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THE URGENT NEED FOR SUSPENSION OF NUCLEAR AND THERMO-NUCLEAR TESTS

REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON
DISARMAMENT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS
WITH REGARD TO THE CESSATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS

ANNEX II

Summaries of the positions of the following delegations: Brazil, Burma,
Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Sweden, United Arab Republic; Nigeria (Addition 1).

Addendum 2 to the
Report to the General Assembly of the United Nations
with regard to the Cessation of Nuclear Weapon Tests

Attached hereto as Addendum 2 to the Report are the summaries of the positions of the following delegations: Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Sweden and the United Arab Republic.

BRAZIL

At today's meeting of the Disarmament Conference, Mr. Assumpção de Araujo, representative of Brazil, made a statement on the suspension of nuclear tests. He observed that the Conference should be encouraged by the progress, modest though it was, which had been achieved in that sphere in the last few months, as well as by the way in which the international situation had developed recently. The views expressed in the Memorandum of the eight non-aligned nations of 16 April 1962 had been confirmed by resolution 1762 of the United Nations General Assembly of 6 November 1962. Brazil's position was as follows:

1. Brazil could not admit the legitimacy of any nuclear tests whatsoever, no matter by whom they were conducted;
2. It desired the complete and permanent abolition of nuclear tests in all environments;
3. It was not opposed, however, to temporary or partial solutions;
4. It therefore supported the appeal to the General Assembly, which had requested the nuclear Powers to cease their tests as soon as possible and not later than 1 January 1963;
5. Brazil also considered that, so long as the negotiations for a general treaty continued, the idea of a limited moratorium should not be rejected;
6. Brazil considered that tests in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space, which did not raise serious problems of control, could be suspended immediately;
7. So far as concerned underground tests, the possibility of agreement regarding explosions of more than a specified force could be considered immediately, and the threshold might be reduced whenever technical progress made such reduction possible;

8. That did not mean that Brazil was in favour of a moratorium without control, or of control established without previous agreement.

The Brazilian representative supported the Swedish suggestion that an interim international scientific commission should be set up without awaiting the final drafting and entry into force of a complete agreement. That procedure was in accordance with the eight-nation memorandum and with the ideas expressed by Mr. Melo Franco at the sixteenth and seventeenth sessions of United Nations General Assembly and at the Disarmament Conference. The Swedish formula could, moreover, be combined with other proposals, such as the suspension of tests in the three non-controversial environments, accompanied by a limited moratorium of six months, for example, for underground tests. During that time, the scientific commission would express its views on the nature and degree of control which was really necessary to secure the permanent abolition of explosions of that type.

In conclusion, the Brazilian representative appealed to the nuclear Powers to respect the General Assembly's resolutions, to safeguard the future of mankind as a whole and to protect their own best interests.

BURMA

The Delegation of Burma joined the other delegations in stressing that the Conference should concentrate on the question of cessation of nuclear testing with a view to arriving at an agreement. It supported the suggestion of the Swedish Delegation to set up an interim commission composed of a panel of scientists with functions in line with those set out in the Eight-Nation Memorandum. It stated that the Joint Memorandum serves as the basis for an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests and appealed to the nuclear Powers to have a look at it again and try to reach agreement in a spirit of "mutual understanding and concession".

ETHIOPIA

The Ethiopian representative, pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 1762 (XVII) urging the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to negotiate a treaty banning all tests by 1 January 1968; and subject to the Committee deciding to concentrate its efforts on the working out of an agreement to end tests in the atmosphere, outer space and underwater, accompanied by an interim arrangement to suspend underground tests with adequate assurance for effective detection and identification of seismic events by an international scientific commission, has lent support to the proposal that emanated from the Swedish delegation regarding the establishment of an interim international scientific commission with functions envisaged in the Eight-Power Memorandum.

The delegate stated further that the system providing assurances against violation of the interim agreement need not be the same as the one envisaged for the permanent agreement for if it were so, he affirmed, there would be no need of entering into an interim agreement.

He therefore suggested that those functions envisaged in the Eight-Power Memorandum which clearly defined the tasks of the Commission, the rights and obligations of the parties, apply for the interim period, while negotiations continue with the view to clarifying the parts requiring further interpretation so as to finally come to an agreed interpretation of the Memorandum and thereby conclude the comprehensive test ban agreement.

