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Twentieth session

REPORT OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

1. The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament transmits to the United Nations Disarmament Commission and to the General Assembly a report on the Committee's deliberations on all questions before it for the period 27 July 1965 to 16 September 1965.
2. Representatives of the following States continued their participation in the work of the Committee: Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, India, Italy, Mexico, Nigeria, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and United States of America.

I. Procedural arrangements

3. Upon recommendation of the Co-Chairmen, members of the Committee reconvened the Conference on 27 July 1965.
4. Seventeen plenary meetings took place between 27 July 1965 and 16 September 1965.
5. The Committee, at its 234th meeting on 16 September 1965, having in view the convening of the twentieth session of the General Assembly on 21 September 1965, decided to adjourn this session of the Conference following its plenary meeting on 16 September 1965. The Committee decided to resume its meetings in Geneva as soon as possible after the termination of the consideration of disarmament at the twentieth session of the General Assembly, on a date to be decided by the two Co-Chairmen after consultation with the members of the Committee.

II. General and complete disarmament and measures aimed at the lessening of international tension, the consolidation of confidence among States, and facilitating general and complete disarmament

6. The Committee has continued its discussion of general and complete disarmament. The Committee considers it to be a primary goal of its future work to continue efforts to develop a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control. However, in view of present international developments, a number of members concentrated their attention at this session of the Conference on collateral measures.
7. In its efforts to achieve and implement the widest possible agreement at the earliest possible date, the Committee continued consideration in its plenary meetings of such measures as could be agreed to prior to, and as would facilitate the achievement of, general and complete disarmament.
8. On 26 July 1965, the Co-Chairmen received a letter (ENDC/149) from the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission transmitting to the Committee document DC/224, addressed to the General Assembly and containing the text of the resolution adopted by the Disarmament Commission on 11 June 1965 on the question of a world disarmament conference, and document DC/225, containing the text of the resolution adopted by the Disarmament Commission on 15 June 1965 which, inter alia, made certain specific recommendations to the Committee.
9. On 27 July 1965, at the 218th meeting, the United States submitted a message from President Lyndon B. Johnson to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC/150).
10. On 29 July 1965, at the 219th meeting, the United Kingdom representative read a message to the Conference from Prime Minister Harold Wilson.
11. On 5 August 1965, at the 221st meeting, the Committee issued a statement on the second anniversary of the signing of the limited test ban treaty in Moscow which stated that the Committee considered more urgent than ever further progress on disarmament measures.

12. On 10 August 1965 a letter was submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics representative to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations (ENDC/151).
13. On 17 August 1965, at the 224th meeting, the United States, supported by the delegations of Canada, Italy, and the United Kingdom, submitted a draft treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons (ENDC/152)* and a statement by President Lyndon B. Johnson on this draft treaty (ENDC/153).
14. On 2 September 1965, at the 229th meeting, Sweden submitted a memorandum on international co-operation for the detection of underground explosions (ENDC/154).*
15. On 9 September 1965, at the 231st meeting, the United Kingdom submitted notes on United Kingdom research on techniques for distinguishing between earthquakes and underground explosions (ENDC/155).*
16. On 14 September 1965, at the 232nd meeting, Italy submitted a draft unilateral non-acquisition declaration (ENDC/157).*
17. On 15 September 1965, at the 233rd meeting, a joint memorandum on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (ENDC/158)* was submitted by Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, and the United Arab Republic.
18. Also at the 233rd meeting on 15 September 1965, Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, and the United Arab Republic submitted a joint memorandum on a comprehensive test ban (ENDC/159).*
19. As at past sessions, the questions before the Committee were in general discussed in a thorough manner. All the participants in the Committee took an active part in this discussion and a number of interesting suggestions were put forward. The Soviet Union stated its readiness to meet the position taken by the United Arab Republic and to agree to its proposal that the implementation of the Moscow Treaty relating to the banning of tests of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water should be extended to cover underground nuclear tests above a seismic magnitude of 4.75, and that as an additional measure the nuclear Powers should agree to a moratorium on all other forms of underground

* The asterisk indicated Conference documents which are attached as annex I.

nuclear testing until such time as agreement had been reached on an over-all ban on nuclear weapons tests. The United States reiterated its readiness to conclude an adequately verified comprehensive test ban treaty and in this regard emphasized the desirability of an exchange of scientific information among nuclear Powers, as suggested by the eight non-aligned States in document ENDC/145.

