

UNITED NATIONS

GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY



Distr.  
GENERAL

A/5408  
DC/207  
12 April 1963

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH/RUSSIAN

REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION  
COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

Letter dated 10 April 1963 from the Co-Chairmen of the Eighteen-Nation  
Committee on Disarmament addressed to the Secretary-General

We have the honour to forward herewith, on behalf of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, a progress report to the United Nations Disarmament Commission and to the United Nations General Assembly. This report, covering the Conference deliberations for the period 26 November 1962 to 10 April 1963, is transmitted pursuant to resolution 1767 (XVII) of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

(Signed) S.K. TSARAPKIN

United States of America

(Signed) Charles C. STEELE

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

Report to the United Nations

Geneva, 10 April 1963

The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament transmits herein to the United Nations Disarmament Commission and to the General Assembly a further interim progress report on the Committee's deliberations on all questions before it for the period 26 November 1962 to 10 April 1963. This report is submitted in response to resolution 1767 (XVII) of the General Assembly.

I. Organization of Conference

A. Participants in the Conference

Representatives of the following States continued their participation in the work of the Committee: Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, India, Italy, Mexico, Nigeria, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America.

B. Procedural arrangements

1. Upon recommendation of the Co-Chairmen, members of the Committee reconvened the Conference on 26 November 1962.
2. At its ninety-second meeting on 14 December 1962, the Conference decided to recess from 21 December 1962 to 15 January 1963. Subsequently, the members of the Committee adopted the recommendation of the Co-Chairmen that the Committee reconvene on 12 February 1963.
3. Thirteen plenary meetings took place between 26 November 1962 and 20 December 1962.
4. Twenty-five plenary meetings took place from 12 February 1963 to 10 April 1963.

## II. Nuclear test ban

The Committee considered the problem of a nuclear weapon test ban at a number of plenary meetings while it was in session between 26 November 1962 and 20 December 1962. In addition, six meetings of the Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests, and a number of meetings of the Representatives of the Soviet Union and of the United States, as Co-Chairmen, were held during this phase of the negotiations.

On 7 December 1962 the Committee submitted a report to the United Nations General Assembly on the progress of these negotiations (ENDC/68).

When the Committee reconvened on 12 February 1963, it had the benefit of the exchange of letters between Mr. N.S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and Mr. John F. Kennedy, President of the United States of America (ENDC/73 and 74).\*

Although there have been no meetings of the Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests, the Committee is continuing to devote a substantial proportion of its efforts to this problem. Accordingly, of the twenty-five plenary meetings held since reconvening on 12 February 1963, the Committee has devoted eighteen meetings, including one informal meeting, in whole or in part to the consideration of this question.

On 1 April 1963, at the 116th meeting, the United Kingdom and the United States submitted a Memorandum of Position Concerning the Cessation of Nuclear Weapon Tests (ENDC/78).\*

In addition to the plenary meetings, there were a number of meetings between the USSR and United States Co-Chairmen.

## III. General and complete disarmament

The Committee has continued consideration of general and complete disarmament and, in accordance with the agreed agenda (ENDC/52), stage I measures regarding nuclear weapons delivery vehicles and conventional armaments were discussed. These discussions gave primary consideration to a revised draft treaty on general

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\* Asterisk indicates Conference documents which are attached hereto as annex I.

and complete disarmament submitted by the USSR on 26 November 1962 (ENDC/2/Rev.1),\* and to the outline of basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world submitted by the United States on 18 April 1962 (ENDC/30, transmitted as part of annex I of the Committee's report of 31 May 1962).

On 10 December 1962, at the ninetieth meeting, the United States submitted a draft treaty article for stage I, Reduction of Armaments (ENDC/69).\*

#### IV. Measures aimed at the lessening of international tension, the consolidation of confidence among States and facilitating general and complete disarmament

Although there have been no meetings of the Committee of the Whole, the Committee continued consideration in its plenary meetings of such measures as could be agreed to prior to, and as would facilitate the achievement of, general and complete disarmament.

On 12 December 1962, at the ninety-first meeting, the United States submitted a Working Paper on Reduction of the Risk of War through Accident, Miscalculation or Failure of Communication (ENDC/70).\* On 12 February 1963, at the ninety-sixth meeting, the USSR submitted a draft Declaration on Renunciation of Use of Foreign Territories for Stationing Strategical Means of Delivery of Nuclear Weapons (ENDC/75).\* On 20 February 1963, at the 100th meeting, the USSR submitted a draft Non-Aggression Pact between the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty and the States parties to the North Atlantic Treaty (ENDC/77).\*

#### V. Meetings of the Co-Chairmen

During the period covered by this report, the representatives of the United States of America and of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in their capacity as Co-Chairmen of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, have held numerous meetings. The schedule of and procedure for the work of the Conference, general and complete disarmament, cessation of nuclear weapons tests and measures aimed at the lessening of international tension, the consolidation of confidence among States, and facilitating general and complete disarmament, were discussed.

VI. Conference documents

Transmitted herewith as annex II to this report is a list of all documents and verbatim records of the plenary meetings and the Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests.

This report is submitted by the Co-Chairmen on behalf of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

United States of America

(Signed) S.K. TSARAPKIN

(Signed) Charles C. STELLE

ANNEX I

List of documents attached to the Report

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Letters dated 19 December 1962 and 7 January 1963  
from the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the  
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, addressed to  
the President of the United States of America

ENDC/73\*

United States of America:

Letter dated 28 December 1962 from the President of  
the United States of America to the Chairman of the  
Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet  
Socialist Republics

ENDC/74\*

United Kingdom and United States of America:

Memorandum of position concerning the cessation of  
nuclear weapon tests

ENDC/78

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Treaty on general and complete disarmament under  
strict international control (Draft by the Union  
of Soviet Socialist Republics)

ENDC/2/Rev.1

Correction to the document ENDC/2/Rev.1

ENDC/2/Rev.1/Corr.1

United States of America:

U.S. Draft of treaty on general and complete disarmament  
Article V

ENDC/69

United States of America:

Working Paper on reduction of the risk of war through  
accident, miscalculation, or failure of communication

ENDC/70

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Declaration on renunciation of use of foreign  
territories for stationing strategical means of  
delivery of nuclear weapons  
(Draft proposal by the Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics)

ENDC/75

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Non-aggression Pact between the States parties to the  
Warsaw Treaty and the States parties to the North  
Atlantic Treaty  
(Draft proposal by the Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics)

ENDC/77

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT**

ENDC/73\*  
31 January 1963  
ENGLISH  
ORIGINAL: RUSSIAN

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UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Letters dated 19 December 1962 and 7 January 1963 from the  
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet  
Socialist Republics, addressed to the President of the  
United States of America

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\*The document ENDC/73 dated 28 January 1963 was originally issued in New York

COMMUNICATION DATED 19 DECEMBER 1962 FROM N.S. KHRUSHCHEV, CHAIRMAN  
OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR, ADDRESSED TO JOHN F. KENNEDY,  
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Mr. President,

In our recent correspondence, relating to the events in the Caribbean area, we touched on the question of the cessation of nuclear tests. Today I should like to revert to this problem, and to state my views on possible ways of achieving a speedy solution which would be acceptable to both our sides.

It seems to me, Mr. President, that the time has now come to put a stop to nuclear tests once and for all, to make an end of them. This is a very propitious moment for doing so. The period of maximum crisis and tension in the Caribbean is behind us. We are now free to consider seriously other urgent international matters, in particular a subject which has long been ripe for action - the cessation of nuclear tests. In my view, the definite improvement which has taken place in the international situation should facilitate such endeavours.

The Soviet Union does not need war. I believe that war holds out no bright prospects for the United States either. Whereas in the past, after every war, the United States found itself with an increased economic potential and an accumulation of fresh wealth, today, with the use of modern nuclear missiles, war will span seas and oceans in a matter of minutes. A thermonuclear holocaust will mean vast numbers of casualties and tremendous suffering for the people of the United States as for the other peoples of the world. To prevent this from happening, we must, on a basis of complete equality and due consideration for each other's interests, develop peaceful relations between us and resolve all controversial questions by means of negotiations and mutual concessions.

One such question, with which the Governments of our countries have now been concerned for many years, is the conclusion of an agreement concerning the prohibition of all nuclear weapons tests.

You and I agree that national means of detection are adequate for the control of a ban on nuclear testing in outer space, in the atmosphere, and under water. However, we have not yet been able to find a mutually acceptable solution to the problem of the cessation of underground tests. The main obstacle in the



way of an agreement is the insistence of the United States on international control and inspection of the cessation of underground nuclear testing in the territories of the nuclear Powers. I should like to think that you yourself appreciate the truth of our arguments that national means of detection are now adequate for the control of this method of testing as well, so as to ensure that all parties are complying with the agreement. But you have been unwilling thus far to recognize this reality openly and accept it as a basis for the immediate conclusion of an agreement on the cessation of tests.

In its desire to find a mutually acceptable basis for an agreement, the Soviet Union recently took an important step to meet the West: it agreed to the installation of automatic seismological stations. This idea, as you know, was not advanced by ourselves. It was proposed by English scientists during a recent meeting of members of the Pugwash movement in London. Moreover, we are well aware that when this idea was put forward your scientists, who were then in London, were not averse to it.

We proposed the installation of such stations both near the frontiers of the nuclear Powers and in their territory. We announced our consent to the installation of three such stations in the territory of the Soviet Union, in zones particularly subject to earthquakes. There are three such zones in the Soviet Union in which these stations could be set up: the Central Asian, the Altai, and the Far Eastern zone.

In the opinion of Soviet scientists, the most suitable sites for locating automatic seismological stations in the Soviet Union are the vicinity of the town of Kokchetav in the Central Asian zone of the USSR, the vicinity of the town of Bodaibo in the Altai zone, and the vicinity of the town of Yakutsk in the Far Eastern zone. If, however, following an exchange of views between our representatives, other sites should be proposed for the placing of automatic seismological stations in these seismic zones, we shall be prepared to discuss the matter and to seek a mutually acceptable solution.

In addition to the above-mentioned zones, there are two other seismic zones in the Soviet Union - the Caucasian and Carpathian. These zones, however, are so densely populated that it would be virtually out of the question to conduct nuclear tests there.

It would, of course, be perfectly possible for the necessary sealed apparatus to be transported to and from the international centre, for the purpose of its periodical replacement in the automatic seismic stations sited in the USSR, by Soviet personnel, using Soviet aircraft. If, however, it should be considered necessary for foreign personnel to participate in such deliveries of apparatus to and from automatic seismic stations, we could also agree to this, taking measures, if required, to prevent such visits from being used for espionage purposes. Our proposal for automatic seismic stations thus includes elements of international control. This is an important gesture of goodwill on the part of the Soviet Union.

I tell you frankly that before making this proposal I held detailed consultations with the experts, and after these consultations I and my colleagues in the Government came to the conclusion that, so far as the Soviet Union is concerned, the observations made above regarding the measures to be taken by us are well-founded, and should not, we feel, give rise to any objection from the United States.

You and your representatives, Mr. President, refer to the fact that, without a minimum number of on-site inspections, it would be impossible for you to persuade the United States Senate to ratify an agreement on the cessation of testing. This condition, as we understand it, ties your hands and is preventing the signature of a treaty which would enable all of us to turn our backs for ever on the nuclear weapons proving grounds. Very well: if this is the only obstacle to agreement, we are prepared to meet you on this point in the interests of the noble and humane cause of ending nuclear weapons tests.

We have noted that on 30 October 1962, in discussions held in New York with Mr. V.V. Kuznetsov, the First Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, your representative, Ambassador Dean, said that in the opinion of the United States Government 2-4 on-site inspections a year in the territory of the Soviet Union would be sufficient. At the same time, according to Ambassador Dean's statement, the United States would be ready to work out measures to rule out any possibility of espionage being carried out under cover of these inspection visits. Such measures might include the use of Soviet aircraft flown by Soviet crews to transport the inspectors to the site, the screening of aircraft windows, a ban on the carrying of cameras, etc.

We have given consideration to all these points, and with a view to overcoming the deadlock and reaching a mutually acceptable agreement at last we would be prepared to agree to 2-3 inspections a year being carried out in the territory of each of the nuclear Powers, when it was considered necessary, in seismic regions where any suspicious earth tremors occurred. Control of the agreement on the prohibition of underground nuclear testing would, of course, mainly be effected by national detection systems, operating in conjunction with the automatic seismic stations. On-site inspections could be carried out with the precautions against the misuse of control for intelligence purposes mentioned by Ambassador Dean.

We believe that the path to agreement is now clear and plain. From 1 January of this new year of 1963, the world can be rid of the thunder of nuclear explosions. This is what the peoples are awaiting and this is what the General Assembly of the United Nations has called for. With the elimination of the Cuban crisis, we delivered men and women from the threat of the military use of lethal nuclear weapons that directly confronted the world. Can we not solve the far simpler problem of the cessation of test explosions of nuclear weapons in time of peace? I think that we can and must do so. This is now our duty to the peoples of our own countries and indeed to the peoples of all other countries. By achieving a speedy solution of this question too - and all the necessary conditions for a solution now exist - we can facilitate the preparation of a disarmament treaty and proceed with even greater confidence to the solution of other urgent international problems - of which, unfortunately, we have no lack.

