



UNITED NATIONS  
GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY



Distr.  
GENERAL

A/6300/Add.7\*  
25 November 1966

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Twenty-first session  
Agenda item 23

REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE SITUATION WITH REGARD  
TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF  
INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES

(covering its work during 1966)

Rapporteur: Mr. Ala'uddin H. ALJUBOURI (Iraq)

CHAPTERS IX AND X

EQUATORIAL GUINEA (FERNANDO POO AND RIO MUNI)  
AND IFNI AND SPANISH SAHARA

CONTENTS

| <u>Chapter</u>  | <u>Paragraphs</u> | <u>Page</u> |
|---|-------------------|-------------|
| IX. EQUATORIAL GUINEA (FERNANDO POO AND RIO MUNI) . . . . .                               | 1 - 113           | 3           |
| I. ACTION PREVIOUSLY TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL<br>COMMITTEE AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY . . . . . | 1 - 3             | 3           |
| II. INFORMATION ON THE TERRITORY . . . . .  | 4 - 32            | 4           |
| III. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE . . . . .                                     | 33 - 54           | 9           |
| Introduction . . . . .  | 33 - 34           | 9           |
| A. Written petition and hearing . . . . .   | 35 - 42           | 9           |
| B. General statements . . . . .   | 43 - 54           | 11          |
| IV. ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE . . . . .                                       | 55 - 91           | 15          |

\* This document contains the chapters on Equatorial Guinea (Fernando Poo and Río Muni) and Ifni and Spanish Sahara. The General introductory chapter of the report of the Special Committee will be issued subsequently under the symbol A/6300 (Part I). Other chapters of the report are being issued as addenda.

CONTENTS (continued)

| <u>Chapter</u>   | <u>Paragraphs</u> | <u>Page</u> |
|--|-------------------|-------------|
| V. FURTHER CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE . . . . .  | 92 - 94           | 24          |
| Introduction . . . . .   | 92 - 93           | 24          |
| Written petitions . . . . .  | 94                | 24          |
| VI. ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE REPORT OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE ON EQUATORIAL GUINEA . . . . .  | 95 - 114          | 25          |
| ANNEX: REPORT OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE ON EQUATORIAL GUINEA (FERNANDO POO AND RIO MUNI) . . . . .  |                   | 30          |
| X. IFNI AND SPANISH SAHARA . . . . .   | 1 - 243           | 125         |
| I. ACTION PREVIOUSLY TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY . . . . .   | 1 - 3             | 125         |
| II. INFORMATION ON THE TERRITORIES . . . . .   | 4 - 61            | 127         |
| A. Ifni . . . . .  | 4 - 26            | 127         |
| B. Spanish Sahara . . . . .  | 27 - 61           | 129         |
| III. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE . . . . .  | 62 - 115          | 137         |
| IV. ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE . . . . .  | 116               | 154         |
| V. FURTHER CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE . . . . .  | 117 - 191         | 155         |
| Introduction . . . . .   | 117 - 119         | 155         |
| A. Written petitions and hearings . . . . .  | 120 - 164         | 156         |
| B. General statements . . . . .  | 165 - 191         | 169         |
| VI. FURTHER ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE . . . . .  | 192 - 243         | 177         |
| ANNEX: LETTER DATED 8 SEPTEMBER 1966 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF SPAIN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE . . . . . |                   | 189         |

CHAPTER IX

EQUATORIAL GUINEA (FERNANDO POO AND RIO MUNI)

I. ACTION PREVIOUSLY TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE  
AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

1. Following its consideration of Equatorial Guinea (Fernando Poo and Río Muni) at its meetings in 1964, the Special Committee adopted a resolution as contained in its report to the General Assembly at its nineteenth session.<sup>1/</sup> At its meetings in 1965, the Special Committee did not specifically consider this Territory, but included relevant information in its report to the General Assembly at its twentieth session.<sup>2/</sup>

2. At its twentieth session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2067 (XX) of 16 December 1965. In the fifth preambular paragraph of the resolution, the Assembly noted that the Territories of Fernando Poo and Río Muni had been merged and named Equatorial Guinea.

3. In the operative paragraphs of this resolution, the General Assembly:

"1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of Equatorial Guinea to self-determination and independence;

"2. Requests the administering Power to set the earliest possible date for independence after consulting the people on the basis of universal suffrage under the supervision of the United Nations;

"3. Invites the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples to follow the progress of the implementation of the present resolution and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its twenty-first session."

---

<sup>1/</sup> Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annex No. 8 (A/5800/Rev.1), chapter IX.

<sup>2/</sup> A/6000/Add.7, chapter X.

## II. INFORMATION ON THE TERRITORY<sup>3/</sup>

4. The policy of the administering Power, according to the information transmitted, has been to complete the various phases of the process of establishing the autonomous system in accordance with the fundamental laws introducing that régime. The persons who were to discharge the functions of government have been elected and appointed. The original composition of the different organs of government, it is reported, has not yet undergone any change, since these organs are continuing to function for the periods prescribed by the law. The formation of the Territory's leadership was completed during the period under review with the appointment of the delegate of the Autonomous Government in Madrid.

5. In social affairs, it is reported that priority has been given to the co-operative movement, which the administering Power has promoted through long-term credits and housing construction. The work done by the National Housing Institute is reflected in the construction of 1,500 dwellings at a cost of 301 million pesetas.<sup>4/</sup>

6. For appointment to the Labour Judicature and other bodies with competence in labour matters, eight officials who are indigenous inhabitants of the Territory have been selected for office and are at present studying in Madrid.

7. Educational activities during this period have consisted mainly in the establishment of new centres. As far as secondary education is concerned, the secondary schools of Fernando Poo and Río Muni have been established at Santa Isabel and Bata respectively. Teacher-training colleges and industrial apprenticeship schools have been established in the same cities. In the field of primary education, efforts have been concentrated on increasing the number of the teaching staff. As regards educational assistance in the form of scholarships, the policy has been to give preference to higher studies, which cannot be undertaken in Equatorial Guinea. Scholarships have been awarded up to a value of 3.5 million pesetas every year for study in Madrid, Barcelona and other university centres.

8. In the field of public works, it is reported that highways, water supply systems, ports, expressways to Santa Isabel Airport and other projects have been constructed at a total cost for the years 1964-66 of 425 million pesetas.

---

<sup>3/</sup> The information contained in this section has been taken from the information transmitted by Spain on 28 June 1966 under Article 73 e of the Charter.

<sup>4/</sup> The local currency is the Spanish peseta, which is equal to \$US0.0168.



9. In the health field, such endemic diseases as trypanosomiasis, leprosy and malaria have almost disappeared or are under control. A plan for the total eradication of malaria is being put into effect. A member of the Governing Council is responsible for the health services. He is assisted by a Director and a number of physicians.

10. As regards the training of indigenous persons for the public services, it may be noted that the Health Service has a number of indigenous physicians, including the Chief of the Service. Other organs also have indigenous personnel in their top posts. These include, for example, labour inspectors, chiefs of the Special Police Corps and other occupants of senior professional posts. Indigenous personnel, it is stated, represent almost the entire strength in other positions in the public administration.

#### Health services

11. In 1965, 109,730 medical consultations took place at the various health centres and 35,342 sick persons received treatment in hospitals. Of these 10,743 were treated at Santa Isabel Hospital, 5,877 at Bata Hospital and 7,519 at San Carlos Hospital. The surgical staff performed 2,966 operations at Santa Isabel and 1,237 at Bata. There was an increase in the number of operations on victims of accidents. Further assistance was provided by the dental, ophthalmological and child health services. As regards assistance in maternity clinics, the number of births at the Santa Isabel and Bata maternity homes was 2,660 and 906 respectively.

12. The epidemiological picture finds malaria in first place, with 30,000 cases reported. This, it is stated, does not mean an increase in the incidence of the disease, rather in the assistance provided at clinics as a result of the eradication campaign. The number of cases of dysentery was 7,159. Trypanosomiasis control revealed 97 cases, of which almost half were at Puerto Iradier. A total of 393,451 blood tests were necessary to identify these cases. Among children's ailments there was an epidemic of measles this year, with 3,403 cases and a mortality of 1.2 per cent. There were also 2,317 cases of whooping cough, with one death. There were 512 cases of mumps.

13. In the field of preventive medicine, the Health Service organized and carried out a poliomyelitis vaccination campaign, which covered 44,029 persons, and a triple vaccination campaign (tetanus, diphtheria, whooping cough), which covered 86 per cent of the children. The use of an anti-measles vaccine was also begun.

14. The old and inadequate hospital at Concepción has been replaced by a new structure which can hold seventy beds and is provided with the necessary auxiliary services, including, in addition to the hospital building, a community house for the nuns who care for the sick and accommodations for the male nurses.

15. The hospital at Ebebiyín, which is approaching completion, will make it possible very soon to include another new structure in the programme for expanding and renovating the health system.

#### Primary education

16. There are thirty primary schools and 135 elementary schools. The School of Education continues to function. The enrolment at the end of the past year was 21,091 and 1,105 primary education certificates and 1,701 elementary educational certificates were awarded at the end of the course. During the period of autonomy, ten elementary schools have been established.

17. The manning table for substantive and auxiliary personnel in this Department is as follows: one director-inspector; one sub-inspector at Bata; 18 national teachers; 29 primary school teachers; and 350 assistant teachers.

18. The substantive and auxiliary manning table has been increased by thirty-five primary school teachers and forty-five assistant teachers. The present Director-Inspector of the Department is an indigenous inhabitant of Equatorial Guinea, as are the twenty-nine primary school teachers. The latter were trained at the Santa Isabel and Bata teacher-training colleges, which were established in this region. Twenty assistant teachers graduated from the School of Education and are now taking a practical course in the school groups.

19. The school meal and nutrition service is continuing its work, distributing powdered milk in schools as a diet supplement, and the school dining-rooms are still operating.

20. In December 1964 and January and February 1965, holiday camps were operated for the first time in the valley of Moka for four periods of twenty days each, during which school children from Fernando Poo enjoyed the pleasant climate of the valley. These camps were in operation again during the same months of the 1965-66 school year. It is also planned that during the dry season in Río Muni, holiday camps should be maintained for students at schools in the mainland area at a high altitude.

21. In this first stage of autonomy, six education boards have been established in Río Muni in the school districts of Sevilla de Niefang, Valladolid de los Bimbiles, Mongomo, Nsoro de Guadalupe, Acurenam and Puerto Iradier, each being under the direction of a primary school teacher, an indigenous inhabitant of the Territory, who is responsible for co-ordinating the substantive and administrative work of the district's schools with the policies of the Director-Inspector of the Department.

22. During the current year, a primary education act adapted to the educational requirements of the region was drafted by the substantive personnel of the department.

#### Public Works Department

23. Since July 1964, when this department of the Governor-General's administration was transferred to the Autonomous Administration of Equatorial Guinea (more specifically, to the Office of Public Works, Housing and Town Planning), public works projects initiated by the former régime have been completed. These include the construction of the Santa Isabel water supply system, the expressway to the new airport and the Punta Santiago air-and-sea lighthouse. Other highway and water supply projects have been started.

24. Among the projects in progress is the highway round the eastern shore of the island. This new road is of great importance economically, since it passes through the richest cocoa-growing area of Fernando Poo, where there are a large number of small farms and where produce previously had to be transported under uneconomical conditions.

25. In Río Muni, action has been taken to strengthen the road-beds, whose peculiarities, rather than the traffic itself, make them vulnerable to the effects

of tropical rains. The road network has been kept completely open to traffic and today traffic moves quite normally over the whole system.

26. Since the introduction of the autonomous system, the activities of the Housing and Town Planning Office have increased, the "new projects" budget rising from 20 million to 102,826,858.60 pesetas a year. The Office's main tasks are:

- (a) planning and direction of new projects;
- (b) maintenance of official buildings;
- (c) proceedings for the allocation and withdrawal of titles to land;
- (d) administration of official housing.

27. The sums appropriated are intended mainly for educational and health buildings, housing and offices.

28. In the field of education, a teacher-training college for 640 students and a national secondary school for 1,200 students have been built at Bata, and primary and secondary schools with student accommodation are to be built at Mongomo and Basacato del Oeste. The total sum invested in school construction was 30,193,499.56 pesetas.

29. The total sum invested in the construction of housing for civil servants was 27,344,820.75 pesetas.

30. Investment in the Health Service amounted to 14,946,385.35 pesetas. This includes completion of the Concepción and Evinayong Hospitals.

31. The sum of 2,002,586.29 pesetas, or 1.9 per cent of the budget, was allocated to equip offices for the Autonomous Administration, especially the new Health Department where the Governing Council is temporarily housed.

32. The Governing Council was allocated 28,012,688 pesetas for its permanent premises, including the Councillor's residence.

III. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

Introduction

33. The Special Committee considered Equatorial Guinea (Fernando Poo and Río Muni) at its 447th, 451st, 452nd and 454th meetings held in Africa between 15 and 21 June 1966.

34. In a letter dated 16 June 1966 (A/AC.109/185), the Deputy Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations requested permission for a Spanish delegation to be represented at the Special Committee's meetings in Algiers in an observer capacity and to take part in the discussions on Equatorial Guinea. At its 451st meeting, the Special Committee decided, without objection, to accede to this request.

A. Written petition and hearing

35. The Special Committee circulated the following petition concerning Equatorial Guinea:

Petitioner

Mr. Daniel G. Mbandememo'o, representative in the United Arab Republic, Idea Popular de la Guinea Ecuatorial (IPGE), concerning Equatorial Guinea

Document No.

A/AC.109/PET.500

36. At its 447th meeting held in Cairo on 15 June 1966, the Special Committee heard Mr. Mbandememo'o (IPGE).

37. Mr. Mbandememo'o said that the Spanish colonialists and their imperialist friends were spreading various myths about Equatorial Guinea. He felt it his duty to re-establish certain facts. Equatorial Guinea had been a Spanish colony for 188 years. Geographically, it was divided into two Territories of unequal size: Fernando Poo and Río Muni. Fernando Poo covered 2,000 square kilometres and had 55,000 inhabitants, 4,300 of whom were Europeans. Its capital was Santa Isabel, a port which included the small island of Annobón, with an area of seventeen square kilometres. Río Muni covered 26,000 square kilometres and had 300,000 inhabitants, 3,000 of whom were Spanish settlers. It was bounded on the west by the Atlantic Ocean, on the north by the Federal Republic of Cameroon, and on the east and south by the Republic of Gabon. Its principal town was the port of Bata. The small islands of Corisco and Elobeyes were part of its territory.

Equatorial Guinea's natural products were timber, cocoa, coffee, palm oil, cabbage-palms, bananas and coconuts. There were also deposits of gold, petroleum, coal, tasmanite, iron, manganese, uranium and bauxite in the country.

38. In 1959, the inhabitants of Río Muni and Fernando Poo had decided to embark on a struggle against Spanish colonialism. The two secret freedom movements, the Idea Popular de la Guinea Ecuatorial (IPGE) and the Mouvement National de Libération de la Guinée Equatoriale (MNLGE) had been persecuted by the Spanish Government. A great many militant members had been interned; the island of Annobón had been transformed into a concentration camp. In January 1964, the Spanish Government had decided to grant the inhabitants of the country so-called "internal self-government", which had in fact left the former colonial status of Equatorial Guinea unchanged. A referendum on the so-called fundamental law had been used as a pretext for many acts of violence, the colonialist forces having sought to prevent the nationalist activists from speaking to the people. When the Guinean people had nevertheless unanimously voted against that law, the Spanish Government had proceeded to falsify the results. The Guinean nationalists had then demanded that the referendum should be annulled; the Spanish Government had riposted by arbitrarily establishing a supposedly "autonomous" Government, which naturally took its orders from the Spanish authorities. A party similar to the Spanish Falange was founded; the Movimiento de Unión Nacional de la Guinea Ecuatorial (MUNGE), which was in the service of the Western settlers and the petty bourgeoisie. In 1964, that party had been declared the only party in the country and had ordered the imprisonment of the IPGE nationalists on the excuse that the latter had held secret meetings.

39. During that period, assassinations, sentences of exile, expulsion, arbitrary sequestration and tortures had been the daily lot of the Guinean nationalists. The IPGE and the MNLGE had then decided to merge in order better to fight the bloodthirsty colonialists. That decision had been taken in October 1964, the intention being to call the new movement, the Frente Nacional y Popular de Liberación de la Guinea Ecuatorial (FRENAPOL). But in March 1965 the Spanish Government had decided to recognize MNLGE, thereby giving proof of collusion between that party and the administering Power. The IPGE, on the other hand, although far more numerous, had been banned and its followers relentlessly persecuted. That party was still proscribed. It had naturally withdrawn from FRENAPOL, convinced that the leaders of FRENAPOL were the tools of Spanish imperialist policy.

40. The Spanish Government today was harbouring fearsome designs against the Guinean people: 12,000 troops occupied the country and four warships were patrolling off Río Muni and Fernando Poo. The Spanish troops also had parachutist commandos and jet aircraft.

41. Worst of all, the Spanish Government was not only assisted by their NATO allies but were also receiving moral support from certain African countries, which were enabling the Spanish Government to prolong a disgraceful situation. Political refugees from Equatorial Guinea could no longer continue their political struggle against Spanish colonialism and the so-called autonomous government of Equatorial Guinea in some adjacent African countries. Thus, after the military coup d'état which had overthrown Dr. Nkrumah, African liberation movements had been driven out of Ghana by the new régime. At present, ten activists of the IPGE were in Accra prisons. The Ghanaian authorities had recently announced that those ten revolutionaries would be handed over to Spain.

42. Another Spanish manoeuvre had been to try to persuade the rest of the world that the IPGE was a communist movement which preached violence. The IPGE was not a communist party and did not favour violence; but it would use violence if need be to defend the rights, the freedoms and the dignity of the people of Equatorial Guinea. It urgently requested the Special Committee to place the question of Equatorial Guinea on its agenda, to condemn Spanish colonialism in that country, to urge the Spanish Government to grant unconditional independence to the Territory, to appeal to the Ghanaian authorities to release the ten IPGE activists in prison at Accra, to use its influence to convince the African Governments who were members of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) - and more particularly the Governments of Cameroon, Gabon and Nigeria - to allow the IPGE full freedom of action in their countries, in accordance with the resolutions adopted by the Conference of Heads of State of the Organization of African Unity at Accra, and finally to appeal to independent African States and all peace-loving countries to give the IPGE the political, moral and material support it needed to bring about final and complete elimination of Spanish colonialism.

B. General statements

43. The representative of Spain said that it would be redundant to describe once again the situation in equatorial Guinea, its political development and its

constitutional progress. The members of the Committee were aware that it had an autonomous Government. Members of his delegation included Mr. Ondó Edú, President of the Governing Council, and Mr. Gori Molubela, President of the General Assembly. Mr. Ondó Edú was a well-known figure in the United Nations: after being exiled from his country, he had appeared as a petitioner more than four years earlier. He had been repatriated when the Spanish Government had announced the referendum for the establishment of self-government and had conducted his electoral campaign in complete freedom. Since he knew his people well and could express himself easily in his native tongue "fang", he had soon captivated them and they had elected him without hesitation. Mr. Gori Molubela was a person with a profound knowledge of the realities of his country. Mr. Ondó Edú would make a statement at a later stage and he and Mr. Gori Molubela would be glad to explain any points concerning the item under discussion, should the members so request.

44. Spain had nothing to hide in Equatorial Guinea; in order to prove it and to enable the Committee to ascertain the true conditions in the Territory, the Spanish Government would be very pleased if the Committee or a representative group of members could visit Equatorial Guinea to see for themselves what those conditions were. If the Committee could not accept the invitation for the time being because such a visit had not been scheduled, he confidently hoped that it would be able to do so in the near future. The invitation had been extended; it was for the members to decide upon it. He had no doubt that they would realize the importance and significance of the offer.

45. Mr. Ondó Edú, speaking as a representative of Spain, reminded the Committee that in November 1965 he had been present at the meetings of the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly at the twentieth session and had made a statement in his capacity as President of the Governing Council of Equatorial Guinea.

46. He further recalled that years ago, too, he had taken part in the work of the Fourth Committee, but in very different circumstances. He had been a petitioner who was outside his country and had found it necessary, together with his compatriots, Mr. Atanasio N'Dong, Mr. Jesus Oyono and Mr. Itanguino, to arrest the attention not only of the Spanish Government, but of the United Nations in that way. All that was past history. The Spanish Government had finally yielded to the appeal that it should grant self-government to Equatorial Guinea. Once self-government had been granted, he had come to New York, to the twentieth session of



the General Assembly, and had provided full information on the electoral procedures and on the setting up of the Government. All that information appeared in the records of the Fourth Committee and his statement had been published as document A/C.4/656.

47. As head of the Government of Equatorial Guinea, he wished, through the Committee, to convey the most profound gratitude of his Government and people to the General Assembly for its adoption of resolution 2067 (XX). He had been informed of the contents of the resolution by the Spanish authorities. He considered it of particular importance that the United Nations had reaffirmed the right of the people of Equatorial Guinea to self-determination and independence, but he would be lacking in fairness if he failed to point out - in observance, as he had told the Fourth Committee on 9 November 1965, of that one very simple axiom he had learnt, inter alia, from his teachers, past and present, namely noblesse oblige - that a member of the Spanish Government had informed him, in his capacity as President of the Governing Council, that it was the stated, official intention of the Spanish Government that Equatorial Guinea should choose its own political course when it so desired, that is, total independence if it regarded that as the best solution for its problems.

48. It followed that, having accepted the principle of self-determination, there was nothing to prevent Equatorial Guinea from asking for independence if it so desired. In that connexion, he wished to inform the Committee that, while his people manifestly shared that aspiration, he still felt that, as he had said in November 1965, it was essential and advisable to go through a preparatory stage and it was to that end that he had asked the Committee to help and support them and to give them assistance. Equatorial Guinea needed technical and economic assistance; it needed the aid of the International Bank for its development. It was easy enough to promote independence but it was very difficult to survive once independence had been attained. It was inadmissible that such a noble aspiration should be exploited by demagogues.

49. The elected representatives of the people of Guinea had certain responsibilities towards the people; they were bound by those responsibilities and could not evade them.

50. Those responsibilities were basically concerned with the desire to consolidate independence and future development in Equatorial Guinea on the basis of sound

social and economic realities. He did not want his country, once independence had been achieved, to be exposed to economic penetration by any foreign Power; that would be a real form of neo-colonialism as evil as political penetration and more difficult to control.

51. He reiterated that he wanted independence, even immediate independence, but it was necessary for Equatorial Guinea to go on preparing for it, so that when independence came it would be in a position to survive and to withstand situations likely to frustrate independence. That was what it wanted from Spain and what he hoped the General Assembly would consider at its twenty-first session.

52. There was no doubt that Guinea had certain problems, but responsibility for resolving them lay with those who had been freely elected by the people of Guinea. A compatriot who was still living outside the country had appeared before the Committee several times. Guinea was now a self-governing Territory which enjoyed freedom of action and there was nothing to prevent any Guinean from coming back to work for the future of his country. He, for his part, would like them to do so.

53. He was certainly not trying to hide anything from the United Nations or from the Committee which had been entrusted with the task of ensuring decolonization. Consequently, his Government had been particularly pleased about the invitation extended by the representative of Spain for the Committee to visit Equatorial Guinea, where it could see what the actual situation was and suggest what it regarded as the best solutions, which would be given careful study.

54. If the members of the Committee wanted any further particulars, the President of the Assembly, the representative parliament constituted by the people through elections which the United Nations had recognized as free and fair, was entirely at their disposal.

IV. ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

55. At the 452nd meeting, the representative of Syria, introducing a draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.314), co-sponsored by Afghanistan, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, United Republic of Tanzania and Yugoslavia, said that the question of Equatorial Guinea fell within the scope of General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 and 2067 (XX) of 16 December 1965. The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, contained in the former resolution, was not only a progressive step in the history of the United Nations, but a turning point in human and international relations. By it the people of Equatorial Guinea had found recognition of their legitimate right to self-determination and independence and the acknowledgement of their irrevocable right to live freely and enjoy full sovereignty over their Territory and resources. In that light the administering Power had been requested to establish the earliest possible date for independence on the basis of universal suffrage, under United Nations supervision.

56. The substance of the problem was to accelerate preparations for independence of the Territory so that its effective proclamation would not be delayed. Every effort must be deployed to overcome any problems arising in that regard, and it would appear that the administering Power had had that purpose in mind when it had taken the initiative of inviting the Special Committee to send representatives to visit the Territory and familiarize themselves with the preparations being made.

57. It was with those considerations in mind that the Afro-Asian group and Yugoslavia had submitted the draft resolution under consideration, which he presented to the Committee paragraph by paragraph. The co-sponsors hoped that all members of the Committee would support it.

58. The representative of Sierra Leone said that he was gratified by the Spanish offer for the Special Committee to visit Equatorial Guinea and examine conditions there. He was also glad to note that the invitation had come in the proper manner from the administering Power itself. That attitude was encouraging.

59. General Assembly resolution 2067 (XX) had specifically requested the administering Power to set the earliest possible date for independence after the holding of elections by universal suffrage under United Nations supervision. So far, however, the administering Power had not acceded to that request. The Committee had been told that the Territory was not ready for independence; but paragraph 3 of the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.314) gave the administering Power a little more

/...

time to meet the General Assembly's request. By the time the proposed sub-committee was ready to visit the Territory, it was hoped that the administering Power could give an indication of the date when independence could be expected. The Committee had been invited by the General Assembly to follow the progress made in the implementation of resolution 2067 (XX) and to report to the General Assembly as early as possible.

60. His delegation was honoured to be able to endorse the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.314). He hoped that the Committee could adopt it unanimously, for the proposals it contained represented an extension of resolution 2067 (XX), which had been adopted by 103 votes to none, with 2 abstentions.

61. The representative of Chile expressed his appreciation of the statement by the representative of Spain. The Chilean delegation could only commend the work of the Spanish Government to promote the process of decolonization in the Territories still under its administration. In so many other cases administering Powers had constituted a barrier to the Committee's progress, and had blocked the road to independence. The co-operative attitude manifested by Spain had stemmed from its awareness that colonialism could not continue in the twentieth century and that, consequently, every remaining Territory must move rapidly towards independence. An autonomous Government had taken over in Equatorial Guinea once the way had been prepared by the administering Power. Such a favourable set of circumstances appeared unusual by contrast with the unco-operative policies adopted by other Governments. Spain had just invited the Special Committee to send a mission to visit Equatorial Guinea - an unprecedented and exemplary action which should be imitated by other administering Powers. The Committee should accept the invitation and profit from the occasion to elaborate and adopt specific plans of action.

62. Since the draft resolution prepared by the Afro-Asian group and Yugoslavia on Equatorial Guinea (A/AC.109/L.314) contained the acceptance of Spain's invitation and the decision to send a sub-committee to Equatorial Guinea as soon as practicable, he hoped that quick action would be taken to implement that decision.

63. Referring to operative paragraph 2, he called upon the Committee to bear in mind the statement by Mr. Ondó Edú, which had been greatly appreciated. Chile warmly supported the draft resolution.

64. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania expressed appreciation of the administering Power's attitude. He was convinced that if others followed its example, the Special Committee's work would be greatly facilitated.

65. Despite his pleasure at the progress made in Equatorial Guinea, he felt disappointed that its population had not yet been prepared for complete independence. In his view, their self-determination had been delayed too long. Nevertheless, he wished to assure the people of Equatorial Guinea that independence would not mark the end of the close co-operation between them and the people of his country, but rather a new beginning. It was therefore in the interest of every people, and in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) that the day of freedom should dawn as soon as possible.

66. While appreciative of the unprecedented invitation extended by the administering Power to the Special Committee, he considered it essential that certain preliminary steps should be taken to ascertain Spain's willingness to co-operate to the fullest extent. First, the Committee should call upon Spain to repatriate any political exiles or refugees who wished to return to Equatorial Guinea. Their presence would be of value not only to the Committee during its mission, but also to the young nation throughout its preparation for independence. Secondly, no obstacles should be allowed to prevent petitioners or political prisoners from testifying before the Committee during its stay. Lastly, the administering Power should do its utmost to promote the fullest implementation of the Committee's recommendations. If Spain accepted those conditions, it would facilitate the task to be performed and create new and stronger links between the administering Power and the Special Committee. The latter, for its part, would ensure that all possible measures would be sought to carry out decolonization in a peaceful, constructive manner. He reiterated his thanks to the Spanish Government for its co-operation, and expressed the hope that when the Committee's recommendations were approved, Spain would apply all the measures that had been adopted.

67. The representative of Ethiopia felt no need to reiterate his whole-hearted support of the resolution (A/AC.109/L.314) of which his delegation was a co-sponsor. Rather, he wished to mention the great interest with which he had listened to the statement of the Spanish Ambassador. He welcomed with satisfaction Spain's invitation to a sub-committee in order that it might discern at first hand the realities of the situation in Equatorial Guinea. Spain had acted wisely in taking that step, and must be encouraged to make a similar approach to every avenue of

/...

co-operation leading to the final goal of statehood for its Territories. For that reason the Ethiopian delegation was particularly pleased to note the Special Committee's unreserved acceptance of Spain's invitation, and hoped that it would be taken at face value with no hint of suspicion about the possible motives lying behind it. The important consideration would be to ensure that all necessary facilities were provided by the administering Power in order that the sub-committee's work might produce maximum results.

68. He voiced the hope that other administering Powers, especially Spain's neighbour, Portugal, would extend similar invitations. The situation resulting from the latter's refusal to co-operate with the Special Committee, the Secretary-General or the General Assembly, had given rise to a deplorable situation which seriously hampered the Committee's work. With the inhabitants of Portuguese Territories up in arms, the administering Power should at last consent to take the obvious and inevitable steps towards granting their independence.

69. The representative of the United States of America expressed appreciation of the statements made by members of the Spanish delegation. She was gratified to know that the people of Equatorial Guinea would have the opportunity to decide their own future, with a full range of choice, unlimited by predetermining arrangements made from outside. Her delegation welcomed and whole-heartedly supported the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.314).

70. The representative of Australia announced his delegation's support of the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.314). If he had found it necessary to note that the document was deficient in some respects, he had been prompted by objective considerations and **not** by the opposition on certain matters which he had vigorously stated to the Spanish Government in the past. Firstly, the draft resolution had failed to commend Spain for its new enlightened approach and for the reforms it had recently instigated with a view to giving the people a greater voice in the affairs of their country. It must be recognized that the administering Power had refused in the past - and to some extent still refused - to recognize the contribution of people like Mr. Ondó Edú who had protested against its former policies. Operative paragraph 3 implied prejudgement of a situation which should have been evaluated by on-the-spot observers who were capable of discovering what the people really wanted. Having simply wished to note those weak points, he associated himself with others in support of the resolution.

71. The representative of Venezuela said that he had been very pleased to see the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.314) on Equatorial Guinea. The President of the Government of Equatorial Guinea, Mr. Bonifacio Ondó Edú, had given the Committee an account of conditions in the Territory on the preceding day. Once again, Spain was coming before the Special Committee and stating its intention of implementing General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and all the other resolutions which had the same objective. In so doing, Spain was taking a further step along the course which the Committee had set itself. Spain hoped that the Special Committee would set up the sub-committee referred to in the draft resolution, and it was even inviting members of the Committee to make an on-the-spot inspection of conditions in the Territories. That attitude was in keeping with Spanish tradition and it did honour to Spain. He regretted, however, that operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution did not mention the fact that the Committee had heard President Bonifacio Ondó Edú, in his capacity as a petitioner, tell them what he thought of conditions in Equatorial Guinea. Nevertheless, he would vote in favour of the text submitted to the Committee, and he earnestly hoped that the Special Committee would decide to set up a sub-committee, as soon as practicable, to visit Equatorial Guinea with a view to seeing how Spain was implementing resolution 1514 (XV) and the other pertinent resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

72. The representative of Iran welcomed Spain's invitation, which showed that it had nothing to hide from the Committee. He hoped that Spain's example would be followed by other administering Powers and that the enhanced co-operation between Spain and the Special Committee would effectively promote the conditions required for the people's self-determination. Any requests for aid from United Nations specialized agencies should be given full consideration by the visiting sub-committee.

73. The representative of Iraq wished to add his voice to others raised in approval and support of the draft resolution on Equatorial Guinea (A/AC.109/L.314). Spain's example should be followed by other administering Powers that had refused the visit of Special Committee missions despite numerous requests contained in resolutions and recommendations. The high esteem enjoyed by Spain in the Arab world and in Africa would certainly be underscored by the new step it had taken.

74. The representative of Afghanistan said that his delegation's views were reflected in the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.314), of which it was a co-sponsor. The importance of the draft resolution lay in the fact that it marked a significant trend away from the traditional unco-operative tactics of administering Powers. He hoped that the proposed visit would speed up the implementation of General Assembly resolutions 2067 (XX) and 1514 (XV), with regard to the granting of independence to Equatorial Guinea.

75. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that he did not share the enthusiasm of some delegations, who apparently considered that Spain had rendered a signal service to the Special Committee by inviting some of its members to visit Equatorial Guinea. General Assembly resolutions 2105 (XX) and 2067 (XX) concerning the date on which Territories under colonial domination should recover their independence had not yet been implemented. The same was true of the resolution on Ifni and "Spanish" Sahara. The fact was that Spain, with the collusion of other countries, was scheming to retard the implementation of the General Assembly resolutions which would lead to its quitting African soil.

76. He supported the statement made by the representative of Tanzania; all the petitioners who might wish to address the sub-committee must be allowed to do so. Political prisoners must be released and exiles must be allowed to return home. All of them must be allowed to express their views to the sub-committee and to the people, and to engage in political activities.

77. He emphasized the importance of operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.314) and recalled that Australia had regretted the restrictive definition of the powers of the sub-committee, which in fact should work to implement the resolutions of the General Assembly. In any event, if the sub-committee's work was to be of any value, representatives of countries which were in connivance with the colonialists must not be allowed to participate.

78. At its 454th meeting, on 21 June 1966, the Special Committee adopted the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.314) by a roll-call vote of 22 to none as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Australia, Bulgaria, Chile, Denmark, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Venezuela and Yugoslavia.

Against: None.



79. The text of the resolution (A/AC.109/186) on Equatorial Guinea (Fernando Poo and Río Muni) adopted by the Special Committee at its 454th meeting on 21 June 1966 reads as follows:

"The Special Committee,

"Having considered the question of Equatorial Guinea,

"Having heard the statements of the administering Power and of a petitioner,

"Recalling General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960,

"Recalling further General Assembly resolution 2067 (XX) of 16 December 1965,

"1. Notes with satisfaction the open invitation made to it by the administering Power to visit Equatorial Guinea;

"2. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of Equatorial Guinea to self-determination and independence;

"3. Decides to send to Equatorial Guinea, as soon as practicable, a sub-committee to ascertain the conditions in the Territory with a view to speeding up the implementation of General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 2067 (XX);

"4. Decides to maintain the question of Equatorial Guinea on its agenda."

80. After the vote was taken, the representative of Spain said that the Spanish Government appreciated the Special Committee's acceptance of its invitation, and had noted with special gratitude the interventions of the representatives of Chile, Ethiopia, Tanzania, the United States of America, Australia, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (who, although not completely in agreement with the formulation of the resolution, had emphasized the solidarity of his people with the people of Spain).

81. He had taken particular note of the request made by the representative of Tanzania for the repatriation of exiles to Equatorial Guinea. That request had reiterated the words of Mr. Ondó Edú who two days earlier had urged the Committee to ensure that petitioners and political prisoners be allowed to appear before the sub-committee during its mission. The Spanish representative had, however, to remind the Committee that there were no political prisoners. Members' unawareness of that fact was not the fault of the Committee, but it could be remedied by first-hand acquaintance with the situation.

82. Regarding the circulation of information, he pointed out that the deadline of 15 June 1966 had been adhered to and that a report was being prepared by the administering Power, in compliance with Article 73 e of the Charter on Territories under Spanish administration.

83. Before commenting upon the resolution, he wished to express his satisfaction at the Special Committee's acceptance of the administering Power's open invitation to visit Equatorial Guinea.

84. Reference had been made in the preamble to the presence of a petitioner. His delegation pointed out that when it had learnt that the question of Equatorial Guinea had been placed on the agenda for the Algiers meeting, it had made plans to be present at the discussions. It had not known in Cairo that a petitioner would be appearing before the Committee. Although it did not attach major importance to the matter, it did feel compelled to state its reservations on the procedure that had been followed. It was known that according to Chapter XI of the Charter, petitioners from Non-Self-Governing Territories were not authorized to be present. If, however, the provisions of Chapters XII and XIII had been considered to supersede those of Chapter XI, by their reference to non-metropolitan Territories, the change might have merited being put to the vote. In the past, his delegation would in similar circumstances have asked that a vote be taken, and it might have done so once again, but would instead merely request that its reservations be placed in the record.

85. In connexion with operative paragraph 2, he recalled that his Government had recognized the right of its Territories to self-rule and independence long before the United Nations had made any recommendations to that effect. In view of his Government's known position and in view of the fact that an autonomous Government had been set up, he felt that the reaffirmation contained in paragraph 2 was unnecessary.

86. The reference in operative paragraph 3 to speeding up the implementation of General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 2067 (XX) prompted his delegation to remind the Special Committee that the administering Power had nothing to hide, a fact which was substantiated by its offer to receive an investigating sub-committee in that Territory. The invitation had not been extended with the sole purpose of speeding up the implementation of the relevant resolutions, but rather in order to

enable the sub-committee effectively to evaluate the real situation. No conclusions could be reached or even outlined in advance: if they were, it would serve no useful purpose to visit the Territory.

87. Finally, his delegation knew perfectly well that when the President of the Governing Council of Equatorial Guinea had taken office, he had done so in the name of Spain but with authority vested in him by the people through universal suffrage. The same had been true for Mr. Gori Molubela, President of the Assembly. Provision for their election had been made in the Law of Self-Determination which had also conferred upon the Territory the name of Equatorial Guinea appearing in the resolution. Those facts furnished further proof of the United Nations acceptance of the Law of Self-Determination, in connexion with which the Fourth Committee had in November 1965, upon the request of Mr. Ondó Edú, ordered that the address of the President of the Council of Government of Equatorial Guinea be circulated as a document of the General Assembly. He thanked the Special Committee once again for the recognition it had given the work done by the administering Power, and requested that his statement be included in the Committee's records.

88. The Chairman said that it had always been the Special Committee's practice to hear petitioners from countries on its list anywhere, and that it had accordingly heard a petitioner on Equatorial Guinea in Cairo.

89. The representative of Poland said that he had listened with regret to the statement by the representative of Spain, and considered his attitude to be retrograde. It would be useless for the sub-committee to visit the Territory if it could not hear petitioners.

90. The representative of Spain said there was no question of the administering Power wishing to interfere in the sub-committee's work, but that it was his delegation's right, representing as it did a Member State of the United Nations, to state a reservation.

91. At its 460th meeting, the Special Committee, on the proposal of the Chairman, decided that the Sub-Committee on Equatorial Guinea should be composed of the representatives of Chile, Denmark, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria and the United Republic of Tanzania.

V. FURTHER CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

Introduction

92. The Special Committee further considered Equatorial Guinea (Fernando Poo and Río Muni) at its 482nd meeting held at Headquarters on 18 November 1966. The Committee had before it the report of the Sub-Committee on Equatorial Guinea (Fernando Poo and Río Muni), which is annexed hereto.

93. In letters dated 14 and 17 November 1966<sup>5/</sup> the Permanent Representatives of Cameroon and Spain requested permission for delegations of their respective countries to participate in the discussion of the question of Equatorial Guinea. At its 482nd meeting the Special Committee decided, without objection, to grant these requests.