20. The Committee did not reach any specific agreement at this session either on questions of general and complete disarmament or on measures aimed at the lessening of international tension. However, the members of the Committee believe that the extensive discussions on major problems relating to certain collateral measures were particularly valuable in clarifying the respective points of views of member Governments. The Committee believes that these discussions and exchanges of views may facilitate agreement in the further work of the Committee.

III. Meetings of the Co-Chairmen

21. During the period covered by this report, the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and of the United States of America, in their capacity as Co-Chairmen of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, held meetings to discuss the schedule of and procedure for the work of the Conference and certain substantive questions before the Conference.

IV. Conference documents

22. A list of all documents and verbatim records of the plenary meetings is given in annex II to the present report.

23. This report is submitted by the Co-Chairmen on behalf of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

(Signed) S.K. TSARAPKIN
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

(Signed) William C. FOSTER
United States of America

ANNEX I

List of documents attached to the Report

United States of America: Draft Treaty to prevent the spread of Nuclear Weapons	ENDC/152
Sweden: Memorandum on International co-operation for the detection of underground nuclear explosions	ENDC/154
United Kingdom: Notes on United Kingdom Research on techniques for distinguishing between earthquakes and underground explosions	ENDC/155
Italy: Draft of Unilateral Non-Acquisition Declaration	ENDC/157
Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic: Joint Memorandum on Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons	ENDC/158*
Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic: Joint Memorandum on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty	ENDC/159*

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT**

ENDC/152
17 August 1965

Original: ENGLISH

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Draft Treaty to prevent the spread of Nuclear Weapons

The Parties to this Treaty,

Desiring to promote international peace and security,

Desiring in particular to refrain from taking steps which will extend and intensify the arms race,

Believing that the further spread of nuclear weapons will jeopardize these ends,

Recalling that Resolution 1665 (XVI) of the General Assembly of the United Nations urges all States to cooperate for these purposes,

Desiring to achieve effective agreements to halt the nuclear arms race, and to reduce armaments, including particularly nuclear arsenals,

Reaffirming their determination to achieve agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

1. Each of the nuclear States Party to this Treaty undertakes not to transfer any nuclear weapons into the national control of any non-nuclear State, either directly, or indirectly through a military alliance, and each undertakes not to take any other action which would cause an increase in the total number of States and other organizations having independent power to use nuclear weapons.

2. Each of the nuclear States Party to this Treaty undertakes not to assist any non-nuclear State in the manufacture of nuclear weapons.

ARTICLE II

1. Each of the non-nuclear States Party to this Treaty undertakes not to manufacture nuclear weapons; each undertakes not to seek or to receive the transfer of such weapons into its national control, either directly, or indirectly through a military alliance; and each undertakes not to take any other action which would cause an increase in the total number of States and other organizations having independent power to use nuclear weapons.

ENDC/152
page 2

2. Each of the non-nuclear States Party to this Treaty undertakes not to seek or to receive assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons, or itself to grant such assistance.

ARTICLE III

Each of the States Party to this Treaty undertakes to cooperate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency or equivalent international safeguards on all peaceful nuclear activities.

ARTICLE IV

In this Treaty

(a) -- "nuclear State" means a State possessing independent power to use nuclear weapons as of _____ (date).

(b) -- "non-nuclear State" means any State which is not a nuclear State.