Accept, etc.,

N. KHRUSHCHEV

19 December 1962

COMMUNICATION DATED 7 JANUARY 1963 FROM MR. N.S. KHRUSHCHEV, CHAIRMAN  
OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR, ADDRESSED TO MR. KENNEDY,  
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Sir,

I have received your reply to my communication of 19 December 1962. I am satisfied that you have correctly evaluated the Soviet Government's proposals set forth in that communication as being aimed at securing a prohibition of all nuclear weapons tests in the very near future.

We understand your reply to mean that you do not object to the proposal that the basis for control over the implementation of an agreement to ban underground nuclear tests should be national means of detection in conjunction with automatic seismic stations. We note your agreement that the installation of automatic seismic stations will prove useful from the point of view of increasing the effectiveness of control over the discontinuance of underground nuclear explosions. During the Geneva talks, it was justly observed, by your representatives among others, that the installation of such seismic stations would constitute an excellent means of verifying the proper functioning of the national seismic stations. It was precisely with these considerations in mind that the Soviet Government proposed that the idea of installing automatic seismic stations, put forward at the Pugwash conference of scientists, should be taken up.

In my communication of 19 December 1962, I indicated the three regions where, in our scientists' opinion, automatic seismic stations should be set up on the territory of the Soviet Union. These regions were selected after careful study and thorough consideration of local geological and seismic conditions.

In the Kokchetav and Bodaibo regions, automatic seismic stations would be installed, according to our proposal, on outcroppings of crystalline rock, and in the Yakutsk region, in the permafrost zone. It is known that in crystalline rocks and in ground that is frozen to a great depth minor seismic disturbances are always observed - a fact which facilitates the reliable detection of underground nuclear explosions. In conjunction with seismic stations abroad, in territories adjacent to the seismic zones of the Soviet Union, automatic stations installed at the sites indicated will be an adequate means of removing any doubts of the other side regarding the proper functioning of the national system of seismic stations.

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You did not comment on the siting of an automatic seismic station for the Altai zone in the region of the city of Bodaibo, and we could therefore consider this matter agreed.

However, you have doubts about the siting of automatic seismic stations for the other seismic zones of the Soviet Union - the Far Eastern and Central Asian zones. In the case of these zones, you consider that it would be desirable to install such stations in the Kamchatka region and the region of Tashkent. In the opinion of Soviet scientists, the proposal to install automatic seismic stations in the Tashkent and Kamchatka regions would be an inferior alternative to our own proposal, since the operation of the automatic stations in these regions would be seriously complicated by seismic interference. However, if you consider it more expedient to relocate those stations, we shall not object.

In my communication to you I have already indicated that the Soviet Union is prepared to seek a mutually acceptable solution on the question of the siting of automatic seismic stations also. We would agree to relocate the automatic seismic station for the Central Asian zone of the USSR to the region of Tashkent, installing it near the city of Samarkand, and to install the automatic station for the Far Eastern zone at Seimchan, which is part of the Kamchatka seismic region.

The installation of an automatic seismic station on the Kamchatka Peninsula itself would in the view of Soviet scientists be clearly unacceptable, in view of the serious interference which would result from the proximity of the ocean and the intense volcanic activity occurring in the Peninsula itself, factors which would inevitably disturb the normal functioning of the station. Accordingly, we think that agreement can also be regarded as having been reached between us on the siting of automatic seismic stations for the Central Asian and Far Eastern seismic zones of the USSR.

After consulting its specialists, the Soviet Government has come to the conclusion that the installation of three automatic seismic stations on the territory of the Soviet Union would be fully adequate. It is strengthened in this view by the fact that in your communication, Mr. President, you indicate the possibility of siting automatic seismic stations in territories adjacent to the seismic areas of the Soviet Union, such as Hokkaido, Pakistan and Afghanistan - with the consent, of course, of the Governments concerned.

The Soviet Government has designated certain specific areas for the siting of automatic seismic stations in USSR territory. In addition, Mr. President, we would be prepared, in deference to your wishes, to relocate two stations. We therefore feel justified in anticipating that you in your turn will designate specific areas in which such stations are to be installed in the territory of the United States of America, and that in reaching agreement on the siting of those stations due regard will be taken of our wishes by the American side.

We are convinced, Mr. President, that every possibility now exists for reaching agreement on the question of inspection also. Throughout the recent period, as you know, we have been told on repeated occasions by the Western side that if we agree in principle on inspection the way will be open to an accord. It has always been our view, as it still is, that there is no need for inspection at all; and if we now agree to a quota of two to three inspections a year, we do so solely in order to remove the remaining differences for the sake of bringing about agreement.

As you see, we have taken a most important step to meet your views. The quota of inspections in the territory of each of the nuclear Powers which we are proposing is an adequate one: your representatives themselves admitted during the negotiations that there is no need to verify all or a high proportion of significant suspicious events in order to deter States from attempting to violate the treaty. In this connexion, they mentioned an annual number of inspections which virtually coincides with the quota we are proposing. It stands to reason that the most rational course would be to carry out inspections in the seismic areas in which the greatest number of unidentified seismic events are likely to occur. If, however, you consider it necessary, we would have no objection to inspections being carried out in aseismic areas also, provided that the annual quota we have indicated is not exceeded.

I have noted that in your reply you concede the necessity of taking reasonable precautionary measures to prevent visits of inspection or visits to automatic seismic stations being used for the collection of intelligence data. It could of course, occur that the area in which an on-site inspection was being carried out contained an installation of importance to the defence of the country

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concerned. It is clear that in such circumstances the necessary measures will have to be taken to prevent any damage being done to the security interests of the State in whose territory the inspection is being carried out. I fully agree, on this point, with the ideas expressed in your communication.

You suggest in your communication, Mr. President, that our representatives should meet in New York or Geneva for a brief preliminary review of some of the problems you have raised. We have no objections to such a meeting being held between our representatives. The Soviet Government has designated for this purpose Mr. N.T. Fedorenko, Permanent Representative of the USSR to the United Nations, and Mr. S.K. Tsarapkin, representative of the USSR in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, who could meet your representative, Mr. William S. Foster, from 7 to 10 January in New York. We take this decision in the belief that the meetings between our representatives should lead in the very near future to agreement being reached on outstanding questions, so that when the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee resumes its work our representatives will be able to inform it that the way lies open to agreement on the prohibition of all nuclear weapons tests.

Accept, etc.

N. KHRUSHCHEV

7 January 1963

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CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/74\*  
31 January 1963  
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Letter dated 28 December 1962 from the President of the United States of America to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I was very glad to receive your letter of December 19, 1962, setting forth your views on nuclear tests. There appear to be no differences between your views and mine regarding the need for eliminating war in this nuclear age. Perhaps only those who have the responsibility for controlling these weapons fully realize the awful devastation their use would bring.

Having these considerations in mind and with respect to the issue of a test ban, I therefore sincerely hope that the suggestions that you have made in your letter will prove to be helpful in starting us down the road to an agreement. I am encouraged that you are prepared to accept the principle of on-site inspections. These seem to me to be essential not just because of the concern of our Congress but because they seem to us to go to the heart of a reliable agreement ending nuclear testing.

If we are to have peace between systems with far-reaching ideological differences, we must find ways for reducing or removing the recurring waves of fear and suspicion which feed on ignorance, misunderstanding or what appear to one side or the other as broken agreements. To me, the element of assurance is vital to the broader development of peaceful relationships.

With respect to the question of on-site inspections I would certainly agree that we could accept any reasonable provision which you had in mind to protect against your concern that the on-site inspectors might engage in "espionage" en route to the area of inspection. In a statement at the United Nations, Ambassador Stevenson suggested that the United States would accept any reasonable

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\* The document ENDC/74 dated 23 January 1963 was originally issued in New York.



security provision while the inspectors were being taken to the site, so long as they had reasonable provision for satisfying themselves that they were actually at the intended location and had the freedom necessary to inspect the limited designated area.

With respect to the number of on-site inspections there appears to have been some misunderstanding. Your impression seems to be that Ambassador Dean told Deputy Minister Kuznetsov that the United States might be prepared to accept an annual number of on-site inspections between two and four. Ambassador Dean advises me that the only number which he mentioned in his discussions with Deputy Minister Kuznetsov was a number between eight and ten. This represented a substantial decrease in the request of the United States as we had previously been insisting upon a number between twelve and twenty. I had hoped that the Soviet Union would match this motion on the part of the United States by an equivalent motion in the figure of two or three on-site inspections which it had some time ago indicated it might allow.

I am aware that this matter of on-site inspections has given you considerable difficulty although I am not sure that I fully understand why this should be so. To me, an effective nuclear test ban treaty is of such importance that I would not permit such international arrangements to become mixed up with our or any other national desire to seek other types of information about the Soviet Union. I believe quite sincerely that arrangements would be worked out which would convince you and your colleagues that this is the case.

But in this connection, your implication that on-site inspections should be limited to seismic areas also gives us some difficulty. It is true that in the ordinary course we would have concern about events taking place in the seismic areas. However, an unidentified seismic event coming from an area in which there are not usually earthquakes would be a highly suspicious event. The United States would feel that in such a circumstance the USSR would be entitled to an on-site inspection of such an event occurring in our area and feels that the United States should have the same rights within its annual quota of inspection.

Perhaps your comment would be that a seismic event in another area designated for inspection might coincide with a highly sensitive defense installation. I recognize this as a real problem but believe that some arrangement can be worked out which would prevent this unlikely contingency from erecting an insuperable obstacle.

Your suggestion as to the three locations in the Soviet Union in which there might be unmanned seismic stations is helpful but it does not seem to me to go far enough. These stations are all outside the areas of highest seismicity and therefore do not record all of the phenomena within those areas. These stations would be helpful in increasing the detection capability of the system but I doubt that they would have the same value in reducing the number of suspicious seismic events by identifying some as earthquakes. For this purpose unmanned seismic stations should be in the areas of highest seismicity, not outside them. To achieve this result there would be need for a number of stations in the vicinity of the Kamchatka area and a number in the Tashkent area. It might be possible, of course, to reduce somewhat the number actually in the Soviet Union by arranging stations in Hokkaido, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. If the stations on Soviet territory were sited in locations free from local disturbances and could be monitored periodically by competent United States or international observers who took in portable seismometers and placed them on the pedestals it would be very helpful in reducing the problem of identification.

You have referred to the discussion of the "black box" proposal at the Tenth Pugwash Conference in London in September of this year as a United Kingdom proposal to which the United States has agreed. I do not believe that this was the situation. This proposal was reported to me as a Soviet proposal which was discussed with some United States scientists. Of the United States scientists who signed the statement none represented the United States Government or had discussed the matter with responsible officials. All were speaking as individuals and none were seismologists. Their agreement does not signify anything other than that this was an area which justified further study. The United States Government has given it that study and the results have been the conclusions which I have indicated above.

Notwithstanding these problems, I am encouraged by your letter. I do not believe that any of the problems which I have raised are insoluble but they ought to be solved. I wonder how you think we might best proceed with these discussions which may require some technical development. It occurs to me that you might wish to have your representative meet with Mr. William C. Foster, the Director of our Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, at a mutually convenient place, such as

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ENDC/74\*  
English  
Page 4

New York or Geneva. I will be glad to have your suggestions. After talks have been held we will then be in a position to evaluate where we stand and continue our work together for an effective agreement ending all nuclear tests.

Sincerely,  
John F. Kennedy

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# CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/72

1 April 1963

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

## UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

### Memorandum of position concerning the cessation of nuclear weapon tests

During the course of the present session of the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament the United Kingdom and the United States have presented their new position for the purpose of arriving at agreement on a treaty ending all nuclear weapon tests. This position is outlined in this memorandum. They emphasize in particular the importance of the arrangements concerning the conduct of on-site inspections. This memorandum deals with arrangements for inspections only on territory under the jurisdiction or control of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States. The treaty would, of course, have to deal with inspections on the territories of other parties.

#### I. General Principles

1. There now exists a new basis for agreement on a nuclear weapon test ban arising from the exchange of letters between Chairman Khrushchev and President Kennedy. Under this basis for agreement each nuclear side would place primary reliance on its national detection stations for the collection of seismic data, supplemented by the use of automatic seismic stations. Each nuclear side would use a small number of on-site inspections to check the nature of potentially suspicious unidentified events. It is a system which differs from the kinds of systems under discussion by this Conference before the last recess.

2. The United Kingdom and the United States have also indicated that, under certain conditions related to the conduct of inspections, they would accept an annual quota of seven on-site inspections in the territory of each nuclear power. This reduction in the number of inspections emphasizes the need to maximize the deterrent effect of each on-site inspection. This, in turn, will enhance the feeling of confidence each nuclear side will have in the verification system, and consequently, in the fact that treaty obligations are being observed.

3. With this end in view, the present position of the United Kingdom and the United States is strongly influenced by the concept of reciprocal inspection, in accordance with which each nuclear side plays a primary role in the arrangements concerning on-site inspection in the territory of the other. Members of the international staff of the commission would also participate in the inspection.

