



Eighteenth session  
Agenda item 23

REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE SITUATION WITH  
REGARD TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE  
GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND  
PEOPLES\*

Rapporteur: Mr. Najmuddine RIFAI (Syria)

ADEN

CONTENTS

	<u>Paragraphs</u>	<u>Page</u>
A. INFORMATION ON THE TERRITORY		
INTRODUCTION . . . . .	1 - 3	3
ADEN (FORMERLY ADEN COLONY)		
General . . . . .	4 - 5	4
Government		
Status . . . . .	6	4
Previous Constitutions . . . . .	7 - 9	5
1962 Constitution . . . . .	10 - 21	5 - 7
Operation of the Constitution . . . . .	22 - 26	7 - 8
Judiciary . . . . .	27	8
Local Government . . . . .	28	8
Political Parties . . . . .	29 - 32	9

\* Note: This document contains the chapter on Aden. The general introductory chapter and the remaining chapters will be issued later under the symbol A/5446.

CONTENTS (continued)

	<u>Paragraphs</u>	<u>Page</u>
THE PROTECTORATE OF SOUTH ARABIA (FORMERLY ADEN PROTECTORATE)		
General . . . . .	33 - 34	10
Government		
Status . . . . .	35	10
Constitution . . . . .	36 - 38	10 - 11
Judiciary . . . . .	39	11
THE FEDERATION OF SOUTH ARABIA		
Composition . . . . .	40	12
The Treaty of Friendship and Protection, 1959 . .	41 - 42	12
Executive and legislative institutions . . . . .	43 - 45	13
Accession of Aden to the Federation of South Arabia . . . . .	46 - 52	13 - 14
New Federal Constitution . . . . .	53 - 55	14 - 16
B. HEARING OF PETITIONER BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE IN 1962	56	17
C. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE		
Introduction . . . . .	57	18
Written petitions and hearings . . . . .	58 - 104	18 - 34
General statements by Members . . . . .	105 - 302	35 - 95
D. ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE		
Establishment of the Sub-Committee on Aden . . .	303 - 348	96 - 111
Action arising from the Report of the Sub-Committee on Aden . . . . .	349 - 478	112 - 154
APPENDIX REPORT OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE ON ADEN . . . . .		155

ADEN

A. INFORMATION ON THE TERRITORY

Introduction

1. The Territory of Aden formerly comprised Aden Colony and the Aden Protectorate. Eleven of the States included in the Protectorate were members of a federation known as the Federation of South Arabia.
2. On 18 January 1963, Aden Colony acceded to the Federation of South Arabia. At the same time the component parts of the Territory were renamed Aden and the Protectorate of South Arabia and a new constitution came into force in Aden.
3. Information on the Territory is set out below under three main headings, viz: Aden (formerly Aden Colony), The Protectorate of South Arabia (formerly Aden Protectorate) and The Federation of South Arabia.

## ADEN (formerly Aden Colony)

General

4. Aden lies on the southern coast of the Arabian Peninsula, about 100 miles east of the Straits of Bab el Mandeb and has an area of 75 square miles (194 square kilometres). Until 1959 the island of Perim<sup>1/</sup> in the Bab el Mandeb Straits, about 100 miles west of Aden, and the five Kuria Muria Islands<sup>2/</sup> off the coast of Oman were included in Aden Colony. Since that date they have been administered directly by the Governor of Aden. The island of Kamaran,<sup>3/</sup> an island in the Red Sea off the Yemeni coast, has also been administered by the Governor of Aden, although it has never formed part of either Aden Colony or Aden Protectorate.

5. The estimated population of Aden is 220,000. At the census of 1955, the population of Aden Town was made up as follows:

	<u>(per cent)</u>
Arabs	75.2
Indians and Pakistanis	11.4
Somalis	7.7
Europeans	3.2
Others	2.5

GovernmentStatus

6. Aden Colony was part of British India from 1839 until 1937 when it was constituted as a separate colony. On 18 January 1963, Aden was included in the Federation of South Arabia and became the twelfth State of the Federation.

<sup>1/</sup> Perim Island which was occupied briefly by the British in 1799 and re-occupied in 1857 is about 5 square miles (13 square kilometres) in area and has a population of about 300.

<sup>2/</sup> The Kuria Muria Islands which were ceded to the United Kingdom in 1854 have an area of 28 square miles (73 square kilometres) and a population of about 100.

<sup>3/</sup> Kamaran Island has been occupied by the British since 1915 and has an area of 22 square miles (87 square kilometres).

### Previous Constitutions

7. The first Legislative Council was established in Aden Colony in 1947. At the end of 1955, elections were held for the first time and four of the nine non-official seats were filled by elected members. The Legislative Council was reorganized in 1959 to include 12 elected members, 6 nominated members and 5 ex officio members. The Governor, who had formerly presided over the Legislative Council, was replaced by a Speaker. At the same time, the Executive Council was reconstituted to consist of 5 elected or nominated members of the Legislative Council and 5 ex officio members; the former were to be "in charge" of various government departments, i.e., the medical, labour, local government, public works, education and postal departments. In February 1961 the "Members in Charge" became "Ministers".

8. At the 1959 elections, which were the most recent elections held in Aden, the twelve elected members of the Legislative Council were elected from five constituencies, two of which returned three members each while the remainder returned two members each. The franchise qualifications required that voters be adult males and be British subjects born in Aden, or British subjects or Protected Persons who had resided in Aden for not less than two of the three years preceding registration. Voters were also required to have owned immovable property within Aden to the value of 1,500 shillings or to have been in occupation of premises in Aden of an annual value of 250 shillings for twelve months out of the preceding two years, or to have had an average monthly income of 150 shillings during the previous twelve months.

9. Registered voters at these elections totalled 21,500 of whom less than 6,000 or 26 per cent actually voted. The Aden Trade Union Congress protested against the restricted franchise and boycotted the elections.

### 1962 Constitution

10. In August 1962, following discussions between the United Kingdom Government and the Ministers of Aden Colony and of the Federation, agreement was reached on proposals for the entry of Aden into the Federation and for a new Constitution for Aden. These proposals were subsequently approved by the United Kingdom Parliament and by the Legislatures of Aden and the Federation.<sup>4/</sup>

---

<sup>4/</sup> For details of the discussion in the Aden Legislative Council of the proposals for the accession of Aden to the Federation, see paragraphs 47 and 48 below.

11. The new Constitution which provides for changes in the composition and powers of the Executive and Legislative Councils came into operation, in part, on 9 October 1962, and in full on 18 January 1963. The main provisions of the new Constitution are set out below.

(i) High Commissioner

12. Under the new Constitution the Governor's title is changed to High Commissioner for Aden and the Protectorate of South Arabia. Provision is also made for the appointment of two Deputy High Commissioners. The High Commissioner is the head of the Administration and his assent is required for all legislation. He has certain reserved powers and has exclusive control of the public service and the police.

(ii) Council of Ministers

13. The Executive Council is replaced by a Council of Ministers which consists of not less than seven Ministers who are members of the Legislative Council, one of whom is styled Chief Minister, and the Attorney General who is an ex officio member. The High Commissioner appoints as Chief Minister the member of the Legislative Council who appears to him most likely to command the support of the majority of the members of the Legislative Council. The other Ministers are appointed by the High Commissioner on the advice of the Chief Minister.

14. The Chief Minister's appointment may be revoked by the High Commissioner when he loses the support of the majority of the members of the Legislative Council or when he resigns. If the Chief Minister is removed or resigns the other Ministers must also vacate their offices.

15. The High Commissioner consults with the Council of Ministers in the formulation of policy and in the exercise of his powers except those which relate to external affairs, defence, internal security or the police. In these cases he may consult with the Council although he is not obliged to do so. The High Commissioner may act in opposition to the Council's advice only in special circumstances and in accordance with specified procedures.

(iii) Legislative Council

16. The new Constitution provides for a Legislative Council composed of a Speaker, sixteen elected members, six nominated members and the Attorney-General. The High Commissioner "makes laws for the peace, order and good government of Aden with the advice and consent of the Legislative Council".

17. The Legislative Council is empowered to deal with any matter introduced by means of a bill or a motion by its members. However, except on the recommendation of the High Commissioner, the Council may not proceed on any bill or motion which relates to financial matters, the public service, external affairs, defence, internal security, the police, or the Attorney General's powers of prosecution for criminal offences. The High Commissioner is empowered to introduce bills or motions and, under his reserved powers, may, in certain circumstances and in accordance with prescribed procedures, declare that any bill or motion which the Council has failed to pass shall have effect as if it had been passed.

(iv) Electoral System

18. The new Constitution sets out the qualifications for election as a member of the Legislative Council but does not set out the electoral system or the franchise qualifications. These matters are to be provided for by legislation to be passed by the Legislative Council.

19. The qualifications for election to the Council are the same as those required to be a voter under the previous constitution.<sup>5/</sup>

(v) Protection of fundamental rights and freedoms

20. The new Constitution contains provisions for the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual.

(vi) Public Service and Police

21. Control of the public service and the police is vested exclusively in the High Commissioner. The new Constitution provides for the establishment of a Public Service Commission and a Police Service Commission to which the High Commissioner may refer certain matters for advice.

Operation of the Constitution

22. Provision was made in the Constitution for the life of the existing Legislative Council and the tenure of its members to be extended by one year to January 1964.

23. The Constitution also provided that the four additional members of the Legislative Council required to bring its number of elected members to sixteen should be elected by the members of the Council sitting as an electoral college. On 17 December 1962 the Legislative Council elected four new members from fifty-one candidates. In the voting on the candidates, eight of the eleven

---

<sup>5/</sup> See paragraph 8 above.

electd members<sup>6/</sup> voted, while of the four Adeni nominated members, two voted and two abstained. The four ex officio members, who would retire when the new Constitution came fully into operation, abstained.

24. On 18 January 1963, the date of Aden's accession to the Federation, the new Constitution came fully into force. Mr. Hassan Ali Bayoomi,<sup>7/</sup> leader of the United National Party took office as Chief Minister and formed a Government made up of the Attorney General and seven other Ministers appointed on his advice.

25. At the first session of the new Legislative Council in March 1963 it was announced that an approximate election date could be fixed only after the Council had approved the new franchise qualifications which were to be formulated by a proposed commission of inquiry.

26. Recent developments in Aden connected with Aden's accession to the Federation are set out in paragraphs 46 to 52 below.

#### Judiciary

27. The Judiciary consists of a Chief Justice, two Puisne Judges, the Chief Magistrate, four divisional magistrates, and a registrar. The Chief Justice presides over the Supreme Court, which has unlimited civil and criminal jurisdiction. The appeals from the Supreme Court are heard by the Court of Appeal for East Africa, which visits Aden annually for this purpose. There are also subordinate civil and criminal courts presided over by the Chief Magistrate, assisted by divisional magistrates.

#### Local Government

28. There are three local government bodies: Aden Municipality, Sheikh Othman Township Authority and Little Aden Township Authority. The Aden Municipality is an autonomous body which collects its own revenue, mainly from rates and taxes, and has a Council of fourteen elected and six nominated members. The Sheikh Othman Township Authority comprises four nominated and six elected members, while the Little Aden Township Authority comprises six nominated members. The

---

<sup>6/</sup> One of the twelve elective seats was vacant because of the death of a member.

<sup>7/</sup> Following the death of Mr. Bayoomi, a new Chief Minister, Mr. Zain A. Baharoon (an Independent) was appointed on 1 July 1963. Of the seven Ministers appointed on his advice, five are Independents and two are members of the United National Party.

two township authorities are autonomous but collect taxes and fees on behalf of the central government.

#### Political Parties

29. The South Arabians League was constituted in 1950 under the leadership of Mr. Mohammed Ali Algifri as President. Mr. Algifri and Mr. Shaikhan Alhabshi, the League's Secretary-General are in exile in Cairo. The League's aims are unity, freedom from colonial rule, and socialism for South Arabia. The League demands that Aden and the Aden Protectorate be unified and that all treaties with the United Kingdom be terminated. The League opposes the present Federation of South Arabia, which it describes as a loose and fictitious federation which was established to divert the people from their aspirations for an immediate transfer of sovereignty rights to the people.
30. The United National Party was formed in November 1960 and, until his death in June 1963, was led by Mr. Hassan Ali Bayoomi. The party supported the entry of Aden into the Federation. Allied to this party is the Peoples Political Party.
31. The Peoples Congress was registered in July 1961. Its Secretary-General, Mr. Mohammed Ali Luqman, appeared before the Special Committee in September 1962<sup>8/</sup> to oppose the integration of Aden into the Federation. The party has stated that the Federation is designed "to keep the Aden foothold and preserve the Aden base for British strategic and economic purposes", and demands that Aden should be given self-governing status and a national government before entering into negotiations about federation.
32. The Peoples Socialist Party was founded in July 1962. The party is allied to the Aden Trade Union Congress; the President of the party, Mr. Abdullah Asnag, being Secretary-General of the ATUC. Under its President, Mr. Ali Qadhi, the ATUC, which boycotted the elections in 1959, is opposed to the present government and to the Federation of South Arabia. The Party demands the evacuation of British forces, the dissolution of the Legislative Council and the Supreme Council of the Federation, the holding of free and general elections throughout "South Yemen" (Aden and Amirates) on the basis of universal adult franchise, and self-determination in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

---

<sup>8/</sup> See Report of the Special Committee to the Seventeenth Session of the General Assembly, A/5238, Chapter XII, paragraphs 54 to 61.

THE PROTECTORATE OF SOUTH ARABIA (formerly Aden Protectorate)

General

33. The Protectorate of South Arabia lies along the southern shore of the Arabian Peninsula, and includes territories that are bounded on the east by the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman, on the west and north by the Republic of Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and on the south by Aden and the Gulf of Aden. It also includes Socotra, an island in the Indian Ocean about 150 miles ENE of Cape Guardafui. The area of the Protectorate, including the island of Socotra, is about 112,000 square miles (290,080 square kilometres).

34. No census has ever been taken. The estimated population is 1,000,000, comprising 550,000 in the Western Protectorate, and 450,000 in the Eastern Protectorate. The vast majority are Arab.

Government

Status

35. The status of the Territory is that of a Protectorate. Included in the Protectorate are some 23 states, 18 in the Western Protectorate and five in the Eastern Protectorate. Thirteen of these States are members of the Federation of South Arabia.<sup>9/</sup>

Constitution

36. The United Kingdom does not administer the Protectorate directly. Its relationship with each of the component States is governed by Advisory Treaties and Treaties of Protection, which have been concluded at various times since 1839 between the rulers of the States and the United Kingdom.

37. The High Commissioner has no direct administrative powers in relation to the Protectorate. He is responsible for relations between the States and the United Kingdom and for advisory services in the States. These services are carried out by the British Advisory Staff who advise local rulers on the administration of their areas.

38. The form of government within the States varies from one to another. In the Western Protectorate the States nominate their own heads but their appointment

---

<sup>9/</sup> See paragraph 40 below.

is subject to subsequent recognition by the United Kingdom through the High Commissioner. Eight of these States have State Councils and one, Lahej, has a Legislative Council. In the Eastern Protectorate, the principal States are Qu'aiti and Kathiri which are administered by their Sultans as constitutional rulers and have State Councils.

#### Judiciary

39. The law courts of the States are of two kinds: sharia courts, which administer Qoranic law, and Urfi (or common law) courts, which handle all cases outside the jurisdiction of the sharia courts.

## THE FEDERATION OF SOUTH ARABIA

### Composition

40. On 11 February 1959, a federation of six States in the Western Protectorate, called the Federation of Arab Emirates of the South, was inaugurated, and a Treaty of Friendship and Protection was signed between the United Kingdom and the new Federation. Other States later joined the Federation which was renamed the Federation of South Arabia in 1962. The federated States are: the Amirate of Baihan, the Sultanate of Audhali, the Sultanate of Fadhli, the Amirate of Dhala (including the Quatibi), the Sheikhdome of Upper Aulaqi, the Sultanate of Lower Aulaqi, the Sultanate of Lower Yafa'i, the Sultanate of Lahej, the State of Dathina, the Sheikhdome of Aqrabi and the Sultanate of Wahidi. Aden joined the Federation on 18 January 1963. Two more States, the Sheikhdome of Sha'ibi and the Sultanate of Haushabi joined on 31 March 1963.

### The Treaty of Friendship and Protection, 1959

41. In the preamble to the Treaty it is stated that the rulers of the States have entered into a federation for their mutual defence and for their development in all social, political and economic matters for the betterment of the country and its people. The preamble notes the desire of the Federation to develop ultimately into an economically and politically independent State and the undertaking by the United Kingdom to assist the Federation to become ultimately an independent State.

42. The Treaty provides that the United Kingdom shall have full responsibility for the Federation's external relations and shall furnish the Federation with financial and technical assistance. The treaty also provides that the Federation shall accept and implement in all respects any advice given by the United Kingdom in any matter connected with the good government of the Federation. Provision is made for the accession of new members and for the existing treaties with the rulers of the individual States to remain in force except where they are inconsistent with the Federation Treaty. A special provision covers arrangements for mutual co-operation with respect to defence and internal security, by which the Federation shall maintain a Federal Army and a National Guard, and permit the United Kingdom to maintain and operate its forces in the Federation.

Executive and legislative institutions

43. Under the 1959 Constitution the general executive authority of the Government of the Federation is vested in a Supreme Council, which is exclusively responsible for the initiation of all legislation. The Supreme Council consists of six ministers, elected by and from the members of the Federal Council.

44. The Federal Council consists of six representatives of each Member State of the Federation, each member being selected "by whatever constitutional means are appropriate".

45. The Constitution provides for three methods of legislation. The Supreme Council may introduce into the Federal Council a draft of any measure which it considers should be enacted as an ordinance. If the Federal Council either passes the draft unamended or amended in a form acceptable to the Supreme Council, it becomes an ordinance and has the force of law throughout the Federation. The Supreme Council may also legislate by provisional order or by decree if it considers that a state of public emergency exists in the Federation.

Accession of Aden to the Federation of South Arabia

46. Proposals for the accession of Aden to the Federation, and for a new constitution for Aden, which were agreed upon in August 1962, were approved in September 1962 by the United Kingdom Parliament and by the Legislatures of Aden and of the Federation.

47. These proposals were debated in the Aden Legislative Council between 24 and 26 September 1962. Opposition members introduced an amendment to the proposals which while endorsing the principle of unity between Aden and the Federation strongly rejected the proposals and called for an immediate general election for a new legislature which would be wholly elective and for the formation of a new government with increased powers whose first task would be to negotiate and effect unity between Aden and the Federation. The amendment also called for substantial financial assistance to both Aden and the Federation.

48. This amendment was defeated by sixteen votes to seven. Five elected and two nominated members voted for it, while seven elected and four nominated members voted against it along with the five ex officio members. Following the defeat of the amendment the seven members who had voted for it walked out of the chamber in protest. After another member had withdrawn in protest against

both the Opposition and the Government, the proposals for the accession of Aden to the Federation were agreed to without a vote.

49. Following the approval of these proposals by the Legislative Council disturbances occurred in Aden and a ban was imposed on demonstrations.

50. On 14 November 1962 the Colony's Minister for Education and Information, Mr. Husaini, resigned as a protest against "rushing the merger plan".

51. The Aden Trade Union Congress also opposed the proposals. On 19 November 1962, the President, Mr. Ali Qahdi, called for a 24 hour general strike in protest against the proposals and against deportations of Yemeni workers. For this action, Mr. Qahdi was sentenced in January 1963 to six months imprisonment under the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1960. His appeal against this decision was rejected by the Supreme Court in March 1963.

52. On 3 December 1962 the Federal Council approved the necessary amendments to the Federal Constitution. The Treaty for the accession of Aden to the Federation of South Arabia was signed on 16 January 1963, and became effective two days later.

#### New Federal Constitution

53. By the terms of the new treaty signed between the United Kingdom and the Federation, provision is made for the withdrawal of Aden from the Federation. The United Kingdom may exclude or withdraw at any time from the Federation any area or areas within Aden, if it considers this desirable for the purposes of its world-wide defence responsibilities. It is also provided that if, in the year following the end of the sixth year after Aden's joining the Federation, the Legislative Council of Aden should pass a resolution by a two-thirds majority asking for secession on the ground that the Federation has acted in a manner which unfairly prejudices the interests of Aden, then the United Kingdom shall convene a conference to resolve the difficulties. If agreement cannot be reached the United Kingdom may call upon the Federation to take action to remedy the position. If the Federation fails to take this action the United Kingdom may withdraw Aden from the Federation.

54. The effect of the principal amendments to the Federal Constitution may be summarized as follows:

(a) Representation of the States on the Supreme Council is now in the ratio of one for every six members of the Federal Council. Up to three other members may be appointed by the Supreme Council.

(b) Representation on the Federal Council remains at six for each Member State with the exception that Aden will be represented by 24 members.

(c) The right to introduce bills into the Federal Council which was formerly restricted to the Supreme Council has now been extended to Members of the Federal Council, with the exception that the introduction of bills on matters outside the authority of the Federation is prohibited and bills to amend the constitution and impose taxes or changes on revenue may not be introduced without the consent of the Supreme Council.

(d) Provision is made for a Public Service Commission to advise the Supreme Council on public service matters.

(e) A distinction is made between matters under the exclusive authority of the Federation and those under the concurrent authority of the Federation and the States.

(f) A Federal High Court is established with a minimum of three judges and with original jurisdiction in matters concerning the interpretation of the Federal Constitution, disputes between the States and between a State and the Federation, and on cases in which jurisdiction is conferred on it by Federal law. The High Court will also act as an Appeal Court from superior courts in the States in cases involving the interpretation of the Constitution. The Supreme Council may refer questions as to the interpretation of the Constitution to the High Court for their advice.

(g) New provisions for amending the Constitution are introduced.

(h) Provision is made for a review of the Constitution. Three years after Aden's accession the Supreme Council shall convene, at the request of any State, a conference of delegates from all States to review the Constitution and, if necessary, to recommend amendments.

55. Aden's 24 members of the Federal Council have been nominated by the High Commissioner. On 28 January 1963 the Supreme Council selected four of them,

including the Chief Minister, to be members of the Supreme Council. It was stated that these appointments were temporary until the Federal Council at its next meeting elects four of the 24 Adeni members to be Federal Ministers for a five-year term.

B. HEARING OF PETITIONER BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE IN 1962

56. Although the Special Committee did not consider Aden at its meetings in 1962 it circulated 13 petitions<sup>10/</sup> concerning the Territory and heard one petitioner, Mr. Ali Luqman, Secretary-General of the People's Congress. Statements were also made by the representatives of Yemen and the United Kingdom.<sup>11/</sup>

---

<sup>10/</sup> See paragraph 58 below.

<sup>11/</sup> See A/5238, Chapter XII, paragraphs 54-63.

C. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

Introduction

57. The Special Committee considered Aden at its 149th to 164th and 169th meetings, between 17 April and 10 May 1963, and at its 170th, 187th to 189th, 191st, 193rd, 194th, 196th and 197th meetings, on 10 June and between 3 and 19 July 1963.

Written petitions and hearings

58. The Special Committee circulated the following written petitions concerning Aden:

	<u>Petitioner</u>	<u>Document No.</u>
(a)	<u>In 1962:</u>	
	Mr. Ali Mohamed Luqman, Secretary-General, Peoples Congress	A/AC.109/PET.24 and Add.1
	South Arabian Nations	A/AC.109/PET.25
	South Arabians residing in Saudi Arabia	A/AC.109/PET.26
	Messrs. Mohamed Algifri and Abdullah Shaikhan Alhabshi, President and Secretary of the South Arabians League	A/AC.109/PET.34
	The United Nations Party and the Peoples Political Party	A/AC.109/PET.35
	Mr. Abdulla Ali Quasy and others	A/AC.109/PET.36
	Mr. Jabir Ahmad Jabir and others	A/AC.109/PET.37
	Mr. Saleh Abdul and others	A/AC.109/PET.38
	Mr. Mohamood Mohamed Sulaiman and others	A/AC.109/PET.39
	The Democratic Party	A/AC.109/PET.40
	Mr. Mohamed Ali Lokman	A/AC.109/PET.44
	Peoples Political Party	A/AC.109/PET.45
(b)	<u>In 1963</u>	
	United National Party	A/AC.109/PET.47
	Mr. S.A. Alhabshi, Secretary-General, South Arabians League	A/AC.109/PET.48
	Sheikh Ali Ahmed and Haj Ali Saidi on behalf of 6,000 Adeni Patriots	A/AC.109/PET.78

<u>Petitioner</u>	<u>Document No.</u>
Sheikh Abdulla Omar Makh and others on behalf of 5,000 British Petroleum, Air Ministry and Port Trade Unionists	A/AC.109/PET.79
Syd Muhd Bin Muhd Buneidi and Sheikh Ahmed Muhd Am Sodani on behalf of 1,200 merchants and citizens in Aden	A/AC.109/PET.80
Peoples Socialist Party	A/AC.109/PET.81 and Add.1
Mr. Abdulla Isa Fadhli for the Fadhli Trade Unionists	A/AC.109/PET.82
Mr. Louis Saillant, General-Secretary of World Federation of Trade Unionists, Prague Peoples Socialist Party	A/AC.109/PET.83
Mr. Abdo Hussein Adhal	A/AC.109/PET.112 and Add.1
Mr. A.R. Girgrah, Secretary-General, United National Party	A/AC.109/PET.113
Sheikh Muhamed Farid, "Minister of External Affairs, Federation of South Arabia"	A/AC.109/PET.114
Independence Party, Aden Trade Union Congress, Arab Woman Association, Al-Ittihad Al-Muhammadi, Sports Union, Free Yezni Union, Arab Youth Organisation, Arab Students Association, Refugees from the Protectorates in America and five other petitioners	A/AC.109/PET.116
Mr. Ali Abdelkerim, Sultan of Iahej in exile, South Arabian Refugees in Saudi Arabia, Mr. Mohamed S. Bawazir, Secretary of Committee for the Liquidation of Colonialism in South Arabia, 41 representatives of groups and regions, 250 representatives of all provinces of South Arabia, and 10 other petitioners	A/AC.109/PET.117 and Add.1
Mr. Salem Awadh Hudrami and others, refugees in Jeddah	A/AC.109/PET.118 and Add.1
Mr. Albert Carthy, Secretary, Socialist International	A/AC.109/PET.119
Mr. Irving Brown, Director, International Confederation of Free Trade Unions	A/AC.109/PET.129
Mr. Yahia Ibrahim Kamarani and Arafat Mohamed Kamarani on behalf of Kamaran Island inhabitants	A/AC.109/PET.141
Mr. Abdullah Al-Asnag, Secretary-General of the Aden Trade Union Congress and President of the Peoples Socialist Party	A/AC.109/PET.142
	A/AC.109/PET.150

Petitioner

Document No.