ARTICLE V

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign this Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the United States of America, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force on the deposit of instruments of ratification by _____ (a certain number of) governments, including those of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the United States of America.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding states of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification of and accession to this Treaty, and the date of its entry into force.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

ARTICLE VI

1. This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely subject to the right of any Party to the Treaty to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other signatory and acceding States and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

2. _____ years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of parties may be held at a date and place to be fixed by agreement of two-thirds of the parties in order to review the operation of the Treaty.

ARTICLE VII

This Treaty, of which the Chinese, English, French, Russian, and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

DONE in triplicate at the city of _____, the _____ day of _____, one thousand nine hundred and sixty five.

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/154
2 September 1965
Original: ENGLISH

SWEDEN

Memorandum on international co-operation for the detection
of underground nuclear explosions

In view of the efforts being made to extend the partial test ban to cover also underground nuclear tests, the question of improving existing facilities for monitoring seismic events has received increased attention. The scientific advisers, attached to the Swedish delegation at the ENDC, a few months ago presented a discussion paper on extended international co-operation in seismology for detection purposes ("detection club"). The Swedish delegation has the honour to present to the ENDC for information its views on this subject.

Underground nuclear explosions do not, as a rule, generate global distributions of easily detected radio active debris. So far the seismic method seems to be the only technical way to detect them. Since the conclusion of the partial test ban considerable progress has been made in the fields of seismic detection. Problems, however, still remain in the fields of identification and inspection. These problems are not discussed in this paper which is confined to the problem of detection, i.e. questions related to the national systems of seismological detection.

The seismological stations are not yet optimally developed in all countries. It is surmised that if the means of detection were sufficiently developed, the problem of identification, i.e. of distinguishing between natural earthquakes and man-made explosions would be greatly facilitated.

Well equipped and well located stations can now detect events corresponding to yields of the order of one kiloton from distances up to 10.000 kilometres, covering half the globe. Hence no state has territories large enough to contain such seismic signals within its borders. The methods to record these signals seems now to be good enough to permit an adequate "national means only" solution of the detection part of the verification problem. If, however, the data emanating from the national systems were kept insulated within the national framework of each country, few of these, if any, would be large enough to monitor signals from the whole globe. To make it possible for all nations, interested in the compliance with a treaty banning

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ENDC/154
page 2

nuclear test explosions, to follow and also seek to evaluate events, presupposes availability of data from several stations in widely distributed and suitably selected locations. Such co-operation by exchange of seismological data is already internationally instituted for the purpose of monitoring and studying earthquakes.

As new and technologically much more advanced seismic stations are now being established and data flowing from them are beginning to reach the community of scientists in this field, the time has come to consider which forms further collaboration should take. We think that states, interested on one hand in furthering seismological observations and research and on the other hand in the detection of underground explosions, will find it useful to co-operate in an exchange of pertinent seismological observations. Such a "detection club" would essentially be an international data service, giving access to first class data for independent analysis.

If such co-operation is started before an underground test ban enters into force, research on the remaining test ban verification problems will be facilitated.

The last mentioned aspect has led the Swedish Government to plan certain steps to establish in Sweden appropriate resources for seismological observation and analysis. The observation data will be made available to all interested parties, and Sweden expects to get corresponding information in return.

The detection club data should preferably come from good instruments on good sites, globally distributed in advantageous positions. Although a broad participation would be desirable, such a global network could be based on seismological observations from selected stations in a rather small number of countries.

In order to broaden the uncertainty range of the absolute detection threshold facing a prospective test ban violator and thus increase the deterrence capability of seismological verification systems it is foreseen that some stations might remain outside the network of co-operating stations.

The data exchanged should comprise short messages - of the bulletin type currently used by seismologists - continuously circulated on a time scale appropriate to detection efforts. It would also be of great value if the results of calculations on bulletin data were included. The data co-operation should, furthermore, comprise the exchange, upon request, of copies of records.

Another essential element of the proposed co-operation would be the facilitation of the data exchange by the adoption of appropriate standards for instrumentation and data formats.

One will also have to consider that the existing and projected advanced seismological stations will extract a very large amount of information from the earth. To cope with this immense quantity of data it may prove necessary to establish some international co-ordinating body.