Written petitions

94. The Special Committee circulated the following additional written petitions concerning Equatorial Guinea:

| <u>Petitioner</u>   | <u>Document No.</u>    |
|---|------------------------|
| Three petitions from Mr. Jesús Mba Ovono, Secretary-General, <u>Idea Popular de la Guinea Ecuatorial (IPGE)</u> , concerning Equatorial Guinea (Fernando Poo and Río Muni)  | A/AC.109/PET.500/Add.1 |
| Petition from Idea Popular de la Guinea Ecuatorial (IPGE) concerning Equatorial Guinea (Fernando Poo and Río Muni)  | A/AC.109/PET.500/Add.2 |
| Two petitions from Mr. Pastor Torao Sikara, President General, and other members of the <u>Movimiento Nacional de Liberación de la Guinea Ecuatorial (MNLGE)</u> concerning Equatorial Guinea (Fernando Poo and Río Muni) | A/AC.109/PET.529       |
| Petition from the <u>Ccmité del Exterior, Movimiento Nacional de Liberación de la Guinea Ecuatorial (MNLGE)</u> , concerning Equatorial Guinea (Fernando Poo and Río Muni)  | A/AC.109/PET.529/Add.1 |

5/ A/AC.109/213, A/AC.109/215.

VI. ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE REPORT OF  
THE SUB-COMMITTEE ON EQUATORIAL GUINEA (FERNANDO POO  
AND RIO MUNI)

95. At the 482nd meeting, the Chairman of the Special Committee, speaking as Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Equatorial Guinea, introduced the Sub-Committee's report (see annex). Pursuant to the resolution adopted by the Special Committee at its 454th meeting (see para. 79 above), the Sub-Committee had visited Madrid and Equatorial Guinea in August 1966, and had had an opportunity to talk both to Spanish Government officials and to a large number of bodies and individuals in Equatorial Guinea. Section I of the report gave information on the Territory, sections II and III an account of the discussions and consultations during the Sub-Committee's visits to Spain and to the Territory, and section IV the Sub-Committee's conclusions and recommendations. He was happy to report that, thanks to the spirit of compromise shown by all its members, the Sub-Committee had been able to adopt the report unanimously. He commended it to the Special Committee.

96. The representative of Spain said that the Territory of Equatorial Guinea, although remote from Spain geographically, was very close to Spain's heart, being the only area in Equatorial Africa where Spanish was spoken and Spanish customs were to be found. The people of the Territory were now preparing for a most important step in their history, but at the same time they did not wish to break their ties with Spain and were anxious to continue to receive Spanish assistance.

97. In inviting the Special Committee to visit the Territory, Spain had been aware that such an invitation represented a decisive step in the Committee's work. The appreciation expressed by the Sub-Committee for Spanish co-operation in the process of decolonization was gratifying, but Spain would have liked the Sub-Committee to give greater attention to Spain's achievements in the Territory.

98. He was not able to discuss the Sub-Committee's report in substance since his delegation had only just received the text and neither the Spanish Government nor the Autonomous Government of Equatorial Guinea had had an opportunity to study it. He would, however, make some preliminary comments. He wished first to pay a tribute to the Sub-Committee for its achievement in submitting such a detailed

report as the result of such a brief visit. His delegation was not in agreement with the recommendation regarding the fixing of a date for independence, although it was true that paragraph 29<sup>4</sup> recognized that the fixing of a date must depend on the outcome of talks between representatives of the population and the Spanish authorities. Spain considered that it was for the population, in the exercise of self-determination, to fix the date for independence if it so wished.

99. Although he was surprised that greater importance had sometimes been given to unrepresentative groups and individuals than to the elected authorities, he had the impression that the Sub-Committee had been able to appreciate the qualities of those elected authorities. He was also surprised by suggestions that there was no freedom of political activity, since the members of the Sub-Committee had had an opportunity to verify the existence of political parties in the Territory.

100. He had read with interest the Sub-Committee's views concerning the maintenance of the unity of the Territory; it was because Spain favoured such unity that it had granted self-government to Equatorial Guinea as a single entity. He wondered, however, whether the report perhaps minimized some of the problems in that regard.

101. The importance attributed to the powers of the Commissioner-General and the suggestion that autonomy was fictitious were, in his view, refuted by the report itself. The members of the Sub-Committee had had an opportunity to verify that the supposed wide powers of the Commissioner-General did not exist in practice. He would also have like to see a reference to the high level of economic, social and educational development in the Territory, considered in relation to that of the region in which it was situated.

102. With regard to criticisms which might be directed at constitutional arrangements in the Territory, he wished to point out that the terms of the Basic Law establishing the régime of autonomy had been worked out in agreement with representatives of the inhabitants and had been the subject of a referendum in which all adult inhabitants, male and female, had participated. The Basic Law allowed for amendment through established procedures. Above all, it enabled the inhabitants to exercise the right of self-determination and to decide upon their own future.

103. The representative of Mali considered that the conclusions and recommendations of the Sub-Committee were of great importance. His delegation also attached

importance, however, to the fact that the Territories of Fernando Poo and Río Muni had been united under the Basic Law to form the Territory of Equatorial Guinea. Consequently, although he agreed with the recommendation in paragraph 301 of the report concerning the speedy transfer of all powers to the people, he thought that it should be made clear that, in accordance with the Basic Law, it was the united Territory of Equatorial Guinea which was to accede to independence.

104. The representative of Australia said that his delegation considered that the fact that the Sub-Committee had been invited by the Spanish Government to visit the Territory was to Spain's credit. He commended the Sub-Committee for its diligence and realism; in general, it would be hard to find fault with its conclusions and recommendations. His delegation attached particular importance to paragraph 304, in which the introduction of an electoral system based on universal adult suffrage was recommended. With regard to paragraph 301, he took it that the recommendation for the fixing of a date for independence not later than July 1968 was qualified by the words "in response to the wishes of the people". His delegation would hope that the date would be fixed by representatives of the people, elected on the basis of "one man, one vote", in consultation with the Spanish authorities. He would have preferred no time-limit to have been indicated in the paragraph and the matter to have been left entirely to the representatives of the people.

105. The representative of Iran said that the Sub-Committee was to be congratulated on the thorough study it had made of the question of Equatorial Guinea. In view of the fact that the Sub-Committee had adopted its report by unanimous vote, he proposed that the Special Committee should decide to adopt the report and to endorse the conclusions and recommendations on the understanding that the observations and reservations of delegations would be included in the record of the meeting.

106. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania welcomed the spirit of co-operation shown by the administering Power and the restraint with which the Spanish representative had expressed his views on the report. With regard to the Australian representative's remarks, he wished to make it clear that the question of fixing a date for independence had been raised by people interviewed by the Sub-Committee in the Territory; that was why the reference to "the wishes of the

people" had been included in paragraph 301. He fully agreed that it was the wishes of the people of Equatorial Guinea which must be decisive; the people were naturally free to change their decision, though he certainly hoped that they would not decide that they did not want independence by July 1968. In view of the pressure of time, the details of the question could be left for discussion by the Fourth Committee, including the point raised by the representative of Mali. In the meantime he would support the proposal of the representative of Iran.

107. The representative of Denmark said that, as a member of the Sub-Committee he wished to express his appreciation of the co-operation that Spain had given the Sub-Committee. The recommendation concerning the date for independence had been the subject of protracted discussions in the Sub-Committee and his delegation had had some hesitation about it, but it had accepted the inclusion of the recommendation in view of the reference to the wishes of the people. The mention of a date had been made in response to wishes expressed by the inhabitants, for it had been the clear impression of the Sub-Committee that the overwhelming majority of the people wanted independence not later than July 1968.

108. The representative of the United Kingdom said that he did not object to the Iranian proposal. His delegation, not having had time to study the report, was not in a position to express views on it, but would not wish for that reason to hold up the Special Committee's decision.

109. The representative of the United States of America said that he too had no objection to the Iranian proposal. His delegation wished to express its appreciation of the hard work done by the Sub-Committee and of the co-operation given by the Spanish Government. He wished to record his delegation's reservation regarding paragraph 301, for similar reasons to those expressed by the Australian representative, and regarding paragraph 309.

110. The representative of Madagascar supported the views expressed by the representative of Mali and asked for the inclusion in paragraph 301 of a phrase to the effect that it was understood that independence would be granted to Equatorial Guinea as a single entity, in accordance with the Basic Law and the resolutions of the United Nations.

111. The representative of Venezuela said that he could accept the Iranian proposal but wished to state that his delegation had not had an opportunity to



study the report and therefore reserved the right to raise points in connexion with it in the Fourth Committee.

112. The representative of Cameroon said there were many historical and traditional bonds between his country and Equatorial Guinea and many ethnic groups common to both. His delegation was therefore particularly grateful for the statements in favour of their emancipation.

113. The proposal by the representatives of Mali and Madagascar for an addition to paragraph 301 of the Sub-Committee's report (see annex) did not constitute an amendment to the report. The addition to that paragraph would lay stress on the contents of paragraph 291, which made it clear that only a small minority among the Bubis of Fernando Poo and certain vested interests tended to favour the separation of Fernando Poo and Río Muni. The majority of the population of Equatorial Guinea unquestionably wanted their country to become independent as a single State.

114. At the 482nd meeting on 18 November 1966, the Special Committee decided to adopt the proposal of the representative of Iran. By this decision, the Special Committee adopted the report of the Sub-Committee on Equatorial Guinea (see annex), and endorsed the conclusions and recommendations contained therein, it being understood that the observations and reservations made by members would appear in the record.

ANNEX\*

REPORT OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE ON EQUATORIAL GUINEA  
(FERNANDO PO AND RIO MUNI)

Rapporteur: Mr. Rafic JOUEJATI (Syria)

CONTENTS

|  | <u>Paragraphs</u> |
|--|-------------------|
| INTRODUCTION . . . . .   | 1 - 13            |
| I.    INFORMATION ON THE TERRITORY . . . . .                   | 14 - 77           |
| II.   DISCUSSIONS WITH OFFICIALS OF THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT . . | 78 - 120          |
| III.  CONSULTATIONS WITH THE PEOPLE OF THE TERRITORY . . . . . | 121 - 285         |
| IV.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . .                 | 286 - 310         |
| V.   ADOPTION OF THE REPORT . . . . .                          | 311               |

APPENDICES

- I.    ITINERARY AND PROGRAMME OF MEETINGS
- II.   REPRESENTATIVES OF CORPORATIVE BODIES AND CO-OPERATIVES  
      ELECTED TO MUNICIPAL COUNCILS
- III.  REPRESENTATIVES OF HEADS OF FAMILIES ELECTED TO MUNICIPAL  
      COUNCILS
- IV.  BREAKDOWN OF ELECTORATE (HEADS OF FAMILIES) AT MUNICIPAL  
      COUNCIL LEVEL IN 1964

---

\* Previously issued under the symbol A/AC.109/L.348/

## INTRODUCTION

1. At its 454th meeting on 21 June 1966, the Special Committee adopted a resolution concerning Equatorial Guinea (see para. 79 of this chapter), operative paragraphs 1 and 3 of which read as follows:

"1. Notes with satisfaction the open invitation made to it by the Administering Power to visit Equatorial Guinea.

...

"3. Decides to send to Equatorial Guinea, as soon as practicable, a Sub-Committee to ascertain the conditions in the Territory with a view to speeding up the implementation of General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 2067 (XX)."

2. At the 460th meeting on 5 August 1966, the Chairman informed the Special Committee that the Government of Spain would find it convenient to receive the Sub-Committee during the third week of August 1966, and would agree to a visit to the Territory during a period of approximately eight days thereafter.

3. At the same meeting the Special Committee, on the proposal of the Chairman, decided without objection that the Sub-Committee on Equatorial Guinea should consist of Chile, Denmark, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria and the United Republic of Tanzania. The Sub-Committee was composed of the following representatives:

|                           |                               |
|---------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Mr. Gershon B.O. Collier  | (Sierra Leone) (Chairman)     |
| Mr. Hernán Sánchez        | (Chile)                       |
| Mr. Skjold G. Mellbin     | (Denmark)                     |
| Mr. Yaya Diakite          | (Mali)                        |
| Mr. Kazimierz Smiganowski | (Poland)                      |
| Mr. Rafic Jouejati        | (Syria)                       |
| Mr. John W.S. Malecela    | (United Republic of Tanzania) |

4. Following consultations with the Spanish Government, the Sub-Committee visited Madrid from the morning of 17 August to the evening of 18 August 1966. During its stay in Madrid, the Sub-Committee held meetings with senior officials of the Spanish Government, an account of which is included in section II of this report.

5. The Sub-Committee then visited Equatorial Guinea (Fernando Póo and Río Muni) from 19 August to 24 August 1966. It was in Fernando Póo from 19 August to 21 August 1966 and in Río Muni from 22 August to 24 August 1966.
6. On the arrival of the Sub-Committee in the Territory, arrangements were made by the local authorities at its request for the public to be informed, through the Press and by radio, of the purpose of its visit to the Territory, its terms of reference, and its programme, as well as of its desire to receive oral and written evidence from all bodies, groups and individuals, wishing to consult with it.
7. While in the Territory the Sub-Committee held meetings and had discussions with the Commissioner-General and other officials, an account of which is included in section II. The Sub-Committee also held meetings with members of the governmental and legislative organs, and with a large number of bodies, groups and individuals, an account of which is contained in section III of this report. Members of the Sub-Committee also had informal contacts and conversations with a sizable number of personalities and individuals in the Territory.
8. The itinerary and programme of the Sub-Committee in Madrid and in Equatorial Guinea is attached to this report as appendix I. During its visit the Sub-Committee was accompanied by a secretariat composed of Mr. K.K.S. Dadzie (Principal Secretary), Mr. Richard W. Wathen (Political and Administrative Officer), Messrs. Pierre Dufour and Juan Rodriguez (Interpreters) and Mrs. Cecilia T. Bowles (Secretary).
9. The Sub-Committee reconvened at Headquarters on 30 September 1966. It held thirteen meetings between that date and 18 October 1966, when it adopted its report.
10. The information gathered by the Sub-Committee concerning conditions in the Territory is contained in section I of this report. Its conclusions and recommendations are set out in section IV.
11. The Sub-Committee expresses its appreciation to the Spanish Government for the invitation to visit Madrid and the Territory, for the welcome and hospitality extended to it, and for the facilities placed at its disposal by the Spanish officials concerned with the arrangements for its visit. The Sub-Committee is appreciative also of the assistance and co-operation made available to it by the Commissioner-General and his colleagues.

12. The Sub-Committee also acknowledges with gratitude the cordial welcome and the facilities extended to it by the Governing Council and the two Provincial Councils of the Territory. It wishes to pay tribute to the warmth of the reception, the generosity, and the co-operation accorded to it by all the various bodies, groups and individuals with whom it had contact.

13. The Sub-Committee's visit to Equatorial Guinea, as well as its brief stay in Madrid, was very useful in providing elucidation of the problems of the Territory. In particular the visit was of great assistance in enabling the Sub-Committee to ascertain conditions in the Territory and in acquainting it at first hand with the aspirations of the people of Equatorial Guinea.

## I. INFORMATION ON THE TERRITORY

### A. GENERAL

14. The Territory of Equatorial Guinea consists of the provinces of Fernando Póo and Río Muni, the former comprising the island of that name, adjacent islets and island of Annobón, while the latter comprises the continental area bordered on the north by Cameroon and on the south and east by Gabon, as well as the islands of Corisco, Elobey Grande, Elobey Chico and adjacent islets. The area of Fernando Póo is 2,034 square kilometres, and that of Río Muni 26,017. The capital of Fernando Póo is Santa Isabel and that of Río Muni is Bata.

15. The total population of the Territory today is estimated to be 260,000. According to the 1960 census, when the total population was 245,898 inhabitants, 62,612 lived in Fernando Póo and 183,377 in Río Muni. Of those living in Fernando Póo, 58,390 were Africans, including Nigerian workers and other non-indigenous groups, and 4,222 were Europeans, while the figures for Río Muni were 180,513 and 2,864 respectively. Population density was 31 per square kilometre and 7 per square kilometre respectively. The largest urban agglomeration is Santa Isabel which, in 1963, had an estimated population of approximately 28,000. The next largest town is Bata with an estimated population of 25,700 in 1963.

16. The indigenous population consists chiefly of two groups, the Bubis in Fernando Póo and the Fangs (also known as Pámues) in Río Muni. Other smaller groups in Río Muni are the Kombes, Bengas and Bujebas. Detailed figures are not available. There is a large non-indigenous African population, mainly from Nigeria, numbering approximately 32,000 in 1966, working in the Territory usually on fixed term contracts; this element of the population is most numerous in Fernando Póo. The non-African population is almost entirely Spanish.

### B. GOVERNMENT

#### Constitution of 1963/1964

17. Fernando Póo and Río Muni, which in 1959 had been given the status of integral provinces of Spain, were accorded a new constitutional framework in 1963 under the designation of Equatorial Guinea. This framework was defined by Basic Law

No. 191/1963 of 20 December (Ley de Bases) granting Equatorial Guinea, in the words of the law, "a régime of 'autonomy'".<sup>a/</sup>

18. The new constitutional structure was initiated by a declaration of the Spanish Government following a decision taken in the Council of Ministers on 9 August 1963 regarding the granting of autonomy to the Territory. A commission of the Spanish Cortes, which included participants from the Territory, drew up a bill for a basic law providing for a new system of government. The bill was approved by the Cortes. Before being sanctioned by the Head of State of Spain, the Law was submitted to a plebiscite held on 15 December 1963 which was open to nationals, African and Spanish, duly registered over the age of 21 years. The non-indigenous African population did not, of course, qualify to vote under these conditions.

19. The number of registered voters in the plebiscite was 126,378, of whom 17,699 were in Fernando Póo and 108,679 in Río Muni. According to the administering Power the results of the plebiscite were as follows:

|              | <u>Votes cast</u> | <u>In favour</u> | <u>Against</u> |
|--------------|-------------------|------------------|----------------|
| Fernando Póo | 12,500            | 5,340            | 7,150          |
| Río Muni     | <u>82,317</u>     | <u>53,940</u>    | <u>28,387</u>  |
| Total        | 94,817            | 59,280           | 35,537         |

20. Following the plebiscite, the Basic Law was promulgated on 20 December 1963. During the first half of 1964, the various councils envisaged under the Basic Law came into being. The Governing Council was constituted on 15 May 1964 and on 27 May 1964 the President of the Governing Council was designated. The regime of autonomy came into effect on 16 July 1964.

21. A law providing an expanded text of the Basic Law of the autonomous regime was promulgated by Decree 1885/1964, of 3 July 1964. This law (Ley Articulada sobre Régimen Autónomo de la Guinea Ecuatorial) was drawn up in accordance with Article 1 of the Final Clauses of the Basic Law whereby the Government of Spain was empowered to decree an expanded text of the Basic Law in consultation with the representatives of the autonomous regime comprising the Governing Council of Equatorial Guinea. The Ley Articulada contains the essential legislative basis of the present régime of autonomy.

---

a/ The text of the above-mentioned Basic Law is to be found in the annex of A/AC.109/71.

22. The Basic Law stipulates that nationals born in Fernando Póo and Río Muni shall enjoy the same rights and shall be bound by the same duties as "other Spaniards" under the Fundamental Laws, and that "the right of representation in the Spanish Cortes shall continue to be guaranteed". Under these arrangements, Fernando Póo and Río Muni are represented in the Cortes on the same basis as other Spanish provinces, each province of the Territory providing three deputies. These are the mayors of Santa Isabel and Bata, one deputy each for Fernando Póo and Río Muni, respectively, representing the other municipal councils, and a representative of each of the two provincial councils, currently the Presidents.

#### Organs of government

23. The Basic Law states that the government and administration of Equatorial Guinea shall be representative in nature and shall be entrusted to a General Assembly and a Governing Council. As well as making provision for the establishment of these organs, the Law establishes the Office of the Commissioner General, who represents the Government of Spain in the Territory and is appointed by decree of the Head of State of Spain.

24. The Governing Council is constituted by a President and eight Councillors, four from Fernando Póo and four from Río Muni. The Councillors are elected by the Assembly while the President is appointed by decree from a list of three candidates proposed by the Governing Council. They serve for a four-year term. The present President of the Governing Council is Mr. Bonifacio Ondo Edú.

25. The General Assembly consists of the Provincial Councils (Diputaciones) of Fernando Póo and Río Muni meeting in joint session. It holds at least two sessions a year alternately at Santa Isabel and Bata. Within their spheres of competence, the two provincial councils are the organs of local government in their respective provinces. The Provincial Councils of Fernando Póo and Río Muni comprise eight and ten members respectively. Should any of these members be elected by the Assembly to the Governing Council; the resulting vacancies are filled in accordance with electoral procedures set out below (see paragraphs 40-42).



Powers and jurisdiction of the organs of government

26. According to the Basic Law of 1963, the Governing Council takes over the functions previously exercised by the Governor-General with the exception of those assigned to the Commissioner-General. Members of the Council are empowered to assume, on appointment by the President, supervisory functions over one or more of the departments of the Administration. According to the provisions of the Ley Articulada, these departments are under the direction of technical personnel appointed by the Spanish Government on the recommendation of the Commissioner-General who is advised by the President of the Governing Council. The Council's functions include submitting bills to the General Assembly, drawing up a draft budget pertaining to revenues and expenditures in the provinces (but not pertaining to subsidies from the Spanish Government) and implementing the decisions of the General Assembly within the sphere of its competence. It also puts forward a list of three candidates for President of the Governing Council, one of whom is then nominated by decree of the Spanish Government. It has the same functions with regard to the appointment of the Civil Governor for each province. The Governing Council is also empowered to appoint a delegate to Madrid to ensure on its behalf the better dispatch and co-ordination of affairs of the autonomous administration connected with the work of the various official bodies.

27. An important limitation to the above powers, however, are those assigned to the Commissioner-General who inter alia, as the representative of the Spanish Government:

- (a) Co-ordinates the autonomous administration with the central administration;
- (b) Advises the Governing Council in the performance of its duties;
- (c) Is responsible for public law and order, having at his disposal for this purpose the Armed Forces, and may, to the extent that he thinks fit, delegate authority in this field to the Civil Governors who in these matters are responsible to him;
- (d) Conducts relations with authorities outside Equatorial Guinea;
- (e) May propose to the Spanish Government the suspension of the acts of the Governing Council in the following cases:

- (i) When these acts concern matters outside the Council's jurisdiction,
- (ii) When they constitute a criminal offence,
- (iii) When they are contrary to law and order, and
- (iv) When they constitute a manifest breach of the law.

The Commissioner-General may "if execution of such acts should incur a risk of serious harm" suspend such acts on his own initiative, reporting post facto to the Spanish Government. The Commissioner-General may also propose the dismissal of the President and Councillors of the Governing Council. He also has powers of intervention in such spheres as information and entertainments, post and telecommunications, and airports. Further, his competence extends to immigration and the police.

28. The functions of the General Assembly include the following:

(a) To propose legislation applicable to territorial affairs supplementing existing legislation. Such proposals, which require the approval of the Commissioner-General, may be returned by the latter to the Assembly for further consideration. Should the Assembly maintain its previous proposals, the final decision would rest with the Spanish Government.

(b) To approve the ordinary budget of Equatorial Guinea submitted by the Governing Council. The Basic Law provides, however, that so long as the Spanish State directly or indirectly subsidizes the economy of Equatorial Guinea, its budget must be approved finally by the Spanish Cortes.

(c) To request by a two-thirds majority, modifications in existing legislation which, together with the comments of the Commissioner-General, are referred for approval to the Spanish Government.

29. The General Assembly, which elects the eight members of the Governing Council, may also propose their dismissal as well as that of the President of the Council, by a two-thirds majority. The Commissioner-General, as noted above, may also put forward such a proposal. Final action in this regard rests with the Spanish Government.

30. In each province there is a Civil Governor, who is the representative of the Governing Council, although, as noted above, for the maintenance of law and order they are responsible to the Commissioner-General. According to the Ley Articulada the Civil Governors must be indigenous inhabitants of the provinces to which they are appointed.

### Electoral system

31. The autonomous regime of Equatorial Guinea is described in Base (or Statute) V of the Basic Law as being representative in character, and Base XII prescribes that the various councils shall be organized according to the principles of corporate representation. In Article 12 of the Ley Articulada, the regime is described as being "organically" representative. This is a reflection of the large part played by the "corporations", variously called corporative bodies or economic, cultural and professional entities together with the co-operatives, as the units representing the people, based upon the corporativist philosophy that man is best represented according to the function he plays in society.

32. Each of the provincial councils (diputaciones) which, when meeting in joint session, form the General Assembly of the Territory, is composed as follows: half its members are elected by the corporative bodies (i.e., economic, cultural and professional entities) and the co-operatives, and the other half by the municipal councils (ayuntamientos). A list of these bodies is given in paragraph 42 below.

33. As for the municipal councils, half their membership is elected also by corporative bodies and co-operatives and the other half by a vote of heads of families of the electoral unit. The number of councillors in each municipal council depends on the size of the population of the town in question. The mayors-chairmen of the municipal councils are appointed from among the councils concerned by the Civil Governor (see paragraph 30) from a list of three names proposed by these councils. In contrast, the Mayors-Chairmen of Santa Isabel and Bata, however, are appointed by the Spanish Government from a list of three candidates submitted by the respective councils. The number of municipal councils, as created by the Order of 24 May 1962, was four in Fernando Póo and eleven in Río Muni.

34. Within the jurisdiction of the municipal councils there are village councils (juntas vecinales) consisting of a chief and four members elected by heads of families. It should be noted, however, that these councils are concerned solely with local matters and play no part in the formation of the provincial councils, General Assembly and Governing Council. The number of village councils, as created by the Order of 24 May 1962, was forty-two in Fernando Póo and 146 in Río Muni.

35. In view of the important part played by the corporative bodies and co-operatives in the electoral process as introduced in Equatorial Guinea, it is necessary to describe them in more detail. As noted above, they account for half the membership of the provincial councils and half the membership of the municipal councils which themselves provide the other half of the members of the provincial councils. Moreover, as will be seen below, the specific corporative entities and co-operatives given the right to be represented are, in practice, substantially the same bodies at both the municipal council and provincial council levels.

36. At the municipal council level, the procedure for the election of representatives of the corporative bodies (economic, cultural and professional entities) and the co-operatives is outlined in the Instruction of 25 January 1964 issued by the former Governor-General. Each corporative body and co-operative was invited to name its delegate who, with his fellow delegates from the other corporative bodies and co-operatives in the area, proceeded to elect representatives to their respective municipal councils. These representatives were required to be residents over the age of twenty-three belonging to the bodies concerned. Their candidatures were put forward by these bodies at the same time as the latter named their delegates to act as electors in this process. The corporative bodies and co-operatives having the right to name their delegates and propose candidates for the election of representatives to their respective municipal councils were the following:

(1) Corporative bodies entitled to name delegates for elections to municipal councils

(a) Province of Fernando Póo

For San Carlos

(i) Chamber of Agriculture, Commerce and Industry

(Cámara Oficial Agrícola de Comercio e Industria)

(ii) Commission of Port Administration

(Comisión Administrativa del Puerto)

For Santa Isabel

(iii) Provincial Social Security Fund

(Caja Provincial de Seguros Sociales)

(iv) Chamber of Agriculture, Commerce and Industry

(Cámara Oficial Agraria de Comercio e Industria)

(v) Commission of Port Administration

(Comisión Administrativa del Puerto)

- (vi) Teacher Training College  
(Escuela Normal del Magisterio)
- (vii) St. Thomas Aquinas School for Assistant Teachers  
(Escuela Superior Provincial de Santo Tomás de Aquino)
- (viii) Bar Association  
(Ilustre Colegio de Abogados)
- (ix) National Institute of Secondary Education  
(Instituto Nacional de Enseñanza Media)

(b) Province of Río Muni

For Bata

- (x) Chamber of Agriculture, Forestry, Commerce and Industry  
(Cámara Agrícola, Forestal, de Comercio e Industria)
- (xi) Commission of Port Administration  
(Comisión Administrativa del Puerto)
- (xii) School of Arts and Crafts  
(Escuela de Artes y Oficios)
- (xiii) Teacher Training College  
(Escuela Normal del Magisterio)
- (xiv) Bar Association  
(Ilustre Colegio de Abogados)
- (xv) National Institute of Secondary Education - Bata branch  
(Sección Delegada del Instituto Nacional de Enseñanza Media)

For Rio Benito

- (xvi) Timber Syndicate  
(Sindicato Maderero)

(2) Co-operatives entitled to name delegates for election to municipal councils

(a) Province of Fernando Póo

For Annobón

- (i) Co-operative of San Antonio

For San Carlos

- (ii) - (xvii) Co-operatives of Claret de Batete, Bocoricho, Balombe, San Luis de Bombe, Boloco Bantabarés, Balachá-Maule, Baho Pequeño, Baho Grande, Bilelipa, Eburu-Ehoco, Moca, Musola, Mueri, Rilaja Oloitia, Ruitche, Ureca.

For Santa Isabel

(xviii) - (xxiv) Co-operatives of Baney, Basacato de la Sagrada Familia, Bariobé, Bacaque Pequeño, Bacaque Grande, San Luis de Cupapa, Santa Teresa de Bososo.

(xxv) Provincial Union of Agricultural Co-operatives  
(Unión Provincial de Cooperativas del Campo)

(xxvi) Provincial Co-operative of Light Transport  
(Cooperativa Provincial de Transportes Ligeros)

(b) Province of Río Muni

For Bata

(xxvii) Provincial Union of Agricultural Co-operatives.  
(Unión Provincial de Cooperativas del Campo)

For Ebebiyín

(xxviii) Co-operative of San Juan Bautista de Río Nsie.

(xxix) Co-operative of San Jenaro de Oveng.

For Micomeseng

(xxx) Co-operative of Santiago de Ncomo.

For Valladolid de los Bimbiles

(xxxi) Co-operative of Medina del Bosque.

37. These bodies elected a total of fifty-eight representatives to the municipal councils of Fernando Póo and Río Muni with between two and five representatives per municipality depending on its size.<sup>b/</sup> The heads of families, for their part, also provided a total of fifty-eight representatives distributed on a basis of between two and five representatives per municipality again depending on its size.<sup>c/</sup>

38. The number of other electors participating in elections to municipalities was 45,286.<sup>d/</sup> These were the heads of families voting for their half of the membership of the municipal councils. For electoral purposes, heads of families

---

b/ In some municipalities, however, where there were as yet no corporative bodies or co-operatives in existence to elect candidates in the manner set out in paragraph 36 above, members were nominated directly by the authorities. In the municipal council elections in 1964, 38 out of 58 members representing the corporative bodies and co-operatives were so nominated.

c/ For details see appendices II and III.

d/ For details see appendix IV.

are those over the age of twenty-one years with dependants and those over the age of twenty-one without dependants who do not live in the family group. They must be residents duly registered on the electoral rolls established by the Department of Statistics of the Territory. They include Spanish residents ("other inhabitants") who, according to the Ley Articulada have the same rights and duties as the indigenous population so long as they are residents (avecindados), and duly registered as such.

39. Candidates standing for election to municipal councils representing heads of family must themselves be heads of family over the age of twenty-three, resident in the areas concerned, and may propose themselves directly to the Municipal Census Office or be proposed to the latter, in accordance with one of the following conditions:

(a) If they have already served or have been currently serving as municipal councillors for at least one year in the council concerned;

(b) If they are proposed by four other councillors or ex-councillors of the municipal council concerned, or three provincial councillors, or two deputies of the Cortes;

(c) If they receive the endorsement of one-twentieth of the registered electors of the area concerned;

(d) If they own agricultural, industrial or commercial concerns within the limits of the area concerned.

Proposed candidates are disqualified from standing for election if they are in debt, have been sentenced to prison terms or have been judged incapable of holding public office, or are involved in litigation against the municipal council in question or the services under its jurisdiction. Other disqualifications relate to personnel in the employment of the municipal council in question, as well as entrepreneurs and their personnel who provide goods or services to the municipal council, and persons who hold concessions, or are bidding for contracts or subsidies involving public funds administered by the municipal council in question.

40. At the level of the provincial councils, as mentioned above, half their members are elected by the municipal councils and the other half by the corporative bodies and co-operatives. The procedure governing these elections is set out in an instruction issued by the former Acting Governor-General on 7 March 1964.

41. The members representing the municipal councils are elected by a group of delegates appointed for this purpose by the municipal councils. These elect their representatives to the provincial councils as follows: In Fernando Póo out of a total of four, one is elected directly by the Municipal Council of Santa Isabel, and the remaining three jointly by the delegates of the Councils of Annobón, San Carlos and San Fernando. In Río Muni, out of a group of five, one is elected directly by the Municipal Council of Bata and the remaining four jointly by the delegates of the Councils of Acurenam, Ebebiyin, Evinayong, Mícomeseng, Mongomo de Guadalupe, N'sork, Puerto Iradier, Río Benito, Sevilla de Niefang and Valladolid de los Bimbiles.

42. The other half of membership of the provincial councils representing the corporative bodies and co-operatives is broken down as follows: For Fernando Póo: two representatives of corporative bodies, and two representatives of co-operatives. For Río Muni: three representatives of corporative bodies and two representatives of co-operatives. As in the case of the municipal councils, the corporative bodies and co-operatives concerned appoint delegates who proceed to the election of candidates (which they also propose) as their representatives to the provincial councils. The corporative bodies and co-operatives given the right to name delegates and propose candidates are the following:

(1) Corporative bodies entitled to name representatives to the provincial councils

(a) Province of Fernando Póo

- (i) Social Security Fund  
(Caja de Seguros Sociales)
- (ii) Chamber of Agriculture, Commerce and Industry  
(Cámara Oficial Agrícola de Comercio e Industria)
- (iii) Commission of Port Administration, San Carlos  
(Comisión Administrativa del Puerto de San Carlos)
- (iv) Commission of Port Administration, Santa Isabel  
(Comisión Administrativa del Puerto de Santa Isabel)
- (v) Teacher Training College  
(Escuela Normal del Magisterio)
- (vi) St. Thomas Aquinas School for Assistant Teachers  
(Escuela Superior Santo Tomás de Aquino)



- (vii) Bar Association  
(Ilustre Colegio de Abogados)
- (viii) National Institute of Secondary Education  
(Instituto Nacional de Enseñanza Media)

(b) Province of Río Muni

- (ix) Chamber of Agriculture, Forestry, Commerce and Industry  
(Cámara Oficial Agrícola Forestal de Comercio e Industria)
- (x) Commission of Port and Harbour Administration, Bata  
(Comisión Administrativa del Puerto de Bata y fondeaderos)
- (xi) School of Arts and Crafts  
(Escuela de Artes y Oficios)
- (xii) Teacher Training College  
(Escuela Normal del Magisterio)
- (xiii) Bar Association  
(Ilustre Colegio de Abogados)
- (xiv) National Institute of Secondary Education  
(Instituto Nacional de Enseñanza Media)
- (xv) Timber Syndicate  
(Sindicato Maderero)

(2) Co-operatives entitled to name representatives to the provincial councils

(a) Province of Fernando Póo

For Annobón

- (i) Co-operative of San Antonio

For San Carlos

- (ii) - (xvii) Co-operatives of Baho Grande, Baho Pequeño, Balachá-Mule, Balombe, Bantabaré, Claret de Batete, Bilelipa, Bocoricho, Boloco, San Luis de Bombe, Eburu-Ehoco, Musola, Mueri, Rilaja-Oloitia, Ruitche, Ureca.

For Santa Isabel

- (xviii) - (xxiv) Co-operatives of Baney, Basacato de la Sagrada Familia, Bariobé, Bacaqe Pequeño, Bacaqe Grande, San Luis de Cupapa, Santa Teresa de Bososo.

(xxv) Provincial Union of Agricultural Co-operatives .  
(Unión Provincial de Cooperativas del Campo)

(xxvi) Provincial Co-operative of Light Transport  
(Cooperativa Provincial de Transportes Ligeros)

(b) Province of Río Muni

For Bata

(xxvii) Provincial Union of Agricultural Co-operatives  
(Unión Provincial de Cooperativas del Campo)

For Ebebiyín

(xxviii) Co-operative of San Juan Bautista del Río Nsie

(xxix) Co-operative of San Jenaro de Oveng

For Micomeseng

(xxx) Co-operative of Santiago de Ncomo

For Valladolid de los Bimbiles

(xxxii) Co-operative of Medina del Bosque

Justice

43. The highest court in the Territory is the Supreme Court (Tribunal Superior) which has the jurisdiction attributed by law to the territorial courts (audiencias territoriales) and the Central Labour Court (Tribunal Central del Trabajo). Decisions of this court may be appealed to the Supreme Court of Spain. Judicial appointments are made by the President or the Spanish Government on the advice of the Spanish Ministry of Justice in the case of candidates from the metropolitan country. In the case of indigenous candidates, appointments are made by the Commissioner-General on the advice of the President of the Supreme Court of Equatorial Guinea. The Sub-Committee noted the need for the employment of Africans as judicial officers since at present, most of these judicial appointments are held by expatriates.

C. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

General

44. Equatorial Guinea's economy is based predominantly upon agriculture and forestry: cacao in Fernando Póo and coffee and timber in Río Muni. Other crops that are cultivated both for home consumption and export include yucca, palm oil and kernels, coconuts and bananas. The development of fisheries, although slow at the start is reported to be going ahead rapidly.

/...

45. Of the main crops, cacao is the most important. Exports are chiefly to the metropolitan country where preferential treatment is granted. The average output is approximately 30,000 tons a year. Coffee, which is granted similar preferential treatment, reaches an average annual output of 6,000 tons.
46. In 1964 there were thirty-eight companies engaged in timber production in Río Muni, chiefly around Bata, Río Benito and Cogo where they had been granted concessions amounting to approximately 170,000 hectares; another 13,000 hectares elsewhere in the region were exploited by smaller concerns. There are about 140 different species of timber in the region which is reported to hamper concentration on those most in demand in foreign markets. In 1963 the output was 315,581 tons and investment at the time in machinery and installations was approximately 750 million pesetas.<sup>e/</sup>
47. The production of bananas at one time reached 14,000 tons per annum, while yucca, which used to be an important export to Spain, now chiefly supplies the home market apart from about 6,000 tons still exported to Spain in 1963.
48. Local industry which is in the early stages of development is chiefly concerned with the processing of foods and agricultural products such as oil and soap, the processing of cacao and by-products, yucca and coffee. Seafood canning factories have also been established. Most of these new local industries are chiefly located in Fernando Póo.

#### Economic and Social Development Plan

49. The Economic and Social Development Plan which was conceived as a section of the over-all Spanish plan of economic and social development was drafted by a Special Commission created by an Order of the President of the Spanish Government on 5 May 1962 after extensive field surveys and consultations in the Territory itself. The period of the Plan is from 1964 to 1967 and covers both the public and private sectors although initially, at least, emphasis is being placed on the public sector where a detailed programme of expenditure on economic and social projects has been worked out.

---

<sup>e/</sup> Statistics in the following sections on economic and social conditions relate, with few exceptions, to 1963 and 1964. Up-to-date figures were not available to the Sub-Committee.

50. At the end of the four-year period covered by the Plan, the objective is to achieve an annual cumulative growth rate in Gross Regional Product of 7.56 per cent. The following table illustrates results anticipated under the Plan:

|                                       | <u>1962</u>              | <u>1964</u>  | <u>1967<sup>a/</sup></u> |
|---------------------------------------|--------------------------|--------------|--------------------------|
|                                       | (million (1962) pesetas) |              |                          |
| Gross regional product . . . . .      | 2,301                    | 2,662        | 3,311                    |
| Imported goods and services . . . . . | <u>1,151</u>             | <u>1,356</u> | <u>1,723</u>             |
| Total resources available . . . . .   | 3,452                    | 4,018        | 5,034                    |
| Private consumption . . . . .         | 1,450                    | 1,709        | 2,185                    |
| Public consumption . . . . .          | 235                      | 291          | 371                      |
| Gross internal investment . . . . .   | 369                      | 525          | 761                      |
| Goods and services exported . . . . . | <u>1,398</u>             | <u>1,493</u> | <u>1,717</u>             |
| Total resources used . . . . .        | 3,452                    | 4,018        | 5,034                    |

a/ 60 pesetas are equivalent to \$US1.00.