Mr. Omer Salem Ba'pad, Peoples Congress	A/AC.109/PET.151
Mr. Ali Faris Al-Nahdi, Central Organisation for the Liberation of the Arab South, Djakarta	A/AC.109/PET.152

59. The Special Committee heard the following petitioners concerning Aden:

Mr. Shaikhan A. Alhabshi, Secretary-General, South Arabians League	(149th, 150th and 155th meetings)
Mr. Saeed Hesson Sohbi, representing the Peoples Socialist Party	(150th, 152nd and 153rd meetings)
Sheikh Muhammed Farid, "Minister of External Affairs", Federation of South Arabia	(154th meeting).

60. Mr. ALHABSHI said that the South Arabian case was clear and simple if the underlying complications were disregarded. The case was that of a dependent people living under United Kingdom rule and sovereignty. The South Arabians were not represented in any international forum or organization; they were not members of the free society of the world. It was for the United Nations to transform South Arabia into an independent country.

61. Though South Arabia was a political unit as far as the outside world was concerned, internally it was divided into some twenty-three or more States headed by a variety of sultans, sheikhs and emirs. Although the sheikhs were Heads of State as far as their peoples were concerned, they had no freedom of action and were bound to comply with the instructions and advice of the United Kingdom authorities in Aden. Under the Advisory Treaties none of them could maintain relations or conduct correspondence or negotiations with anybody, internally or externally, without the previous consent of the United Kingdom authorities in Aden; none of them could negotiate even with another sheikh without that consent. Through the treaties the country had been divided up into more and more political units and more and more cut off from the outside world.

62. Once the United Kingdom had imposed itself as the de facto guardian, it was under an obligation to carry out the duties of a good guardian to care for the ward and promote its interests. That, however, had not been the case; the United Kingdom had never fed the people of the country, taken care of their health or promoted their economic, social, political or educational welfare in any way.

Until 1956 there had not been a single secondary school in the whole of South Arabia except in the Crown Colony of Aden. There had not been a single indigenous doctor or lawyer in the whole territory. According to the report of the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories, there were now about 104 hospital beds for the 1.5 million inhabitants of South Arabia. Such was the achievement of the self-constituted guardian of the territory.

63. The South Arabians had for many years been under the mistaken impression that by the Protective and Advisory Treaties they were bound to comply with whatever instructions and advice they were given by British officers in the territory. Anyone who pointed out that the treaties were null and void according to international law was deposed and sent to gaol or banished. The people had made many attempts to express their aspirations and their desire for freedom and had on many occasions peacefully made representations and presented petitions, but they had always been met with repression. Many Arab leaders in South Arabia had been sent into exile or driven to the high mountains. Thousands of refugees were living in Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia.

64. Aden itself was governed directly by British officers, who were bound to observe to a certain extent the rules of justice. In the sultanates and the sheikhdoms, however, the British did not rule themselves but had set up a sheikh in each of them and vested him with despotic powers, under the control of the United Kingdom authorities in Aden. A sheikh who found a document of a nationalist movement in a man's possession could sentence that man without trial to twenty years' imprisonment and a fine of 20,000 shillings. That was why the people of South Arabia had failed clearly to demonstrate what they wanted. If fear were removed from them it would become clear that all South Arabians wanted freedom and unity and the right to join other Arab countries in their peaceful pursuits and in contributing to human welfare and civilization.

65. There had been many peaceful, legitimate and justified demonstrations in Aden, but they had all been met with repression and violence. Many people had been killed. In the tribal territories some of the tribes which sympathized with the national freedom movement had been punished by bombing and machine-gunning by the Royal Air Force; villages had been bombed, cattle killed and crops set on fire. A Minister in the House of Commons had admitted that there had been about

12,000 aerial sorties in the territories. These facts were unknown to civilized nations because correspondents were not allowed to report them.

66. As early as 1956 the South Arabian League had manifested the aspirations and demands of the South Arabians. There were three of such demands: firstly, the abolition of United Kingdom rule in South Arabia, Aden and Aden Protectorate, and of any form of domination from outside the territory; secondly, the maintenance of the unity of the territory, secured and guaranteed by the United Nations and all Powers; thirdly, the transfer of all powers of government and rights of sovereignty to the people. If those three objectives were to be achieved the present conditions of fear and terror must be removed. The United Nations should establish its presence in the Territory to supervise measures for removing the existing terror.

67. An attempt had been made to separate Aden from the rest of South Arabia and to make it a separate entity like Hong Kong, Singapore or Gibraltar. As early as 1956, therefore, the South Arabian League had insisted that Aden should be deemed to be part and parcel of South Arabia. To prevent the achievement of that objective the United Kingdom authorities had created the Federation, in which Aden had been merged. The South Arabians were not opposed to the concept of federation, but the Federation created by the United Kingdom Government was not a true federation; it was a confederation. Moreover, it comprised only some fourteen of the twenty-three or more States in South Arabia. At the present time there were four separate units in the alleged State of South Arabia. There were certain small but important islands which the United Kingdom planned to keep for itself, separate from the Federation and from South Arabia. The South Arabians were against that division; they wanted unity, not federation or confederation. The United Kingdom representative would probably claim that the Federation was a Government and that the United Kingdom could not interfere in its affairs. It must be emphasized that the Federation was absolutely devoid of any sovereign rights or power. It was unable to conduct any relations or maintain any communications with anyone inside or outside the territory without the previous consent of the United Kingdom Government. Moreover, each State in the Federation remained subject to the Protective and Advisory Treaties. Since the Federal Government was deprived of any power, Aden and the Protectorate remained dependent and non-self-governing. The South Arabians were denied their right to freedom and their right to maintain

relations with their brother Arabs and with the rest of the world. It was for the United Nations to restore their rights to them. The Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples should be strictly applied to the Territory.

68. The Special Committee had been given the specific function by the General Assembly of ensuring the implementation of the Declaration. It would not be wise for the Committee to go into the many complicated details of the question of Aden, for the issue was not Aden's accession to or secession from the Federation: that was for the people of the country to decide. The Committee's function was to secure for the South Arabians the right of self-determination, so that they could decide on the political regime for their country and on their relations with other countries.

69. The South Arabians had three specific demands: they wanted to be free; they wanted to be united, not federated or confederated; and they wanted to keep the powers of government, in democratic institutions, with a constituent assembly. He appealed to the Committee to assist in bringing about the establishment of a constituent assembly, freely elected by the people under United Nations supervision.

70. Mr. SOHBI said that his party regarded Aden and the Eastern and Western Protectorates as forming, together with the area now known as Yemen, a single Territory, which it referred to as the Province of "Natural Yemen"; that view was supported in a book published in 1877 by Mr. F.M. Hunter, an English writer. His party considered the Province of "Natural Yemen" to be a constituent part of the Arab homeland and its people a constituent part of the Arab nation. It felt that the liberation of the Territory from colonialism and its orientation along democratic and socialist lines would be a step towards the unification of the Arab nation, which would in turn contribute to the creation of a world based on the principles of humanism.

71. In 1839, after unsuccessfully trying to purchase the port of Aden, the British had seized it by force; indeed, he had once heard Sir Tom Hickinbotham, a former Governor of Aden, acknowledge that fact quite openly. The British had then proceeded to bring the surrounding areas under their control by concluding treaties with the local sultans, sheikhs and emirs. Those treaties had been obtained by deceit and treachery and had generally provided for the payment of

large stipends to the sultan, sheikh or emir in return for the grant of protectorate rights and other privileges. Moreover, there was no time-limit for their duration. It was hard to imagine any more fraudulent contract than the treaties concluded between shrewd political officers and ignorant sheikhs who were unaware of their contents. Yet those treaties were held to be binding not only on those who had signed them but on their successors. The truth was that the British had occupied the Territory by force, they had remained there by force and they continued to stay there by force. The treaties they had concluded were the only legal excuse they could produce for remaining in the Territory. If a tribe disobeyed a Government order, the British Resident or Governor would call a conference of his political staff and order the peaceful tribe to be bombed. The British claimed that the purpose of the treaties was to protect the tribes from outside aggression, but in 1915 the Turks had reached the very gates of Aden and had occupied Lahej until 1918, when their troops had had to withdraw from Arabia under the terms of the armistice.

72. The frontier with Yemen had been defined in the Anglo-Turkish Convention of March 1914, but after the war the Imam of Yemen had quite logically refused to be bound by the Convention. The British had pressed him to recognize the boundaries defined by the Convention; they had encouraged the tribesmen to rebel against him and as a last resort had begun bombing Yemeni towns and villages. In 1934 the Imam had been obliged to yield and had concluded the Treaty of Sana, which provided that pending the conclusion of the negotiations the existing situation would be maintained and that no violation of the frontier would be allowed. The Imam had concluded the Treaty for two reasons: firstly, because fighting had broken out over the disputed territory of Nejran, and secondly in order to stop the British raids and bombing operations in the southern part of the country. Even after the conclusion of the Treaty the United Kingdom had continued its aggressive policy, the purpose of which was to spread fear among peaceful peoples so as to suppress any anti-imperialistic movement. British policy in the occupied part of southern Yemen was to sow the seeds of dissension and encourage separatist movements. The power of each sultan, prince or sheikh was consolidated and he was given a free hand in the administration of his area. British troops were stationed in camps and ready to go to the help of a sultan when the tribes revolted against him.

73. Although the Protectorate had been occupied by British troops for almost a century, there were no indications of modern civilization. During the past ten years some primary schools had been built, but there were no secondary schools. There was not a single clinic in any of the sheikhdoms or emirates, with one exception, i.e. the Fadhli Sultanate, where the Cotton Board was interested in developing the country. There were no proper roads outside Aden. In most parts of the Protectorate goods were still exchanged by barter. There was nothing which could properly be called a legal department or a code of laws. The sultans wielded despotic power despite the presence of the British political authorities who were supposed to guide them in civilizing and educating their people. In Aden itself the Arab inhabitants had been given no share in the government of their country; they were simply one community among many. People of every creed and colour had been encouraged to come to Aden so that when the time came for liberation conflicting interests would make the process more difficult. That policy had first been revealed during the elections to the Legislative Council. While immigrants from Commonwealth countries had been given the franchise, indigenous inhabitants, who came mostly from the north, had not been allowed to vote.

74. After the Second World War Arab political consciousness had begun to be felt in the colony. Early in the fifties political parties had begun to spring up: the Aden Association stood for internal self-government within the Commonwealth; the South Arabians League wanted a union including both Colony and Protectorate to form an independent entity; the National United Front had been the predecessor of the People's Socialist Party and its stated policy had been union with the Protectorate and Yemen and the setting up of a Yemen Arab Independent Republic; the Aden Trade Union Congress had come into being as an answer to the bad conditions of the workers and was now, with the People's Socialist Party, the most powerful organization in the Territory. From its inception the ATUC had tried, firstly to defend and protect the interests of the workers, secondly to lead the people in their struggle for liberty. It had been successful in both respects. After failing to reach agreement with the employers the ATUC had resorted to strikes and had also launched a campaign against United Kingdom policy in Aden and the Protectorate. The people had responded favourably to its call to boycott the elections to the Legislative Council in 1959 as a result of which 76 of those

entitled to vote had boycotted the elections. The main reason for the opposition of the ATUC to the Council was, however, that while citizens of Commonwealth countries were given the right to vote, the majority of the Arabs from the North were denied that right.

75. The ATUC had called a general strike in November 1962 as a protest against unlimited immigration of Commonwealth citizens to Aden and the Protectorate, the deportation of its members, the unlawful merging of Aden with the South Arabian Sultanate Federation against the wishes of the people, the frequent trials of trade unionists by British courts and the imprisonment of nationalists.

76. In an endeavour to curb the power of the ATUC the Administration had imprisoned four of its leaders on a charge of publishing seditious materials, its President and others had been imprisoned for participating in the strike, an ordinance prohibiting house-to-house collections had been passed and a state of emergency had been declared.

77. The Federation of South Arabia had been established in 1959 by a treaty between the United Kingdom Government and the local rulers. The United Kingdom retained control over the Federation's foreign relations. The Federation undertook to accept and execute any advice from the United Kingdom with regard to any matter affecting its government, provided the Federation was given the opportunity to express its views thereon, and to permit the United Kingdom to have military bases in the lands of the Federation and to allow the United Kingdom forces absolute freedom of movement on land and in the air. Aden had now acceded to the Federation.

78. The People's Socialist Party, which had been founded in July 1962, was co-operating with the Aden Trade Union Congress in leading the people in their struggle. The party's first action had been to declare a general strike on 23 July 1962 in protest against the secret talks about the merger of the Colony of Aden with the Federation. The party had been and was strongly opposed to the merger because the latter had been imposed by force without the people's consent. It wanted Aden and the Eastern and Western Protectorates to be united with Yemen, of which it considered them to be a part.

79. On 24 September 1962, when the Legislative Council, under the protection of United Kingdom troops, had agreed to the accession of Aden to the Federation, it

had called for a peaceful march, in which 25,000 people had taken part despite the use of tear gas and baton charges by the police. Many demonstrators had been sentenced to imprisonment and many had been flogged.

80. His party's aims and demands were described in the memorandum<sup>12/</sup> dated 24 September 1962 addressed to the Governor of Aden. It was still seeking self-determination, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, but the situation in Yemen had changed since the memorandum had been written. Before the revolution in that country, the situation in Aden and the Protectorate had been better than under the rule of the Imam and his party had been looking forward to liberating the North. Now, however, changes were taking place throughout Arabia and the people were seeking Arab unity. His party held that Aden was part of Yemen and of Arabia as a whole.

81. The memorandum could not be published in Aden itself because it might be regarded as seditious and might provide grounds for prosecution. Shortly before he had left Aden his party's headquarters had been raided by police, who had seized some 200 to 300 copies of the memorandum. Aden was now a real police State. The name of every nationalist was on the black list and nationalists were openly followed. The two newspapers which had been supporting his party had been banned and now the party could not even publish a circular without a licence, since such a circular could be deemed to be a newspaper. In September 1962 the Commissioner of Police had ordered his department not to issue any permits for meetings, processions or gatherings. Other examples of the infringement of basic human rights in Aden were the High Commissioner's reserve power to legislate on any matter if he considered it expedient, the proposed Ordinance to regulate societies and the treatment of political prisoners.

82. The Industrial Relations Ordinance under which strikes were forbidden had been widely condemned by world labour organizations. The section in question referred to "a trade dispute or otherwise", the words "or otherwise" having been included at the request of the Attorney-General, in order to cover political strikes. Those words had been the subject of appeals both in Aden and in Nairobi.

---

12/ A/AC.109/PET.81.

83. The People's Socialist Party was demanding the evacuation of the United Kingdom military bases, the abrogation of the London Treaty, the abolition of the Industrial Relations Ordinance of 1960 and the restoration of human rights in occupied Southern Yemen, i.e. Aden and the Western and Eastern Protectorates. It also demanded the lifting of the restriction imposed on the press and on public meetings and speaking; the replacement of the unlawful legislative and executive bodies in Aden and the Protectorate by truly representative bodies; and the holding of free general elections throughout Southern Yemen under United Nations supervision so that the people of the area could elect their genuine representatives and unite with the Arab Yemen Republic.

84. Sheikh Muhamed FARID stated that he was speaking on behalf of the Federation of South Arabia which was still little known to the world at large, and that he intended to correct some misleading statements which had been made before the Committee. He held the portfolio of Foreign Affairs in the government of the Federation. He explained that when the Federation had been formed, it had been decided that although final responsibility for external affairs must continue to be exercised by the United Kingdom Government, that would not be done without the fullest consultation with the Federal Government. Moreover, since the Federation was bound eventually to become independent, the existence of the post of Minister for Foreign Affairs would provide the necessary prior experience.

85. Before the occupation of Aden by the United Kingdom 124 years earlier, the country had been split up into numerous tribal areas in each of which the chiefs had exercised a loose authority and had owed allegiance to no superior governmental authority. It was true that in 1635 the rulers of Yemen had extended their authority and influence eastward into some regions of South Arabia, but their penetration had been limited in scope, and, for example, the Sheikhdcm of Upper Aulaqi had never come under Yemen's authority. In any event, the Yemeni intrusion had come to an end in 1728. After that date there had been no evidence that any Yemeni ruler had exercised the slightest authority over the region, and when the United Kingdom had occupied Aden in 1839, Yemen had neither protested nor come to the assistance of the Sultan of Lahej. Yet Yemen had at that time been fully independent, and it would certainly not have permitted the United Kingdom to occupy Aden if it had regarded that territory as its own.

86. After 1872, the chiefs had sought the United Kingdom's protection against Turkish and Zaidi encroachment from Yemen, and they had concluded treaties with the United Kingdom authorities at Aden. The chiefs had been empowered to speak on behalf of their people. It had, of course, been a commonplace in the nineteenth century for a colonial Power to enter into treaties of that kind and then to gain complete control over a region which in fact became a colony. The Aden Protectorate had not, however, suffered that fate. The tribes and the chiefs had maintained their independence, which had been threatened by the Turks rather than by the United Kingdom. Similarly, when after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the First World War, Yemen had laid claim to the Aden Protectorate and had invaded part of the country, its only achievement had been to rouse opposition to Yemen and not to the United Kingdom. The resentment against the United Kingdom at that time had been due solely to its failure to act sufficiently quickly to expel the Yemeni invaders.

87. The country, however, had remained poor and cut off from the forces of progress. Consciousness of that fact had developed during and after the Second World War, and finally the United Kingdom's aid and advice had been sought to set up better administrative systems and to promote economic and social development. Though progress had not always been as fast as could have been desired, the ten years following the war had seen substantial changes and the birth of small States with their own administration and judicial systems. That had happened at a time when all over the world the peoples of the colonies had been attaining independence. Although the people of the Aden Protectorate had never been directly subjected to colonial rule, the contacts made possible by modern means of communication had aroused in them a desire to be fully independent and to live on a footing of equality with their brothers in the other Arab countries.

88. If what had been stated before the Committee had been true, the people would at that time have overwhelmingly sought union with Yemen. The Yemeni Government had certainly done its best at the time to encourage such a movement. However, it had succeeded only in enlisting the services of a comparatively small number of mercenaries who had been employed to cause disturbances. Those elements had seriously interfered with the progress of the country, but they had failed to arouse among the people any desire for union with Yemen. On the contrary, the great mass

of the people had showed opposition to Yemeni influence, the reason being that they were not Yemeni and wanted independence on their own terms.

89. The main obstacle to independence had clearly been disunity, but, there again, the people had wanted unity on their own terms. That was why they had rejected an earlier attempt by the United Kingdom Government to unite the various States in a federation. The proposals put forward in 1954 had envisaged a colonial-type government with a United Kingdom Governor at its head. The rejection of the 1954 proposal had delayed progress. Nevertheless, the desire for union had persisted and had later been intensified by the Yemeni Government's activities. On 11 February 1959 six States had taken the initiative in joining together and establishing the Federation of South Arabia. Since then eight other States, including Aden itself, had joined the Federation. The negotiations, in which he himself had participated, had taken months of effort, and it was false to state that they had been carried out without consultations. The agreements that had finally been reached had subsequently been ratified by the State Councils on which the representatives of the tribes sat. Thus, no one could say that the Federation had been imposed by force; it was on the contrary the outcome of an initiative taken by the States.

90. The Federal Government's authority extended to external affairs, defence, internal security, education, health, communications, and posts and telegraphs. The Federal Government shared responsibility with the State governments for agriculture, fisheries, commerce and industry, and other matters. Thus, there could be no question of its being an autocratic and feudal government lacking a representative character and without popular support. Even the great Powers were not agreed as to what constituted "democracy", and very different systems of government all claimed to be democratic. It was obvious that a system of government should be related to the particular conditions of the country concerned. In the Federation of South Arabia an attempt had been made to achieve a compromise between the conventional forms of democracy and local customs. The two Councils of the Federation were organized on a democratic basis, since the Federal Council was composed of the representatives of States, and the Supreme Council was elected by them. Again, with the exception of Aden, nine tenths of the people of the Federation were organized in tribal, clan and family units and were still firmly

attached to traditional practices. Those families and clans had always chosen their leaders, not by voting, but after discussions in which the entire membership could participate. The leaders so elected then met to elect the tribal chiefs. That was still current practice although it had been modified in some respects. The heads of the States were elected in the traditional manner of the tribal chiefs, and the members of the councils which shared with them in the government of the States were similarly chosen from among the clan leaders. In some cases, as in Dathina which was a republic, representatives were elected to district councils, and they in turn elected representatives to the State council. In other cases, as in the Sheikhdome of Upper Aulahi, representatives were elected direct to the State councils. In yet other cases, the members of the Federal Council were elected directly by the tribes. Those practices were truly democratic, although that did not rule out consideration of more formal electoral procedures, as was actually being done in the States of Lahej and Fadhli.

91. The relationship between the United Kingdom Government and the Federation was governed by the Treaty signed on 11 February 1959. Under that Treaty, the Federation had ceded to the United Kingdom its control over foreign affairs, while reserving the right to be consulted. The United Kingdom, for its part, had agreed to assist the Federation by providing for its defence, giving it technical advice and financial aid and, generally, helping it to become fully independent. Thus the Federation was by no means a typical colonial territory. In particular, the High Commissioner had no "reserve powers" in respect of the Federation or the Federal Government. In addition, although the High Commissioner had "power of advice" on certain matters, he had never used it, and, to judge from what had happened so far in the different States, it was most unlikely that he would use it in the future. The Federation, in fact, exercised full control over every aspect of government, except for foreign affairs, and even in that case it was extensively consulted when its interests were involved. Recently, for example, when relations had been broken off between the Somali Republic and the United Kingdom, he, in his capacity as Minister for Foreign Affairs, had impressed on the United Kingdom Government the desire of the Federation to retain its link with Somalia, and the Somali Consulate in Aden had remained open.

92. Aden occupied a special place in the Federation. Although Aden was now a member of the Federation, the United Kingdom Government retained its sovereignty there for the time being. The Federation had accepted that arrangement because of the special responsibilities of the United Kingdom in Aden. It was not possible to obtain all that one wanted in an agreement. The United Kingdom had been in Aden since 1839, and, consequently, there had been no alternative but to request its aid and advice. The United Kingdom had granted that request and, in all sincerity, had made a large contribution to the very substantial progress made in the economic and social spheres since the creation of the Federation.

93. During the coming year, the Federation proposed to spend more than a million pounds on education and almost as much on public health. Social services were already highly developed in Aden, and important progress had also been made in the rural areas.

94. Recapitulating the progress made, he recalled that four years previously the region had been split into a number of small States, none of which could possibly have aspired to independence. Aden had been under the full control of a colonial Government. Today, however, fourteen States were united in a Federation which - apart from the case of Aden - was fully independent in every respect except for foreign affairs. Having regard to the history of the country and to various unavoidable difficulties, the progress made was most encouraging. The Federation was an almost entirely independent State and could be expected to achieve full independence without undue delay.

95. In conclusion, he said that this country was not part of Yemen. It was, however, inhabited by Arabs and, when it had become independent, it would seek a place of respect in the Arab world. In order to attain that goal, it was counting on the assistance and sympathy of all peoples of goodwill.

96. Mr. ALHABSHI in a further statement said that he considered that the Territory of Aden was a dependent Territory within the meaning of the Declaration on the granting of independence and that it was incumbent upon the Committee to ensure that the provisions of the Declaration were applied to it.

97. He drew attention to the assertions by Sheikh Farid that the Federation of South Arabia was a sovereign State, adding that no government worthy of the name could permit interference by an international organization. Yet he had made these statements before the Committee, whose competence was limited to dependent Territories.

98. He also drew the Committee's attention to the Hadramout, which consisted of three States in the Eastern Protectorate representing more than half the territory and which would not become part of the Federation. The Committee should consider that province as an integral part of the territory of South Arabia or of the Aden Protectorate. This Province, which was rich in manpower and agricultural and mineral resources, must at all costs be prevented from becoming, sooner or later, another Katanga.

99. Mr. SOHBI in a further statement said that Sheikh Farid represented nobody but himself. The Peoples Socialist Party had never recognized the so-called Federation and its organs, the Supreme Council and the Federal Council, or the so-called Aden Legislative Council, because they were not created by popular will and their only purpose was to serve United Kingdom interests.

100. It was entirely untrue that the FSP and the Trade Union Congress consisted solely of persons born in the North. He used the word "North" advisedly because the territory as a whole was Yemen. Sheikh Farid was well aware that Mr. Sohbi had been born in Aden and that his father had been born in Aden, as had the five members of the Presidential Council of the FSP. The Party had been established by the leaders of the Trade Union Congress, who had suffered fines and imprisonment because of their sacred struggle against the British and the reactionaries. The Trade Union Congress and the entire intelligentsia of the country were all united in the FSP. The base of the Party was labour, but it represented all classes of society and its members were mainly from the various provinces of the Protectorate. Actually, 70 per cent of the members of the oil refinery union - one of the most powerful in the country - were Authalis.

101. Sheikh Farid had said that from 15,000 to 20,000 persons were working at the Aden base. Actually, the number did not exceed 6,000, without allowing for the vacancies caused by deportations. The Sheikh claimed that the workers were well paid, but he had failed to point out that the consumer price index was the highest in the Middle East.

102. Sheikh Farid had forgotten to mention how many leaders and members of the Forces Trade Union at the Aden base had been thrown into prison or deported because of their fight for better living conditions. He had also failed to mention how many United Kingdom officers had testified against them. Nor had he described

how, in 1962, the five members of the First Emergency Committee of the Forces Trade Union had been dragged into court and how an attempt had been made to force them to sign a bond that they would give up their trade union activity. When they had decided to call a general strike, they had been thrown into prison.