## II. On-Site Inspection Arrangements.

1. A state would have up to sixty days from the time a seismic event took place to designate that event as one which it may later wish to inspect. Under the designation process the designating state would send a statement to the international commission for transmission to the country in which the event occurred. The statement submitted by the designating state would indicate the location of the event and the time of its occurrence. Accompanying data would include four clearly measurable and mutually consistent arrival times. These would have to include P-wave arrival times at three different stations. The data would have to meet certain location criteria listed in the treaty. The statement would also have to indicate that the event could not be identified, from the data submitted by the designating state, as an earthquake by the use of agreed criteria. These agreed criteria would also be listed in the treaty.

2. For the purposes of the preceding paragraph, location criteria such as those contained in Article VIII of the UK/US draft comprehensive treaty of August 27, 1962 (ENDC/58) would be used.

3. The state on whose territory the event took place would have one week to provide any data which it might wish to make available concerning the designated event. Such data would be made available to the international commission for transmission to the designating state.

4. During the one-week period the designating state would have the right, if it so desired, to send its personnel, accompanied by members of the international staff, to retrieve and examine the data collected by the recording instruments in the sealed vaults of the automatic seismic stations in the territory of the receiving state.

5. The designating state would then be given an additional week to analyze the information which might be received concerning the event, including that from the automatic seismic stations. If the designating state wished to initiate an

on-site inspection of the event it would have to submit a further statement to the international commission for transmission to the receiving state. If this one-week period passed without the event being selected for inspection, it would no longer be eligible for inspection.

6. A state selecting an event for on-site inspection would have to indicate in its further statement the location and boundaries of the area selected for inspection. The area may be an ellipse with a semi-major axis of no more than fifteen kilometers, with a maximum area of 500 square kilometers.

7. The statement selecting an event for inspection would also include information on the proposed time and place of arrival of the inspection team at a point of entry in the receiving state. The receiving state would then have a period of five days to reply, setting forth the arrangements it would make for the reception of the inspection team.

8. In its reply, the receiving state would also have the right to indicate the presence in the inspection area of a sensitive defense installation, consisting of buildings or similar facilities. The designating state would then decide whether to continue with the inspection, excluding the defense installation from the area to be inspected, or to cancel the inspection without charging the inspection to the annual quota. If, in its judgment, a party felt this procedure was being abused, it could invoke the withdrawal procedures of the treaty.

9. The receiving state would be responsible for transporting the team and its equipment to the site of the inspection. It would be permitted to institute all safeguards it considered necessary to assure the security of military and other sensitive defense installations, subject only to the condition that the inspection team arrive promptly at the inspection area. These safeguards could include the use of its own aircraft and pilots to transport the inspection team, measures to prevent the inspection team from being able to view the territory of the receiving state en route to the inspection area, and the use of flight routes to avoid passing over certain portions of the receiving state.

10. The inspection team would consist partly of persons from the inspecting nuclear side and partly of persons from the international staff. The leader of the team would be one of the team members from that nuclear side. To ensure

that certain functions of the team are carried out by highly trained technical personnel so that the maximum deterrent and confidence-building effect of each on-site inspection would be achieved, at least fourteen technical experts from the designating nuclear side would be necessary for a typical inspection in the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom or the United States.

11. Personnel of the inspection team could be accompanied by official personnel, including observers, designated by the receiving state to assure itself that the on-site inspection and the activities of the team members were carried out in accordance with the terms of the treaty.

12. The inspection process would include low-level aerial flights to examine the area both visually and photographically for any evidence of a nuclear weapon test. Members of the team would have access throughout the area for the purpose of surface inspection and would be permitted entrance to any sub-surface cavities, such as mines, to look for evidence of a nuclear weapon test.

13. Inspection teams would have, unless drilling were required, a maximum of six weeks to complete the inspection, a period which could be extended by mutual agreement.

14. If it were determined that drilling was necessary, the team leader would be obliged to notify the receiving state. This notification would state what persons and equipment would be required and their length of stay.

15. The team leader would be responsible for submitting a report to the commission on the findings of the inspection no later than thirty days after completion of the inspection.

### III. Automatic Seismic Stations

1. Automatic seismic stations, with the exception of certain instrumentation, would be built by the Soviet Union and the United States, each in its own territory, in accordance with agreed specifications. The other nuclear side would then supply recorders and other necessary instruments, some of which would be sealed in the vaults of these stations. The United Kingdom and the United States propose that there be seven such stations in the territory of the Soviet Union and seven such stations in the territory of the United States.

2. At each automatic station data would be produced and recorded in both a sealed vault and a separate structure. The information recorded in the unsealed structure would be forwarded by host country nationals to the international commission and the other nuclear states at frequent intervals.

3. Personnel from the other nuclear side accompanied by personnel from the international staff would have the right to visit each station a maximum of eight times per year. These visits might be used in order to obtain the data from the instruments in the sealed vault in one or more stations in connection with the clarification of a particular event. Automatic stations could also be visited within the annual limit for routine recovery of data, maintenance, calibration of instruments, installation of improved instrumentation or checking of seismic noise levels.



CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT

Private  
ENDC/2/Rev.1  
26 November 1962  
ENGLISH  
Original: Russian

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS  
Treaty on general and complete disarmament  
under strict international control  
(Draft by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)

P R E A M B L E

The States of the world,

Acting in accordance with the aspirations and will of the peoples,

Convinced that war cannot and must not serve as a method for settling international disputes, especially in the present circumstances of the precipitate development of means of mass annihilation such as nuclear weapons and rocket devices for their delivery, but must forever be banished from the life of human society.

Fulfilling the historic mission of saving all the nations from the horrors of war,

Basing themselves on the fact that general and complete disarmament under strict international control is a sure and practical way to fulfil mankind's age-old dream of ensuring perpetual and inviolable peace on earth.

Desirous of putting an end to the senseless waste of human labour on the creation of the means of annihilating human beings and of destroying material values,

Seeking to direct all resources towards ensuring a further increase in prosperity and socio-economic progress in all countries in the world,

Conscious of the need to build relations among States on the basis of the principles of peace, good-neighbourliness, equality of States and peoples, non-interference and respect for the independence and sovereignty of all countries,

Reaffirming their dedication to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter,

Have resolved to conclude the present Treaty and to implement forthwith general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

## PART I. GENERAL

### Article 1

#### Disarmament Obligations

The States parties to the present Treaty solemnly undertake:

1. To carry out, over a period of five years, general and complete disarmament entailing:

The disbanding of all armed forces and the prohibition of their re-establishment in any form whatsoever;

The prohibition and destruction of all stockpiles and the cessation of the production of all kinds of weapons of mass destruction, including atomic, hydrogen, chemical, biological and radiological weapons;

The destruction and cessation of the production of all means of delivering weapons of mass destruction to their targets;

The dismantling of all kinds of foreign military bases and the withdrawal and disbanding of all foreign troops stationed in the territory of any State;

The abolition of any kind of military conscription for citizens;

The cessation of military training of the population and the closing of all military training institutions;

The abolition of war ministries, general staffs and their local agencies, and all other military and paramilitary establishments and organizations;

The elimination of all types of conventional armaments and military equipment and the cessation of their production, except for the production of strictly limited quantities of agreed types of light firearms for the equipment of the police (militia) contingents to be retained by States after the accomplishment of general and complete disarmament;

The discontinuance of the appropriation of funds for military purposes, whether from State budgets or by organizations or private individuals.

2. To retain at their disposal, upon completion of general and complete disarmament, only strictly limited contingents of police (militia) equipped with light firearms and intended for the maintenance of internal order and for the

discharge of their obligations with regard to the maintenance of international peace and security under the United Nations Charter and under the provisions of article 37 of the present Treaty.

3. To carry out general and complete disarmament simultaneously in three consecutive stages, as set forth in parts II, III and IV of the present Treaty. Transition to a subsequent stage of disarmament shall take place after adoption by the International Disarmament Organization of a decision confirming that all disarmament measures of the preceding stage have been carried out and verified and that any additional verification measures recognized to be necessary for the next stage have been prepared and can be put into operation when appropriate.

4. To carry out all measures of general and complete disarmament in such a way that at no stage of disarmament any State or group of States gains any military advantage and that the security of all States parties to the Treaty is equally safeguarded.

## Article 2

### Control Obligations

1. The States parties to the Treaty solemnly undertake to carry out all disarmament measures, from beginning to end, under strict international control and to ensure the implementation in their territories of all control measures set forth in parts II, III and IV of the present Treaty.

2. Each disarmament measure shall be accompanied by such control measures as are necessary for verification of that measure.

3. To implement control over disarmament, an International Disarmament Organization composed of all States parties to the Treaty shall be established within the framework of the United Nations. It shall begin operating as soon as disarmament measures are initiated. The structure and functions of the International Disarmament Organization and its bodies are laid down in part V of the present Treaty.

4. In all States parties to the Treaty the International Disarmament Organization shall have its own staff, recruited internationally and in such a way as to ensure the adequate representation of all three groups of States existing in the world.

This staff shall exercise control on a temporary or permanent basis, depending on the nature of the measure being carried out, over the compliance by States with their obligations to reduce or eliminate armaments and the production of armaments and to reduce or disband their armed forces.

5. The States parties to the Treaty shall submit to the International Disarmament Organization in good time such information on their armed forces, armaments, military production and military appropriations as is necessary for the purpose of carrying out the measures of the stage concerned.

6. Upon completion of the programme of general and complete disarmament, the International Disarmament Organization shall be kept in being and shall exercise supervision over the fulfilment by States of the obligations they have assumed so as to prevent the re-establishment of the military potential of States in any form whatsoever.

### Article 3

#### Obligations to Maintain International Peace and Security

1. The States parties to the Treaty solemnly confirm their resolve in the course of and after general and complete disarmament:

- (a) to base relations with each other on the principles of peaceful and friendly coexistence and co-operation;
- (b) not to resort to the threat or use of force to settle any international disputes that may arise, but to use for this purpose the procedures provided for in the United Nations Charter;
- (c) to strengthen the United Nations as the principal institution for the maintenance of peace and for the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means.

2. The States parties to the Treaty undertake to refrain from using the contingents of police (militia) remaining at their disposal upon completion of general and complete disarmament for any purpose other than the safeguarding of their internal security or the discharge of their obligations for the maintenance of international peace and security under the United Nations Charter.

## PART II. FIRST STAGE OF GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

### Article 4

#### First Stage Tasks

The States Parties to the Treaty undertake, in the course of the first stage of general and complete disarmament, to effect the simultaneous elimination of all means of delivering nuclear weapons and of all foreign military bases in alien territories, to withdraw all foreign troops from these territories and to reduce their armed forces, their conventional armaments and production of such armaments, and their military expenditure.

### CHAPTER I

#### Elimination of the Means of Delivering Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Military Bases in Alien Territories, and Withdrawal of Foreign Troops from those Territories. Control over such Measures

##### A. Means of Delivery

### Article 5

#### Elimination of Rockets Capable of Delivering Nuclear Weapons

1. All rockets capable of delivering nuclear weapons of any calibre and range, whether strategic, operational or tactical, and pilotless aircraft of all types shall be eliminated from the armed forces and destroyed, except for an agreed and strictly limited number of intercontinental missiles, anti-missile missiles and anti-aircraft missiles in the "ground-to-air" category, to be retained by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, exclusively in their own territory, until the end of the second stage. A strictly limited number of rockets to be converted to peaceful uses under the provisions of article 15 of the present Treaty shall also be retained.

All launching pads, silos and platforms for the launching of rockets and pilotless aircraft, other than those required for the missiles to be retained under the provisions of this article, shall be completely demolished. All

instruments for the equipment, launching and guidance of rockets and pilotless aircraft shall be destroyed. All underground depots for such rockets, pilotless aircraft and auxiliary facilities shall be demolished.

2. The production of all kinds of rockets and pilotless aircraft and of the materials and instruments for their equipment, launching and guidance referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall be completely discontinued. All undertakings or workshops thereof engaged in their production shall be dismantled; machine tools and equipment specially and exclusively designed for the production of such items shall be destroyed; the premises of such undertakings as well as general purpose machine tools and equipment shall be converted to peaceful uses. All proving grounds for tests of such rockets and pilotless aircraft shall be demolished.

3. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall verify the implementation of the measures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 above.

4. The production and testing of appropriate rockets for the peaceful exploration of space shall be allowed, provided that the plants producing such rockets, as well as the rockets themselves, will be subject to supervision by the inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization.

## Article 6

### Elimination of Military Aircraft Capable of Delivering Nuclear Weapons

1. All military aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons shall be eliminated from the armed forces and destroyed. Military airfields serving as bases for such aircraft and repair and maintenance facilities and storage premises at such airfields shall be rendered inoperative or converted to peaceful uses. Training establishments for crews of such aircraft shall be closed.

2. The production of all military aircraft referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall be completely discontinued. Undertakings or workshops thereof designed for the production of such military aircraft shall be either dismantled or converted to the production of civil aircraft or other civilian goods.

3. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall verify the implementation of the measures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 above.

## Article 7

### Elimination of All Surface Warships Capable of being Used as Vehicles for Nuclear Weapons, and Submarines

1. All surface warships capable of being used as vehicles for nuclear weapons and submarines of all classes or types shall be eliminated from the armed forces and destroyed. Naval bases and other installations for the maintenance of the above warships and submarines shall be demolished or dismantled and handed over to the merchant marine for peaceful uses.

2. The building of the warships and submarines referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall be completely discontinued. Shipyards and plants, wholly or partly designed for the building of such warships and submarines, shall be dismantled or converted to peaceful production.

3. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall verify the implementation of the measures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 above.

## Article 8

### Elimination of All Artillery Systems Capable of Serving as Means of Delivering Nuclear Weapons

1. All artillery systems capable of serving as means of delivering nuclear weapons shall be eliminated from the armed forces and destroyed. All auxiliary equipment and technical facilities designed for controlling the fire of such artillery systems shall be destroyed. Surface storage premises and transport facilities for such systems shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses. The entire stock of non-nuclear munitions for such artillery systems, whether at the gun site or in depots, shall be completely destroyed. Underground depots for such artillery systems and for the non-nuclear munitions thereof shall be destroyed.

2. The production of the artillery systems referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall be completely discontinued. To this end, all plants or workshops thereof engaged in the production of such systems shall be closed and dismantled. All specialized equipment and machine tools at these plants

and workshops shall be destroyed, the remainder being converted to peaceful uses. The production of non-nuclear munitions for these artillery systems shall be discontinued. Plants and workshops engaged in the production of such munitions shall be completely dismantled and their specialized equipment destroyed.

3. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall verify the implementation of the measures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 above.

### B. Foreign Military Bases and Troops in Alien Territories

#### Article 9

#### Dismantling of Foreign Military Bases

1. Simultaneously with the destruction of the means of delivering nuclear weapons under articles 5-8 of the present Treaty, the States parties to the Treaty which have army, air force or naval bases in foreign territories shall dismantle all such bases, whether principal or reserve bases, as well as all depot bases of any types. All personnel of such bases shall be evacuated to their national territory. All installations and armaments existing at such bases and coming under articles 5-8 of the present Treaty shall be destroyed on the spot. Other armaments shall either be destroyed on the spot in accordance with article 11 of the present Treaty or evacuated to the Territory of the State which owned the base. All installations of a military nature at such bases shall be destroyed. The living quarters and auxiliary installations of foreign bases shall be transferred for civilian use to the States in whose territory they are located.

2. The measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall be fully applicable to military bases which are used by foreign troops but which may legally belong to the State in whose territory they are located. The said measures shall also be implemented with respect to army, air force and naval bases that have been set up under military treaties and agreements for use by other States or groups of States, regardless of whether any foreign troops are present at those bases at the time of the conclusion of the present Treaty.

All previous treaty obligations, decisions of the organs of military blocs and any rights or privileges pertaining to the establishment or use of military



bases in foreign territories shall lapse and may not be renewed. It shall henceforth be prohibited to grant military bases for use by foreign troops and to conclude any bilateral or multilateral treaties and agreements to this end.

3. The legislatures and Governments of the States parties to the present Treaty shall enact legislation and issue regulations to ensure that no military bases to be used by foreign troops are established in their territory. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall verify the implementation of the measures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article.

#### Article 10

##### Withdrawal of Foreign Troops from Alien Territories

1. Simultaneously with the elimination of the means of delivering nuclear weapons under articles 5-8 of the present Treaty, the States parties to the Treaty which have troops or military personnel of any nature in foreign territories shall withdraw all such troops and personnel from such territories. All armaments and all installations of a military nature which are located at points where foreign troops are stationed and which come under articles 5-8 of the present Treaty shall be destroyed on the spot. Other armaments shall either be destroyed on the spot in accordance with article 11 of the present Treaty or evacuated to the territory of the State withdrawing its troops. The living quarters and auxiliary installations previously occupied by such troops or personnel shall be transferred for civilian use to the States in whose territory such troops were stationed.

2. The measures set forth in paragraph 1 of this article shall be fully applicable to foreign civilians employed in the armed forces or engaged in the production of armaments or any other activities serving military purposes in foreign territory.

Such persons shall be recalled to the territory of the State of which they are citizens, and all previous treaty obligations, decisions by organs of military blocs, and any rights or privileges pertaining to their activities shall lapse and may not be renewed. It shall henceforth be prohibited to dispatch foreign troops, military personnel or the above-mentioned civilians to foreign territories.

3. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall verify the withdrawal of troops, the destruction of installations and the transfer of the premises referred to in paragraph 1 of this article. The International Disarmament Organization shall also have the right to exercise control over the recall of the civilians referred to in paragraph 2 of this article. The laws and regulations referred to in paragraph 3 of article 9 of the present Treaty shall include provisions prohibiting citizens of States parties to the Treaty from serving in the armed forces or from engaging in any other activities serving military purposes in foreign States.

## CHAPTER II

### Reduction of Armed Forces, Conventional Armaments and Military Expenditure Control over such Measures

#### Article II

#### Reduction of Armed Forces and Conventional Armaments

1. In the first stage of general and complete disarmament the armed forces of the States parties to the Treaty shall be reduced to the following levels:

The United States of America - 1,900,000 enlisted men, officers and civilian employees;

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics - 1,900,000 enlisted men, officers and civilian employees.

.....  
(Agreed force levels for other States parties to the Treaty shall be included in this article.)

2. The reduction of the armed forces shall be carried out in the first place through the demobilization of personnel released as a result of the elimination of the means of delivering nuclear weapons, the dismantling of foreign bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from alien territories, as provided for in articles 5-10 of the present Treaty, but chiefly through the complete disbandment of units and ships' crews, their officers and enlisted men being demobilized.

3. Conventional armaments, military equipment, munitions, means of transportation and auxiliary equipment in units and depots shall be reduced by

30 per cent for each type of all categories of these armaments. The reduced armaments, military equipment and munitions shall be destroyed, and the means of transportation and auxiliary equipment shall be either destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.

All living quarters, depots and special premises previously occupied by units being disbanded, as well as the territories of all proving grounds, firing ranges and drill grounds belonging to such units, shall be transferred for peaceful uses to the civilian authorities.

4. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control at places where troops are being disbanded and released conventional armaments and military equipment are being destroyed, and shall also verify the conversion to peaceful uses of means of transportation and other non-combat equipment, premises, proving grounds, etc.

## Article 12

### Reduction of Conventional Armaments Production

1. The production of conventional armaments and munitions not coming under articles 5-8 of the present Treaty shall be reduced proportionately to the reduction of armed forces provided for in article 11 of the present Treaty. Such reduction shall be carried out primarily through the elimination of undertakings engaged exclusively in the production of such armaments and munitions. These undertakings shall be dismantled, their specialized machine tools and equipment shall be destroyed, and their premises, and general purpose machine tools and equipment shall be converted to peaceful uses.

2. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control over the measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this article.

## Article 13

### Reduction of Military Expenditure

1. The States parties to the present Treaty shall reduce their military budgets and appropriations for military purposes proportionately to the destruction of the means of delivering nuclear weapons and the discontinuance of

their production, to the dismantling of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from alien territories as well as to the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments and to the reduction of the production of such armaments, as provided for in articles 5-12 of the present Treaty.

The funds released through the implementation of the first-stage measures shall be used for peaceful purposes, including the reduction of taxes on the population and the subsidizing of the national economy. A certain portion of the funds thus released shall also be used for the provision of economic and technical assistance to under-developed countries. The size of this portion shall be subject to agreement between the parties to the Treaty.

2. The International Disarmament Organization shall verify the implementation of the measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this article through its financial inspectors, to whom the States parties to the Treaty undertake to grant unimpeded access to the records of central financial institutions concerning the reduction in their budgetary appropriations resulting from the elimination of the means of delivering nuclear weapons, the dismantling of foreign military bases and the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments, and to the relevant decisions of their legislative and executive bodies.

### CHAPTER III

#### Measures to Safeguard the Security of States

##### Article 14

#### Restrictions on the Movement of Means of Delivering Nuclear Weapons

1. From the beginning of the first stage until the final destruction of all means of delivering nuclear weapons in accordance with articles 5-8 of the present Treaty, it shall be prohibited for any special devices capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction beyond the limits of their national territory to be placed in orbit or stationed in outer space, for warships to leave their territorial waters and for military aircraft capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction to fly to.

2. The International Disarmament Organizations shall exercise control over compliance by the States parties to the Treaty with the provisions of paragraph 1 of this article. The States parties to the Treaty shall provide the International Disarmament Organization with advance information on all launchings of rockets for peaceful purposes provided for in article 15 of the present Treaty, as well as on all movements of military aircraft within their national frontiers and of warships within their territorial waters.

#### Article 15

##### Control over Launchings of Rockets for Peaceful Purposes

1. The launching of rockets and space devices shall be carried out exclusively for peaceful purposes.
2. The International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control over the implementation of the provisions of paragraph 1 of this article through the establishment, at the sites for peaceful rocket launchings of inspection teams, which shall be present at the launchings and shall thoroughly examine every rocket or satellite before its launching.

#### Article 16

##### Prevention of the Further Spread of Nuclear Weapons

The States parties to the Treaty which possess nuclear weapons undertake to refrain from transferring control over nuclear weapons and from transmitting information necessary for their production to States not possessing such weapons. The States parties to the Treaty not possessing nuclear weapons undertake to refrain from producing or otherwise obtaining nuclear weapons and shall refuse to admit the nuclear weapons of any other State into their territories.

#### Article 17

##### Prohibition of Nuclear Tests

The conducting of nuclear tests of any kind shall be prohibited (if such a prohibition has not come into effect under other international agreements by the time this Treaty is signed).

Article 17a

Measures to reduce the danger of outbreak of war

1. From the commencement of the first stage large-scale joint military movements or manoeuvres by armed forces of two or more States shall be prohibited.

The States parties to the Treaty agree to give advance notification of large-scale military movements or manoeuvres by their national armed forces within their national frontiers.

2. The States parties to the Treaty shall exchange military missions between States or groups of States for the purpose of improving relations and mutual understanding between them.

3. The States parties to the Treaty agree to establish swift and reliable communication between their Heads of Government and with the Secretary General of the United Nations.

4. The measures set forth in this article shall remain in effect after the first stage until the completion of general and complete disarmament.

Article 18

Measures to Strengthen the Capacity of the  
United Nations to maintain International  
Peace and Security

1. With a view to ensuring that the United Nations is capable of effectively protecting States against threats to or breaches of the peace, all States parties to the Treaty shall, between the signing of the Treaty and its entry into force, conclude agreements with the Security Council by which they undertake to make available to the latter armed forces, assistance and facilities, including rights of passage, as provided in Article 43 of the United Nations Charter.

2. The armed forces specified in the said agreements shall form part of the national armed forces of the States concerned and shall be stationed within their territories. They shall be kept up to full strength and shall be fully equipped and prepared for combat. When used under Article 42 of the United Nations Charter, these forces, serving under the command of the military authorities of the States concerned, shall be placed at the disposal of the Security Council.

#### CHAPTER IV

##### Time-limits for First-Stage Measures Transition from the First to the Second Stage

###### Article 19

##### Time-limits for First Stage Measures

1. The first stage of general and complete disarmament shall be initiated six months after the Treaty comes into force (in accordance with article 46), within which period the International Disarmament Organization shall be set up.
- 2. The duration of the first stage of general and complete disarmament shall be 18 months.

###### Article 20

##### Transition from the First to the Second Stage

In the course of the last 3 months of the first stage the International Disarmament Organization shall review the implementation of the first-stage measures of general and complete disarmament with a view to submitting a report on the matter to the States parties to the Treaty as well as to the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations.

#### PART III. SECOND STAGE OF GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

###### Article 21

##### Second Stage Tasks

The States parties to the Treaty shall undertake, in the course of the second stage of general and complete disarmament, to effect the complete elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, to conclude the destruction of all military rockets capable of delivering nuclear weapons which were retained by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America after the implementation of the first stage, and to make a further reduction in their armed forces, conventional armaments and production of such armaments, and military expenditure.

## CHAPTER V

Elimination of Nuclear, Chemical, Biological  
and Radiological Weapons. Control over such  
Measures

## Article 22

Elimination of Nuclear Weapons

1. (a) Nuclear weapons of all kinds, types and capacities shall be eliminated from the armed forces and destroyed. Fissionable materials extracted from such weapons, whether directly attached to units or stored in various depots, shall be appropriately processed to render them unfit for direct reconstitution into weapons and shall form a special stock for peaceful uses, belonging to the State which previously owned the nuclear weapons. Non-nuclear components of such weapons shall be completely destroyed.

All depots and special storage spaces for nuclear weapons shall be demolished.

(b) All stockpiles of nuclear materials intended for the production of nuclear weapons shall be appropriately processed to render them unfit for direct use in nuclear weapons and shall be transferred to the above-mentioned special stocks.

(c) Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall verify the implementation of the measures to eliminate nuclear weapons referred to above in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph.

