads as follows:

"The General Assembly,

"Recalling its resolutions 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, 1654 (XVI) of 27 November 1961, 1810 (XVII) of 17 December 1962 and 1951 (XVIII) of 11 December 1963, and the resolution adopted by the Special Committee on 5 November 1964,

"Noting with regret that the administering Power has not yet taken effective measures to implement the resolutions of the General Assembly,

"Taking into account the fact that any further delay in the implementation of those resolutions would create further hardships for the people of the Territory,

"Considering that the constitutional changes contemplated by the administering Power would foment separatist tendencies and stand in the way of the political, economic and social integration of the people as a whole,

^{1/} Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annex No. 8 (Part 1) (A/5800/Rev.1), chapter XIII, para. 119.

"1. Approves the chapters of the reports of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating to the Territory of Fiji, and endorses the conclusions and recommendations set forth therein;

"2. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of Fiji to freedom and independence in conformity with the provisions of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples;

"3. Invites the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, as the administering Power, to implement immediately the resolutions of the General Assembly;

"4. Requests the administering Power to take, as a matter of urgency, measures to repeal all discriminatory laws and to establish an unqualified system of democratic representation based on the principle of 'one man, one vote';

"5. Further requests the administering Power to report to the Special Committee and to the General Assembly on the implementation of the present resolution;

"6. Invites the Special Committee to keep the question under consideration and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its twenty-first session;

"7. Decides to include the question of Fiji in the provisional agenda of its twenty-first session."

II. INFORMATION ON THE TERRITORY^{2/}

Introduction

3. Information on Fiji is contained in reports to the General Assembly at its nineteenth and twentieth sessions.^{3/} Supplementary information on recent developments is set out below.

4. At the end of 1964, the total population was estimated to be 456,390, consisting of Fijians (41.5 per cent), Indians (50 per cent), and others (9.5 per cent).

Political and constitutional developments

Fiji's present Constitution

5. An Order-in-Council early in 1963 made provision for a new Constitution for Fiji, including an expanded Legislative Council and an extended franchise. The present Legislative Council consists of a Speaker, up to nineteen official members (the number has, in practice, been reduced to ten), and eighteen unofficial members (six Fijians, six Indians and six Europeans), most of whom are directly elected.

6. A change, not involving any amendment to the Constitution, was effected in July 1964 when a "membership" system of government was introduced. At that time the Executive Council was reconstituted, and it now consists of four official and six unofficial members (two Fijians, two Indians and two Europeans), of whom three are directly associated with the supervision of groups of government departments and with the formulation and presentation of government policy for particular subjects.

^{2/} The information presented in this section has been derived from published reports. The information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the United Kingdom under Article 73 e of the Charter, on 9 June 1965, was used in the preparation of the chapter on Fiji in the Special Committee's report to the General Assembly at its twentieth session (A/6000/Add.7, chapter XII).

^{3/} Ibid., and A/5800/Rev.1, chapter XIII.

Fiji Constitutional Conference

7. As previously reported,^{4/} a Constitutional Conference was due to take place in London early in 1965. In April 1965, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies visited Fiji and held discussions with the representatives of the various communities in order to ascertain their views, especially those of the minorities who would not be directly represented at the Constitutional Conference, where participation was to be confined to the eighteen unofficial members of the Legislative Council.

8. In July 1965, the Secretary of State for the Colonies outlined the objectives of the Conference. He suggested that it would need, amongst other things, to consider the development of the membership system; a strengthening and broadening of the elected element in the Legislative Council; and matters affecting the franchise. It would also no doubt wish to consider the adoption of provisions concerning human rights, the Public Service and the judiciary.

9. Before the Conference opened, it was agreed that independence was not an issue to be discussed at the London Conference. It was also agreed that minority communities not at present enfranchised should be brought on the electoral rolls, the principal ones being the Rotumans, the Chinese and other Pacific Islanders.

10. The Fiji Constitutional Conference 1965 was held in London from 26 July to 9 August, and a report containing its recommendations was published on the latter date.

11. The Conference recommended, inter alia, that Fiji should have an elected majority in the Legislative Council; that the practice of having nominated unofficial members should be discontinued and the number of nominated official members should be reduced; that the minority groups in the population (mainly Chinese and immigrants from other Pacific Islands) should be enfranchised, thus achieving full adult suffrage; and that a ministerial system should be introduced.

12. The report noted that during the discussions there were certain matters on which the views of the delegation from Fiji were not unanimous. They were principally: the proposed method of election; the representation of the various communities on the Legislative Council; and the powers of the Executive Council.

^{4/} A/6000/Add.7, chapter XII, para. 4.

13. The report stated that the Indian group wished to replace the existing system of elections on communal rolls with a straight common roll with neither communal qualifications for electors nor communal reservation of seats for candidates. The Fijian and European groups could not agree to the introduction of a system of elections on a common-roll basis at the present stage or in the foreseeable future, and no agreement was reached on when such a system should be introduced.

14. The United Kingdom Government considered that election on a straight common-roll basis was not practicable for Fiji until a greater degree of integration of its communities had been achieved. It considered it important, however, that a system be introduced whereby some members would be both elected by and responsible to voters drawn from all communities. To this end it put forward proposals for a cross-voting system whereby some members would be both elected by, and responsible to, voters drawn from all communities. These proposals were eventually accepted by the Fijian and European groups who emphasized that the proposals would be brought before the communities in Fiji affected by them, through a debate in the Legislative Council. The proposals were not accepted by the Indian group - except partially, by one Indian delegate, who would have preferred the adoption of elections on a common-roll basis, but was prepared to accept the proposals in so far as they related to the method of election. When it became clear that their proposal for full common-roll elections was not acceptable, the Indian group offered an alternative which would increase the number of members elected under the system of cross-voting. This was not accepted by the Fijian and European groups. The Indian group then indicated that in these circumstances they would wish to take their stand on full common-roll elections.

15. The Indian group unanimously rejected the proposal that there should be two more Fijian members than Indian members in the Legislative Council. They considered that, as the Indians constituted a majority of the population, they were entitled to at least parity of representation with the Fijian community.

16. In the discussions on the provisions of the Constitution dealing with executive powers, the Indian group, with one dissident, considered that the stage had been reached where full internal self-government should be introduced forthwith. The remainder of the Fiji delegation considered that it was still necessary for the Governor to retain a substantial measure of discretionary power.

Legislative Council

17. The Conference recommended that the Legislative Council should comprise thirty-six elected members together with not more than four official members nominated by the Governor. Non-official members would consist of the following: fourteen Fijians: nine elected on the Fijian communal roll, two elected by the Fijian Council of Chiefs, three elected according to a new cross-voting system; twelve Indians: nine elected on the Indian communal roll, three elected by the cross-voting system; ten Europeans: seven elected on a communal roll, three elected by the cross-voting system.

18. The communal roll for Fijians would also include Rotumans and other Pacific Islanders. Chinese and any other minority communities formerly not entitled to vote would be included on the communal roll with Europeans. For the election of the nine members by the cross-voting system, Fiji would be divided into three constituencies, each returning one Fijian (or Rotuman or other Pacific Islander), one Indian and one European (or Chinese or member of another minority group), each member being elected by persons of all communities. The Conference abolished some qualifications and disqualifications concerning candidates and electors. These included the requirements relating to property or income for candidates and the literacy tests for voters. A non-voting Speaker would be elected by the Legislative Council either from within the Council or from persons qualified to be elected to the Council. The Council would also be empowered to appoint a Deputy Speaker from among its members. The maximum life of the Council would be five years.