103. Sheikh Farid had refrained from saying that the last settlement between the Forces Trade Union and the United Kingdom forces had not been a final one. The British were exempted from customs duties and taxes and from the payment of rent, despite the fact that they occupied the best land. Apart from the meagre subsidies provided by the United Kingdom, the country derived no benefit from the presence of the armed forces - quite the contrary.

104. Just as the people of Aden glimpsed the possibility of being reunited with their mother country, the British had resorted to another trick. The so-called Federation was even worse than the colonialists, because behind the camouflage of Arab leadership, it represented only the interests of the United Kingdom. He hoped that one day the supporters of the Federation would take their places beside the nationalists, who were waiting to welcome them. Although he had consistently championed the cause of unity with his Northern brothers, Mr. Sohbi was not opposed to self-determination for the territory, because he knew that his party enjoyed the support of the people and was confident that unity would come with independence.

General Statements by Members

105. The representative of Iraq said that Aden and the surrounding areas, known since 1959 as the Federation of South Arabia, had always had the closest relations with Yemen. Ever since the ninth century the various sheikhs and emirs of the Southern Arabian coast had acknowledged the sovereignty of the rulers of Yemen. During the nineteenth century, however, the United Kingdom had become interested in securing control of the Arab lands on the route to its imperial possessions in Asia. As early as 1802 a so-called Treaty of Amity and Commerce had been concluded with the local emir of Aden. The emir had had no right to conclude treaties with foreign Powers, but in the course of the nineteenth century the United Kingdom Government had concluded many such illegal and unequal treaties with the petty sheikhs and princelings of the Southern Arabian coast and the Gulf area.

106. The Treaty of Amity and Commerce had soon been found inadequate to meet the United Kingdom's desire for greater control over the area. In 1837 there had been an incident in the port of Aden involving a British Indian vessel. The United Kingdom Government had rejected all offers of compensation and had demanded that Aden should be sold to it for use as a coaling depot for British ships. That demand had unexpectedly been accepted and the United Kingdom had had to find another pretext for occupying Aden. On 19 January 1839, British forces had bombarded and occupied Aden because the Sultan of Lahej had insisted on maintaining his nominal sovereignty over the town. Since then Aden had been a Crown Colony administered first through the Government of India and since 1937 by the Colonial Office in London.

107. British control over the hinterland had been extended through so-called protective treaties concluded during the latter part of the nineteenth century, when the opening of the Suez Canal had made South Arabia and the Gulf very important for British imperial communications to India and the Far East. Numerous such treaties had been concluded with the various sultans, emirs and sheikhs of the area, who had had no legal sovereignty over the lands and peoples in whose name they had accepted such far-reaching obligations. Moreover, the treaties had been completely unequal, having been concluded between weak and helpless local tribal leaders and what had been at that time the greatest empire in the world.

From 1936 onwards the agreements had been amended by so-called advisory treaties which, while maintaining the basic provisions of the Protectorate, made the acceptance of advice from the Governor of Aden compulsory.

108. Yemen had never recognized the legality of the treaties and had never relinquished its claim to sovereignty over Aden and the Protectorate. Fighting had broken out between Yemeni and British troops and had continued intermittently until 1928, when negotiations had begun which had ended in the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Co-operation signed in 1934. The Government of Yemen had not given up its claim, but had agreed that pending negotiations nothing should be done to upset the status quo. That had subsequently been confirmed in an exchange of letters on 20 January 1951 between the United Kingdom and Yemeni Governments in which it had been agreed to establish a joint frontier demarcation commission and both sides had undertaken not to alter the status quo in the disputed areas before the conclusion of the commission's work. In spite of those undertakings, the United Kingdom Government had continued its endeavours to change the situation with a view to preventing the restoration of the territories to Yemen. Since the conclusion of the Treaty of 1934 the question of sovereignty had been held in abeyance pending agreement; it was therefore clear that anything that prejudged the question of sovereignty or prejudiced the right of one of the claimants must be considered a violation of the spirit, if not the letter, of the Treaty. Yet that was exactly what the United Kingdom Government had sought to do during the past ten years.

109. It must be remembered that the strategic and political concepts of British imperial policy had undergone a drastic change after the Second World War. The loss of the Indian Empire and other colonial territories in South East Asia had coincided with the discovery and production of oil in the Gulf area. The usefulness of Aden as a coaling station and a naval base had become obsolete. A new importance had been found for it, however, with the rapid expansion of Middle Eastern oil production. In 1954 a large oil refinery had been built at Aden and the area was to be built up as a major military base for use in case of emergency. It would be remembered that that had been a period when the United Kingdom had returned in the Middle East to the policy of using force to gain political objectives.

110. After the Iraqi revolution of 14 July 1958 a new attempt had been made to consolidate British control in Southern Arabia. In February 1959 a Federation of Southern Arabian principalities had been established and had concluded a treaty with the United Kingdom Government under which the United Kingdom maintained complete and exclusive control of foreign affairs. The Protective Treaties and the Advisory Agreements remained in force and British forces had absolute freedom of movement and installation at all times.

111. The control and influence of the United Kingdom Government over the territories was not derived from written engagements alone but was based on the relationship of subservience between the feudal sheikhs and that Government. The final element of the plan to consolidate British control over South Arabia had been to include Aden in the Federation, as had become apparent after the publication of the latest White Paper on Defence, which showed that the United Kingdom intended to keep land forces permanently stationed in Aden and the Gulf. In addition to the desire to maintain a permanent military base, the Federation had been imposed on the people of Aden in order to perpetuate the separation of the town and its hinterland from Yemen. The haste with which the Federation had been rushed through Parliament and put into effect might be explained by a desire to neutralize the effect on South Arabia of the changes that had taken place in Yemen, where a progressive Government had taken over. The revolution in Yemen and the emergence of a progressive Government had removed any doubts which the liberal elements in Aden might have had about reunion with Yemen. As he had stated before the General Assembly on 20 November 1962, the consent of the people of Aden to the Federation had never been obtained. The federal plan had been adopted by the so-called Legislative Council, which had been elected under a most undemocratic franchise. Over 76 per cent of the population had boycotted the elections in 1959 and the elected members had obtained the votes of not more than 2 per cent of the population. Eight of the twelve elected members had abstained and only four had voted for the federal plan. Thus the destinies of the people of Aden for at least six years had been decided by a minority vote of a council chosen on the basis of a highly restrictive and selective franchise.

112. Article 2 of the so-called treaty between the sheikhs of the Federation of South Arabia and the United Kingdom Government for the inclusion of Aden in the Federation stated categorically: "Nothing in this treaty shall affect British sovereignty over Aden". It was hardly necessary to point out the inconsistency of that article with the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples. The United Kingdom Government could exclude or withdraw from the Federation any area or areas within Aden at any time; furthermore, Aden had no right to withdraw from the Federation except with the approval of the United Kingdom Government and not before the expiration of six years. Even if such withdrawal were effected, Aden would still remain a British colony. Thus the Federation was primarily aimed at maintaining the colonial status of Aden and at preserving the authority of the United Kingdom Government in the area. That was done in a variety of ways. For example the Governor, or High Commissioner as he was now called, could overrule any decision taken by the Federation on matters concerning defence, external affairs and internal security. Hence, even in the unlikely event of the tribal sheikhs asking for real independence or demanding the withdrawal of the military installations from Aden, the United Kingdom Government could veto their demands. Aden was a military base and would remain one, whether the inhabitants or the people of the other Arab countries which were directly threatened by the base liked it or not. It was to remain forever a colony in order to maintain British domination over the various oil interests in the Middle East.

113. The people of Yemen, Aden and its hinterland had opposed the Federation precisely because it served British colonial interests. Moreover, it strengthened the feudal and backward regime of the sheikhs at a time when, with the liberation of Yemen, the oldest citadel of feudalism and reaction in the Arab world had fallen. The policy of the United Kingdom represented an effort to stem the tide of progress and freedom. Because of that the people of the Territory were resolutely opposed to its colonial plans and had made their demands clear. They were, firstly, the dissolution of the present legislative bodies; secondly, new elections, based upon universal suffrage, under United Nations supervision; thirdly, free exercise of the right to self-determination under adequate international guarantees. New elections must, however, be preceded by reforms in the electoral laws, introducing the principle of universal adult suffrage and the

right to vote for all Yemeni people residing in the Territory. In the past Yemenis from the north had been disqualified from voting on the ground that they were not British subjects, although they had more in common with the people of the territory than British subjects from other parts of the world who had been given the right to vote after only two years' residence.

114. It might be useful for the Special Committee to send a visiting mission to Aden and the hinterland, to contact the representatives of the people, examine conditions and report with recommendations on the best and most expeditious means of implementing the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples and restoring the unity of the people of South Arabia with their brethren in Yemen.

115. During the century and a quarter that Aden had been under British rule very little had been done to raise the economic, social and educational standards of the people. United Nations documents showed how primitive and backward conditions were in Aden and the surrounding areas. Public health had been sadly neglected, with the result that the colony and protectorate had one of the highest rates of child mortality in the world. Secondary education was practically non-existent in the hinterland, while not more than 2 per cent of the population attended school at any level. Economic and social conditions in the Territory would be examined by the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories; he had mentioned the appalling conditions in Aden and the Protectorate only to emphasize the need for quick and effective action.

116. Political repression of the nationalist political parties had continued with increasing violence during the past decade. Many political leaders had been exiled or imprisoned. In September 1962, when the federal plan had been under consideration by the Legislative Council, Mr. Asnag, the Secretary-General of the Aden Trade Union Congress, had been flogged and sentenced to one year's imprisonment and Arab lawyers in Cairo who had been retained to defend him had been refused permission to do so. Mr. Asnag and others had been sentenced for distributing a pamphlet describing the events of 24 September, when the people had demonstrated against the federal plan, and for fomenting a strike. All strikes in Aden were illegal, irrespective of their cause or type.

117. It was often argued in explanation of the United Kingdom's reluctance to meet the nationalist demands in South Arabia that it had certain obligations towards the rulers. In fact, however, the obligations of the United Kingdom to the so-called Middle Eastern rulers had no moral or legal validity. Instead of supporting those feudal and reactionary potentates the United Kingdom Government would do well to recognize the great emerging force of progressive nationalism in the Middle East, a force that shared with the British people their cherished ideals of freedom and the dignity of man. Furthermore, it was clear that whatever interests any country had in foreign lands could be secured only through the good will and friendly co-operation of the peoples concerned. The United Kingdom Government had a great and unique opportunity to improve its reputation in the Arab world and to protect its interests in a more rational and lasting way. It must be aware of the changes taking place in the Arab world, the result of which would be to unify the Arab people and to chart for them a road of progress, freedom and dignity. The United Kingdom had a great opportunity to react to those historic developments with realism and statesmanship. The delegation of Iraq hoped that it would agree to the suggestion that a visiting mission should be sent to the Territory as a prelude to guaranteeing the exercise by the people of their right to self-determination in conditions of freedom and democracy.

118. The representative of Syria stated that his delegation wished to bring home to the Committee the gravity of the situation created by British constitutional plans for the area and the continued denial of the right of self-determination. The United Kingdom Government's recent move was designed to give the impression that it was at long last endeavouring to meet its obligations under the Charter and under General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) but nothing could be further from the truth.

119. An eminent British scholar had rightly said that Crown Colony Government was essentially a perpetuation of subordinate status rather than an introduction to self-government. The recent changes had done nothing to alter the subordinate status of South Arabia or to meet the legitimate aspirations of its people. The representative of Iraq had already explained how the area had first come under British domination. The British had been actuated by imperial interests and had

not the slightest concern for the well-being of the people involved. Aden and the hinterland, or Protectorate, had been occupied against the will of the people and divided into small emirates, sheikhdoms and sultanates to suit British interests. The treaties to which the imperial Power so often referred, had been concluded under duress and were consequently illegal. It was obvious that no people would of their own volition ask for foreign rule. Even assuming, for argument's sake, that some had done so, they had been either deceived or backward individuals and hence not entitled to mortgage the future of the whole people forever.

120. During the long period of British domination, nothing had been done to improve the lot of the people or prepare them for self-government. The appalling social, educational and economic situation described by Mr. Alhabshi at the 149th meeting was sufficient proof of the imperialist Power's utter neglect of the welfare of the people, while the information provided by the Secretariat and the petitioner's statement showed how the people had been kept in a state of complete dependence on the so-called advice or the direct rule of the British authorities.

121. In July 1961, a member of the British Parliament had written that Aden and the Aden Protectorate had originally been brought into the British orbit because they served British imperial requirements and that more enlightened modern principles of freedom, self-determination and international justice demanded that, with the same motive and wisdom that the United Kingdom had had in liberating India and other imperial possessions, it should seek to implement those principles in Aden colony and the Protectorate. Unfortunately nothing of the sort had been done. On the contrary, the United Kingdom Government had sought to reinforce its sway, for that was the purpose of the Federation of South Arabia, to which Aden had to accede against the will of its people. It was well-nigh impossible to argue that the Federation was designed to promote the constitutional evolution of South Arabia towards unity and independence. As the petitioners and the representative of Iraq had pointed out, the real purpose of the Federation was to guarantee British strategic and economic interests.

122. It could legitimately be asked whether that action was morally right and whether it could be considered legal, opposed as it was by the overwhelming majority of the population. The following facts about the so-called Federation of South Arabia would be hard to deny.

123. Firstly, it was an imposed Federation, having no regard for the will of the people. Aden had been forced to join it and its people had not been consulted. The matter had been settled between the United Kingdom Government and the Legislative Council of Aden, whose elected members had received no more than 2 per cent of the popular vote, and the people of the rest of the Federation had never been consulted. In accordance with the usual British practice, the consent of the sheikhs, emirs and sultans - and that was not always freely given - had been sufficient to bind the people.

124. Secondly, the Federation did not alter the subordinate status of the area. It was openly stated in Article 2 of the Treaty that nothing in the Treaty should affect British sovereignty over Aden. The Treaty provided that the Federation must accept and implement in all respects any advice given by the United Kingdom in any matter connected with the good government of the Federation.

125. Thirdly, the Federation, while open to other States which might wish to join it, also provided for secession, moves in either direction being subject, of course, to United Kingdom agreement. Thus divisions were maintained, parochial interests encouraged, and the clear desire of the people of South Arabia to be united and independent totally frustrated.

126. That situation was contrary not only to the United Nations Charter but to the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples. Not only was the will of the people of South Arabia being thwarted but their freedom was being subjected to all sorts of limitations.

127. The Syrian delegation found it difficult to comprehend that policy, since the United Kingdom had been among the first colonial Powers to speak of the "wind of change" and to attempt to bend in its direction. The United Kingdom was not serving even its own interests by endeavouring to perpetuate its domination over South Arabia contrary to the wishes of the people, who were longing to regain their freedom and to reunite with their mother country, Yemen.

128. The tide of unity and liberation was sweeping over the whole Arab world and neither parochial nor imperial interests could stem it in South Arabia. In the name of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples and in that of progressive humanity, the Syrian delegation urged that the constitutional sham imposed on South Arabia should be completely demolished. The

people of South Arabia were asking for self-determination and the right to live as free people in their own homeland.

129. The Syrian delegation therefore urged the Committee to call on the United Kingdom Government to issue a general amnesty for all political prisoners, to allow all exiles to return and to rescind such laws as suppressed freedom of political activity and all other freedoms in Aden and the Aden Protectorate.

130. Secondly, the Committee should call immediately for general elections, on the basis of universal adult franchise, in all parts of South Arabia under British rule. The existing Legislative and Supreme Councils did not represent the people and should be dissolved.

131. Thirdly, the Committee should urge the United Kingdom Government to accede to the will of the people and to proceed immediately to the application of the Declaration embodied in resolution 1514 (XV).

132. The Committee would be well advised to send a mission to the area to recommend suitable means of ensuring the prompt realization of the legitimate aspirations of the people, in conformity with the historic Declaration.

133. The representative of Cambodia said that in its approach to the question on Aden his delegation was not going to expatiate on the distant or recent past of the Territory, or on the considerations of an economic, social and military nature, since the Special Committee was aware of the present situation thanks to the document prepared by the Secretariat and to the information on certain aspects of the problem supplied by the petitioners and the representative of the Administering Power.

134. It was clear to his delegation that resolution 1514 (XV) was wholly applicable to the Territory of Aden; in other words, to the Colony of Aden, the islands administratively attached to it and the Protectorate composed of a large number of small States. A petitioner had expressed the hope that the United Nations would adopt a resolution on the application of the Declaration, on the granting of independence, to the people and territory of Aden. Actually, Aden was a Non-Self-Governing Territory in respect of which the Administering Power had agreed to furnish information under Article 73 of the Charter, and there was no doubt that the Territory of Aden even in its present form came within the purview of the Committee, since it had not yet attained independence. Immediate steps should therefore be taken to transfer all powers to the inhabitants of Aden,

without any reservations in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire, in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence and freedom.

135. The first concrete measure would be to create conditions that would enable the population to make its aspirations known freely. The enjoyment of fundamental human rights and freedoms, the exercise of political rights, the introduction of universal adult suffrage, were far from assured in the Territory, and its present status could not be considered valid in spite of the attempts that were made to give that status the appearances of legality. It was obvious that the future of a country could not be based on the approval of a Legislative Council which, taking into account the opposition of eight of the twelve elected members, did not, after all, represent even 1 per cent of the population.

136. Moreover, the present status of the Territory did not appear to conform to the principles mentioned in the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples; certainly the use of the term "Protectorate", which had now been given to the whole of the Territory, was not likely to encourage the belief that colonialism had been abandoned. Cambodia, which had also been a protectorate, had learned what that meant by hard experience. The clauses of the new treaty with respect to Aden left no doubt concerning the part played by foreign domination.

137. In the view of his delegation, the principle of self-determination in accordance with the United Nations Charter should be applied. To that end, it was necessary, first, to suspend implementation of the treaty, on which the people had not been consulted; secondly, to rescind measures restricting the exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms; thirdly, to introduce the free exercise of political rights; fourthly, to disband the present Legislative Councils and hold general elections throughout the Territory of Aden. In working out those various measures, a United Nations visiting mission could make a useful contribution. As to the evacuation of military bases and possible unification with another country of the region, the people of the Territory of Aden could decide on those questions in full sovereignty once they were independent.

138. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics reminded the Committee that the question of the United Kingdom colonies in South Arabia had been

considered by the Special Committee the year before. Since that time, as was indicated by the numerous petitions received from parties and organizations representing the indigenous population, tension in the area had been increased, because of the new measures taken by the United Kingdom colonialists to maintain their domination.

139. The crumbling of the United Kingdom's colonial empire in the Middle East was already a historical fact. It was a great victory for the Arab peoples. Nevertheless, the United Kingdom persisted in trying to maintain itself in South Arabia. During the past few years the United Kingdom's colonial policy had exhibited a marked tendency towards the creation of so-called federations. The Committee had already dealt with the Central African Federation, and everyone knew what lay behind that. The old policy of "divide and rule" had failed in South Arabia. The United Kingdom had therefore tried to exploit the desire for unity of the peoples of the Arabian Peninsula, who saw in unification a possibility of putting an end for all time to their dependent status. It had decided to create the Federation of South Arabia in order to mask its domination. That so-called Federation was a new form of the earlier colonial domination, as was indicated by the very methods by which it had been established.

140. On 18 January 1963 Aden had been made a part of the Federation of South Arabia because the United Kingdom politicians considered that to be the only way they could keep the Territory, and hence all of South Arabia, under the direct domination of the United Kingdom. Since the adoption of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, it had become too risky to try to maintain the colonial regime in its previous form. The revolution in Yemen had complicated London's political machinations in South Arabia, and the United Kingdom, abandoning earlier plans, had concluded the so-called agreement making Aden a part of the Federation. London had, in fact, been dissatisfied with the number of countries in the Federation and its limited viability; it had therefore been important to include Aden, which was entirely subordinated to the wishes of the United Kingdom and was considered the political and economic cornerstone of the Federation. The United Kingdom's plans went

beyond that: the Federation was to be given internal autonomy, and it would then be proclaimed an independent member of the Commonwealth. Thus, while it would have an appearance of independence, the Federation would remain bound by the treaties which subjugated it for reasons of mutual aid and the maintenance of military bases. Moreover, the implementation of those plans, according to the United Kingdom, would lead to the legal recognition of the Federation by the other States.

141. Within the Federation, all power was held by the United Kingdom High Commissioner, who appointed and removed the chief ministers, while United Kingdom advisers to the sultans and emirs made sure that orders were carried out without protest. As had been stated by the Cairo newspaper Al Akhbar, the Federation was a bogus union which had been imposed by force and in no way expressed the will of the people. It amounted, in fact, to a continuation of the earlier order.

142. The situation in the United Kingdom colonies of South Arabia was marked by poverty, illiteracy and the lack of any public health measures, even though the United Kingdom had been in the region for 120 years. The Territories were in fact used as bases for maintaining the domination of the so-called free world, which was founded on the NATO Powers' exploitation of the natural and human resources of Africa, Asia and Latin America. That world was free only in the same sense as the Roman Empire, in which Roman citizens had been free and many nations had been enslaved.

143. The Federation of South Arabia constituted a new example of political trickery, following after the Central African Federation, the West Indies Federation and the Federation of Malaysia. It must be remembered that there was oil in south-east Arabia and in the sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf. Known reserves had amounted in 1957 to more than 9,200 million tons, or 40 per cent of the total reserves of the Near East. In 1958 half the oil of the eastern Arab world had come from that region, and, according to geologists, immense undeveloped resources still existed.

144. The strategic situation of the area must also be considered. According to a White Paper on defence published in 1962 by the United Kingdom Government, the peace and stability of the oil States of Arabia and the Persian Gulf were of

vital importance to the Western world. It was for that reason that the United Kingdom had reinforced its military establishment in the Middle East. In May 1962 the headquarters of the United Kingdom's naval forces in the Middle East had been transferred from Bahrein to Aden, which had thus become the headquarters of all three United Kingdom services in the Middle East. The Daily Express had stated that Aden was the last bastion of the United Kingdom in the Near and Middle East.

145. Aden was one of the United Kingdom's most important foreign bases, and about 10,000 men were stationed there. When the United Kingdom had had to liquidate its Suez Canal military base in 1952, Aden had become an outpost in the battle against the national liberation movement in the eastern Arab world. That was the base from which United Kingdom aircraft had flown to bomb Egypt at the time of the Suez venture and from which they were currently flying to bomb the battling towns of Oman. Moreover, according to the above-mentioned White Paper, the United Kingdom was taking steps to expand its Aden base to accommodate its troops currently stationed in Kenya. In other words, the United Kingdom was transforming Aden into a real military stronghold. According to its own Press, the United Kingdom was spending between \$9 and £11 million annually on installation at Aden.

146. It was, however, becoming increasingly difficult to justify the maintenance of such bases. For that reason Western strategists had decided to conceal their bases under water, using submarines equipped with Polaris missiles. Those plans were directed not only against the socialist countries but, in general, against any country which refused to bow to orders from abroad. The existing network of nuclear submarine bases was eventually to cover the entire globe. The Daily Express of 28 January 1963 had stated that in addition to the nuclear submarine base at Rota, which Franco had placed at NATO's disposal, and the bases at Naples and in Crete, a similar base was to be established in the Indian Ocean, that is, at Aden. Since, for the purposes of aggression against the Soviet Union, NATO had common frontiers with that country, it followed that the Polaris missiles at Aden would be directed not against the Soviet Union but against the neighbouring countries of the area.

147. In order to facilitate the execution of its plans, the United Kingdom had taken care to isolate South Arabia from the rest of the world, and, in particular, from the Arab world. Its only exception to that rule had been to allow United States monopolies to penetrate into South Arabia. The United Kingdom's policy consisted essentially of maintaining a climate of hostility between South Arabia and the other Arab nations. Until 1962 Yemen had been under the semi-colonial control of the United Kingdom, which had had every opportunity to strengthen the traditional ties between Yemen and South Arabia. In fact, it had taken every possible step to sow disunity. The true interest of the people of South Arabia was to unite all their efforts against United Kingdom colonial policy, and it was regrettable that there were still some people in South Arabia who had not understood that by associating themselves with the United Kingdom they were merely preparing new suffering for their nation. The military base at Aden and the Federation of South Arabia were in fact merely instruments which could be used for aggression against nations struggling for their political and economic independence.

148. According to the Press, the profits of the Shell Oil Company, which carried on its activities chiefly in the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf, had amounted to £500 million in one year. Instead of weighing the economic advantages which might accrue to the people from the existence of the Aden base, it would be better to consider whether it might not be preferable to return to the people of the area the oil which belonged to them, so that they might exploit it themselves.

149. The question of true independence for the people of South Arabia could not be settled until the problem of the military base of Aden was solved. Furthermore, the total liquidation of the colonial regime was closely linked to the cause of maintaining international peace and co-operation. The Special Committee should therefore firmly reject all the subterfuges of the colonialists. It should support the demands in the petitioners' statements and in the written petitions from the inhabitants of South Arabia. A study of the situation in the United Kingdom colonies of South Arabia led to the conclusion that the so-called "Federation of South Arabia" ran counter to the interests of the population of those territories, that in the plans of the United Kingdom colonialists those territories were a stronghold for combating the national liberation movements and

/...

attacking the independent States in the region, and that the United Kingdom intended to go on plundering the resources of the region with the assistance of the United States.

150. It was therefore the main task of the Special Committee to work out practical ways of applying the Declaration on the granting of independence to the United Kingdom colonies in South Arabia. The Soviet Union delegation supported the demands of the people of South Arabia for the immediate abolition of the colonial regime, the withdrawal of all United Kingdom troops, the liquidation of military bases, an amnesty for all political prisoners and the granting of all political liberties to the indigenous people. It also supported the demands of the inhabitants for free elections with universal suffrage. The question of the future status of any particular territory was a matter which should be decided by the inhabitants when they could express themselves freely. At the present stage the Soviet Union delegation considered that it was possible to accept the proposal that a visiting mission should be sent to the area with the task of finding means of implementing the Declaration on the granting of independence. As Lenin had predicted as far back as 1922, the great majority of peoples had now freed themselves from the chains of colonialism and imperialism. There was no doubt that the people of South Arabia, too, would soon enjoy freedom and independence.