51. It may be noted that the gross regional product was reckoned at 1,501.5 million pesetas in 1954 and that the mean annual cumulative growth rate between 1954 and 1962 reckoned in pesetas of constant value amounted to 5.5 per cent.

52. Expenditure under the Development Plan, comprising both public and private expenditure, is estimated at 2,579 million pesetas (\$42,833,333) for the period of the Plan. Of this amount, public expenditure will account for 1,651 million pesetas (\$27,366,667) while private expenditure is estimated at 928 million pesetas (\$18,466,666). Total public and private expenditure planned for each year between 1964 and 1967 is as follows:

|                | (million (1962) pesetas) |
|----------------|--------------------------|
| 1964 . . . . . | 547                      |
| 1965 . . . . . | 607                      |
| 1966 . . . . . | 664                      |
| 1967 . . . . . | <u>761</u>               |
| Total          | 2,579                    |

/...

53. A summary of the programme of public expenditure for 1964-67 by sector is as follows:

|   | (million (1962) pesetas) |             |             |             |              |
|---|--------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|
|   | <u>1964</u>              | <u>1965</u> | <u>1966</u> | <u>1967</u> | <u>Total</u> |
| <u>Social expenditure</u>                   |                          |             |             |             |              |
| Education and vocational training . . . . . |                          |             |             |             |              |
|   | 33                       | 37          | 46          | 56          | 142          |
| Health . . . . .                            |                          |             |             |             |              |
|   | 40                       | 52          | 61          | 76          | 229          |
| Housing and urban development . . . . .     |                          |             |             |             |              |
|   | 47                       | 50          | 53          | 56          | 206          |
| <u>Expenditure in productive sectors</u>    |                          |             |             |             |              |
| Agriculture . . . . .                       |                          |             |             |             |              |
|   | 1.7                      | 4.3         | 4.3         | 60          | 11.3         |
| Mining . . . . .                            |                          |             |             |             |              |
|   | 7.3                      | 6.3         | -           | -           | 13.6         |
| Airports . . . . .                          |                          |             |             |             |              |
|   | 117.1                    | 108.9       | 5.4         | 4.8         | 236.2        |
| Public works . . . . .                      |                          |             |             |             |              |
|   | 80.6                     | 100.7       | 214.4       | 267.2       | 662.9        |
| <u>State aid to local corporations</u>      |                          |             |             |             |              |
|   | <u>30</u>                | <u>30</u>   | <u>30</u>   | <u>30</u>   | <u>120.0</u> |
| Total public expenditure . . .              |                          |             |             |             |              |
|   | 356.7                    | 389.2       | 414.1       | 491.0       | 1,651.0      |

54. The financing of the Plan's public expenditure programme is reported to be as follows:

|                              | (million (1962) pesetas) |              |              |              |              |
|------------------------------|--------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
|                              | <u>1964</u>              | <u>1965</u>  | <u>1966</u>  | <u>1967</u>  | <u>Total</u> |
| Equatorial Guinea budget . . |                          |              |              |              |              |
|                              | 159.6                    | 200.3        | 225.7        | 265.2        | 850.8        |
| Spanish State budget . . . . |                          |              |              |              |              |
|                              | <u>197.1</u>             | <u>188.9</u> | <u>188.4</u> | <u>225.8</u> | <u>800.2</u> |
| Total . . . . .              |                          |              |              |              |              |
|                              | 356.7                    | 389.2        | 414.1        | 491.0        | 1,651.0      |

55. Public expenditure undertaken under the Spanish State budget accordingly is 800.2 million pesetas, representing 48.47 per cent of the total expenditure planned for the four-year period 1964-1967.

56. Some of the predominant elements of the Plan are reported to include:

- (a) the training of indigenous technical and administrative personnel with considerable stress being given to various forms of technical or vocational training;
- (b) the modernization and diversification of agriculture involving better credit facilities and transport to ensure better prospects of facing competition on the international market, as well as developing the production of other crops;
- (c) the development of processing industries, in particular fisheries where salting and canning factories offer good prospects for export;
- (d) the expansion of port and harbour facilities especially in Fernando Póo to

cater inter alia for the above-mentioned fisheries, (e) research into the feasibility of refining oil from neighbouring zones as well as prospecting in this field; (f) the extension of the free port zones of Santa Isabel and San Carlos with the addition of factories and warehouses to serve the West African coast; (g) the development of tourism especially in Santa Isabel but also in Río Muni, and (h) the rapid expansion of transport and communications upon which much of the above-mentioned items to a large extent depend.

### Budget

57. According to Chapter IX of the Ley Articulada promulgated by Decree 1885/1964 of 3 July 1964, public expenditure is divided between the ordinary Budget for Equatorial Guinea and the Budget of State Aid and Collaboration (Presupuesto de Ayuda y Colaboración del Estado a la Guinea Ecuatorial). The latter consists chiefly of subsidies, grants and direct or indirect aid from the Spanish State. It includes expenditure under the Development Plan and also on such items as administration of justice, armed forces, Commissariat-General and the maritime and air services.

58. Figures available for the 1964 financial year indicate expenditures as follows: 422,189,197 pesetas (\$US7,036,485) under the Equatorial Guinea budget; and 826,413,308 pesetas (\$US13,773,555) under the Spanish State budget. The total figure of public expenditure was 1,248,602,505 pesetas (\$US20,810,040).

59. Estimates of public expenditure for 1965 made at the end of 1964 amounted to 1,053.355 million pesetas.

60. The price supplements on subsidies for cacao and coffee represent the largest single item of expenditure on the part of the Spanish Government. It is admitted that this is a basically unsatisfactory situation and the Plan therefore recognizes the need for modernization and rationalization of the production of coffee and cacao to make them more competitive in world markets.

61. Detailed information concerning the sources of internal revenue was not available. Import taxes on consumer goods appear to be generally low, with the exception of those on wine and liquor.

62. It should be noted that according to Chapter IX of the Ley Articulada (and Base IV of the Basic Law) the entire budget of Equatorial Guinea must be approved by the Spanish Cortes so long as direct and indirect subsidies are

f...

received from the Spanish State. Thus the ordinary budget is drawn up by the Governing Council based upon a technical draft submitted by the Department of Finance in the Territory. It must be approved by the General Assembly before 1 October, after which it goes to the Presidency of the Spanish Government where any necessary adjustments are made to accord with the current subsidies on the advice of the Spanish Ministry of Finance. It must finally be submitted to the Spanish Cortes during the first two weeks of November. It should also be noted that legislation governing taxation in Equatorial Guinea is also approved by the Spanish Cortes.

### Co-operatives

63. The development of co-operatives began in 1940 in the Moka Valley of Fernando Póo with the aim of organizing agriculture. Later they flourished primarily in the cacao growing areas of Fernando Póo where in 1964 approximately thirty co-operatives harvested 1,200 tons of cacao. The total production, however, was over 26,000 tons. In Río Muni co-operatives are less developed. Although some figures indicate a total of thirty-four co-operatives<sup>f/</sup> with a total of 4,232 members, those listed as having the right of electing representatives, together with the corporative bodies, to municipal councils and provincial councils amount to twenty-six from Fernando Póo and five from Río Muni. Under the Development Plan it is intended to encourage the growth of co-operatives particularly in Río Muni where they are to be based on coffee as well as other products. Since 1964 long-term credit for the development of the co-operative system amounts to about 73 million pesetas.

### Housing and public works

64. In 1965 the National Housing Institute constructed about 1,500 dwellings at a cost of 301 million pesetas. A programme of houses for teachers was also undertaken. A sum of 28,012,688 pesetas has been allocated to the Governing Council for the construction of dwellings for the officials of the new autonomous régime.

---

<sup>f/</sup> Figures supplied by the Secretary-General of the Trades Union Centre in Madrid indicated that in Fernando Póo there were one industrial and twenty-nine agricultural co-operatives, while in Río Muni the figures were two and fourteen respectively.

65. Public works undertaken by the Office of Public Works, Housing and Town Planning of the autonomous administration includes the Santa Isabel water supply system, the expressway to the airport and the Punta Santiago air and sea lighthouse. Other water supply and highway projects have been started, including the construction of the highway round the eastern shore of the island which passes through the richest cacao-growing area of Fernando Póo.

D. SOCIAL AND EDUCATIONAL CONDITIONS

Public health

66. The main hospitals are those at Santa Isabel and Bata and there are also others at San Carlos, Puerto Iradier, Río Benito and new ones at Concepción and Evinayong. The first two have a capacity of 350 and 345 beds respectively. There is reported to be a total of about 1,500 beds. At Micomeseng in Río Muni, there is a leper hospital with 200 beds. It was observed by the Sub-Committee that patients are divided in hospitals by tribe and by race.

Labour

67. It has been noted that agriculture, particularly the production of cacao and coffee, is the mainstay of Equatorial Guinea's economy. Indigenous farmers have small holdings of about ten acres each which produce cacao and coffee for the market. These rely on the family group and do not hire labour. On the other hand, the European-style farms devoted to these crops rely principally on Nigerian labourers, usually on three-year contracts, whose number has been constantly increasing. Although the indigenous farmers have been organized to some extent in co-operatives, it will be recalled that these accounted for only 1,200 tons of cacao produced out of a total of 26,000 tons in 1964.

68. As at the end of 1963 the wage of the average plantation worker was reported to be 445 pesetas a month, plus an additional 225 pesetas a month paid in a lump sum at the end of the contract. Board, lodging and medical care are also provided.

69. In 1964, of the total labour force of 37,400 employed by private enterprise, 28,000 were Nigerians, 5,600 were indigenous Guineans, 800 came from other parts of Africa and 3,000 were Europeans. Thus, 85 per cent of the manpower employed in private enterprise were non-indigenous people.

70. A total of 3,500 were employed in public concerns and administration in 1964 of whom 13 per cent were European and 87 per cent were indigenous employees.



71. The labour legislation in force is contained principally in the Ordinance of 24 May 1962 which regulates contracts and conditions of employment. The Department of Labour was empowered to raise minimum wages within the limits of the law and a Central Labour Court was empowered to hear and settle disputes. This Court retained its powers under the new régime, its personnel, as that of other courts, being appointed in the case of those from the metropolitan country by the Presidency of the Spanish Government on the advice of the Spanish Ministry of Justice, and in the case of indigenous candidates by the Commissioner-General on the advice of the President of the Supreme Court.

### Schools

72. Equatorial Guinea's educational system consists basically of three stages: (a) the elementary school period of five years, compulsory to all children living within five kilometres of a school up to the age of 12, although these are allowed to stay on until the age of 14; this course leads to the elementary school certificate which enables them to continue to the primary schools; (b) the primary schools most of which are located in the larger municipalities and offer a two-year course for children from 13 to 14 years, although here again children are allowed to stay on until the ages of 15 and 16; and (c) secondary education leading to studies at the university level outside the Territory or technical or vocational training upon which the régime sets great store.

73. As at the end of 1965 there were 135 elementary schools and thirty primary schools administered by the educational authorities of the Territory, with a total enrolment of 21,091. At the end of 1963 there was a total of fifteen primary schools. At the end of 1965, 1,701 elementary education certificates and 1,105 primary education certificates were awarded. The above figures do not include non-official or private schools of these categories.

74. Elementary and primary school teachers are trained at the St. Thomas Aquinas Provincial School for Assistant Teachers and at the Teacher Training Colleges of Santa Isabel and Bata established in 1963.

75. In the field of vocational or technical education there is the "La Salle" Professional Centre, founded in Bata in 1959, maintained by the Provincial Council of Río Muni which awards certificates in agronomy and livestock as well as administration. There is also a School of Agricultural Training dependent on the Agricultural Department, a School of Sanitary Training for male and female nurses and the School of Arts and Crafts of the Catholic Mission in Santa Isabel, subsidized by the Government. The latter offers training in printing, tailoring, carpentry, building and mechanics. Schools of industrial apprenticeship have also been created in Santa Isabel and Bata.

76. As for higher education, scholarships up to a value of 3.5 million pesetas every year have been awarded for study chiefly in Spain. In 1962, 113 students under scholarships and 100 without scholarships were attending courses at universities or technical colleges in Spain. The Sub-Committee was informed by the Spanish authorities that there were 120 students from Equatorial Guinea in 1966 in Spain. According to information submitted by petitioners, however, the number did not exceed ninety-two, some of whom were on scholarships.

77. It should be noted that trained indigenous personnel in important posts of various services as at the end of 1965 included the following: the Chiefs of the Health and Education Departments; twenty-nine primary school teachers; personnel of the Sub-Department of Primary Education Inspection; eight labour inspectors; twelve chiefs of the Special Police Corps; and a housing and town planning supervisor.

## II. DISCUSSIONS WITH OFFICIALS OF THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT

### A. Meeting with Director-General of African Settlements and Provinces and other Spanish Government officials

78. The Sub-Committee called on General Diaz de Villegas, Director-General of African Settlements and Provinces (Plazas y Provincias Africanas) in the Office of the Presidency on 17 August 1966.

79. After an exchange of courtesies, the Director-General reviewed the record of the Spanish Government in relation to Equatorial Guinea. He stated inter alia that the Territory had no marketing problem as regards its cacao and coffee production, as almost all the produce was imported by Spain at prices considerably in excess of current world levels. Spain was buying the Territory's cacao at 42 pesetas per kilogramme as compared with the current world price of 17 pesetas, and coffee at 67 pesetas per kilogramme as compared with the average world price of 40 pesetas.

80. The cacao and coffee producers of Equatorial Guinea were free to sell on the international market, but in fact they exported their produce only to Spain, except when there were surpluses exceeding the demands of the Spanish market. It was desirable for these producers to develop trade with other markets but they had shown no interest. However, there was no long-term agreement covering exports of these commodities to Spain. No major increase in agricultural production was to be expected inasmuch as costs were higher in the Territory than elsewhere. There were new areas of economic activity being opened up, for which provision had been made in the Development Plan. This Plan had been prepared by the Spanish Government. In the event of Equatorial Guinea acceding to independence in the near future, he could not predict the extent to which the Spanish Government would continue to give economic assistance to the Territory.

81. In the field of education there were a number of elementary and vocational schools as well as two teacher-training institutions. Facilities for higher education were not available in the Territory but dozens of students were in universities in Barcelona, Pamplona and Madrid on scholarships. The total number of students from Equatorial Guinea in Spanish institutions was of the order of 120.

82. As regards the Government of the Territory, the Director-General stated that there was an autonomous legislative body. Further, the people of the Territory

were exempt from military service and the police force was small and indigenous in its composition.

83. On the question of future constitutional development the Director-General stated in reply to questions that he would not indulge in prophecy; it was a matter for the people themselves. Contact between the Governing Council of the Territory and the Spanish Government was maintained through a representative of the Council in Madrid rather than through the Commissioner-General. The people of the Territory were at liberty to submit petitions directly to the Spanish Government or to the local authorities. If the majority of the people of the Territory asked for independence, the Spanish Government would accede to their wishes. Proposals affecting the constitutional status of the Territory required a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly, or a simple majority of the people voting in a referendum. The term of the present governmental bodies would expire in 1968 at which time their membership would have to be renewed. If the people expressed a preference for direct elections, the question would require to be submitted to a referendum.

B. Meeting with Secretary-General, Trade Unions Centre and other officials

84. On 17 August 1966, the Sub-Committee held a meeting with Mr. Arturo Espinosa Poveda, Secretary-General of the Trade Unions Centre, Mr. Fuentes Irurozqui, National Under-Secretary for Economic Co-ordination and other officials.

85. The Secretary-General informed the Sub-Committee that the Spanish trade union organization had undertaken the training of workers from Equatorial Guinea with the aim of enabling them to operate such labour institutions as might be set up in the future. Trade union activity in the Territory centred around the promotion of co-operatives. In Fernando Póo, there were one industrial and 29 agricultural co-operatives; in Río Muni, the numbers were 2 and 14 respectively. These co-operatives were concerned with the provision of assistance to small producers in the improvement of output, the sale of produce and the extension of credit. In Fernando Póo, 25 co-operatives with a total membership of 964 had at their disposal credit facilities amounting to 48 million pesetas and in Río Muni 11 co-operatives with 2,781 members had 44 million pesetas. These credit facilities consisted of loans to these co-operatives extended by the Spanish trade union organization.

86. With the assistance of that organization, the co-operatives in the Territory were planning to extend their activities into other fields, including the

introduction of training courses and seminars in trade union work, the constitution of joint employer and employee associations, the carrying out of studies of workers' problems and the censuses of workers and enterprises.

87. One of the problems of the Territory was the lack of skilled labour. Up to 1963 there was some discontent arising from the different treatment of local workers and those from Spain, owing to the fact that the local workers did not have the training necessary to use complicated machinery. The Spanish trade union organization had therefore concerned itself with the training of skilled workers, of which some seventy had already taken the necessary courses. The organization was also interested in assisting in such fields as collective bargaining, social security and the establishment of adequate levels of employment.

88. Its activities in relation to Equatorial Guinea had begun only in recent years but it was to be noted that although there had been several difficulties involving workers in 1962, there was no serious problem of labour unrest in the Territory. At the present time there were about 8,000 Nigerian workers in Río Muni, most of whom did not enjoy the benefit of trade union status, and over twice that figure in Fernando Póo. It should also be noted that the activities of the organization had to be related to the existing pattern of economic activity, and that the training of skilled workers was costing it 40,000 pesetas per worker.

89. In reply to questions, the Sub-Committee was informed that no indigenous engineers had been trained by the organization. There were several students taking professional and other courses in such institutions as the University of Barcelona but the figures were not immediately available. If technical assistance were to be extended to the Territory by the United Nations, the most appropriate field would be the training of skilled workers. Since most of the manpower needs of the Territory were filled by imported labour, especially from Nigeria, the problem would arise whether such training should be given to the imported workers on the spot, or to selected indigenous people at institutions abroad.

90. As regards land tenure, there was no difference in the terms extended to the Spanish and to the indigenous people. Farmers belonging to co-operatives were eligible for loans on the same terms as Spanish owners; the interest rate was of the order of  $3\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. Working conditions and wages were determined by standards set by the Government. Indeed these standards were such that there had been demands for the restriction of imported manpower, since the Nigerian workers in particular often expressed a wish to remain indefinitely in the Territory. The participation of the workers themselves in the determination of working conditions

was limited, but efforts were being made to educate the workers so as to enable them to participate more effectively in this connexion, especially as regards collective bargaining.

C. Meetings with Assistant Commissioner for the Economic and Social Development Plan and other Spanish officials

91. On 17 August 1966, the Sub-Committee held a meeting with Mr. Tomas Allende, Assistant Commissioner for the Economic and Social Development Plan, Mr. Juan Alvarez Corugedo, Secretary of the Commission for the Economic Development of Fernando Póo and Río Muni, and other officials.

92. The Sub-Committee was informed that the over-all Economic and Social Development Plan for 1964-1967 included a section relating to Equatorial Guinea. This part of the Plan was established by a commission which included participants from the Territory and had received the approval of the General Assembly of Equatorial Guinea. It provided for development both through public investment and expenditure, for which Spain and the Territory were jointly responsible, and by private enterprise. The governmental organs of the Territory were at liberty to develop their own plan for the future but for the time being economic policies were based on the present Plan. The purpose of the Plan was to enable the Territory to sustain international competition and determine its own economic future by the end of the period covered by the Plan.

93. The Plan envisaged an annual increase in the per capita income of 7.56 per cent in the Territory, as compared with 6 per cent for Spain. The achievement of this objective would imply an increase in the annual per capita income in Equatorial Guinea from \$132 in 1963 to \$170 by 1967. For this purpose, public investment of the order of 1,651 million pesetas over the period covered by the Plan would be required, in addition to private investment of 982 million pesetas. Of the required public investment, it was expected that 850 million pesetas, covering education, health and roads, would be derived from the Territory itself, and the remainder, including expenditure on the Santa Isabel airport and on town planning and construction, from the Spanish Government.

94. Actual performance as regards public investment by the Territory had fallen short of the target by 20 per cent, owing to increased public consumption. However, the rate of increase envisaged in the per capita income had been maintained. On the other hand, the investment arrangements envisaged by the Spanish Government in respect of the Santa Isabel airport had been slightly disrupted owing to a delay in the completion of construction plans.

95. In the private sector, it was to be noted that the Territory exported to Spain all its production of cacao and coffee, which together with timber were the most important products, at prices higher than those prevalent on the international market. The subsidy thus extended by Spain on coffee and cacao amounted to some 700 million pesetas annually. However, the Spanish market was incapable of absorbing quantities in excess of the present production of the Territory. For this reason producers of these commodities stood to lose if they sold any surpluses on the international market.

96. The Plan accordingly envisaged an increase in the cultivation of bananas, yuccas and pineapples instead of an expansion of cacao and coffee production. The Plan also recommended the development of cattle-raising, fishing, and industries based on agricultural products. The prospects for the development of heavy industry were limited, owing to the lack of mineral production, but geological studies were to be carried out. In order to encourage activity in the above-mentioned areas, the Plan contained provisions for tax exemption, and for the extension of credit at low interest rates.

97. As a result of these incentives, a banana plantation had been established, a fish processing factory was under construction, and a cacao processing plant was to be built in Fernando Póo. In Río Muni, a palm oil factory was expected to begin operations shortly, and a fish processing factory was also under construction.

98. In reply to questions, the officials stated that as Equatorial Guinea was not self-sufficient as regards trained manpower, provision for vocational training, which was a primary need of the Territory, had been included in the Plan. There were opportunities for training in agricultural and industrial schools from which about 100 people graduated every year. With regard to formal education, the officials stated that the school population, which was 34,000 in 1947, had increased to 40,000 in 1966. The Plan included specific targets in this sector, as well as in the field of health.

99. On the question of incentives to producers, the officials explained that the extension of tax concessions and easy credit was limited to those activities which were most useful to the Territory, to the exclusion of cacao and coffee for instance, which were subject to over-production and unfavourable world market conditions. The officials denied that this policy might encourage the formation of monopolistic enterprises, inasmuch as there were regulations aimed against the

establishment of monopolies. Foreign companies were free to re-invest their profits in the Territory or to export them; however, it was the normal practice for these companies to re-invest their profits locally, and this practice was expected to continue.

100. The officials further stated that in order to ensure the future economic viability of the Territory, the Spanish Government was refraining from the encouragement of such economic activity as required to be subsidized. Nevertheless the Spanish Government would continue extending the subsidies it had been paying even after the Territory acceded to independence.

101. Explaining the figures they had given earlier, the officials stated that the per capita income was calculated on the basis of the whole population of the Territory. The income of the Spanish population raised no problems in this respect as the number of Spanish residents was small: There were only 4,000 of them in Fernando Póo and 2,500 in Río Muni. A large number of job opportunities for the indigenous people had come into being as a result of the development projects under way.

D. Meeting with the Under-Secretary, Ministry of Labour and other officials

102. On 18 August 1966, the Sub-Committee held a meeting with Mr. Antonio Ibañez Freire, Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Labour and other officials. In their introductory remarks, they mentioned that the Spanish Government had taken important economic and social measures in Equatorial Guinea, resulting in great progress in such fields as health and education. Indeed, in the field of health, the ratio of doctors to the population, namely, one doctor to every 3,500 people in Fernando Póo and one to every 9,600 in Río Muni, was far in excess of the ratio in many other independent African countries.

103. As regards the activities of the Ministry of Labour relating to Equatorial Guinea, the officials stated that it was concerned with questions of labour and social security, and, in particular with the enforcement of labour regulations and the training of indigenous labour inspectors to supervise the application of these regulations. The second principal function of the Ministry was in the field of assistance to co-operatives in the Territory. The Spanish trade unions were in charge of the management of such assistance, while the Ministry was concerned with



the provision of funds. Over the past two years, the Ministry had expended 90 million pesetas in this respect. The third main function of the Ministry was in the field of professional training for adult workers through on-the-job instruction and full time courses. In this connexion, they drew attention to the First School of Intensified Professional Training where, among others, workers from the Territory between the ages of 18 and 41 years were following six-month courses to qualify as metal or construction workers, mechanics and electricians. There were ten of these schools run by the trade unions in Spain. It was expected that the Ministry would extend its activities in this field to the Territory.

E. Meetings with the Commissioner-General and other officials

104. On 20 August 1966, the Sub-Committee called on the Commissioner-General of the Territory, Mr. Suances Diaz del Rio, in Santa Isabel. The Commissioner-General assured the Sub-Committee that it was at liberty to interview whomever it wished and that he would extend his full co-operation to it. He would place himself at the disposal of the Sub-Committee in case the latter wished to hold discussions with him.

105. On 22 August 1966, the Sub-Committee held a further meeting in Bata with the Commissioner-General. Mr. Jaime de Piniés, the Deputy Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations, Mr. Gabriel Mañueco, the Director-General of African and Arab World Affairs in the Spanish Foreign Ministry, and other officials were also present.

106. At this meeting, the Commissioner-General informed the Sub-Committee that it was the intention of the Spanish Government to grant independence to Equatorial Guinea inasmuch as it accepted sovereign independence as the final stage in the contemporary evolution of dependent Territories. It was in this spirit that the Spanish Government had granted autonomy to the Territory as a preparatory step towards independence in conditions of stability and viability.

107. Spain had no economic interests in the Territory, as was demonstrated by the fact that it extended subsidies to and absorbed most of the export production of Equatorial Guinea. The only interest of Spain in the Territory at the present time was spiritual; historical circumstances had forged social, cultural and other links between the two countries and peoples. The Spanish Government was also concerned

to protect the Territory against possible expansionist or neo-colonialist designs from outside as well as from the danger of exploitation by unscrupulous foreign economic interests. Bearing these considerations in mind, the Spanish Government was ready to grant independence to the Territory when the people so requested. The freedom with which the people had spoken to the Sub-Committee was itself testimony to the good faith of the Spanish Government in this regard.

108. In reply to questions the Commissioner-General stated that, having assumed his office only a few days ago, he had no recollection of a motion alleged to have been adopted by the General Assembly in which a formal request was made for independence. His information was that there had been some discussion on the subject but that no agreement had been reached. He undertook to investigate and transmit the required information. Referring to another recently adopted motion in which the General Assembly had expressed its lack of confidence in the Governing Council, the Commissioner-General stated that he had not forwarded it to the Spanish Government. Since, a short time previously, the same General Assembly had adopted another motion congratulating the Governing Council on its performance, he had thought it fit to request the Assembly to reconsider its motion of no confidence.

109. Outlining the recent constitutional development of the Territory, the Commissioner-General recalled that the referendum of December 1963 had put to the people the question whether or not they were in favour of autonomy. The referendum was open to all indigenous people of twenty-one years of age and over, as well as to Spanish people who had lived in the Territory for at least two years. Other non-indigenous people were not eligible to participate. Following the affirmative result of the referendum, elections had been held for the municipal councils and the provincial councils, and subsequently the Governing Council had been established.

110. In explanation of the electoral system, the officials accompanying the Commissioner-General stated that each municipal council was composed of an equal number of members elected by the heads of family resident in the area concerned, and members elected by local co-operatives and corporative bodies; corporative bodies consisted of various economic, cultural and professional groups including local chambers of commerce, and associations of doctors, pharmacists, lawyers, engineers and teachers. In areas where no corporative bodies were in existence, the vacancies reserved for these bodies in the municipal council were usually filled by nominees

of the Civil Governor. In the recollection of the officials, some twenty-two vacancies in the municipal councils had been filled on this basis. The nominees were normally persons who had failed by a narrow margin to win one of the elective seats in the council concerned.

111. The officials recalled that the Provincial Council of Río Muni consisted of ten members and that of Fernando Póo of eight members. These provincial councils meeting in joint session constituted the General Assembly. Each of them consisted of an equal number of members elected by representatives of the municipal councils, and members elected by the corporative bodies and co-operatives. There were two Spanish members in the Río Muni Provincial Council and one in that of Fernando Póo.

112. As regards political parties, the Commissioner-General stated that before the establishment of the autonomous régime, there had been some restriction on political activity in the Territory. However since that time, political parties had been free to carry out their activities, although there was no provision for their official recognition. The authorization of the Civil Governor, who was responsible to the Commissioner-General in this respect, was required for the holding of public political meetings; such authorization was as a rule granted. Apart from the Movimiento de Unificación Nacional de la Guinea Ecuatorial (MUNGE) and the Movimiento Nacional de Liberación de la Guinea Ecuatorial (MONALIGE), which were based in the Territory, there was the Idea Popular de la Guinea Ecuatorial (IPGE) which was handicapped by lack of organization and financial support and had recently decided to merge with MUNGE. Political activity had recently increased during the period preceding the Sub-Committee's visit.

113. As regards the suggestion advanced in some quarters for the separation of Fernando Póo and Río Muni, the Commissioner-General stated that the Spanish Government was giving the matter careful study. It was a recent development. On the question of independence, the Commissioner-General stated that the Territory would find it difficult to maintain itself economically, without support from Spain. Political independence was not impossible if such support were available. It would be difficult to predict, however, when the Territory would be ready for independence unless the people reached agreement among themselves on the question. With regard to the electoral system, his feeling was that there was a majority in favour of the future application of universal adult suffrage, but that there was no enthusiasm for its extension to women.

114. On the Sub-Committee's return to New York, it received a communication from the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations in which he stated on behalf of the Commissioner-General and in response to the request previously made by the Sub-Committee to the latter that an examination of the records had revealed no information regarding the submission to the Spanish Government of a formal petition for independence by the autonomous administration. Although on one occasion a concrete proposal of this nature was discussed in the Governing Council, it obtained only one favourable vote and was therefore rejected.

F. Meeting with the Civil Governor of Río Muni

115. On 23 August 1966, the Sub-Committee held a meeting with the Civil Governor of Río Muni, Mr. Simon Ngomo Ndumu Asumu. At this meeting the Civil Governor informed the Sub-Committee that in his opinion independence should be granted to Equatorial Guinea but that in terms of the organizational requirements the Territory was not yet prepared for it. The reasons for this situation were the small size of the population and the division of the nationalist movement into three groups, namely MUNGE, MONALIGE and IPGE.

116. He himself had been associated with all these groups, beginning with MONALIGE, the original leaders of which were people from Río Muni, resident in Fernando Póo. Later he had been affiliated to IPGE which was originally based in Río Muni. However IPGE had adopted a platform which included a plan to merge the Territory with Cameroon; this plan had been unacceptable to him and to a large number of IPGE's supporters. The leaders of IPGE had subsequently gone into exile owing partly to restrictions imposed on their activity by the Government. In an effort to establish a single united political movement, MUNGE had been formed on 30 November 1963, following a conference in which representatives of all sections of the population including the various mayors participated. He was in sympathy with the objectives of this party, particularly those relating to the question of independence. The continued existence of the other political parties stemmed partly from their discontent with the distribution of official posts after the elections.

117. As to relative strength of the different parties, the Civil Governor said that from documentary evidence and taking account of the alliance between MUNGE and IPGE, MUNGE appeared to have the largest membership; his personal impression

however, was that MONALIGE had a larger following among the people, especially in Río Muni. In Fernando Póo their relative strength was about the same. The alliance between IPGE and MUNGE had become operative in Río Muni but not in Fernando Póo where talks were still in progress. Neither MUNGE nor MONALIGE was completely satisfied with the performance of the present Governing Council, and wished to correct the defects in the present system.

118. With regard to the existing electoral system, the Civil Governor did not think it inadequate to the needs of the Territory after independence, considering that the structure of the government after independence would be different from that of the autonomous administration. In his official capacity he could not criticize the General Assembly, which consisted of the legitimate representatives of the people. In his personal capacity, he thought that a change could be made in the system in order to give the President of the Governing Council a greater say in the choice of members of the Council, with whom he had to work as a team.

119. Explaining his views on the question of independence, the Civil Governor stated that in referring to the organizational requirements for independence, he had in mind the importance of co-ordinating and harmonizing the ideas, objectives and efforts of the people in regard to independence. At the present time, there was an absence of dialogue between the political parties on the steps to be taken for the achievement of independence. Each of them desired independence but regarded itself as comprising the true and genuine leaders of the people.

120. On the method of appointment of Civil Governors, he stated that they were selected by the Spanish Government from a list of three candidates submitted to the Commissioner-General by the Governing Council. The Spanish Government's choice was usually dictated by the number of votes cast for each candidate in the Governing Council.

### III. CONSULTATIONS WITH THE PEOPLE OF THE TERRITORY

#### A. Meeting with the President of the Assembly

121. On its arrival on 19 August 1966, the Sub-Committee called on the President of the General Assembly, Mr. Enrique Gori Molubela. Some other members of the Assembly were present.

122. In a statement of welcome, Mr. Gori Molubela informed the Sub-Committee that it was the desire of all the people of Equatorial Guinea that the Territory should accede to independence. The problem was how and when. For his part, he hoped there would be no undue delay. He then gave a brief historical account of the Territory, calling attention in particular to the fact that the original population of Fernando Póo consisted of the Bubis, who numbered 40,000 in 1900 but were now only 18,000 in number. The influx of settlers from Nigeria and Sierra Leone was a recent development; the Nigerians numbered some 32,000. He added that the original population of Río Muni comprised the Fangs who were also to be found in Cameroon and Gabon.

123. Referring to the growth of political activity in the Territory, Mr. Gori Molubela mentioned that he had played a part in the initiatives leading to the dialogue with the Spanish Government, which resulted in the granting of autonomous status to Equatorial Guinea. Thus it was that he had participated in the foundation of the Movimiento Nacional de Liberación de la Guinea Ecuatorial (MONALIGE) in 1961.

124. He also noted that the Idea Popular de la Guinea Ecuatorial (IPGE) was founded in 1963 by a Cameroonian. Based in Río Muni, IPGE in its manifesto had then called for autonomy and independence with a view to federation with Cameroon. He was apprehensive about the future of Fernando Póo if federation with Cameroon came about. It was therefore understandable that proposals for the separation of Fernando Póo from Río Muni were gaining ground. In this connexion, he recalled that on 29 April 1965, the General Assembly had unanimously adopted a motion calling for a revision of the relationship between the two parts of the Territory before the expiry of the term of the present administration. IPGE was at the present time rent by divisions but had not renounced its demands for federation with Cameroon. The present situation was that it was the desire of the Bubis that Fernando Póo should be separated from Río Muni.

125. Further, Mr. Gori Molubela drew attention to a document prepared by him in which, according to him, he had attempted to present for the Sub-Committee's information an objective picture of the political situation, consistent with his position as member of the Santa Isabel Municipal Council, President of the Fernando Póo Provincial Council and of the General Assembly. In this document, he asserted that the fundamental characteristics of the Territory were its small size, the economic, human and cultural diversity and individuality of each of the two provinces, their lack of geographical contiguity and the difference in their ethnic composition.

126. The document also claimed that the unitary system of government had created tensions between Fernando Póo and Río Muni, which had been increased by the dominant position of people from the latter in the Government. In the economic sector, the situation had led to diffidence on the part of private enterprise which regarded a transitional political system as risky for capital investment.

127. According to the document, the right of the people to self-determination was not exhausted by their acceptance of the autonomous system in December 1963.

Evidence of this was to be found in the fact that the General Assembly and the Governing Council were considering two matters that presupposed the existence of this right. The first was the revision of the law governing the autonomous system, and the second was the separation of Fernando Póo and Río Muni.

128. Any consideration of the timing of independence should take into account a number of factors, including the small size and population of Equatorial Guinea, the fact that the Territory's economic situation was largely due to the preferential treatment that its products enjoyed on the Spanish market, and the possibility of annexation by neighbouring States with lower incomes.

129. Describing current political trends, the document submitted by Mr. Gori Molubela claimed that with individual exceptions, the people of Río Muni accepted the unitary system of government for the Territory as a whole, while the opposite position was held in varying degrees of intensity by the people of Fernando Póo. The people of Fernando Póo regarded unification as a fiction contrary to the true geographical human and cultural nature of the two parts of the Territory, which had no common history except for their experience of Spanish colonial rule. Further, the present system of government was in effect a restriction of the right to self-determination of the indigenous people of Fernando Póo. This system meant supremacy for Río Muni inasmuch as that province

commanded a majority in the Assembly and the Governing Council. In addition, Río Muni absorbed two thirds of the Territory's budgetary expenditure while contributing only one third of the revenue.

130. As regards the movement for independence, the document stated that while part of the population of the Territory was in favour of independence, there was no consensus on the subject. There was popular support, particularly in Fernando Póo, for association with Spain after independence under agreements covering defence and economic and technical aid. In the north of Río Muni there was strong sentiment in favour of association with Cameroon, and in the southern part the people tended to favour association with Gabon. However, the degree of association desired ranged from the mere maintenance of relations to federation.

131. In addition, the document submitted by Mr. Gori Molubela noted that political parties made their appearance in the Territory during the period preceding the autonomous system, their aim being almost exclusively to end colonial rule. They were the Idea Popular de la Guinea Ecuatorial (IPGE) which inclined towards federation with Cameroon, the Movimiento Nacional de Liberación de la Guinea Ecuatorial (MONALIGE) and the Movimiento de Unificación de la Guinea Ecuatorial (MUNGE). According to the document the activities of these parties had been on the decline since the introduction of the present system, which had absorbed many of their activities. In another document listing members of the General Assembly, Mr. Gori Molubela informed the Sub-Committee that of the eighteen members of that body, seven had originally been elected to municipal councils by the heads of families and the remainder represented the corporative bodies and co-operatives.

132. In conclusion Mr. Gori Molubela called attention to a speech which he made on 3 January 1966 concerning the principle of self-determination for the people of Fernando Póo. In that speech he expressed the determination of the people not to permit interference by any country in their political status. The people knew that some countries were simply awaiting the withdrawal of the Spanish presence, so as to take over Fernando Póo. The wish of the people was that any change in their status, in exercise of their legitimate right of self-determination, should be carried out solely by means of direct dialogue



between the Spanish Government and their true representatives. In this connexion he recalled the pledge recently given by the Head of State that Spain would defend the people's desire freely to decide for themselves, and to defend them against any outsiders who attempted to jeopardize their future.

B. Meetings with members of the Governing Council

133. On 19 August 1966, the Sub-Committee called on Mr. Bonifacio Ondo Edú, the President of the Governing Council and the following members of the Council: Mr. Francisco Macias Nguema, Vice-President, Mr. Aurelio Nicolas Itoha, Mr. Gustavo Watson Bueko, Mr. Luis Maho Sicacha, Mr. Román Borico Toichoa, Mr. Antonino Candido Nang, and Mr. Rafael Nsue Nchama. Following an exchange of courtesies there was a discussion which led to some revision of the programme proposed by the Governing Council for the Sub-Committee's visit.

134. On 20 August 1966, the Sub-Committee had a substantive meeting with the members of the Governing Council. Following is a summary of statements made by them, including their replies to questions put by members of the Sub-Committee.

135. Opening the discussion, Mr. Ondo Edú, member of MUNGE in 1964, observed that the people of Equatorial Guinea like the people of other dependent Territories looked forward to the attainment of independence. On the question of independence, he remarked that the Territory had been granted autonomous status without adequate preparation. In his view, a date should be set for the beginning of negotiations aimed at establishing the necessary preparatory arrangements for independence. He would elaborate on these views after his colleagues had expressed their opinions. He noted that elections would be held at the end of 1967 for the establishment of a new Governing Council after 15 July 1968, when the mandate of the present Council was due to expire.

136. Mr. Luis Maho Sicacha (Councillor for Information and Tourism) member of MONALIGE in 1964, stated that the performance of the present regime required improvement. The achievement of such improvement would itself constitute preparation for independence. The Territory was facing a number of pressing internal problems which called for solutions before the attainment of independence.