International data exchange is since long a well established practice in the geophysical sciences. The paramount importance of such co-operation for seismology has generated several national, regionally international and global schemes for the collection, analysis and exchange of data. Examples of regionally international schemes are the arrangements maintained in France, Japan, the USSR and the United States,

Indeed, much of the desiderata for the extended data exchange proposed in this paper is already met by the existing arrangements for scientific purposes. Thus, the specific needs of a "detection club" would in many cases require only adjustments of present national and international efforts.

The development of the science of geophysics and of the technique of test ban verification are closely connected. It would therefore be advantageous for all concerned to make the "detection club" data available to all scientists, to use such standards as might be sponsored by the International Council of Scientific Unions, to seek ways to achieve rapid circulation of bulletin data on some global telecommunication network accessible to scientists (e.g. the one used by the World Meteorological Organization for weather data and tapped in all countries) and to achieve co-ordination as far as possible, with existing global seismological co-operative efforts, such as the International Seismological Centre at Edinburgh.

The considerations in this paper have been formulated so as to help achieve more effective seismological detection as well as to allow science to benefit from resources allocated for detection purposes and vice versa, while avoiding to place an unwanted political burden upon scientists.

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT**

ENDC/155
9 September 1965
Original: ENGLISH

UNITED KINGDOM

Notes on United Kingdom Research
on techniques for distinguishing between
earthquakes and underground explosions

The E.N.D.C. is familiar with the history of the Experts Conference here in Geneva in 1958 and its recommendations for monitoring possible violations of a nuclear test ban treaty in all environments. Then, as now, discussions about how to distinguish between earthquakes and man-made underground explosions proved most difficult of all. This continuing difficulty is reflected in the fact that while it is still not possible to obtain agreement on this problem, a treaty banning nuclear tests in all other environments has been concluded.

When it became clear that for various reasons the control system recommended at Geneva in 1958 was unlikely to be implemented, scientists in the United Kingdom took a new look at the possibilities of detecting underground events at much greater distances than the 1000 kilometre range required for the Geneva recommendations of 1958. The thought was that seismic waves generated at such distances as would enable them to travel through the earth's homogeneous deep mantle should be much freer from the complexities introduced at shorter ranges by heterogeneities along shallower propagation paths through the earth's crust. With this concept in mind, U.K. scientists embarked on a seismic research programme to examine the possibilities of developing a detection system very different from that already recommended at Geneva.

The problem was seen as calling not only for research in all the usual seismic conditions but also as one where the seismic problem itself should be examined as one of exact measurement. The latter aspect immediately led to all recordings being made in such a way as would enable them to be processed electronically. By increasing the number of seismometers per station and deploying them in beam-forming arrays, by placing them in deep boreholes and by seeking lower noise sites than previously used,

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the possibility of great improvements in the signal to noise ratio soon became apparent with an essentially increased ability to see the first motions of the compressional or P waves arriving from a seismic source.

It was found that arrays of this particular type offered the greatest promise of advancement. As well as offering a signal to noise improvement in proportion to the square root of the number of seismometers used, they allowed the possibility of turning the array to more than one signal component velocity, thus improving the reception of later signal components, they offered an approximate determination of the direction of the source and they provided a body of data which enabled a method for determining depth of focus to be applied with considerable success. With such early encouragement scientists in the U.K. intensified their work with these arrays and established an experimental facility in U.K. to develop array techniques and prove instrumentation. At the same time, in close collaboration with their colleagues in the U.S., they established a similar experimental facility in the U.S. From this work it became apparent that a completely new concept of methods could be used to detect and identify earthquakes. The main facts then emerging may be summarised as follows:

- (a) Application of data processing techniques to magnetic tape recordings increased the capability of determining first motion of the first wave.
- (b) Estimation of the focal depth of events could be improved.
- (c) Array type stations could be operated effectively beyond 3000 kilometres, as compared with the 1000 kilometres range for the previous Geneva system.
- (d) Comparative differences in the characteristics of seismic waves from earthquakes and explosions were enhanced.