151. The representative of Sierra Leone said that the fact that the question of Aden and South Arabia was being discussed by the Committee for the first time should not lead it to minimize the gravity of the situation in that Territory. The Committee should seek every possible means of implementing resolution 1514 (XV) on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples. The people of Aden and South Arabia, like all non-self-governing peoples, had a right to self-determination and it was the duty of the Committee to help them to achieve their aspirations.

152. The United Kingdom, which wanted a foothold in the East, had been in Aden for nearly 130 years. As an Administering Power it had accepted the "sacred trust", in accordance with Article 73 of the Charter, to promote to the utmost the well-being of the inhabitants of the Territory, and, to that end (a) to ensure their political, economic, social and educational advancement, their just treatment and their protection against abuses; and (b) to develop self-government

and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions, according to the particular circumstances of each territory and the stage of advancement of its people.

153. The Committee had heard petitioners representing various political groups. Furthermore, the representative of a minority group, the Acting President of the United National Party of Aden, had given an account<sup>13/</sup> of the educational progress achieved in Aden, and the methods used to induce the United Kingdom Government to satisfy the aspirations of the indigenous peoples. He had argued that excellent results had been achieved and that Aden was on the road to self-government, the ultimate goal being to create a new independent and sovereign State which would include Aden and all the States of South Arabia.

154. The picture which the Committee had been given of the situation in the Protectorate, however, was far from satisfactory. Two petitioners, Mr. Alhabshi, of the South Arabians League, and Mr. Sohbi, of the Peoples Socialist Party, had described the efforts of the United Kingdom Government to stem the tide of progress; they had shown how, under the guise of offering protection and advice, the United Kingdom Government had sown disunity and discord in the Territory; they had informed the Committee of the lack of educational, social and medical facilities, of the acts of repression against political leaders and of the way in which the legitimate aspirations of the people were being met with terrorism, repression and deportation.

155. Such acts were contrary to General Assembly resolution 1188 (XII), which recommended that Member States having responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing Territories should promote the realization and facilitate the exercise of the right of self-determination by the peoples of such Territories.

156. Although their methods might differ, it was obvious that all the political groups in Aden and the Protectorate were working for unity and independence. His delegation thought it was desirable that those groups should endeavour to reach a compromise among themselves so that they would be better able to present a united front in order to achieve independence at the earliest possible date. Sierra Leone, a former United Kingdom colony, was well aware of the divisions there

---

13/ A/AC.109/PET.114.

might be in a subject people. Those difficulties, although great, were not insurmountable and the Sierra Leone delegation was certain that the people of Aden and of the Protectorate would attain independence in the near future.

157. The representative of the Ivory Coast noted that until 1962 there had been a Federation of eleven States, called the "Federation of South Arabia", and a colony officially called "Aden Colony". Those two groups were under a colonial regime and had the right to attain independence by virtue of resolution 1514 (XV) on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, adopted in December 1960. On 18 January 1963 Aden had been attached to the Federation of South Arabia, of which it had become the twelfth territory. With or without Aden, the Federation of South Arabia remained a Non-Self-Governing Territory, within the competence of the Committee.

158. Having heard one of the petitioners, a Minister of that Federation, say that it desired independence, the Committee should ask for the implementation of resolution 1514 (XV) in the Federation. It should request the Administering Power to take all the steps provided for in that resolution and to transfer sovereignty over the Federation to representative authorities democratically elected by the people. That was the position of the Ivory Coast delegation in regard to the general problem presented by the Federation.

159. On 18 January 1963 Aden had been integrated with the Federation, at the request of certain Aden Ministers but following a vote by the Legislative Council which had obviously taken place in confusion. Furthermore, the wishes of the people had apparently not been consulted in that act of integration. The Ivory Coast delegation held that the happiness of a people could not be achieved against its wishes and it consequently considered that that act could not be recognized.

160. The Ivory Coast delegation held that a Government was not entitled to alienate any of the national territory and it denied the right of anybody, no matter how representative it was, to ask for the annexation of a territory, unless that was in conformity with the expressed wishes of the people concerned. For that reason the Ivory Coast delegation did not think that it could be said that the problem would be solved by the annexation of the Territory to another State.

161. In the opinion of the Ivory Coast delegation, the only way of finally solving the problem of Aden was to secure the implementation of resolution 1514 (XV). If that solution were not adopted, the problem would arise once more in different forms and the Committee might no longer have the right to examine it; thus part of the population of a country would be robbed of the ability to make their voice heard. The solution his delegation would recommend was that a plebiscite should be held, under United Nations auspices, in that part of the Territory in order to determine whether the population of Aden wished to obtain independence separately from the Federation, integrated with the Federation, or attached to Yemen.

162. The representative of the United Kingdom said that his Government's policy towards Aden and the Protectorate of South Arabia was the same as for other Territories under United Kingdom administration or protection, namely, to bring them to self-government and independence as fast as possible and thus to create a strong and prosperous new nation, at peace with itself and its neighbours. In many Territories that goal had already been achieved; in others obstacles still remained. The principal difficulty in South Arabia had been the existence of numerous sheikdoms, each proud of its own independence and, in the past, more concerned with its own local affairs than with the wider interests of South Arabia as a whole. The United Kingdom had not, of course, created that situation; the various rulers had made themselves independent of Yemen for a century or more before the British had arrived and it had been largely in order to preserve their freedom from Yemeni incursions and Turkish rule that they had willingly entered into relationships with the United Kingdom Government. Contrary to the assertions of the representative of Iraq, the treaties were instruments of a kind fully recognized by international law and imposed a legal as well as a moral obligation on the signatories.

163. For many years the United Kingdom Government had encouraged the various rulers to join together to form a single State large enough to stand on its own feet and to achieve independence. As time went on the rulers had become increasingly conscious that their Territories were too small to establish themselves as fully independent States and the desire to unite in some way had been growing stronger each year. Finally, early in 1959, six of the States had cn

their own initiative formed a Federation for mutual defence and to foster political, economic and social development for the benefit of their country and its people. In the same year the Federation had concluded with the United Kingdom Government a treaty similar to various treaties already in force between the United Kingdom Government and the individual States. Again, that treaty had been freely contracted and could at any time be reviewed or amended by mutual consent of the contracting parties. In the course of the ensuing four years five further States had joined the Federation, which thus at the beginning of 1963 had comprised eleven members.

164. During the same period a series of meetings had been held between the Ministers of the Federation and Ministers of Aden, at the conclusion of which, in August 1962, the Ministers had submitted a joint memorandum to the United Kingdom Government pointing out that the inhabitants of Aden and of the Federation were predominantly of Arab race and Moslem religion, shared a common language and regarded themselves as one people, and that all the Ministers were convinced that the ending of the division between them would be in the true interest of all who lived in the area. The memorandum had also pointed out that by increasing their economic strength and political stability the union between Aden and the Federation would accelerate the achievement of full independence. The Ministers had therefore requested the United Kingdom Government to give favourable consideration to the entry of Aden into the Federation. The Ministers had attached to the memorandum proposals for the amendment of the Constitution of the Federation to provide for the accession of Aden, proposals for constitutional advancement in Aden itself, provisions designed to protect fundamental rights and the freedom of the individual, and the text of a draft treaty to be concluded between the United Kingdom Government and the Government of the Federation. The proposals had been debated in autumn 1962 in the United Kingdom Parliament and by the legislatures of the Federation and of Aden itself, and approved by them. The treaty had been signed on 17 January 1963 and on the following day Aden had become the twelfth member of the Federation. In March two further States had joined the Federation, which now comprised the majority of the States of South Arabia.

165. A number of States, including three of considerable size and importance, still remained outside the Federation; the United Kingdom hoped that they too would choose to join, but that was a matter for them to decide.

166. Under the Constitution of the new Federation general executive authority was vested in the Supreme Council, which consisted of Ministers elected by a Federal Council from among its members. The Federal Ministers themselves might appoint or co-opt up to three additional members to the Supreme Council if they so desired. The Federal Council consisted of representatives from each of the States in the Federation. Each State determined the manner in which its representatives on the Federal Council were selected; in some cases they were elected by the State Councils, which were composed of representatives elected by the local people; in other cases they were elected directly in accordance with custom and tradition. The normal number of members was six, though Aden, in view of its special political, economic and social position in the Federation, had twenty-four members out of the total of eighty-five.

167. The legislative and executive authority of the Federation extended over a wide range of subjects. Under the treaty of 1959 the conduct of external relations was entrusted to the United Kingdom Government, in consultation with the Federal Government. The Federation and the States had concurrent legislative and executive authority in a number of matters. The Constitution of the Federation also provided for the accession of other States and for the amendment of the Constitution itself.

168. The representatives of Iraq and Syria had ascribed great importance to the fact that the United Kingdom retained sovereignty over Aden itself. That was a legal point; from the practical point of view it was no obstacle to Aden's full participation as a member of the Federation. One reason why the United Kingdom Government had welcomed the establishment of the enlarged Federation was that it believed that close association within the Federation and with Aden would stimulate the development of the admittedly backward economies of some of the Member States. The Federation would have little hope of making itself independent of the services provided by the colony of Aden. When the new nation achieved independence, which was clearly stated in the 1959 treaty to be the eventual goal, it would thus have a greater chance of being a viable entity.

169. The representatives of Iraq and Syria, as also one of the petitioners, had claimed that South Arabia was part of Yemen. The fact was that Yemen had succeeded in occupying a part of South Arabia during the seventeenth century but had lost such control as it had established by the beginning of the eighteenth century. By 1839, when the British settlement had been established, the various rulers had been independent for nearly a century. The Yemeni Government had persistently claimed that the States of South Arabia were an integral part of its territory, but the States rejected the claim. Only one of the petitioners, who represented the political party in Aden which drew its main support from Yemeni immigrant workers, had supported that claim. Much could be said on the subject, but since the Committee's concern was with the achievement of independence by colonial countries and peoples and not with the arbitration of territorial claims, he hoped that no more would be heard in the Committee of the Yemeni claim, which was both unfounded and irrelevant.

170. It had been alleged that the United Kingdom had done nothing for the Protectorate and even that its presence there was motivated by economic interests, whereas in fact the United Kingdom had spent nearly £15 million in the Protectorate alone over the past five years in aid of various kinds.

171. It had also been alleged that there were no laws in the Protectorate. In fact, there were three systems of law in force: statutory laws enacted by the Federal legislature or the legislatures of the individual States, Koranic law administered in accordance with Moslem custom by Sharia courts, and customary law administered by Urfi courts, which, like English common law, was uncodified. It had also been alleged that there were no newspapers in the Protectorate, whereas there were at least six.

172. With regard to the assertion that the present Government of Aden was unrepresentative, the facts were that the franchise was at present confined to those born or permanently resident in Aden, and thus excluded the Yemeni immigrant workers who came to seek work in the town. The People's Socialist Party, which relied on the support of the Yemeni immigrants, had naturally been disappointed that persons who were not permanent residents of Aden were excluded from the franchise and had therefore decided to boycott the elections in 1959, but the refusal by a number of electors to exercise their voting rights did not alter the

fact that the Government of Aden was constitutionally elected and could both make decisions on the future of Aden and carry them out. In any event, the franchise was to be reviewed before the next general election, which must be held within three months of the dissolution of the Legislative Council in January 1964.

173. There had also been allegations of restrictions on free political activity in Aden itself. In fact, the South Arabians League was free to operate in Aden; members of the party had complete freedom of movement and an application on behalf of the League for a newspaper licence had recently been granted. Public meetings in Aden, as in many other countries, required prior permission from the police and since January 1962 such permits had been issued three times to the South Arabians League and refused once. No one was detained without trial. The President and Secretary-General of the Aden Trade Union Congress had been tried and sentenced to short terms of imprisonment for offences against the law; both had now been released. No immigration control was exercised in respect of Yemenis, tens of thousands of whom freely chose to work in Aden, attracted by the good labour conditions and high wage rates. That fact alone showed that Mr. Sohbi's statement that there was a reign of terror in Aden was ridiculous. Their freedom to organize trade unions had also been evident from Mr. Sohbi's account of the membership and activities of the unions. Some Yemenis had on occasion broken the laws of Aden and had been deported back to their country of origin, a perfectly normal procedure between neighbouring States.

174. It was absolutely untrue that the United Kingdom military base at Aden was intended for aggression. Its purpose was to enable the United Kingdom to carry out its treaty obligations in the Protectorate and in the Middle East generally. Incidentally the presence of the base made a major contribution to Aden's prosperity, since British forces and their families spent something over £11 million a year there. The existence of the base did not constitute a hindrance to the constitutional development of the Federation and its progress towards eventual independence. He categorically rejected the various allegations that had been scattered throughout the USSR representative's speech.

175. The issue before the Committee was not whether the small States of South Arabia should join together and form a strong and united nation. All the petitioners agreed that unity was desirable and indeed essential. There was no

tradition in South Arabia of a strong central Government to which the United Kingdom could merely transfer power; indeed, until four years previously there had been no central Government at all. The creation of the Federation had simply been an expression of confidence by the rulers of six of the States that they could work together for the common interests of their people. No Federal organization or capital had existed at that time. Since then great progress had been made; the Federal and Supreme Councils were in operation, the Federal Ministers were in office and a new capital, Al Ittihad, had been founded and was growing rapidly. It had been a great and historic moment in the history of South Arabia when Aden had joined the Federation on 18 January 1963. Some attempts had been made in the Committee to make political capital out of the way in which Aden's accession had been brought about. The fact was that the legal Government of Aden had clearly demanded the United Kingdom Government's agreement to its entry into the Federation. Had the United Kingdom rejected that demand, it would have unjustifiably maintained a major obstacle to independence by excluding the largest and most developed State, and the only port of the country, from the Federation.

176. With regard to the Federal Government itself, the Federation had just undergone a major transformation with the accession of Aden. Only three months had passed since that momentous event and it would take some time for the administrative, political, economic and social consequences to appear.

177. Allegations had been too freely made in the Committee that the Federal Government and the Governments of the other individual States were unrepresentative. Those allegations were untrue. Sheikh Muhamed Farid had described to the Committee how many of the State Councils were elected and how those Councils chose their Federal representatives. There was nothing undemocratic in that system. The fact that two of the political parties in Aden had chosen to boycott the elections did not mean that the representatives of the other two parties that had been elected were unrepresentative. Nevertheless, the United Kingdom Government did not claim that the present electoral methods were final; all parties agreed that the franchise must be reviewed, and that would be done before the next election. In the

remaining States of the Federation, the rulers and their State Councils intended to bring their electoral methods into line with the practice in other countries as soon as local conditions make it practicable to do so. That, however, was a matter for the States themselves and not for the Federal Government or the United Kingdom Government to decide.

178. Some representatives had suggested that a visiting mission should be sent to Aden. There should be no need to reiterate his Government's objection on grounds of principle to the sending of visiting missions to Non-Self-Governing Territories under its administration. It had always been willing to co-operate with the Committee and to provide it with information, but under the Charter the responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing Territories rested with the Administering Member concerned and not with the United Nations or with any of its subsidiary organs. The presence of a visiting mission in a United Kingdom Territory would clearly offend against that principle and constitute an interference in the Territory's internal affairs, and he was authorized by his Government to state that such a proposal would be unacceptable to it.

179. Such a procedure would seem particularly inappropriate where Aden was concerned, since, as he had said, his Government's policy was to bring the Territory to independence as early as possible. Intervention in the shape of a United Nations visiting mission would impede, not assist, that process.

180. The representative of Yugoslavia observed that the United Nations was confronted with a serious situation as a result of the United Kingdom's recent moves and its continued refusal to implement the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples and to grant self-determination to the people of Aden. The history of the Territory was characterized by the classic features of British conquest, designed to secure the United Kingdom's imperial routes and interests. During the past week the Committee had heard of a whole series of measures which had strengthened the domination of the conquerors. One of the steps taken to facilitate their rule had been the creation of a number of emirates, sheikhdoms and sultanates. The petitioners had revealed the true character and value of the treaties concluded between the United Kingdom and the various parts of Aden. The United Kingdom delegation represented the treaties as fair and valid, but in the eyes of the Yugoslav delegation they had been concluded between conqueror and conquered and were therefore illegal and devoid of value. It was in the light of

that fact that his delegation judged all that had happened later and in particular the recent constitutional changes. The petitioners had ably analysed the treaties and there was no need to go into the subject again.

181. The petitioners had described conditions in that part of the world. Among other things they had stated there were no clinics, no proper roads and no social life in any of the sheikhdoms or emirates. He would not dwell on that aspect, since the Committee's basic task was to find means by which the Declaration could be implemented. Nevertheless, it was necessary to stress once again that throughout the long history of British domination the welfare of the people of the territory had been almost completely neglected, in spite of the Administering Power's obligations under the Charter.

182. The real character of the Constitutions given to the various parts of Aden had been made clear by the statements of the petitioners, the documents prepared by the Secretariat and the memoranda submitted to the Committee. Members were familiar with similar constitutions in other United Kingdom colonies, promulgated by the same Power to serve the same aims. Once again there were the reserved powers, the electoral qualifications, the ex officio and nominated members, and so on. There were the provisions assuring the Administering Power of full control and giving it the means to take every step to protect its interests. The Yugoslav delegation's views regarding such constitutions were well known and had been expressed on various occasions in connexion with other United Kingdom Territories. It demanded that constitutions should be the result of negotiations with the representatives of the people and based on the principles of the Charter. The people should be enabled to elect their representatives on the basis of universal adult suffrage.

183. Since the Second World War, and particularly during the past few years, the Administering Power had made new efforts to maintain and reinforce its position, including the creation of the Federation of South Arabia, to which Aden had been obliged to accede. Ostensibly the aim of the Federation was to secure the constitutional fulfilment of the evolution of South Arabia towards unity and independence, but in reality it had been brought about without consultation and against the will of the population and formulated in such a way as not to alter in any degree the subordinate status of the whole area.

184. In his delegation's view the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples must be implemented as soon as possible in South Arabia; the Administering Power should immediately proclaim a general amnesty for all political prisoners, rescind all laws contrary to basic human rights, hold free and impartial elections on the basis of universal adult suffrage and lift all restrictions on the Press and on public meetings and speeches. Future relations between the various parts of the country should be decided by the people themselves in conditions of freedom and independence.

185. His delegation supported the proposal that a visiting mission should be sent to the area to ascertain the wishes and views of the population.

186. The representative of Italy observed that the information given to the Committee by the Secretariat, the petitioners and the United Kingdom delegation had enabled the members of the Committee to form an adequate idea of the situation prevailing in the Federation of South Arabia. He would submit that some of the points raised by the petitioners and taken up by members of the Committee in their questions might have the effect of complicating rather than simplifying the issue with which the Committee was faced, namely, the application to the Territory of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples. For example, some delegations had placed great emphasis on the existence in Aden of a United Kingdom military base. Apart from the beneficial aspect of the base on Aden's economic situation, the Italian delegation considered that the presence of a military base within the boundaries of a Territory was not necessarily an obstacle to the attainment of independence by that Territory.

187. Another point which had been debated at great length was whether the Territory under consideration was a part, on historical grounds or otherwise, of Yemen and whether there was a genuine desire among the population of South Arabia that their country should be merged with that State. The Italian Government had always viewed with sympathy the aspirations to unity of the Arab peoples but it did not think that the Special Committee could, without exceeding its mandate, express any opinion about the political future of the Federation of South Arabia. All the Committee could or should do was to declare that the people of the Territory should be enabled as soon as practicable to exercise the right of self-determination in the widest sense of the word and in consonance with the situation in the area.

188. In his delegation's view the creation of the Federation of South Arabia, in so far as it had been brought about with the consent of the people concerned, was a significant step towards the political unity of the region and the formation of a local representative government. That represented a considerable degree of progress in comparison with the situation a few years earlier, when there had been only a Crown Colony administered directly from Whitehall and a number of unorganized and unco-ordinated States. The Federation was but a first step; the Italian delegation was confident that the United Kingdom would transfer to the Federal Government, gradually but without undue delay, all the functions and powers of a full-fledged Government. He assumed in particular that the United Kingdom Government, in accordance with the method it had applied in other territories, would create the conditions necessary to permit the peoples of South Arabia to exercise the right of self-determination.

189. The representative of Madagascar observed that despite the confusion to which the contradictory statements of the petitioners had given rise, they had been unanimous, in recognizing that independence was the main concern of the people of Aden.

190. He found it particularly easy to appreciate their problems since Madagascar had known similar ones a few years earlier. Some Malagasys had called for immediate and unconditional independence, while others, whose views had prevailed, had favoured gradual progress towards independence. That choice had been justified by developments. It was, however, difficult to suggest the same choice to the people of Aden, where the political and psychological context was different.

191. Madagascar would like to contribute to the improvement of the political atmosphere in Aden's relations with the United Kingdom. There, as elsewhere, it behoved the Administering Power to decide to grant independence to the Territory in all urgency.

192. The Malagasy delegation welcomed the statement by the United Kingdom representative that his Government's objective was independence for Aden. It would, however, like that independence to be granted as soon as possible, in accordance with the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples (resolution 1514 (XV)).

193. The United Kingdom should bring together the conflicting groups emerging in the Territory - the champions of the Federation of South Arabia, who set their hopes on the United Kingdom's good intentions towards them, and the sceptics who wished to cast off colonial rule immediately. It was incumbent upon the United Kingdom not to disappoint the hopes of the Aden Government and, indeed, to anticipate its desires by allowing elections based on universal suffrage to be held under United Nations supervision and a visiting mission to be sent to the Territory to study the speediest means of implementing the Declaration.

194. By so doing the United Kingdom would demonstrate its sincerity and would dispel the uneasiness which accounted for the attitude of the opposition parties. It would thus put an end to internal divisions and would be able to grant independence almost immediately to a united people, without fear of leaving behind a country rent by the anarchy of tribal interests.

195. The representative of Mali said that resolution 1514 (XV) on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples was applicable to Aden and the Protectorate States which, with it, formed the Federation of South Arabia.

196. In the fifth century A.D., in the pre-Islamic era, the Territory had been part of a flourishing Hemyarite State ruled by sheikhs and emirs who had maintained order and security among the South Arabians and between them and their brothers to the North. The geographical situation and natural resources of the Territory had aroused the white man's cupidity. The British had disembarked on the coast of Aden in 1802 and had succeeded in persuading the Arab chiefs to accept treaties which had made them and their brothers slaves. Gradually those who had come to dispense knowledge had begun to behave like conquerors, and an incident in the port of Aden on 18 January 1839 had marked the beginning of colonial rule. The country had been divided into small provinces headed by chiefs who had been the docile tools of a policy of oppression. The sultans and emirs had ignored each other and had come directly under the authority of the British Governor.

197. Aden and the Protectorate covered an area of approximately 272,000 square kilometres and probably nowhere else in the world was there a country so small and so divided. From outside, the country appeared to be one political unit, but internally it was divided into a multitude of States: it consisted of some thirty

sultanates and emirates, with as many heads of State, flags and customs stations. The sultans and emirs had been ignorant feudal lords used in the service of a policy which in reality had not granted them any juridical sovereignty. The agreements they had concluded had not even left them the right to maintain contacts with the outside world.

198. It had long been thought that the colonial Power had been performing a civilizing mission in the country, whereas in fact the people had been kept in utter poverty and ignorance and the sole concern of the regime had been to profit from the natural resources and strategic position of the Territory. The statements of the petitioners and the documents prepared by the Secretariat bore witness to the failure of that alleged civilizing mission which in 125 years had done nothing for the education and health of the people: the school attendance rate was 2 per cent; there were virtually no secondary schools to produce the middle ranks of the civil services; there were fewer than 200 hospital beds available for a population of some 2 million. The economic situation was equally unsatisfactory.

199. After the Second World War nationalist political parties had been organized. They had had to fight against a most savage repression. Prominent leaders had been exiled or imprisoned. Such persons as undertook to organize trade unions had been subjected to arbitrary arrest and imprisonment. Mr. Alhabshi, the Secretary-General of the South Arabians League, who had addressed the Committee as a petitioner, had been compelled to live abroad ever since the League had been established in 1956.

200. In 1947 the United Kingdom Government had been forced to set up the first Legislative Council of Aden Colony. Elections had been held for the first time in 1955 to fill four of the nine seats reserved for non-official members. The Council had been reorganized in 1959, always on an anti-democratic basis. It had then consisted of twelve elected members, six appointed members and five ex officio members, one seat being reserved for the Governor, who was Chairman of the Legislative Council. The Executive Council, a faithful image of the Legislative Council, had consisted of five ex officio members and five members appointed by the Legislative Council who, strangely enough, had borne the title of "ministers". The electoral system, based on property qualifications, had been designed to

deprive the people of one of its legitimate rights. In 1959, twelve members had been elected to the Legislative Council by only 6,000 of the 21,500 registered voters. Such a Council had clearly no representative value.

201. On 11 February 1959 the United Kingdom Government had set up a Federation of eleven States, which had then been called the Federation of the Arab Emirates of the South, and had concluded a Treaty of Friendship and Protection with the new Federation, thereby trying to create the impression that it had played no part in the latter's establishment. On 18 January 1963 Aden had been attached to the Federation, against the will of the majority of the people, who had been demanding the election of a national government. In the Malian delegation's opinion, the Federation of South Arabia was no answer to the people's desire for unity and was merely a new arrangement for the perpetuation of British rule in that part of Arabia. Aden and the Federation remained colonies. The Federation, while it served United Kingdom colonial interests, consolidated the feudal and reactionary regimes of the Sheikhs.

202. Its strategic position made Aden an important base for the United Kingdom, which was using it to control that region of the Arab world and to defend its oil interests. In order to retain that choice position in the heart of a small country and to be able to play an important role in NATO, the United Kingdom Government squandered over £9 million a year on maintaining the base. The new Treaty between the United Kingdom and the Federation demonstrated clearly that it was the base at Aden to which the United Kingdom attached the greatest importance. United States oil companies had infiltrated throughout South Arabia. As Mr. Sohbi, the leader of the Peoples Socialist Party had said, the Federation of South Arabia was in point of fact a mere manifestation of neo-colonialism.