137. Mr. Aurelio Nicolas Itoha (Councillor for Labour), member of MUNGE in 1964, informed the Sub-Committee that during the conversations which led to the granting of autonomy, the participants from Equatorial Guinea had refrained from asking that the duration of the autonomous status be defined. They had agreed that a date for independence should be discussed only when the people of the Territory were ready for it. When that time came, the Government of the Territory would ask for independence, bearing in mind the assurances given by the Spanish Government that it would place no obstacles in the way of such a request. Consequently there was no need to fix a date at the present time.

138. Mr. Román Borico Toichoa (Councillor for Industry and Mines) member of MUNGE in 1964, associated himself with the views expressed by Mr. Nicolas Itoha. The fixing of a date for independence should be considered only when the Territory was ready for it. At the present time he did not consider that Equatorial Guinea had had adequate preparation.

134. Mr. Francisco Macias Nguema (Councillor for Public Works, Housing and Town Planning) member of MONALIGE in 1964, stated that the people of the Territory wanted to assume control over their own destiny. Lack of preparation could not and should not be a valid reason for the postponement of independence. In his opinion, a date for independence should be set immediately. This could be done through conversations with the Spanish Government. It was not the intention of the people that relations with Spain be severed at independence; rather, they looked forward to the maintenance of relations similar to those existing between Commonwealth countries and the United Kingdom. Independence, which should be achieved by peaceful means, would enable Equatorial Guinea to take its rightful place in the international community and in the Spanish-speaking world. While it could be said that the Territory was not sufficiently viable in economic terms, it should be recalled that no country had begun its independent existence in satisfactory economic conditions.

140. In conclusion Mr. Macias Nguema asked that a target date for independence should be set without delay, so that the experience of colonization might be brought to an end peacefully and without violence. His own suggestion was that 15 July 1967 would be a suitable date, inasmuch as that date would allow the time necessary for negotiations and for the drafting of a constitution consonant with

the aspirations of the people, which in his opinion should be the subject of a plebiscite. Referring to demands that were being made by some sections of the population for the separation of Fernando Póo and Río Muni, he stated that the question was one for the people as a whole to decide. However, he recalled that the example of other countries had shown that the problem was capable of resolution; problems of this kind were liable to arise when the different regions of a country were at different stages of economic development. Perhaps some sort of federal relationship might be the solution.

141. Mr. Rafael Nsue Nchama (Councillor for Agriculture), member of MUNGE in 1964, stated that in his view an early date should be fixed for the independence of the Territory. This view was shared by the people he represented. He thought that the date should be 15 July 1968 when the term of the present Governing Council was due to expire.

142. Mr. Gustavo Watson Bueko (Councillor for Health and Welfare) member of MUNGE in 1964, observed that the Basic Law itself envisaged the Territory as composed of two different parts. The people of Fernando Póo had attained a higher level of economic, social and educational development than those of Río Muni. It was in recognition of these differences that on 12 August 1966, a motion calling for the economic and administrative separation of Fernando Póo and Río Muni had been tabled in the Governing Council by himself and Messrs. Maho Sicacha, Borico Toichoa, and Nicolas Itoha. On 13 August 1966, the Governing Council had agreed, after a vote, to refer the motion to the General Assembly for consideration. The Assembly had not yet considered the motion. As regards independence, he thought it would be inappropriate and premature to set a date at the present time. The question of a date should be a subject for negotiation, which should begin without delay. He urged the Sub-Committee to ascertain the real wishes of the majority of the people, not those of an imaginary majority who lived in the urban areas and whose views were unrepresentative.

143. Mr. Antonino Candido Nang (Councillor for Education) member of MONALIGE in 1964, recalled that the Spanish Government had undertaken to grant independence if and when the people should ask for it. It was on this understanding that

the elections leading to the establishment of the autonomous Government, had taken place. He observed that the demonstrations that had taken place the previous day were all in favour of early independence. It was the duty of members of the Governing Council to reflect the views of the electorate. The attainment of independence was a necessary prelude to the consolidation of the freedom of the people, and to the decisions which the people needed to take as to the form of Government best suited to their needs and aspirations.

144. In a further statement, Mr. Maho Sicacha recalled that he was among those who had begun the struggle for independence and had appeared before United Nations bodies to testify in that connexion. In his opinion, a date should be set by the Commissioner-General for the opening of negotiations which would look towards the economic and administrative separation of Fernando Póo from Río Muni and the possible establishment, subsequently, of a federal relationship. These negotiations should also cover the question of the timing of independence.

145. Concluding the discussion, Mr. Ondó Edú informed the Sub-Committee that during 1962 he had been in exile for the sake of the independence of his country, and that he had appeared before the United Nations to request the granting of autonomy and independence. He felt bound to say, however, that during the current period of autonomy, the political solutions to the problems of the Territory, which had to be found before the attainment of independence, had not yet been achieved. In view of the small size and population of the Territory, its unsatisfactory economic situation, and the demands being made in some quarters for separation, it was not surprising that differences of view existed on the question of independence. Indeed, the present situation could well lead to conflict and violence. For his part, he resented all the talk about separation; the Territory had been one unit for more than a century; the talk of separation had only begun now that the Territory had an autonomous regime. For instance, the people of Río Muni had given their life for the Territory as a whole. While he was by no means opposed to independence, he had his doubts whether subsequent developments would be in the best interests of the people, unless a solution was found to the problems to which he had referred.

146. At a further meeting the same day between the Sub-Committee and members of the Governing Council, Mr. Ondó Edú appealed to his colleagues not to allow their differences to become too obvious. If separation was unavoidable, it should take place only after independence. However, unity was essential both for the achievement and for the maintenance of independence. In his opinion many of the prerequisites for the existence of a nation, such as homogeneity of population, economic viability, availability of administrative and other cadres, did not yet exist in the Territory.

147. He noted with deep regret that under the present system, he as President of the Governing Council did not have the power to select his colleagues. It was therefore not surprising that no consensus existed among members of the Council on the timing of independence. Having regard to the problems of the country, it was his view that Spain had saddled the Council with a "broken dish". Neither he nor the Council had the necessary authority to initiate solutions to these problems.

148. He also said that he would welcome advice from the Sub-Committee on the question of independence. While there were some Spanish elements who would rather see the country destroyed than be denied the opportunity to exploit it, neither the Council nor the Spanish Government wanted this to happen. It was his hope that before the end of the term of the present Council, agreement would be reached on the changes necessary for the proper functioning of the autonomous regime as a preliminary to independence. In his opinion, negotiations with Spain should be initiated before the expiry of his Council's mandate, in order to establish constitutional, economic and other arrangements preparatory to independence. If the Spanish Government proved unwilling to co-operate in this respect, he would himself submit a petition to the United Nations.

149. As regards the electoral system, Mr. Ondó Edú saw no objection to the present arrangements for elections to the General Assembly, but the fact that he had no say in the choice of members of the Governing Council was deplorable. Regrettable also was the fact that he had no executive powers whatever. His position was, therefore, no more than nominal.

150. Mr. Nicolas Itoha explained that, in saying earlier that there was no need at the present time to set a date for independence, what he had in mind was not an indefinite postponement of a decision. His own thinking was that prior to any decisions regarding independence, the internal problems of the Territory should be resolved by the economic and administrative separation of Fernando Póo and Río Muni.

151. Mr. Borico Toichoa, expressed agreement with the views of Mr. Nicolas Itoha. He added that independence would be an empty word if it meant that the Territory would continue to rely heavily on external assistance. In this connexion he observed that 90 per cent of the technicians in Equatorial Guinea came from Europe, the Territory lacked adequate roads, the army was maintained by Spain, and there was only a handful of indigenous lawyers, and no engineers. It would be some five years before these inadequacies were met to the extent necessary to justify accession to independence.

152. Mr. Candido Nang remarked that there was no educational programme in existence geared to the manpower needs of the Territory in anticipation of independence. This observation applied also to other fields. As Councillor responsible for education, he had no power to establish such a programme.

153. Replying to questions, Mr. Ondó Edú stated that the Commissioner-General played no part in the appointment of members of the Governing Council, and did not participate in the Council's meetings. Prior to the inauguration of the autonomous regime, political parties had to operate in a clandestine manner. Although political parties had not been accorded official recognition since that time, their existence was unofficially tolerated. They were required to obtain official authorization for the holding of public meetings. Mr. Macias Nguema intervened at this juncture to say that, in practice, MONALIGE was rarely granted such authorization for its meetings.

154. Continuing, Mr. Ondó Edú said that in response to a Spanish suggestion that existing political parties should merge into a single movement, a congress of local and foreign-based political groupings had been held in Bata shortly after the inauguration of the autonomous regime. The congress had failed to agree to a unified political movement. Another conference had taken place in Moka in early 1965, at

which the political parties operating in Fernando Póo had agreed to a temporary halt in their activities. This was the reason for the reluctance of himself and his colleagues to be identified with any particular political grouping at the present time.

155. Mr. Nicolas Itoha drew attention to a written communication which he had submitted to the Governing Council jointly with Mr. Borico Toichoa, Mr. Watson Bueko, and Mr. Maho Sicacha, on 3 June 1966, and commended it to the serious attention of the Sub-Committee. In this communication, the authors contended that the political unity on which the autonomous regime was based was fictitious. This political unity presupposed the existence of a region which in reality was non-existent. Not only were Fernando Póo and Río Muni not geographically contiguous, but their people had no common ethnic origin, culture, history or language. Their hopes that this lack of a basis for unity might be remedied by experience had not been fulfilled.

156. According to the communication, there had been a clear-cut tendency on the part of the Río Muni group in the Governing Council to appropriate all benefits for that province; while Fernando Póo was responsible for 81 per cent of the budgetary income of the Territory, Río Muni accounted for 83 per cent of the expenditure. A contraband traffic in cacao and coffee had sprung up between Río Muni and neighbouring countries, which threatened Fernando Póo with economic collapse. According to the authors, there had been considerable emigration from Río Muni to Fernando Póo, resulting in profound changes in the population structure of the latter. Friction and tension existed among the Bubis, the principal ethnic group on the island, and the Pámues of Río Muni, which had been sharpened by the present regime.

157. In conclusion, the authors claimed that the right of self-determination did not belong exclusively to the aggregate of the people living in the Territory. To deny this right to the people of Fernando Póo, who constituted a homogeneous group, would be contrary to elementary international standards. In order to ensure to the people of Fernando Póo the exercise of this right, they called for the economic and administrative separation of the two parts of the Territory. Since the necessary legislative measures were within the competence of the Spanish Government,

this demand did not require endorsement by a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly. The question should be put to a plebiscite in which the votes of the people would be valid only for their province of origin.

158. The Sub-Committee held another meeting with members of the Governing Council on 21 August 1966, at which the latter elaborated their views regarding the question of independence.

159. Mr. Nicolas Itoha stated that when independence was in sight, following the negotiations to which he had referred in an earlier statement, consideration could then be given to the role, if any, which the United Nations might play in the arrangements for independence. The United Nations would be approached if its assistance was required. On the general question of independence he had nothing to add to the views he had previously expressed.

160. Mr. Borico Toichoa saw no need for United Nations intervention in the electoral or other processes leading to independence. However, he would not oppose consideration being given to inviting the United Nations to be present in an observer capacity. United Nations intervention would be called for only if the Spanish Government withheld independence from the Territory when the people asked for it.

161. Mr. Macias Nguema and Mr. Nsue Nchama expressed the opinion that given the situation in the Territory, the effective presence of the United Nations was necessary during the holding of any plebiscite or election that might be held.

162. Mr. Watson Bueko remarked that there had been no United Nations observers during the plebiscite held in December 1963 on the Basic Law. The plebiscite was nevertheless free and properly conducted. It was immaterial to him whether or not the United Nations should be invited to send observers to a future plebiscite. However, care should be taken to ensure that such observers were completely impartial and honourable men, who would not seek to impose their own ideas, or intervene between the people and the Spanish Government. He envisaged a plebiscite at which people would indicate whether or not they desired independence, followed by negotiations and by elections. The function of United Nations observers, if any, should be limited to ascertaining whether or not the voting was free.



163. Mr. Candido Nang believed that United Nations participation in bringing the Territory to independence would ensure that the result was in keeping with the wishes of the people. He thought that the assistance of the United Nations in this connexion would be necessary.

164. Mr. Maho Sicacha saw no reason why the United Nations should not be invited to observe all the processes leading to independence. He believed that it would be useful to have United Nations assistance in this respect.

165. Mr. Ondó Edú stated that in order to dissipate any doubts about the genuineness of the processes leading to independence and about their outcome, the United Nations should be invited to send observers. In this way, the intentions and performance of Spain in relation to the Territory would be clearly vindicated.

166. As regards changes which should be made in the present electoral system, Mr. Macias Nguema and Mr. Nsue Nchama expressed themselves in favour of direct elections under a system of universal suffrage for all persons, including women, over 21 years of age. Mr. Macias Nguema noted that the women had complained against their ineligibility to vote. Mr. Candido Nang was in agreement, but stated that he would prefer the voting age to be reduced to 18; he saw no reason for withholding the vote from persons of 18 years and over, since that was adjudged to be the minimum age for the assumption of marital responsibilities.

167. In Mr. Watson Bueko's opinion, universal suffrage would result in democracy of the inorganic kind. It might work in highly developed countries, but not in Equatorial Guinea where in his view organic democracy was more appropriate. Under a system of organic democracy the different sectors of the national life were represented in governmental organs. He therefore preferred the continuance of the present system, with some adjustments to meet actual needs and circumstances. In view of the difficulty the people had in distinguishing political platforms, personalities and interests, it was more appropriate for them to be represented according to the interest groups and sectors to which they belonged.

168. Mr. Borico Toichoa had no comment to make on this question. Mr. Nicolas Itaho expressed himself in favour of the present system but said he was not irrevocably opposed to universal adult suffrage. Mr. Maho Sicacha and Mr. Ondó Edú favoured universal adult suffrage.

169. Referring to reports that only Africans were sent to gaol on conviction for criminal offences, Mr. Watson Bueko said that these allegations were true of the period before autonomy but did not apply to the present time. Spanish residents who were found guilty of minor offences were subject to expulsion from the Territory. Those who committed serious offences were sent to gaol outside the Territory, usually in Las Palmas. However, pending trial, such persons could be remanded in custody in the local gaols.

170. Mr. Macias Nguema asserted that the administration of justice in the Territory was discriminatory. He pointed out that all the Court judges were Spanish. It was the responsibility of the United Nations to secure the enjoyment by the people of equal rights. Mr. Candido Nang added that it was not the laws themselves that deserved condemnation but their discriminatory application. The African and the Spanish people were subject to the same laws, but the application of these laws as well as the punishments meted out for their infraction were different.

Mr. Nsue Nchama said that he had yet to hear of a Spanish resident being gaoled in the Territory after conviction.

171. Mr. Borico Toichoa did not think that any useful purpose was being served by recalling incidents which had taken place in the distant past. He noted that the Territory was not yet independent. Mr. Maho Sicacha stated that, in his experience as a practising lawyer, the Spanish residents rarely committed criminal offences warranting their being sent to gaol. Those that did were sent to prisons outside the Territory which met the minimum conditions laid down in the Spanish penal code. There were no such prisons in Equatorial Guinea. Mr. Ondó Edú pointed out that the administration of justice was not within the competence of the Governing Council. He himself had had occasion to complain to the Commissioner-General about excessive leniency to offenders, including some Africans.

172. In response to a question, Mr. Nsue Nchama confirmed the statement made to the Sub-Committee by some petitioners that a law of 4 May 1948, which was still in force, limited land ownership by the African population to four hectares per person.

173. On the question of political prisoners, Mr. Macias Nguema said that though there had been several in the past, there were to his knowledge only three or four, who had come from outside the Territory, in gaol at the present time. Previously

the number stood at six or seven, but one had been released as a result of representations made by him.

174. Mr. Nicolas Itaho denied that there were any political prisoners.

Mr. Candido Nang observed that while there might not be persons in prison for political activity, it was not difficult to secure the imprisonment of persons expressing unwelcome political opinions by arranging their conviction on criminal charges. He knew of one such case.

175. In conclusion, the members of the Governing Council stated their views on the question of whether the people of Equatorial Guinea were ready for independence.

Mr. Candido Nang believed that they were. Mr. Nsue Nchama agreed that they were but thought that independence should be granted not immediately, but by July 1968.

Mr. Macias Nguema believed strongly that the Territory should accede to independence by July 1967. Mr. Maho Sicacha's preference was for the initiation of negotiations immediately with a view to independence in two years' time. Mr. Nicolas Itoha did not consider that the people were ready for independence; they could only be said to be ready if independence was regarded as a lottery in which the people would participate in the hope of fortuitous benefits. Mr. Watson Bueko felt that negotiations should begin in the very near future aimed at the fixing of a date for independence.

176. At the end of the meeting Mr. Macias Nguema submitted to the Committee a communication signed by himself, Mr. Candido Nang, and Mr. Nsue Nchama, on the question of independence for the Territory. In the communication the authors stated that nothing was of greater importance to the people than that the Territory should attain independence. According to them the governmental organs of the present regime did not possess the necessary powers to bring about the changes required to promote the spiritual and material welfare of the people. They recalled that in various letters they had addressed to the Spanish Government, they had requested Spain or, if necessary, the competent international organizations first to set a date for independence which should precede the expiry of the term of the present administration, and secondly the establishment of representative committees to formulate, with outside, including United Nations, assistance, if required, the agreements which would form the basis of independence.

177. In a final statement addressed to the Sub-Committee on 24 August 1966, Mr. Ondó Edú said that the autonomous status should be terminated forthwith and that negotiations for independence should be initiated immediately, with a view to the Territory acceding to independence in two years. If the period of these negotiations, as proposed by the Governing Council, did not meet with a whole-hearted welcome from Spain, and if as a result the people of Equatorial Guinea should press for independence prematurely, he would not consider himself responsible for the consequences. The two-year period of negotiation which had been proposed would be a period of preparation and of experience in the assumption of greater responsibility and freedom of action. In conclusion, he emphasized that unity and indissolubility must govern the decisions of the people if a peaceful solution to the problems of the Territory was to be achieved.

C. Meetings with groups and individuals affiliated to MONALIGE

178. Before undertaking its visit to the Territory the Sub-Committee had before it a number of petitions from leaders of the Movimiento Nacional de Liberación de la Guinea Ecuatorial (MONALIGE) (A/AC.109/PET.529 and Add.1).

179. In these petitions, the leaders of MONALIGE declared that they regarded independence as the best means of solving the institutional as well as socio-economic problems of Equatorial Guinea. They also reiterated their previous demand that a date for the attainment of independence should be fixed before the end of the term of the present Administration. The fixing of a date for independence was, in their view, justified by the political maturity of the people of the Territory. Further, the economic position of the Territory, to which the Spanish Government had repeatedly drawn attention, gave it a more valid right to independence than many other countries which had acceded to independence in less favourable circumstances.

180. In this connexion they recalled that in a speech made on 31 December 1965, the Head of State of Spain spoke of his steadfast intention to proceed, without delay or hesitation, with efforts to promote the progress of the people of Equatorial Guinea so that they might be fully prepared to meet the future; in the same speech, he had declared that, in any event, Spain would defend their desire to make a free decision. Further, the petitioners recalled that in a statement made at Algiers on

20 June 1966, the President of the Governing Council had said that, according to his official information, it was the express and formal desire of the Spanish Government that "Equatorial Guinea, whenever it so desired, should choose its own political future, that is to say, complete independence".

181. The petitioners also deplored the manoeuvres, which according to them, had been carried out with the approval of certain members of the autonomous Government with a view to keeping the indigenous people of Equatorial Guinea in a position of political, economic and social subordination. They drew attention to the failure to evolve reasonable standards for the Africanization of the administration and to gross discrimination between Spanish Europeans and Africans doing the same work in the public service, as regards grading, remuneration and other terms of service. These conditions were responsible for the strike by civil servants that took place from 20 to 25 April 1966.

182. Moreover, the petitioners complained that the activities of MONALIGE, which had the support of a sizeable majority of the population of Equatorial Guinea, were being systematically hampered with the result that the will of the people was being stifled. For instance, a MONALIGE meeting scheduled for 19 December 1965 for the purpose of submitting a formal proposal for independence had been suspended by the Spanish authorities. Subsequently, in January 1966, the leadership of MONALIGE had addressed a letter to the Spanish Government requesting that Spanish military forces stationed in the Territory should cease all armed action or reprisals in respect of political activity relating to independence and that a date be set immediately for the early independence of the Territory through a plebiscite to be held under United Nations auspices. The letter also requested that MONALIGE be granted full freedom of action as well as permission to hold discussions with the Spanish Government regarding the timing and conditions of independence. Nothing but silence had greeted this letter.

183. According to the petitioners, an illustration of the Spanish Government's immobility was its failure to act upon a motion adopted by the General Assembly of the Territory on 29 April 1966 to suspend the Governing Council for its lack of authority and prestige among the people, for its indifferent administration and for squandering public funds. This motion had not even been officially forwarded to the Spanish Government by the Commissioner-General.

184. In addition, certain metropolitan institutions had been giving financial support to a pro-colonialist movement known as MUNGE which was in favour of the continued presence of Spain in the Territory. The neo-colonialist manoeuvres of the Spanish Government had resulted in an artificial micro-nationalism among the indigenous population of Fernando Póo aimed at separating that province from the territorial unit and keeping it aligned with Spanish interests. For this reason, MONALIGE solemnly affirmed the inviolable unity of Fernando Póo and Río Muni, which must attain independence as a single political unit.

185. The extent to which acts of the Governing Council were subject to prior censorship and dictation by the Spanish authorities was, according to the petitioners, shown by an incident that had taken place recently. During May 1966, the Governing Council had submitted to the Spanish Government a general report on the Territory, in which it noted, inter alia, that relations between itself and the General Assembly had not been harmonious and that no progress had been made in regard to several projects provided for in the current Development Plan. In the report the Governing Council also stressed the urgent need to annul existing legislation prohibiting the establishment of foreign companies and the influx of foreign capital. In early June 1966, the Director-General of African Settlements and Provinces of the Spanish Government had visited the Territory, held a meeting with the Governing Council, and obtained its assent to a revised version of the report which contained no reference to the above-mentioned matters.

186. In pressing its demand for independence at the earliest possible date, MONALIGE was ready to offer, by way of concessions, guarantees for the life and property of the Spanish population, freedom of entry to the Territory for Spanish immigrants, and the maintenance on a priority basis of political, economic, cultural and other relations with Spain.

187. On 19 August 1966, a group of nineteen petitioners affiliated to MONALIGE, led by Mr. Tomas Alfredo King, a lawyer, called on the Sub-Committee at Santa Isabel. Following a description of the ethnic composition of the Territory, the petitioners informed the Sub-Committee that MONALIGE, founded twenty years earlier, was representative of all the ethnic groups in the Territory, and was committed to the struggle for the freedom and welfare of the people. None of its present

membership held official positions in the autonomous Government. There was in existence another political grouping known as MUNGE, the formation of which, according to them, had been inspired by divisive colonialist manoeuvres and by personal ambition. MUNGE consisted of persons who held or aspired to official positions and had received special favours. They recalled that Mr. Ondó Edú who was a leader of MUNGE used to be a member of MONALIGE. In conclusion, they informed the Sub-Committee that the people were unanimous in their support of MONALIGE's demand for immediate independence.

188. On 20 August 1966, the Sub-Committee had a meeting with the same group of petitioners. Mr. Alfredo King informed the Sub-Committee that MONALIGE had one clear aim, namely immediate independence. The people of the Territory were no more than fourth class citizens, who were deprived of the rights, legal protection and privileges extended to the Spanish residents.

189. He noted, for instance, that some 99 per cent of the arable land was under the control of the colonizers. The Spanish settlers were permitted to acquire land freely and without limitation but the indigenous people were limited to four hectares per person. If an indigenous person wished to acquire land beyond this limit, he could only do so in the name of another member of his family who was required to submit proof that he was cultivating the land himself. Evidence of these disabilities could be found in the relevant legislation and in the administration of this legislation as shown in the official gazette. He added that it was possible in theory for an indigenous person to acquire additional land under the public auction system. However, not merely were these auctions held only in Madrid, but they were open to all Spanish citizens, corporations and companies, with the result that an indigenous person was clearly at an overwhelming disadvantage. The public auction system had led to the existence of a large number of absentee landlords, and to the establishment of huge plantations such as ENASA which was Spanish owned, and controlled 10,000 hectares of land.

190. Commerce was almost entirely in the hands of the Spanish residents. Prospective African traders enjoyed no protection from the law and were, therefore, in no position to compete in this field. The situation had been aggravated by recent legislation which conferred on Spanish residents the same rights as the indigenous people. He noted in this connexion that the people of Equatorial Guinea did not

enjoy the same rights in Spain as Spanish citizens. It was not surprising that there were no important African businessmen, even in cacao and coffee.

191. Referring to labour conditions, Mr. Alfredo King stated the labour structure was pyramidal in structure, with the Spanish residents at the top and the African workers at the base. The wage system was highly discriminatory, and the legislation in force tended to perpetuate this situation. Imported African workers, who usually were employed on two-year contracts, were paid miserable wages and were not permitted to transfer to other positions or to other parts of the Territory before the expiry of their contracts. The minimum wage set by the law, namely 900 pesetas per month for an eight-hour day, was grossly unsatisfactory. Further, imported African labourers in fact received only 50 per cent of their wages locally; the remainder was held in trust and paid to them only when they were about to leave the Territory. No provision existed for pensions or social security benefits for African workers. In contrast, Spanish residents working as agricultural foremen or supervisors received at least 5,100 pesetas per month.

192. African workers enjoyed only twenty-four days vacation every two years. Imported African workers were required to renew their contracts within ten days of its expiry; if not they had to be deported. Indigenous African workers were under the same obligation; if not they faced imprisonment under the vagrancy laws. All recruitment of African labour had to be carried out under government supervision. On the other hand, the Spanish workers who also came to the Territory on two-year contracts enjoyed not only fifteen days vacation every year, but they were granted six months' home leave, with passages paid for themselves and their families, at the end of their contracts.

193. Concerning the administration of justice, Mr. Alfredo King stated that only African people were sent to gaol on conviction of criminal offences. Conditions in these gaols were appalling. By contrast, Spanish residents guilty of these offences were never persecuted, or if they were, they were sentenced to small fines. It was only for serious offences like manslaughter that they were tried and, if convicted, sentenced to imprisonment; in such cases they were gaoled in Spain, not in Equatorial Guinea. If a Spanish resident were to be remanded in custody pending trial, he would be installed in a hotel and be provided with free meals.



194. In the field of political activity, MONALIGE was the only genuine movement. It had consistently struggled for independence. MONALIGE had formerly numbered Mr. Ondó Edú and Mr. Maho Sicacha among its membership but having assumed official positions, they had become conservative in their political outlook. MONALIGE desired Equatorial Guinea to accede to independence as one unit, or if this was impossible, as a federation with communications, transport, defence and foreign affairs controlled by a central government. MONALIGE wanted to see negotiations initiated without delay for the setting of a date for independence. The basis of future co-operation with Spain would be one of the subjects to be taken up during these negotiations. It was the wish of MONALIGE that independence be granted immediately, but since the negotiations it envisaged were, if begun forthwith, unlikely to be concluded before the end of 1966, they were prepared to wait until the beginning of 1967 for formal accession to independence.

195. The electoral system, according to the petitioners from MONALIGE, was undemocratic. In effect, two-thirds of the members of the Territory's governmental organs were appointed by the Spanish Government and related interests. The much-vaunted affirmative vote of the people in the 1963 plebiscite was the result of manoeuvres by the Spanish authorities. The clergy had also wielded powerful influence. The concern of the Spanish Government to protect the Spanish residents against any manifestation of the legitimate grievances of the African people was reflected in the continued presence in the Territory of a large number of Spanish soldiers. There were three gun-boats in the territorial waters, full of marines. Apart from the police force, there were over 100 other military personnel, "civil guards", armed with modern weapons stationed in the Territory. These civil guards went about among the people making demonstrations of armed force, and interfered in the political and social life of the Territory as well as in many matters of civil administration. They had instructions to repress any kind of political demonstrations. Also based in the Territory was a squadron of military aircraft, which flew over the Territory every day.

196. The petitioners then submitted to the Sub-Committee, as an aide-mémoire, a communication signed by themselves and twenty-two others. In addition to the views orally conveyed by the petitioners, the communication contained the following information.

197. The most fervent wish of the people of Equatorial Guinea was for immediate independence, that is to say, before the end of 1966, to be achieved by means of a referendum. They regarded independence as a starting point for building the country's future in freedom and without harmful interference.

198. The dominance of the Spanish community in the economic life of the country was shown by the fact that the governing body of the Executive Board of the Chamber of Commerce, comprising fourteen members, included only two indigenous persons. In the cacao section of the Chamber, only two of the nine members were indigenous persons. All the members of the sections concerned with coffee, miscellaneous products, commerce and banking, and industries were Spanish.

199. Of the total exports of cacao from Fernando Póo amounting to 28,700,000 kilogrammes only 3,980,000 derived from indigenous farmers. All coffee exports came from Spanish producers, except for an insignificant amount which was sold locally to the Spanish people. All the banana production was similarly in the hands of the Spanish people. Of the 7,600 workers imported from Nigeria, all but 180 were in the employment of Spanish enterprises. Of the 32,000 hectares of land being worked in Fernando Póo, only 2,170 were farmed by indigenous persons. Of the sales made by the Chamber of Agriculture, amounting to some 200 million pesetas, only 4 million went to indigenous people. Out of 14,500,000 pesetas worth of goods exported, permits worth only 850,000 pesetas were granted to indigenous persons. Not a single permit covering the 17 million pesetas worth of imports was granted to an indigenous person.

200. Following the meeting, the Sub-Committee received a communication from a group of indigenous workers from Río Muni affiliated to MONALIGE, in which they protested the failure of the Spanish Government to promote the welfare of the people. According to this communication, there was grave disparity in the wages paid to indigenous and to Spanish workers. The Spanish worker received a monthly wage of 10,000 pesetas, and 12,000 if he was married, as well as the right to such benefits as a furnished house, and seven months' home leave with passages paid, while the indigenous worker was paid only 1,500 pesetas out of which he had to meet his bills for housing, furniture, etc. It was the impression of the authors, from speeches made by the President, that only petitioners who had appeared before the United Nations had the right even to complain about the wage system. Grievances over wages had led to two strikes during the first two years

...

of the autonomous régime. The first involved civil servants and the second was against the Compañía de Telecomunicaciones, S.A. Two more strikes had been announced.

201. The Spanish Government had failed to keep its promise to grant freedom to the Territory, on the pretext that the people were not ready. Meanwhile it had done very little to foster economic development. They had suffered persecution because of their ardent desire for freedom; indeed a few days earlier, the civil guards had confiscated and destroyed the placards they intended to use in a welcoming demonstration for the Sub-Committee. In contrast, when a Minister of the Spanish Government was due to arrive, all workers were given a holiday.

202. In another communication submitted to the Sub-Committee at the same time the President of MONALIGE, Mr. Pastor B. Torao Sikara, in his own name and on behalf of MONALIGE, recalled that in speeches delivered in late 1964 and 1965, the Head of State of Spain had stated that Spain would not stand in the way of Equatorial Guinea, but would grant it independence when it so requested. He also referred to a subsequent statement by the representative of Spain in the United Nations in September 1965 that it was for the people of Equatorial Guinea to request and set a date for independence. In view of these statements, the Sub-Committee should use its influence to ensure that independence was granted to the Territory on 6 January 1967, and that negotiations with Spain be initiated forthwith.

203. The Sub-Committee held a further meeting with seventy-six representatives of MONALIGE, including twelve women, on 21 August 1966. At this meeting, Mr. Alfredo King explained that all land was owned by and could only be acquired from and through the Spanish Government. The public auction system for land acquisition was established by a law promulgated on 4 May 1948. Outside the public auction system the acquisition of land as previously indicated was limited to four hectares per indigenous person. However, another law promulgated on 23 December 1948 allowed the colonizers seventy-five hectares per person.

204. Referring to exploitation by the Spanish colonizers, the petitioners submitted documents which established that the vast majority of imported African labourers worked for Spanish employers or on Spanish-owned plantations. They also produced examples of contracts granted to African and Spanish workers which in their view showed the gross disparity in wages and other terms of service accorded to the two

categories. The petitioners further stated that the forces of law and order were excessive for the needs of the Territory and that their numbers were obviously intended to intimidate the people and to discourage political activity aimed at independence. For instance, the Spanish civil guard consisted of 1 major (comandante), 3 captains (capitanes), 8 lieutenants (tenientes), 2 staff sergeants (brigadas), 4 non-commissioned officers (sub-oficiales), 19 sergeants (sargentos), 49 corporals (cabos), 8 privates first-class (guardias primeros), 8 buglers (cornetas), 20 telegraph operators (guardias telegrafistas) and 247 privates (guardias).

205. The petitioners further stated that they were opposed to the idea of separation of Fernando Póo from Río Muni advanced in certain quarters. It was their wish to continue relations with Spain, but this question was a matter for negotiations on a basis of equality with the Spanish Government after independence. These and other negotiations should be carried out by the genuine representatives of the people, elected through free elections, rather than persons representing Spanish interests. If there was any doubt about the aspirations to which MONALIGE was giving expression, they should be put to a plebiscite under United Nations supervision in the Territory as a whole, in the same conditions as the plebiscite on the Basic Law. In conclusion the petitioners urged that the present electoral system be scrapped in favour of a system based on the principle of one man one vote. Primary organs elected on this basis could, if necessary, elect representatives to organs at a higher level. The important factor, however, was the establishment of direct elections on the basis of universal adult suffrage for persons 21 years and over, with the electorate of both parts of the Territory voting together as one unit.

206. In illustration of the workings of the present electoral system, the petitioners stated that Mr. Pastor Torao and Mr. Abiléo Bibao, who had received the highest votes for election to the village and municipal councils, had for some unknown reason, been left out of the Government. On the other hand, several members of the General Assembly occupied their present positions by means other than elections, or alternatively, had secured very few votes in the elections. Indeed Mr. Rondó, one of the members of the Governing Council, who had recently died, had said clearly that he had not contested the elections, but had been nominated

by the Spanish Government to occupy that position. For these reasons, MONALIGE tolerated, rather than recognized the Governing Council and the General Assembly. 207. The petitioners also called attention to a provision of the Basic Law which requires that after two years, new elections should be held to replace one half of the members of the municipal councils, the General Assembly and the Governing Council. This provision had been waived, for fear that people hostile to the Spanish Government might succeed the present members of these bodies, who were personae gratae. In conclusion, they stated that there was no freedom of political activity in the Territory. The only newspaper was government-owned and did not publish any views except those in favour of the Government.

208. At this juncture, the women in the MONALIGE group asked to be permitted to submit a petition bearing twenty-five signatures. In presenting the petition, they stated that all the women of the Territory were concerned about the problems of the Territory but that their presence before the Sub-Committee in such small numbers was due to the fear of their husbands. The Sub-Committee should realize that it was their only hope and salvation.

209. In their petition, the women requested total, complete and immediate independence for Equatorial Guinea, and the establishment of a federal government in a democratic manner. They hoped that the Sub-Committee would give them its unconditional support in the United Nations. They were unhappy with the vague, ambiguous so-called autonomy imposed by the Spanish Government. They demanded the immediate initiation of negotiations with a view to the granting of independence not later than 6 January 1967.

210. At a meeting with other representatives of MONALIGE in Bata on 22 August 1966, a further petition was submitted to the Sub-Committee. In the petition, the authors stated that after 165 years of colonial rule, Spain had not trained even a hundred people to carry out technical and professional functions. It had failed to grant an adequate number of scholarships to indigenous students. There was a lack of social justice in the Territory; for example a Spanish national often without any professional training was better paid than an African trained for the same work. In spite of the granting of autonomy, no programme existed for the attainment of independence or for the training of the indigenous population for the tasks to be carried out after independence. Various leaders who had been

campaigning for independence, including Mr. Acacio Mane Ela, Mr. Mongomayene, and Mr. Edjodjomo, had been arrested and shot by the civil guard without trial.

211. In addition, the authors of the petition rejected the idea of the separation of Fernando Póo from Río Muni. The unanimous desire of the people of the Territory was for complete and immediate independence and they accordingly requested the United Nations immediately to set a date for independence and the transfer of all powers to the people.

212. Further, the petitioners drew attention to a letter bearing 460 signatures and 165 thumb prints which the leaders of MONALIGE had addressed to the Head of the Spanish State on 15 August 1966. In this letter, MONALIGE, which claimed to represent more than 90 per cent of the population, recalled statements by various Spanish officials and representatives to the effect that Spain would never oppose self-determination for the people of Equatorial Guinea or their desire to change their present status, if the majority so wished. They also recalled statements made by the President of the Governing Council that it was for the people of the Territory to set a date for independence. In view of these statements, and bearing in mind the political maturity of the people, to which the Spanish Minister for Information and Tourism had recently attested, it was the wish of MONALIGE that the Territory should accede to independence by 1 January 1967. However, this wish did not imply a desire to break off relations with Spain.

213. In conclusion, MONALIGE demanded that a committee freely elected by the people should be set up to draft the necessary agreements on which independence would be based. These agreements would cover such matters as respect for Spanish investments, recognition of the rights of Spain in economic, commercial, social and other matters, and free entry for all Spanish people wishing to work in the Territory. Finally MONALIGE asked that the present rulers should take no repressive measures against anyone for political activity and that it should be accorded official recognition.

214. In another petition bearing 1,008 signatures submitted to the Sub-Committee on the same day, MONALIGE gave an historical account of Equatorial Guinea since its first contact with Spain in 1472. From that time onwards, the Territory had suffered annexation by conquest or by unequal treaties, colonialism of different kinds, and the repression of all political activity aimed at liberation. The

authors of the petition stated that the indigenous inhabitants had no political or civil rights. The Spanish Government did not permit the formation of parties which were truly representative of the people, and if such parties were formed, it persecuted or imprisoned the leaders. Among these leaders were Messrs. Mariano Eyama, Pablo Nsue Edu, Martin Nvo Abaga, Enrique Nguema Ngonu, Florentino Nculu Esono, Francisco Oyono Mico, Agapita Mangué, Miguel Elo, Mbiang Mba, and others. The forcible repression by Spain of protesting voices and of national liberation movements had forced large numbers of people into exile. In consequence of these policies, the indigenous people were not duly represented in the organs of government, which consisted of Europeans and a few Africans who could not reflect the aspirations of the people.

215. Commenting on the educational system, the authors claimed that after five centuries of Spanish rule, the illiteracy rate was the highest in the world. Primary education, which together with secondary education was subject to an age limit, did not fulfil its purpose. The number of indigenous people attending Spanish universities was so small that it was impossible to believe that Spain was seriously trying to educate the indigenous population. There was a lack of teachers and the shortage of universities and other educational institutions was felt everywhere. This lack of concern could be seen from the fact that there were only ninety-two persons from the Territory studying in Spain, fifty-seven of whom were paying students.

216. As regards health conditions, the population was afflicted by malaria, tuberculosis, parasitic diseases, malnutrition and a high infant mortality rate. There was an alarming shortage of doctors and auxiliary health staff. For a population of 300,000 there were only 72 physicians, 27 of whom were internes, and 163 indigenous medical assistants. There were only two first-class hospitals with a total of 741 beds and two second-class ones with 254 beds. In addition, there were eleven poorly equipped health centres, sometimes headed by a doctor.

217. Various forms of forced labour conditions were in existence. Penal sanctions were imposed on indigenous workers for failure to fulfil their employment contracts. The principle of equal pay for equal work was not respected. Indigenous workers were cruelly treated. The Spanish Government did not permit the formation of workers' organizations and trade unions so that the workers had no suitable ways of

defending the interests. Racial discrimination was practised, inasmuch as a Spanish worker earned twenty times as much as the indigenous worker. Discrimination even manifested itself in the preference given to Spanish people in the provision of medical care.