19. Subject to the restrictions imposed by the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865, and by any provisions of the Constitution itself, such as a Bill of Rights, the Constitution would give the Legislative Council full power to make laws on any subject. There would be a provision to prevent bills from being introduced without the consent of the Governor if their effect would be to impose taxes or to increase expenditure or alter terms and conditions of service of public officers. The Governor would have power to refuse assent, to reserve legislation, and to ensure that bills were passed by certification. Certain subjects specified by reference to particular laws would be dealt with by special procedure in the Legislative

Council. Under this procedure, bills affecting the laws concerned would require the support of more than two thirds of all the elected members of the Legislative Council. A similar requirement would apply to any resolution, the effect of which would be to recommend any change in the Constitution.

Executive Council

20. The Conference recommended that executive authority should remain formally vested in the Governor, who would continue to appoint the unofficial members of the Executive Council. These would be drawn from among the elected members of the Legislative Council, and the Governor would ensure appropriate representation of the various communities in Fiji. The Constitution would provide that at the appropriate time, the Governor might appoint members of the Executive Council to be ministers with executive powers, and at that time the Executive Council would become a Council of Ministers.

21. The Governor would be required to consult the Executive Council and, in general, to accept its advice, except when he considered it necessary to act against this in the interests of public order, public faith or good government. Certain subjects, including defence, external affairs, internal security and public service, would be reserved to the Governor.

22. Recommendations were also made for the establishment of a Supreme Court and a Court of Appeal; for the setting up of an advisory Judicial and Legal Service Commission, Public Service Commission and Police Service Commission; and for a Bill of Rights to be included in the Constitution.

Legislative action on constitutional proposals

23. On 16 December 1965, the proposals were approved by the Fiji Legislative Council by a vote of 12 to 5, with 7 abstentions. Official members did not take part in the debate and abstained in the vote. The new Constitution is expected to be brought into force during 1966.

Elections

24. A general election for the new Legislative Council (see paragraph 17 above) is to be held in Fiji in the fall of 1966. This will be on the basis of universal

adult suffrage. It is estimated that about 182,500 persons will be eligible to enrol as voters. There were 94,000 persons registered in the 1963 election when women voted for the first time. The election will shorten the life of the current Legislative Council by two years, whose unofficial members were elected in 1963 for five-year terms.

Political parties

25. The Fijian community in Fiji has three political parties: the Fijian Association, the Fijian Democratic Party and the Fijian Advancement Party. The main party, the Fijian Association, was formed in the late 1950's. No information is available concerning the size of its membership. The Fijian Democratic Party is approximately three years old and claims to have about 4,000 "financial" members. The Fijian Advancement Party was formed in 1965, but no further information is available concerning it.

26. The Indian community in Fiji has a number of political parties or groupings which include the Federation Party, the National Congress Party, the Fijian Western Democratic Party, the Fiji Minority Party and the All-Fiji Muslim Political Front. The largest party is the Federation Party. Although information is not available concerning its present membership, its members held four seats in the Legislative Council in 1965. These were directed by the party in April 1965 not to hold any discussions on constitutional matters with other members of the Legislative Council in Fiji, but "to make all such representations and submissions which they may think fit and proper in their absolute discretion on all matters to be discussed" at the London Conference. The party, inter alia, advocates a common roll and is opposed to a communal roll in Fiji.

27. The National Congress Party was formed in 1964. It is reported to be in opposition to the Federation Party. In a memorandum issued in 1964, it declared that the United Kingdom Government should give Fiji internal self-government without delay. No information is available concerning the size of its membership.

28. The formation of the Fijian Western Democratic Party was noted in 1963.^{5/} No recent information is available concerning it.

^{5/} Official Records of the General Assembly, Eighteenth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23 (A/5446/Rev.1, chapter VII, para. 19).

29. The Fiji Minority Party, in a memorandum to the United Kingdom Secretary of State for the Colonies, supported separate representation for Muslims in the Legislative Council and retention "for the time being" of communal electoral rolls. After the London Conference, the party is reported to have considered the latter a victory for reason and co-operation and to have urged Muslims to accept the new Constitution for Fiji and to give it their undivided loyalty and support. Information is not available concerning the membership of the party.

30. At the end of 1965, a new political party was formed calling itself the All-Fiji Muslim Political Front. Membership in the party is open to all Muslims in Fiji. The party is reported to be in opposition to the terms of the new Constitution which discontinues the practice whereby the Governor nominated a Muslim representative to the Legislature. In a resolution passed in December 1965, it called on Muslims generally to refrain from enrolling on the Indian communal roll and to protest to the United Kingdom Government through the Governor of Fiji on behalf of the Muslims of Fiji that their rights and interests be protected and recognized as distinct from that of the Indian community of Fiji, and that constitutional provision be made to entrench an electoral system guaranteeing Muslim representation in Fiji's Legislature.

III. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

Introduction

31. The Special Committee considered the question of Fiji at its 410th, 412th, 413th, 461st, 462nd, 463rd and 469th meetings between 6 May and 29 September 1966.

General statements by members

32. The representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland said that there was not a great deal to add to his delegation's statements on Fiji in the Fourth Committee in November 1965.^{6/} On that occasion, the United Kingdom delegation had described the decisions taken at the Constitutional Conference held in July and August 1965, which were briefly summarized in the Secretariat working paper (see paragraphs 7-16 above). The agreed objectives of the Conference had been to evolve a constitutional framework for Fiji which would preserve a continuing link with the United Kingdom and within which further progress could be made towards internal self-government. Under the new arrangements, there would be universal suffrage. Almost all members of the Legislative Council would be elected and there would be more elected representatives for each of the three main communities in Fiji. The Indian community would have the same proportion of the total membership as before. The Fijian community would have proportionately more seats than before, at the expense of the Europeans, to take account of new voters who would vote on the Fijian roll. A very important innovation from the point of view of Fiji's future political development was that an element of the membership of the Legislative Council would for the first time be elected by all three communities. The object was to encourage the emergence of political leaders appealing to all sectors of the population and not to any single community. Experience elsewhere had shown that such a system could be very effective in bridging divisions between different communities and promoting a single national loyalty. It was the declared purpose of the United Kingdom Government to help achieve that goal in Fiji. Lastly, the new constitution would include a bill of rights and provisions to make possible the introduction of a ministerial system.

6/ Ibid., Twentieth Session, Fourth Committee, 1558th and 1570th meetings.

33. Those new electoral measures went further than the Fijian and European representatives at the Conference would have wished and not as far as the Indian representatives had wanted. The Fijians and Europeans had recognized that elections with a straight common roll, as proposed by the Indian representatives, were a desirable long-term objective but had not been able to agree to the introduction of such a system at that stage or in the foreseeable future. In view of those conflicting attitudes, it should be clear that the decisions of the United Kingdom Government at the Conference, taken after the fullest discussion and most earnest thought, were steps in the direction advocated by the great majority in the United Nations and in the Special Committee. The decisions did not represent a victory for any one group of the Fijian people over any other. The constant aim of the United Kingdom had been to encourage co-operation and trust among all the people, whatever their ethnic origin. The decisions of the Conference were designed to help achieve that aim, while maintaining progress in the direction of internal self-government.