The delegate enumerating those functions of the commission, the rights and obligations of the parties, which in his view required no additional interpretation, mentioned the processing by the commission of all data received from the agreed system of observation posts and of reporting on any nuclear explosion or suspicious event on the basis of a thorough and objective examination of all available data; the obligation of the parties to furnish the commission with the facts necessary to establish the nature of any significant and suspicious event; the obligation of

the parties to consult and co-operate with the commission with a view to clarifying and facilitating the assessment of certain doubtful events; the reporting by the commission to the parties concerned of all data and of all the circumstances, including its assessment thereof; and the right of the parties to be free to determine their actions with regard to the treaty.

He also suggested that the interim agreement so reached be registered with the Secretariat of the United Nations so as to have the force of an international treaty as an added safeguard against possible future violations and it continue to be in operation until replaced by the comprehensive and permanent treaty.

INDIA

On November 30, 1962, the Delegation of India observed that since one side had insisted on obligatory on-site inspections, while the other side had stated that it "will invite" the Commission in certain circumstances to visit sites, the element of common ground between these two views would seem to indicate the possibility of agreement being reached to the effect that, anticipating the number of invitations that they would issue in the first year, the two sides could agree on a small quota up to which invitations would be issued for that year, in the first instance, provided, of course, that the Commission requested them. It was explained that unless a permanent agreement (i.e. a final Treaty) was immediately reached, the interim arrangement to be entered into should be such as would continue till the final agreement was reached. The agreement on the number of invitations after the first year would depend upon the nature of the development of seismological and other instrumentation, and on other relevant factors. The occasions and the places for which invitations would be issued would be determined, in each case, after consultation and agreement between the International Scientific Commission and the country concerned. It was also observed by the Delegation of India that consistently with the obligation of all countries, in accordance with the 8-Nation Memorandum, to furnish the Commission with the facts necessary to establish the nature of any suspicious or significant event, it would be agreed that any State guilty of breaches of these obligations would, by such breaches, free the other parties from being tied any longer to the Agreement.

MEXICO

The delegation of Mexico (in a statement by Ambassador Padilla Nervo on 30 November 1962, ENDC/PV.85) said:

"The General Assembly in its Resolution A/RES/1762 (XVII), page 3, paragraph 6, recommends that: '... if, against all hope, the parties concerned do not reach agreement on the cessation of all tests by 1 January 1963, they should enter into an immediate agreement prohibiting nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere in outer space, and under water, accompanied by an interim arrangement suspending all underground tests'.

What in the opinion of the nuclear Powers should be the main features of such an interim arrangement which, in the words of the resolution, must 'include adequate assurances for the effective detection and identification of seismic events by an international scientific commission?'"

The delegation of Mexico suggests that the temporary or experimental interim arrangement referred to in the above-mentioned paragraph 6 might include the following elements:

(a) The setting up for an interim period of an international scientific commission with the functions proposed by the delegation of Sweden (ENDC/PV.84, 28 November), and with the powers assigned to the scientific commission in the Memorandum submitted by the eight nations on 16 April.

(b) A clause to the effect that if this interim scientific commission wishes to make an on-site inspection in order to identify a suspicious seismic event, any Power party to the interim arrangement which refuses to invite the scientific commission shall ipso facto by its refusal release the other party from its obligations under the interim arrangement.

A refusal by one of the parties to invite the interim scientific commission when an on-site inspection is the only means of identifying a suspicious seismic event would, if our suggestion is accepted, have the effect or consequence of legally and politically releasing the other party from its obligations under the interim arrangement, which would mean the termination of the agreement and the resumption of nuclear weapon tests.

We do not believe that any party would assume the very grave responsibility vis-à-vis world opinion of refusing such an invitation.

We believe that an interim arrangement for the suspension of underground tests containing such clauses as those I have mentioned, could be tried out provisionally whilst the parties concerned were negotiating a final treaty, and that this would facilitate, in accordance with the General Assembly's wishes, the conclusion of an immediate agreement prohibiting nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water.

SWEDEN

The Swedish delegation (in an intervention November 28) suggested that the international scientific commission, as proposed in the 8-Power memorandum, should be set up immediately, on an interim basis, without awaiting the final drafting and entry into force of a comprehensive agreement.

This interim commission could be given a mandate by the 13 Nation Conference, but the nomination of scientists from different countries could be made by some independent, scientific institution.