218. The economic situation represented the most pernicious aspect of Spanish colonialism. The Territory had a primitive subsistence economy. Spain was the only market for the primary produce of Equatorial Guinea. The control of foreign exchange, of imports and exports, and of the prices paid to the primary producers was in the hands of Spain. The economy of the Territory was thus completely subordinated to that of Spain. Under an Act of 4 May 1948 which was still in force, the indigenous inhabitants could acquire only four hectares of land while a European could possess estates of up to 200,000 hectares. A subsequent act of 24 December 1948 made a free grant of thirty hectares to Europeans resident in the Territory for more than ten years. Furthermore, the Spanish Government did not shrink from conducting a propaganda campaign concerning its assistance to the Territory while refraining from revealing the origin of the subsidies which it claimed to be disinterestedly dispensing. It was the view of the authors that in the field of economic development, as in public health and education, the Spanish Government should seek wider co-operation with the competent international organizations for the benefit of the Territory.

219. In conclusion the authors demanded the right for the people to control their own affairs and the fixing of a date for independence. This date should be 15 November 1966, if possible, or otherwise 1 January 1967.

220. At a further meeting with a group of sixty-six representatives of MONALIGE on 23 August 1966, Mr. Angel Masie, Technical Secretary, said that it was MONALIGE's wish that Equatorial Guinea should accede to independence in the shortest possible time, in peace and understanding with Spain. In addition to the points raised in their petition, they wanted Spain to take measures to establish full equality of civil rights. Mr. Alfonso Oyono Oallogo, one of the leaders of the group, stated that in their view independence should be attained in conditions free of violence and racial discrimination.

221. Continuing, Mr. Masie said that MONALIGE comprised 90 per cent of the population of the Territory. It had some 195,000 registered members, with an additional 12,000 who had applied but were not yet registered. It included a



women's section as well as a section for youth who became full members at the age of twenty-one. MUNGE, by contrast, was a minority party, favoured by the Spanish Government, and consisting mainly of government employees. It was riven by policy differences. IPGE, which had been formed abroad, was the mother organization of MONALIGE. Owing to disagreements within that movement, MONALIGE had been formed in 1962. In the event of a plebiscite being held on an independence constitution, the votes should be counted for the Territory as a whole, and not for its parts separately. The present electoral system was unsatisfactory and they were in favour of universal adult suffrage for all persons over twenty-one years of age. Furthermore they were opposed to the separation of Fernando Póo from Río Muni.

222. Mr. Henri Nkona Mdong, one of the petitioners, stated that if negotiations were initiated with Spain, the Territory should be represented by the President of MONALIGE, one member of the Governing Council, and other members elected by MONALIGE. Mr. Masie added that other political groups could also designate representatives. Mr. Cyono saw no objection to the General Assembly being represented by one member.

223. The autonomous regime, according to the petitioners, had proved very unsatisfactory. There was a vast difference, in their opinion, between rule by a small clique of colonizers and a popularly based government. During the elections preceding the inauguration of the autonomous regime, the activities of MONALIGE had been systematically hampered in favour of MUNGE, which enjoyed the support of the Spanish authorities, and claimed to be the only political party. MONALIGE was confident that in any future elections which were not supervised and manipulated by the colonial Government, it would win the majority of seats. It was for this reason that they requested that any such elections should be controlled and supervised by the United Nations.

224. Following its return to New York, the Sub-Committee received a communication from Mr. Atanasio Ndong Miyona, Secretary-General of MONALIGE, stating that the visit of the Sub-Committee to Equatorial Guinea represented ipso facto recognition by the Spanish Government of the right of the Territory to independence. Independence, however, would not mean a sharp break with Spain; it would be only a transformation of relations based on principles of co-operation and mutual respect. He accordingly requested that a date be set for the Territory's accession to independence.

225. In a further communication submitted shortly afterwards, Mr. Ndong informed the Sub-Committee that in order to be able to devote himself more directly to the preparations for the independence of Equatorial Guinea he had decided to terminate his political exile. Outlining the position of MONALIGE, Mr. Atanasio Ndong stated that a date for the independence of the Territory should be fixed during the forthcoming session of the General Assembly. The time-limit proposed by the people of Equatorial Guinea was 15 February 1968, and the year 1967 should be regarded as a transitional period for the discussion of constitutional arrangements and for the installation of a provisional government prior to general elections. The people of the Territory were firmly determined to accede to independence as a unitary state, while taking into account local and regional conditions. Further, it was the desire of the people that the United Nations should supervise the general elections shortly to be held in the Territory. In conclusion, he expressed appreciation to the Spanish Government for facilitating the work of the Sub-Committee and registered the belief that the Sub-Committee would help the people to build the country in unity and to safeguard their Hispano-African attachment within the African continent.

D. Meetings with groups and individuals affiliated to MUNGE<sup>g/</sup>

226. On 21 August 1966, the Sub-Committee received a group of fifteen representatives of the Movimiento de Unificación Nacional de la Guinea Ecuatorial (MUNGE), led by its President, Mr. Agustín Eñeso Ñeñe.

227. In lieu of an oral statement, Mr. Eñeso Ñeñe presented, on behalf of MUNGE, a written communication to the Sub-Committee. In this communication, he recalled that the autonomous regime which was established by the Act of 20 December 1963, had, as its corollary, a recent statement by the Under-Secretary of the Spanish Presidency that should the inhabitants of Equatorial Guinea ever wish to change the present political structure, Spain would offer no opposition. That statement had encouraged them to expect co-operation and assistance from Spain. However, as a transitional stage, the autonomous regime had failed to meet their expectations. This failure was due to the fact that the Act of 1963 had many

---

<sup>g/</sup> MUNGE is variously known as Movimiento de Unión Nacional de la Guinea Ecuatorial, Movimiento de Unificación Nacional de la Guinea Ecuatorial and Movimiento de la Unificación de Guinea Ecuatorial.

gaps and shortcomings which had led to serious divisions between the two parts of the Territory; these shortcomings had been compounded by human and technical errors. Although that Act prescribed modes of possible change, all efforts in that direction had proved fruitless.

228. Nationhood and independence had as their purpose the development and improvement of the people. Independence was meaningless if it was not intended to achieve this goal. At the same time, independence was a natural and noble right which could not be denied on the ground of impediments of a cultural, technical and economic nature. The specific historical circumstances of Equatorial Guinea indicated that it was capable of subsisting after independence with the help of the solidarity of the world community, as a member of the great Spanish family.

229. It was the wish of the people of the Territory that Spain should grant them independence at the end of the term of the present administration on 15 July 1968, even though the errors to which the people were subject would persist for some time to come and the solution of new problems might be more difficult. They accordingly suggested the formation of a constituent commission comprising all sectors and groups, particularly economic interests, political parties and representatives of the existing Government, in order to give an opportunity to the various opinions current in the Territory to be heard. In view of the fundamental importance of the Act which would be drafted by this commission, a plebiscite should be held to determine the acceptability of that Act in April 1968. While believing themselves capable of solving their own problems, they would welcome disinterested advice and would therefore be happy if a member of the Special Committee were to be present during the holding of this plebiscite.

230. In response to questions, Mr. Eñeso Ñeñe said that it was and had been since 1963, the aim of MUNGE to unite all the people of the Territory in a single movement. His party had lost faith in the present Governing Council as it had failed to carry out the people's wishes. He was aware that the Council included members who were formerly affiliated to MUNGE. The Council had paid no attention to the views of the political parties. Nevertheless, in order to avoid civil disturbances MUNGE was prepared to tolerate its existence, pending the changes advocated above.

231. His party had given thorough consideration to the question of independence and had decided that the date for independence should be 16 July 1968. On the question of the separation of Fernando Póo and Río Muni, he recalled that the motto of MUNGE was "Unity, Peace and Work". While the party acknowledged the realities of history, as well as the small size of the Territory, it considered that Fernando Póo and Río Muni were themselves too small to subsist as separate entities. In any event the question of separation was an internal matter to be settled by the people themselves.

232. MUNGE had accepted the autonomic regime as a transitional stage but its operation had failed to satisfy the people's aspirations. In anticipation of independence on 16 July 1968, the intervening period should be devoted to negotiations with Madrid by commissions composed of representatives of political parties, the Governing Council, the economic sector and religious groups. A plebiscite should be held in April 1968 on the independence constitution. This plebiscite should be carried out not by Spain but by the people themselves in democratic conditions; everyone over the age of 21 should be allowed to participate in it. MUNGE would welcome a United Nations presence in this regard.

233. It was the expectation of MUNGE that after independence, the Territory would maintain economic relations with any other countries it thought fit. On social conditions, the belief of MUNGE was that while the Territory should be maintained as one unit, the interests and problems of minority groups should be taken into account. The membership of MUNGE comprised about 80 per cent of the population. Their strength was higher in Río Muni than in Fernando Póo which had a greater variety of cultural groups. Its membership included the Bubi, but recently the Bubi had been influenced by the separatist ideas of certain members of the governmental organs.

234. In conclusion Mr. Eñeso Ñeñe informed the Sub-Committee that, recognizing their community of aims and objectives, the leadership of the Idea Popular de la Guinea Ecuatorial (IPGE) had recently decided to merge that party with MUNGE.

235. On 22 August 1966, the Sub-Committee held a meeting in Bata with representatives of the junta of MUNGE and IPGE, who submitted two communications in lieu of written statements.

236. The first communication signed by Mr. Justino Mba Nsue, Secretary-General of the junta, declared that the leadership desired full independence, without in any way hampering the cordial relations which through history and culture linked the Territory with Spain and the Spanish-speaking world. It was also in favour of healthy international coexistence with African and other countries.

237. The second communication, bearing forty signatures, contained an historical account of the Territory, and a number of representations concerning conditions in Equatorial Guinea. In this connexion, the authors stated that the achievements of Spain deserved emphasis. According to them, the rate of population increase over the past sixteen years was 2 per cent as compared with a death rate of 7.8 per thousand. The hospital in Río Muni, regarded as one of the best in Africa had 1,400 beds, and the staff of the public health service consisted of 28 physicians, 5 surgeons, 5 pharmacists, assisted by a total of 50 nursing sisters, and 350 male nurses. There were various other hospitals and health centres. Extensive campaigns had been conducted against endemic diseases, including malaria. Tripanosomiasis and leprosy were on the decline. Infant mortality had been reduced by 40 per cent.

238. As regards educational conditions, they described the position as fairly satisfactory, although there were certain shortcomings as regards full-time education, owing to the shortage of boarding schools. Generally speaking there was an adequate number of primary schools which included 302 public schools with permanent buildings. The over-all rate of school enrolment was 90.7 per cent and instruction was provided by 350 indigenous and European teachers. The average number of pupils per class was about forty-one. School children amounted to 14 per cent of the population. Pupils undergoing secondary, technical and vocational education accounted for 1.2 per cent of the population. For higher education, students had to go to Spain on scholarships or at their own expense.

239. The authors also claimed that during 1962, the total regional income was 2,036.5 million pesetas, or 7,922 pesetas per inhabitant. The cumulative annual rate of growth was 5.5 per cent. The export index of the Territory was possibly the highest in Africa. Almost all of the Territory's output went to Spain, since it received higher prices there than on the international market. A certain amount was also exported to the United States, the United Kingdom, Belgium, and other

countries. The main products of the Territory were cacao, coffee and timber. Although there had been a small increase in the production of coffee by indigenous people, owing to an increase in the area cultivated, the farms of indigenous people were not as efficiently operated as the plantations and much remained to be done to increase the output and improve the quality. As regards timber production, for which concessions were awarded by auction, the initial capital required precluded indigenous participation. There was the possibility of cultivating new crops such as hevea, sisal, etc. and of improving existing products. Further, there were hopeful prospects for mining; the sedimentary geology of the Territory seemed to offer a good chance of finding deposits of petroleum, lignite, and radioactive and iron ores.

240. As regards labour conditions, the petitioners stated that the per capita income per worker amounted to 59 per cent of the average income in Equatorial Guinea. Rural co-operatives in cacao, coffee and vegetables, the commercial and industrial co-operatives as well as the timber syndicate were making satisfactory progress.

241. On political developments, they remarked that the movement towards decolonization had not failed to have some repercussions in the Territory, where a number of true indigenous nationalists had sought the strict application of the principle of respect for the right of all people to choose their form of government and the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to peoples forcibly deprived of them. Accordingly, the Government of Spain, in keeping with the relevant provisions of the United Nations Charter, had decreed the present autonomous system. Recalling that in 1965 the President of the Governing Council, Mr. Bonifacio Ondo Edú had told the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly that MUNGE had been formed in order to combine the activities of existing political parties and thus to command the support of all the people, the petitioners believed that the best prospect for the development of political coexistence lay in the establishment of a political council which would study the major political problems of the country and bring about understanding between the Spanish Government and the autonomous Government of the Territory.

242. They also recalled a declaration made in 1962 by Mr. Luis Carrero Blanco, Under-Secretary in the Office of the Presidency, that if one day the majority of the people of Equatorial Guinea wished to modify the present status of the

Territory, Spain would see no objection to negotiating with it about its future. Mr. Carrero Blanco had also stated that no other country had more respect for self-determination than Spain. The people were therefore grateful for the efforts that Spain had made to promote the political, economic, social and cultural development of the Territory.

243. At the recent meetings of the Special Committee held in Algiers, Mr. Ondó Edú had stated that since the question of independence affected all the people directly, it would be advisable for all of them first to be given a thorough knowledge of the situation and then for them freely to express their opinions. This statement, as well as his support of the invitation extended by the Spanish delegation to the Special Committee represented a great occasion in the history of Equatorial Guinea. The leadership of MUNGE-IPGE was grateful for the Spanish gesture and requested the Sub-Committee to shoulder its responsibilities by studying the ways of meeting the aspirations of the people.

244. In conclusion, the petitioners observed that the expression of friendship and co-operation between Equatorial Guinea and Spain was in the interests of the peoples of both countries. It was the desire of the people of the Territory to develop this common interest. The Spanish Government had enabled Equatorial Guinea to reach a higher economic level than many developing countries. It had not only based its policies on the fundamental principles of human rights as recognized by the United Nations but had recognized the people of the Territory as being capable of self-government. They regarded the present autonomous system as a stage on the way to independence. At the same time, independence would not alienate them from Spain; rather it would enable them to appreciate their links and therefore to establish friendly relations on the basis of equality within the Hispanic community. Equatorial Guinea as an African country would never tolerate interference in its internal affairs and would respect the sovereignty of other countries, observing strict reciprocity in its relations with them.

245. For all the above reasons the leadership of MUNGE-IPGE was requesting that a date be set for the independence of Equatorial Guinea by means of cordial discussions between the Spanish Government and the political council of MUNGE-IPGE. The agreements resulting from these discussions should be registered with the United Nations.

246. On 22 August 1966, the Sub-Committee held a meeting with a group of thirty-two petitioners, representing the political junta of MUNGE-IPGE, led by Mr. Agustin Eñeso Ñeñe, the President of MUNGE, Mr. Justino Mba Nsue, Secretary-General of MUNGE, Mr. Antonino Eworo, President of IPGE, and Mr. Clemente Ateba, Secretary-General of IPGE.

247. Mr. Eñeso Ñeñe recalled that two weeks earlier MUNGE and IPGE had decided to form an alliance inasmuch as their aims and objectives were similar. Mr. Mba Nsue expressed appreciation of the initiative of the Spanish Government in inviting the Sub-Committee. This invitation was a reflection of the fact that the people of the Territory were beginning to assert their individuality and integrity. They were assuming positions of responsibility in increasing numbers. They desired independence as well as a broad measure of economic and social development, without jeopardizing their relations with Spain and the Hispanic world.

248. In response to questions, Mr. Mbu Nsue explained that IPGE had been formed twelve years ago by exiles from the Territory in Cameroon, but that following the inauguration of the autonomous regime, MUNGE had been established with a view to combining all the political parties of the Territory in a single movement. Some time ago a number of exiles had returned from Cameroon, and two weeks earlier, as indicated by Mr. Eñeso Ñeñe, the leadership of the two movements had come to the conclusion that an amalgamation was necessary in order to prepare for the future of the Territory. It was their hope that this amalgamation would be extended to include MCNALIGE, and some talks had already taken place in this connexion.

249. In their view, a date for the independence of Equatorial Guinea should be fixed through negotiations between the Spanish Government and a delegation from the Territory comprising representatives drawn from the General Assembly and the leadership of MUNGE and IPGE. Meanwhile they requested that modifications be made to the present system in order to make it more efficient and democratic. They envisaged an independence constitution under which the President would be directly elected by universal adult suffrage and the General Assembly by an electoral college comprised of members of municipal councils.

250. Mr. Eworo stated that while agreement had been reached for the amalgamation of MUNGE and IPGE, the relevant instruments had not yet been drawn up. His group was in favour of complete independence, if possible by the end of 1966 or early 1967, but felt that it was for the Spanish Government to set the date, after consultation with representatives of the people at a round-table conference. Continuing, he



stated that it was important for the people to be fully informed as to the political, economic and social situation and prospects of the Territory. His party regarded the autonomous régime only as a transitional stage during which the people would acquire the discipline and make the preparations necessary for the attainment of independence in the best possible conditions.

251. Mr. Eñeso Ñeñe added that they envisaged that one half of the membership of the General Assembly would be elected through universal adult suffrage and the other half by corporative bodies and co-operatives. The President, who would be elected by universal adult suffrage, would be empowered to select his own cabinet. The present electoral system under which the President was not directly elected was unsatisfactory. Mr. Ateba stated that all the legislative bodies should be composed of members directly elected by the people on the basis of universal adult suffrage.

252. In conclusion, Mr. Eñeso Ñeñe said, on behalf of MUNGE, that independence should be granted to the Territory not later than 15 July 1968, with the intervening period being devoted to negotiations in which all political parties, religious faiths, as well as members of the General Assembly and Governing Council would participate.

253. In reply to a question, the leaders of the group stated that they were not familiar with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Responding to another question, the leaders of MUNGE stated that, after consultation with their counterparts from IPGE, they were prepared to support the request of the IPGE group for independence during 1967. The IPGE leaders claimed for their party a membership of 160,000 and the MUNGE leaders asserted that their following combined with the membership of IPGE comprised 80 per cent of the population of the Territory. According to the leaders of IPGE, MONALIGE had in the past criticized MUNGE for opposing independence simply on the ground that the latter had expressed itself in favour of the autonomous system. However, now that it was clear that MUNGE was for independence, the chances had improved of the MUNGE-IPGE alliance being extended to include MONALIGE.

E. Meetings with groups and individuals affiliated to IPGE

254. At the outset of its work, the Sub-Committee took account of the statement made to the Special Committee at its 447th meeting on 15 June 1966 by a petitioner representing the Idea Popular de la Guinea Ecuatorial (IPGE). In that statement,

the petitioner informed the Committee that the Spanish Government had been persecuting members of his party and those of another freedom movement, the Movimiento Nacional de la Guinea Ecuatorial (MONALIGE); a large number of them had been imprisoned in a concentration camp on the island of Annobón. The granting of so-called autonomy to the Territory had left the colonial status of the Territory unchanged. Indeed the results of the referendum on the question of autonomy had been falsified by the Spanish authorities in order to permit the establishment of a supposedly autonomous Government which naturally took its orders from Spain.

255. In 1964, the Movimiento de Unificación Nacional de la Guinea Ecuatorial (MUNGE) which had been founded by members of the autonomous Government to serve the interests of the Spanish Europeans and the petty bourgeoisie, had been declared the only political party in the Territory. During that period, the people of Equatorial Guinea had been subjected to exile, expulsion, arbitrary sequestration, torture and assassination. An initiative taken by the leadership of IPGE and the MONALIGE to merge these parties in a new movement known as Frente Nacional y Popular de Liberación de la Guinea Ecuatorial (FRENAPOL) had been frustrated by a decision of the Spanish authorities in March 1965 to recognize MONALIGE. This decision was followed by the proscription of IPGE and the relentless persecution of its members. In this connexion, the petitioner stated that the designs of the Spanish Government could be inferred from the presence of 12,000 troops in the country and of four warships as well as jet aircraft and parachutist commandos in the area.

256. In conclusion, the petitioner informed the Special Committee that IPGE was prepared to use violence if need be to defend the rights, freedom and dignity of the people of Equatorial Guinea. He requested, inter alia, that the Special Committee condemn Spanish colonialism in the Territory, urge the Spanish Government to grant unconditional independence to the Territory, and call on African Governments to extend to IPGE the necessary political, moral and material support.

257. Before undertaking its visit to Equatorial Guinea, the Sub-Committee also had before it a number of petitions from leaders of IPGE concerning the Territory (A/AC.109/PET.500/Add.1 and 2).

258. In these petitions, the leaders of IPGE complained of arrests, imprisonment, assassination and other acts of repression carried out against members of their

party by the Spanish colonial authorities. According to them, the total number of Spanish soldiers stationed in the Territory had risen to 14,000 since 1959. The petitioners also protested against inequities and discriminatory practices which the African people of the Territory were suffering at the hands of the Spanish European element. They also asserted that the autonomous Government of the Territory was a puppet regime, in no way reflecting the aspirations of the people. They referred by way of illustration to a statement attributed to the President of the Governing Council in December 1965 to the effect that Equatorial Guinea was not yet ready for independence.

259. They called for the dissolution of the autonomous Government and for the taking of appropriate measures by the United Nations to avoid the disastrous results that had ensued in other colonial Territories where demands for independence remained unfulfilled.

260. Before its departure for the Territory, the Sub-Committee received a communication from Mr. Jesus Mba Ovono, Secretary-General of IPGE, in which he regretted his inability to appear before the Sub-Committee. He explained that he was in enforced exile in Brazzaville and that many other members of his party were in a similar situation in Algeria, Cameroon, Guinea and the United Arab Republic.

261. According to Mr. Mba Ovono, the problem confronting the Sub-Committee was simple. It was a question whether or not Equatorial Guinea should accede to independence in the shortest possible time. IPGE's reply to this question was in the affirmative, whereas the reply of the Spanish colonizers was in the negative. It was a problem which resided in the basic fact of the recognition by the United Nations and world opinion of the right of peoples to self-determination and independence.

262. He further observed that the extent of illiteracy and poverty in the Territory, which the Sub-Committee would appreciate during its visit, was itself a condemnation of Spanish colonialism and a reason why the people must be freed from Spanish domination at the earliest possible time. It would be a contradiction to use the backwardness of the Territory as a justification for the maintenance of colonial rule.

263. In conclusion, he urged the Sub-Committee to break down the barriers which would be placed in the way of the people in their attempts to make contact with it.

He also suggested that the Sub-Committee should not hesitate in the exercise of its rights to enter into discussions with people other than the indoctrinated groups acting under police supervision who would be presented to it.

264. On 22 August 1966, a number of members of IPGE presented a communication bearing five signatures to the Sub-Committee. In this communication, the authors declared that the idea of merging IPGE and MUNGE without the holding of a proper public meeting was nothing but an ambitious personal project of Mr. Antonino Eworo Obama and Mr. Clemente Ateba Nso, who had never been real members of IPGE. IPGE had been founded in Sevilla de Niefang on 30 September 1959 by Mr. Enrique Nkuna Ndongo, Chairman, Mr. Salvador Nsamiyo Ensema, Vice-Chairman, and Mr. Crisanto Masié Esono, Secretary. The Chairman and Vice-Chairman were at present Chairmen of the local committees of MONALIGE in the districts of Sevilla de Niefang and Micemeseng, respectively. According to the authors, this showed that the members of IPGE now supported MONALIGE.

265. Following its return to New York, the Sub-Committee received another communication from Mr. Jesus Mba Ovono. In this communication, Mr. Mba Ovono noted that the agreement signed by Spain with King Bankoro of Corisco in March 1778 set up a protectorate for a period of fifty years for the sole purpose of allowing trade contacts. This agreement did not involve any concession of territory or of powers of government, and stipulated that after the fifty-year period, its extension would be a matter for fresh negotiation. It was therefore clear that Spain never had any right, except that of armed force, to impose its rule on Equatorial Guinea. For this reason, many people in Equatorial Guinea had been dissatisfied with Spanish colonization, and ever since the assassination of their leader, Mr. Acacio Mane Ela, in November 1959 by the Spanish authorities, had been preparing to fight openly against Spanish colonial rule.

266. Subsequently, the Spanish authorities, faced with the development of the liberation movement in the Territory, had intensified their repressive measures and had arrested, imprisoned and assassinated the nationalist leaders, a number of whom had been obliged to take refuge in neighbouring countries, particularly in Cameroon and Gabon. Further, the Spanish Government had carried out an intensive propaganda campaign designed to persuade the people not to ask for independence but simply to rest content with autonomy. It had devoted all its efforts to this end and having failed, it was preparing to bring bloodshed to the Territory. There

were more than 14,000 Spanish soldiers in Equatorial Guinea, four warships were patrolling the coast and nine jet aircraft and a group of parachutists were stationed in the Territory. The installation of a puppet autonomous administration had only made the situation worse.

267. In March 1964, the Eubis had held a meeting at Santa Isabel, under the presidency of the then Commissioner-General of the Territory, at which they signed a document requesting the separation of Fernando Póo and Río Muni. This document was the result of manoeuvring, on the part of the Spanish capitalist landowner settlers, and it was to be noted that these demands had recently been repeated by the Eubis.

268. Spanish colonialism was now preparing to grant independence of a neo-colonialist type with the collaboration of indigenous traitors who were simply protecting the interests of the Spaniards in Equatorial Guinea and acquiescing in the colonial exploitation of the Territory's resources. The statements made to the Sub-Committee by certain leaders of the Territory, particularly the President of the Governing Council and the President of the General Assembly ran counter to the aspirations of the people of Equatorial Guinea who desired complete and immediate independence.

269. Nevertheless, Spain deserved gratitude for changing its former attitude and for its new willingness to grant independence to Equatorial Guinea. In these circumstances Spain should carry out the following measures as an indispensable condition for the granting of independence to the Territory at the earliest possible date: a general and unconditional amnesty for all political prisoners and exiles; the dissolution of the sham autonomous Government; recognition of IPGE and MUNGE and the organization of free elections under United Nations auspices on the basis of universal adult suffrage; a constitutional conference under United Nations supervision; the formation of a government on the basis of the results of the elections and the proclamation of independence; and lastly, the immediate withdrawal of Spanish military forces from the country.

270. In conclusion, Mr. Ovono expressed the hope that Spain and Equatorial Guinea would continue to maintain good relations both diplomatic and commercial in the future, on a footing of equality, and that Spain would comply as soon as possible with the desire of the people of the Territory for complete, immediate and sovereign independence.

F. Meetings with other groups and individuals

271. On 20 August 1966, the Sub-Committee held a meeting with a group of nineteen Eubis led by Mr. Augustín Santiago Sota Esele who stated that they were representing all the Eubis of Fernando Póo. Mr. Santiago Sota Esele informed the Sub-Committee that on 10 July 1966 a meeting of all the representatives of the Village Councils of Fernando Póo had been held in Rebola and had adopted a number of resolutions which were contained in a communication he had presented to the Sub-Committee. These resolutions contained a demand for the reconciliation and unification of all the villages in Fernando Póo and an endorsement of a recommendation stated to have been made by the Fernando Póo Provincial Council on 9 March 1965 for the abolition of all political parties. The resolutions also included a demand for the total separation of Fernando Póo and Río Muni and a request that the governmental organs of the Territory should take the necessary steps towards this end.

272. Mr. Santiago Sota Esele also informed the Sub-Committee that when its impending arrival became known, all the Eubis of Fernando Póo resident in Santa Isabel, San Fernando, San Carlos and forty-two villages, as well as in isolated farming communities held a meeting in Rebola on 18 August 1966. The proceedings of this meeting were contained in a communication bearing thirty-eight signatures which he had submitted to the Sub-Committee. In this communication the authors expressed support for the motion for separation submitted by the Eubi councillors, Mr. Aurelio Nicolas Itoha, Mr. Luis Maho Sicacha, Mr. Román Borico Toichoa and Mr. Gustavo Watson Bueco, at a meeting of the Governing Council held on 12 and 13 August 1966. They claimed that since the members from Río Muni constituted a majority in the General Assembly, the views of the members from Fernando Póo had been consistently disregarded. Further, the majority of projects for public works and improvements were carried out in Río Muni; while Fernando Póo contributed 81 per cent of the revenue, Río Muni accounted for 83 per cent of the expenditure.

273. The authors of the communication also reiterated a resolution adopted by them at a meeting in Santiago de Baney on 27 August 1964 in which they called for the complete separation of Fernando Póo and Río Muni. In support of this demand, they stated that unrestricted immigration to Fernando Póo by outsiders would lead to over-population, scarcity of land and unemployment. Recalling that Pope John XXIII, in his encyclical Pacem in Terris, had urged that ethnic minorities should

be respected and their values encouraged, they asserted that unrestricted immigration would also result in a repression of the vitality and development of the Eubis. They claimed that their demand was in accordance with Article 73 e of the Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Charter of the Organization of African Unity (CAU).

274. They also recalled that there were a number of countries, including Luxembourg, Andorra, Liechtenstein and Monaco, which were smaller in area than Fernando Póo but which were nevertheless sovereign independent States. If their demand for the complete separation of Fernando Póo and Río Muni were granted, each of the resulting entities would be ruled by its own autonomous administration, without prejudice to any assistance that they may wish to extend to each other. In conclusion, the authors of the communication stated that as soon as Fernando Póo had been separated from Río Muni, a commission appointed by the people of Fernando Póo should be established for the purpose of determining, in negotiation with Spain, the date of its independence. Subsequently, the State of Fernando Póo would proceed to conclude the necessary treaties of friendship with Spain in view of the close ties between the two countries and in gratitude for the work carried out by Spain.

275. Mr. Santiago Sota Esele also stated that the Eubis were in full support of the memorandum submitted by Mr. Nicolas Itoha, Councillor for Labour, on 20 August 1966. In response to questions, Mr. Santiago Sota Esele stressed that the Eubis desired independence, but not before the economic and administrative separation of Fernando Póo and Río Muni. Otherwise, serious difficulties might arise similar to those prevailing in other parts of Africa. Furthermore, the five members of the Governing Council from Río Muni, including the President, were in a position to outvote the four Eubi members from Fernando Póo on all questions. There was a real danger that the 200,000 people of Río Muni would increasingly disregard the interests of the 18,000 Eubis of Fernando Póo. Providence itself had segregated mankind into ethnic groups and man could not be presumed to know better. The Eubis wanted to be able to protect their families and property and their livelihood when independence was attained. They were disappointed with the autonomous administration for devoting a disproportionate amount of attention and expenditure to Río Muni.

276. On 1 August 1966, the Sub-Committee held a further meeting at Moka with a group of thirteen Eubis, also led by Mr. Santiago Sota Esele, who stated that they represented all the Eubis in the Moka area, including San Carlos and surrounding villages. He felt bound to emphasize, in view of allegations that had been made about them, that the Eubis were indeed the indigenous people of Fernando Póo and that their interests should be paramount in all matters relating to their country.

277. Mr. Juan Balboa Boneke informed the Sub-Committee that the views of the Eubis were contained in the documents presented to the Sub-Committee the previous day. It was the wish of the Eubis that the internal problems of the Territory be solved before independence was attained. The solution to these problems lay in the separation of Fernando Póo and Río Muni. If this solution were not arrived at, there would be conflict and bloodshed. For the Eubis it was a question of preserving their integrity. After separation they would negotiate the question of independence with Spain.

278. Mr. Domisio Sila stated that it was for the indigenous people of Fernando Póo to determine their own future. It was the Spanish Government which had imposed a false unity on the two parts of the Territory. The Eubis thought it essential that independence should be attained in conditions of peace and prosperity but there was a danger of conflict at the present time inasmuch as they were being pushed into an inferior position by people who had come to Fernando Póo as their guests. They were in favour of negotiations with Spain regarding independence but he shared the view that the internal problems of the Territory should be settled first.

279. On 21 August 1966 the Sub-Committee received a communication from Mr. Primo Mbomio Nso which contained a complaint that racial discrimination was rampant in the Territory. According to him, Spanish people had come to Equatorial Guinea to avail themselves of the wealth of the Territory and had used the people as tools for the attainment of their ambition and desires without regard to the economic situation or well-being of the people. In the communication Mr. Mbomio Nso also stated that the indigenous worker who had served a firm for some five to eight years earned a smaller wage than a recently arrived Spanish



worker even though the former did more work than the latter. Moreover, there were two rates of pay throughout the Territory, one for the Spanish worker and one for the indigenous worker. The Spanish community had done nothing for the Territory in the sense of industrial development. The indigenous people were housed in miserable dwellings while the Spanish residents lived in comfortable houses. In conclusion, he stated that the Spanish people had done great harm to the people of Equatorial Guinea.

280. On 21 August 1966 the Sub-Committee received a further communication from a group of indigenous workers. In this communication they complained that the Spanish worker received a wage of 10,000 pesetas with entitlements to housing, furniture, etc., while the indigenous worker was paid only 1,700 pesetas without any extras. Indigenous workers were not even given the opportunity to complain about their conditions of work. After 188 years of Spanish rule the Spanish Government had done nothing which could serve as an example to be emulated should the Territory become independent. Soon after the establishment of the autonomous régime, the Spanish Government had made all kinds of promises which remained unfulfilled, and many indigenous persons who opposed the Spanish authorities ran the risk of execution. The Spanish authorities had treated the people as slaves in their own country. This situation was clearly intended to make it impossible for them to achieve independence.

281. On 21 August 1966, a further communication bearing thirty signatures was presented to the Sub-Committee on behalf of the Fang residents in the district of San Carlos. In this communication, the authors stated that in 1915, indigenous workers from Río Muni were exported to Fernando Póo to supply the labour necessary for the exploitation of the latter. From that time onwards mutual co-operation of all kinds had developed among the inhabitants of the two parts of the Territory. Their acceptance of the unity of Fernando Póo and Río Muni had been embodied in the present Basic Law. The authors were therefore greatly surprised that the Councillors for Health and Welfare, Information and Tourism, Labour, and Industry and Mining should have submitted a motion in favour of the economic and administrative separation of the two parts of the Territory even before the end of the term of the present administration and without having any idea of the consequences of such a measure.

282. The Fangs resident in Fernando Póo were there in order to serve the country. It was to be noted that there were hundreds of workers and residents from other parts as well. They felt themselves to be at home and were therefore entitled to freedom of residence. According to the authors, the country was on the brink of economic chaos and this was the reason for recent disturbances. If the Eubis of Fernando Póo really had the interests of the country at heart they should be asking the Sub-Committee to arrange for the provision of economic assistance since it was for lack of financial and technical means that the resources of the country had not been developed. In conclusion, the authors stated that far from helping the country, the separation of Fernando Póo and Río Muni would contribute to its ruination.

G. Meeting with members of Río Muni Provincial Council

283. At a meeting held with members of the Río Muni Provincial Council on 22 August 1966, the President read a prepared statement on behalf of the members of that Council. In the statement, the members of the Provincial Council declared their desire for independence, with economic and military assistance from Spain. Only thus could the peace and security of the Territory be guaranteed. The experience of the past two years had taught them firstly, that it was difficult for a small nation to live in isolation, secondly, that it would be preferable to have a greater degree of self-determination and thirdly, that the Spanish Government, in their belief, was most willing to entertain their proposals. For these reasons they thought the time had come to negotiate with Spain the terms of independence for Equatorial Guinea.

284. In response to questions at a later meeting on 23 August 1966, they recalled that the General Assembly had previously adopted a motion calling for changes in the autonomous system and that the President of that body was expected to appoint a study group to examine and submit a report on the implications of that motion. One of the reasons for their desire for independence was that it would enable the Territory to avail itself of assistance from the United Nations and other international bodies. Further, this desire was independent of the willingness or otherwise of the Spanish Government to continue extending economic assistance.

The present time was propitious for the beginning of negotiations for independence. They envisaged that following these negotiations, a plebiscite would be held on an independence constitution, the votes of which should be counted for the Territory as a whole, rather than for its component parts.

285. Referring to conditions in the Territory, they mentioned that there were only six indigenous doctors in the whole Territory, four of whom were in Río Muni. As regards the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, some of them had knowledge of it from their compatriots in Gabon and Cameroon; others were not aware of it and would wish that copies be made available to them.

#### IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

##### A. Conclusions

286. In accordance with its terms of reference and having ascertained the conditions in the Territory with a view to speeding up the implementation of General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 and 2067 (XX) of 16 December 1965, the Sub-Committee on Equatorial Guinea has reached the following conclusions:

287. The Government of Spain has stated on several occasions that independence would be granted to the Territory when the people ask for it. These statements have given rise to an understanding among the people that the present regime of autonomy represents the last stage of constitutional development towards complete independence.

288. However, the expectations of the people that at this stage they would participate effectively in the control and management of their own affairs have not been fulfilled. This autonomous regime is also unsatisfactory to some members of the Governing Council. Most of the powers are still vested in and exercised by the Commissioner-General and the Spanish Government. Neither the Governing Council nor the General Assembly wields effective power even within the scope of its competence.

289. The electoral system which is not only indirect, but is based mainly on selective corporative representation and to a lesser extent on the vote of heads of families through municipal councils, limits participation to only a small minority of the adult population in the election of representatives to governmental organs. For this reason these organs are highly unrepresentative of the people as a whole and are not a reflection of their freely expressed will and desire. In this connexion, the Sub-Committee notes that there is strong support among the people for a system of direct elections on the basis of universal adult suffrage.

290. Although people were able to appear before the Sub-Committee as petitioners, evidence indicates that freedom of political activity is curtailed. Political parties are not accorded official recognition. There was also evidence that persons expressing political opinions unwelcome to the administering Power were

liable to harassment. Some petitioners complained that the presence of Spanish military forces in the Territory has an intimidating effect on the people. Further evidence was presented that justice and, in particular, criminal laws were unequally applied to the detriment of the Africans.

291. There are some tendencies favouring the separation of Fernando Póo and Río Muni with regard to certain budgetary and administrative matters. However, these views are held only by a small minority among the Bubis of Fernando Póo and by certain vested interests. They are not shared by the vast majority of the people nor by any of the major political parties. Further, it is the wish of the majority of the people that the Territory should accede to independence as one unit.

292. From the consultations held by the Sub-Committee with the people, it is clear that there is unanimity among all sections of the population in favour of the attainment of independence without delay. This view is shared by the various political parties and by most members of the Governing Council, including its President. There is also a unanimous desire that the negotiations with the Spanish Government should begin immediately for the transfer of all powers to the people of the Territory.

293. Recalling that the Spanish Government has undertaken to grant independence to the Territory when the people ask for it, the bodies, groups and individuals with whom the Sub-Committee held consultations made a variety of suggestions as to the date on which the Territory should accede to independence. These suggestions ranged from independence with immediate effect, to independence by the end of the term of the present Governing Council in July 1968.

294. On the basis of the foregoing, it is clear that the desire of the vast majority of the people of the Territory is for independence not later than July 1968. The fixing of a definite date, however, would seem to depend on the outcome of a conference between the administering Power and the various political parties of the Territory and all sections of the population. It is also clear from the evidence received by the Sub-Committee that the wish of the majority of the people is for United Nations participation in the processes leading to the independence of the Territory.

295. As regards economic conditions, the Sub-Committee noted that the economy of the Territory is basically dependent on cacao and coffee and is characterized by a lack of diversification. It is now admitted by the Spanish Government that this situation is unsatisfactory. The Sub-Committee noted that most of the commerce of the Territory is in foreign hands.

296. Although the Spanish Government has in recent years extended more aid to Equatorial Guinea through support of its main export products, its contributions to the budget and the maintenance of economic and social programmes in the area and the steps taken by it in the field of economic development have been slow and inadequate particularly in the continental part of the Territory. The Sub-Committee also noted that at no time has the administering Power undertaken effective measures to reduce the economic dependence of the Territory on Spain and to enable it to achieve rapid and balanced economic development. Further, the Sub-Committee took note with satisfaction of the statement by the Spanish Government that it would continue to grant assistance to Equatorial Guinea even after the Territory attains independence.