34. The necessary steps were being taken to implement the decisions of the Conference. The Order-in-Council to enable elections to be held had been promulgated at the end of November 1965 and the new electoral regulations had been published the following month. The registration of electors had taken place during the first four months of 1966 and about 84 per cent of the potential electorate had been registered. The provisional electoral rolls were being prepared on the basis of that registration and would be ready for publication later in the summer. There would then be a period for decisions on any objections which might be raised to the rolls, which would then be published in final form. The existing Legislative Council was to be dissolved towards the end of August 1966; 12 August would be the nomination day for candidates for the new Council; polling would take place from 26 September to 8 October and the new Legislature was due to meet early in the following month.

35. There was no disagreement in the Special Committee about aims and objectives. All recognized that the different communities in Fiji - which had separate cultures, different ways of life and a good deal of mutual mistrust - must be encouraged to co-operate in an atmosphere of trust and harmony. All agreed that the process of healing divisions must be carried forward with continued constitutional advance

towards more representative and responsible government in Fiji. If there was disagreement, it was only over the best ways of achieving those goals. In the opinion of the United Kingdom Government, a moderate course was most likely to succeed: the permanence of divisions and safeguards should not be accepted but nor should the pace be forced to the point of arousing more fears. In September 1965, the then United Kingdom Colonial Secretary had declared that co-operation in the new constitution would lead to political integration and racial harmony and show that inter-racial voting did not adversely affect the interests of any race.

36. He hoped that, in the Committee's discussions, there would be a wide measure of agreement on the nature of the situation and the direction in which it should be encouraged to develop. If the Committee was to play the positive role for which it had been established and to serve the true interests of the people of Fiji, it should define the extent of common agreement and the common goals, and endorse the aims and directions he had just described.

37. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania said that, judging by the statement of the United Kingdom representative (see paragraphs 32-36 above), the situation in Fiji, as far as decolonization was concerned, remained virtually unchanged. The representative of the administering Power had claimed that steps could not be taken to implement General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1591 (XVIII) until full integration of the various communities had been achieved. It was, however, the United Kingdom Government itself that was seeking to accentuate communal separation by the introduction of communal representation. If there was "mutual mistrust" among the people of Fiji, it was the administering Power that had brought it about. The United Kingdom representative should not, therefore, imagine that his views could command the collective endorsement of the Special Committee.

38. In General Assembly resolution 1951 (XVIII), the administering Power was invited "... to achieve the political, economic and social integration of the various communities". Yet the system of tripartite representation would encourage rather than diminish disunity, exemplifying the colonialist maxim of "divide and rule". The administering Power was seeking to accentuate the ethnic origin of the various sections of the population. Of the so-called Indian community, however, 92 per cent had been born in the Territory. They were thus

as much indigenous inhabitants of Fiji as any other group. The purpose of such distinctions was to ensure that the European minority, comprising less than 9 per cent of the population, was enabled to continue its exploitation of the resources of Fiji. The example of Southern Rhodesia was still fresh in the Committee's mind.

39. The United Kingdom representative had suggested that the Special Committee should seek the highest common denominator. The highest common denominator among freedom-loving nations was to be found in the pertinent resolutions of the General Assembly. If the administering Power would apply the principles there enshrined, a free Fiji would arise.

40. The representative of India said that the statement of the representative of the United Kingdom did not add materially to the description of the situation in Fiji and had avoided altogether the responsibility of the administering Power to report on the implementation of the resolutions of the General Assembly. He quoted from a statement of the Secretary-General of the United Nations which, while praising the achievements of the United Kingdom in the field of decolonization, also pointed out the exceptions like Southern Rhodesia which dimmed this record. While agreeing generally with this assessment, his delegation considered that events in Fiji also were a disturbing element which tarnished the record of the administering Power. The lack of any constitutional progress in Fiji, and the apparent determination of the administering Power to avoid its responsibilities under the various resolutions of the General Assembly, constituted - like the situation in Southern Rhodesia - an unhappy exception to the otherwise commendable record of the United Kingdom in the field of decolonization. The recent statements by the United Kingdom representative in the Special Committee showed that the administering Power was unwilling and had failed to implement the provisions of Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV), 1951 (XVIII) and 2068 (XX). It was this essential and crucial failure which prevented the administering Power from making a full and complete statement on the situation in Fiji.

41. In resolution 1951 (XVIII), the administering Power had been invited to work out a new constitution providing for free elections conducted on the principle of "one man, one vote" and the creation of representative institutions. Instead, even after three years, the administering Power had introduced an electoral system

which divided the people of Fiji on communal and racial lines and provided certain entrenched interests, particularly the Europeans, with greater voting powers than the rest of the population - a system reminiscent of that introduced in Southern Rhodesia, and which had enabled the white racist minority to seize power illegally, at the expense of the majority. Hitherto, the Europeans in Fiji had governed in the most absolutist manner. After the so-called electoral reforms, which purported to introduce limited internal self-government, the Europeans and their racial allies, who constituted about 4 per cent of the total population, would hold as many as 30 per cent of the elected seats in the Legislative Council, whereas more than 50 per cent of the population would hold just twelve seats. Again, the complicated cross-voting system was reminiscent of a similar feature in the 1961 Constitution of Southern Rhodesia. Thus the "reforms" were an all too familiar stratagem to perpetuate European minority rule through constitutional devices.

42. The representative of the administering Power had made much of the "conflicting attitudes" of the Fijian and Indian communities - from which the Europeans, as the master community, stood aloof. As the Tanzanian representative had pointed out, however, all the inhabitants of Fiji, irrespective of their racial origins, were Fijians. Thus, it was not proper to refer to the people of Indian origin living in Fiji as the "Indian community". They were Indian only in the sense that their ancestors had been brought to Fiji from the Indian sub-continent, to work there as indentured labour on the European-owned plantations. It was typical of colonial policy that Europeans settling in Rhodesia became Rhodesian, while persons of Indian origin going to Fiji remained Indians. Use of the term "Indian community" was designed to stir up communal hatred, which happily did not exist at the roots.

43. The General Assembly had also invited the administering Power to create representative institutions. The restricted internal self-government granted to a clearly unrepresentative and impotent Legislative Council could scarcely be considered "representative institutions" within the meaning of resolution 1514 (XV). Not only had the people of Fiji neither the shadow nor the substance of real democratic control; the administering Power had announced that there was no possibility of any such developments in the foreseeable future.

44. In the same resolution, the General Assembly had invited the administering Power to endeavour to achieve the political, economic and social integration of the various communities. The scanty information supplied by the administering Power showed that very little had been done in that all-important field. On the contrary, much had been done to divide the people of Fiji on communal and racial lines. That policy, which was nothing new in the history of British colonial administration, could be summed up by the maxim "divide and rule". Wherever the United Kingdom had reluctantly given up control, it had deliberately planted discord to create future difficulties for the newly independent States. It was no accident that, as the Secretary-General had pointed out, all the current peace-keeping operations pertained to problems arising from the process of British decolonization. Yet the administering Power, while applying those time-worn methods to the people of Fiji, wished the Special Committee to believe that the apparatus of division created in the Territory was designed to encourage co-operation and trust among all the people, whatever their ethnic origin, and that experience had shown that such a system could be very effective in bridging divisions between different communities and promoting the growth of national unity. The truth was that such communal differences as did exist had been artificially created and sustained by the administering Power, which was exploiting the tensions thus created in order to cling to its dominions. The history of British colonialism was littered with the experience of broken nations and artificially divided peoples. In Fiji also, the administering Power had created educational institutions and governmental organs based on communal and racial doctrines. In this connexion he referred to the statements of the representative of Chile in 1963 to the Special Committee and of the representative of Ceylon to the Fourth Committee at the twentieth session of the General Assembly.

