## UNITED NATIONS

## GENERAL ASSEMBLY

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> IETTER DATED 9 NCVFMBER 1965 FROM THE PEIMANENT REERESENTATIVE OF INDIA TO THE UNTTED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECPETARY-GENERAI.

I have the honour to refer to the letter which the Permanent Representative s' Pakistan addressed to you on 1 November 1965, and which was circulated as Securjity Council document $s / 6858$ and General Assembly document A/6097. This letter purported to answer my letter of 5 0ctober 1965 to you (S/6747 and A/6045).

In his Ietter the Permanent Representative of Pakistan has attempted to evade the responsibility for his country's aggression against, India which commenced on 5 August 1965. He has also tried somehow to suggest that the initiative for hostilities which began on 5 August 1965 came from India. His בetter cites, in eviaence, your report of 3 September 1965 ( $\mathrm{s} / 6651$ ) and the statement made in the I239th meeting of the Security Council on 17 September 1965 by His Ixcellency Ambassador Rifai of Jorian (S/FV.1239).

I would merely quote the following passages from your own report of 3 September $1965(\mathrm{~s} / 6651)$ and the statement made by His Excellency Ambassador Ramari of Malaysia in the l24lst meeting of the Security Council on 18 September 1965 (S/PV.1241), to refute the false and baseless allegations made by the Pemanent Representative of Pakistan, and to substantiate Irdia's charge that Faxiatan committed aggression against India and that the responsibility for commencing the hostilities on 5 August -965 must Iie squarely on Dekistan's shoulders:
I. WUOTATIONS FIRM TEE SECRETARY-GENERAT'S REP KTI CF 3 SEETEMEER 1965 (S/6651)
"5. The current serious trouide affecting the Cease-Fire and the citifn Kashir dated from 5 August 1965 , and consists of a large number of riolations of the CFI by crossings of the Line, by firing across it with artiliery pieces, and by the occupation of pitions on the wrong side of the Iine.

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"6. General Nimmo has indicated to me that the series of violations that began on 5 August were to a considerabie extent in subsequent days in the form of armed men, generally not in uniform, crossing the CFL from the Pakistan side for the purpose of armed action on the Indian side.
"9. On the morning of 9 August, a cable was received from General Nimmo warning that the situation wes deteriorating along the CFL. On the basis of this report, I saw the Representative of Pakistan at 1230 hours on that day, and asked him to convey to his Government my very serious concern about the situation that was developing in Kashmir, involving the crossing of the CFI from the Pakistan side by numbers of armed men and their attacks on Indian militery positions on the Indian side of the Line, and also my strong appeal that the CFL be observed. That same afternoon I saw the Representative of India, told him of the information I had received from General Nimmo and of the áémarche I had made to the Government of Pakistan, and asked him to convey to his Government my urgent appeal for restraint as regards any retaliatory action from their side. In subsequent days, I repeated these appeals orally for transmission to the two Governments, asking also that all personnel of either party still remaining on the wrong side of the Line be withdrawn to its own side. I have not obtained from the Government of Pakistan any assurance that the Cease-Fire and the CFL will be respected henceforth or that efforts would be exerted to restore conditions to normal along that Line. I dia receive assurance from the Goverment of India, conveyed orally by their Representative at the United Nations, that India would act with restraint with regard to any retaliatory acts and will respect the Cease-Fire Agreement and the CFL if Pakistan does likewise.
...
"10. In view of the continuing deterioration in the situation as of 16 kugust, I gave consideration tc a further step in the form of a draft statement about the Cease-Fire violations which was designed for public release. The draft was handed to the two Representatives to be transmitted for the information of their Goverments. Both Governments reacted promptly. The Goverment of India had no objection to the release of the statement but at first wished certain modifications which, in part at least, I regarded as unacceptable. The Government of Pakistan was strongly negative about the statement in general on the grounds that it favoured India in that it dealt only with the current cease-fire situation without presenting the political background of the broad issue and thus was lacking in balance, since a cease-fire alore supports the status quo to India's benefit."
II. quotations frcm h.e. hmbebsidor ramani's statement in mhe l24lst MEEPING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL (S/FV.1241)
"But I am perfectly sure that he will agree with me that the date has a significance in the context of the Secretary-General's report; we, the cosponsors of that resolution, did not invent it for fun or choose it arbitrarily because we liked the look of it on a calendar. The date of