2. (a) The production of nuclear weapons and of fissionable materials for weapons purposes shall be completely discontinued. All plants, installations and laboratories specially designed for the production of nuclear weapons or their components shall be eliminated or converted to production for peaceful purposes. All workshops, installations and laboratories for the production of the components of nuclear weapons at plants that are partially engaged in the production of such weapons shall be destroyed or converted to production for peaceful purposes.



(b) The measures for the discontinuance of the production of nuclear weapons and of fissionable materials for weapons purposes referred to in sub-paragraph (a) above shall be implemented under the control of inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization.

The International Disarmament Organization shall have the right to inspect all undertakings which extract raw materials for atomic production or which produce or use fissionable materials or atomic energy.

The States parties to the Treaty shall make available to the International Disarmament Organization documents pertaining to the extraction and processing of nuclear raw materials and to their utilization for military or peaceful purposes.

3. Each State party to the Treaty shall, in accordance with its constitutional procedures, enact legislation completely prohibiting nuclear weapons and making any attempt by individuals or organizations to reconstitute such weapons a criminal offence.

### Article 23

#### Elimination of Chemical, Biological and Radiological Weapons

1. All types of chemical, biological and radiological weapons, whether directly attached to units or stored in various depots and storage places, shall be eliminated from the arsenals of States and destroyed (neutralized). All instruments and facilities for the combat use of such weapons, all special facilities for their transportation, and all special devices and facilities for their storage and conservation shall simultaneously be destroyed.

2. The production of all types of chemical, biological and radiological weapons and of all means and devices for their combat use, transportation and storage shall be completely discontinued. All plants, installations and laboratories that are wholly or partly engaged in the production of such weapons shall be destroyed or converted to production for peaceful purposes.

3. The measures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 above shall be implemented under the control of inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization.

CHAPTER V A

The Destruction of Rockets Capable of  
Delivering Nuclear Weapons which were  
Retained after the First Stage

Article 23A

1. All intercontinental missiles, anti-missile missiles and anti-aircraft missiles in the "ground-to-air" category retained by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America under paragraph 1 of article 5 shall be destroyed. together with their launching installations and guidance systems.
2. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall verify the implementation of the measures referred to in paragraph 1 above.

CHAPTER VI

Further Reduction of Armed Forces, Conventional  
Armaments and Military Expenditures, Control over  
such Measures

Article 24

Further Reduction of Armed Forces and Conventional  
Armaments

1. In the second stage of general and complete disarmament the armed forces of the States parties to the Treaty shall be further reduced to the following levels:

The United States of America	-	One million enlisted men, officers and civilian employees;
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	-	One million enlisted men, officers and civilian employees.

.....  
(Agreed force levels for other States parties to the Treaty shall be included in this article).

The reduction of the armed forces shall be carried out in the first place through the demobilization of personnel previously manning the nuclear or other weapons subject to elimination under articles 22 and 23 of the present Treaty, but chiefly through the complete disbandment of units and ships' crews, their officers and enlisted men being demobilized.

2. Conventional armaments, military equipment, munitions, means of transportation and auxiliary equipment in units and depots shall be reduced by 35 from the original levels for each type of all categories of these armaments. The reduced armaments, military equipment and munitions shall be destroyed, and the means of transportation and auxiliary equipment shall be either destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.

All living quarters, depots and special premises previously occupied by units being disbanded, as well as the territories of all proving grounds, firing ranges and drill grounds belonging to such units shall be transferred for peaceful uses to the civilian authorities.

3. As in the implementation of such measures in the first stage of general and complete disarmament, inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control at places where troops are being disbanded and released conventional armaments and military equipment are being destroyed, and shall also verify the conversion to peaceful uses of means of transportation and other non-combat equipment, premises, proving grounds, etc.

## Article 25

### Further Reduction of Conventional Armaments Production

1. The production of conventional armaments and munitions shall be reduced proportionately to the reduction of armed forces provided for in article 24 of the present Treaty. Such reduction shall, as in the first stage of general and complete disarmament, be carried out primarily through the elimination of undertakings engaged exclusively in the production of such armaments and munitions. These undertakings shall be dismantled, their specialized machine tools and equipment shall be destroyed, and their premises and general purpose machine tools and equipment shall be converted to peaceful uses.

2. The measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall be carried out under the control of inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization.

## Article 26

### Further Reduction of Military Expenditure

1. The States parties to the Treaty shall further reduce their military budgets and appropriations for military purposes proportionately to the destruction of nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological weapons and the discontinuance of the production of such weapons as well as to the further reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments and the reduction of the production of such armaments, as provided for in articles 22-25 of the present Treaty.

The funds released through the implementation of the second-stage measures shall be used for peaceful purposes, including the reduction of taxes on the population and the subsidizing of the national economy. A certain portion of the funds thus released shall also be used for the provision of economic and technical assistance to under-developed countries. The size of this portion shall be subject to agreement between the parties to the Treaty.

2. Control over the measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall be exercised in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 of article 13 of the present Treaty. Financial inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall also be granted unimpeded access to records concerning the reduction in the budgetary appropriations of States resulting from the elimination of nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological weapons.

## CHAPTER VII

### Measures to Safeguard the Security of States

## Article 27

### Continued Strengthening of the Capacity of the United Nations to Maintain International Peace and Security

The States parties to the Treaty shall continue to implement the measures referred to in article 18 of the present Treaty regarding the placing of armed forces at the disposal of the Security Council for use under Article 42 of the United Nations Charter.

## CHAPTER VIII

### Time-limits for Second-Stage Measures Transition from the Second to the Third Stage

#### Article 28

#### Time-limits for Second-Stage Measures

The duration of the second stage of general and complete disarmament shall be twenty-four months.

#### Article 29

#### Transition from the Second to the Third Stage

In the course of the last three months of the second stage the International Disarmament Organization shall review the implementation of this stage.

Measures for the transition from the second to the third stage of general and complete disarmament shall be similar to the corresponding measures for the first stage, as laid down in article 20 of the present Treaty.

## PART IV. THIRD STAGE OF GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

#### Article 30

#### Third Stage Tasks

The States parties to the Treaty undertake, in the course of the third stage of general and complete disarmament, fully to disband all their armed forces and thereby to complete the elimination of the military machinery of States.

## CHAPTER IX

### Completion of the Elimination of the Military Machinery of States

#### Control over such Measures

#### Article 31

### Completion of the Elimination of Armed Forces and Conventional Armaments

1. With a view to completing the process of the elimination of armed forces, the States parties to the Treaty shall disband the entire personnel of the armed forces which remained at their disposal after the accomplishment of the first two stages of disarmament. The system of military reserves of each State party to the Treaty shall be completely abolished.

2. The State parties to the Treaty shall destroy all types of armaments, military equipment and munitions, whether held by the troops or in depots, that remained at their disposal after the accomplishment of the first two stages of the Treaty. All military equipment which cannot be converted to peaceful uses shall be destroyed.

3. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control over the disbanding of troops and over the destruction of armaments and military equipment, and shall control the conversion to peaceful uses of transport and other non-combat equipment, premises, proving grounds, etc.

The International Disarmament Organization shall have access to documents pertaining to the disbanding of all personnel of the armed forces of the States parties to the Treaty.

#### Article 32

### Complete Cessation of Military Production

1. Military production at factories and plants shall be discontinued, with the exception of the production of agreed types and quantities of light firearms for the purposes referred to in article 36, paragraph 2, of the present Treaty. The factories and plants subject to elimination shall be dismantled, their specialized machine tools and equipment shall be destroyed, and the premises,

general purpose machine tools and equipment shall be converted to peaceful uses. All scientific research in the military field at all scientific and research institutions and at designing offices shall be discontinued. All blueprints and other documents necessary for the production of the weapons and military equipment subject to elimination shall be destroyed.

All orders placed by military departments with national or foreign government undertakings and private firms for the production of armaments, military equipment, munitions and material shall be cancelled.

2. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control over the measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this article.

### Article 33

#### Abolition of Military Establishments

1. War ministries, general staffs and all other military and para-military organizations and institutions for the purpose of organizing the military effort of States parties to the Treaty shall be abolished. The States parties to the Treaty shall:

- (a) demobilize all personnel of these institutions and organizations;
- (b) abrogate all laws, rules and regulations governing the organization of the military effort and the status, structure and activities of such institutions and organizations;
- (c) destroy all documents pertaining to the planning of the mobilization and operational deployment of the armed forces in time of war.

2. The entire process of the abolition of military and para-military institutions and organizations shall be carried out under the control of inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization.

### Article 34

#### Abolition of Military Conscription and Military Training

In accordance with their respective constitutional procedures, the States parties to the Treaty shall enact legislation prohibiting all military training, abolishing military conscription and all other forms of recruiting the armed

forces, and discontinuing all military courses for reservists. All establishments and organizations dealing with military training shall simultaneously be disbanded in accordance with article 33 of the present Treaty. The disbanding of all military training institutions and organizations shall be carried out under the control of inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization.

## Article 35

### Prohibition of the Appropriation of Funds for Military Purposes

1. The appropriation of funds for military purposes in any form, whether by government bodies or private individuals and social organizations, shall be discontinued.

The funds released through the implementation of general and complete disarmament shall be used for peaceful purposes, including the reduction or complete abolition of taxes on the population and the subsidizing of the national economy. A certain portion of the funds thus released shall also be used for the provision of economic and technical assistance to under-developed countries. The size of this portion shall be subject to agreement between the parties to the Treaty.

2. For the purpose of organizing control over the implementation of the provisions of this article, the International Disarmament Organization shall have the right of access to the legislative and budgetary documents of the States parties to the present Treaty

## CHAPTER X

### Measures to Safeguard the Security of States and to Maintain International Peace

## Article 36

### Contingents of Police (Militia)

1. After the complete abolition of armed forces, the States parties to the Treaty shall be entitled to have strictly limited contingents of police (militia), equipped with light firearms, to maintain internal order, including the



safeguarding of frontiers and the personal security of citizens, and to provide for compliance with their obligations in regard to the maintenance of international peace and security under the United Nations Charter.

The strength of these contingents of police (militia) for each State party to the Treaty shall be as follows:

.....

.....

2. The States parties to the Treaty shall be allowed to manufacture strictly limited quantities of light firearms intended for such contingents of police (militia). The list of plants producing such arms, the quotas and types for each party to the Treaty shall be specified in a special agreement.

3. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control over compliance by the States parties to the Treaty with their obligations with regard to the restricted production of the said light firearms.

#### Article 37

##### Police (Militia) Units to be made available to the Security Council

1. The States parties to the Treaty undertake to place at the disposal of the Security Council, on its request, units from the contingents of police (militia) retained by them, as well as to provide assistance and facilities, including rights of passage. The placing of such units at the disposal of the Security Council shall be carried out in accordance with the provisions of Article 43 of the United Nations Charter. In order to ensure that urgent military measures may be undertaken, the States parties to the Treaty shall maintain in a state of immediate readiness those units of their police (militia) contingents which are intended for joint international enforcement action. The size of the units which the States parties to the Treaty undertake to place at the disposal of the Security Council as well as the areas where such units are to be stationed shall be specified in agreements to be concluded by those States with the Security Council.

2. The command of the units referred to in paragraph 1 shall be composed of representatives of the three principal groups of States existing in the world on

the basis of equal representation. It shall decide all questions by agreement among its members representing all three groups of States.

## Article 38

### Control over the Prevention of the Re-establishment of Armed Forces

1. The police (militia) contingents retained by the States parties to the Treaty after the completion of general and complete disarmament shall be under the control of the International Disarmament Organization, which shall verify the reports by States concerning the areas where such contingents are stationed, concerning the strength and armaments of the contingents in each such area, and concerning all movements of substantial contingents of police (militia).

2. For the purpose of ensuring that armed forces and armaments abolished as a result of general and complete disarmament are not re-established, the International Disarmament Organization shall have the right of access at any time to any point within the territory of each State party to the Treaty.

3. The International Disarmament Organization shall have the right to institute a system of aerial inspection and aerial photography over the territories of the States parties to the Treaty.

## CHAPTER XI

### Time-limits for Third-Stage Measures

## Article 39

The third stage of general and complete disarmament shall be completed over a period of one year. During the last three months of this stage the International Disarmament Organization shall review the implementation of the third-stage measures of general and complete disarmament with a view to submitting a report on the matter to the States parties to the Treaty as well as to the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations.

PART V. STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL  
DISARMAMENT ORGANIZATION

Article 40

Functions and Main Bodies

The International Disarmament Organization to be set up under, article 2, paragraph 3, of the present Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Organization", shall consist of a Conference of all States parties to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Conference", and a Control Council, hereinafter referred to as the "Council".

The Organization shall deal with questions pertaining to the supervision of compliance by States with their obligations under the present Treaty. All questions connected with the safeguarding of international peace and security which may arise in the course of the implementation of the present Treaty, including preventive and enforcement measures, shall be decided by the Security Council in conformity with its powers under the United Nations Charter.