45. The best way of ascertaining the facts would be for the Special Committee, or one of its sub-committees, to visit the Territory and hold conversations with the rulers and the ruled at all levels. If the administering Power was sincere in wishing the Committee to learn the facts, it should have no objection to such a visit. His delegation, for one, would abide by the findings of such a visiting mission.

46. The Special Committee's report to the General Assembly on the question of Fiji might perhaps be delayed until after the return of the visiting mission. The

Committee might also accede to the request of the United Kingdom representative for longer notice of the Committee's intention to report to the General Assembly on the implementation of resolution 2068 (XX), so that the administering Power could arrange for people with special knowledge of the Territory to participate in the Committee's discussions; the Committee might accordingly take the matter up again after its return from Africa.

47. In conclusion, he stressed that there was no agreement between the Special Committee and the administering Power in the basic assessment of the situation in Fiji. If the Special Committee was indeed to "serve the true interests of the people", it should refuse to condone the administering Power's failure to implement the pertinent resolutions of the General Assembly or endorse the reactionary colonial policy, but should recommend measures for the speedy and complete implementation of resolution 1514 (XV).

48. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that his delegation's attitude towards the question of Fiji reflected its policy of universal support for peoples fighting for freedom and independence. An objective analysis of the situation in Fiji showed that the administering Power was resorting to all kinds of manoeuvres in order to thwart the implementation of the relevant United Nations resolutions.

49. Contrary to the assertions of the representative of the administering Power, an electoral system based on communal rolls and cross-voting did not guarantee equal suffrage or follow the democratic principle of "one man, one vote" and ignored the requests of the General Assembly in that regard. The Constitutional Conference, convened almost five years after the adoption of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, had completely disregarded the purposes and principles of that Declaration and the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly. As stated in the Secretariat working paper (see paragraph 9 above), it had been agreed "that independence was not an issue to be discussed at the London Conference". Since the aims of the Conference were limited, it could not yield any positive results.

50. The Conference had made the representation of the various communities even more unequal. For example, it had recommended that the Legislative Council should include twelve elected Indians and ten elected Europeans, although Fijians of Indian

origin constituted 50 per cent of the population and Europeans only 9.5 per cent. It could thus be seen that the aim of the so-called "constitutional progress" was to give the European voter an advantage over other voters and help him to preserve the interests of the European minority in Fiji. The system of cross-voting, whereby an equal number of seats on the Legislative Council was allocated to communities of differing sizes, was also designed to protect the interests of the European minority. Such an inequitable system of suffrage and representation actually increased the political differences among the communities. The only possible conclusion to be drawn was that the Legislative Council was not elected on a democratic basis, as required by the United Nations resolutions on the question of Fiji.

51. The powers of the Legislative Council, as described in paragraph 19 above were clearly inadequate and the United Kingdom Governor was all-powerful in legislative matters.

52. The Conference had recommended that executive authority should remain formally vested in the Governor, who would continue to appoint the unofficial members of the Executive Council. In addition, the Governor could refuse the advice of the Executive Council if such a refusal was "in the interests of public order, public faith or good government". Thus he also had unlimited executive power.

53. The administering Power was therefore quite wrong to ascribe any positive significance to the Constitutional Conference, which had done nothing to enable the people of the islands to exercise their right to freedom and independence in accordance with the provisions of the Declaration. It was no coincidence that in resolution 2068 (XX) the General Assembly had requested the administering Power to take, as a matter of urgency, measures to repeal all discriminatory laws and to establish an unqualified system of democratic representation based on the principle of "one man, one vote" and had invited it to implement immediately the resolutions of the General Assembly. By a bitter irony of fate, on 16 December 1965 - the date of the adoption of that General Assembly resolution - the recommendations of the Constitutional Conference on Fiji had been approved.

54. The economy of Fiji was characterized by the dominance of foreign monopolies which, having seized key positions, were continuing to plunder the natural resources and mercilessly exploit the people of the Territory. It was the policies of those

monopolies which had produced the one-sided agrarian economy of Fiji. All profits from the Territory's minerals went into the coffers of the foreign monopolies - mainly United Kingdom, United States of America, Australian and New Zealand companies. The large plantations were owned by United Kingdom and other companies, the most important of which were the Colonial Sugar Refinery, the Copra Board and the Banana Board. As a result, the population's level of living remained very low. Workers earned only £3 to £3.5 a week, with a working day of ten to twelve hours. There was no system of social insurance in the colony and educational and health services were in a sorry state.

55. The system of land tenure had made the agrarian problem one of the most burning issues in Fiji and was acquiring increasing political overtones. Most of the land was in the hands either of landowners, who rented it at high prices, or of the powerful foreign companies. Those who worked directly on the land were forced to rent it on exceedingly unfavourable terms. As a result, less than 10 per cent of the land was being used for agriculture, although as much as 72 per cent of the land could be made arable. Since the European sector of the population and particularly the monopolies owned about 375,000 acres of land, the colonial authorities were doing nothing to solve the land problem or to allot land to those who worked it. Both the indigenous Fijians and the Fijians of Indian origin were interested in the speedy solution of that problem. By creating artificial obstacles to a solution, the administering Power was trying to cause new friction between the communities in order to maintain its supremacy in the archipelago. Only a just solution of the agrarian problem would enable the people of Fiji to develop the islands in the interest of the entire population and to fight against the influence of the foreign monopolies. Any delay in that respect would greatly harm the interests of the people of Fiji as a whole and the administering Power would have to bear the responsibility.

56. The colonial Powers had recently come to appreciate still more the value of the Territory. Fiji was of strategic significance, since it was situated at the cross-roads of the transport network in the southern part of the Pacific Ocean. It had well-equipped harbours and first-class airports, which were attracting the attention of the aggressors waging a bloody war against the national liberation movement in South-East Asia.

57. None of the measures recommended by the General Assembly had been implemented by the administering Power. The Special Committee should condemn the attitude of that Power as a violation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence and of subsequent decisions of the General Assembly on the question of Fiji. It should request the administering Power unconditionally to implement all the United Nations recommendations and thus enable the people of Fiji to exercise their inalienable right to freedom and independence.

58. The representative of Sierra Leone recalled that on 5 November 1964 the Special Committee had adopted a resolution on Fiji inviting the administering Power to implement, inter alia, General Assembly resolution 1951 (XVIII), which invited it to work out a new constitution providing for free elections on the principle of "one man, one vote" and the creation of representative institutions, to take immediate steps for the unconditional transfer of all power to the people of the Territory and to endeavour to achieve the political, economic and social integration of the various communities. General Assembly resolution 2068 (XX) had further requested the administering Power to take, as a matter of urgency, measures to repeal all discriminatory laws and to establish an unqualified system of democratic representation based on the principle of "one man, one vote". The administering Power had not stated whether all discriminatory laws had now been repealed.