297. A number of petitions and petitioners expressed the need for a change in the land tenure system obtaining in the Territory. They stated that the present system was not only unfair to the indigenous people but also tended to encourage ownership of land by expatriate Spanish nationals and companies. The present system of auctions, which are held in Madrid, favours the wealthier land purchasers to the detriment of the indigenous population. Furthermore, in many cases the legal provisions limiting the permissible acquisition of property by one person or corporation have been successfully circumvented.

298. With regard to labour conditions, the present legislation favours expatriate Spanish nationals in preference to the African workers. There is gross disparity in the wages and other conditions of service granted to the Spanish and the African workers. Most of the positions of authority and responsibility in public administration as well as in the private sector are filled by expatriate Spanish nationals. The formation of trade unions representing the workers vis-à-vis the employers is not permitted.

299. As regards educational conditions, the Sub-Committee noted that in spite of steps recently taken by the administering Power, there is a shortage of educational institutions and particularly institutions of secondary education

/...

and higher learning, as well as of teaching staff. Consequently, educational opportunities in the Territory are limited. At the same time, the number of students sent from the Territory to acquire higher knowledge or special skills abroad is inadequate to the needs of the Territory.

B. Recommendations

300. In the light of the discussions held with the administering Power and the autonomous authorities, the evidence received, and the conclusions reached above, the Sub-Committee considers that the Special Committee should make the following recommendations:

301. That the administering Power should immediately convene a conference, in which the various political parties of the Territory and all sections of the population would be fully represented, in order to establish the modalities for the transfer of all powers to the people without delay, and to fix a date for independence which, in response to the wishes of the people, should be not later than July 1968.

302. That in the meantime, the administering Power should undertake the speedy transfer of effective governmental powers to the representatives of the Territory.

303. That the administering Power should remove all restrictions on political activities and establish full democratic freedoms.

304. That the administering Power should replace the present electoral system by a system based on universal adult suffrage, and that elections should be held on this basis before independence.

305. That the administering Power should establish in law and in practice full equality of political, economic, social and other rights and should in particular:

(a) Reform the legislation and practice relating to land tenure bearing in mind the principle that the interests of the people of the Territory are paramount;

(b) Reform the legislation and practice relating to labour conditions in order to promote the interests of the African worker and ensure respect for the principle of equal pay for equal work;

(c) Permit the formation of representative trade unions which would defend and promote the interests of the workers;

(d) Ensure the equal application of justice without regard to race, creed or colour.

306. That the administering Power should intensify its assistance to the Territory and take effective measures for balanced economic diversification and rapid economic development of the Territory.
307. That a study be undertaken by the Special Committee in consultation with the administering Power and representatives of Equatorial Guinea on the best ways of securing the assistance of the specialized agencies, especially as regards economic diversification, education and health.
308. That the administering Power should establish institutions of secondary education and higher learning in the Territory and accelerate training programmes adequate to the urgent needs of Equatorial Guinea, including the training of Africans in various fields of administration and positions of high responsibility.
309. That the administering Power should continue to co-operate with the United Nations by ensuring United Nations participation in the processes leading to the independence of the Territory.
310. That the administering Power should undertake a full-scale circulation of the present report on Equatorial Guinea and the dissemination in the Territory of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV)) as well as the relevant documentation on the work of the Special Committee.



V. ADOPTION OF THE REPORT

311. This report was unanimously adopted by the Sub-Committee at its thirteenth meeting held at Headquarters on 18 October 1966.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

ITINERARY AND PROGRAMME OF MEETINGS

Wednesday, 17 August 1966

AM Arrival in Madrid.

Meeting with the Director-General of African Settlements and Provinces (Plazas y Provincias Africanas), Office of the Presidency, and other senior officials.

Meeting with the Secretary-General of the Trade Unions Centre, the National Under-Secretary for Economic Co-ordination (Vice Secretario Nacional de Coordinación Económica), and other senior officials.

PM Meeting with the Assistant Commissioner for the Economic and Social Development Plan, and the Secretary of the Committee for the Economic Development of Fernando Póo and Río Muni.

Visit to Our Lady of Africa University College (Colegio Mayor Universitario Nuestra Señora de Africa).

Thursday, 18 August 1966

AM Meeting with the Under-Secretary, Ministry of Labour and other senior officials of the Ministry.

Visit to the First School of Intensified Professional Training (Centro Numero 1 de Formación Profesional Acelerada).

PM Departure from Madrid.

Friday, 19 August 1966

AM Arrival at Santa Isabel. (Fernando Póo, Equatorial Guinea).

Meeting with the President and members of the General Assembly.

PM Meeting with the President and members of the Governing Council.

Meeting with representatives of Movimiento Nacional de Liberación de la Guinea Ecuatorial (MONALIGE).

Saturday, 20 August

- AM Meeting with the Commissioner-General.  
Visit to the Santa Isabel Hospital.  
Meeting with the President and members of the Governing Council.
- PM Meeting with representatives of MONALIGE.  
Meeting with the President and members of the Governing Council.  
Meeting with Bubi representatives.

Sunday, 21 August

- AM Departure from Santa Isabel.  
Arrival at Moka (central Fernando Póo).  
Meeting with Bubi representatives.  
Departure from Moka.  
Visit to San Carlos (central Fernando Póo).  
Arrival at Santa Isabel.
- PM Meeting with representatives of MONALIGE.  
Meeting with representatives of Movimiento de Unificación Nacional de la Guinea Ecuatorial (MUNGE).  
Meeting with the President and members of the Governing Council.

Monday, 22 August

- AM Departure from Santa Isabel.  
Arrival in Bata (Río Muni).
- PM Meeting with the President and members of the Provincial Council.  
Meeting with representatives of junta of MUNGE and Idea Popular de la Guinea Ecuatorial (IPGE).  
Meeting with representatives of MONALIGE.

Tuesday, 23 August

AM Meeting with the Civil Governor.

Meeting with the President and members of the Provincial Council.

PM Meeting with representatives of MONALIGE.

Meeting with the Commissioner-General and other Spanish officials.

Wednesday, 24 August

AM Departure from Bata.

Arrival at Santa Isabel.

Meeting with the President of the Governing Council.

Departure from Santa Isabel.

APPENDIX II

REPRESENTATIVES OF CORPORATIVE BODIES AND CO-OPERATIVES  
ELECTED TO MUNICIPAL COUNCILS

Fernando Póo

|                                      | <u>Number of<br/>representatives</u> |
|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| Annobón:                             |                                      |
| Corporative bodies and co-operatives | 2                                    |
| San Carlos:                          |                                      |
| Corporative bodies                   | 2                                    |
| Co-operatives                        | 2                                    |
| San Fernando:                        |                                      |
| Corporative bodies and co-operatives | 3                                    |
| Santa Isabel:                        |                                      |
| Corporative bodies                   | 3                                    |
| Co-operatives                        | 2                                    |
| <u>Río Muni</u>                      |                                      |
| Acurenam:                            |                                      |
| Corporative bodies and co-operatives | 3                                    |
| Bata:                                |                                      |
| Corporative bodies                   | 4                                    |
| Co-operatives                        | 1                                    |
| Ebebiyín:                            |                                      |
| Corporative bodies and co-operatives | 5                                    |
| Evinayong:                           |                                      |
| Corporative bodies and co-operatives | 4                                    |
| Micomeseng:                          |                                      |
| Corporative bodies and co-operatives | 4                                    |
| Mongomo de Guadalupe:                |                                      |
| Corporative bodies and co-operatives | 4                                    |

/...

Number of  
representatives

N'sork:

Corporative bodies and co-operatives 3

Puerto Iradier:

Corporative bodies and co-operatives 4

Río Benito:

Corporative bodies and co-operatives 4

Levilla de Niefang:

Corporative bodies and co-operatives 4

Valladolid de los Bimbiles:

Corporative bodies and co-operatives 4

Total 58

APPENDIX III

REPRESENTATIVES OF HEADS OF FAMILIES ELECTED TO MUNICIPAL COUNCILS

|                            | <u>Number of<br/>representatives</u> |
|----------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| <u>Fernando Póo</u>        |                                      |
| Annobón                    | 2                                    |
| San Carlos                 | 4                                    |
| San Fernando               | 3                                    |
| Santa Isabel               | 5                                    |
| <br>                       |                                      |
| <u>Río Muni</u>            |                                      |
| Acurenam                   | 3                                    |
| Bata                       | 5                                    |
| Ebebiyín                   | 5                                    |
| Evinayong                  | 4                                    |
| Mícomeseng                 | 4                                    |
| Mongomo de Guadalupe       | 4                                    |
| N'sork                     | 3                                    |
| Puerto Iradier             | 4                                    |
| Río Benito                 | 4                                    |
| Sevilla de Niefang         | 4                                    |
| Valladolid de los Bimbiles | 4                                    |
|                            | <hr/>                                |
| Total                      | 58                                   |

## APPENDIX IV

BREAKDOWN OF ELECTORATE (HEADS OF FAMILIES) AT MUNICIPAL COUNCIL LEVEL  
IN 1964

| Provinces and municipalities                | Population<br>of<br>municipality | Number of electors<br>on<br>electoral rolls | Number of electors<br>voting |
|---|----------------------------------|---|------------------------------|
| FERNANDO POO                                |                                  |   |                              |
| Annobón                                     | 1,881                            | 421   | 312                          |
| San Carlos                                  | 10,535                           | 2,592                                       | 1,577                        |
| San Fernando                                | 3,157                            | 898   | 357                          |
| Santa Isabel                                | 28,180                           | 5,708                                       | 3,585                        |
| Total                                       | <u>43,753</u>                    | <u>9,619</u>                                | <u>5,831</u>                 |
| RIO MUNI                                    |                                  |   |                              |
| Acurenam                                    | 9,280                            | 1,853                                       | 1,724                        |
| Bata  | 25,760                           | 8,583                                       | 5,381                        |
| Ebebiyín                                    | 31,752                           | 7,640                                       | 5,929                        |
| Evinayong                                   | 18,509                           | 4,661                                       | 4,397                        |
| Micomeseng                                  | 17,125                           | 5,622                                       | 4,384                        |
| Mongomo de Guadalupe                        | 12,039                           | 3,062                                       | 2,711                        |
| N'sork                                      | 8,894                            | 2,872                                       | 2,375                        |
| Puerto Iradier                              | 12,118                           | 3,289                                       | 2,245                        |
| Río Benito                                  | 12,792                           | 4,404                                       | 2,518                        |
| Sevilla de Niefang                          | 19,764                           | 5,923                                       | 4,021                        |
| Valladolid de los Bimbiles                  | 14,145                           | 5,075                                       | 3,770                        |
| Total                                       | <u>182,178</u>                   | <u>52,984</u>                               | <u>39,455</u>                |
| Total Equatorial Guinea<br>(municipalities) | 225,931                          | 62,603                                      | 45,286                       |



CHAPTER X

IFNI AND SPANISH SAHARA

I. ACTION PREVIOUSLY TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE  
AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

1. In 1964, the Special Committee considered Ifni and Spanish Sahara and adopted a resolution which is contained in the Special Committee's report to the General Assembly at its nineteenth session.<sup>1/</sup> At its meetings in 1965, the Special Committee did not consider these Territories, but included information on them in its report to the General Assembly at its twentieth session (A/6000/Add.7, chapter X).
2. At its twentieth session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2072 (XX) of 16 December 1965. The resolution reads as follows:

"The General Assembly,

"Having considered the chapters of the reports of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating to Ifni and Spanish Sahara,

"Recalling the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples contained in its resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960,

"Bearing in mind that the Declaration is inspired by the strong desire of the international community to put an end to colonialism wherever and in whatever form it may occur,

"1. Approves the provisions of the resolution concerning Ifni and Spanish Sahara adopted on 16 October 1964 by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples;

"2. Urgently requests the Government of Spain, as the administering Power, to take immediately all necessary measures for the liberation of the Territories of Ifni and Spanish Sahara from colonial domination and, to this end, to enter into negotiations on the problems relating to sovereignty presented by these two Territories;

---

<sup>1/</sup> Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annex No. 8 (A/5800/Rev.1), chapter IX.

"3. Requests the Special Committee to report on the implementation of the present resolution to the General Assembly at its twenty-first session;

"4. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit this resolution to the administering Power."

5. The Secretary-General transmitted this resolution to the administering Power on 10 January 1966.

## II. INFORMATION ON THE TERRITORIES<sup>2/</sup>

### A. IFNI

#### General

4. The Moslem inhabitants of the Territory are governed by their own civil laws, the Sharia courts having jurisdiction in civil and labour matters with the status of Territorial Courts. Moslems are exempt from military service, but they may enlist voluntarily in the Army or the Police and may hold officers' commissions.
5. The indigenous inhabitants of the Territory have access to the municipal administrative organs on a footing of equality with their European neighbours. Three of the present Council members are Moslems.
6. In the matter of wages, there is no discrimination on the basis of ethnic origin or social class. The labour laws provide that indigenous workers are to be paid the wages appropriate to their respective occupations and labour categories and that they are entitled to dependency and cost-of-living allowances, paid vacations, sickness and accident insurance, and other social security benefits.

#### Public health and welfare

7. Public health services consist of a network of dispensaries staffed by doctors, auxiliaries and assistants and a hospital (at present equipped with 200 beds) which provides, inter alia, the following services: general medicine, general surgery, traumatology, gynaecology, child health and paediatrics. The hospital is to be enlarged this year; a new surgical complex with two operating rooms will be built and the number of beds increased.
8. A total of 12 million<sup>3/</sup> pesetas was spent on public health services during 1965.
9. The maternity services of the hospital are being used by a growing number of Moslem women who come to the hospital for their deliveries.
10. In the provincial hospital, patients of both religions share the same accommodations and no distinction is made between them except as regards diet, in which the Koranic precepts are observed for Moslems.

---

<sup>2/</sup> The information presented in this paper is taken from information transmitted by Spain on 28 June 1966 under Article 73 e of the Charter.

<sup>3/</sup> The local currency is the Spanish peseta, which is equal to \$US0.0168.

11. In the matter of preventive medicine, there are periodic vaccination campaigns and campaigns to promote sanitation in homes and meeting places.
12. The "Gobernador Artalejo" Residence, opened at the beginning of the year, provides a home and medical care for those who, because of age, lack of a family or physical disability, voluntarily choose to enter it. This institution, which now accommodates forty residents and is to be expanded, was built at a cost of 2.5 million pesetas.
13. Another welfare development is the establishment of the Organization for the Blind, which provides a decent livelihood for blind persons who in the past were unable to earn their living by other means.
14. In the field of social welfare in Ifni, it is noted that more than 5.5 million pesetas in retirement and widows' pensions were paid during 1965.

#### Education

15. In addition to the primary schools for both sexes, there are numerous Koranic schools which are subsidized by the local administration and attended by children whose parents wish them to have this type of education. During the 1966/67 academic year two new school units, which have already been completed and can accommodate 180 pupils each, will go into operation and a new pre-school unit with five classes will probably be opened.
16. At these educational centres, each pupil receives a glass of milk as a diet supplement and many of them are given their noonday meal.
17. Secondary education is provided by the National Institute, established in 1963 to take the place of the Secondary Education Centre which has been operating in the Territory for the previous twenty years. It is attended by pupils who hope ultimately to study at the university level.
18. For those pupils who do not wish to go on to the university, there is a vocational school, which has a current enrolment of 156. The construction in 1962 of the new building in which this school is housed cost 3.5 million pesetas.
19. Studies above the secondary level are pursued outside the Territory, and scholarships are offered for this purpose. Seventy-four persons at present are studying with the aid of scholarships.
20. There is also a Preparatory School of Agriculture at which pupils nearing the end of their studies are introduced to the theoretical and practical fundamentals of this occupation.

### Public works

21. The subsidy for public works to the local budget during the last financial year was 29 million pesetas.

22. A new pier was built at State expense despite the natural difficulties presented by the coastline. A port-island, linked to the mainland by a cable railway, was constructed for the purpose. The cost of the project was 210 million pesetas.

### Economy

23. The budget of the Territory, which in 1964 amounted to 65 million pesetas, rose to 85 million for the year under review. This figure does not include supplementary and special credits.

24. Efforts are being made to improve agriculture and make it more productive. As a result, fruit is now being grown on land which until recently produced only barley. This programme, which is being carried out at State expense, calls for the consolidation of land holdings with the consent of the owners and the establishment of farmers' associations to work the land under a co-operative system.

25. Attention has also been given to housing construction. A development consisting of 464 houses was recently completed at a total cost of 160 million pesetas. The Territory contributed 13.5 million pesetas to cover the cost of roads linking the development to the urban centre, the purchase of lots and the provision of electric power and drinking water. Another development is under construction at Id U Faqueh; twelve houses and the mosque have already been completed.

### Communications

26. Air transport between the Territory and other countries is provided by Iberia Air Lines and maritime transport is provided under an agreement with a shipping company. The road network affords access to all rural localities.

## B. SPANISH SAHARA

27. The Spanish Sahara has a population of 25,000, consisting for the most part of nomadic herdsmen. The administering Power reports that the most significant

effort made in the Territory has been "the gradual stabilization and settlement of the population and the establishment of the basic prerequisites for a census and for the development of the first organs of administration and government on these initial foundations".

#### Political and social conditions

28. The Governor-General, who has a civilian status, is the highest administrative authority and the departments of education, health, public works, architecture, telecommunications, mining, finance and labour are the executive organs.

29. Organs of local administration are the cabildo (territorial council), currently headed by Seila Uld Abeida Uld Sid Ahmed, the municipal councils of El Aaiún and Villa Cisneros where the mayor is Suilem Uld Abdelahe Uld Ahmed Brahim, and smaller local units at Smara and Güera. There are also "nomadic sections", which are of a special nature in that they embrace those Saharans who, because they are herdsmen, cannot participate in the municipal organs.

30. The members of these bodies are selected either directly by the population or through the corporations, industry, commerce and the professions. The Christian community is represented in all of them with the exception of the nomadic sections, but proportionately much less than the Moslem community because it accounts for a considerably smaller percentage of the population. Matters arising among Moslems are settled quite independently by Sharia justice whose written and customary laws are applied in full.

31. There is religious freedom. Mosques have been built at the expense of the Spanish State, which also pays the salaries of the fakirs and professors of the Koran. Each year, the Administration sponsors the Saharan Moslems' pilgrimage to Mecca.

32. In the social field, mention should be made of the child-care dispensaries and kindergartens which have been established; according to the information received, the high infant mortality, which was impeding the growth of the nomadic population, has virtually disappeared. Primary education is provided as part of the State educational system, which extends throughout the desert. There are also secondary educational establishments, and higher education is provided by means of scholarships. The social security system in force in Spain is applied in the Sahara; it guarantees a minimum wage, unemployment benefits, health care and old-age

and disability pensions. These benefits are provided on an equal basis for Christians and Moslems.

33. Nomadism is giving way to a settled mode of life, as the development of the Territory creates urban centres and, with them, employment opportunities. The Territory now has towns, such as El Aaiún and Villa Cisneros, in which 1,447 modern dwellings have been built recently. Urban centres have been appearing in the desert; there are some larger ones, such as Smara, Auserd, in the middle of the desert, and Güera, the port in the southern region, and other smaller centres. All have electric light, water, schools, dispensaries, etc.

34. An Advisory Council was recently established whose aim was to implement a plan for the development of the Territory. It is composed of representatives of the authorities, the technical departments of the Administration and the nomadic population. The latter is represented by their traditional chiefs.

#### Public health and welfare

35. There are maternity clinics, headed by qualified specialists, in the hospitals at El Aaiún and Villa Cisneros. In the inland villages, these services are provided by general practitioners, and patients can be evacuated in Health Department ambulances or in aircraft if specialized treatment is required.

36. These two towns also have child-care dispensaries which are under the direction of child-care specialists. In addition, children from the inland villages who cannot be treated with normal resources and skills, are referred to these centres. For this purpose, examinations are conducted regularly in all schools.

37. For adult patients, there is a general hospital in El Aaiún which provides the normal hospital services (radiology, clinical analysis, surgery, internal medicine, dentistry, otorhinolaryngology, ophthalmology, etc.). There is a district hospital at Villa Cisneros, which provides the same services but has fewer beds.

38. In the villages of Smara, Auserd and Güera, health services are provided at nursing dispensaries under the direction of qualified doctors. These dispensaries have twenty beds each and serve as the first reference echelon for the rural dispensaries. The smaller villages have mobile dispensaries which are also staffed by doctors.

39. The Health Department of the Territory has a fleet of ambulances, and, for very urgent cases, aircraft which transport patients to the first echelon (the

nursing dispensaries at Smara, Auserd and Güera) and the second (the hospitals at El Aaiún and Villa Cisneros).

40. Spanish Sahara has the following medical centres: one provincial hospital at El Aaiún (150 beds), one district hospital at Villa Cisneros (50 beds) and one hospital at Güera; 2 child-care dispensaries (at El Aaiún and Villa Cisneros); 2 mobile dispensaries; 2 maternity clinics; and a nursing dispensary at Smara and one at Auserd, each with 20 beds. In addition there is a dispensary in each of the villages of Hausa, Echdeiría, Mahbes, Hagunía, Bojador, Guelta Zemmur, Bu Craa, Tichla and Bir N'Zarán and a health post in each of the villages of Edchera, El Farsia, Agracha and Aguenit.

41. The Head of the Health Department is a doctor as are the directors of the hospitals at El Aaiún and Villa Cisneros. The centres are staffed by the following personnel: 10 specialists for the hospital; 2 pharmacists for the hospitals; 15 doctors, for the urban and rural mobile dispensaries; 40 auxiliary health technicians, from the National Health Corps; 50 qualified health workers; 20 nursing sisters; and subordinate and cleaning staff.

42. As regards public welfare, unemployment benefits are paid to all Saharans who have no paid employment (at present, there are not more than 200 unemployed). Elderly persons, invalids and destitute children receive a monthly food ration which provides them with a minimum diet. Planning and financial arrangements have been made for the establishment of homes for these needy persons, who will receive complete care on a residential basis.

### Education

43. Children aged two to six are admitted to the children's homes (Hogares de la Infancia) at El Aaiún and Villa Cisneros, on a semi-residential basis. The children are fed and clothed. In 1965 there were 300 pupils and ten teachers.

44. Primary education is given in school groups and multi-grade schools. These schools are constructed in localities where there are at least thirty pupils. So that no Saharan child will be denied an opportunity to obtain an education, portable schools have been introduced, which follow the groups of nomads in their search for pastures for their livestock. All the pupils are clothed, shod and fed at school wardrobes and dining-rooms. In 1965, there were ten school groups, twelve multi-grade schools and six mobile schools. There were fifty-seven national



teachers, twenty-nine teachers of Hassania and the Koran. The total enrolment in primary schools was 2,200.

45. Secondary education is provided at the Institutes of Secondary Education at El Aaiún and Villa Cisneros, which are State-run centres. There are thirty-two teachers at these institutes and 466 pupils. For higher education, pupils are given scholarships, with no limitation on the number awarded.

46. Saharan students who are not qualified for other types of instruction are given vocational training. Until now, this training has been provided either in the Territory itself, through courses for health workers, driver-mechanics and construction workers, or at special vocational training schools in Spain, which give intensive training to sixty pupils a year. Because of this activity, it was thought advisable to establish vocational schools in the Territory itself, and plans have been drawn up and funds provided for centres at El Aaiún and Villa Cisneros.

#### Public works

47. Urban development. The towns of El Aaiún and Villa Cisneros and the villages of Smara and Güera have asphalt roads, water mains and sewer systems. The other villages also have water supply systems and small electric power stations.

48. Roads. Primary roads exist between El Aaiún and Playa (25 km), Villa Cisneros and Aargub (20 km), Güera and the Mauritanian frontier (4 km). There are tertiary roads from El Aaiún to Daora (45 km), El Aaiún to Edchera (30 km), El Aaiún to Smara (180 km), Smara to Hausa (20 km), Hausa to Edchera (10 km), El Aaiún to Cabo Bojador (80 km) and along the detour to Guelta Zemmur (26 km). These roads enable traffic to cross the desert and reach all important centres. They are four metres wide and asphalted.

49. Ports. The port of Villa Cisneros is equipped with all services for maritime traffic; other facilities include wharves at El Aaiún and Güera and a wharf for unloading minerals.

50. Airports. The Territory's facilities include an airport at El Aaiún with asphalt runways which can be used by Caravelle jets, a similar airport at Villa Cisneros and several landing fields.

Economy

51. The Territory's budgetary deficit, representing 80 per cent of total expenditure, is met by the Spanish State. What little revenue there is comes mainly from civil servants. The indigenous inhabitants pay no taxes.
52. The report transmitted by the administering Power states that the desert character of the Territory is the reason for its poverty. The sparse population provides little opportunity for trade; the lack of raw materials accounts for the absence of industry; the soil, for the most part rocky and sandy, is not suitable for agriculture or for cattle-raising, and in addition, the climate is harsh and water scarce; there are indications that the sub-soil contains minerals, but it is doubtful that they can be profitably exploited since the deposits are at such a great distance from possible embarkation points; finally, the coastline is very steep and has no natural harbours suitable for the construction of ports, so that possibilities for trade and the establishment of fishing fleets are extremely limited.
53. Nevertheless, efforts are being made to exploit all available resources with a view to developing the Sahara. A brief outline of these efforts is set out below.
54. Agriculture. In the last few years, farming trials have been conducted in the areas where the existence of both topsoil and water gives some hope for agricultural viability. There is an experimental centre at Villa Cisneros, which supplies excellent green vegetables of all kinds for local consumption. However, the large-scale work is being done in the Aargub District, where 150 hectares are currently being prepared for farming trials, particularly the cultivation of cereals, forage crops and vegetables. This was made possible by the discovery of a large sheet of underground water, which rises under its own pressure from a depth of 450 metres. If, as is hoped, the experiment is successful, as much as 5,000 hectares can be farmed in the southern region of the Territory alone. According to the information received, it is not claimed that agriculture will save the economy, but it will help to meet local needs and, above all, produce forage which can be used to feed livestock in periods of prolonged drought when natural forage dries up. In addition, market gardens are being planted in the Northern District in places which have water; they are expected to help hundreds of families, who will consume part of the produce and sell the surplus in the urban centres. This work is being done by the Government at its own expense; once the market gardens are

ready, they will be turned over to the Saharan families, who will cultivate them with technical assistance from the Department of Agriculture.

55. Cattle-raising. This is dependent upon agriculture, and the administering Power reports that no attempt is being made to turn the desert into a cattle-raising centre. Unfavourable geographical conditions preclude the adaptation of species of the right number and quality for export. The aim is rather to keep the camel herds in good condition and also the sheep and goat herds, which adapt so well to this terrain. An attempt will also be made to introduce zebus, whose meat is prized more highly than that of the camel. In this way, and through the agricultural development described above, the nomadic population is being ensured a livelihood at low cost.

56. Industry. The almost complete absence of industry is explained by the fact that until now there have been no raw materials to be processed. However, an attempt is being made to develop this branch of the economy by taking advantage of the opportunities afforded by fishing. Since the port of Villa Cisneros has been completed and there is an abundant supply of drinking water in the area, it is hoped that fishing industries will be established. Two factories producing by-products are already in operation at Güera, and it is planned to install industrial freezers at Villa Cisneros so that the large catch can be frozen and then exported to consumer markets.

57. Trade. Small-scale trade is the only kind to be found in the Territory.

#### Transport

58. The population centres of the Territory are linked by roads or tracks that are easily accessible to vehicles, which have replaced camels as a means of transport. These routes, which are described in paragraph 45 above, are sometimes asphalt roads, like the El Aaiún-Smara road, which is 180 kilometres long. Others, however, are tracks running over the land itself, which is good enough for normal vehicular traffic; actual roads are built only in stretches of rocky or sandy soil where normal traffic would be difficult.

59. For maritime traffic there are regular lines stopping at El Aaiún, Villa Cisneros and Güera. In addition, specially chartered vessels provide irregular service in bringing supplies into the Territory.

60. Air travel, which is the most frequent form of travel between the Territory and Spain - either directly or via the Canary Islands - is provided by two airline

companies which have three flights a day between them, both to the Canary Islands and to Spain. In addition, there are several flights a day by another company during the tourist season in the Canary Islands.

Telecommunications

61. The telecommunication services functioning in the Sahara are:

(a) A radio network which enables El Aaiún, Villa Cisneros and the most important inland villages to communicate with the rest of the world and provides services for radiograms, long-distance calls and the transfer of money.

(b) A 5-kilowatt radio transmitter which gives clear reception throughout the Territory, in the Canary Islands, in southern Morocco and at the Mauritanian border.

(c) A television relay station which transmits programmes from the Canary Islands.

### III. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

#### Introduction

62. The Special Committee considered the questions of Ifni and Spanish Sahara at its 435th and 436th meetings held in Addis Ababa on 7 June 1966.

63. By letters dated 31 May, 4 June and 5 June 1966<sup>4/</sup> the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mauritania, the Permanent Representative of Morocco and the Ambassador of Spain in Ethiopia asked that delegations of their respective Governments be permitted to participate in the discussions of the Special Committee on the questions of Ifni and Spanish Sahara.

64. At the 435th meeting, the Special Committee decided without objection to accede to these requests.

65. By a letter dated 7 June 1966 (A/AC.109/176/Add.1), the Ambassador of Spain in Ethiopia stated that his delegation would not participate in the discussion of the question of Ifni and Spanish Sahara.

#### General statements

66. The representative of Morocco, speaking at the Chairman's invitation, said that ever since the Kingdom of Morocco had won back its freedom and independence and had become a Member of the United Nations, the constant concern of His Majesty the King had always been to regain the Moroccan Territories which remained under colonial domination and had been separated from the country under an arbitrary and annexionist policy carried out at its expense by the Powers which had placed it under the jurisdiction of their respective protectorates. That situation, which was a legacy of colonialism and was completely unjust and contrary to the international agreements and treaties guaranteeing the Kingdom of Morocco's territorial integrity, had inevitably given rise to growing and persistent opposition from the whole Moroccan people, including those living in the regions separated from Morocco.

67. The Moroccan Government firmly believed in negotiated and peaceful solutions and based its policy on the threefold principle of law, justice and respect for commitments. Thus, in the very first days of its independence it had initiated

---

<sup>4/</sup> A/AC.109/174, A/AC.109/175 and A/AC.109/176.

diplomatic action to open negotiations for the return of those Territories to the mother country, Morocco. That had led to the belief that the colonial chapter of Morocco's history had finally been ended and that Morocco and its former colonizer had embarked on the path of fruitful co-operation - fruitful because it was based on sincere friendship and mutual respect. Over the last ten years, the Moroccan Government, through its representatives in the competent bodies of the General Assembly, had consistently and regularly placed on record its legitimate claims to the Territories which had been taken from it. Thus, the Moroccan representatives in the Fourth Committee, the General Assembly and later, since its establishment, the Special Committee had always stated in one form or another their most express reservations and had recalled Morocco's inalienable right of sovereignty over those Territories.

68. On 16 October 1964, the Special Committee had adopted a resolution on so-called Spanish Sahara and Ifni, urgently requesting the administering Power to take the necessary steps to free those Territories from colonial domination. That unanimous decision had been the start of positive action which, the Committee's members had felt, should logically lead those Moroccan Territories to full emancipation - in other words, to their freedom from colonial domination in accordance with the provisions of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

69. Unfortunately, the General Assembly's Committees had been unable to function at its nineteenth session, and it had therefore been impossible for the Assembly to proceed to a consideration of the Special Committee's report in 1964. Only at the end of 1965, at the twentieth session, had that report been adopted by the General Assembly. At that same session, General Assembly resolution 2072 (XX) had been adopted unanimously except for two votes, those of Spain and Portugal. In operative paragraph 2 of that resolution, the General Assembly urgently requested the Government of Spain, as the administering Power, "to take immediately all necessary measures for the liberation of the Territories of Ifni and Spanish Sahara from colonial domination and, to this end, to enter into negotiations on the problems relating to sovereignty presented by those two Territories".

70. Although Morocco had not been a co-sponsor of that resolution, it had supported it in its entirety and voted for it. During the drafting stage of the resolution,

/...

the Moroccan delegation had been consistently guided by a spirit of conciliation and compromise. Moreover, its wish had been to rely on the wisdom and perception of the Fourth Committee's members. For that reason, although the problem was a fundamental one of very direct interest to it, it had accepted certain amendments which had not exactly reflected its position.

71. In so doing, the constant concern of the Moroccan Government had been precisely to work, as it had always done, in the most vigorous way to ensure that colonialism in all its forms of domination and exploitation should finally disappear from Africa, Asia and Latin America, and give way at last to a new order in which all people would be able to live in genuine freedom and dignity and freely enjoy their national heritage, both cultural and material. Expressed in that great African capital, those ideas were bound to find a deeper response than anywhere else. That was all the more true as the peoples of the eastern part of the African continent, like the Moroccan people, had also suffered the violation of their national independence and territorial integrity through colonial aggression.

72. The principal basis upon which the Special Committee was considering, at its present session, the problem of the future and liberation of Ifni and so-called Spanish Sahara was resolution 2072 (XX) relating to those Territories. That important resolution had been adopted by the General Assembly at its 1398th plenary meeting on 16 December 1965. More than five months had elapsed since that time, and so far the administering Power's reactions, as reflected both in its official statements and in the new measures adopted in the Territories, including demonstrations of force, indicated that the colonial policy with respect to those Territories had in no way been influenced by the spirit of that resolution. Quite the contrary, there had been an incomprehensible stiffening of the administering Power's attitude towards the local population. While the imposition of European colonization was becoming more and more marked, the civilian and military authorities were intensifying their policy of division and pressure on the indigenous population by using a wide variety of tactics. In addition, attempts, fraught with far-reaching consequences, were being made to exploit certain mineral deposits with the help of foreign capital. Those illegal activities showed how little store the administering Power set by the political and legal aspects of the problem. Moreover, a campaign of systematic virulence had been started by certain

official press organs at Madrid, which had asserted with unusual vehemence that those Territories were and remained Spanish provinces, in the same way as León, Castile and Asturias.

73. Coming from a friendly country, such behaviour had rather surprised the Moroccan Government, which had always placed great hopes in the possibilities of broad co-operation between the two countries. But that co-operation must, of course, be based on the emergence of a new state of mind congenial to the requirements of decolonization in Africa and throughout the world. Therefore, the Moroccan Government, which had always attached particular importance to those requirements, with regard both to the territorial dispute pending with Spain and to the colonial problem as a whole, could not remain indifferent to the disturbing trend taken by Spain's colonial policy since the General Assembly vote on resolution 2072 (XX) the previous December. That was why the Moroccan Government, which was anxious to give greater weight to the means available to the Special Committee, had felt that the Moroccan Territories still under Spanish domination must, whatever the circumstances, be liberated. Since their liberation through negotiations based on the premise that they would be returned directly to the Kingdom of Morocco did not seem, for the time being, to meet with the agreement of the Madrid Government, the Moroccan Government proposed that they should as soon as possible be granted their independence.

74. But although the Moroccan Government, increasingly disturbed at the continuation, for an indeterminate period, of the aftermath of Spanish colonialism in that part of its national territory, had deemed it necessary to propose that methods in order to put an end to an anachronistic situation, the conclusion must not be drawn that Morocco was abandoning its rights of sovereignty. It was also important that that independence should not be a façade, aimed solely at deceiving international opinion and concealing a still more virulent and aggressive colonialism. It must be a genuine independence, enabling the people of those Territories to exercise all the responsibilities of power themselves, without any colonialist presence, pressure or interference of a military, political or economic nature. That solution had the merit both of being in harmony with the objectives

/...



of the Special Committee and of meeting the need to find a way out of the present impasse, which was of benefit only to colonialist and foreign interests. In taking that stand, his country intended to continue its peaceful efforts and to forestall the arguments being put forward by the administering Power in an attempt to evade its obligations to the international community and, in particular, to circumvent the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

75. The Moroccan Government was convinced that the liberation and independence of the Moroccan people of so-called Spanish Sahara, whose patriotism and national honour had withstood all trials, would enable them to choose the path most appropriate to their interests and hopes. Once they had become masters of their own fate, the inhabitants of those Territories would be able to carry out their duties as conscientious and dignified citizens in full freedom, and would, in the very nature of things, pursue a policy in accord with the national objectives of their people within the general framework of African unity. In the conviction that unity could be achieved only through liberation and independence, Morocco could not indefinitely tolerate a situation in which Moroccans were deprived of their freedom and were subjected to a colonial regime whose policy of domination and exploitation merely became increasingly harsh. On the other hand, it was to be hoped that Spain, the administering Power, which through the voice of its leaders and of its representatives in the United Nations had already given its support to the work of decolonization going on in various parts of the world, would find it possible to probe its conscience and take into account the inalienable rights of the people involved, namely, their right to freedom and to moral and material well-being.

76. He wished on that occasion to reaffirm, on behalf of the Moroccan Government, that the stand taken by Morocco must not in any way be understood to mean that it had abandoned, in any form, its rights to the Sahara at present under Spanish domination. Those sovereign rights remained inalienable. That national sovereignty had been established from the very earliest times of Moroccan history and had only recently been interrupted by a de facto colonial occupation.

/...

77. By proposing to the Special Committee that its Saharan Territories should be granted independence, the Moroccan Government wished again to facilitate the Special Committee's work and enable it to carry out its task of decolonization. It also wished to eliminate what had so far been taken as a pretext to perpetuate colonial domination in an area where it had already endured too long. He hoped that the members of the Special Committee would take cognizance of Morocco's efforts to make a positive contribution to their work in the search for a final solution to that grave problem. The Moroccan Government believed that its present position should enable the Committee to measure the extent of its own responsibilities, which it would unquestionably be able to assume to the fullest degree.

78. In conclusion, he expressed the hope that the Special Committee, in conformity with the noble task entrusted to it, would accede to the Moroccan request by adopting a resolution and taking appropriate steps for the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in that part of Moroccan national territory which was occupied by Spain, as the administering Power.

79. The representative of Mauritania, speaking at the Chairman's invitation, said that he would not at that stage of the debate discuss Ifni but intended to deal at some length with the question of Spanish Sahara.

80. He recalled that under the colonial régime, Mauritania had been occupied by France and Spain. The French part had regained its independence by virtue of the loi-cadre.

81. The Spanish part, known as "Spanish Sahara", was made up of Rio de Oro and Saguia El Hamra. It covered an area of 280,000 square kilometres situated between 9° and 17° west longitude and between 21° and 27° north latitude, and thus formed the north-west region of independent Mauritania, which was itself situated between 5° and 17° west longitude and between 15° and 27° north latitude. Geographical limits were not, however, the only factors which confirmed that Spanish Sahara was an integral part of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania. In fact, the same tribes, the same Moslem religion, the same language and the same traditions were to be found on both sides of the frontier.

82. It had only been with the advent of colonization that the country had been divided along arbitrary and, moreover, very roughly defined frontiers.

83. In 1884, Spain, basing its action on the Berlin Act, according to which any "free" territory could be occupied, had notified the other Powers that it was establishing a protectorate over the western coast of Africa in the area situated between 20° and 27° north latitude. Not until the Conventions of 27 June 1900, 3 October 1904 and 27 November 1912 had the frontiers between the French and Spanish possessions been determined, and even then with somewhat less than strict exactitude.