5 August is the vital date in this debate. It is in fact and in truth the starting point in the long and sorry train of tragic events narrated by the Secretary-General in his report contained in document s/6651 of 3 September, which is, I repeat, the foundation of this debate.
"The fifth of August as the vital date to this debate is referred to at least seven times in that report, and I crave the Council's indulgence to enumerate it.
"First, the sub-heading at page 3 is entitled 'Events since 5 August'.
"Secondly, the opening sentence of paragraph 5 reads: 'The current sericus trouble affecting the cease-fire and the cease-fire line in Kashmir dated from 5 August 1965...'
"Thirdly, the concluding sentence of the same paragraph reads: 'The adequacy of the present number of Observers and of their function may well be reappraised in the light of experiences since 5 August'.
"Fourthly, the opening sentence of paragraph 6 begins: 'General Nimmo has indicated to me that the series of violations that began on 5 fugust were to a considerable extent in subsequent days in the form of armed men, generally not in uniform, crossing the cease-fire line from the Fakistan side for the purpose of armed action on the Indian side'.
"Fifthly, part II of the same report is entitled: 'Annotated list of those incidents since 5 August 1965 which had been investigated by the United Nations Observers prior to 3 September 1965'.
"Sixthly, the second sertence in the seventh paragraph of General Nimmo's report reads: 'This list comprises only incidents on which complaints have been submitted asserting violation of the cease-fire and the cease-fire line between 4 and 30 August 1965...'
"Seventhly, and lastly, the list itself sets out the first and second incidents as those of 5 and 6 August."
"According to the Secretary-General's report ( $5 / 6651$ ) of 3 september, General Nimmo, as a result of investigations and 'in the light of the extensiveness and character of the raiding activities', reached the conclusion that large-scale infiltrations of heavily armed irregulars from Pakistan across the cease-fire line took place on 5 August and subsequent days. If one examines, as I have, the annotated list of incidents attached to the Secretary-General's report, one finds that not until after the first eleven incidents, spaced within 5 August and 1 h August, had occurred, each with increasing intensity and severity, did the Indian troops for the first time cross the cease-fire line and reoccupy the position northeast of Kargil, from which previously in May, upon the appeal of the Secretary-General, they had withdrawn.


#### Abstract

"In these eleven incidents there are to be found confirmations by Generel Nimmo's Observers of attacks within the Indian side of the ceasefire line by large armed groups varying from forty and seventy to as many as 'exceeding l, OCC', leaving large quantities of arms with tell-tale markings. This could not go on with impunity and indeed provoked selfdefensive reactions. Subsequently, the pace of the response kept in step with the pace of infiltration, until by the beginning of September everything went out of hand.


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"I would venture to suggest that Crom the Secretary-Generai's report, supported by the aareful findings of General Nimmo as a part of it, one can only - and I say this with the deepest regret - reach the conclusion thet the highly armed, well-trained and weil-led infiltrators came from Pakistan's side of the cease-fire line.
"We in our part of the world have been facing for over two years this kind of war - infiltration, subversion, sabotage - and we may speak with some large knowledge, learnt in the hard school of experience. It is an exhausting, exasperating war where the initiative is forever with the aggressor, where the real casualties are not so much human boaides or valuable material, but the slow erosion of the steel, the detemmination, the will to fight, the will to stand firm in the face of odds, possessed by the passion to give one's all to save one's country.
"Military pundits have calculated the defensive human costs oif such operaticns in the ratio of at least ten to one. The art and science of this wearing, wearying, wasteful war have now been perfected in asia. The peril of our times is the expansion export and propagaticr of this kind of war Ento regions farther beyond, regions which are judged to be ripe for revolution. Today, however, Asia is its testing ground.
"men the truth with regard to these infiltrations became known, Pakistan answered with vague denials and claims that these are but the symptoms of an ancient malignency and the Security Council should direct its mind and employ its energies in exterminating the rcot cause of all: the denial by Indis of a plebiscite in Kashmir, agreed to by India as long ago as 1948. Mhis was repeated this morning by the Minister of Law of Pakistan. This has been a time-honcured refrain."

I shall be grateful if this commaication is circulated both as a Security Council end a General Assembly docurnent.