59. Although the Constitutional Conference held in 1965 had accepted the principle of "one man, one vote", it was regrettable that it had been decided before the Conference that independence was not an issue to be discussed. The fact that all adults in Fiji, regardless of background, were to be enfranchised represented some progress, but that advance was diluted by the fact that there would still be official members nominated by the Governor in both the Legislative Council and the Executive Council. The Sierra Leone delegation would have liked the elections which were to take place later in the year to produce a completely representative Legislative Council, without the four official members nominated by the Governor, and the Council of Ministers, which was later to replace the Executive Council, to be chosen by the elected members themselves rather than by the Governor.

60. In his statement (see paragraphs 32-36 above), the United Kingdom representative had referred to the divisions between the different communities in

Fiji, and had seemed to imply that the unification of the communities could proceed only at a snail's pace. He himself would have appreciated further information on the "racial disharmony" and "mutual mistrust" which allegedly prevailed in Fiji.

61. The objectives towards which the administering Power should work were quite clear: namely, the speedy implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), with particular reference to the provisions of resolution 1951 (XVIII).

62. Three principles had guided the Special Committee's approach to colonial questions: the granting of universal adult suffrage, the affirmation of the indigenous peoples' rights and the adoption of all necessary measures to grant freedom and independence at an early date. Those same principles should guide the Special Committee in the question of Fiji and genuine efforts should be made to overcome any communal divisions and to speed up the process of independence, rather than hampering it by allowing the Governor to place men of his choice in the Legislative Council and the Executive Council. Every effort should be made to unify the population of the Territory, by political, social and educational means, and constitutional barriers to democratic representation should be removed.

63. The representative of the United Kingdom, replying to points raised during the debate, said that he had to reject the entirely false argument advanced by the representatives of Tanzania, India and the Soviet Union that the United Kingdom Government was encouraging communal differences in Fiji for various selfish motives. The truth was precisely the opposite: every endeavour of the United Kingdom Government was directed towards bringing the communities together on a sound basis and preparing a political and constitutional structure which would enable them to live and progress in harmony. The differences between the Indian and the indigenous Fijian communities were a feature of the situation which no administering Power could ignore in preparing the island for constitutional advance. If what he had said earlier about the racial disharmony was insufficient, the detailed information requested by the representative of Sierra Leone was to be found in the working papers for the present and previous years. The United Kingdom Government could not disregard the plain facts of the situation, nor should the Special Committee.

64. With regard to the constitutional position, he had already explained the new system of cross-voting for nine of the thirty-six seats in the Legislative

Council. That innovation was an important step towards racial harmony and a unified electoral system and would not accentuate communal divisions, as had been suggested. On the contrary, nothing was more certain to exacerbate communal divisions than the immediate adoption of a single common roll, as had been proposed by the Indian and Tanzanian representatives. Any anomalies in the representation of the different communities did not result in the domination of any one community over the others. The United Kingdom's policy of working towards political integration by encouraging co-operation and trust between the communities was obviously the right one and his Government intended to pursue it. With the help of all those concerned in Fiji and the goodwill of all those outside Fiji, progress could be made; conversely, partisanship, obstruction and ill will could only be harmful.

65. The allegation that the administering Power was pursuing a policy of "divide and rule" in order to exploit the island's resources was totally unfounded; on the contrary, its policy was to unite the communities and help them to live together in peace. As for the motives attributed to it, he could only say that the aid and assistance which it willingly provided to Fiji far outweighed any benefit which it might receive from trade or investment in the Territory. Far from exploiting Fiji, commercial firms performed an essential service and were welcomed by all the communities; indeed, it was difficult to imagine the economy of Fiji without them.

66. The representative of the Soviet Union had made the curious allegation that Fiji was of some sinister strategic significance to the United Kingdom Government. Certainly the island possessed a good airport and good harbours, of which the representative of the Soviet Union would surely not disapprove, but the United Kingdom had no troops, no naval ships, no military aircraft, bases or installations of any kind in Fiji. The Soviet Union representative had also reversed his usual line by suggesting that, by failing to develop mineral resources and by encouraging the development of agriculture, foreign interests had somehow exploited the people. The fact was that both agriculture and mining were being developed for the benefit of all the people of the islands and the gold exports were a valuable contribution to foreign exchange earnings.

67. He wished to assure the Indian representative that there was no ulterior motive of any sort behind the use of the term "Indian community" to describe that part of the population which was of Indian origin; unfortunately, there was no term which described an inhabitant of Fiji without at the same time describing his ethnic origin. The United Kingdom's objective was to promote political and constitutional progress as rapidly as possible, in order to diminish such emphasis on ethnic origin.

68. The Indian representative had been mistaken in stating that the administering Power had announced that there was no possibility of any "democratic control" in the foreseeable future; the United Kingdom Government's objective was the exact opposite of that. Nor had the United Kingdom announced that it did not intend to accelerate the process of granting freedom and independence to the people of Fiji; that interpretation of the United Kingdom Government's policies was quite unacceptable.

69. The Indian representative's use of the slogan "divide and rule" was completely inapplicable to present or past United Kingdom policies; there were many countries formerly under United Kingdom administration, of which India was one, which clearly demonstrated that different communities could and did live side by side in harmony. The United Nations, and in particular the Special Committee, should look to those as examples to emulate rather than to the few exceptions.

70. The United Kingdom Government's policy was clear, firm and consistent. It was a policy of encouraging co-operation and removing obstacles to trust between the different communities. It was incumbent on those who accused the United Kingdom of secretly pursuing the opposite policy to suggest some credible reason why that should be so. The United Kingdom's objectives in Fiji could not be achieved overnight, but they were clearly defined as progress in the direction of self-government, together with political integration and harmony.

71. The representative of India said that he was glad that the United Kingdom representative had admitted the existence of anomalies in the representation of the various communities; that was the crux of the whole problem. He therefore felt justified in stating that it was the United Kingdom policy to encourage communal differences where they had not existed and to magnify and exploit them where they did.

72. The United Kingdom representative's statement had placed an unfortunate emphasis on communal differences rather than on constitutional reform. The system of cross-voting, which supposedly encouraged communal harmony and would ultimately lead to a unified nation, was not new and had been introduced in other Territories under United Kingdom administration. The United Nations experience of that system in other Territories had not been happy and there was no indication that it would be any different in Fiji. Furthermore, he could not accept the United Kingdom representative's implication that it was wrong to advocate a single electoral roll, since the straightforward principle of "one man, one vote" was the demand, not merely of India alone, but of practically all Members of the United Nations.

73. Because of its appreciation of the commendable record of the United Kingdom in the field of decolonization, the Indian delegation had been reluctant to use the term "divide and rule", but unfortunately past history, including that of his own country, testified to the fact that the United Kingdom had followed a policy of encouraging and exploiting differences between communities in almost all its Territories. With regard to the terms used to describe the various communities in Fiji, he was aware of the unfortunate fact that there was no other way of describing them, but the United Kingdom representative must surely know who was responsible for that fact.

74. With regard to the United Kingdom representative's rejection of his statement that the United Kingdom Government had announced that there was no possibility of democratic control in the foreseeable future, he referred the Committee to the United Kingdom representative's first statement (paragraphs 32-36 above).