These advances suggested that the seismic detection and identification required to monitor a ban on underground tests could be carried out by a relatively small number of array stations at teleseismic distances. The reduced number of station sites in turn increased the possibility of confining stations to the quietest seismic sites available and this in itself led to a significant improvement in attaining the signal to noise ratio necessary to detect the smallest events of interest.

The next stage in this research work obviously called for a specific study of explosions and earthquakes at teleseismic distances using large arrays. In the U.K.

case these have varied from about 10 to 25 kilometres in length, are of a crossed linear geometry rather than triangular or radial and are carefully sited for noise, interference, and topographical characteristics. This phase of the work is a continuing part of the research programme still being pursued by U.K. scientists.

In the development and application of these array systems there are many variants to be examined. These include array geometry, site noise level, the number and characteristics of seismometers to be deployed. The results to be reported from the very large array experiment now being carried out in the United States will be of great interest. It is hoped that the approach taken by U.K. scientists will also contribute to resolving this difficult problem of distinguishing between natural seismic events and man-made underground explosions. A corresponding statement from any other delegation which has a contribution to report would be welcome. But behind all this, many detailed technical problems arise calling for detailed technical discussion. It would therefore be greatly preferable to have the scientists working on these problems brought together to discuss their work and assess the possibilities of creating an effective monitoring system for the detection and identification of underground nuclear explosions. It may well be that an effective monitoring system will call not for one particular type of array but various types depending on local seismic and topographical characteristics, as well as costs.

In the meantime the U.K. has continually sought to exploit these new technical advances as they have come along. They made possible a new approach to an underground test ban in 1962 and the West have continued to modify their position as scientific evidence has accumulated. Some of this work has already been published and all the work carried out by U.K. scientists is now being prepared for publication. That work was the subject of a symposium sponsored by the Royal Society in January of this year and to which representatives from many countries, including the Soviet Union, were invited.

Nevertheless, with all these technical advances there still remains a residual number of seismic events at or above seismic magnitude 4.0 that would be unidentifiable by remote seismological observations alone, and which could be suspected as possible violations of a test ban, unless they could be eliminated by some supplementary means such as on-site inspection being applied in some measure. This is the

ENDC/155

page 4

problem that still confronts us and that prevents an extension of the test ban treaty to cover the underground environment. It remains to be seen whether further research can provide any significant improvement on the position now reached but if there is such a possibility the U.K. believe that it could only be hastened in a detailed joint examination of the advances now achieved in the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom.

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT**

ENDC/157
14 September 1965
Original : ENGLISH

I T A L Y

Draft of Unilateral Non-Acquisition Declaration

The Government of not having national control of nuclear weapons, desiring to promote international peace and security and to achieve general and complete disarmament under effective international control, recalling General Assembly Resolution 1665 (XVI); reaffirming the necessity of an international agreement to stop the spread of nuclear weapons,

convinced that a unilateral renunciation of nuclear weapons by the non-nuclear States may facilitate and encourage international agreements to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, to halt the nuclear arms race, and to reduce nuclear arsenals, leading to general and complete disarmament,

hoping that such agreements will be achieved very soon,

declares that: from the date of the entry into force of the present declaration and for a period of years, 1) it will not manufacture or otherwise acquire national control of nuclear weapons; 2) it will not seek or receive assistance from other States in the manufacture of any such weapons; 3) it will accept the application of IAEA or equivalent international safeguards on its nuclear activities;

declares further that: 1) the present undertakings are conditioned upon similar declarations, issued by at least States within six months from the signature of the present declaration; 2) three months before the expiration of the above said period of years, it will consult other signatories of similar declarations, in order to prolong the said undertakings, considering the progress which has been made toward international agreements to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, or to halt the nuclear arms race, and to reduce nuclear arsenals; 3) it reserves all freedom of action if a non-nuclear State in any way acquires within the above-mentioned period of years national control of nuclear weapons.