203. The United Kingdom did not realize that by establishing the Federation it had given those whom it wished to keep in subjection for a long time to come an effective tool which they would turn against it sooner or later. It would not take the South Arabians long to draw the necessary conclusions from the contradictions and imperfections of the Federation. A parallel could be drawn with the "loi cadre" which had been designed to bind the African Territories under

French domination to neo-colonialism, but the Africans had known how to make of it the instrument of their liberation.

204. Many unfortunate errors could be avoided if the United Kingdom was sincerely desirous of shouldering its responsibilities. The people of South Arabia, who longed for freedom, were pinning their hopes on the British people, who had always shown justice towards those struggling for liberation from the colonial yoke. The Malian delegation appealed to the United Kingdom Government to ensure that British realism and wisdom prevailed over selfishness and violence.

205. The Malian delegation, like a number of other delegations, thought that a sub-committee should be sent to Aden to study the means of enabling the South Arabians to have their legitimate aspirations fulfilled at the earliest possible moment, in accordance with the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples. The Malian delegation suggested that the following steps should be taken for the implementation of resolution 1514 (XV): firstly, a general amnesty for all political prisoners and permission for all exiles to return home; secondly, the abrogation of all anti-democratic legislation enacted by the colonial Power; thirdly, the unity of the Territory of Arabia, achieved with United Nations assistance; fourthly, the suppression of the sultanates and emirates, bulwarks of colonialism; fifthly, the holding of elections under United Nations supervision as soon as possible, on the basis of universal adult suffrage, with a view to the transfer of power to democratically elected representatives of the people; sixthly, the withdrawal of all foreign troops and, principally, the evacuation of the Aden base, which presented a permanent threat to the country and its neighbours.

206. The representative of Poland observed that so far the Committee had dealt almost entirely with territories in Africa, but although it had now turned its attention to another area the basic problem remained the same. Although the tactics had changed, the strategy was still designed to perpetuate the colonial relationship. The area which the Committee was now considering was of particular importance since tension was an almost permanent feature of life there. The maintenance of the colonial presence and the determination to prevent the liberation of the people were the main source of tension and instability in the

whole of the Middle East. Since the Second World War many nations had successfully claimed the right of self-determination and that process could not be stopped at the frontier of the United Kingdom's colonial possessions in the south of the Arabian peninsula.

207. Mr. Alhabshi, the representative of the South Arabians League, and Mr. Sohbi, the representative of the Peoples Socialist Party and the Aden Trade Union Congress, had given the Committee a picture of the appalling conditions prevailing in South Arabia after over 120 years of British protection. Not only had the Administering Power done little to promote the economic, social and political welfare of the people, but no steps had yet been taken to implement the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples. Moreover, the United Kingdom had evolved a new political and military plan, known as the Federation of South Arabia, with a view to tightening its grip on the territories in the Arabian peninsula. The plan was being carried out against the wishes of the peoples concerned and all effective opposition was met by a deliberate policy of repression and intimidation.

208. The long expected statement made by the United Kingdom representative at the 156th meeting had not contributed to the solution of the problem; on the contrary, that representative had made an attempt, in a way, to deny the Committee's terms of reference and tried to divert its attention from the main issue to irrelevant problems.

209. A number of representatives had referred to the strategic importance and great natural wealth of the Middle East region and their impact on colonial policy. It had been freely admitted both in public statements and in written documents that the overriding political consideration behind the concept of federation was the maintenance of military bases in order to consolidate the United Kingdom's control over Aden and its other possessions in the south of the Arabian peninsula and to protect foreign oil interests in the Middle East in general. The reasons for that policy had been made clear in the White Paper on defence issued by the United Kingdom Government in February 1962, which showed how the interests of powerful oil cartels, military bases and colonialism were inter-linked in South Arabia. It was solely for those reasons, and to arrest the rapid progress of the movement for national liberation in Asia and Africa, that from 1959 onwards

attempts had been made to renew the old protective and advisory treaties under the guise of the Federation of South Arabia and, finally, to include Aden in it. If the Administering Power really wished to promote unity among the peoples of the Arabian peninsula, it was difficult to see why it had provided for the possibility of detaching Aden or any part of the Colony from the Federation at any time when the United Kingdom Government considered such a secession desirable for the purpose of its world-wide responsibilities. That provision alone was a direct violation of the obligation of the Administering Power under the Charter to regard the interests of the indigenous inhabitants as paramount.

210. All the members of the Committee realized that the United Kingdom had world-wide responsibilities under Chapters XI and XII of the Charter, for the United Kingdom was still the biggest colonial Power and controlled numerous Territories and dependent peoples in all parts of the world, but in order to discharge those responsibilities there was no need to maintain a military base; nor was there any need to have recourse to military force to implement the provisions of the Declaration and to transfer all powers to the peoples of the Territories. Two reasons had been given by the United Kingdom representative for the presence of the United Kingdom base in Aden: firstly, that it enabled the United Kingdom to carry out its treaty obligations in the Protectorate and in the Middle East generally; secondly, that the base made a major contribution to the prosperity of Aden. As far as the second reason was concerned, he maintained that the base exposed the population of Aden and the surrounding area to the risk of their lives in exchange for a doubtful advantage. It contradicted the unanimous conclusion of the Secretary-General's consultative group on the economic and social consequences of disarmament that "the diversion to peaceful purposes of the resources now in military use could be accomplished to the benefit of all countries". That was particularly true in the case of under-developed countries such as Aden and the Protectorate.

211. With regard to the alleged treaties of protection imposed by the United Kingdom on various sheikhs, emirs and sultans in South Arabia in the years following British military occupation of Aden in 1839, it was obvious that Protectorates were today an anachronism. In fact Protectorates had always been a form of colonial control and the division between the so-called Protectorates

and other types of dependent territories was rather artificial, especially in the light of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, which had finally done away with the division of peoples into civilized and non-civilized, those who were ripe for independence and those who were not, and with what was called the sacred trust. The Protectorates were based upon treaties which from the outset had been unequal and in fact had been imposed under duress, without one of the parties most concerned being able to have its rights reflected and without realizing all their implications. Hence they were not valid instruments and could not be invoked as bases of any right or claim.

212. The Colony of Aden had been joined to the Federation by an agreement with the Aden Legislative Council, a body whose few elected members had obtained not more than 2 per cent of the votes of the population in the boycotted elections of 1959. The imposed Federation had brought about no change in the subordinate and dependent status of Aden and the Protectorate. It did not affect the United Kingdom's sovereignty over Aden or the High Commissioner's reserved powers to rescind any decision on matters concerning internal security, defence or external affairs. Furthermore, the treaty concluded by the United Kingdom Government with the Federation for the inclusion of Aden safeguarded the United Kingdom's right to maintain military bases in the Federation and the right of free movement of United Kingdom forces and authorized United Kingdom aircraft to fly over the territory of the Federation and to carry out such other operations as the United Kingdom might deem necessary. Moreover, the Hadhramaut and the islands were excluded from the Federation, the first for the possible exploitation of oil resources and the second for the establishment of new military bases in the event of the United Kingdom having to leave Aden and the Protectorate. All those arrangements were, of course, inconsistent with the letter and spirit of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and were resolutely opposed by the people of the area, who rightly saw in the so-called Federation of South Arabia an endeavour to separate the area from the movement towards unity and to create an appearance of independence while in fact retaining and even increasing the United Kingdom's control over the Territory.

213. The evidence given to the Special Committee by the representatives of the Peoples Socialist Party and the Aden Trade Union Congress and of the South Arabians League, as also the many petitions received from other organizations,

clearly demonstrated that the people of Aden and the Protectorate were determined to liberate themselves from colonial rule. The Polish delegation fully supported the demand of the Arab people for the immediate termination of colonial domination and the transfer of sovereignty to the people themselves, in order that they might freely determine their future in accordance with the provisions of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples. The Committee should urge the United Kingdom Government to grant an amnesty to all political prisoners and exiles, to abrogate all laws suppressing the activities of political parties and trade unions and to ensure the granting of democratic rights and freedoms to the peoples of all its colonial possessions in the south of the Arabian peninsular. It should also call for the withdrawal of foreign troops and the dismantling of all military bases in Aden and the Protectorate. Those steps would create favourable conditions for a general election to be held shortly on the basis of universal adult suffrage. His delegation supported the proposal that a visiting mission should be sent to the area to ascertain the views of the people regarding the most appropriate ways and means for the speedy implementation of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples.

214. The representative of India quoted passages from the debate in the House of Commons in the United Kingdom, including a speech made by Mr. Dennis Healy, a member of the Labour Party, to show that the steps that had been taken to enlarge the Federation of South Arabia by the inclusion of Aden were not only opposed by the majority of the people of Aden but had also earned the censure of the Labour Party. The Federation had been brought about in a manner which was inconsistent with democratic practice. Two of the three petitioners who had appeared before the Committee disapproved of the Federation. It was the Committee's task to see that resolution 1514 (XV) was implemented without delay.

215. Had elections been held before the accession of Aden to the Federation, the present difficulties and future upheavals could probably have been avoided. Obviously a Federation which was not approved by the majority of the indigenous people of the Territories concerned could not ensure political stability nor democratic freedom and sooner or later must collapse. If the Federation of

South Arabia was to have any permanent value, the United Kingdom should take immediate steps to announce drastic and far-reaching legislative and electoral reforms which would lead to elections being held shortly in the area on the basis of universal adult suffrage.

216. The Indian delegation welcomed the United Kingdom representative's assurance that his Government's objective in Aden and the Protectorate was full independence as soon as possible. It hoped that that did not imply that the objective would be approached at a leisurely pace. It was disappointing that the United Kingdom representative had not mentioned specifically that the present electoral system in the Territory would be changed and universal adult suffrage granted to the people of the area. The Indian delegation had also hoped that a date would be announced for the holding of general elections in the Territory. No one could suppose that the present Constitution and electoral laws would produce a lasting settlement, since they were unacceptable to the vast majority of the people of Aden.

217. The Indian delegation had been disturbed to learn from the petitioners of the backward and primitive conditions in the area. It was the responsibility of the Administering Power to ensure that Aden had more than four doctors, four engineers, six advocates and one accountant, the figures given by Mr. Sohbi. There was also great need for increased educational facilities.

218. He quoted from the statements made by Mr. Mackawee, in the Aden Legislature, to show that the members of the present legislature were not at all satisfied with the "shadow of power" available to them, without the substance, in view of the reserved powers vested in the British authorities.

219. The political atmosphere in the Territory was tense. Normal political life was restricted by the fact that a considerable number of political leaders had been exiled. The United Kingdom Government should promulgate a general amnesty for all political exiles, laws which infringed individual freedom of thought and expression should be rescinded immediately, political prisoners should be set free, the people should be guaranteed the free exercise of their political rights and the United Kingdom should without delay announce the date of general elections on the basis of universal adult suffrage.

220. Any attempt to resist the forces of freedom and democracy must inevitably lead to serious consequences. The United Kingdom Government must take steps without delay to transfer power to the people of Aden in accordance with their freely expressed wishes.

221. The representative of Bulgaria recalled that the United Kingdom had occupied Aden over 120 years previously, following a colonial war. By imposing "protective treaties" and "advisory treaties", it had turned the entire Territory of South Arabia into a British colony. Nevertheless, the population of the country, where a great civilization had once flourished, had never accepted British domination, the cruelty of which had been characterized by the author of a petition who had declared that the Administration was manned by fanatical expatriates who would sacrifice the whole of humanity in order to fulfil their dreams. Notwithstanding measures of oppression which in certain cases had degenerated into wholesale massacre, numerous uprisings had taken place. At present the struggle was gaining new impetus and had taken the form of armed resistance.

222. The problem was clearly a colonial one. No one, not even the Administering Power, disputed the fact that Aden and the Protectorate were Non-Self-Governing Territories. Hence the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples was fully applicable to them. The main task of the Committee was therefore clear: it was, in accordance with paragraph 8 of resolution 1810 (XVII), to seek the most suitable ways and means for the speedy and total application of the Declaration, and to propose specific measures toward that end.

223. The principal obstacle was the attitude of the United Kingdom, which was doing its utmost to perpetuate its domination indefinitely. That was why it had established the so-called Federation of South Arabia, in a manoeuvre designed to preserve British rule and to safeguard British economic and strategic interests. The annexation of Aden to the Federation in January 1963 had had the same purpose: it had been carried out against the will of the people, as was evidenced by the resistance and resentment displayed by the people of South Arabia. The United Kingdom authorities had met that resistance with the most cruel repression. The

Secretary-General of the South Arabians League had stated in a petition<sup>14/</sup> that the United Kingdom - as its responsible spokesman had admitted in the House of Commons in 1962 - had used bombs, rockets and machine-guns against the tribesmen. Thus during a public meeting in the Sultanate of Fadhli the British forces had killed twenty-five persons and wounded 130. Other instances could be quoted: on 22 December 1950, twenty-two people had been killed and fifty-seven wounded during a peaceful demonstration at Mukalla; in July 1952 twelve workers had been killed and 232 wounded during a strike in Aden; on 11 May 1956 many people had been wounded during a demonstration in Aden; twenty-nine people had been killed and 330 wounded, some 700 had been gaoled and some 2,000 deported to Yemen following incidents that had taken place on 30 October 1958.

224. With regard to other aspects of the situation in South Arabia, the same petition stated that in the field of public health the Administration left everything to nature, that famine and pestilence had taken a heavy toll amongst the people, that many inhabitants had been driven by poverty to leave the country and take refuge in Saudi Arabia, Indonesia or East Africa, that unemployment was rife, and finally that 99 per cent of the population had never attended State schools. Except in Aden, where there were European communities, there was no hospital or maternity clinic, and water and electricity supplies were restricted to Aden and some other towns. Nothing had been done to improve the life of the people or to prepare them for self-government and independence. The argument that the British had to stay in South Arabia to see to such preparation was the least convincing of all, and the idea that the Arab people, who had contributed so much to civilization, needed British rule in order to learn to run their affairs was unacceptable.

225. The United Kingdom was determined to remain in South Arabia for the purpose of selfishly safeguarding its economic, political and strategic interests. Aden in particular had always played an extremely important part in the United Kingdom's imperial policy. That area had taken on a new significance with the expansion of oil production in the Middle East, and in order to achieve its economic and political objective the United Kingdom was maintaining in Aden a large military base equipped with the most modern weapons. That base had been used in the past

for aggression against the peoples of Africa and Asia; it had been used against the national liberation movement in South Arabia and as a base for aggression against Yemen, Suez, Oman and Saudi Arabia. There was no doubt that it would be used whenever the interests of the United Kingdom and of its oil monopolies so required. The existence of the base represented a constant threat to peace and security in the Middle East and was inconsistent with the legitimate aspirations of the peoples of the area.

226. The Committee should consequently recommend specific measures to secure the speedy and total implementation of the Declaration on the granting of independence. The peoples of South Arabia were calling for the immediate abolition of colonial rule, the withdrawal of all British forces and the removal of the British bases, the release of political prisoners, the return of exiled political leaders, and the exercise of human rights, political freedoms and the right of self-determination. His delegation supported those demands. It was also in favour of sending a visiting mission to South Arabia for the purpose of finding ways and means of hastening the independence of the people. Their struggle was justified and the Bulgarian delegation was convinced that it would be crowned with success before long.

227. The representative of Chile said that the Federation of South Arabia was undoubtedly a Non-Self-Governing Territory and that the Committee should therefore seek the best ways and means of securing the speedy and total application to that Territory of the provisions of the Declaration on the granting of independence.

228. With regard to Aden, the Chilean delegation considered that it was for its population to decide whether it wished to be independent, to be part of the Federation of South Arabia or to be joined to Yemen. Her delegation thought that the Administering Power should be asked to co-operate in allowing general elections to be held on the basis of universal suffrage and in an atmosphere of calmness and respect for human rights. The speedy and total application of the Declaration on the granting of independence was the only possible solution of the problem, the basic causes of which should be remembered.

229. The Chilean delegation regretted that the idea of sending an investigation mission to the Territory had not been accepted by the United Kingdom. The information that might have been supplied by such a sub-committee would have been

extremely useful and its recommendations would have provided a firm basis for negotiation. The dispatch of such missions to Territories under study was one of the most effective procedures open to the United Nations. There was still time for the Administering Power to reconsider the possibility of co-operating with the Special Committee, and her delegation hoped that with the assistance of the Administering Power, the Committee would be able to overcome the obstacles currently confronting it.

230. The representative of Tunisia said that his delegation attached particular importance to the decolonization of Aden and South Arabia - one of the very few areas of the Arab world still subject to colonial rule. As Tunisia had learnt from its own experience, protective treaties were but a polite form of conquest and he was glad to note that the United Kingdom Government had acknowledged that fact, since it recognized that the final objective of its presence in South Arabia was to guide that country towards full independence. Nevertheless, it was essential to know when and how Aden and its hinterland would obtain independence. As one of the petitioners had said, paragraphs 5 and 6 of resolution 1514 (XV) left no doubt with regard to the need, firstly to transfer all powers immediately to the peoples of the territories concerned, and secondly to safeguard the territorial integrity of the areas involved. In the case with which the Committee was dealing, the United Kingdom was not taking any steps to grant immediate independence, or even to guarantee the integrity of the whole of the Territory under its administration.

231. Although his delegation fully understood the particular circumstances obtaining in South Arabia, it did not believe that there were any good grounds for delaying the country's independence. While it might be true that the creation of the Federation represented a step towards emancipation, the fact nevertheless remained that the federal formula that had been devised had at least three defects.

232. To begin with, it did not embrace the whole territory, and Mr. Alhabshi, one of the petitioners, had demonstrated very forcefully the danger of the "Katanganization" of the Hadhramaut, which, like some of the other States, had not been included in the Federation. Thus the Federation was not the answer to the problem of territorial unity. Moreover, many of the States of which it was formed were mere travesties.

233. Furthermore, it was only to a very relative degree that the establishment of the Federation represented a first step in the evolution towards internal self-government. The representative of the United Kingdom had himself told the Committee that the 1959 Treaty resembled the various treaties already in force between the United Kingdom and the various States, in both its contents and its scope. That seemed to be a good indication of the limited nature of the self-government enjoyed by the Federation, which was still covered by the Protectorate Treaties. That being so, it was easy to understand how Aden could be an integral part of the Federation while at the same time remaining under British sovereignty. The whole Federation came more or less directly under that sovereignty, although in internal matters the sheikhs and emirs enjoyed some freedom of action, as hitherto.

234. Lastly, there was nothing particularly democratic about the Federation. The federal organs were not representative bodies. In all federations the legislature consisted of two Chambers, one representing the States and the other the people. Yet in the Federation of South Arabia the latter Chamber was missing and the representation of the States was arranged according to peculiar methods inherent in the tribal system. At Aden itself, where society was not organized on a tribal basis, the Legislative Council represented only 26 per cent of the electorate. In stating that only two parties had boycotted the elections, the United Kingdom delegation had tacitly admitted that those two parties alone represented 74 per cent of the registered voters, not counting the people who had not been able to register owing to the conditions that were imposed with a view to limiting the right to vote. For example, inhabitants of Yemeni origin were automatically excluded - an iniquitous rule considering that they were citizens who had lived in Aden for many years.

235. That systematic mistrust of anything to do with Yemen was not calculated to reassure the people about the intentions of the United Kingdom, which was generally accused of doing its utmost to prevent the possible union of the territory with Yemen. The Tunisian delegation was not proposing that the powers at present exercised by the United Kingdom should be transferred to Yemen: what it wanted

was that the prospect of a union between the two neighbouring brother countries should always be safeguarded. The actual powers should be transferred to representatives freely elected by universal suffrage and it would lie with them to determine when and how the Territory might be united with Yemen.

236. Another serious accusation that had been made against the United Kingdom and had not been refuted was that there was a reign of terror in the Territory. Was it or was it not true that at least two sultans had been deposed, that from time to time there had been bombing raids on the people, and that that fact had been admitted in the House of Commons? Those questions had remained unanswered and it was of the greatest interest to the Committee to know whether that situation still prevailed. It was those bombing raids and other military operations that gave the military base at Aden its aggressive character.

237. The Tunisian delegation would certainly support the sending of a visiting mission. If the United Kingdom would make a real effort to understand, it should be able to agree to the sending of such a mission, which was in no way intended to share its responsibilities; the United Kingdom Government could be given every possible assurance in that respect. The Tunisian delegation therefore hoped that, without having to renounce its reservations of principle, the United Kingdom Government would be able to receive a visiting mission.

238. The representative of Venezuela said that his delegation had followed the discussion on the question of Aden with particular attention because everything that concerned the Arab countries was of special importance to Venezuela. There were many bonds linking Venezuela to the Arab people; it had signed agreements with a number of Arab countries with the object of establishing a common oil policy. The Venezuelan delegation was deeply concerned about the future of Aden and the other Arab States in the Territory, which had a population of about 1.5 million.

239. The Committee actually had very few facts about the situation in the Territory; the information available to it was incomplete and the statements the petitioners had made had been rather vague in some respects and had left some gaps and contained some contradictions on important points. Similarly the information provided by the Administering Power left some doubts in the mind of an impartial observer which could only be dispelled by contact with the real situation.

240. It might be useful to draw attention to some points upon which the petitioners and the Administering Power seemed to agree: they acknowledged that the first difficulty arose from the lack of political, economic and administrative unity. Yet unity was essential if a State was to be viable in the modern world. One of the petitioners had said that in his opinion the Federation was an important step in the direction of unity. Unity, however, must be achieved in freedom, as Mr. Alhabshi had pointed out. The United Kingdom representative, for his part, had stated categorically that the objective of the United Kingdom Government in Aden and the Protectorate was to bring them to independence as soon as possible. There had, however, been much criticism of the Federation on the ground that it had not been set up as a result of a democratic consultation of the people. Mr. Alhabshi had said that it lay with the people of the country to bring about their own unity, either within the Federation or outside it. It could therefore be said that there was general agreement on the need for unity.

241. The only question upon which the Administering Power and the petitioners did not agree was that of the procedure to be followed for the attainment of independence. One of the petitioners had asked for free and impartial general elections to be held under United Nations supervision. It was clear that the Committee could not intervene in internal questions, which could be settled only by the people concerned once they had achieved independence.

242. The petitioners were at one in recognizing the authority of the Committee in its mission to bring colonialism to an end and to seek ways and means for the speedy and total application of the Declaration on the granting of independence to Aden and the whole of South Arabia.

243. The Venezuelan delegation felt that the Committee should bear the above facts in mind, as also the obligations which devolved upon it in accordance with its terms of reference, as outlined in General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV), 1654 (XVI) and 1810 (XVII). Paragraph 8 (a) of resolution 1810 (XVII) invited the Committee "to continue to seek the most suitable ways and means for the speedy and total application of the Declaration to all Territories which have not yet attained independence". It was the duty of the Committee to protect the interests of the people, in accordance with the Charter. It should endeavour to ascertain what was the opinion of the majority of the population on the present situation and it should then be careful to ensure that the will of the people was freely expressed and was respected.

244. Venezuela was and would continue to be an ardent defender of the right of self-determination. The Venezuelan delegation felt, however, that at the present stage the Committee was not in a position to make recommendations to the General Assembly, since it needed further information. The following might be the most effective procedure for enabling the Declaration on the granting of independence to be put into effect in the Territory. Firstly, the Committee should hold direct conversations with the Administering Power which would enable it to form a clear opinion of the situation in Aden and South Arabia. Secondly, it might be useful, following the conversations, for the Committee to send a visiting mission to Aden and South Arabia to obtain further information at first hand. It was true, as the United Kingdom representative had said, that it was the responsibility of the Administering Power to lead the Territory towards independence, but it was equally true that it was the right and duty of the United Nations to see that the principles of the Charter were observed. The United Kingdom representative had repeatedly declared that his Government was firmly resolved to co-operate with the Special Committee; the Venezuelan delegation therefore hoped that the United Kingdom Government would resolutely co-operate with the Special Committee with a view to finding jointly acceptable ways and means of applying the Declaration to Aden and South Arabia.

245. The representative of Tanganyika observed that the Committee was examining the question of Aden and the Federation of South Arabia for the first time. As conditions in the Territory were not well known, the working paper prepared by the Secretariat and the evidence of the petitioners had been particularly useful.

246. The Tanganyikan delegation's attitude towards the question was the same as that already taken by it on other colonial issues. There could be no compromise with the objectionable system of colonialism, which was contrary to human dignity and progress. Secretariat papers showed that Aden had been under colonial domination for over 100 years and that for much of that period it had formed part of British India, by reason of its important position on the route to India. Yet the Territory's constitutional and economic development had been miserably slow. Only in 1947 had the first Legislative Council been formed in Aden, and the first elections had not been held until 1955. The franchise was still very restricted. The Tanganyikan delegation deplored the absence of a really representative Council and strongly endorsed the appeal for free elections, based on universal suffrage, which had been made by Mr. Alhabshi (South Arabians League) and Mr. Sohbi (Peoples Socialist Party).

247. The nationalist petitioners had shown how the colonial Power had encouraged division and antagonism, investing a multitude of sheikhdoms and petty chiefdoms with the rank of States. It was hardly necessary to say that that colonial practice of setting feudal and reactionary forces against progressive nationalist movements could delay self-determination and independence only for a while, since it was the nationalists who would have the power during and after the attainment of independence. The people of Aden and the Protectorate would have to engage in a bitter struggle for their freedom, as had happened in other parts of the world. But there was no doubt that the colonized peoples of Africa and Asia were determined to free themselves from colonial domination, as the President of Tanganyika, Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, had stressed at the opening of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference held at Moshi early in 1963.