75. If the United Kingdom was really sincere in its belief that communal differences in Fiji had existed from time immemorial, that it was doing its best to promote communal harmony in the island and that the introduction of an electoral system on the straightforward basis of "one man, one vote" would have disastrous consequences for the people, then it should agree to a United Nations visiting mission, which would consult representatives of all the communities in Fiji and report its findings to the United Nations. India would be prepared to accept the findings of such an impartial body and he hoped that the United Kingdom Government, too, would agree to do so, since that might be the only means of satisfying the United Nations that its policies were for the good of the people of Fiji.

Unfortunately, there were indications that the United Kingdom Government would not agree to any visiting mission; that refusal spoke for itself.

76. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that his delegation continued to hold the views it had expressed at the previous meeting, since they were based on well-known facts which the United Kingdom representative had not even tried to deny in his statement at the present meeting.

77. His delegation could not regard the United Kingdom statement otherwise than as an attempt to distract the Committee's attention from the main question, namely, how the administering Power was implementing the General Assembly resolutions on the question of Fiji.

78. The United Kingdom representative had tried to give the impression that only he was right and all others who had spoken on the question of Fiji were wrong. It was clear, however, from the proceedings of the General Assembly at its twentieth session that other delegations considered that the administering Powers, particularly the United Kingdom, were resorting to various subterfuges to avoid implementing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence and other General Assembly resolutions on the question of Fiji.

79. If all was well in Fiji, he wondered why the United Kingdom representative did not invite the Committee to send a visiting mission to the Territory to see for itself the political, economic and social conditions prevailing there.

80. The representative of the United Kingdom said that the Indian representative's remarks seemed to be a mere repetition of the earlier Indian statement; a careful reading of the United Kingdom statement might convince the Indian representative that the two countries' objectives in the matter were identical. The Indian accusation that the United Kingdom Government was exploiting communal differences in Fiji to its own advantage was groundless, since the United Kingdom did not and could not derive any advantage from those differences.

81. As for the Soviet Union representative's remark that the United Kingdom seemed to say that it was right and everyone else was wrong, he had studied the three statements made at the 412th meeting of the Special Committee but had failed to find one fact that could support the arguments against the United Kingdom.

82. The United Kingdom was trying to move in a direction which fell within the points of view of two communities which themselves were not going in opposite

directions. His Government's aim was to bring those two communities together in the same direction, and he was convinced that the Committee, on reflection, would consider that direction the right one.

83. The representative of Bulgaria expressed regret that the United Kingdom had not complied with General Assembly resolution 2068 (XX), particularly operative paragraph 4 requesting it to take measures to repeal all discriminatory laws and establish an unqualified system of democratic representation based on the principle of "one man, one vote". The Assembly had found it necessary to make that recommendation because the results of the Constitutional Conference held in the summer of 1965 had been diametrically opposed to all its resolutions on the subject and, in particular, operative paragraph 2 of resolution 1951 (XVIII). The question of the independence of the people of Fiji, as affirmed in operative paragraph 1 of resolution 1951 (XVIII), had been expressly excluded from the agenda of the Conference, and mention not only of independence but even of any idea of internal self-government had been prohibited. The purpose of the Conference and of the recommendations adopted by the participants had been, not to open the way to independence, but simply to make certain adjustments in the United Kingdom colonial system. The participants representing the people of Fiji had been designated on the basis of the old legislative system which favoured one community at the expense of the others and which it was the very purpose of the Conference to amend.

84. The electoral system worked out at the Conference, in violation of the General Assembly's recommendations, divided the population on the basis of community and race and gave the Europeans, who constituted 4 per cent of the population, 30 per cent of the elected seats in the Legislative Council, while the official members to be appointed by the administering Power would also be Europeans. As in Southern Rhodesia and elsewhere, the administering Power had but one goal: to perpetuate political and economic domination by the white minority. The experience of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia had demonstrated that in such cases the European minorities had the same interests as the metropolitan country and that the latter could use those minorities to exploit the wealth of the countries concerned for its own strategic and other purposes. His delegation could not accept the statement made by the United Kingdom representative at the 410th meeting to

the effect that there was no disagreement between the administering Power and other members of the Committee about aims and objectives; the disagreement between them was very considerable and it would persist until the United Kingdom applied the relevant recommendations of the General Assembly, in particular that concerning the principle of "one man, one vote".

85. As the information which the Committee had received about the Territory so far had come almost entirely from the administering Power, he supported the suggestion made by the Indian representative that the possibility of sending a visiting mission to the Territory should be considered.

86. The representative of the Syrian Arab Republic observed that Fiji was one of those Territories on which the United Nations had taken an unequivocal stand in accordance with the provisions of that milestone in contemporary international relations, General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). Yet the administering Power arrogated to itself the right to administer the Territory as it saw fit, regardless of the wishes of the United Nations. The situation raised many fundamental issues, not the least of which was the question how far a Member State - particularly a great Power which had taken an active part in founding the United Nations, had adhered voluntarily to its principles and had pledged without reservation that it would fulfil its obligations - could go in ignoring decisions taken by the world body. Resolution 2068 (XX) had not appointed the administering Power to mediate alleged communal differences in Fiji but had called upon it to repeal all discriminatory laws and establish an unqualified system of democratic institutions based on the principle of "one man, one vote". An unqualified system of democratic representation was urgently needed, not the appointment of an omnipotent foreign Governor holding executive power, appointing members of the so-called Executive Council as he saw fit and having authority to dismiss that Council whenever, in his sole judgement, it acted against the interests of public order, public faith or good government. The Committee would recall that, in a case which was still before it, innocent people had been imprisoned in the name of a similar slogan, i.e., "public safety". In that context safety had clearly come to mean safety to perpetuate colonial rule and the privileges of foreigners. The representative of the administering Power claimed that his Government's policy

in Fiji was aimed at enabling the communities to live and progress in harmony, but the cross-voting system and the division of the electorate on a communal basis might well produce the opposite result.

87. A further point of divergence between the administering Power and other members of the Committee was the possibility that port facilities in Fiji might be turned into military bases. The representative of the administering Power had given solemn assurances that they would not be used for military purposes, but other members of the Committee were justifiably anxious on that score.

88. In view of those divergences, he supported the Indian representative's suggestion that a visiting mission should be sent to the Territory to ascertain what the situation really was. The kind of welcome given it by the administering Power would be the true test of the latter's intentions.

89. The representative of Uruguay said that, while he fully agreed with the position of principle taken by the representatives of Bulgaria and Syria and supported the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), it was essential for the Committee to agree on the facts of the situation in Fiji before it could proceed to debate the legal interpretation of those facts. More specifically, the Committee should base its further discussion on the fullest possible knowledge of the measures taken by the administering Power in pursuance of the resolution on Fiji adopted by the Committee on 5 November 1964 (A/AC.109/105). Only when the Committee had unmistakable evidence of the constitutional developments which had taken place in Fiji to prepare the people for self-determination and independence would it be in a position to assess the future prospects of the Territory. It should ensure that the independent status to be accorded Fiji under its constitution was not merely theoretical, as was the case in Cyprus, which was governed by a constitution imposed on the people as a result of a treaty signed by other Powers. The people of Fiji should be enabled to state in free elections what constitution they desired as the instrument of their self-determination. Since there appeared to be a difference of opinion between the representatives of Bulgaria and Syria and the representative of the administering Power concerning the constitution being proposed by the latter, the Committee would be well-advised not to take hasty action and to clarify the facts of the situation.