The interim commission should:

- (1) provide the conference, and in particular its nuclear sub-committee with pertinent technical and scientific information and undertake certain investigations,
- (2) assist in the elaboration of the detection and data exchange system,
- (3) be explicitly entrusted with functions which the 8-Power memorandum envisages for a permanent commission.

The Swedish delegation further suggested a time-limited suspension of underground tests while the details of a comprehensive test ban treaty were worked out. During this period the interim commission should fulfil the functions with regard to detection and identification of seismic events as laid down in the UN resolution 1762(XVII) A paragraph 5.

Such a provisional arrangement with regard to underground tests should make it possible for the nuclear Powers immediately to enter into a final agreement prohibiting nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water.

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

The UAR delegation expressed the view that once political decisions are taken by the capitals of the nuclear Powers, they can immediately agree on stopping tests in the three above-ground environments, while at the same time agreeing on a provisional arrangement to stop underground tests for a mutually acceptable duration under the supervision of a provisional International Scientific Commission. Meanwhile, negotiations should continue in search of a final agreement. The provisional International Commission would avail itself of existing nationally-manned observation posts as well as of all new technical developments including the black boxes. The Commission could request on-site inspections to verify significant and suspicious seismic events. The parties to the arrangements would have to give the Commission convincing reasons for declining to issue such an invitation. Failure to invite the Commission and to furnish it with convincing explanation would result in the Commission's communicating this to the other parties and to the United Nations.

This communication would free the States concerned from the heavy moral obligations undertaken by all parties in that arrangement.

The UAR delegation furthermore reminded the Committee of its previous suggestions that the two Co-Chairmen "lay down agreed practical arrangements, in other words, the modalities and mechanics of on-site inspection in practical and concrete cases."

The UAR delegation expressed its confidence that once such an arrangement is signed it will be respected by all its signatories. If this arrangement fails we would then revert to the present regrettable situation, but not to a worse one.

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Addition 1 to Addendum 2 to the
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Summary of the position of the Delegation of Nigeria

In a statement made this morning on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, the Hon. Minister of State and Leader of the Nigerian Delegation, reiterated his Government's opposition to all nuclear weapon tests no matter where they occur or who carries them out. He drew attention to the wise and varied deliberations in the UN First Committee on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests and the clear directives to the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament contained in General Assembly Resolution 1762A. He noted with satisfaction that the Eight-Nation Memorandum had received such massive endorsement at the United Nations General Assembly and that the Memorandum has been acclaimed by eminent world scientists as an adequate basis for an agreement banning nuclear weapon tests in all environments. The leader of the Nigerian delegation then proceeded to underline the following:

1. Nigeria is, without any equivocation, opposed to all nuclear weapon tests which she insists, as do the vast majority of the members of the United Nations must cease not later than 1 January 1963. Consequently she will not be satisfied with any Partial Test Ban Treaty on atmospheric, outer space and under water, which leaves tests in any other environment open.
2. Any Partial Test ban should always be inextricably linked with an interim arrangement for underground tests also as recommended in operative paragraph 6 of General Assembly Resolution 1762A. The interim arrangement, which should take as a basis the Eight-Nation Memorandum, should not be limited in point of time, but can be superseded by a more permanent comprehensive treaty banning all nuclear weapon tests in all environments and for all time.
3. (a) The Eight-Nation Memorandum, providing as it does an adequate basis for a comprehensive test ban and being the only basis so far mutually

acceptable to all the Nuclear Powers, should be given more serious and unambiguous consideration, purged of all preconceived ideas, notions and predetermined positions;

- (b) The sound scientific basis of the Eight-Nation Memorandum has been confirmed by recent scientific progress and conferences;
- (c) It should always be borne in mind that in the present world context there cannot be a "perfect" test ban treaty.

4. An International Scientific Commission on the lines advocated in the Eight-Nation memorandum, should be set up immediately, at least on an interim basis.

5. Nigeria advocates more fruitful deliberations in the Nuclear Sub-Committee, more practical consideration of the modalities for a test ban provided for in the Eight-Nation Memorandum, such as the determination of what constitutes a significant and suspicious event and practical arrangements for the setting up of the International Scientific Commission the transmission of data from the national seismic stations to and its processing by the International Scientific Commission - instead of a pointless and not profitable wrangling over so-called principles. The theory of the "Black Boxes" automatic seismic stations, and any other proposals that would bring us closer to an early agreement should also be given careful consideration.