84. The Rabat régime had tried to insinuate that Mauritanian claims to Spanish Sahara were merely a diplomatic manoeuvre to gain recognition of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania by the Kingdom of Morocco. In actual fact, since the dawn of its independence, the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, while opposing any bargaining over its sovereignty, had consistently pressed its point of view on the problem of Spanish Sahara. It had done so repeatedly through the most authoritative voice of all, that of its Head of State, and through its representatives at the United Nations in the Special Committee, the Fourth Committee and the General Assembly. In that connexion, the historical facts recalled by the Islamic Republic of Mauritania were irrefutable. Of particular significance was the Peace Treaty of 1767 between the Sovereign of Spain and the Sultan Moulay Mohammed of Morocco. Article 18 of that Treaty stated:

"His Imperial Majesty refrains from discussing the establishment which His Catholic Majesty wishes to found south of Rio Nun, since he cannot be responsible for the accidents and ills which might arise there, as his sovereignty does not extend as far as that place, and the vagrant and ferocious tribes inhabiting that country have always done harm to the inhabitants of the Canary Islands and reduced them to slavery."

85. That document of two centuries ago demonstrated well the worth of Moroccan assertions that Morocco's sovereignty over the territories forming Spanish Sahara had been exercised for more than a thousand years. If new facts had arisen since the Treaty, they had never had the significance attributed to them by Morocco. Those new facts were not further treaties but attempted incursions carried out with

the aim of invading the Sahara, something which the local tribes had never accepted. In 1863, during his own father's lifetime, Prince Moulay Hassen had launched the first expedition, which had met failure at Agadir. In 1882, the same Moulay Hassen, by then crowned Sultan, had seized his only chance of reaching Cape Nun but had been unable to maintain his position there long enough to give the impression that the local tribes had been subdued. In 1883, in a final attempt, Moulay Hassen had tried in vain to go beyond the parallel of Agadir. Thus, the gates of the Sahara had never yielded to Moroccan invasions. On the other hand, the "Blue Sultan", as if in imitation of the glorious epoch of the Almoravides, had had little difficulty in occupying Marrakesh.

86. It had therefore only been through French intervention that the establishment of a new Mauritanian dynasty in the Maghreb had been prevented. Since that time it had been clear to what extent the term "protectorate" (the relations established between France and Morocco) had corresponded to a deep reality, in the sense that it had been a real protection of certain special Moroccan interests. It was therefore in full knowledge of the facts that the Moroccan leaders had, until recently, recognized that Spanish Sahara was an integral part of Mauritania. The Rabat régime, in an official document which had since become famous - the White Paper given widespread circulation in 1960 by His Sherifian Majesty's Ministry of Foreign Affairs - had stated in particular:

"Mauritania is a vast territory embracing the southern provinces of the Kingdom of Morocco, which lies between the regions of Tindouf and Seguia' el-Hamra, the Algerian Sahara to the east, the Atlantic coast to the west and the Senegal River to the south.

"In order better to dissociate Mauritania from the rest of the Moroccan Kingdom, Spain recently substituted the expression 'Spanish Sahara' for that of 'Spanish Mauritania'.

"The capital strategic importance of Mauritania, due to its geographical location, has determined the extent of Franco-Spanish penetration since the beginning of the twentieth century."

/...

87. The legend of the map attached to the White Paper read: "The problem of Mauritania - a simplified map showing the portion of Mauritanian territory under French domination and that under Spanish domination. Morocco includes all the territory between Tangier and Saint-Louis of Senegal."

88. The Government of His Sherifian Majesty had not countered those facts and documents, whose authenticity could easily be verified, with any convincing arguments. Having been left with no further ammunition, Morocco had had to boast of its friendship with Spain.

89. There again, it must be wondered whether the Rabat régime had not met with obstacles similar to those which had always prevented Sherifian sovereigns from occupying the Sahara. Indeed, on 16 December 1965, Mr. Manuel Aznar, the Spanish representative, had stated in the General Assembly that Ifni and the Sahara were two quite different geographical entities, that having been an unambiguous way of inviting the representative of Morocco to limit his Government's claims solely to the Territory of Ifni.

90. Despite that warning - which by its discretion has been a friendly one - the Moroccan representative had set out to show, through quotations and words taken from the statement of the Spanish representative before the Special Committee, that Madrid and Rabat had agreed to open negotiations on Spanish Sahara. The deputy representative of Spain, Mr. Jaime de Pinies, had given an unequivocal denial in reply by stating that one could not quote one part of one or several statements and omit another part, for they all constituted a harmonious whole; the part to which the representative of Morocco had referred and which he had described as an agreement reached in 1963 had not in fact been such.

91. Since, moreover, Morocco took such pride in its good relations with Spain, it should be reminded of what had been written in 1961 in the Madrid periodical ABC by Salvador Lopez de la Torre, a specialist in Saharan questions:

"In fact, a change becomes progressively apparent from a point further north, the basin of the Sous River, in the region of Agadir. It is from there that one begins to find two ways of life superimposed: the semi-nomads become gradually less numerous and give way to the great nomads, independent and proud

shepherds, with whom the Moroccan Kingdoms have never had friendly relations throughout the course of history. Different ways of life first appear in the Sous basin and then become considerably more marked as one travels south in the Assaka River basin. The final frontier is in the Draa River basin. Although desert people with ties of kinship to families in the foot-hills of the Anti-Atlas may still be found in the Draa region, it is impossible, south of the Draa River, to find any trace of a link between that region and the northern region."

92. The same journalist had added:

"We have no reason to contradict the good Sultan, Moulay Mohammed, who signed the Treaty of Peace and Commerce of 1767, during the reign of Charles III, when he made this confession, which may well be recalled now:

"His Islamic Majesty refrains from discussing the establishment which His Catholic Majesty wishes to found south of Rio Nun, since he cannot be responsible for the accidents and ills which might arise there, as his sovereignty does not extend as far as that place.'

"His Islamic Majesty knew what he was talking about. South of Rio Nun, that is, the present Draa River, lay the region where anarchy reigned: Bled es Siba, as the Moroccans called it, simply because it was a region to which the Sultan's sovereignty, as he himself said, did not extend. It is there, in fact, that an entirely different world begins.

"That is why we believe that the Sultan's expeditions never went beyond the Sous River, which is the first frontier of the Sahara, and that only once, taking advantage of the flight of the local tribes, who had allowed the Royal Caravan to pass in order to avoid any fighting, did he briefly reach Rio Nun, today known as Rio Draa, and then only for a few hours.

"One need only determine from a map the distance separating Rio Nun or Draa from genuinely Saharan territory to realize the full justification for the view that Morocco is the 'Jazzirat al Maghrib', the island of the west, the island of the Maghreb, between two different kinds of sea. The history of the desert and what might be called its 'philosophy' can only be understood if the southern frontier of Morocco is regarded as a real shore-line, the border between two different worlds.

"The inevitable historical frictions between those two heterogeneous worlds have always proceeded in one direction. The confrontation of the Saharan people and the Moroccan people has consisted of invasion of the north by the south, without any counterpart in the form of a movement from the north to the south. In the conflict between these two adjacent but distinct worlds, there has always been but a single victor: the south, that is, the desert. The north, in other words, Morocco, has always been the loser. The epic story of the Almoravides, setting out from what is today Mauritanian territory, swept over Morocco and continued on to the Iberian peninsula.

"The first great victory of the Sahara against the Maghreb, moving from south to north, blazed the trail which was to become that of future wars in that part of Africa. The brief adventurous episode of Pasha Djuder against Tombouctou was to be the only exception in this one-way movement.

"Almost a thousand years after the Almoravid expedition, the "Blue Sultan" (a Mauritanian) invaded southern Morocco and occupied Marrakesh. It was a repetition, a thousand years later, of that movement of conquest which has been, as it were, a constant feature of the Sahara and fully explains the hostility of the nomads living in those territories towards the foreign threat represented by Morocco. As Montagne said: 'The Nun River, which we call the Draa, represents the line of demarcation between two different systems of social and political organization; it is the southern shore of the island of Maghreb'."

93. In the eyes of Mauritania, the Moroccan dreams represented nothing more than the vestiges of claims which President Moktar Ould Daddah had called as ridiculous as those which England might now make against France on the pretext that at the time of Joan of Arc, Paris and a large part of France had been occupied by the English.

94. The Islamic Republic of Mauritania, too, could invoke its friendship with Spain, but not in the Moroccan terms according to which good relations were a convincing argument, or at least a sufficient reason, for Madrid to cede its colonial possessions to Rabat. As the Mauritanian Government saw it, the friendship between Spain and Mauritania was based on mutual understanding and a common desire for honest co-operation. The Mauritanian Government had asked Spain to enter into a frank and sincere dialogue, in the spirit of the special ties uniting the two countries, in order to find a solution to the problem. It would never, however, ask Spain to cede Ifni, or even Tarfaya which Spain had nevertheless graciously ceded to Morocco. President Moktar Ould Daddah had made that point clear in his report of 28 November 1965 on the state of the nation:

"We know that, as part of this fruitful co-operation, it will be possible to find a satisfactory solution which will validate the integration of Spanish Sahara into our national territory and thus make possible the total reunification of our country. The progressive attitude of the Spanish Government towards the problems of decolonization gives good reason to have confidence in the future."

/...

95. The confidence had become manifest two months previously, when the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs had paid a visit to Mauritania from 7 to 9 March 1966. The joint communiqué issued at the end of that visit had stated:

"During these talks, the two delegations considered, in an atmosphere of complete cordiality and mutual understanding, all the political and economic problems affecting the two countries. The two delegations, greatly desiring to maintain and constantly improve the excellent relations between Spain and Mauritania, expressed their firm desire to strengthen and diversify their co-operation in every sphere.

"The two delegations reviewed the progress made in the direction of this co-operation and decided to take all steps necessary to ensure that jointly agreed plans would be carried out."

96. Encouraged by that manifestation of friendship and sincere desire to enter into a frank and honest dialogue, the Mauritanian Government had decided to inform the Spanish Government that it was prepared to engage in negotiations on the problem of Spanish Sahara, having due regard for General Assembly resolution 2072 (XX) of 16 December 1965.

97. That attitude of the Mauritanian Government must not, however, be interpreted either as a retreat or as a refusal to allow the peoples of the Sahara to become independent. There could be no question of allowing a single plot of African territory to remain under foreign domination. The day when the Special Committee went beyond the resolution adopted by the General Assembly, the Mauritanian Government would not have the slightest objection to the liberation of Spanish Sahara.

98. The representative of Morocco said that the statement which he had just heard certainly excused him from continuing the debate. He had fulfilled his task of making a positive statement on behalf of his Government. The Mauritanian spokesman had been at pains to affirm the rights of Spain over that part of Moroccan territory, rather than attempting to prevail upon the Special Committee to take a stand on decolonization. His statement had consisted mainly of press extracts, including an article by a Spanish journalist described as "a specialist in Saharan questions". The point of view advanced by the spokesman of Mauritania was not an African point of view. That spokesman had become the champion of a purely colonialist argument, the defence of which by an African was for the Moroccan delegation a matter for regret.

/...



99. The representative of Mauritania said that there was no question of the Mauritanian Government coming to the defence of colonialism, especially in Rio de Oro or Spanish Sahara. As to the matter of quoting an extract from an article by a Spanish journalist, there was in the circumstances nothing out of the ordinary in making use of quotations. He fully agreed with the Moroccan representative regarding Spanish Sahara's right to freedom. That Territory should be completely independent of Spain, but also, of course, of Morocco.

100. The representative of Tunisia said that the Tunisian Government would examine the statements by the representatives of Morocco and Mauritania with the greatest interest and would use all the means at its disposal to satisfy their legitimate and justified claims. He was convinced that the Special Committee would give due weight to those two statements when the time came for it to seek the ways and means that might lead to a peaceful solution of the thorny problem under consideration.

101. The Tunisian delegation had spoken on all the items on the Special Committee's agenda. It would be failing in its duty if it did not state its position on Ifni and so-called Spanish Sahara, especially since they were neighbouring Territories to whose liberation the Tunisian Government attached the highest importance. The status of those two Territories was certainly difficult to settle because certain Member States disputed their right to sovereignty. But in that respect, too, the attitude of the Tunisian Government had always been clear and precise because it was dictated by reason and justice.

102. The Tunisian delegation believed that in order to settle disputes of that kind fairly, prime consideration must be given to historical and geographical factors. For example, in the cases of Gibraltar and the Falkland Islands (Malvinas), his delegation had always opposed the unjustified claims of the United Kingdom and favoured the restitution of the two Territories to Spain and Argentina, respectively, since it seemed unreasonable that a foreign Power should be able to retain a Territory which historically and geographically belonged to another country. That was a question of justice and security.

103. In the case of Ifni and so-called Spanish Sahara, the Tunisian delegation had a right to expect a similar attitude from Spain, particularly as friendly relations

of very long-standing had created a bond between Spain and North Africa. Moreover, the people of those countries, who had many points in common, were bound by economic and cultural ties which were becoming still closer.

104. It was unfortunately apparent that the administering Power was thus far continuing to claim sovereignty over those Territories. The Tunisian delegation refused to accept those claims because it could no longer condone domination by foreign Powers, whoever they might be, on the African continent. It was, moreover, merely agreeing with the opinion expressed the previous day by the Administrative Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity, who had said that the African peoples would not be fully satisfied until the last square inch of African soil had been withdrawn from non-African authority.

105. With that principle established, and in view of the high esteem in which Spain was held by the Arab and African countries, the Tunisian delegation appealed to the administering Power voluntarily to renounce the sovereignty which it exercised over those Territories as soon as possible instead of stiffening its position by dividing and oppressing the indigenous inhabitants. It should also declare its willingness to enter into negotiations for the prompt transfer of powers to the indigenous inhabitants of those Territories. In doing so, it would merely be complying with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2072 (XX), which had been adopted unanimously except for two votes - those of Spain and Portugal. ~~By acting in that way, Spain could not but rise in the estimation of the African and Arab countries,~~ which would not fail to accord it more lasting and appreciable benefits.

106. His delegation would certainly make its contribution to the Special Committee's work when the time came to consider ways and means which might lead to a peaceful solution of the problem. It would, in addition, support any action conforming to the principles which he had set out in his statement.

107. The representative of Chile said that the statements made by the representatives of Mauritania and Morocco would be taken into account by the Special Committee in its consideration of the question of Ifni and Spanish Sahara. However, its task was complicated by the claims of two sister African States to sovereignty in respect of those Territories. He therefore appealed to Spain to assist the Committee in its task of eradicating colonialism by complying with the terms of operative paragraph 2 of General Assembly resolution 2072 (XX).

108. The representative of Iraq supported the Tunisian representative's appeal to Spain to implement the terms of General Assembly resolution 2072 (XX). The views expressed by the Tunisian representative would undoubtedly be shared by many other members of the Special Committee.

109. The representative of Mali said that his delegation would study the statements of the representatives of Morocco and Mauritania with all the attention which they merited. He associated himself with the position of the Tunisian representative and drew the Committee's attention to operative paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution 2072 (XX) of 16 December 1965, in which the Special Committee was requested "to report on the implementation of the present resolution to the General Assembly at its twenty-first session". He also asked the Spanish delegation, if present, to inform the Special Committee of its views on the status of Ifni and Spanish Sahara, having due regard for the resolution adopted in that matter by the Fourth Committee.

110. The representative of Venezuela said that his delegation was convinced of Spain's readiness to decolonize the remaining Territories under its control and to comply with the terms of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), as repeatedly stated by its representatives both before the Special Committee and before the General Assembly. However, in the specific case of Ifni and the Spanish Sahara, the problem was complicated by the fact that claims to sovereignty over those Territories had been advanced by two or more countries and that, to date, neither the Committee nor the General Assembly had indicated with which Power Spain should negotiate. It was therefore the opinion of the Venezuelan delegation that the Committee should postpone further action on the matter until, in accordance with the terms of resolution 2072 (XX), Spain had reported to the twenty-first session of the General Assembly.

111. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said he was convinced that the points of view expressed by the representatives of Morocco and Mauritania would be taken into consideration by all members of the Special Committee. The Soviet delegation attached the greatest importance to them. It believed that in considering the question of Ifni and Spanish Sahara, the Committee should bear in mind the very moving address given by Mr. Diallo Telli, the Administrative Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity, who had said that "OAU was

as concerned about the fate of those small Territories as it was about the fate of the big colonies, for a question of principle was involved. The decolonization to which OAU aspired and for which it was working should cover all the African territories, large or small, rich or poor. The African peoples would not be fully satisfied on that score until the last square inch of African soil had been withdrawn from non-African authority".

112. Five years had elapsed since the adoption of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. His delegation held it to be a matter of principle, firstly, that that Declaration applied to the two Territories under consideration and, secondly, that Spain must immediately leave those Territories in order to free them from its rule. The General Assembly had most recently considered that question at its twentieth session and had at that time requested the Government of Spain to take immediately all necessary measures for the liberation of Ifni and Spanish Sahara. Unfortunately, it was only too apparent that Spain was ignoring that stand. It was engaging in diplomatic manoeuvres intended to show that it was changing its policy and paving the way for the independence of the Territories under its administration, but that was purely a diplomatic diversion. In fact, Spain was using those Territories as trump cards and as a means of exerting pressure in order to gain time and continue to exercise its domination over land which was not its own. It was in the same spirit that it was attracting foreign capital to the Territories. It was well known that half the arable land had been leased to foreign monopolies. The only conclusion to be drawn was that Spain was continuing to sell things which did not belong to it. The Soviet delegation therefore called for the immediate implementation of the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2072 (XX) of 16 December 1965.

113. The representative of Syria said that his delegation regretted that the administering Power had gone back on its original intention to accelerate the process towards self-determination and independence of Ifni and the Spanish Sahara. In view of the terms of General Assembly resolution 2072 (XX), the Special Committee was fully justified in asking what measures had been taken by Spain for the liberation of those Territories. Furthermore, it should be possible to reach a solution regarding the conflicting claims advanced in that respect by initiating negotiations on the questions of sovereignty, as required under operative

paragraph 2 of the resolution. It was to be hoped that Mauritania and Morocco would soon compose their differences so that the cause of emancipation from foreign rule would prevail and that Spain would embark upon a policy of decolonization.

114. The representative of Ethiopia considered that, before the Special Committee reached any decision on Ifni and the Spanish Sahara, a thorough study should be made on the question, at which time his delegation would make its views known. He suggested that the Secretariat should prepare a detailed working paper on the matter, taking into account the statements made by the representatives of Mauritania and Morocco.

115. The representative of Iran supported those speakers who had appealed to the Spanish Government to implement the terms of General Assembly resolution 2072 (XX) and reiterated his delegation's firm conviction that colonial issues involving sovereign rights should be settled through negotiation in accordance with United Nations practice.

IV. ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

Consensus adopted by the Special Committee

116. At its 436th meeting held on 7 June 1966, the Special Committee decided, on the proposal of the Chairman, to adopt the following consensus on the questions of Ifni and Spanish Sahara:

"The Special Committee requests the Secretary-General to convey the views expressed at the present meeting concerning Ifni and Spanish Sahara to the Government of Spain and to obtain from that Government as soon as possible information concerning the measures taken by it in implementation of operative paragraph 2 of General Assembly resolution 2072 (XX) of 16 December 1965. Having regard to paragraph 3 of the same resolution, the Special Committee will resume its consideration of these Territories on receipt of the information requested."

V. FURTHER CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

Introduction

117. The Special Committee further considered Ifni and the Spanish Sahara at its 472nd, 474th, 478th, 479th and 481st meetings, held at Headquarters between 12 October and 17 November 1966. The Committee had before it a letter dated 8 September 1966 (A/AC.109/202) from the Permanent Representative of Spain in which, following the adoption by the Special Committee at its 436th meeting of the consensus concerning Ifni and the Spanish Sahara, the Government of Spain informed the Special Committee of its attitude and intentions regarding the implementation of General Assembly resolution 2072 (XX) of 16 December 1965. This letter is annexed to the present chapter.

118. In a letter dated 22 September and two letters dated 10 October 1966,<sup>5/</sup> the Permanent Representatives of Mauritania, Morocco and Spain requested that delegations of their respective Governments be permitted to participate in the discussion of this item. At its 472nd meeting, the Special Committee decided without objection to accede to these requests.

119. In a letter dated 4 November 1966 (A/AC.109/211), the Permanent Representative of Algeria requested permission to participate in the proceedings of the Special Committee during its consideration of Ifni and the Spanish Sahara. At its 474th meeting, the Special Committee decided without objection to grant this request.

---

<sup>5/</sup> A/AC.109/207, A/AC.109/208, A/AC.109/209.

A. Written petitions and hearings

120. The Special Committee circulated the following additional written petitions concerning Ifni and Spanish Sahara:

| <u>Petitioner</u>   | <u>Document Number</u> |
|---|------------------------|
| <u>Ifni</u><br>Messrs. Mohammed Bey,<br>Lahoussine Bey and Youssef  | A/AC.109/PET.532       |
| <u>Spanish Sahara</u><br>Mr. El Abadila Ould Sheikh<br>Laghdaf and others                                 | A/AC.109/PET.562       |
| Messrs. Ould Sheikh Malainine<br>and Mohamed Ould Haidalla  | A/AC.109/PET.563       |
| Mr. Seila Uld Abeida and five<br>others on behalf of "La<br>Comision Elegida por el<br>Pueblo del Sahara" | A/AC.109/PET.572       |

121. The three petitions concerning Spanish Sahara contained requests for hearings which were granted by the Special Committee.

122. At its 478th and 479th meetings, the Special Committee heard statements by Messrs. El Abadila Ould Sheikh Mohamed Laghdaf, Braika Ould Ahmed Lahcen and Hamdi Ould Salek Ould Ba Ali. The petitioners were accompanied by Messrs. Brahim Ould Hassena Douihi, Abdallah Ould El Khattat and Habouha Ould Abeida.

123. At the 479th meeting, the Chairman stated that Messrs. Sidi Mohamed Ould Haidala, Dahi Ould Nagem, Slama Ould Sidi Ould Oumar and Sheikh Ould Mouhamed Saleh, whose request for a hearing had been granted, had informed him that because of language difficulties they would not make a statement but would present their petition in writing. The Special Committee decided to incorporate the statement submitted by the petitioners in the records of the Committee.

124. At the 479th meeting, the Chairman informed the Special Committee that Mr. Ould Sheikh Malainine, who had originally requested a hearing with the preceding group, had requested to be heard separately. The Committee agreed to this request and Mr. Malainine made a statement at that meeting.



125. Mr. El Abadila Ould Sheikh Mohammed Laghdaf stated that the Saharan people confidently awaited a decision of the United Nations to free them from oppression.

126. Río de Oro and Saguia El Hamra were situated in north-west Africa and covered approximately 280,000 square kilometres. The coastline of the region lay between  $27^{\circ} 40' N.$   $20^{\circ} 47' N.$  Those imaginary and superficial frontiers had been created by colonialism in order to dismember the African continent and divide its peoples.

127. The population of the region was over 250,000, notwithstanding the colonial Power's statement that it did not exceed 25,000. The colonial Power was trying to minimize the importance of the region so that the United Nations would take no interest in it. The chief towns of the Sahara were El Aaiún, Semara, Güera and Addakhla, which had later been named Villa Cisneros. The inhabitants belonged to the following tribes: Rqueibat, Azerkien Ouled Dlim, Ouled Tidrarin, Ait Lahcen, Filala, Ahl Chekh Ma Al Aynin and Al Aroussyin. They were tribes of Arab origin, whose religion was Islam and whose language was Arabic. From time immemorial they had all been part of the Moroccan nation. Furthermore, the dynasty of the Almoravides, which had ruled in Morocco for two centuries and constituted a great empire, had been founded by the Lemtouna tribe, which came from the Sahara. The Territory had depended on Morocco during the reign of the Sa'adians and the Alaouits. The Governors of the Sahara had been appointed directly by the Sultans from the time of Mulay Ismail and Mulay Mohamed Ben Abdallah in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries until the reign of Sultan Mulay Hafid, when Morocco had been reduced to a Protectorate.

128. Originally the idea of conquering the Sahara had been advocated by private Spanish companies such as the Sociedad de Pesquerías Canario-Africanas and the Sociedad de Africanistas y Colonistas. On 15 October 1884 the ships of those companies had arrived at Río de Oro and at Cape Blanco and, under the leadership of Emilio Bonelli, the Spaniards had built wooden huts and hoisted the Spanish flag. On 3 November 1884 they had carried out the same operation in Addakhla, which since then had been called Villa Cisneros. The Spanish Government had notified the European Powers that Spain was placing the whole north-west African coastline between Cape Bojador and Cape Blanco under its protectorate. In that

way Spain had endeavoured to make its occupation appear legal. That act had aroused French opposition and after negotiations the two Powers had signed the treaty of Muni on 27 June 1900.

129. The State and people of Morocco had reacted more energetically. The Ouled Dlim tribe had attacked the Spanish installations and driven out the invaders. Popular resistance had prevented the Spaniards from extending their occupation beyond the ports of Villa Cisneros and Cape Blanco, set up by Mr. Benelli. Spain had been unable to complete the occupation of Río de Oro and of Saguia El Hamra until 1934, in which year France had occupied the Anti-Atlas and the Sous region.

130. With regard to the region of Saguia El Hamra, France in a secret agreement signed on 8 October 1904, had recognized Spain's full freedom of action in the area between 26° N. and 27° 40' N. Before 1934, however, Spanish occupation had been confined to the town of Tarfaya, to the centre of Villa Cisneros and, from 1920, to the centre of Güera. After completing its occupation of the Sahara, Spain had set up military bases in El Aaiún and had fortified the existing bases in Villa Cisneros and Güera.

131. Spain had first divided the Sahara into three regions, whose names had changed according to the circumstances. The change of name had been intended to deprive the regions of their Moroccan character so that, when Morocco had become independent, it would not be able to claim them, and Spain would thus be able to perpetuate its domination. The Tarfaya region had been named the Southern Zone of the Spanish Protectorate, the Saguia El Hamra region had been named the Zone of Free Occupation and the Río de Oro region had been named the Southern Sahara. Subsequently, after all outward signs of the Moroccan character of the regions had been removed, Spain had again changed their names and Tarfaya had been named the Northern Sahara Zone, Saguia El Hamra the Central Sahara Zone and Río de Oro the Southern Sahara Zone.

132. Spain had believed it could keep the authentic Tarfaya area under its rule and for that reason had not transferred it to Morocco after that country had become independent, as it had done with the zone it occupied in the north of Morocco. Spain's intention had been to incorporate the Tarfaya area in what it had later called, and was still calling, its overseas provinces. Nevertheless, the inhabitants had obliged Spain to recognize protectorate status for that area, which

/...

obviously went beyond the Wad Draa. Spain had returned only part of Tarfaya to Morocco and had arbitrarily fixed  $24^{\circ} 40'$  N. as the southern border of its protectorate in Southern Morocco.

133. There was no logical justification for that artificial division of Tarfaya since there was no frontier between Tarfaya and Saguia El Hamra. Geographers recognized Saguia El Hamra as one of the most important areas of the Moroccan southern Sahara. The same nomadic tribes roamed Saguia El Hamra and Tarfaya. Moreover, the representative of the Grand Vizir for the Spanish protectorate in south Morocco, Sheikh Mohamed Laghdaf, had not only been appointed by the Caliph of the Sultan in Tetuan, but had been a native of Spanish Sahara and had lived in what was now Saguia El Hamra. His father, Sheikh Ma Al Aymin, had built the city of Semara, eight kilometres south of the Saguia El Hamra River in 1898. He had been the Caliph of the Sultan in Spanish Sahara and had been appointed by a royal decree, which at the time had been called a "dahir" of the Cherif. Other "dahirs" stipulated that the authority of the Caliph extended from Tarfaya to Cape Bojador and Cape Blanco.

134. Those were incontestable historical, geographic and social facts. There was no dividing line between southern Morocco and Tarfaya, Saguia El Hamra and Río de Oro so far as population, topography, history, religion and customs were concerned. The people of Spanish Sahara was a valiant people with an illustrious past, a culture and a civilization.

135. That did not mean that the petitioners were demanding that Spanish Sahara should become part of Morocco, for the people alone should determine the future they wanted. The situation in Spanish Sahara was serious, indeed explosive, and a solution was urgent. There was no difference between Spanish colonialism in the Sahara and Portuguese colonialism in Angola or so-called Portuguese Guinea. Both sought to foist the European element on the indigenous population for purposes of exploiting the latter. Since the end of the Spanish Civil War, Spain had been trying to make Spanish Sahara part of its own territory and had repeatedly reorganized its administrative system. Thus, in 1940, the Political Military Government of Ifni and Spanish Sahara had been established, and the Spanish High Commissioner in northern Morocco had been appointed Governor-General for those

Territories. That action demonstrated, moreover, that the political, social and geographical conditions in Spanish Sahara were identical with those in the rest of Morocco. In June 1958, namely, after Morocco had become independent, Spain had again changed the status of the Territories, which had become two Spanish provinces, designated as Ifni and Spanish Sahara. Subsequently, in April 1961, it had been decided that all Spanish laws would apply in the province of Spanish Sahara and that imports from Spain would be free of duty. Thus, Spain had completed the process of assimilating Spanish Sahara both legally and administratively.

136. Spain had endeavoured to assimilate the Territory politically by such means as the following: by promoting the large-scale immigration of Spaniards into Spanish Sahara and providing them with the means and privileges necessary to ensure their supremacy over the indigenous inhabitants and their possession of the country's wealth; by oppressing the indigenous population and expelling them in order to expedite immigration from Spain; by destroying the traditions and the moral and cultural values of the indigenous population; by stationing in the Territory a large army of occupation double the number of civilian inhabitants in order to enforce its policy; and by granting extensive privileges to certain lackeys of colonialism in order to induce them to sing the praises of Spanish rule.

137. That process had been intensified when Spain had discovered mineral deposits in Saguia El Hamra, specifically phosphate and iron. Spain had then attempted to persuade large world corporations to invest in Spanish Sahara. Therein lay the danger, for the colonial interests which Spain was promoting would jeopardize the future of the Territory and stand in the way of its emancipation in conformity with the principle of human rights and the resolutions of the United Nations. The appetite of adventurcous capitalism knew no bounds.

138. The Saharan nationalists were fighting that policy of Spain and suffering severe repression. The Spanish Army was bombing the villages and raping women and children. The petitioners had specific information on those atrocities which they were making available to the Special Committee.

139. At the same time as it was oppressing the people, Spain was trying to compel them as well as the sheikhs and the tribal chiefs, to sign petitions supporting integration with Spain. The Spanish authorities had recently adopted a decision under which the saharauis could not acquire land or property unless they accepted Spanish nationality by signing a special document. Thus, expropriation of their property, annihilation of their personality and expulsion from their country represented the future which Spain planned for the people of Spanish Sahara, while paying lip service to their right of self-determination. Spain sought to convince world public opinion that it was a liberal colonial Power; yet, in Saquia El Hamra and Rio de Oro, it was pursuing a policy of oppression and attempting to impose the kind of racism which prevailed in South Africa and Rhodesia.

140. There were only two courses open to the people of Spanish Sahara in fighting that colonialism: either to denounce it before the United Nations or to take up arms and fight for freedom. The saharauis had no civil liberties which they could exercise to defend their rights and express their legitimate grievances peacefully. There was no freedom of the Press, speech or assembly in Spanish Sahara; actually, the Territory was under military occupation. The military forces were lords and masters over persons and property.

141. The people of Spanish Sahara wanted full and immediate independence for their country. Consequently, they called upon the United Nations to demand the withdrawal of foreign troops and an end to Spanish immigration into the Territory. They further called on the United Nations to supervise the process leading to independence so that they would be guaranteed the equitable implementation of their right to self-determination in good faith. The people of Spanish Sahara had no confidence in the Spanish colonial administration; they relied entirely on the United Nations.

142. As it was essential for all the saharauis to take part in elections to be organized by the United Nations, the refugees who had been expelled from the country or had fled from the Spanish authorities should be allowed to return. No Spanish citizen, regardless of his circumstances, should be entitled to take part in deciding the future of Spanish Sahara.

143. The people of Spanish Sahara were confident that the United Nations would protect them as it had always protected other colonial peoples and would take appropriate measures to put an end to the colonial rule and to help them fulfil their legitimate aspirations to freedom and dignity.

144. Mr. Braika Ould Ahmed Lahcen said that the situation in Spanish Sahara was explosive and crucial. It was urgent for the United Nations to take strong and effective action to protect the people of Spanish Sahara in their tragic plight and deliver them from their suffering before the situation degenerated into a conflict with unpredictable consequences. There must be an end to the oppression and the reign of terror prevailing in the Territory.

145. The people of Spanish Sahara had a right to freedom and independence and had put all their hopes in the United Nations as the instrument of their deliverance. They also called upon the Spanish Government to renounce its anti-African policy of European supremacy and persecution of the indigenous population.

146. The Spanish authorities of the Territory had recently forced the inhabitants, both men and women, to sign false documents with which Spain sought to prove that the people of Spanish Sahara preferred to live under Spanish colonial rule indefinitely. That colonialist manoeuvre had resulted in the dismissal of two chiefs who had refused to sign and in an uprising by 500 men who were hiding out in the mountains.

147. By means of such illegal tactics, the Spanish Government was seeking to go on exploiting the economic resources of the Territory and to establish a European majority in Spanish Sahara as the bulwark of a white-dominated régime such as that of Ian Smith. Its policy was to divide and rule and to keep the people in poverty and ignorance. Schooling remained at a very low level and was reserved for the children of prominent families. The Spanish authorities did not hesitate to use force against the nationalists or to torture and murder innocent men, women and children. Many saharauis were imprisoned and sent to the concentration camp at Fuerteventura in the Canary Islands. That was the policy by which Spain was endeavouring to bring the saharauis up to the level of the free, civilized world.

148. Spain believed that it could convert Spanish Sahara into an overseas Spain, but the saharauis, as Africans, Arabs and Moslems, were very far from being Spanish.

149. The Frente de Liberación del Sáhara, the organization which the petitioners represented, had fought and would go on fighting against Spanish colonialism until it won full and unconditional independence for the Territory. The nationalists were a mere handful against the colonial Power, but their loyalty to the national cause and to justice and their confidence in the United Nations would serve as powerful weapons for the conquest of colonialism, the enemy of the free world.

150. Mr. Hamdi Ould Salek Ould Ba Ali said that the petitioners had come to the United Nations to state their objectives, namely, to ensure respect for the principle of self-determination in Spanish Sahara. Colonialism was weighing very heavily on the lives of the saharauis.

151. The people of Spanish Sahara could not accept the survival of colonialism in their Territory, and they therefore requested the administering Power to recognize their freedom and independence under the supervision of the United Nations. The petitioners regarded the other petitioners who had requested the United Nations for a hearing as their brothers, provided that they too came to seek the independence and freedom of Spanish Sahara. If, however, they requested something different, they would be regarded as collaborationists and friends of colonialism.

152. Messrs. Sidi Mohamed Ould Haidala, Dahi Ould Nagem, Slama Ould Sidi Ould Oumar and Sheikh Ould Mouhamed Saleh said in their written statement that the so-called Spanish Sahara was a region which on a geographical and ethnic basis was hard to differentiate from Mauritania, from which it was separated by a theoretical and imaginary line in the south. Together with the neighbouring provinces of Tiris Zemmour and the Baie du Lévrier, it constituted a single region which there was no justification for subdividing. The tribes occupying the Territory numbered some 25,000 to 28,000 people. The petitioners included representatives of the various districts. The nomads who inhabited Spanish Sahara and Mauritania belonged to the same tribes and had the same customs, religious practices and language. Only colonial occupation had led to a frontier being drawn between western and eastern Tiris, two parts of the same province of Zemmour, and to the subdivision of other regions.

153. In 1884, Spain, on the basis of the Berlin declaration to the effect that any so-called free territory could be occupied, had informed the other Powers that it was assuming the protectorate of the west coast of Africa between the twentieth and twenty-seventh parallels. The frontier between French and Spanish "possessions", however, had not been fixed until the conventions of 27 June 1900, 3 October 1904 and 27 November 1912, and then only very approximately. At present, the 280,000 square kilometres making up the Spanish Sahara were treated as an African province of Spain and were administered by a department of the Spanish Government responsible for the African provinces. The Saharans, however, were a freedom-loving people with an innate desire for independence. Just as they believed in friendship, so they rejected and condemned the injustice inherent in the domination of one people by another. They therefore regarded the exercise of their right of self-determination, an inalienable right recognized by the United Nations and accepted by the Spanish Government, as the best means by which they could decide upon their future in friendship with Spain.

154. The Saharans, although distant from Morocco both geographically and in their way of life, had great respect for that country, even if they had not always appreciated its expansionist ambitions. The ties binding them to Mauritania, on the other hand, were so obvious that they scarcely needed to be mentioned. There was no difference in appearance, in dress, or in any other respect between the Saharans and Mauritanians and the similarity was reinforced by their common outlook and way of life, in addition to the many ties of blood between them. The people of Spanish Sahara were prepared, however, to refrain from mentioning those fundamental truths for some time and would gladly agree to the application of the principle of self-determination. They would urge those who showed themselves most eager for the liberation of the Spanish Sahara to refrain from using the Saharans for other ends which had nothing to do with the desire for freedom, independence and peace. The Saharans were proud and vigilant and knew where their interests lay. They would prefer not to be subjected to propaganda or involved in the political affairs of Morocco. They wanted to choose their own destiny, while preserving the many solid ties between Spain and themselves, and they believed that their future was profoundly linked with that of Mauritania. Despite their ardent opposition to colonialism, they wished to make their choice in peace and order, without bloodshed and free from interference by false friends.



155. Mr. Ould Sheikh Malainine said that the people of the so-called Spanish Sahara had resisted Spanish colonization ever since Spain had sought to gain a foothold on the coast of Africa. They had waged many battles, in which many heroes had fallen. They had held the conquerors at bay until 1934, when Spain had officially occupied the country. Their resistance had never ceased despite the fact that the Spanish colonial authorities had done everything possible to tame them, destroying villages, plundering property and raping, torturing, exiling and massacring the people. The Spanish were seeking to erase the African and Arab personality of the people and to establish a system based on the alleged superiority of the European, which in fact meant racial discrimination and persecution of the indigenous people. While the true inhabitants were driven into exile, the authorities encouraged mass immigration of Spaniards, who plundered the wealth of the Territory. The people were unanimous in rejecting the destiny thus imposed on them and in their determination to drive out the colonialists and gain independence under the aegis of the United Nations. There was no disagreement among the population, who formed one front against colonialism. He therefore appealed to the Special Committee to ensure that steps were taken to enable them to live in freedom and dignity. Such steps might include the withdrawal of foreign troops, the halting of immigration, the release of political prisoners and the return of political refugees, to be followed by the exercise of the right of self-determination in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

156. Referring to the statements of Mr. El Abadila Ould Sheikh Mohamed Laghdaf and the other petitioners of his group, the representative of Spain said that the petitioners' statements had been a tissue of lies and exaggerations. When asked about their origins and background, they had been evasive. He would simply point out that Ould Sheikh Malainine was a legal adviser at Rabat, Morocco, Hamdi Ould Salek Ould Ba Ali was a caliph in the Moroccan service in the area of the frontier with Algeria, and Brahim Ould Hassena Douihi was a caliph at Tetuán, Morocco. It was therefore quite clear where they came from.

157. He categorically rejected the petitioners' allegations of ill-treatment of women and children. The extensive information which had been made available to the United Nations with regard to Spanish rule in those Territories showed how untrue such charges were.

158. The figures which the petitioners had given in regard to the number of inhabitants and the size of the Spanish forces in the Sahara were all false. The population of the Spanish Sahara was approximately 25,000. A census was being conducted and definitive figures would be available soon. A recent issue of Jeune Afrique referred to a population of 30,000; that was certainly the highest possible estimate. There were 9,500 peninsular Spaniards in Spanish Sahara and a Spanish military force of 10,000 men, which because of the vast extent of the Territory - 280,000 square kilometres - was required to fulfil Spain's obligations under Article 73 of the Charter.