ENDC/157

page 2

invites all States not having national control of nuclear weapons, and particularly those which are already approaching nuclear capability, to engage, as a matter of urgency, in the undertakings as set forth in the present declaration;

calls upon all States to respect and to observe the principles of this declaration and to encourage their observance by other States.

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT**

ENDC/153*
15 September 1965
ENGLISH ONLY

BRAZIL, BURMA, ETHIOPIA, INDIA, MEXICO, NIGERIA,
SWEDEN AND THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC.

Joint Memorandum on Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The Disarmament Commission of the United Nations adopted Resolution DC/225 on 15 June, 1965, with an overwhelming majority and, inter alia, "convinced that failure to conclude a universal treaty or agreement to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons leads to the most serious consequences", recommended that the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee should "also accord special priority to the consideration of the question of a treaty or convention to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, giving close attention to the various suggestions that agreement could be facilitated by adopting a programme of certain related measures."

The delegations of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic have been deeply concerned with this problem. They have noted with satisfaction that the other members of the Committee also expressed their anxiety in regard to this problem. The delegations of the NATO countries represented in the Committee have submitted a draft treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The non-aligned delegations regret, however, that it has not yet been possible to reconcile the various approaches for an appropriate or adequate treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

In these circumstances, the delegations of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic believe that it would be of advantage if they placed on record their basic approach to the question of non-proliferation. A treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is not an end in itself but only a means to an end. That end is the achievement of General and Complete Disarmament, and, more particularly, nuclear disarmament. The eight delegations are convinced that measures to prohibit the spread of nuclear weapons should, therefore, be coupled with or followed by tangible steps to halt the nuclear arms race and to limit, reduce and eliminate the stocks of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery.

The delegations of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic express the hope that their basic approach concerning a non-proliferation treaty as put forward in the foregoing paragraphs will receive general acceptance so that a draft treaty on prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons receives the support of the entire international community.

* This document supersedes the document ENDC/158

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT**

ENDC/159*
15 September 1965
Original: ENGLISH

BRAZIL, BURMA, ETHIOPIA, INDIA, MEXICO, NIGERIA, SWEDEN AND
THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

Joint Memorandum on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

The international community has for many years urged upon all states, particularly the major powers, the imperative need to reach agreement on the cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time. The United Nations has adopted several resolutions on the subject, particularly Resolution 1762 (XVII) which condemned all tests.

The Moscow Test Ban Treaty, entered into on August 5, 1963, was a significant first step in this direction. The preamble to this Treaty expressed the determination of the nuclear powers to continue negotiations for achieving the discontinuance of all nuclear-weapon tests. Unfortunately, no progress has yet been made towards this end, and test explosions continue to take place despite repeated calls by the United Nations for the urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests [Resolution 1910 (XVIII)]. In particular, the United Nations has called upon the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to continue with a sense of urgency its negotiations on that behalf.

The delegations of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic noted that the Disarmament Commission, convened in April-June 1965, took special interest in the question of the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, and made a special mention of the initiative taken by the eight delegations as contained in the memorandum they jointly submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee on 14 September 1964. Resolution DC/225 of June 15, 1965, especially recommended that the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee should consider as a matter of priority the question of extending the scope of the Partial Test Ban Treaty to cover underground tests.

In response to world public opinion and to the will of the United Nations as embodied in the various resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, as well as in implementation of the Resolution 225 of the Disarmament Commission, the delegations of the eight non-aligned states have continued to pursue with urgency and determination, in the present session of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, the question of the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests. They have also elaborated various proposals and suggestions made by them in this respect.

* This document supersedes the document ENDC/159.

ENDC/159 *
page 2

The delegations of the eight non-aligned states are convinced that the discontinuance of the underground tests and the conclusion of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty will not only consolidate the Partial Test Ban Treaty but also in itself constitute a measure towards non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It will strengthen the efforts being made to reach agreement on an appropriate treaty about non-proliferation, and generally improve the international climate.