Article 41

The Conference

1. The Conference shall comprise all States parties to the Treaty. It shall hold regular sessions at least once a year and special sessions, which may be convened by decision of the Council or at the request of a majority of the States parties to the Treaty with a view to considering matters connected with the implementation of effective control over disarmament. The sessions shall be held at the headquarters of the Organization, unless otherwise decided by the Conference.

2. Each State party to the Treaty shall have one vote. Decisions on questions of procedure shall be taken by a simple majority and on all other matters by a two-thirds majority. In accordance with the provisions of the present Treaty, the Conference shall adopt its own rules of procedure.

3. The Conference may discuss any matters pertaining to measures of control over the implementation of general and complete disarmament and may make

recommendations to the States parties to the Treaty and to the Council on any such matter or measure.

4. The Conference shall:

- (a) Elect non-permanent members of the Council;
- (b) Consider the annual, and any special, reports of the Council;
- (c) Approve the budget recommended by the Council;
- (d) Approve reports to be submitted to the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations;
- (e) Approve amendments to the present Treaty in accordance with article 47 of the present Treaty;
- (f) Take decisions on any matter specifically referred to the Conference for this purpose by the Council;
- (g) Propose matters for consideration by the Council and request from the Council reports on any matter relating to the functions of the Council.

#### Article 42

##### The Control Council

1. The Council shall consist of:

- (a) The five States which are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council;
- (b) ... (number) other States parties to the Treaty, elected by the Conference for a period of two years.

The composition of the Council must ensure proper representation of the three principal groups of States existing in the world.

2. The Council shall:

- (a) Provide practical guidance for the measures of control over the implementation of general and complete disarmament; set up such bodies at the headquarters of the Organization as it deems necessary for the discharge of its functions; establish procedures for their operation, and devise the necessary rules and regulations in accordance with the present Treaty;
- (b) Submit to the Conference annual reports and such special reports as it deems necessary to prepare;

(c) Maintain constant contact with the United Nations Security Council as the organ bearing the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security; periodically inform it of the progress achieved in the implementation of general and complete disarmament, and promptly notify it of any infringements by the States parties to the Treaty of their disarmament obligations under the present Treaty;

(d) Review the implementation of the measures included in each stage of general and complete disarmament with a view to submitting a report on the matter to the States parties to the Treaty and to the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations;

(e) Recruit the staff of the Organization on an international basis so as to ensure that the three principal groups of States existing in the world are adequately represented. The personnel of the Organization shall be recruited from among persons who are recommended by Governments and who may or may not be citizens of the country of the recommending Government;

(f) Prepare and submit to the Conference the annual budget estimates for the expenses of the Organization;

(g) Draw up instructions by which the various control bodies are to be guided in their work;

(h) Make a prompt study of incoming reports;

(i) Request from States such information on their armed forces and armaments as may be necessary for control over the implementation of the disarmament measures provided for by the present Treaty;

(j) Perform such other functions as are envisaged in the present Treaty.

3. Each member of the Council shall have one vote. Decisions of the Council on procedural matters shall be taken by a simple majority, and on other matters by a two-thirds majority.

4. The Council shall be so organized as to be able to function continuously. The Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure and shall be authorized to establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.

Article 43

Privileges and Immunities

The Organization, its personnel and representatives of the States parties to the Treaty shall enjoy in the territory of each State party to the Treaty such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the exercise of independent and unrestricted control over the implementation of the present Treaty.

Article 44

Finances

1. All the expenses of the Organization shall be financed from the funds allocated by the States parties to the Treaty. The budget of the Organization shall be drawn up by the Council and approved by the Conference in accordance with article 41, paragraph 4 (c), and article 42, paragraph 2(f), of the present Treaty.

2. The States parties to the Treaty shall contribute funds to cover the expenditure of the Organization according to the following scale: .....  
.....  
(The agreed scale of contributions shall be included in the present article.)

Article 45

Preparatory Commission

Immediately after the signing of the present Treaty, the States represented in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee shall set up a Preparatory Commission for the purpose of taking practical steps to establish the International Disarmament Organization.

## PART VI. FINAL CLAUSES

### Article 46

#### Ratification and Entry into Force

The present Treaty shall be subject to ratification by the Signatory States in accordance with their constitutional procedures within a period of six months from the date of its signature, and shall come into force upon the deposit of instruments of ratification with the United Nations Secretariat by all the States which are permanent members of the Security Council, as well as by those States that are their allies in bilateral and multilateral military alliances, and by ..... (number) non-aligned States.

### Article 47

#### Amendments

Any proposal to amend the text of the present Treaty shall come into force after it has been adopted by a two-thirds majority at a conference of all States parties to the Treaty and has been ratified by the States referred to in article 46 of the present Treaty in accordance with their constitutional procedures.

### Article 48

#### Authentic Texts

The present Treaty, done in the Russian, English, French, Chinese and Spanish languages, all texts being equally authentic, shall be deposited with the United Nations Secretariat, which shall transmit certified copies thereof to all the Signatory States.

In witness whereof, the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed the present Treaty.

Done at .....

# INFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/2/Rev.1/Corr.1

20 December 1962

ENGLISH only

## UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

### correction to the document:

### Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control

On page 12, replace the last paragraph by the following:

#### CHAPTER III

#### Measures to Safeguard the Security of States

##### Article 14

##### Restriction of Displacements of the Means of Delivering Nuclear Weapons

1. From the very beginning of the first-stage and until the final destruction of all means of delivering nuclear weapons under Articles 5-8 of the present Treaty, the placing into orbit or stationing in outer space of any special devices capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, the leaving of their territorial waters by warships, and the flying beyond the limits of their national territory by military aircraft capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction, shall be prohibited.



# CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

## UNITED STATES

### U.S. Draft of treaty on general and complete disarmament

#### ARTICLE V

##### 1. Reduction of Armaments.

a. Each of the following Parties: (BLANK)  
agrees to reduce its armaments in Stage I in accordance with the provisions of this Article.

b. Each Party named in paragraph 1 of this Article, with the exceptions provided in the Annex on Stage I Armaments Reductions, shall reduce the number of its armaments in each of the types listed in that Annex by not less than 30 per cent of the number of such armaments existing at the beginning of Stage I.

c. Each Party named in paragraph 1 of this Article agrees not to retain at the end of Stage I any armaments of the types listed in the Annex on Stage I Armaments Reductions in excess of the number of such armaments existing at the beginning of Stage I less the number of such armaments required to be reduced in Stage I by such Party under this Article.

##### 2. Method of Reduction

a. Each Party to this treaty shall submit to the International Disarmament Organization, within            days after the beginning of Stage I, a declaration setting forth inventories of the numbers of its armaments, existing at the beginning of Stage I, in each type listed in the Annex on Stage I Armaments Reductions. The form of such declaration shall be in accordance with the requirements set forth in that Annex.

b. The reductions of armaments required by this Article shall be accomplished in three consecutive steps, each consisting of one year. Each Party named in paragraph 1 of this Article shall reduce

(i) by the end of the first step the number of its armaments in each type by not less than one-third of the number of such armaments required to be reduced by such Party in Stage I, and

(ii) by the end of the second step the number of its armaments in each type by not less than two-thirds of the number of such armaments required to be reduced by such Party in Stage I.

By the end of the third step, each Party named in paragraph 1 of this Article shall complete the reductions of armaments it is required to make in Stage I.

c. Each step shall be divided into two consecutive parts, each consisting of six months. In the first part of each step, each Party named in paragraph 1 of this Article shall deposit the armaments which it is required to reduce in that step in depots under the supervision of the International Disarmament Organization. During the second part of each step, the deposited armaments shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses under the supervision of the International Disarmament Organization.

d. The number, location, establishment and operation of depots, and the destruction or conversion to peaceful uses of armaments, shall be in accordance with the provisions of the Annex on Stage I Armaments Reductions and with rules adopted by the Control Council of the International Disarmament Organization in accordance with Article

### 3. Limitations on Production and Testing of Armaments.

a. Each Party to this Treaty shall limit its production of armaments of the types listed in the Annex on Stage I Armaments Reductions in accordance with the table of production allowances contained in that Annex. For each armament produced during Stage I, an existing armament of the same type as that produced, in addition to the armaments required to be reduced in the absence of production, shall be deposited in a depot under the supervision of the International Disarmament Organization and disposed of in accordance with paragraph 2c of this Article, so that the reductions required in Stage I may be achieved and so that no Party may, after the beginning of Stage I, increase the number of its armaments in any type listed in the Annex on Stage I Armaments Reductions.

b. Each Party to this Treaty shall, from the beginning of Stage I, limit its production of parts and assemblies usable in any type of armament listed in the Annex on Stage I Armaments Reductions in accordance with the provisions of that Annex.

c. No Party shall, after the beginning of Stage I, expand its facilities for the production of any type of armament listed in the Annex on Stage I Armaments Reductions, or construct or equip facilities for the production of any type of armament which it has not produced prior to the beginning of Stage I.

d. No Party shall, from the beginning of Stage I, test or produce any type of armament which it has not tested and produced prior to the beginning of Stage I.

e. Each Party to this Treaty shall, after the beginning of Stage I, limit flight testing of missiles in accordance with the table in the Annex on Stage I Armaments Reductions.

#### 4. Verification.

The obligations set forth in this Article shall be verified by the International Disarmament Organization in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty and the Annex on Verification.

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
DISARMAMENT

ENDC/70  
12 December 1962  
Original: ENGLISH

UNITED STATES

Working Paper on reduction of the risk  
of war through accident, miscalculation,  
or failure of communication

THE PROBLEM

The technology and techniques of modern warfare are such that much reliance is inevitably placed on the ability to respond rapidly and effectively to hostile military action. Events which may occur in connexion with the efforts of one state to maintain its readiness to respond to such action may, in varying degrees and with varying consequences, be misconstrued by another. The initiating state may have underestimated the ambiguity of such events and may have miscalculated the response they would call forth. The observing state may misinterpret them and feel compelled to act.

Non-belligerent steps of a precautionary character taken by one state may be viewed by another as being provocative at best and, at worst, as presaging or constituting the initiation of hostilities. Accidents can occur and may be considered deliberate acts. Unauthorized acts may appear to reveal hostile purpose, and fault may be incorrectly assigned.

Particularly where such actions and events may occur against the background of an already existing crisis in the relations of the states concerned, erroneous assessments may dictate a rapid and disproportionate response. As a consequence, sudden and unexplained changes in the military situation may increase the risk of the outbreak of war.

The United States has been keenly aware of this problem and has taken positive measures to reduce the risk of the outbreak of war insofar as its own armaments and armed forces are concerned. On a continuing basis, the United States seeks to accomplish such objectives as the following:

1. To incorporate special safety features into the design of weapons in order to preclude an accidental nuclear explosion.
2. To develop types of weapons systems and to design techniques for their employment calculated to increase the feasibility of deferring a military response until confirmatory evidence has been received and evaluated.

3. To exercise effective command and control over the choice of military response and to maintain procedures and arrangements for limiting any possibility of unauthorized use of weapons.

The United States regards its approach to these matters as a useful contribution to reduction of the risk of the outbreak of war. However, the United States recognizes that there are limits to the effectiveness of measures which any state may undertake alone. In any case, the problem, which exists in respect of non-nuclear as well as nuclear armaments, is of concern to many states. It will continue to exist as long as armaments and armed forces, whether nuclear or conventional, remain at the disposal of states separated by immediate differences of historical grievances.

These considerations offer compelling reasons for seeking to curtail the arms race and to achieve disarmament in a peaceful world. They also call attention to the need for reaching agreement on the early implementation of limited measures designed to reduce the risk of the outbreak of war through accident, miscalculation, or failure of communication.

#### GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

The "Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World", presented by the United States to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, April 18 1962, proposes measures concerning advance notification of major military movements and manoeuvres, conduct of confirmatory and supplementary observations, improvement of means of continuing consultation on military matters and of communication in time of military emergencies, and establishment of arrangements for examination of possible additional steps. The common purpose of such measures is to reduce the risk of the outbreak of war through accident, miscalculation, or failure of communication. Depending on their exact character, these measures could lessen the hazard that sudden changes in the military situation might inadvertently be misconstrued as representing the mounting of an attack.

In the context of a disarmament programme, these measures would contribute importantly to the building of confidence and also to prevention of possible disruption of the disarmament process. They can also be placed in operation prior to the implementation of a disarmament programme and might help bring about conditions under which such a programme might more readily be achieved.

There may, of course, be differences in the character of measures suitable in the context of a disarmament programme and the character of those which might be acceptable in advance of such a programme; that is to say, certain measures might be undertaken on a more extensive scale during disarmament than prior to its initiation. However, although most of the measures must be regarded as experimental in character and too much should not be asked of those measures which may be considered appropriate for early implementation, they can effect useful and significant advances in the capabilities of states to provide mutual reassurance.

The measures proposed by the United States can be undertaken either as a group, in which case each would serve to reinforce the effectiveness of the others, or specific measures can be undertaken separately. A beginning can be made with as much or as little as may be agreed at any particular time, and as experience is gained through co-operative implementation of early agreements, the initial measures can be modified or expanded, and new measures can be added.