248. The nationalist petitioners had drawn the Committee's attention to the repressive measures applied in the Territory - deportations, arrests, prison sentences, and so forth. They had also asserted that the Federation created by the colonial Power did not reflect the will of the people; and federations not based on the popular will were bound to fall, as was currently being witnessed in the case of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, which had been imposed on the African population. It was therefore incumbent upon the Administering Power to heed the legitimate demands of the nationalist petitioners and to arrange for elections based on universal suffrage. It should make the country's various rulers understand that in the twentieth century the march of the peoples towards freedom and unity would not stop. Since not much was known about actual conditions in Aden and South Arabia, the Tanganyikan delegation considered that certain steps should be taken. First, there was a genuine case for the dispatch of a visiting mission. Secondly, a constitutional committee, acceptable to all parties, should be set up to draft a constitution providing for universal adult suffrage. Thirdly, elections should be held and a responsible government established. Fourthly, all political prisoners should be set free and leaders currently in exile should be authorized to return to the country. Fifthly, the United Kingdom should make a statement as to when it proposed to grant independence to the Territory in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). As its President had declared, Tanganyika would give its full support to all the Asian countries which had not yet won their independence.

249. The representative of Iran said that the provisions of resolution 1514 (XV) fully applied to the Territory of Aden and that the Administering Power itself had recognized that fact, since it was regularly transmitting information on the Territories in question under Article 73 of the Charter.

250. In the opinion of the Iranian delegation, the Committee's main object should be, in the matter of Aden, to apply the provisions of resolution 1514 (XV) and to seek the most effective means and methods of doing so. The present position, and the history of British colonization in that part of the world, had already been described during the debate; the Iranian delegation would therefore merely mention the measures which might, in its view, facilitate the Committee's task in its efforts to apply resolution 1514 (XV).

251. The Committee should invite the Administering Power to organize in Aden, as rapidly as possible, free elections based on universal suffrage, so as to enable the population to express its will freely. Obviously it would be necessary, before such elections were held, to remove all the obstacles which, because of current legislation, prevented the people from exercising its political rights. All political prisoners should be freed, the political leaders in exile should be enabled to return to their country, and universal suffrage - the sine qua non for the exercise of the right of peoples to decide their own future - should be instituted. It could not be doubted that present conditions in the Territory were far from being in line with the objectives of resolution 1514 (XV); the population of Aden and the Protectorate - in other words, of the Federation of South Arabia - had not been enabled to state its views with regard to the 1959 Constitution, which had given birth to the present Federation.

252. The Iranian delegation endorsed the proposal, made by several delegations, that a sub-committee be sent to Aden to study the situation on the spot and make contact with the people and the leaders of the political parties. That step would enable the Committee to determine the means calculated to lead the Territory's population to self-determination and independence as rapidly as possible.

253. The representative of Ethiopia said that the debate on Aden and the Protectorate of South Arabia had shown that, whatever their status or the form of association chosen, those Territories had remained dependent and had all the characteristics of Non-Self-Governing Territories. They came under Chapter XI

of the Charter and the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, and the essential matter was therefore that of transferring all powers to the peoples of those Territories, in accordance with resolution 1514 (XV).

254. With regard to Aden's accession to the Federation of South Arabia, the United Kingdom representative had claimed that the Legislative Council of Aden had freely opted for such accession; he had also represented that such association would result in greater economic prosperity, thanks to the creation of a common market and to the influence which Aden's economy would inevitably have on the less developed economy of the rest of the Territory. He himself, like many other members of the Committee, would like to know to what extent the members of the Aden Legislative Council who had voted for Aden's accession to the Federation had, at the time of voting, represented the will of the people. In his own view, no one could claim that the choice arrived at by the Legislative Council had represented the choice of the population, expressed in accordance with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). As for the consideration of economic prosperity advanced by the United Kingdom representative, it could not in itself suffice to be of more weight than the process of self-determination. Any form of political association in South Arabia must be freely decided upon by the population, and the latter, before it could participate in any political association, must be in a position to decide its own future.

255. It was that principle upon which the Ethiopian Government's attitude in the matter was based, just as it had been based on the same principle in the matter of the Central African Federation. The Ethiopian delegation considered that the Committee's prime task must be to transfer the powers of government to the population of the Territory, and it would therefore support any resolution whereby ways and means of implementing General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) could be found.

256. The representative of the United States of America said that his delegation had listened with great interest to the debate and particularly appreciated the statements made by the petitioners, representing both points of view, who had its sympathy.

257. Until recently contact between the modern world and South Arabia, except for the great port of Aden, had been almost non-existent; the political institutions of South Arabia had adhered to traditional patterns, and economic and social development had been scarcely perceptible. The United States delegation was glad that the winds of change were now blowing in the whole area, and considered that that was a natural and desirable trend.

258. The United States had watched with interest the establishment and growth of the Federation of South Arabia. While, a few years earlier, there had been no truly modern institutions of self-rule, ministries under the direction of local leaders and civil servants had now been set up, a legislature had been formed and the process of accumulating experience in self-government had now begun in earnest.

259. The United Kingdom representative had said that the present political, economic and administrative patterns had to be advanced. The United States delegation was sure that the United Kingdom was sincere when it said that it was determined to bring South Arabia to self-government and independence as rapidly as possible.

260. The United States delegation would not comment at length on the present form of the Federation of South Arabia or on its ties with the surrounding areas. It would merely point out that the petitioners who had made statements in the Committee had agreed that a closer unity than that which had previously existed between the small States of South Arabia was not only desirable but absolutely necessary in the interests of the people. South Arabia was extremely underdeveloped; no rich natural resources had yet been discovered there and the land supported the growing population only with difficulty. Greater unity with the rest of the Arab world might become desirable, but that question must be decided by the peoples concerned without outside interference.

261. With regard to the possibility of sending a visiting mission to South Arabia, as suggested by various delegations, which the United Kingdom delegation considered particularly inopportune, the United States delegation was inclined at the present stage to accept the arguments put forward by the Administering Power, so that co-operation between the Committee and the United Kingdom Government could continue. The United States delegation was glad to see that the people of South Arabia had begun their march to self-government and

independence, which, it was sure, they would be granted at the earliest possible date. Much remained to be done to bring the benefits of modern development to the area. The people of South Arabia, who would have to play the major role in that development, could count on the sympathy and co-operation of the people of the United States.

262. The representative of Denmark stated that his Government unreservedly supported the attainment of independence as rapidly as possible by all nations. That position also applied to the question of Aden. In the view of the Danish delegation the establishment of the South Arabian Federation was an important step towards complete independence. It was the Committee's task to facilitate that process. The Danish delegation was glad that the United Kingdom representative had given the Committee the assurance that the aim of his Government in Aden and in the Protectorate was the attainment of full independence as soon as possible.

263. One of the questions which had been raised in the debate was whether Aden was part of Yemeni territory. He doubted whether the Committee was the proper forum for the consideration of problems of that nature. In his view the discussion had also gone beyond the Committee's terms of reference in touching on the question of the military base in Aden. It would be for the independent State to decide whether it was in its best interests to have such bases on its territory.

264. With regard to the question of sending a visiting mission to Aden, the Committee should give careful consideration, taking all relevant circumstances into account, to the necessity of sending such missions and should avoid taking an almost automatic decision to send a visiting mission whenever it discussed a new territory. In the present instance the declared readiness of the United Kingdom delegation to co-operate with the Committee should not be overlooked. The United Kingdom Government would probably be readier to meet the Committee's wishes if the latter showed understanding for its point of view. As a step in the right direction the Committee should encourage the United Kingdom Government to revise the electoral system in Aden.

265. The Danish delegation felt that, in light of the rapid developments which were taking place in the Middle East, the United Nations should be careful not to take any action that might interfere with that natural evolution, which should be met with understanding on the part of the responsible great Powers.

/...

266. The representative of the United Kingdom said, in reply, that in his delegation's view there were certain tasks with which the Committee had been entrusted by the General Assembly and others which were outside its competence. It was not a committee of academic historians studying the history of each of the Non-Self-Governing Territories in order to determine the precise circumstances in which it had first come under colonial rule, or the rights and wrongs of colonial rule in previous centuries. If members of the Committee would like a full account of the history of Aden from earliest times his delegation would naturally be prepared to provide one, but it would take some time to prepare and would not, he thought, materially assist the Committee in its proper task. He did not, therefore, propose to deal at length with the exaggerations and misrepresentations of the first two petitioners about the past history of the British administration, exaggerations and misrepresentations which some delegations had quite unjustifiably thought fit to endorse.

267. Nor was the Committee a court of law. The Administering Power was not a criminal being put on trial, with witnesses for the prosecution and the defence, although certain delegations behaved as though that were the case. It sometimes seemed that petitioners need only fling the wildest accusations at the Administering Power for them to be unhesitatingly believed by a number of delegations. The majority of the allegations that had been made were completely irrelevant to the Committee's task and he would not deal with them. He would, however, refute such allegations as were relevant.

268. The role of the Committee was to examine the reasons why Non-Self-Governing Territories had still not achieved full independence. That was a practical task in which his delegation was prepared to co-operate. The United Kingdom was faced with a practical problem, that of assisting the Non-Self-Governing Territories to achieve independence as soon as possible. It could not rewrite history or change the facts of geography; it had to deal with the situation as it existed and it looked to the Committee for a certain degree of understanding of the difficulties involved and a realistic appraisal of the policies that were being carried out.

269. The United Kingdom delegation could not accept the suggestion made by a number of delegations that there was a lack of information about Aden, or, in particular, the suggestion that information had been deliberately withheld by /...

the United Kingdom Government. Aden had been treated in precisely the same way as the other thirty-nine Territories for which the United Kingdom was responsible. Each year information was transmitted on economic, social and educational conditions in South Arabia. In addition, since 1962 his delegation had provided the Secretary-General with political and constitutional information. There had also, of course, been the statement made by the United Kingdom Representative earlier in the debate. In any event the alleged lack of information had not deterred some members of the Committee from making very definite statements and reaching very definite conclusions about the situation in the Territory.

270. A number of delegations appeared to think that the mere existence of twenty States in South Arabia proved that the United Kingdom had adopted a policy of "divide and rule". As had been pointed out in his first statement, South Arabia had already been divided for a century or more when the British had arrived in 1839. The United Kingdom Government had had no desire to annex and administer large areas of South Arabia and the sheikhs and sultans would certainly have fought bitterly to prevent it from doing so; they had wanted to preserve their own independence from the Turks and the Yemenis and they had freely sought British protection in return for guarantees of non-interference in their internal administration.

271. Some delegations which criticized the United Kingdom for perpetuating divisions also criticized it for taking steps to bring those divisions to an end. Other delegations accused it of not bringing the divisions to an end rapidly enough and blamed it for not compelling all the States to enter the Federation. It was, however, precisely because the United Kingdom did not wish to enforce the Federation that it had been happy to see the initiative come from the States themselves. Similarly, while it had welcomed the decision of eight more States to join the Federation and would welcome a decision by any or all of the remaining States to join, it would leave the decision to them.

272. The Committee appeared to be in danger of being led to a position where the very word "federation" was suspect and any attempt to unite small Territories in a larger unit was denounced as neo-colonialism or worse. The United Kingdom was proud of the federations it had helped to create in different parts of the world; the successful federations far outnumbered those which had not endured and the Committee should not allow itself to be led into criticisms of the Federation

of South Arabia because of imagined comparisons with federations elsewhere. The facts of history and geography showed that only by uniting the various States could South Arabia achieve independence and that Aden itself must inevitably be a part of the Federation. The alternative, an independent State of seventy-five square miles with 100,000 citizens, was not seriously advocated by anyone. Moreover, all the political parties supported the principle of unity. The present franchise in Aden and the electoral methods in the Federation should and would be reviewed, but the Committee should welcome the establishment of the Federation as a step toward the creation of a single, united and fully independent State of South Arabia.

273. Despite the clear evidence to the contrary given by Sheikh Muhamed Farid, some members continued to speak about "appalling mediaeval conditions" in the Protectorate. To refute that charge once and for all he would give the Committee two quotations. In a broadcast given on 20 September 1962, the Federal Minister for Agriculture and Economic Development had stated that, although the country was poor, there was no great wealth or abject poverty and that during the past fifteen years Aden had grown from a coastal town to one of the great seaports of the world, while at the same time the country had blossomed. The Minister had referred to an irrigation system, to the development of gardens producing fruits and vegetables for the Aden market, to a hospital with 50 beds and 5 health units serving the outlying areas, to 2 intermediate schools, 11 boys' primary schools, and 5 girls schools, to a power line, graded roads, electricity and piped water supplies to the principal towns, to a cotton ginnery at Al Kod and to machinery workshops at Ja'ar. He had also spoken of future plans for the development of electricity supplies and improved schools and hospitals.

274. The Minister had also described the political training the people were being given through thrift and savings societies, local councils and the management of large projects. The rulers, he had said, were the trustees of their people but the people themselves were undertaking more and more responsibility. In the great majority of the States Legislative Councils had been established which represented all interests.

275. In a broadcast delivered on 23 September 1962, the Federal Minister for Health had said that there had been criticisms of the agreement between Aden and the Federation on the grounds that their political systems were so different

that no useful partnership was possible. He had therefore endeavoured to explain to the people of Aden the true facts about the Federation, the most important of which was that the majority of the inhabitants remained attached to their traditional tribal way of life. It was against that tribal background that the sultanates had come into being; there had been continual inter-tribal fighting and the people had felt the need for leaders who could arbitrate between them and settle their disputes, provide them with protection and manage their affairs in general. The sultans had been mostly the elected leaders of the largest and most powerful tribes, to whom the neighbouring tribes had looked for leadership, and that was still the case today. Sultans, the Minister had pointed out, were not hereditary monarchs, as claimed by the critics of the Federation, but were elected. Nor were they dictatorial rulers who could disregard the people's wishes; indeed few sultans had ever been in a position to act without consulting the tribal leaders. The Minister had added that the old traditional systems had undergone considerable change; State councils, district councils and town councils had emerged, the members of which had hitherto been mostly elected tribal leaders, though with changing conditions thought was now being given to introducing electoral systems similar to that in Aden.

276. The Minister had pointed out that it was also untrue the Federation was ruled by a handful of dictatorial sultans. The main institution was the Federal Council, in which each State was represented. The executive authority of the Federal Government rested in the hands of the Ministers, who together constituted the Supreme Council; they were elected by the Federal Council for a five-year period, at the end of which fresh elections must be held. Of the nine present Ministers only four were sultans and they, like the other Ministers, had been democratically elected by the Federal Council.

277. Lastly the Minister had observed that, if democracy meant conformity with the parliamentary systems in countries like the United Kingdom and the United States, only a handful of countries could claim to be democratic and that not a single Arab country could put forward such a claim. He had concluded that political systems must be related to local conditions and that a system which was suited to a heavily populated industrial country would not necessarily suit South Arabia. Though the systems in Aden and the other States differed, they

were fundamentally based on popular consent and the Aden representatives in the Federal Council would be no less representative of the people's will than those of the other States.

278. Mention had been made by the representative of Tunisia of the allegation by one of the petitioners that there was a reign of terror in the Territory and had asked whether it was true that at least two sultans had been deposed because they had not obeyed their British mentors. Those allegations were not true. In 1958 the then Sultan of Lahej had been deposed by the Lahej Electoral College because he had carried out treasonable negotiations with the Yemeni authorities, culminating in the desertion of a number of Lahej troops to the Yemen at his instigation, and the present Sultan had been elected in his place. In the second case the son of the Sultan of Lower Yafa - not the Sultan himself - had used his position as Governor of the Abyan area to enrich himself by seizing the land of private persons. In July 1957, after a violent disagreement with the other members of the State Council, he had taken refuge in the hills with a number of his personal followers, taking with him some £10,000 from the State treasury. He had since left the country. In February 1959 his father had died and his brother had been elected Sultan.

279. Reference had also been made by the representative of Tunisia to air action in support of the security forces. One of the petitioners had alleged that 12,000 sorties had been flown against the population of South Arabia, but he had not mentioned the fact that that figure referred to every type of air activity, including transport of personnel, movement of freight, leaflet dropping and reconnaissance. Only a small proportion had been ground attack sorties and they had been directed primarily against armed incursions from the Yemen and related to a period in 1958 when the Government of Yemen had been particularly active in encouraging frontier violations. It was quite untrue that hundreds of casualties had been caused among the population of South Arabia by air action or that such action was a normal feature of law and order maintenance in the Territory.

280. In a petition<sup>15/</sup> from Mr. Alhabshi, Secretary-General of the South Arabians League, a number of statements were made concerning alleged incidents at various

places in the Territory, which were either grossly exaggerated or completely untrue. To take, for example, the incident described in paragraph 3 on page 10 of that document, there had in fact been an incident at Mukalla on 27 December 1952, when the Sultan of Mukalla had agreed to see a deputation of the Nationalist Party that had wished to protest against the appointment of a Sudanese national as State Secretary. The deputation had been followed into the Sultan's palace by a mob which had stormed through the ground floor and reached the floor above. After attempts to persuade them to leave had failed, the Arab Commanding Officer of the Mukalla army had ordered his troops to open fire. Sixteen persons had been killed and twenty-four wounded. British officers had not been concerned in the incident. The allegations in paragraph 4 were completely untrue. With regard to paragraph 5, there had been a small disturbance after Lord Lloyd had left the airport, as a result of which eleven persons had been arrested and prosecuted. No troops had been used and no one had been wounded. Paragraph 6 might refer to an incident in 1956, when a large crowd of rioters had attempted to force their way into a police station after three persons had been arrested. It had certainly not been a peaceful demonstration, as stated by the petitioner. After repeated warnings had been given and four policemen had been injured the police had opened fire. No United Kingdom forces had been involved. The statement in paragraph 9 was also untrue. Action had had to be taken in 1959 against a group of tribesmen who, at the instigation of the Yemeni authorities, had been engaging in acts of violence and brigandage. Two persons had been killed in the action. With regard to paragraph 12, the facts were that a riot had taken place in 1958 and after a number of police had been injured they had been compelled to open fire, killing five persons - not twenty-nine - and wounding seventeen - not 350; following the riot thirty-two persons - not 700 - had been imprisoned and 250 Yemenis - not 2,000 - had been returned to their own country.

281. He hoped that he had demonstrated that Mr. Alhabshi's allegations were not to be taken at their face value. He drew attention to the fact that the allegations covered a period of over nine years and that the last incident had occurred over three years previously. He could hardly believe that the Committee would take charges of that nature as an indication that a critical and explosive situation endangering peace and security existed in South Arabia.

282. He trusted that his references to statements made by various delegations would not be interpreted as criticisms of their sincerity or good faith. His delegation had noted with gratitude the expressions of confidence and trust in his Government's sincerity and good faith which had been made by a number of delegations.

283. As he had said before, the United Kingdom had the practical task of bringing its Territories to independence as soon as possible and, in consultation with the inhabitants of the Territories, it was taking steps to do so. Any impartial observer comparing the state of affairs in South Arabia five years earlier with the present situation would surely concede that a dramatic advance towards independence had taken place. Progress was in the right direction, but time was still needed. No one could seriously maintain, as had been suggested, that a federation established on one day could seek independence on the following day. Nor could anyone seriously maintain that a federation could become independent within a matter of weeks of the accession of a new member of the size and importance of Aden. Some members had criticized the fact that a date for independence had not been fixed. As the Committee was aware, the United Kingdom Government was not in favour of arbitrary dates; the naming of a date for independence was not an end in itself but the final culmination in a series of successive steps towards that goal. To do so before the time for the final decisive step had been reached might not accelerate the progress towards independence but rather slow it down.

284. As his delegation had already made clear, the aim of the United Kingdom Government was independence as soon as possible and the best and quickest way to achieve that goal was through the union of the different States of South Arabia in a federation. The Federation of South Arabia had made rapid progress in the past four years and the accession of Aden had further accelerated that progress. It was for the States which were not yet in the Federation to decide whether to join. Similarly, the exact form of the Federation was for its members to decide. What was important was that the Territory should advance to independence as rapidly as possible in accordance with the wishes of its inhabitants, and that was the policy of the United Kingdom Government.

285. The United Kingdom had a three-fold task: to encourage political and constitutional development; to press on with economic and social development; to

assist the Federal Government to protect its territory from incursions from Yemen and to maintain law and order. Its responsibilities were clear and it was determined to carry them out.

286. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in reply, said that if the United Kingdom representative's idyllic account of conditions in Aden was to be believed, it would seem astonishing that any country should have wished to free itself from British colonial rule. The fact was, however, that the United Kingdom's former colonies had been willing to shed blood in order to gain freedom and independence and there was no doubt that the people of South Arabia, too, would one day be free and independent. The only question was whether the United Kingdom was really helping to further that end.

287. He agreed with the United Kingdom's representative's statement that the function of the Committee was to examine the reasons why Non-Self-Governing Territories had not yet achieved independence, but he could not support that representative's attempt to restrict the Committee's activities and competence, which had been defined by the General Assembly.

288. The United Kingdom representative had complained that accusations had been levelled at his Government's policy. He had made no attempt, however, to reply to those accusations, since they could not be refuted.

289. The United Kingdom was determined to cling to Aden because it commanded the most direct route to the oil-producing States of the Persian Gulf and the approaches to the Suez Canal and because it was thought possible that there were oil deposits in Aden or the surrounding area. British companies had long held concessions granting them exclusive rights to exploit any oil resources that might be found in Aden and the Protectorate, and the Federation which the United Kingdom planned to establish in South Arabia was to grant the same concessions. He wondered whether the Committee was expected to defer any thought of independence for the peoples of South Arabia until the expiration of the long-term oil concessions which had been imposed on them by treaty.

290. The United Kingdom representative had asserted that many members of the Committee were opposed to the unification of the people of South Arabia. What they really opposed, however, was the United Kingdom's attempt to exploit the natural, historic trend towards unification in order to maintain its domination

of the area under the guise of the Federation. The Federation or any other State set up in South Arabia must be controlled by the people and not by the colonialists.

291. The representative of Iraq, in reply, referred to the statement by the United Kingdom representative that it was impossible to rewrite history or change the facts of geography. Yet that was exactly what the United Kingdom had done 125 years earlier, when it had occupied Aden and made it a colony; it had changed the facts of geography in that the Territory had hitherto been closely linked with Yemen, and it had rewritten the history of the entire area by imposing its colonial domination there. It was therefore possible for the United Kingdom to rewrite the history it had written 125 years earlier; indeed, it was its duty under the United Nations Charter and the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and people to do so.

292. The United Kingdom representative had said that the various sheikhs had wanted to preserve their independence from the Turks and Yemeni and had freely sought United Kingdom protection accompanied by guarantees of non-interference in their internal affairs. He had not explained how it was that those sheikhs had chosen such a distant country as the United Kingdom for that purpose. It had already been shown that the Treaties of Protection were unequal treaties which gave the United Kingdom Government great rights and privileges in the Territory. In fact, the sheikhs had pledged themselves and their successors in perpetuity never to enter into relations with any other Power except with the approval of the United Kingdom Government. That was scarcely a guarantee of non-interference in their internal affairs.

293. The United Kingdom representative had said that the initiative for the Federation in 1959 had come from the sheikhs themselves, but he had failed to mention that a proposal for a similar Federation had been made in 1954 and rejected by a majority of the sheikhs. It had been only under pressure, and on the initiative of the Governor of Aden, that agreement had been reached on the establishment of the Federation in 1959.

294. He agreed with the United Kingdom representative on the value of federations, but for that representative to claim that the establishment of federations had always been the policy of the United Kingdom in its colonies was, he submitted,

a misrepresentation of the facts. He would only remind the United Kingdom representative of the number of small States created by the United Kingdom in order to consolidate its power; that scarcely testified to the United Kingdom's love of federations.

295. The United Kingdom's representative had said that the objective of his Government's policy was independence for the Territory. The United Kingdom policy of gradual evolution towards independence, however, ran counter to the letter and spirit of the Declaration on the granting of independence, which said that "immediate steps" should be taken to transfer all powers to the people of the territories so that they might enjoy complete independence. The United Kingdom representative had spoken of introducing political, economic and social reforms in order to prepare the Territory for independence. That, too, was contrary to the Declaration, paragraph 3 of which stated that inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence. Moreover, if the Territory was not ready for independence, that could only be the fault of the United Kingdom Government.

296. The Iraqi Government held that independence should not be granted until it was certain that the people who would rule the Territory were the true representatives of the people, for to give independence to a Territory upon which the rulers had been imposed was not to give independence at all. The present ruler in South Arabia did not represent the people. If there was any doubt about that, the best way to resolve the doubt would be to give the people an opportunity to decide what rulers they wanted.

297. The representative of Cambodia in reply, said that although his delegation had refrained from voicing criticisms or accusations, it could not, as one of the firm supporters of the Declaration, forgo its right to speak in defence of certain principles which it cherished. The United Kingdom representative had touched upon everything except one point: the thirst of all peoples for freedom and independence. He had, in fact, unconsciously made himself the defender of the old colonialist theory that independence could be given only to so-called "civilized" peoples which had an adequate political, social and economic system. That outworn theory was not in conformity with the great principles of the Charter regarding human dignity and the equal rights of men and of nations. He would point out that

the peoples which had achieved independence in recent years had made progress in all fields. In his own country there had been greater progress in the fields of education and health and in the infrastructure in the ten years of independence than in the fifty years of foreign domination.

298. His delegation appreciated the good intentions of the Administering Power but good intentions were not enough: what was needed was a resolute determination to face the crucial problem of the desire of the people for freedom and independence. Much as it wished to show a spirit of understanding and co-operation, Cambodia would be failing in its duty if it did not draw attention to that fact

299. The representative of Syria in reply, emphasized that United Kingdom protection had not been sought in South Arabia; it had been forced on the southern part of Yemen. It was common knowledge that the Federal Ministers only echoed the statements of their British mentors. Repression with armed might was still going on in the territory, and the military base at Aden continued to threaten liberty and to crush all liberation movements in the area. Observers reviewing the United Kingdom record over the last 130 years were shocked at the appalling conditions prevailing in the territory and the lack of political freedom and population representation.

300. The representative of the United Kingdom in a further statement in reply referred to certain points that had been made by the representative of the Soviet Union. Among other things, that representative had complained that no reply had been given to accusations made during the debate about British monopolistic interests in Aden and the Protectorate and about the military base in Aden.