90. The representative of Poland said that his country had always supported peoples struggling to liberate themselves from colonial domination. Despite the efforts of the General Assembly and of the Special Committee, the situation in Fiji had not changed much. The administering Power had not implemented General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1951 (XVIII). On the contrary, it was using many devices to delay Fiji's independence and to create a governmental structure which would safeguard British economic and military interests in the future.

91. The main issue at the London Constitutional Conference in 1965 had not been Fiji's independence but how to preserve the inequalities in the representation of the various communities in the Legislative Council. In Fiji, one European vote was equal to six non-European votes and the privileged position of the European minority was further strengthened by the cross-voting system and by the dominant position of the United Kingdom Governor in the Executive Council. The result would be racial antagonism rather than the "social integration of the various communities" recommended in operative paragraph 2 (c) of General Assembly resolution 1951 (XVIII). The United Kingdom representative had stated at the 413th meeting that the administering Power was "preparing the island for constitutional advance towards more representative and more responsible government" but it had shown no sign of implementing the provisions of operative paragraph 2 (b) of General Assembly resolution 1951 (XVIII).

92. He supported the Indian representative's suggestion that a visiting mission should be sent to Fiji to study the situation at first hand. He was prepared to support any other proposals which would speed up the process of decolonization in Fiji.

93. The representative of Chile noted that some progress had been achieved in Fiji, particularly with respect to the introduction of universal adult suffrage. There remained, however, obstacles to full democracy particularly in the form of official members appointed by the Governor both in the Legislative Council and in the Executive Council. Furthermore, there would be a large number of elected representatives in the main communities and one of the members of the Legislative Council would be elected for the first time by all three communities. The new Constitution contained a declaration of rights as well as provisions for the establishment of a ministerial system. However, it was to be regretted that a system of democratic representation based on the principle of "one man, one vote",

had not been established in accordance with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2068 (XX). The continued presence of official members appointed by the Governor both in the Legislative Council and in the Executive Council would impede progress towards democracy in Fiji.

94. His delegation hoped that the United Kingdom would fully implement General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1951 (XVIII). Vigorous action was required to reconcile the existing differences between the various communities. A solution might be found in the establishment of an electoral system based on proportional representation in which all the inhabitants would elect their representatives on a common roll. That would tend to eliminate the differences and animosities and would create, in a more democratic way, a national conscience and a common purpose.

95. It was clear from the results of the Constitutional Conference of 1965 that the administering Power was trying to establish a constitutional framework to give the people of Fiji their internal self-government while at the same time maintaining their ties with the United Kingdom. He hoped that Fiji would achieve unification and integration into a single nation which could properly exercise its inalienable rights to self-determination and independence.

96. The representative of Madagascar said that Fiji had all the qualifications required for the attainment of independence. It was a distinct geographic entity with a population of about 455,000 people. Some countries in Europe, Asia and Africa with a population of like or even smaller size enjoyed their sovereignty, for example, Luxembourg, Iceland, the Maldiv Islands and Gabon. Fiji also possessed the economic potential to enable its population to achieve a fair standard of living. Its highly developed administrative and political structure included a Legislative Council, largely elected by direct suffrage, and an Executive Council.

97. It was surprising therefore that the 1965 Constitutional Conference had discussed only minor aspects of the question of Fiji's attainment of independence. The administering Power seemed to be pursuing a status quo policy which was at variance with the fundamental provisions of the General Assembly resolutions on the Territory. The administering Power was inclined to stress the harm that might be done to various minorities if independence were granted. Thus, it claimed that special treatment should be given to certain minorities and that the

multiplicity of political parties was a sign of internal disunity which would be aggravated by independence. It was said that in a memorandum published in 1964 the National Congress Party had agreed only to the granting of internal self-government to Fiji. Such manoeuvres on the part of minority groups were not unknown to the Special Committee whose concern was to identify a majority capable of governing the country in accordance with the rules of democracy and of securing the political, economic and social integration of the population.

98. He supported the Indian representative's suggestion that a visiting mission should be sent to Fiji to report on the situation there and on the obstacles which stood in the way of Fiji's independence.

IV. ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

99. At the 462nd meeting on 16 August 1966, the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania introduced a draft resolution on Fiji (A/AC.109/L.320) jointly sponsored by Afghanistan, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Madagascar, Mali, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, United Republic of Tanzania and Yugoslavia. It deplored the failure of the United Kingdom to implement the relevant General Assembly resolutions and called upon the United Kingdom Government to adopt certain measures, including the holding of general elections on the basis of one man, one vote, in accordance with the principle of universal adult suffrage for the purpose of forming a constituent assembly which would draw up a democratic constitution. Unless that was done, it would be very difficult for Fiji to achieve racial harmony at a time when the differences between the races were magnified by the administering Power. The United Kingdom Government was also requested to give Fiji a representative government, to fix an early date for its independence and to abolish all discriminatory measures. The draft resolution recommended the appointment of a sub-committee, as originally suggested by the Indian representative, to visit the Territory and report to the Special Committee as soon as possible. He hoped that the Secretariat would be able to provide all the necessary facilities for the sub-committee's visit to Fiji.

100. The draft resolution deserved unanimous support since its provisions represented the minimum which the Special Committee could expect to do for the people of Fiji.

101. The representative of India, speaking in support of the draft resolution, said that it embodied the consensus which seemed to prevail in the Special Committee. Some of its provisions were contained in earlier resolutions. It was time for the administering Power to fix an early date for the granting of independence to the people of Fiji so that they might attain their rightful place in the world of free nations. The administering Power claimed that the new constitutional arrangements were satisfactory but some members of the Special Committee had expressed their doubts. It was therefore necessary to send a visiting mission to study the situation at first hand and report back to the Special Committee.

102. The representative of Australia stressed his country's interest in the Fiji Islands because of their proximity to Australia and referred to Article 73 b of the Charter whereby the administering Powers undertook to help the peoples develop self-government and to take due account of their political aspirations. In Fiji the Special Committee was faced with a special problem because of the heterogeneity of the population. There were 176,000 Fijians of Melanesian origin, the original inhabitants of the islands, 206,000 people of Indian origin, and 36,000 belonging to other races. Between those various groups there were profound differences in race, culture and habits.

103. It was generally realized that in a similar situation the principle of majority rule, which Australia endorsed, was difficult to apply, much more difficult for example, than in New Guinea and Papua where the people, although divided into many tribes, were essentially of Melanesian origin.

104. The draft resolution tried to impose on the peoples of Fiji an oversimplified application of the principle of self-determination. Was the Committee certain that the text was in accord with the wishes and aspirations of the Fijians, as was required in Article 73 b of the Charter? There was nothing to show that the 175,000 Fijians of Melanesian origin wanted independence on the basis suggested in the draft resolution and many of the 205,000 Indians did not want it either.

105. The Committee should not force any Territory to pursue a course of political development which did not reflect its aspirations. He felt that the appeal made earlier by a petitioner from Grenada - "Let us decide" - was also relevant to Fiji.