Taken as a whole or considered separately, the measures suggested by the United States can have wide applicability to the relations of a number of states or groups of states in different geographic areas. Some measures can be undertaken directly between the states concerned; depending on the circumstances, others might be more effective if undertaken by groups of states. It follows that details of procedures and arrangements to implement the measures can best be developed in specific cases by the states or groups of states involved in order to ensure that the measures will be designed to meet their special needs.

In outlining the general character of these measures in the sections below, the United States hopes not only that the measures will commend themselves to states represented in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament but also that other states will recognize their desirability. For its own part, the United States is prepared to work out the details of these measures with other states which may be interested, including the Soviet Union, and where particular measures might be most effective if undertaken by groups of states, the United States is prepared to consult with other members of the groups in which it participates, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and to join them in working out mutually agreeable arrangements.

ADVANCE NOTIFICATION

Purpose. Advance notification of major military movements and manoeuvres could provide additional opportunity for calm appraisal of military activities which might give rise to misinterpretation as threatening the imminent outbreak of hostilities. The ultimate character of such an appraisal would, of course, depend on many considerations in addition to the fact that advance notification had been provided. However, the establishment and use of procedures for advance notification could assist in reducing any hazard that detection of an unannounced activity of seemingly major proportions might induce a rapid and disproportionate military response.

A certain amount of information is currently made available by a number of states. In some instances, such information is necessary to ensure the safety of non-military activities being pursued in the vicinity. Moreover, for its own part, the United States frequently provides advance notification specifically in order to preclude any possibility of misinterpretation. As a general matter, however, the current practices of states vary widely as to content, timing, and procedure, and there arises the question of whether such practices can be expanded, regularized, and more fully utilized. The suggestions of the United States in this regard are outlined below.

Content and timing. Criteria for determining what military activities might be of concern are, in many respects, subjective and dependent on the general situation in which a particular activity may occur, the states or geographic areas involved, and the level of tension at the time. Accordingly, it may be difficult to specify precisely all activities respecting which advance notification might be most useful on a continuing basis, and in a number of instances substantial reliance may of necessity have to be placed on the judgement of the state initiating an activity.

However, if advance notification procedures are to be effective, the states or groups of states concerned would wish to know with reasonable certainty what information could be expected on a continuing basis, and, of equal importance, what types of activities would not be regularly reported. The following types of activities might usefully be explored from the standpoint of their inclusion in advance notification procedures:

1. Movements and manoeuvres by ground forces of considerable strength where such activities may be conducted in the proximity of frontiers.
2. Significant movements and manoeuvres of naval surface forces of substantial size.
3. Co-ordinated flights of sizable numbers of military aircraft where such flights may deviate from routine or well-known patterns or where they may take place in the vicinity of frontiers.
4. Launchings of long-range ballistic missiles where an unusual number of such launchings may be scheduled to occur within a limited period of time.

The foregoing list, which could be more clearly defined in an agreed manner, is intended to suggest the principal types of activities which might be of some concern and in respect of which it might be feasible to establish routine advance notification procedures. However, states should be free to provide advance notification in any additional instances deemed by them to warrant use of such procedures as might be established.

Although the exact amount of detail provided might vary, such matters as the following could reasonably be expected to be covered: the type of activity; the approximate size of the units involved; the beginning and terminal dates of the activity or the period during which it was scheduled to occur; and the locations, areas, or direction of movement involved.

Such information should be provided on a timely basis. As a general matter, notice might be provided as schedules become reasonably firm, with, say, seven days' notice being given where practical in the case of major activities. Notice of changes in initial schedules should be reported as promptly as possible.

Procedures. To ensure authenticity, and to avoid the lack of precision which might result from voice transmission of information, notification could appropriately be made in the form of an official written communication issued by the state or group of states initiating the activity. Such procedures as the following might be considered:

1. Under a bilateral arrangement, a state initiating an activity could provide advance notification directly to the other state concerned. Specific channels could be designated for this purpose in order to ensure that notifications would promptly reach those officials having an interest in them.



2. Where groups of states were concerned, similar procedures could be designed. A question would arise as to whether notice would be given by the military headquarters of one group to that of the other, which would then re-transmit the information to its member states, or whether procedures should be such that both the military headquarters of a group of states and the military headquarters of member states would receive the information simultaneously.

3. A "clearinghouse", established jointly by the states or groups of states entering into a particular arrangement, might receive and disseminate information made available by participants. Since timeliness would be a key consideration, the most direct procedures would seem best suited for the purposes of advance notification. However, the concept of a "clearinghouse" might be examined as a possible supplement to, rather than a replacement for, direct procedures.

#### OBSERVATION POSTS

Purpose. Advance notification constitutes a potentially useful measure undertaken separately or in conjunction with other measures. A closely related measure would, in effect, represent an extension of the advance notification concept through the establishment of systems of ground observation posts at major transportation centers. The posts comprising such systems could receive such information relative to military activities in their vicinity as the host state might wish to provide and could, under agreed arrangements, observe the flow of military traffic and the general level of military activity on a local basis, thereby clarifying reports made pursuant to advance notification procedures.

Not only the capability of supplementing advance notification through direct observation but also the willingness of host states to co-operate in the establishment and operation of observation post systems could contribute further to the building of confidence and the improvement of reassurance in the relations of the states or groups of states concerned.

Elements of systems. It would be impractical (as well as unnecessary from the standpoint of providing general reassurance) to attempt to establish observation posts at all transportation centers. It would be sufficient to place posts at such locations as certain principal ports, major railroad junctions, intersections of key highways, and possibly at certain significant airfields.

The complement of posts might vary as the result of differing conditions in the locations of interest, but relatively limited complements should be adequate. Members of post complements would enjoy such privileges and immunities and would have such travel rights as might be agreed.

Each post would be responsible for observing military movements within an agreed surrounding area. Over-all value of the posts would be enhanced if, on the occasion of military movements through nearby areas, host states would, at their discretion, afford opportunities for observation at the point nearest the post-city. Similarly, it might be useful to be able to conduct occasional visits to transportation centers where no posts were permanently located. In all cases, access would be limited to points appropriate for observation purposes.

To facilitate accomplishment of the missions of observation posts, host states should provide advance notification of movements passing through the post area.

Extent of geographic coverage. The potential usefulness of systems of observation posts is not confined to particular states or areas. In the broadest sense, such systems would be useful wherever significant military activities take place. The geographic coverage of particular systems, however, would, as a practical matter, be designed to reflect military relationship in a realistic manner.

Where neighbouring states might undertake to provide mutual reassurance through establishment of a system of observation posts, it is not unlikely that transportation centers near frontiers would offer suitable locations. Where groups of states might wish to undertake such a measure, appreciation of military realities would seem to make desirable the establishment of posts in each of the participating states since observation of areas from which forces might be projected would be of importance in addition to observation of more central locations.

### ADDITIONAL OBSERVATION ARRANGEMENTS

Purpose. The establishment of systems of ground observation posts in fixed locations would represent a major improvement in existing conditions. However, it is apparent that the capabilities of such posts would be limited. Accordingly, it would seem useful to consider whether mutually acceptable arrangements for additional types of observation could be developed either to supplement systems of ground observation posts or as separate measures. As a general matter such arrangements could be useful either on an ad hoc or continuing basis and could provide highly effective and flexible means of rapidly identifying and clarifying military activities and events.

Elements of systems. Any and all of such observation techniques as the following offer substantial promise:

1. Aerial observation.
2. Mobile ground observation teams.
3. Over-lapping radars.

Each of these techniques offers a different approach to resolving the same problem: that of lessening the possibility of unexpected confrontations of military power and thereby lessening the risk of the outbreak of war. The details of arrangements for employing such techniques would be on an agreed basis and of a character designed to give equal assurance to all participating states.

Extent of geographic coverage. Where states or groups of states wished to employ techniques such as the foregoing, agreement would have to be reached on the geographic areas involved. Such areas might be identical for all techniques although this need not necessarily be the case. The problem can be approached on a pragmatic basis with due regard to the relationships of the states or groups of states concerned.

### EXCHANGE OF MILITARY MISSIONS

Purpose. The problem of reducing the risk of the outbreak of war does not, of course, arise simply from the unexpected character of certain military activities or lack of factual knowledge concerning them. In the first place, the state initiating an activity may have miscalculated the response that might be occasioned on the part of another state. In the second place, a state which

views a particular activity with concern may be misinterpreting its true character. In both cases, each of the states involved will proceed not only on the basis of such factual information as may be available but also in the light of its own past experience, its assessment of over-all military relationships, and its military as well as political evaluation of the intentions of the other state.

Even with adequate factual information, there is no way of ensuring that these broader factors which govern calculations and interpretations will prove accurate guides in a specific situation. However, it appears reasonable to suppose that such factors may be more clearly accurate, or less so, to the extent that they are formed on the basis of extensive or narrow contacts between the states or groups of states involved. In this regard, it may be of some significance that direct contacts between the military establishments of many states and groups of states, are, generally speaking, relatively narrow. The exchange of military missions suggests itself as a possible approach to this aspect of the problem.

General character of exchanges. The exchange of military missions is conceived as taking place between the central military headquarters of states or groups of states. Each mission would be headed by an officer of high rank. A number of additional officers, possibly of specialized competence, and the necessary supporting personnel would complete the mission. Members of the mission would be fully accredited and would enjoy such privileges and immunities and would have such travel rights as might be agreed.

Within the framework of the agreed arrangements, the mission would carry out formal and continuing liaison with the military headquarters of the host state or group. Functions of the mission might include such activities as the following:

1. Receipt of such information or views on military matters as the host state or group might wish to make available.
2. Observation of such specific military activities or events as the host state or group, at its discretion or under agreed arrangements, might make accessible.
3. Consultation on military matters of common concern.

4. Participation, upon request, in efforts to clarify ambiguous situations where lack of authentic information might prove disquieting either to the host or the sponsoring state or group.

5. Reporting of the foregoing to the sponsoring state or group and representation of its views on military matters in contacts with the host headquarters.

Although the foregoing functions are of considerable importance, it would be hoped that in practice the opportunity for continuing contact between competent and responsible military officials would itself prove to be of substantial value to those involved and to the states or groups they would represent.

#### COMMUNICATIONS ON MILITARY EMERGENCIES

Purpose. Although extensive technical means of communication are available today, there is a question as to whether existing arrangements for communications between states would prove sufficiently rapid and reliable in time of a military emergency or crisis. If there is to be assurance that means of communication will be available when needed, steps must be taken in advance, and it would appear to be a reasonable precaution to place in effect between particular states special arrangements which could ensure the availability of prompt, dependable, and direct communications. Awareness of the availability of such communications links could itself prove reassuring, and should the need to use them arise, they could be employed with a minimum of the uncertainty that is characteristic of periods of tension.

Principal elements. In considering the establishment of special communications links, it would be necessary for the states concerned to reach agreement on a number of matters.

1. In view of the essentially experimental and untested character of such arrangements, it would not appear necessary or desirable to attempt to specify in advance all types of situations in which a special communications link might be utilized. However, there should be a common understanding of the general purpose of the link and of the broad circumstances under which it might be most useful. In the view of the United States, such a link should, as a general matter, be reserved for emergency use; that is to say, for example,

that it might be reserved for communications concerning a sudden change in the military situation or the emergence of a military crisis which might appear directly to threaten the security of either of the states involved and where such developments were taking place at a rate which appeared to preclude the use of normal consultative procedures. Effectiveness of the link should not be degraded through use for other matters.

2. Specific technical means should be determined in the light of the geographic locations and types of equipment available to the states concerned. The primary criteria would be that technical arrangements be effective on a continuing basis and that they be as rapid as practical. Ordinary voice telephone represents one possibility, and radio might also be considered although until communications satellites become available on an operational basis, radio might not prove sufficiently reliable. In both these cases, however, there would seem to be some possibility of inadvertent error either through lack of precision in reception or through incorrect translation. Considering all aspects of the problem, the use of teletype systems might, on balance, prove preferable. It should be noted that a line reserved for transmission of messages by teletype could have a dual capability and be used for voice communication as well should that prove desirable.

3. Each state would be responsible for arrangements within its own territory, would determine the terminal (or originating) point of the link, insofar as its end of the circuit was concerned, and would make such arrangements as might be needed to effect internal distribution of messages to appropriate government officials. In the case of the United States, it might be practical for the link to originate (or terminate) in the national command center, which maintains continuing contact with principal government officials, including the President. Such a location would also permit relevant data and experience in military matters to be brought rapidly to bear. The route for connecting the two end points of a particular link would, of course, have to be agreed.

4. Adequate arrangements would be made by each state for continuous manning of the link and for acting on messages which might be received. Periodic joint tests or checks of the link could be undertaken.

5. No exchange of personnel would be involved. However, if military missions were exchanged concurrently with the establishment of a direct communications link, such missions would be available for consultation should that prove desirable in connection with matters requiring use of the link.

Although the foregoing arrangements would be undertaken directly between the states concerned, such states might, at their discretion, wish to notify the Secretary General of the United Nations of the circumstances involved in a military situation of a character warranting emergency use of the link.