The delegations of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic have noted with satisfaction the declarations made during the current session of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee that there has been considerable improvement in the techniques of detection and identification of underground tests. They therefore urge the Nuclear Powers to take immediate steps to reach an agreement to ban all nuclear weapon tests. They still believe that agreement on a treaty banning underground tests could be facilitated by the exchange of scientific and other information between the Nuclear Powers or by the improvement of detection and identification techniques, if necessary. Meanwhile, they reiterate their appeal to the powers concerned to suspend forthwith nuclear weapon tests in all environments. In order to assist the Nuclear Powers in observing suspension of underground tests, the non-aligned delegations stress the advantages that would accrue from international cooperation in the work of seismic detection.

The eight delegations reaffirm their stand that all nuclear weapon tests should cease immediately.

ANNEX II

CHECK-LIST OF DOCUMENTS ISSUED BY THE CONFERENCE
(26 July 1965-16 September 1965)

Part A - Verbatim records of the Conference [ENDC/PV.-series]

	<u>Date</u>	<u>Symbol</u>
218th meeting to 234th meeting	27 July 1965 to 16 September 1965	ENDC/PV.218 to ENDC/PV.234

* * *

Part B - Documents of the Conference [ENDC/- series]

<u>Title of document</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Symbol</u>
Letter dated 16 June 1965 from the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission to the co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on disarmament transmitting resolutions DC/224 and DC/225 of the Disarmament Commission	26 July 1965	ENDC/149
United States of America: Message of President Lyndon B. Johnson of 27 July 1965 to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament	2 August 1965	ENDC/150
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Letter dated 10 August 1965 from the Chairman of the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations	10 August 1965	ENDC/151
United States of America: Draft Treaty to prevent the spread of Nuclear Weapons	17 August 1965	ENDC/152
United States of America: Statement of President Lyndon B. Johnson of 17 August 1965 on the Draft Treaty to prevent the Spread of Nuclear Weapons	18 August 1965	ENDC/153
Sweden: Memorandum on international co-operation for the detection of underground nuclear explosions	2 September 1965	ENDC/154
United Kingdom: Notes on United Kingdom Research on techniques for distinguishing between earthquakes and underground explosions	9 September 1965	ENDC/155

<u>Title of document</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Symbol</u>
Draft Report to the United Nations Disarmament Commission and the General Assembly (recommended by the co-Chairmen)	14 September 1965	ENDC/156
<u>ibid</u>	15 September 1965	ENDC/156* French, Russian and Spanish
Italy: Draft of Unilateral Non-Acquisition Declaration	14 September 1965	ENDC/157
Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic: Joint Memorandum on Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons	15 September 1965	ENDC/158
<u>ibid</u>	15 September 1965	ENDC/158* English only
Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic: Joint Memorandum on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty	15 September 1965	ENDC/159
<u>ibid</u>	15 September 1965	ENDC/159*

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Part C - Documents containing information of an administrative nature
/ENDC/INF. - series/

<u>Title of document</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Symbol</u>
Basic information for delegations on conference arrangements and documentation	27 July 1965	ENDC/INF.1/Rev.5
List of Members of Delegations to the Conference	27 July 1965	ENDC/INF.2/Rev.21
Corrigendum to the List of Members of Delegations to the Conference	29 July 1965	ENDC/INF.2/Rev.21/ Corr.1 English only
List of Members of Delegations to the Conference	3 August 1965	ENDC/INF.2/Rev.22
Corrigendum to the List of Members of Delegations	2 September 1965	ENDC/INF.2/Rev.22 Corr.1
Check-list of documents issued between 26 July 1965 and 16 September 1965	16 September 1965	ENDC/INF.4/Add.35

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Part D - Non-governmental communications /ENDC/NGC/ - Series/

<u>Title of document</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Symbol</u>
List of communications received by the Secretariat of the Conference from 26 July 1965 to 16 September 1965	16 September 1965	ENDC/NGC/20

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