301. He recalled that the second of those accusations had been answered by his delegation in an earlier statement,<sup>16/</sup> in which it was stated that the base had not been established for aggression, that its purpose was to enable the United Kingdom to carry out its treaty obligations in the Protectorate itself and in the Middle East generally, that the presence of the base had contributed to the prosperity of Aden, since the British forces and their families spent some £11 million a year there, and, lastly, that the presence of the base did not constitute a hindrance to the constitutional development of the Federation and its progress towards independence.

---

<sup>16/</sup> See paragraphs 162-179 above.

302. With regard to the so-called monopolies, he pointed out that the representative of the Soviet Union had spoken at length about the alleged activities of oil companies in various countries, without ever referring to Aden or the Protectorate, for the simple reason that there was not a single oil well in those Territories.

D. ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

Establishment of the Sub-Committee on Aden

303. At the 160th meeting, on 30 April 1963, Cambodia, India, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Syria, Tanganyika and Yugoslavia submitted a draft resolution<sup>17/</sup> which read as follows:

The Special Committee,

Having considered the question of Aden and the Aden Protectorates,

Having heard the statements of the petitioners from these territories,

Noting that the Administering Power has not fully implemented the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples in respect of these territories and has not taken steps for the transfer of all powers to the peoples of Aden and Aden Protectorates as provided for in paragraph 5 of the Declaration,

Noting that the constitutional provisions now in force are not consistent with the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples,

Deeply concerned at the critical and explosive situation prevailing in Aden and Aden Protectorates as a result of the denial of political rights, and the detention of nationalist leaders - a situation, the continuation of which, would endanger peace and security in Southern Arabia,

1. Recognizes the right of the people of these territories to self-determination and freedom from colonial rule in accordance with the provisions of resolution 1514 (XV);

2. Recommends that the people of these territories should be given an early opportunity to decide their future under free and genuinely democratic conditions;

3. Calls upon the Government of the United Kingdom to release all political prisoners, permit the return of all political leaders at present living in exile, remove all restraints on political activities and ensure political freedoms and human rights throughout all these territories;

4. Decides to send to these territories a Visiting Mission to be nominated by the Chairman;

5. Authorizes the Visiting Mission to visit, if necessary, other neighbouring countries;

6. Requests the Visiting Mission to ascertain the views of the population especially those of the representatives and leaders of the various political parties, and hold talks with the Administering Authority;

7. Expresses the hope that the Administering Authority will fully co-operate with the Visiting Mission;

8. Requests the Visiting Mission to submit, not later than 10 June 1963, a report with recommendations for the speedy implementation, in respect of these territories, of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of the inhabitants.

304. Introducing the nine-Power draft resolution, the representative of Iraq said that at a time when people everywhere were throwing off colonial rule and joining the march towards freedom, South Arabia was still living in the most appalling mediaeval conditions. His delegation would have had no hesitation in proposing that the Special Committee should recommend that the General Assembly should condemn the system prevailing in the Territory and call for the immediate termination of colonial rule. Since, however, the problem was being discussed for the first time, many members had felt that it would be premature to submit a final recommendation to the General Assembly, and the sponsors had therefore prepared the draft resolution now before the Committee. It was really an interim measure, or rather a procedural resolution, and he hoped that after receiving the report of the visiting mission - which, despite the objections of the United Kingdom representative, the United Nations was fully entitled to send to the Territory - the Special Committee would be in a better position to submit recommendations to the General Assembly with a view to the speedy application to the Territory of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples.

305. At the 161st meeting another draft resolution was submitted by Australia, Denmark, Italy and the United States<sup>18/</sup> which read as follows:

---

<sup>18/</sup> A/AC.109/L.55.

The Special Committee,  
Having considered the question of Aden and the Aden Protectorates,  
Having heard the statements of the petitioners from these territories,  
Noting that the Administering Power has not yet fully implemented the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples in respect of these territories,

1. Recognizes the right of the people of these territories to self-determination and independence in accordance with the provisions of resolution 1514 (XV);

2. Recommends that the people of these territories should be given an early opportunity to decide their future in accordance with their freely-expressed will and desire.

306. Speaking of the four-Power draft resolution, the representative of Australia pointed out that the fact that the Committee had before it two draft resolutions indicated that although the members of the Committee were in agreement as to the objectives to aim at, they differed as to the kind of action to take. His delegation considered that the topic of Aden was a complex question on which the Committee, although it had heard three petitioners who had put forward their points of view sincerely, had not had time to form an opinion. His delegation regretted that the Committee had not attempted to reach a consensus.

307. His delegation had joined in sponsoring the four-Power draft resolution because it considered that the nine-Power draft resolution by no means represented the conclusions formed by the majority of the members of the Committee. In particular, there were a number of elements in it that his delegation was unable to support.

308. In the first place, the Australian delegation had been decisively impressed by the statements of policy which had been made on more than one occasion by the representative of the United Kingdom and from which it was clear that it was the policy of the United Kingdom Government to bring self-government and independence to the Territories under its administration as quickly as possible, in consultation with the inhabitants. In the opinion of the Australian delegation, that policy was entirely in accordance with the Charter and with the terms and spirit of resolution 1514 (XV).

309. In the Special Committee's discussion of the statements of the United Kingdom and the petitioners, there had been some disagreement about whether the means adopted by the Administering Power and the rate of progress achieved were satisfactory. In the opinion of the Australian delegation, the United Kingdom Government had exercised its overriding responsibility to further the interests of the inhabitants of its Territories and had acted wisely in deciding to form a federation of several small units, which offered the Territories in question, as a group, a political and economic future which they would not have individually. The present arrangements provided the possibility of orderly progress towards independence in accordance with the wishes of the people, ascertained through consultations. Some delegations had claimed that the methods used to consult the population had been faulty, but the Administering Power had assured the Committee that there would be changes and that a new electoral system would be put into operation in Aden. The Australian delegation was sure that the methods of consultation would become better and better as the months went by and that once independence had been obtained a number of questions which had been resting heavily on the minds of the petitioners and of some delegations would be answered. Once the group of territories under consideration had become independent, it could determine its own future.

310. However that might be, the Australian delegation did not consider the situation in Aden to be such that the terms used in the last preambular paragraph of the nine-Power draft resolution could be applied to it. If that draft resolution were compared with the four-Power draft resolution, it would be seen that the very brief preamble to the latter draft resolution was a fairer and more just representation of the true situation in the Territory and of the views which had been expressed in the Committee.

311. The point on which the sponsors of the two draft resolutions disagreed most strongly was clearly the question of the visiting mission. That was an extremely important question. His delegation felt that no source of information should be excluded from the Committee's consideration but that each case should be considered on its merits. In the present case, there were two important factors to consider.

The first was that the Committee had not exhausted the sources of information which were available to it at United Nations Headquarters. The Committee should have gone into the matter more deeply and put more questions to the United Kingdom delegation. At all events, there were many ways in which the Committee could fill the gaps in its information without resorting to such an extreme step as sending a visiting mission. The second factor which was involved was the attitude of the Administering Power. If the Administering Power had good reasons of principle for suggesting that a visiting mission should not be sent, the Committee should take its views into consideration. For those various reasons, the Australian delegation did not think that it would be wise to send a visiting mission to the Territory.

312. With regard to the four-Power draft resolution, he was sure that it would be an encouragement to the people of the Territory and would cause the United Kingdom Government to persevere with increased interest and sense of responsibility in working for the objectives on which the Committee was agreed.

313. The representative of the United Kingdom said that with regard to the final preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 3 of the nine-Power draft resolution, no case had been made to justify the allegations that a critical and explosive situation existed in the territory, that political rights were denied, that political prisoners were detained and so on. There were no "political prisoners" in Aden, no press censorship, no persons were detained without trial, no Aden-born politician had been exiled or deported. Political parties did operate, hold meetings and publish newspapers. They sent representatives to the United Nations and to conferences in Africa, Asia and elsewhere. If people coming from foreign countries abused the hospitality of Aden, they were returned to their own countries; there was nothing unusual in that. The paragraphs in question were based on completely groundless assertions by the petitioners and did not deserve inclusion in a resolution of the Special Committee.

314. Before the draft resolution had been submitted the United Kingdom Permanent Representative had made it abundantly clear that his Government was quite unable to accept the proposal that a visiting mission should be sent to the Territory. The Federation was a new creation and in its present form had existed for only three months. Much hard work, good will and co-operation would be needed by all

concerned within the Territory and his delegation did not believe that a visiting mission could assist in any way in the essentially practical tasks which must be faced. His delegation regarded the draft resolution as inappropriate and unacceptable.

315. The representative of Poland said that, while the nine-Power draft resolution generally reflected the views expressed during the debate, in that it placed emphasis on the sending of a visiting mission and on the mission's terms of reference, the statement in the third preambular paragraph that the Administering Power had not "fully" implemented the Declaration implied that the Declaration had been implemented in some manner. Inasmuch as none of the speakers in the general debate, including the Administering Power, had contended that the Declaration had been implemented in any way whatsoever, he wondered if the sponsors would explain what they had in mind or if they would agree to delete the word "fully".

316. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that his delegation supported the proposal in the nine-Power draft resolution that a visiting mission should be sent to Aden and the Protectorate for the purpose of gathering information and formulating recommendations, but it questioned the statement in the third preambular paragraph that the Administering Power had not fully implemented the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, since there was no evidence as yet that the Administering Power had done anything at all to implement the Declaration.

317. The representative of Iraq said that the United Kingdom representative had not explained why his delegation thought that the dispatch of a visiting mission to the Territory would aggravate the situation and would not help to solve the problems there. That seemed highly unlikely considering that the visiting mission would only be required to ascertain the views of the people. The sponsors were aware that the United Kingdom had always objected to the sending of visiting missions to Non-Self-Governing Territories, but the General Assembly had always insisted on its right and the right of its subsidiary organs to send such missions. If the United Kingdom Government really felt that the Territory was progressing towards independence and that the people were satisfied with the present situation, it could only strengthen its case by allowing a United Nations mission to visit

the area. He therefore hoped that the United Kingdom Government would accord the visiting mission the same consideration it had given other visiting missions, would hold talks with it in London and would allow it to enter the Territory so that it might report on the situation in an objective manner. It was on that basis that the sponsors must insist upon retaining the paragraphs relating to the visiting mission.

318. The representative of Venezuela considered that the Committee should proceed by stages in exhausting the means open to it of securing the implementation of the Declaration. He therefore suggested the following amendments to the nine-Power draft resolution which might help to eliminate certain difficulties of principle which would prevent several delegations, including his own, from voting in favour of the draft:

- (i) The third preambular paragraph should read: "Noting that the Administering Power has not fully implemented the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples in respect of these Territories,". The Committee was not in a position to say whether the "steps" taken were or were not in conformity with the Declaration.
- (ii) The fifth operative paragraph should read: "Deeply concerned at the situation prevailing in Aden and the Aden Protectorate,". The petitioners themselves had not furnished the Committee with convincing proof that there was any absolute denial of political rights or systematic detention of nationalist leaders.
- (iii) Operative paragraph 3 should read: "Calls upon the Government of the United Kingdom to ensure political freedoms and human rights throughout all these Territories;".
- (iv) Operative paragraph 4 should read: "Decides to send to the United Kingdom a sub-committee, to be nominated by the Chairman of the Special Committee, for the purpose of holding talks with the Government of the United Kingdom regarding the best means of securing the speedy and total implementation in Aden and Aden Protectorate of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of the inhabitants of these Territories, and authorizes the sub-committee, in the light of the results of these talks and if such a course should seem useful, thereafter to visit Aden and Aden Protectorate;".

- (v) In operative paragraph 5, the words "the visiting mission" should be replaced by "the sub-committee".
- (vi) Operative paragraph 6 should read: "Requests the sub-committee to ascertain the views of the population, especially those of the representatives and leaders of the various political parties,".
- (vii) Operative paragraph 7 should be replaced by the following: "Expresses the hope that the Administering Power will facilitate the decisions of the Special Committee".
- (viii) In operative paragraph 8, the words "the visiting mission" should be replaced by "the sub-committee".

319. The representative of Uruguay commenting on the nine-Power draft resolution said that the information which the Committee had at its disposal on the situation in Aden and the Protectorate was not sufficiently detailed to give it an accurate idea of the situation and there therefore seemed to be grounds for sending a visiting mission. Nevertheless, while it did not challenge the Committee's competence to take such a decision, the delegation of Uruguay had doubts about the effectiveness of that step. The Administering Power had stated that it was opposed to the sending of a mission to Aden, even if the mission had the most modest objectives, and it had raised objections of two kinds. The delegation of Uruguay was unable to recognize the validity of the objections of principle, since the possibility of sending a mission to Territories was provided for in the terms of reference of the Committee, which was authorized by resolution 1654 (XVI) to use "all means which it will have at its disposal within the framework of the procedures and modalities which it shall adopt for the proper discharge of its functions" and in resolution 1810 (XVII) the General Assembly had taken note with approval of the methods and procedures which the Special Committee had adopted for the discharge of its functions. Nor could the delegation of Uruguay accept the practical objections of the United Kingdom. A certain amount of information was essential to enable the Committee to take decisions in full knowledge of the facts. It must be admitted, however, that it would be very difficult to follow the proposed procedure without the Administering Power's agreement. The co-operation of the Administering Power was essential if a visiting mission was to be sent. It was true that the draft resolution provided also for the possibility of a visit to neighbouring territories, and there were precedents for such a course. It should be remembered, however, that when missions had been sent to countries adjoining the countries under consideration, that had been done only as a pis aller.

320. The delegation of Uruguay would have preferred the Committee to ask the Administering Power to take immediate steps to transfer power to the people of the Territory and to submit to the Committee at its second session a report on the steps it had taken. The Committee would then resume its consideration of the situation in Aden in the light of the information provided in the meantime by the Administering Power.

321. The delegation of Uruguay was sure that the United Kingdom's aim was to grant independence as quickly as possible. The Committee must, however, know what immediate steps were envisaged, since the words "immediate steps" appeared in resolution 1514 (XV).

322. The representative of the Ivory Coast stated that the two draft resolutions were not contradictory, although there appeared to be some conflict over the question of political prisoners. The difficulty was not insurmountable as it was simply a matter of point of view. He did not question the assurance the Committee had been given that there were no political prisoners. In his own country, however, the present leaders of the Government had all been prisoners under ordinary law. In order to make the proper distinction it would be necessary to consider all the reasons. He therefore hoped that the United Kingdom representative would not deny the sponsors of the nine-Power draft resolution the right to convince themselves of the truth by seeking the most adequate sources of information. Moreover, it was the first time that the question of Aden had been studied and some delegations, like his own, which as yet had no firm opinion on the subject, would like to know more about the situation before coming to a decision.

323. It had been said that the Committee could obtain all the information it wanted from the Administering Power. It must be acknowledged, however, that that had not hitherto been the practice of the United Nations for the gathering of information. It had in fact been provided that, over and above the statements of the Administering Powers, petitioners could be heard and committees of inquiry could be sent to the Territories to see for themselves whether what the petitioners said was true.

324. Some delegations, including his own, would like to know, for example, whether Aden meant to remain in the Federation and whether or not the desire to join the Federation had been freely expressed. The Ivory Coast certainly had no intention

of opposing the formation of large groups of States, for that was precisely its own objective. Although the small countries of Africa were not ashamed of being little States, they were trying to repair the damage done by the Berlin Conference and to form into groups again, and they were confident that that could be done by the freely expressed wish of each country. It was accordingly a question of some importance for the delegation of the Ivory Coast. As far as Aden was concerned, those who admitted that they were not yet fully informed were entitled to obtain the information they lacked.

325. The representative of Italy said that his delegation had been disappointed to find that none of the points of view that it had put forward in its statement<sup>19/</sup> had been taken into account in the nine-Power draft resolution, which had been conceived on the basis of an entirely different appraisal of the situation. As the Soviet Union representative had pointed out, the draft resolution was also somewhat contradictory in that while it provided for the dispatch of a visiting mission, justified by the lack of sufficient information on the Territory, it included other paragraphs which depicted conditions there in such detailed terms as to suggest that the Committee was completely informed on the subject. The Italian delegation could not agree with the wording of those paragraphs, in particular that of the final preambular paragraph, whose description of the situation did not tally with that given by the petitioners. It was indeed incorrect to describe it as a situation which could endanger peace and security.

326. As for the denial of political rights, the new Constitution contained provisions for the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual, which were enforceable through the courts.

327. Furthermore, operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution was so worded as to convey the impression that the entire Territory lived under a reign of terror, a state of affairs which was not substantiated either by the statements of the petitioners or by the Conference Room Paper prepared by the Secretariat.

328. After listening to petitioners representing the major political parties of Aden and the Protectorate and hearing the statement of a member of the Federal

---

<sup>19/</sup> See paragraphs 186-188 above.

Government and the statement of the United Kingdom delegation, and after examining some forty petitions from individuals and political organizations in the Territory, the Italian delegation could not see what useful purpose the proposed visiting mission or sub-committee could serve in the Territory. Since, to its regret, it was unable to agree with the ideas outlined in the nine-Power draft resolution, it had deemed it proper, in consultation with other delegations, to indicate, in a second draft resolution,<sup>20/</sup> a common ground on which all could agree. What was necessary was that the population should be given an early opportunity of exercising its right of self-determination.

329. Mr. BRYKIN the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that he did not agree with the Italian representative about the nine-Power draft resolution. Most of the members of the Committee had referred to the inadequacy of the information on the Territory. Moreover, the doubts to which the statements of the United Kingdom delegation had given rise had not yet been dispelled. The United Kingdom representative had passed over the fact that oil companies already had concessions in Aden and the Protectorate, even if they were not yet extracting oil. Nor had he said anything about the fact that the base at Aden had been used for the attack on Egypt and for operations against Yemen and the people of Oman. The Soviet Union considered that it was necessary for a visiting mission to be sent to Aden and the Protectorate. The main purpose of the nine-Power draft resolution was to enable a sub-committee to obtain detailed information on the situation in Aden and the Protectorate, through talks with the Administering Power in Aden. The sub-committee's visit to the Territory would enable the Committee to draw conclusions and to formulate recommendations based on a thorough knowledge of the facts.

330. The representative of Tunisia observed that there was little difference of substance in the two draft resolutions except that one did not include the proposal that a sub-committee should visit the Territory. His delegation was of the opinion that the visit of a sub-committee would be useful, but unfortunately the Administering Power was not prepared to agree to such a visit. His delegation had doubts about the usefulness of the sub-committee's work in those circumstances, but would not oppose the setting up of a sub-committee to hold talks with the

Administering Power and to visit the neighbouring countries. On the whole his delegation did not consider the nine-Power draft resolution to be strong enough. It would have liked the word "fully" in the third preambular paragraph to be deleted and it thought that the draft resolution should call for immediate steps to be taken for the transfer of all power to the people. He found operative paragraph 1 of the four-Power draft resolution preferable to that of the nine-Power draft resolution. Nevertheless, since the latter, by mentioning the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, implied that the transfer of power should take place immediately, and because the sponsors were countries friendly to Tunisia, his delegation would vote in its favour.

331. Replying on behalf of the sponsors of the nine-Power draft resolution, the representative of Iraq said that the sponsors had accepted the following amendments. They agreed to delete the last part of the third preambular paragraph, beginning with the words "and has not taken steps", and the words "critical and explosive" in the fifth preambular paragraph.

332. With reference to the reservations that had been expressed about the word "fully" in the third preambular paragraph, he said that that paragraph had been drafted after consultation between all the sponsors, some of whom had felt that it was perhaps fairer to qualify it by the word "fully". His delegation agreed that it was perhaps superfluous, but the important thing was that the Declaration had not been implemented and the word "fully" did not change the basic meaning of the paragraph.

333. With regard to operative paragraph 3, the sponsors felt that that paragraph should remain as it was. They felt that there were in fact people in prison who were there, if not for strictly political offences, at least for offences brought about by political action; many nationalists had been sentenced under criminal law but they were obviously not ordinary criminals. Moreover, there were people at present living in exile, a fact that the United Kingdom representative had not denied.

334. Lastly, the sponsors agreed to replace the words "visiting mission" by "sub-committee", which was the accepted name for such missions.

335. He explained that the text of the draft resolution did not preclude the possibility of a visit to London; indeed, in a sense that idea was implicit

in the wording. The sponsors had, however, seen no need to specify that there should first be a visit to London and had felt that the sub-committee should be allowed a certain latitude in the discharge of its functions. It would therefore rest with the sub-committee to decide, after consultation with the United Kingdom delegation, whether to go to London, what would be the best time to do so, and when to go to the Territory and the surrounding countries. He therefore felt that the point raised by the Venezuelan representative was fully covered by the wording of the draft resolution.

336. At the 163rd meeting, the Special Committee voted on the nine-Power revised draft resolution.<sup>21/</sup> Operative paragraph 4 was adopted by a vote of 16 to 5, with 2 abstentions. The draft resolution as a whole was adopted by a vote of 18 to 5 with no abstentions.

337. The representative of Venezuela explaining his vote said that his delegation was by no means opposed to the sending of a visiting mission, but felt that the Committee should proceed by stages and exhaust the means at its disposal in logical order. The first stage would normally be to enter into conversations with the Administering Power. It should also be borne in mind that the Administering Power had certain responsibilities under the Charter and that it was therefore important to hear its point of view and to try to find a solution in agreement with it. That was why the Venezuelan delegation had abstained from voting on operative paragraph 4. The same considerations explained why it had voted in favour of the text as a whole, together with the amendments.

338. The resolution on Aden adopted by the Special Committee at its 163rd meeting on 3 May 1963 is set out in paragraph 6 of the Report of the Sub-Committee on Aden.<sup>22/</sup>

339. At the same meeting the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics submitted certain oral amendments to the four-Power draft resolution, which were not accepted by the sponsors. It was also suggested that as the Special Committee had already adopted a resolution on Aden it was not necessary to vote upon the four-Power draft.

---

<sup>21/</sup> A/AC.109/L.52/Rev.1.

<sup>22/</sup> See Appendix to this Chapter.

340. At the 164th meeting the Special Committee decided to vote on the four-Power draft resolution by a vote of 8 to 7 with 7 abstentions.

341. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics then submitted the following amendments<sup>23/</sup> to the four-Power draft resolution:

(i) In the third preambular paragraph, delete the word "fully".

(ii) Insert the following new preambular paragraph:

"Considering that the existence of the military base in Aden represents a threat to the national interests of the people of South Arabia and is a cause of concern to neighbouring States,".

(iii) Insert the following new operative paragraph:

"Considers that conditions for a free expression of the popular will do not exist at present and that in order to create such conditions the Administering Power should take the following steps:

(a) Release all political prisoners and create conditions for complete freedom of action by the political parties of the people of the territory, which will decide the most appropriate forms for the expression of the popular will to take;

(b) Withdraw its troops and provide guarantees that the expression of the popular will will take place on a basis of universal suffrage and in an atmosphere free from intimidation, pressure and interference by the Administering Power."

342. At the same meeting the Special Committee voted on the Soviet Union amendments as follows:

The first amendment was not adopted, the vote being 8 in favour, 8 against, with 7 abstentions.

The second amendment was not adopted after a roll-call vote of 8 in favour, 8 against with 5 abstentions as follows:

In favour: Bulgaria, Iraq, Mali, Poland, Syria, Tunisia,  
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yugoslavia.

Against: Australia, Chile, Denmark, Italy, United Kingdom  
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,  
United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela.

Abstaining: Ethiopia, India, Iran, Sierra Leone, Tanganyika.

Not participating: Cambodia, Ivory Coast, Madagascar.

The first part of the third amendment (to the end of sub-paragraph (a)) was adopted by a vote of 14 to 8, with 1 abstention.

The remainder of the third amendment was not adopted, the vote being 8 in favour, 8 against, with 4 abstentions.

343. After an exchange of views, the sponsors of the four-Power draft resolution agreed to an appeal by the representative of Uruguay not to press their draft to a vote. This was agreed to by the Special Committee without objection.

344. The representative of Iran said that since his delegation had not had time to consider the Soviet Union amendments it had abstained in the vote.

345. The representative of Cambodia said that his delegation had been unable to take part in the vote because it could not do so without first consulting its Government, which had been impossible in view of the fact that a number of delegations had appeared anxious to vote as soon as possible.

346. The representative of India explained that his delegation had abstained from voting on certain parts of the Soviet Union amendments because in its opinion they raised questions which should be left to the decision of an independent Government of Aden. His delegation had abstained from voting on the first amendment, calling for the deletion of the word "fully" from the third preambular paragraph, because that word appeared in the nine-Power draft resolution which his delegation had co-sponsored.

347. The representative of Venezuela said that his delegation had voted against the Soviet Union amendments. The first of those amendments ran counter to the resolution adopted at the previous meeting. With regard to the second amendment, the Venezuelan delegation had considered that the Committee should not interfere in matters coming directly within the competence of other organs of the United Nations, but should remain strictly within its terms of reference. With regard to the third amendment, the Venezuelan delegation had felt that by adopting the first draft resolution at the previous meeting the Committee had already given its decision regarding the recommendations to be made and the action to be undertaken in the matter. It could not, therefore, take a different decision in another draft resolution.

348. The representative of Ethiopia said that his delegation had abstained from voting on the Soviet Union amendment relating to military bases, because it considered that question to be a digression from the main issue, which was the transfer, without any conditions or reservations, of all powers to the peoples of Territories that had not yet attained independence, as stipulated in resolution 1514 (XV). Once that fundamental question had been settled on the basis of self-determination, it would be for the people of the independent State to decide upon its policy and upon its future relations with other States.

Action arising from the Report of the Sub-Committee on Aden

349. The Sub-Committee on Aden was composed of Mr. Voeunsai Sonn (Cambodia) as Chairman, Mr. Adnan Pachachi (Iraq), Mr. Rémi Andriamaharo (Madagascar), Mr. Leonardo Diaz-Gonzalez (Venezuela) and Mr. Miso Pavicevic (Yugoslavia). It visited the United Arab Republic, Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Iraq from 25 May to 7 June and adopted its report<sup>24/</sup> on 1 July 1963.

350. The Report of the Sub-Committee on Aden was introduced by the Chairman of the Sub-Committee at the 187th meeting on 3 July 1963 and was considered at the 188th, 189th, 191st, 193rd, 194th, 196th and 197th meetings.