159. The petitioners knew that in fact there had been no mass immigration into the Spanish Sahara from Spain or any expulsion of Saharans. They could not cite a single statute in support of their charges. Their references to a war of liberation were equally meaningless, for the Territory was tranquil and was going to exercise the right of self-determination. The petitioners had said that Spaniards alone had privileges, but all the inhabitants of the Territory were Spaniards and had equal rights. Discrimination against the indigenous inhabitants would be contrary to the spirit of the Spanish nation as well as to the principles of the United Nations. It had been clearly established, in the information submitted by Spain under Article 73 e of the Charter, that the term "province" had no discriminatory implications. The petitioners had also made outrageous charges that the study of the Arabic language was suppressed. Spain took pride in its Arabic cultural institutions. Disputes among Moslems were settled by Sharia justice, whose written and customary laws were applied in full. He referred members to the working paper prepared by the Secretariat (see paras 1 to 61 above) for further information on conditions in Spanish Sahara. The petitioners' allegation that Spain practised racial discrimination was an intolerable insult. They had spoken of Spain's anti-African policy, but Spain, which had suffered colonial domination for many years, took pride in the enrichment of its culture by Arab civilization and had never practised racial discrimination.

160. In a letter dated 8 September 1966 (see annex) his delegation had formally stated its position on the decolonization of Spanish Sahara. Regardless of all the machinations of the petitioners and their supporters, it was ready to affirm once more its willingness to grant self-determination to the people of the Territory. Sinister efforts were being made through such persons as the petitioners to obtain by intervention what they knew could not be secured if the people of the Territory were permitted to express their will freely.

/...

161. The representative of Morocco said that the Spanish representative had denied that the petitioners really represented Spanish Sahara. There was, however, an official Spanish source which proved the contrary: Estudios Saharianos, by Julio Caro Baroja, sponsored by the Higher Council of Scientific Research and published in 1955 by the Institute of African Studies at Madrid. In his introduction to the work, the author had said that special thanks were due to his excellent interpreter, Braika Ould Ali Moulud Ould Ahmed Lahcen, who had assisted him greatly in his journey and who was a fine example of the new generation of young men educated under the Spanish occupation.

162. The Spanish representative had asserted that ~~Ould Sheikh Malainine~~ was not entitled to represent Spanish Sahara because he had served as an official legal adviser in Rabat. That allegation was easy to refute, for he had in his possession documents issued by the Rabat Court of Appeals, dated 10 March 1966, certifying that the petitioner in question had been admitted to the practice of law in Marrakesh after taking the prescribed oath on 18 February 1966 but had subsequently resigned from his position. That meant that the petitioner was a lawyer, practising a liberal profession. The Spanish representative had insinuated that the fact that the petitioner had resided in Rabat, Casablanca and Marrakesh was a crime. Morocco, however, was proud of the fact that it afforded asylum to freedom fighters from all parts of Africa, including refugees from Spanish Sahara. The petitioners had made only statements of fact, which could be verified. No matter in what guise colonialism might present itself, it was the same thing all over the world, the oppression of man by man, the domination of one people by another.

163. Mr. Braika Ould Ahmed Lahcen, speaking on behalf of all the petitioners in his group, said that, contrary to what the Spanish representative had alleged all the petitioners were sons of the Spanish Sahara and were well known in that country. He himself had been born in El Aaiún in 1930 and had studied at Ifni, El Aaiún and for some time in Tetuan. He had begun to work as an interpreter in 1946 at El Aaiún, where he was well known by everybody, including the colonialist Spaniards. Because of his activities in the liberation movement, he had been forced to flee from El Aaiún in 1957, abandoning all his property and taking

with him only one small portfolio of confidential documents. He and his fellow petitioners had subsequently fought against the Spaniards, but he himself had been arrested in December 1957 and imprisoned in El Aaiún together with hundreds of others. He had not benefited by an amnesty and had subsequently been transferred to the San Francisco gaol in the Canary Islands. After some time in various prisons, he had finally been released on the mainland, but had had to walk seventeen kilometres, without shoes and without food, to the Moroccan border, where he had been well received. He had been employed at Agadir as a lawyer, but not as a government official. None of the petitioners were Moroccan government officials but all were saharawi nationalists, who made it a rule to devote half their earnings to the cause of freedom. It was true that they travelled with Moroccan passports and had come to New York via Dakar, but that was merely because they had no other passports and had of necessity been obliged to avoid Madrid. They were present in New York as the only genuine representatives of their country, for whose independence they were all prepared to die.

164. The Spanish representative had said that his Government was officially sponsoring the study of the Arabic language in Spanish Sahara. He challenged that representative to find a single person among the indigenous population who held a primary school certificate of aptitude in Arabic. It was true that Hassania, a local dialect, was taught in the Spanish schools but it was not pure Arabic, which was the mother tongue of his people. The Spanish representative had also claimed that his Government observed the principles of justice in Spanish Sahara; true justice, however, did not exist in that country and not one case in the courts was judged in accordance with legal principles, by either a European or a Moslem judge, the latter being mere legal advisers to the former. He asked whether it could be called justice when a Spanish army had come to the holy city of Smara and had burned an ancient library containing the literary treasures of centuries. The mosque of that city was now used as a barracks for Spanish legionaries, while the local inhabitants had to pray at home or in the open air.

B. General statements

165. The representative of Spain said that the position of Spain on Ifni and the Spanish Sahara had been clearly stated in the letter which its Permanent Representative had sent to the Chairman of the Special Committee on 8 September 1966 (see annex). It was his delegation's fervent hope that the decolonization of Sahara would proceed at a rapid pace; with regard to Ifni, despite the peculiarities of the Territory, the contacts established with Morocco should make it possible to find a satisfactory solution for the interests involved and provide the inhabitants with the necessary guarantees regarding their future. As was stated in the document in question, Spain was firmly resolved to implement the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2072 (XX).

166. The representative of Mauritania pointed out that Mauritania had been divided into two parts under French and Spanish colonial rule and that only the part colonized by France had been able to accede to independence, the north-western part of the country being still a Spanish colony - Spanish Sahara. That was an abnormal situation, since Mauritania, as its President had pointed out, had a mission to fulfil in the Sahara; there was no doubt that geographically, ethnically and economically, so-called Spanish Sahara was an integral part of Mauritania. In a statement to the Special Committee in 1963, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mauritania had said that so-called Spanish Sahara was populated solely by Moorish tribes, mostly nomads, which in language, culture, race, religion, or customs differed in no way from the other tribes which lived in the north-west of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania. Furthermore, it was clear from an official document published in 1960 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Moroccan Kingdom that the territory of Mauritania included the southern provinces of Morocco between the regions of Tindouf and Saguia El Hamra in the north, the Atlantic in the west, and the Senegal River in the south, and that Spain had substituted the expression "Spanish Sahara" for "Spanish Mauritania". A White Paper on Mauritania issued by the Moroccan Government maintained that Río de Oro was a Moroccan region simply because it was an integral part of Mauretania and that so-called Spanish Sahara and Ifni were two distinct regions which should be treated separately. Mauritania

argued that Spanish Sahara was part of its territory and that the Treaty of Peace and Trade, signed at Marrakesh in 1767 between the Sovereigns of Spain and Morocco also corroborated that view.

167. Thus, Mauritania's position on that very important question was quite clear; it wished to contribute to stability and to the maintenance of peace in the world, in particular in its own geographical region; and it believed in the virtue of discussion and in the need for peaceful settlement of international disputes. Morocco's position had not always been so clear. Its policy in that regard had varied, and after subduing the tone of its claims on the independent part of Mauritania, it had emphasized the claims concerning the other part, namely so-called Spanish Sahara.

168. A recent communiqué from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania had stated that all possible confusion must be avoided between two very clearly defined questions: on the one hand, that of Ceuta, Melilla and Ifni, settlement of which lay with Spain and Morocco, and on the other hand, that of Spanish Sahara, which should be the subject of negotiations, not between Spain and Morocco, a country which had never exercised sovereignty over that area, but between Spain and Mauritania, of which so-called Spanish Sahara was an integral part. The excellent relationships existing between the Mauritanian Government and the Spanish Government gave reason to hope for a satisfactory settlement of the question. Moreover, the conversations which had taken place in March 1966 during the visit of the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs to Mauritania had been encouraging, and Mauritania hoped for a solution that would make possible the integration of that region into its national territory; nevertheless, if the administering Power decided to apply the principle of self-determination to the people of Spanish Sahara, Mauritania would not oppose such a step. However, in that event, the inhabitants of Río de Oro and Saguia El Hamra must first be given freedom of expression once again, under the supervision of international observers, with a view to giving the application of the principle of self-determination its full meaning. In such circumstances, the Government and the people of Mauritania were certain what would be the choice made by the inhabitants of the north-western part of Mauritania, known under the name of Spanish Sahara.

169. The representative of Morocco recalled that the Moroccan delegation had stated its position on the agenda item under consideration at the 436th meeting of the Special Committee held at Addis Ababa on 7 June 1966, and had on that occasion made some suggestions regarding a final settlement of the problem.

170. Since its accession to independence, Morocco had never failed to make reservations, in the various United Nations bodies, and in particular in the Trusteeship Council, on the Non-Self-Governing Territories of Ifni and Spanish Sahara. At the same time, it had established contact with Spain, the administering Power, with a view to finding a formula for restoring to Morocco the Territories which had been taken away from it when it was itself under the French and Spanish protectorates. After ten years of patience and in a spirit of co-operation within the United Nations, the Moroccan Government had decided to submit the question to the Special Committee, in the conviction that that body would take appropriate measures to hasten the granting of independence to those Territories, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). That was the gist of the statement which Morocco had made on 7 June 1966 at Addis Ababa. In the opinion of Morocco, as of any other truly independent African country, the indigenous populations must be in a position to decide freely as to their future, either by remaining independent or by becoming integrated in a neighbouring country at the political, economic or constitutional level. However, if the Special Committee preferred the formula of self-determination, Morocco would not object, provided that the administering Power withdrew its military forces, which were at present as numerous as the population; that it discontinued the organized immigration of Spaniards, who were in fact and in law foreigners to the Territory and constituted a threat to the indigenous population because of their dynamism and technical superiority; and that all the refugees who had fled repression were authorized to return and to express their views freely, without fear of reprisals.

171. Furthermore, whatever formula might be decided upon by the Special Committee and the General Assembly concerning the future of the Territory, Morocco stressed that it should actively participate in arrangements for implementing self-determination. He shared the Mauritanian representative's view that international supervision was necessary if the process of decolonization was to proceed in an atmosphere of calm and good faith. In order to accomplish that, the Spanish

administration would have to withdraw and leave it to the competent United Nations bodies themselves to ensure the application of any resolution that the Special Committee might adopt.

172. As he had already stated on 7 June 1966, at Addis Ababa, he hoped that the Special Committee would at the appropriate time adopt a resolution on the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in that part of the national territory of Morocco and that all its members would endorse his desire to see the Committee's discussions brought to a successful conclusion.

173. The representative of Tunisia said that despite the reservations they contained, the statements of Spain, Morocco and Mauritania had in them much that was constructive and likely to prove helpful in promoting an early solution to the problem. In order to avoid wasting time, he therefore suggested that the members of the Committee should hold informal talks with a view to drafting a resolution likely to be approved by the Special Committee as a whole.

174. The representative of Spain said that he would like to know whether the Moroccan representative's remarks on self-determination applied only to the Spanish Sahara or to Non-Self-Governing Territories in general. The Spanish delegation stood by what was said in its letter of 8 September 1966 to the Chairman of the Special Committee (see annex), namely, that the Spanish Government was in favour of the application of General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 2072 (XX) to the Territory of Spanish Sahara. It should be pointed out that Spain had fewer than 30,000 men stationed in the Territory; nor were repressive measures employed against the indigenous populations.

175. Ifni was an enclave and therefore raised special problems, but the Spanish Government was willing to consider any suggestions which Morocco might make, its sole concern being to protect the interests of the population. The Spanish delegation wished to stress the special conditions obtaining in the Territory of Ifni, in particular the fact that Spain was not in control of the entire Territory. It drew attention to the proposals it had set out in document (see annex). It rested with Morocco, therefore, to give its views on those proposals.

176. The representative of Morocco said that in the opinion of his delegation, Ifni and the Spanish Sahara together constituted a single problem. It was a colonial problem, created by the presence of a colonial Power. The two Territories



in question shared a common destiny, just as they shared a common past and just as they had been subjected to the same colonial rule. In the view of Morocco, those Territories were Moroccan, and if there were a mission to be accomplished, it was for Morocco to accomplish it. As for the function of the administering Power, article 5 of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples stated clearly that immediate steps should be taken in Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories or all other Territories which had not yet obtained independence to transfer all powers to the peoples of those Territories without any conditions or reservations.

177. Spain had repeatedly proclaimed its intention of implementing the Declaration and could therefore reasonably be expected to apply it in full, particularly in the matter of the transfer of powers, which should take place, in the words of the Declaration, without any conditions or reservations.

178. The Spanish representative, after stating that the question of Spanish Sahara was distinct from that of Ifni, had said that his Government looked to Morocco to put forward suggestions concerning the latter Territory. If that invitation implied the recognition by Spain of Moroccan rights over Ifni, Morocco would not fail to respond to it. On the other hand, if no Moroccan rights over Ifni were recognized, it should be left to the Special Committee to take action. As things were, Morocco could offer only one suggestion - that the Territory should be liberated from colonial rule.

179. The representative of Mauritania referring to the conditions which the Moroccan delegation had laid down for the self-determination of Ifni and Spanish Sahara, said that in the Mauritanian view there were two distinct problems. One involved questions of principle; the other, the question of confidence in the talks between Mauritania and Spain of whose sincerity Mauritania was convinced.

180. He recalled that during the Special Committee's meetings at Addis Ababa, Morocco had demanded independence for Spanish Sahara. However, the Moroccan representative had declared that it formed an integral part of Moroccan territory. The question therefore was what precisely the Moroccan Government meant by the word "independence". Indeed, the ambiguity of the Moroccan Government's statements could not fail to cause disquiet. There was a contradiction in the attitude of Morocco which it would be in the common interest to resolve.

181. The representative of Morocco said that his country's policy had always been that outstanding problems should be dealt with through direct contacts with Spain; and it would continue to act on that principle. The fact that the whole of Ifni was not under Spanish control was no fault of the Moroccan Government, which, in any event, had taken steps to maintain tranquillity in the region.

182. There was no inconsistency in saying, on the one hand, that the Territories were really Moroccan and should become Moroccan once more and, on the other hand, that they ought to be independent. Morocco was advocating independence in the conviction that once Ifni and Spanish Sahara were free they would choose the path that best suited them.

183. The representative of Syria said that his country unreservedly supported the liberation of Ifni and Spanish Sahara. Like the Tunisian representative, he welcomed the fact that the interested parties were not only prepared for an exchange of views but actually advocated it, and that the administering Power itself was in favour of the early and unqualified application of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. As the Moroccan and Mauritanian delegations had stressed, it was important that the indigenous populations should be able to express their aspirations freely and that the administering Power should help to bring about the necessary conditions by withdrawing its troops, by putting an end to Spanish immigration, and by refraining from intervention in the process of self-determination. Such behaviour could only enhance the administering Power's prestige.

184. The representative of Uruguay pointed out that the Spanish representative's letter of 8 September 1966 (see annex) began with a reference to General Assembly resolution 2072 (XX), the terms of which Spain accepted. There could therefore be no doubt that Spain was prepared to carry out the provisions of paragraph 2 of that resolution, in which the Spanish Government was urgently requested "to take immediately all necessary measures for the liberation of the Territories of Ifni and Spanish Sahara". However, decolonization could come about in different ways, according to the nature of the Territories concerned. In his opinion there was no doubt that the case of Spanish Sahara was quite different from that of Ifni. The fact that Ifni was an enclave was of the greatest importance. His delegation approved the proposal of the Tunisian representative, to the effect that the parties concerned should be left to settle the matter, and that the Special Committee should confine itself to adopting a draft resolution affirming the principles on which agreement already existed.

/...

185. The representative of Iran thought that the points of agreement were much more numerous than the points of disagreement. All three parties felt that an end should be put to the colonial status of the Territories in question. That being so, his delegation considered that different methods might, if necessary, be adopted in each case.

186. He supported the Tunisian representative's proposal that, since the parties were in agreement on certain principles, it was desirable to draft a resolution setting them forth clearly. The Special Committee should examine the Tunisian proposal without delay.

187. The representative of Mali said that the statements made by Spain in its letter of 8 September 1966 (see annex) represented some approach to the application of General Assembly resolution 2072 (XX). Since there were a number of principles which no one disputed, the fact should be placed on record in a resolution, as the Tunisian representative had proposed.

188. The representative of Venezuela expressed his satisfaction at the fact that there were points of agreement between the parties, and associated himself with the Tunisian proposal.

189. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that six years after the adoption of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), Spain was still defying its provisions. The characteristic feature of Spanish colonial policy in Africa was delaying tactics, which could not be concealed by general declarations of principle. For Spain, the Territories it dominated constituted as it were a medium of exchange. Similarly, the immigration policy applied in the Spanish Territories was designed to facilitate the worst kind of exploitation. Spain had ceded some of the resources of the Territories to Western monopolies, which were pillaging them without the slightest restraint. The Special Committee should act to prevent the Territories still administered by Spain from being sold to the highest bidder, and to that end it should demand the immediate application of General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 2072 (XX).

190. The representative of Spain said the Soviet representative was clearly ignorant of Spain's entire policy and position in colonial matters. Spain relied on no one's support, and was acting solely on rational principle. The policy referred to by the Soviet Representative was entirely foreign to Spain.

191. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that his delegation's purpose had been to throw light on a number of specific facts relating to Spanish colonization in Ifni and the Sahara. Such facts were always the essential basis of efforts to liberate the colonial Territories from the domination of foreign Powers.

VI. FURTHER ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

192. At the 474th meeting, the representative of Tunisia introduced a joint draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.351) finally co-sponsored by Afghanistan, Iran, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Sierra Leone, Tunisia and the United Republic of Tanzania.

193. At the 478th meeting the co-sponsors submitted a revised text of the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.351/Rev.1). Further revisions were introduced orally at the 478th and 479th meetings.

194. In introducing the draft resolution, the representative of Tunisia said that the text was the result of long and difficult negotiations, during which the representatives of Morocco and Mauritania had both made a number of concessions and had shown great co-operation. The draft resolution dealt with the two Territories separately. Operative paragraph 1 concerned Ifni; the Organization of African Unity (OAU) had adopted a resolution in similar terms. Operative paragraph 2 requested the administering Power to prepare the indigenous population of Spanish Sahara for self-determination and independence and operative paragraph 3 invited the administering Power to consult with Mauritania and Morocco and the population of the Sahara concerning arrangements for a referendum in the Territory to determine the wishes of the population, while operative paragraph 4 asked Mauritania, Morocco and any other party concerned to assist in implementing operative paragraph 3. Algeria and Mali, for instance, might also be able to help. He hoped that a speedy solution would be found to the problems of the two Territories and that the draft resolution would be adopted with the greatest possible majority.

195. The representative of Sierra Leone, speaking as a sponsor of the draft resolution, said that it was not perfect, but the delegations mainly concerned had had to make great sacrifices in order to agree on a text. It was important to ensure that the inhabitants of the two Territories were able to exercise their right to self-determination and independence as early as possible.

196. The representative of the Ivory Coast expressed his delegation's gratitude to the delegations of Mauritania and Morocco for their constant co-operation during the consultations concerning the text. He welcomed the fact that the administering Power had decided to apply the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2072 (XX)

in their entirety, as noted in the last preambular paragraph. With reference to operative paragraph 1, he wished to make it clear that it was the understanding of the sponsors that the transfer of powers Ifni should be carried out in accordance with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), especially operative paragraph 5 of that resolution, which stated that all powers should be transferred to the peoples of the Territories, without any conditions or reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire, in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence and freedom. He reaffirmed that principle and was sure that all the members of the Special Committee would share his views.

197. The representative of Mali said that, as a sponsor of the draft resolution, he supported the statements of the previous speakers and recommended the text for adoption by the Special Committee. It was important to stress the fact that the administering Power was taking steps to discharge its obligations and to implement General Assembly resolution 2072 (XX). He was convinced that the administering Power, in consultation with Morocco, Mauritania and all other parties concerned, would find the right solution for the problem of Spanish Sahara, but it was important that the people of the Territory should be in a position to exercise their right to self-determination in all freedom.

198. The representative of Tunisia had referred to Mali as one of the countries which might be particularly interested in the question of Spanish Sahara. He would point out that what interested Mali was the end of colonialism in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). He referred to the statement made by the President of Mali to the OAU in 1963, in which he had invited all the African Heads of State to stand by the territorial boundaries as they had been established at the time the colonialists had left their countries. Mali had no intention of annexing any other territory but wished only for peace and security in Africa and throughout the world.

199. The representative of Spain considered that since the Fourth Committee would later be discussing the agenda item under consideration, he felt that the Special Committee should not engage in a lengthy debate at the present stage and that it would be difficult to take an important decision without such a debate.

200. Since Spain had repeatedly expressed its willingness to grant independence to Spanish Sahara, he felt that the language of operative paragraph 2 was somewhat peremptory.

201. He pointed out that in operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution, Spain was invited to consult with Mauritania and Morocco as well as the population of the Sahara concerning arrangements for a referendum. The last-named should have been mentioned first, since they were entitled to have the first and last word on what happened to their Territory.

202. The representative of Algeria said that the disappearance of colonialism in Africa would help to eliminate potential sources of conflict in that continent and was a prerequisite for peace and prosperity throughout the world. His country had waged a relentless struggle against colonialism in order to attain independence and it therefore supported the demands of all peoples for freedom and independence. That was especially true in the case of the so-called Spanish Sahara, with whose inhabitants his country had close ties of blood, tradition and culture. In fact, the Reguibat tribes were nomads and had for centuries been wandering in search of pasture throughout the area made up of the south of the Algerian Sahara, Morocco, Mauritania and the region known as the Spanish Sahara. It was natural that Algeria should take particular interest in the future of a country with which it had common borders and in which there were tribes that spent several months of the year in Algerian territory, for it would to a great degree affect the security of the whole area and hence of that part of his country's national territory. Algeria had fought for many years to regain its territorial integrity and to achieve independence, and its sole concern was to develop good relations and friendship with all States, particularly those with which it had common frontiers. That was one of the fundamental principles of the United Nations Charter and of the OAU.

203. Since its establishment, the Special Committee had been working tirelessly to achieve decolonization and to persuade the colonial Powers to implement General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). His delegation endorsed the views expressed by the Moroccan and Mauritanian delegations at Addis Ababa on the future of Spanish Sahara. It considered that Spain should conform to the new realities of Africa

and should establish the necessary conditions to enable the indigenous inhabitants to exercise their sacred right of self-determination and independence. That was the only course which would enable all the parties concerned to reach a final solution to the problem of the Territory's future. His delegation hoped that the Territory would be a factor of harmony and peace, which Africa sorely needed.

204. The representative of Morocco expressed his delegation's gratitude to the African members of the Special Committee for the sustained efforts which they had made to produce a draft resolution that would be acceptable to all the parties concerned. He also wished to commend the parties concerned for their spirit of understanding.

205. Morocco had already made known its position with regard to the problem. At the 436th meeting of the Special Committee, his delegation had said that in keeping with the spirit of decolonization members should put aside national considerations and concentrate their efforts on liberating the so-called Spanish Sahara. Morocco had close ties with the people of the Territory and since its accession to independence it had tried to promote a settlement of the question both in the United Nations and on a bilateral basis with Spain. After ten years of efforts, it had put aside national considerations and was acting within the framework of decolonization as defined by the United Nations. Since June 1966, Morocco had urged that the people of the Territory should be allowed to exercise their right to independence and self-determination. His delegation had noted that the administering Power had expressed its intention of implementing General Assembly resolution 2072 (XX).

206. Although the joint draft resolution did not include all the arguments advanced by his delegation, he thought that it would enable the inhabitants of the Territory to exercise their right to self-determination. He wished to draw attention to a major concession which his country had made in agreeing that the Territory of Ifni should be considered apart from the question of Spanish Sahara. Morocco had considerable legal and historical reasons for its claim, since the two Territories were Moroccan.

207. His delegation considered that the Territory of Ifni did not present any insurmountable problems, since Spain had always shown itself to be in favour of settling the situation in that Territory. His Government had taken note of the good intentions of the Spanish Government and hoped that Spain would adopt a decisive attitude that would make a final settlement possible.



208. His delegation therefore found the draft resolution acceptable and hoped that all members of the Special Committee would support it.

209. The representative of Mauritania regretted that, in introducing the draft resolution, the Tunisian representative had not made it clear that the Mauritanian delegation had qualified its acceptance of the text. Since, however, a number of delegations had been in favour of the draft resolution, his delegation had not insisted on its reservations.

210. The Mauritanian delegation was happy to note the decision that the two questions should be considered separately. He pointed out that that did not represent a concession on the part of Morocco to reality but a concession to history.

211. The administering Power had emphasized the need to respect the principle of self-determination. In his delegation's view, the administering Power should decide on ways and means of putting that principle into effect in the Territory, taking into account the way of life of the indigenous inhabitants.

212. The representative of Syria congratulated the sponsors of the draft resolution on their efforts to bring the parties together, and paid a tribute to the co-operative spirit of the delegations of Tunisia, Spain, Morocco and Mauritania. His delegation considered that the Special Committee should now concentrate its efforts on accelerating the application of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) to the people of the Territories.

213. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania welcomed the Spanish representative's statement that his Government was willing to implement General Assembly resolution 2072 (XX). It was thanks to the encouraging Spanish attitude that the sponsors had been able to produce the draft resolution.

214. No interested party could agree entirely with the terms of the draft resolution and his delegation could fully understand that there should be reservations. Nevertheless it was encouraging that there had been concessions from several parties involved. The important thing was that the draft resolution should be implemented and the long overdue process of decolonization in Africa completed. The Special Committee and the parties concerned should take account of the interests of the inhabitants of the Territory.

215. The representative of Algeria said that the point at issue was that the people of the Territory should be able freely to exercise their right to self-determination and attain full independence. The long and difficult negotiations that had preceded the production of the draft resolution were evidence of the complexity of the problem. Apart from its position on decolonization, his Government adhered to the principle of good neighbourly relations to which Members of the United Nations had subscribed in signing the United Nations Charter. The prime objective of his delegation was that the people of the Territory should attain freedom and independence.

216. The representative of Uruguay said that it had always been the deeply rooted conviction of his Government that colonial Territories everywhere in the world should be liberated. The self-determination of the people of the Spanish Sahara was a matter for serious consideration by the countries whose territory bordered the area, in view of the extensive and frequent nomadic movements of the inhabitants. The Territory should not only be decolonized; its inhabitants should be enabled to live in peace with their neighbours.

217. The representative of Italy paid a tribute to the efforts made by various delegations to agree on a draft resolution acceptable to all parties. It was perhaps regrettable that the consultations which had preceded the introduction of the draft resolution had not included the administering Power, with which the main responsibility for the decolonization of Ifni and Spanish Sahara rested, and his delegation hoped that the Spanish delegation would find it possible to extend its support to the text.

218. Reservations had been voiced about the advisability of the Special Committee adopting a resolution on the subject when the General Assembly had been in session for almost two months and when a debate on the two Territories had already begun in the Fourth Committee. In view of the considerable effort made by the Special Committee to come to a decision, it would perhaps not be unwise to adopt the draft resolution. He regretted, however, that the Special Committee had not waited to hear the other petitioners, who would be in New York shortly.

219. The Spanish delegation had been correct in asserting that the Special Committee had a special mandate to report on the implementation of General Assembly resolution 2072 (XX). If the second preambular paragraph of the draft resolution

had been divided into two paragraphs, the first reading "Having heard the statements concerning these two Territories made by the representatives of the administering Power and taking note of the letter dated 8 September 1966 from the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations" and the second reading "Having heard the statements by the representatives of Mauritania, Morocco and Algeria", the text would have been more in keeping with General Assembly resolution 2072 (XX) and would have made it easier for the Spanish delegation to accept the draft resolution.

220. In discussing problems of decolonization, the Special Committee was always faced with the conflicting demands of realism and of adherence to principle. In the present case realism had prevailed, in that the draft resolution took note of the fact that there were a number of Member States directly concerned in the future of the Territories, a future which, according to principle, should be shaped only by the will of their indigenous inhabitants. Although his delegation had always stressed the need for realism in the search for solutions to political problems, he wondered whether it would not have been advisable, for the sake of principle, for the draft resolution to place more emphasis on the necessity of ascertaining the views and safeguarding the interests of the indigenous inhabitants of the Territories. The demands of realism could have been satisfied by asking for the co-operation of the neighbouring States, which would be indispensable in consulting the nomad inhabitants of the Territories.

221. His delegation wondered also whether, in view of the fact that the Territories might be considered to come within the category of small Territories in terms of population, a reference to General Assembly resolution 1541 (XV) would not have been appropriate.

222. His delegation also had some doubts concerning operative paragraph 3, for it thought that the administering Power might have difficulty in determining who were the "other parties concerned".

223. Despite the doubts which he had expressed, his delegation would vote in favour of the draft resolution and it hoped that the decolonization process in the two Territories would promote peace and stability in the area.

224. The representative of Spain recalled that his delegation had pointed out certain defects in the draft resolution at earlier meetings. His delegation would prefer to have the two Territories treated in separate resolutions and hoped that the Fourth Committee would follow its previous decision on that point.

225. He pointed out that the new preambular paragraph added by the sponsors of the draft resolution applied only to the petitioners from Spanish Sahara.

226. In previous resolutions dealing with the transfer of powers to the peoples of Non-Self-Governing Territories, it had been customary to invite the administering Power and the Government of the Territory to consult, taking into account the interests of the population. In departing from that tradition in operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution; the Special Committee was going beyond its powers. The reference in operative paragraph 3 to other countries was also quite unprecedented. The sacred trust which Spain had accepted under Article 73 of the Charter obliged it to promote the well-being of the inhabitants of the Territories, whereas operative paragraph 3 would compromise the interests of those inhabitants. His Government was prepared to grant the inhabitants of the Territories the right of self-determination, but it did not think that the exercise of that right should be influenced by foreign intervention.

227. The representative of Chile said that his delegation approved the draft resolution in general and would vote in favour of it. It had doubts, however, about the reference in operative paragraph 3 to countries which were to be consulted in connexion with the arrangements for a referendum. His delegation was aware of the important and legitimate interests of those countries but thought that they should come into play only when the population of Spanish Sahara was independent. He therefore asked for a separate vote on operative paragraph 3; his delegation would abstain in the vote on that paragraph.

228. The representative of Australia said that his delegation would have preferred to have more time to consider the statements of the petitioners. It would therefore abstain in the vote on the draft resolution, without prejudice to its future position on the matter in the light of closer consideration.

229. The representative of Uruguay said that it was highly regrettable that the Special Committee had decided to put the draft resolution to the vote when all the

necessary information was not yet available. Fortunately, delegations could take a position later in the Fourth Committee, when they were in full possession of the facts.

230. His delegation shared the Italian delegation's view concerning the principle of the administering Power's exclusive responsibility and the advisability of dividing the second preambular paragraph into two paragraphs. In operative paragraph 1 there was no reference to the necessity of taking into account the interests of the population - which was the very essence of decolonization. Moreover, the reference to the Government of Morocco in paragraph 1 should be in a separate paragraph, since the basic responsibility for arranging for the transfer of powers rested with Spain. His delegation could support operative paragraph 2 whole-heartedly, but it had some reservations concerning operative paragraph 3. A complex of interests was established in that paragraph, and it was not clear which was to prevail. To invite the administering Power to consult with the Governments of Mauritania and Morocco concerning the arrangements for the referendum was unfair not only to the administering Power but also to the indigenous population of Spanish Sahara. Moreover, such consultations would further delay the exercise by the people of their right of self-determination. Accordingly, his delegation would abstain in the vote on the draft resolution.

231. The representative of Venezuela said that his delegation had always regarded the principle of self-determination as the right of a people to determine its own political future and considered that the interests of the people concerned took precedence over every other interest in the decolonization process. His delegation had therefore been amazed that neither operative paragraph 1 nor operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution included a reference to the interests of the people of the Territory. His delegation would vote in favour of the draft resolution, on the understanding that its reservations would be recorded.

232. At the 479th meeting, the Special Committee voted on the draft resolution. A separate vote was taken on operative paragraph 3 which was adopted by 16 votes to none, with 6 abstentions. The draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.351/Rev.1) as a whole, as orally revised was adopted by a vote of 19 to none, with 3 abstentions.

233. In explanation of vote the representative of Denmark said that his delegation was fully in agreement with the substance of the draft resolution, and had therefore voted in favour of it. He noted that operative paragraph 2 of that resolution affirmed the right of the indigenous population of Spanish Sahara to self-determination and independence. His delegation had reservations, however, concerning operative paragraph 3, for the invitation to the administering Power to consult specific States might prejudice the future status of the Territory.

234. The representative of the United States of America said that his delegation believed firmly in the right of the people of Spanish Sahara to self-determination. It had abstained in the vote on the draft resolution, for if that resolution was to have any chance of success it would have to satisfy the aspirations of the indigenous population and win the support of all the parties concerned, including the nations with legitimate interests in the fate of the Territories.

235. The representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland said that his delegation had voted in favour of the draft resolution, although it had some reservations concerning operative paragraph 1 in view of the absence of a reference to the interests of the people - which were paramount under the Charter - and the inclusion of a reference to resolution 1514 (XV) which was not entirely clear. The text also dealt with matters which were the primary concern of the administering Power. He regretted that the discussion had been closed before all petitioners had been heard.

236. The representative of Mauritania commended the Special Committee for its adoption of the draft resolution. In his delegation's view, Morocco, while it was interested in the Territory of Ifni, had no interest in so-called Spanish Sahara.

237. The representative of Morocco said that the fact that the resolution had been approved unanimously was a demonstration of the solidarity of the nations of Europe, Africa, Asia and Latin America with the peoples of Africa desirous of achieving freedom, and a token of their united will to see that justice, law and the principles of the Charter prevail.

238. Morocco would play its part in a spirit of friendship and co-operation in the active application of the resolution so as to ensure that the decolonization of the Territories under consideration proceeded in an orderly, peaceful and harmonious

manner in keeping with the legitimate wishes of the people, who aspired to dignity, progress and well-being, without detriment to the legitimate rights of anyone. Like all the countries engaged in the struggle against colonialism, Morocco considered that decolonization could only serve the cause of peace in the context of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

239. With regard to operative paragraph 1 of the resolution adopted by the Special Committee, Morocco considered that the decolonization of Ifni should be brought into line with operative paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). With regard to operative paragraph 3, his delegation considered that the question of Sahara under Spanish administration, in so far as it concerned a party other than the population of the Territory itself, was exclusively the concern of Morocco, which did not recognize the validity of any rights claimed circumstantially by other parties.

240. He hoped that note would be taken of the fact that the spirit of compromise reflected in the Committee's resolution did not affect the conviction that the Territory, which had been an integral part of Morocco from time immemorial, had a right to enjoy its right to freedom and independence without let or hindrance, with the assistance of the United Nations. Subject to that reservation, his delegation had accepted the compromise text. Morocco was prepared to co-operate with the administering Power in compliance with the resolution so that the Territories of Saguia El Hamra, Río de Oro and Ifni would become independent on that basis, in the interests of the indigenous population.

241. The representative of Mauritania said he had already expressed his views on the resolution adopted by the Special Committee, and what the Moroccan representative had just said did not surprise him, since of course Morocco laid claim to so-called Spanish Sahara just as previously it had laid claim to Mauritanian territory, as was proved by an official document given world-wide distribution by the Moroccan Government in 1960.

242. He would like to put on record the fact that Ifni was a Territory entirely separate and distinct from Spanish Sahara and had nothing to do with it; and he hoped that the Committee would take due note of that. Mauritania trusted that the people of those Territories would be granted the exercise of their right to self-determination, and noted that the administering Power had undertaken to grant

it. He urged that no obstacle should be put in the way of the exercise of that right by confusing the issue with problems alien to the wishes of the people, and that by agreement with the administering Power, the people should be allowed to decide freely as to their future.

243. The text of the resolution (A/AC.109/214) adopted by the Special Committee at its 479th meeting on 16 November 1966 reads as follows:

"The Special Committee,

"Having considered the item on its agenda relating to Ifni and Spanish Sahara,

"Having heard the statements concerning these two Territories made by the representatives of the administering Power, Mauritania, Morocco and Algeria,

"Having heard the petitioners,

"Recalling the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples contained in General resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960,

"Bearing in mind the provisions of resolution 2072 (XX) adopted by the General Assembly on 16 December 1965,

"Noting the decision of the administering Power to apply the provisions of resolution 2072 (XX) in their entirety,

"1. Invites the administering Power to expedite the process of decolonization of the Territory of Ifni and, in collaboration with the Government of Morocco, to make arrangements for the transfer of powers in accordance with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);

"2. Requests the administering Power to establish without delay appropriate conditions which will ensure that the indigenous population of Spanish Sahara is able to exercise its rights to self-determination and independence;

"3. Invites the administering Power to make arrangements in consultation with the population of Sahara, the Governments of Mauritania, Morocco and any other parties concerned, for a referendum which will be held under United Nations auspices to enable the indigenous population of the Territory freely to exercise its right to self-determination, and to report thereon to the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples before the referendum is held;

"4. Requests the Secretary-General to follow the progress of the implementation of this resolution and to report thereon to the Special Committee."



ANNEX\*

LETTER DATED 8 SEPTEMBER 1966 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF SPAIN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

1. In the letter dated 28 June 1966 which I sent to the Secretary-General with the request that he forward it to the Officer in Charge of the Department of Trusteeship and Non-Self-Governing Territories, I stated, in reply to the letter dated 9 June 1966<sup>a/</sup> which Mr. M.E. Chacko sent me from Addis Ababa, that the Spanish Government would inform the Special Committee in due course of its attitude and intentions regarding the implementation of General Assembly resolution 2072 (XX) of 16 December 1965 concerning Ifni and Spanish Sahara. I now have the honour of submitting this information to you.

SPANISH SAHARA

2. As the Special Committee knows, the Spanish Government has shown itself to be in favour of applying the principle of self-determination in the territory of Spanish Sahara, as stated in the official letter sent by me on 30 April 1964 to the then Chairman of the Special Committee, Ambassador Sori Coulibaly, Permanent Representative of Mali. We have consequently noted with satisfaction that at the 436th meeting of the Special Committee, held on 7 June 1966 in the capital of Ethiopia, some other countries which had hitherto opposed the application of this principle in the territory of Spanish Sahara stated that they were now in favour of it. It will thus be possible to implement General Assembly resolution 2072 (XX) by means of the free self-determination of the saharauis, as the Spanish Government has proposed in the past.

3. To this end, my Government is in contact with the population of the Sahara and is actively making the necessary preparations for them to express their will without any form of pressure. These preparations have taken some time because of the nomadic nature of the inhabitants of the desert and the special features of the territory.

---

\* Previously issued under the symbol A/AC.109/202.

<sup>a/</sup> The letter of 9 June 1966 transmitted the text of the consensus concerning Ifni and Spanish Sahara adopted by the Special Committee at its 436th meeting on 7 June 1966.

IFNI

4. As regards Ifni, the Spanish Government, inspired as always by the spirit of international co-operation and true to the cause of decolonization, must needs draw the Special Committee's attention to the abnormal situation obtaining in this enclave, in some parts of which Spain is having difficulty in exercising its authority, despite the Treaties in which Spain's rights are clearly set out. The reasons for this are well known to all and the Spanish Government is not responsible for them. All the same, because of the special features of this problem it might be advisable to establish contact with Morocco with the primary objective of restoring a lawful state of affairs as a necessary preliminary to seeking an arrangement which would satisfy the interests involved and permit the inhabitants of Ifni to obtain firm and duly guaranteed assurances regarding both their future in general and their individual destiny.

5. I believe, Mr. Chairman, that the above will show the Special Committee how clear and firm is Spain's determination to implement General Assembly resolution 2072 (XX).

-----