#### OTHER AREAS OF POSSIBLE INTEREST

It was noted at the outset that the problem of reducing the risk of the outbreak of war will continue to exist as long as and wherever armaments and armed forces remain in the hands of states holding opposing views. It was also recognized that the problem has been increased, although not created, by the emergence of modern weapons technology and techniques of warfare. The measures proposed by the United States would provide a useful beginning and are pointed toward what appears practical at this time. However, they are not addressed to all aspects of the problem, and other aspects, in particular those which are highly technical in character, may warrant deeper examination. Moreover, in a period of rapidly changing technology, continuing review may be desirable.

With these considerations in view, the United States has included among its proposals the establishment of an international commission on reduction of the risk of war. Such a commission would be composed of technical and military experts. Its size should be relatively small, and its method of operation should be as informal as practical.

A body of this character might, for example, undertake such functions as the following:

1. Consideration of those implications of modern weapons technology and techniques of warfare which have a bearing on increasing or reducing the risk of war.

2. Consideration of data which member states might wish to present respecting steps they are taking to prevent accident, misinterpretation, and miscalculation, and to improve communication.

3. Identification of specific technical risks and clarification of supposed risks.

4. Development of proposals for additional agreed measures and encouragement of separate efforts by the states concerned where such efforts might offer a more practical approach.

The foregoing functions are not offered as specific terms of reference but are rather intended to be illustrative of broad areas which might be of interest to a commission such as that suggested by the United States. Progress in working out the technical details of the other measures outlined in preceding sections may assist in determining when it might be useful to establish a special commission of this character. For its own part, the United States would be prepared in this case, as in the case of other measures, to participate fully, and the United States would find reassurance in the willingness of other states also to participate.

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CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
N DISARMAMENT

ENDC/75  
12 February 1963  
ENGLISH  
Original: RUSSIAN

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

D e c l a r a t i o n

On renunciation of use of foreign territories for  
stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons

(Draft proposal by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)

The Governments of . . . . .  
(States-signatories of the present Declaration to be  
listed)

Desiring to contribute in every possible way to the easing of international  
tension, the consolidation of peace and the creation of the most favourable  
conditions for general and complete disarmament,

attaching particularly great importance to the adoption of measures aimed  
at reducing the danger of a military conflict between the nuclear Powers,

solemnly undertake, within the period of . . . . . from the date of  
signature of this Declaration, to carry out the following measures which they  
regard as a step towards more extensive disarmament measures:

1. To dismantle bases located in foreign territory for submarines carrying  
nuclear and rocket weapons and to renounce the use of foreign ports as bases for  
such submarines.
2. To withdraw from foreign ports aircraft carriers having on board aircraft  
armed with nuclear weapons.
3. To dismantle strategical rocket installations located in foreign  
territory and to transfer to their own national territory rockets of 1,500 km  
range and over and the corresponding nuclear warheads.
4. To withdraw strategical aircraft designed for delivering nuclear bombs  
to their targets as well as these nuclear bombs, from bases located in foreign  
territory to within their own national boundaries.

The Governments of States parties to this Declaration undertake not to  
station in future in foreign territories and ports the means of delivery of  
nuclear weapons, nuclear warheads and bombs referred to in paragraphs 1, 2, 3,  
4 above.

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
N DISARMAMENT

ENDC/77  
20 February 1963  
ENGLISH  
Original: RUSSIAN

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Non-aggression Pact

between the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty  
and the States parties to the North Atlantic Treaty

(Draft proposal by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).

The States parties to the Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance of May 14, 1955, on the one hand, and the States parties to the North Atlantic Treaty of April 4, 1949, on the other hand,

Being firmly resolved to take measures to eliminate international tension and to create an atmosphere of confidence in relations between States in order to help forward the consolidation of universal peace and the speediest possible achievement of agreements on the most vital problems of today and particularly on general and complete disarmament,

Confirming their intention to comply strictly with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter in their relations with one another,

Have agreed on the following:

Article 1

The States parties to the Warsaw Treaty and the States parties to the North Atlantic Treaty solemnly undertake to refrain from attack, the threat or use of force, in any manner inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, against one another or in their international relations in general.

Article 2

All disputes that may arise between one or more States parties to the Warsaw Treaty, on the one hand, and one or more States parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, on the other hand, shall be resolved by peaceful means only, through negotiations between the parties concerned or by using other means for the pacific settlement of international disputes as provided for by the United Nations Charter.

Article 3

Should situations affecting the interests of both sides arise which are likely to endanger the maintenance of peace and security, the States parties to this Pact shall consult together, with a view to taking and implementing such joint measures as may, in conformity with the United Nations Charter, be considered appropriate for the peaceful settlement of such situations.

Article 4

This Pact shall remain in force so long as the Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance of May 14, 1955 and the North Atlantic Treaty of April 4, 1949, are valid.

Article 5

This Pact shall be ratified by the signatory States in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The ratifications shall be deposited with the United Nations Secretary-General who shall notify all the States signatories to the Pact as well as all the other States members of the United Nations, of each deposit.

This Pact shall come into force on the day of the deposit of the last ratification.

Article 6

This Pact, of which the Russian, English and French texts are authentic, shall be registered and remain deposited with the UN Secretariat. Duly certified copies thereof shall be communicated by the United Nations Secretary-General to the Governments of the States signatories to this Pact.

In faith whereof the undersigned representatives of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty and the States parties to the North Atlantic Treaty have subscribed to this Pact and thereto have affixed their seals.

Done at ..... 1963.

ANNEX II

CHECK-LIST OF DOCUMENTS  
ISSUED BY THE CONFERENCE AND ITS SUBSIDIARY ORGANS  
(26 November 1962 - 10 April 1963)

Part A - Verbatim records of the Conference [ENDC/PV. Series]

	<u>Date</u>	<u>Symbol</u>
83rd meeting to 120th meeting	26 November 1962	ENDC/PV.83
	to 10 April 1963	to ENDC/PV.120

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Part B - Documents of the Conference [ENDC/- Series]

<u>Title of document</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Symbol</u>
Recommendation by the co-chairmen on the release of records and documents of the Conference adopted by the Conference on 12 December 1962, at its 91st Meeting	12 December 1962	ENDC/1/Add.4
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament under Strict International Control (Draft by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)	26 November 1962	ENDC/2/Rev.1
<u>ibid</u>	14 December 1962	ENDC/2/Rev.1* Russian only
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Corrigendum to the document ENDC/2/Rev.1	20 December 1962	ENDC/2/Rev.1/Corr.1 English only
United Kingdom: Corrigendum to the document ENDC/60	27 November 1962	ENDC/60/Corr.1 English only
Letter dated 21 November 1962 from the Acting Secretary General of the United Nations to the Co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament transmitting Resolution 1767 (XVII) of the General Assembly	26 November 1962	ENDC/64
Letter dated 27 November 1962 from the President of the General Assembly of the United Nations to the Co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament referring item 93 on the General Assembly's agenda to the Conference	30 November 1962	ENDC/65

<u>Title of document</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Symbol</u>
United Kingdom: Document prepared by 3 United States and 3 Soviet Scientists attending the Xth Conference on Science and World Affairs, Cambridge 1962	4 December 1962	ENDC/66
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: An Article by M. Sadovsky, Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, V. Keilis-Borok, Doctor of Physics and Mathematics, and N. Kondorskaya, Candidate of Physics and Mathematics, published in the newspaper "Izvestiya" on 11 November 1962	7 December 1962	ENDC/67
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Corrigendum to the document ENDC/67	12 December 1962	ENDC/67/Corr.1 English only
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Corrigendum to the document ENDC/67	22 January 1963	ENDC/67/Corr.2 English only
Report to the General Assembly of the United Nations with regard to the Cessation of Nuclear Weapon Tests	7 December 1962	ENDC/68
Corrigendum to the document ENDC/68	2 January 1963	ENDC/68/Corr.1 French only
United States of America: US draft of treaty on general and complete disarmament- Article V.	10 December 1962	ENDC/69
United States of America: Working Paper on reduction of the risk of war through accident, miscalculation, or failure of communication	12 December 1962	ENDC/70
Mexico: Message from the President of the Senate of the United States of Mexico on disarmament and the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests	12 December 1962	ENDC/71

<u>Title of document</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Symbol</u>
Mexico: "Appeal by the representatives of the people of Mexico to the congresses, Parliaments, Peoples' Assemblies and other legislative bodies of all countries in favour of international peace, world disarmament and the banning of nuclear weapons tests", adopted by the Mexican Federal Congress.	19 December 1962	ENDC/72
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Letters dated 19 December 1962 and 7 January 1963 from the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, addressed to the President of the United States of America	31 January 1963	ENDC/73*
United States of America: Letter dated 28 December 1962 from the President of the United States of America to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	31 January 1963	ENDC/74*
United States of America: Corrigendum to the document ENDC/74*	5 April 1963	ENDC/74*/Corr.1 Russian only
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: On renunciation of use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons. (Draft proposal by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)	12 February 1963	ENDC/75
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: The United States Government gives a stimulus to the nuclear armaments race. Statement by TASS	12 February 1963	ENDC/76
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Non-aggression Pact between the States to the Warsaw Treaty and the States parties to the North Atlantic Treaty. (Draft proposal by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)	20 February 1963	ENDC/77

<u>Title of document</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Symbol</u>
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America: Memorandum of position concerning the cessation of nuclear weapon tests	1 April 1963	ENDC/78
United Kingdom and United States of America: Corrigendum to the document ENDC/78	2 April 1963	ENDC/78/Corr.1 French only
Canada: Comparison of some significant developments in USA/USSR Disarmament. Plans, 1960-1963	3 April 1963	ENDC/79
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: French Nuclear explosion in the Sahara - A Challenge to World Public Opinion. Statement by TASS dated 23 March 1963	5 April 1963	ENDC/80
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Letter dated 5 April 1963, from the Representative of the USSR at the Conference to the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General transmitting a telegram from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic	5 April 1963	ENDC/81
<u>ibid.</u>	8 April 1963	ENDC/81* French only
United States of America: Statement by Senator Hubert Humphrey and interventions by other members of the United States Senate in the United States Senate on 7 March 1963.	8 April 1963	ENDC/82



Part C Documents containing information of an administrative nature /ENDC/INF.-Series/

<u>Title of document</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Symbol</u>
Basic information for delegations	26 November 1962	ENDC/INF.1/Rev.2
<u>ibid</u>	12 February 1963	ENDC/INF.1/Rev.3
List of members of delegations to the Conference	26 November 1962	ENDC/INF.2/Rev.6
Corrigendum to the document ENDC/INF.2/Rev.6	30 November 1962	ENDC/INF.2/Rev.6/ Corr.1 English only
<u>ibid</u>	6 December 1962	ENDC/INF.2/Rev.6/ Corr.2
List of Members of Delegations to the Conference	12 February 1963	ENDC/INF.2/Rev.7
<u>ibid.</u>	19 March 1963	ENDC/INF.2/Rev.8
Check-list of documents issued between 8 September 1962 and 25 November 1962	26 November 1962	ENDC/INF.4/Add.11
Check-list of documents issued between 26 November 1962 and 9 December 1962	10 December 1962	ENDC/INF.4/Add.12
Check-list of documents issued between 10 December 1962 and 21 December 1962	21 December 1962	ENDC/INF.4/Add.13
Check-list of documents issued between 22 December 1962 and 11 February 1963	12 February 1963	ENDC/INF.4/Add.14
Check-list of documents issued between 12 February 1963 and 28 February 1963	28 February 1963	ENDC/INF.4/Add.15
Check-list of documents issued between 1 March 1963 and 22 March 1963	23 March 1963	ENDC/INF.4/Add.16

<u>Title of document</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Symbol</u>
Public release of final verbatim records and documents	23 November 1962	ENDC/INF.5/Add.10
<u>ibid</u>	12 December 1962	ENDC/INF.5/Add.11
<u>ibid</u>	21 December 1962	ENDC/INF.5/Add.12
<u>ibid</u>	11 February 1963	ENDC/INF.5/Add.13
<u>ibid</u>	28 February 1963	ENDC/INF.5/Add.14
<u>ibid</u>	22 March 1963	ENDC/INF.5/Add.15

Part D - Non-governmental communications /ENDC/NGC/-Series/

<u>Title of document</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Symbol</u>
List of Communications received by the Secretariat of the Conference during the period 4 September to 30 November 1962	30 November 1962	ENDC/NGC/6
List of Communications received by the Secretariat of the Conference during the period 1 December to 14 December 1962	14 December 1962	ENDC/NGC/7
List of Communications received by the Secretariat of the Conference during the period 15 December 1962 to 11 February 1963	11 February 1963	ENDC/NGC/8
List of Communications received by the Secretariat of the Conference during the period 13 February to 18 March 1963	18 March 1963	ENDC/NGC/9

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Part E - Verbatim records of the Sub-Committee /ENDC/SC.1/PV. Series/

	<u>Date</u>	<u>Symbol</u>
45th meeting to 50th meeting	28 November 1962 to 18 December 1962	ENDC/SC.1/PV. 45 to ENDC/SC.1/PV.50

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