106. The administering Power had no aim other than to fulfil its obligations in accordance with the provisions of the Charter; it had no reason for wishing to perpetuate colonial status. The allegations to the effect that fortifications had been built on Fiji were ill-intentioned and absurd. He noted that in operative paragraphs 2 and 3 the administering Power was accused of having prevented the Territory from attaining independence and that in operative paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 the sending of a visiting mission was recommended. In his opinion, the Committee should not seek to impose its views on the Government and people of Fiji. It was for them to make a choice in their own time and without outside pressure. His delegation therefore could not support the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.320).

107. The representative of Denmark said that his delegation, although prepared to vote for the draft resolution, wished to express certain reservations, particularly with regard to operative paragraph 3 (c). It was not realistic at the present time to fix an early date for the independence of Fiji; moreover, it was most regrettable that the text contained no reference to the wishes of the population. The people of Fiji unquestionably had an inalienable right to independence, as was stated in operative paragraph 1, but it should not be forgotten that a colonial Territory had a choice of various possibilities, as the relevant United Nations resolutions provided.

108. The representative of the United Kingdom recalled that in its statements of 6 and 13 May his delegation had set out the policy of the United Kingdom Government on Fiji. First of all, it had described the aims and objectives of that policy; secondly, it had shown that there was nothing in those aims and objectives with which any member of the Committee would disagree; thirdly, it had shown that the United Kingdom Government was proceeding towards those aims and objectives at the pace which was best suited to the Territory and to their achievement; and, fourthly, it had refuted the accusations that had been made, including those to the effect that the United Kingdom wished for reasons of its own self-interest, to perpetuate colonial rule in Fiji.

109. He wished, before dealing with the draft resolution, to inform the Committee of what the Colonial Secretary, Mr. Lee, had said to the people of Fiji during a recent visit to the Pacific Territories. Mr. Lee had declared that the Territory had achieved substantial progress towards full economic viability, and representative institutions to match. It was still too early to predict the ultimate constitutional solution for the Territory, but progress should not be determined from outside. The United Kingdom's task, with its experience of centuries of parliamentary democracy, was to help the people of Fiji to forge their common destiny. For that purpose, it was essential to weld together the differing traditions of the peoples of Fiji so as to produce a sense of national identity, making the several communities a single nation. The Colonial Secretary had also stated that the new Constitution would be an efficient and democratic foundation for government during the next few years.

110. His delegation regretted that the draft resolution did not recognize the major steps taken by the United Kingdom Government and that its recommendations ran counter to the policy which alone was likely to achieve his Government's declared objectives. His delegation would therefore vote against the draft resolution.

111. The representative of India said he had found the Australian representative's observations useful; he had particularly appreciated the Australian representative's comment that the Indian community in Fiji regarded that Territory, and not India, as its home. It could not be denied that there were two separate communities in Fiji and that it was not the administering Power which had made them separate. In the Special Committee's opinion, however, the administering Power was doing nothing to weld the two communities together; indeed, it was preventing them from coming together.

112. The representative of Australia had said that in operative paragraphs 2 and 3 the Committee was passing judgement on the administering Power, but surely the Committee was merely doing its duty in passing judgement on situations existing in colonial Territories.

113. The Committee believed that the recommendations it was making were in accordance with the aspirations of the people. If, however, they should prove not to be, the Committee was prepared to revise its stand on the basis of the conclusions of a visiting mission to Fiji. The fact that the administering Power had refused to receive a visiting mission seemed to indicate that it had much to conceal from the Committee.

114. He wished to thank the representative of Denmark, who had said that his delegation was prepared to vote for the draft resolution even though it regretted that no mention had been made of self-determination for the people of Fiji. In reply to the United Kingdom representative, he would point out that it was precisely because the Committee did not approve of the administering Power's policy that it was making the recommendations embodied in the draft resolution. As for Mr. Lee's statements, they had contained references which were not likely to be gratifying to the United Nations and the Special Committee.

115. In conclusion, he urged all members of the Committee to vote for the draft resolution.

116. At its 463rd meeting on 7 September 1966, the Special Committee adopted the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.320) by 20 votes to 3, with 1 abstention.

117. The representative of the United States of America, speaking in explanation of her vote, expressed regret that her delegation had been unable to vote for the draft resolution despite its approval of many of the resolution's aims. The objective of communal harmony and national unity in Fiji was supported by all members of the Committee. However, the resolution appeared to contain conclusions and recommendations which ignored the realities of the situation and the efforts being made to cope with them. It was grossly inaccurate to state that the administering Power had ignored the objectives set out in the United Nations resolutions on Fiji. The primary purpose of the 1965 Constitutional Conference had been to achieve those objectives, and the reforms adopted, which would culminate in the election of a new legislature in the autumn, represented progress in that direction. The Legislative Council would be composed of members elected by the three communities. Leaders could thus emerge who would represent the whole people rather than a single community. Important steps were being taken to eliminate divisions in Fiji. Those steps, and the prospects they opened up, should not be overlooked.

118. Since her delegation did not believe that the measures called for in the draft resolution, including the appointment of a visiting mission, were such as would overcome the Territory's difficulties, it had voted against the resolution.

119. The representative of Italy said that his delegation endorsed the general principles and ideas embodied in the resolution just adopted but had some reservations which had prompted it to abstain. First of all, the criticisms directed at the attitude of the administering Power, and particularly the statement that it had not implemented the General Assembly's resolutions, did not seem to reflect the realities of the situation. The United Kingdom might not have done as much as the Committee would have wished, but it was not correct to say that it was entirely opposed to the aims and purposes of the Special Committee. Secondly, it was important that the Territory's progress towards independence should be accompanied by measures designed to maintain peace and racial unity. The draft resolution, and especially operative paragraph 3, did not take that aspect of the problem sufficiently into account. Lastly, it should have been stated that the sending of a visiting mission would be decided upon in consultation with the administering Power.

120. The resolution (A/AC.109/201) thus adopted by the Special Committee on the question of Fiji at its 463rd meeting on 7 September 1966 reads as follows:

The Special Committee,

Having considered the question of Fiji,

Having heard the statements of the administering Power,

Recalling General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, 1951 (XVIII) of 11 December 1963, 2068 (XX) of 16 December 1965 and 2105 (XX) of 20 December 1965,

Noting with regret that the administering Power continues to ignore the recommendations contained in the various General Assembly resolutions,

1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of Fiji to freedom and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples;
2. Deeply regrets the failure of the administering Power to implement the various resolutions of the Special Committee and the General Assembly concerning Fiji;
3. Calls upon the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, as the administering Power, to implement immediately the following:
 - (a) the holding of general elections on the basis of one man, one vote, in accordance with the principle of universal adult suffrage for the purpose of forming a constituent assembly, which will be charged with the task of drawing up a democratic constitution;
 - (b) the formation of a representative government and transfer of full powers to that government;
 - (c) the fixing of an early date for the granting of independence to the people of Fiji;
 - (d) the abolition of all discriminatory measures so as to foster communal harmony and national unity in the Territory;
4. Decides to appoint a Sub-Committee to visit Fiji for the purpose of studying at first hand the situation in the Territory and to report to the Special Committee as soon as possible;

5. Requests the Chairman to proceed with the appointment of the Sub-Committee as envisaged in paragraph 4 above;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to provide all facilities for the visit of the Sub-Committee to the Territory of Fiji.