351. The representative of Cambodia, Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Aden, in introducing the report, drew attention to the Sub-Committee's terms of reference. In this connexion he stated that in view of the United Kingdom Government's continued refusal to permit the Sub-Committee to enter Aden and the Aden Protectorates despite the expressed wishes of many members of the Special Committee and the Chairman's letter requesting that Government to reconsider its position, the Sub-Committee had had to content itself with visits to neighbouring countries; those visits, however, had enabled the Sub-Committee to collect a good deal of information concerning the Territories and to ascertain the views of the population.

352. The Sub-Committee had actually begun its work on 15 May 1963. On 24 May it had left New York for Cairo in the United Arab Republic, Sana'a and Taiz in Yemen, Jeddah in Saudi Arabia and Baghdad in Iraq. After a journey in which it had kept to a very busy schedule and after many meetings in those cities, the Sub-Committee had returned to Headquarters on 10 June and had immediately begun the drafting of its report. That task had been completed only two days before - and he wished to apologize for the delay - owing to the volume of work and the need to examine many documents, most of them in Arabic, and to draft conclusions and recommendations.

353. The report consisted of five chapters. With regard to the first - the introduction - and the second, which dealt with the action taken by the Sub-Committee to carry out its mandate, he would only mention the difficulties caused

---

<sup>24/</sup> The Report of the Sub-Committee on Aden is contained in the Appendix to this Chapter.

by the Administering Power's failure to co-operate with the Sub-Committee and the keen interest aroused by the arrival in the region of a United Nations mission which had been given the task of finding the most appropriate means for ending colonialism. Chapter III, dealing with the hearings granted petitioners, was divided into three parts. The first part described the circumstances under which the hearings had been held and gave a brief note on the personal background of each of the fifty-six petitioners heard. The second part summarized the situation in Aden and the Aden Protectorates as described by the petitioners. The opinions expressed were those of the petitioners and the Sub-Committee had only recorded as faithfully as possible the statements it had heard and the written communications it had received. In the third part of chapter III, the Sub-Committee had brought together the demands of the petitioners under various headings so that the members of the Special Committee might have a fairly clear view of the various problems in the Territories connected with the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). Chapter IV contained the conclusions of the Sub-Committee on the way in which its mission had been accomplished, the main aspects of the question and the measures deemed necessary. Chapter V contained the recommendations of the Sub-Committee for the speedy implementation of the Declaration on the granting of independence with respect to the Territories. The Sub-Committee was of the opinion that the measures recommended were in conformity with the aspirations of a large part of the population and constituted the application of principles accepted not only by those who had voted for the resolution of 3 May 1963 but also by those who had sponsored the four-Power draft resolution<sup>25/</sup>, in that (1) the Special Committee recognized the right of the population of the Territories to self-determination and independence; and (2) it recommended that the population should be given an opportunity to decide on its future at an early date.

354. The representative of Mali said that he had taken note with the greatest interest of the important report submitted by the Sub-Committee on Aden, and he extended his warmest congratulations to the members of the Sub-Committee as well as to the Secretariat staff for the brilliant results they had achieved in so short

a time in spite of the unjustified refusal of the Administering Power to co-operate with the Sub-Committee. He noted, moreover, that the United Kingdom's refusal to co-operate, and the police measures it had taken to hinder the Sub-Committee's mission, had not prevented the petitioners from coming in great numbers and making the voice of their people heard.

355. The petitioners were completely unanimous in regarding the refusal of the United Kingdom Government to authorize the Sub-Committee to enter Aden as flagrant evidence of its contempt for the rights of the people and its fear of letting the exact situation in the Territory be revealed. In addition, the special confidential instructions issued by the Federal Government and British administration upon the announcement of the Sub-Committee's visit, as indicated in paragraph 55 of the report, gave an idea of the atmosphere of terror decried by the petitioners. The petitioners were likewise all aware of the Administering Power's efforts to divide the country and called the United Kingdom policy separatist. They all condemned the Federation of South Arabia, which they regarded as a major step backward in the constitutional development of the country. They felt that the United Kingdom, in creating that false federation, had wanted to divert the people from realizing their goal of true unity and independence; but the people had seen through that sham and had recognized it as a manoeuvre of the United Kingdom to perpetuate colonialism in the Territory. The petitioners had also denounced the Aden base, which they considered a constant threat to the entire Arab world.

356. His delegation was glad to note that the Committee, and through it the entire United Nations, constituted a great source of hope for those peoples. It was convinced that the Committee should persevere in its efforts on behalf of the peoples of South Arabia who were demanding unconditional independence.

357. The representative of Chile congratulated the members of the Sub-Committee on Aden upon their efforts and upon the conciliatory spirit which had guided their work. He also commended them for their careful and matter-of-fact report, which would be invaluable to the Administering Power and the Aden Administration in taking steps to change a situation which could not continue without impairing the prestige of the Administering Power and endangering international peace and security in the area.

358. The Chilean delegation deeply regretted that the United Kingdom, whose good will and co-operative spirit it did not doubt, had denied the Sub-Committee permission to enter Aden and the Protectorates and had refused to hold talks with it. The Chilean delegation also deplored the fact that a circular had been sent to all airlines and shipping companies asking them to prevent the designated persons from travelling to Aden, without specifying that they were members of the Sub-Committee. In other words, the members of a United Nations Mission had been treated by the immigration authorities not only as private individuals, but as suspicious persons.

359. The Chilean delegation could not understand the reasons for the United Kingdom's attitude. It was a policy which ran counter to the objectives being pursued by the United Kingdom, and it was all the more difficult to understand as the United Kingdom, by its participation in the Committee's work, showed that it was not opposed to the Committee's purposes and was prepared to co-operate with it. The Chilean delegation did not share the view that a visiting mission would constitute interference in the internal affairs of the Territory. The Non-Self-Governing Territories were no longer closed and impenetrable colonies; their internal affairs had become part of the international public domain and were primarily of concern to the United Nations under the powers granted it by the Charter and in accordance with the resolutions by which the United Nations had assumed the task of ensuring the welfare of the inhabitants of those Territories.

360. The Chilean delegation also failed to understand how the mission of peace and conciliation entrusted to the visiting mission could be construed as interference in the internal affairs of a country. Surely the United Kingdom representative, who had been taking part in the Committee's work for many months, could not doubt the good faith of the members of the Sub-Committee on Aden. Far from expressing any opinions in the Territory itself, the members of the Sub-Committee would have reserved their comments for the full Committee, which would have had ample opportunity to endorse or not endorse the Sub-Committee's activities. He wished to stress that point because he was thinking not only of the Sub-Committee on Aden, but also of any other sub-committees which might be established by the Special Committee.

361. The Special Committee and its Chairman should try to convince the United Kingdom that any mistrust of the Committee was groundless. The members of the Committee were men of good will; each of them, as a diplomat, had to act with extreme caution; and the Committee, far from being moved by a spirit of opposition to the United Kingdom, wished to help it emerge from the impasse in which it appeared to find itself.

362. In his delegation's view, the sending of a visiting mission was the best way of enabling the United Nations to know the situation in a given Territory and to understand the wishes and problems of the inhabitants. To oppose the use of that method was like concealing a sick person behind locked doors in order to prevent the doctor from seeing him and diagnosing his illness.

363. The Chilean delegation had already dealt with the question of Aden in an earlier statement.<sup>26/</sup> Having regard to the report, it would limit itself to urging the abolition of repressive laws and procedures in Aden, respect for human rights, implementation of the principles of self-determination and self-government, and the transfer of powers to a duly representative Government. The Chilean delegation hoped that with the co-operation of the Administering Power and thanks to the efforts of the people of Aden themselves and the assistance of the United Nations the various stages of that indivisible process would be completed as rapidly as possible.

364. The representative of the United Kingdom presenting his Government's views on report of the Sub-Committee on Aden explained his Government's general policy with regard to the sending of visiting missions to Non-Self-Governing Territories under United Kingdom administration. He recalled that on 27 November 1961, when the General Assembly had adopted resolution 1654 (XVI) setting up the Special Committee, the United Kingdom representative had stated that his delegation was prepared to participate in the Committee's work only on the clear understanding that the Committee would not attempt to interfere in the administration of Territories for which the United Kingdom was responsible. His delegation had subsequently reaffirmed that position<sup>27/</sup> when the President of the General Assembly had invited

---

<sup>26/</sup> See paragraphs 227-229 above.

<sup>27/</sup> A/5084.

it to become a member of the Committee. During the early stages of the Committee's work, his delegation had taken the position that visiting missions should not be dispatched without the consent of the Administering Power<sup>28/</sup> and the Committee, in its discussion of the sending of visiting missions, had recognized the need for securing the co-operation of the Administering Powers concerned.<sup>29/</sup> He recalled that, under the Charter, responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing Territories rested with the Administering Power and not with the United Nations or any of its subsidiary organs.

365. With regard to the specific question of the Committee's decisions to send a visiting mission to Aden, he was unable to agree with the Chilean representative's statement that the Sub-Committee on Aden would have gone to the Territory as impartial observers and would have made no judgements about the Territory. While his delegation had the greatest respect for the members of the Sub-Committee as individuals, their hands had been tied by the terms of the resolution setting up the Sub-Committee, which had requested them to submit recommendations for the speedy implementation of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples and had stated that the constitutional provisions now in force in Aden and South Arabia were not consistent with the Declaration. It should be noted that all the members of the Sub-Committee had voted in favour of the resolution and that one of them had opened the debate on Aden with a strong denunciation of the United Kingdom's policy in the Territory and a plea for the latter's annexation by Yemen.

366. With reference to the letter from the Controller of Immigration informing local shipping and airline offices that members of the Sub-Committee would not be permitted to land in Aden, his Government regretted the suggestion in paragraph 46 of the report that the British authorities had questioned the good faith of those members. It was not a question of good faith nor had the action of the Aden Government been in any way improper, as the report suggested. His delegation had already stated on 26 April, and repeated on 2 May, that his Government could not

---

<sup>28/</sup> A/5238, chapter I, paragraphs 25-26.

<sup>29/</sup> A/5238, chapter I, paragraph 12 (d).

agree to the Sub-Committee's visiting Aden and South Arabia. Nevertheless, the Committee had adopted a resolution instructing a Sub-Committee to visit those Territories. In reply to a letter from the Vice-Chairman of the Committee, his delegation had said that the United Kingdom Government was unable to reconsider its position. The Sub-Committee had none the less departed without announcing that it had decided not to visit Aden. In the circumstances, it had been perfectly legitimate to send the letter in question to the local airlines and shipping agents. The members of the Committee had been referred to by name because they were travelling on individual tickets and not as a group. He hoped that his statement would reassure them that the administrative action taken was merely a direct consequence of the United Kingdom's stated position and had not been intended as a reflection on them.

367. Turning to the remarks in paragraphs 53 to 56 of the report concerning alleged attempts by the authorities to prevent petitioners appearing before the Sub-Committee, he said that, with regard to section 2 of paragraph 55, it was normal for the police force to be alerted in view of the stated intention of the parties represented by the petitioners to organize demonstrations while the Sub-Committee was in Yemen, with the attendant risk of disturbances. The allegations made in sections 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of that paragraph were all untrue and he had already disposed of the matter referred to in section 1. His delegation greatly regretted that the Sub-Committee had taken those allegations at their face value and had used the unfortunate and unacceptable language in paragraph 56.

368. His delegation considered that the report was both inaccurate and tendentious. It had searched in vain for evidence that the memorandum of the United National Party and the statement made by Sheik Muhammed Farid on 24 April or the substantial statements of the United Kingdom on 26 April and 2 May had been taken into account. Nearly all of the many petitioners who had testified before the Sub-Committee were supporters of the Peoples Socialist Party or the South Arabian League, whose representatives had already been heard by the Committee. His delegation regretted that the Sub-Committee had thought fit to reproduce again the reckless allegations and unfounded criticisms which had already been made and answered in the Committee.

369. With respect to paragraphs 60 to 64 of the report, he wished to state again that the military base was maintained, not for any aggressive purpose, but to enable the United Kingdom to carry out its treaty obligations in the Protectorate

and in the Middle East generally. Far from representing a threat, it was a stabilizing factor in that unsettled area - a factor guaranteeing, rather than impeding, the Federation's advance towards independence. Moreover, the total of some £11 million which the staff of the base spent annually in Aden made a major contribution to the prosperity of the Territory.

370. With regard to the allegation in paragraph 63 that the United Kingdom had deliberately fragmented the country, the fact was that when the British had arrived in 1839 South Arabia had already been divided for over a century. The British had had no desire to annex the Territory; the independent sheiks and sultans had freely sought British protection in return for guarantees of non-interference in their internal administration. The treaties concerned had not been unilateral or secured by force or bribes, but were of a kind recognized in international law, which imposed both legal and moral obligations on the parties. Far from perpetuating the division of South Arabia, United Kingdom policy had been to encourage the small States to federate.

371. In connexion with the reference in paragraph 66 to the powers of the Governor of Aden, he had already pointed out that while it was possible to quote from constitutional instruments to demonstrate that the Executive and Legislative Councils were powerless and that the Governor had unlimited powers, to understand the correct position it was necessary to distinguish between constitutional theory and practice. The petitioners had failed to point to a single instance in which the High Commissioner had acted as was alleged in that paragraph.

372. The allegation in paragraph 67 that subordinate legislation could essentially change the law of the country was nonsense. It was the Legislative Council itself which conferred the power to enact such legislation, which could not change the law of the land, could be challenged in the courts if ultra vires, and did not in any way violate democratic practices.

373. With reference to the petitioners' complaint, referred to in paragraph 68, that the present Legislative Council was unrepresentative, the fact was that the franchise in Aden was at present confined to persons born or permanently resident in Aden. The Peoples Socialist Party was disappointed that the many Yemeni immigrant workers, who were not permanent residents, and on whose support it relied, were excluded from the franchise. It had succeeded in persuading some of its supporters who were eligible as electors to boycott the last elections, but their

failure to use their voting rights did not alter the fact that the Aden Government had been constitutionally elected and was entitled to make and to implement decisions in the interests of the people. The number of eligible electors was not 5,000, as given in paragraph 68, but 21,700.

374. The position on the question of general elections in Aden, referred to in paragraphs 69 and 70, was that all parties had agreed that the present franchise should be reviewed before the next general election, which under the Constitution had to be held within three months of the dissolution of the Legislative Council, which would come to an end by January 1964. The new Chief Minister of Aden, Mr. Baharoon, was undoubtedly giving that question urgent consideration.

375. With reference to paragraph 71, election by an electoral college was a recognized democratic process, and the election of four additional members of the Legislative Council by the Council sitting as such a college was only a transitional measure pending the next general election, to enable local inhabitants to replace official members, pursuant to the Constitution.

376. The description of the Federation of South Arabia in paragraph 76 as false and fictitious and created in order to maintain British colonial domination was entirely false. The facts were that for some years a number of rulers had been increasingly interested in uniting in order the better to promote the development of their small territories. At the beginning of 1959 six of those States had formed a Federation on their own initiative for their mutual defence and to foster political, economic and social development. At the beginning of 1963, five other States had joined that Federation. Following a series of talks held during that period, the Ministers of the Federation and of Aden had agreed that union between the two would increase their economic strength and political stability and speed up the achievement of full independence. That proposal had been approved by the United Kingdom Parliament and the legislatures of the Federation and of Aden in the autumn of 1962, and Aden had joined the Federation in January 1963, followed by two more States. The emergence of that Federation, which now comprised the majority of States in Southern Arabia, had been a voluntary act on the part of the States themselves, as would be any decision by any other States to join the Federation.

377. He would not repeat what he had already said in his previous statement,<sup>30/</sup> about the allegedly unrepresentative nature of the Federal Government, referred to

---

<sup>30/</sup> See paragraphs 270-277 above.

in paragraph 80 of the report, but would merely urge the members of the Committee not to take such allegations by political opponents of the Federation at their face value.

378. The demonstrations referred to in paragraphs 84 to 87 had been a carefully planned attempt to intimidate the members of the Legislative Council by violence and riot and unscrupulous methods had been employed. The police, however, had reacted with patience and restraint. It was entirely untrue that a British adviser had threatened a member of the Council during the debate, as alleged in paragraph 86; in any case, no advisers had access to members of the Council during debates in the Chamber.

379. With respect to the alleged restrictions on political activities and infringements of human rights referred to in paragraphs 88 to 106, that section of the report was admittedly based almost entirely on a memorandum by the Peoples Socialist Party, a fact which was sufficient to indicate the tendentious nature of many of the statements made.

380. So far as the Press was concerned, paragraph 90 was totally misleading. Al-Baath was not a newspaper but a printing press and was still in operation. Al-Nahda had not been closed down but had merely changed its name; its owner and former editor was now the Federal Minister of Education. Al-Fagr and Al-Fikr had been closed down for attacking the friendly Government of a neighbouring State. Al-Zaman had ceased publication because of the owner's bankruptcy. Al-Ayam had been closed down for a while but had now been granted a licence. The suggestion in paragraph 91 that all papers opposing the Government had been banned was equally untrue. Eight of the ten daily and weekly newspapers now being published were independent and often criticized the Administration. There had therefore been no suppression of the freedom of the Press in Aden.

381. The last sentence of paragraph 92 showed that the Aden Trades Union Congress had been fomenting strikes for political, not industrial purposes. It was untrue that the Industrial Relations Ordinance had done away with the right to strike and had placed the worker at the mercy of the employer. The Registrar of Trade Unions had virtually no power to cancel a trade union's registration unless its purposes had become unlawful and he was bound to register a union when it had complied with the simple provisions of the Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Ordinance.

382. The Societies Bill referred to in paragraphs 95 to 99 had not been enacted and would not be placed before the Legislative Council until it had been studied in the light of the relevant ILO Conventions.

383. Paragraphs 100 and 101 gave a misleading picture of the provisions regarding the granting of bail, which were liberal and similar to those in the United Kingdom. The granting of bail was obligatory in many cases; in other cases the courts had always to show good reason for refusing it.

384. With respect to the Aden Government's power to deport undesirable aliens referred to in paragraphs 102 and 103, he had already stated on two occasions that no immigration control was exercised in respect of the Yemenis; some of them, however, had from time to time had to be deported to their country of origin because they had broken the law of Aden. That was a perfectly normal procedure between neighbouring States.

385. The statement in paragraph 104 that all public meetings and demonstrations were banned in Aden was quite untrue, as were the allegations in paragraphs 108 to 113 concerning political prisoners in Aden. There were no political prisoners in Aden; all those in prison had been sentenced for breaches of the law, nothing in which related to purely political offences. Nor were prisoners ever tortured.

386. Most of the allegations in paragraphs 114 to 131 were too vague or too wild to be capable of refutation and others had already been dealt with. It was untrue that hundreds of casualties had been caused by air action and that it was a normal means of enforcing law and order in the territory. Nor had the RAF ever used napalm bombs there.

387. The deposition of Ali Abdul Karim, referred to in paragraphs 123 and 74, had been brought about not by the British but by the Lahej Electoral College, which in 1958, after a series of treasonable negotiations between the Sultan and the Yemeni authorities, had elected the present Sultan in his place. Mohammed Aidaroos, referred to in paragraph 120 as the deposed Sultan of Lower Yafei, was the son of the Sultan and had abused his position by seizing privately-owned lands and otherwise interfering with the local economy. Following disagreements with other members of the State Council, he had taken refuge in the hills in 1957 and had since left the country. In 1959 his father had died and his brother had been elected Sultan. The person referred to in paragraph 125 as the deposed Sultan of Upper Yafei had never been elected.

388. The statement in paragraph 127 that the revenues of the port of Aden had been used by the United Kingdom Government was untrue; in fact all such revenues were ploughed back into port development. Nor was it true that there had been no road construction or agricultural development in the Protectorate. With regard to education and health, the figures quoted in paragraphs 128 to 131 were misleading; all the relevant statistics had been transmitted by his Government to the Secretary-General under Article 73 e of the Charter.

389. With regard to the question of the union of Aden and the Protectorate of South Arabia with Yemen, the Yemeni rulers who had once occupied part of South Arabia had lost control there by the beginning of the eighteenth century, and the rulers of all the various States that had been independent since then had always rejected Yemeni claims to sovereignty in their territory. The only petitioners who had supported that claim were those representing the political party in Aden which was supported mainly by Yemeni immigrant workers. In any event, the purpose of the Committee was to help colonial territories achieve independence and not to arbitrate irrelevant and unfounded territorial claims.

390. With respect to the recommendations in paragraph 176, he felt it his duty to restate clearly his Government's policy in the Territories. The aim of the United Kingdom Government was independence as soon as possible, and the best and quickest way to achieve that goal was through the union of the States of South Arabia in a Federation. The Federation of South Arabia had made rapid progress, especially since the accession of Aden. His Government had no intention of forcing the remaining States to join the Federation or of imposing the exact form the Federation should take; those were matters for the States themselves to decide. It was important that the Territories should advance to independence as rapidly as possible in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants. The United Kingdom Government therefore had the threefold task of encouraging political and constitutional development, of promoting economic and social development and of assisting the Federal Government to repel incursions from Yemen and maintain law and order. It was determined to act accordingly.

391. The accession of Aden to the Federation had been a momentous event, the necessary consequences of which had yet to be worked out. The Sub-Committee's recommendations ran directly counter to his Government's policy of progressive

constitutional advance. His Government rejected the charge that the Federal Government was unrepresentative. On the other hand, it did not claim that the present electoral methods were definitive; all parties agreed that the franchise in Aden should be reviewed, and that would be done before the next election. In the other States of the Federation the rulers and State Councils intended to bring their electoral methods into line with the practice in other countries as soon as social conditions made that practicable. That matter, however, like the accession of other states to the Federation, was one for the States themselves to decide. The Sub-Committee's recommendation that a new constitution should be introduced, that all States should be forced to join the Federation and that particular electoral methods should be imposed upon them was quite unacceptable to his Government and he hoped that on reflection they would not be endorsed by the majority of the Committee. At the beginning of the Committee's work this year, he had drawn the Committee's attention to the inadvisability of attempting to force through resolutions which were unacceptable to those to whom they were addressed.

392. Finally, the allegation in paragraph 177 of the report that the situation in the Territories of Aden and South Arabia was a potential threat to international peace and security was an instance of the inappropriate and indiscriminate use of that phrase, which was thus emptied of its true meaning. If members of the Committee would look at a map of the Middle East they would realize that the real threats to the peaceful progress of that troubled part of the world did not come from the Federation of Aden and Southern Arabia.

393. The representative of Chile recalled that the United Kingdom representative had referred to the statement in which he had expressed his delegation's surprise which was surely shared by most members of the Committee and indeed of the United Nations - at the United Kingdom's refusal to allow a United Nations Committee engaged in a peaceful mission to visit Territories under its administration. He had not been convinced by the arguments put forward by the United Kingdom representative, which referred to individual circumstances, whereas the question at issue related to matters of principle. The Chilean delegation would certainly not agree to the dispatch of a United Nations body to intervene in the internal affairs of other countries. The purpose of a visiting mission, however, was not to interfere but to go about its duties, in agreement with the Administering Power, objectively and impartially. His delegation hoped that it would prove possible to

dispel the suspicion with which recourse to international means of peaceful settlement of issue of international significance was still regarded. The Special Committee was neither an inquisition nor a tribunal, but a body entrusted with a peaceful mandate. If the United Kingdom could convince the Committee that there were better methods than the dispatch of visiting missions, then they would of course be taken into account. The Committee's objective, however, which was to bring about the speedy independence of colonial peoples, brooked no argument, since its implementation would benefit the entire international community.

394. The representative of Iraq said that the United Kingdom representative's statement had demonstrated the United Kingdom Government's reluctance to treat South Arabia in the same manner as other territories under its administration. The Arab people would draw their own conclusions from that fact.

395. The United Kingdom representative had defended his Government's refusal to permit the Sub-Committee to visit Aden on the ground that such a visit would have constituted interference in the administration of the Territory, that the Sub-Committee's hands had been tied by the Special Committee's resolution of 3 May 1963,<sup>31/</sup> and that the members of the Sub-Committee would not have been impartial observers in view of certain speeches they had made and certain votes they had cast. With regard to the first of those points, the Sub-Committee on Aden could not be regarded as comparable to the visiting missions which had been sent out in the past by the Trusteeship Council, since it would be the purpose of any sub-committee set up by the Special Committee to promote the speedy implementation of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples. The Sub-Committee had been instructed by the Special Committee to ascertain the views of the population with regard to their future, and the Sub-Committee would, of course, have done that by accepting written petitions and granting hearings to petitioners. That was a normal function of the Special Committee, and he failed to see how it could have constituted interference in the administration of the Territory. The Sub-Committee had not sought any share in the responsibility of administration, as the United Kingdom representative had suggested at the previous

---

<sup>31/</sup> A/AC.109/42 and paragraph 6 of the Report of the Sub-Committee on Aden, an Appendix to this Chapter.

meeting. While it was true, as the United Kingdom representative had said, that the Committee had recognized the need to secure the co-operation of the Administering Power when a visiting mission was sent to a Non-Self-Governing Territory, an Administering Power's refusal to co-operate could not be regarded as giving it a right of veto over the Committee's work.

396. The United Kingdom's position with regard to visiting missions had originally been stated in 1946 during the first General Assembly discussions on the applicability of Chapter XI of the Charter. However, the world of 1963 was very different from that of 1946, and the Charter had been successfully adapted to a changed situation in which the United Nations, in response to the overwhelming demand of world opinion, was now committed to the speedy and unconditional elimination of colonialism throughout the world. The General Assembly and its subsidiary organs had thus assumed special responsibilities which they intended to discharge, regardless of the views of some Administering Powers.

397. The United Kingdom representative's second objection to the Sub-Committee was that its hands had been tied by the Special Committee's resolution of 3 May 1963. However, the statement in the third preambular paragraph of that resolution that the Administering Power had not fully implemented the Declaration in respect of Aden and the Aden Protectorates was obviously true, since the latter were still Non-Self-Governing Territories. The statement in the fourth preambular paragraph that the constitutional provisions now in force were not consistent with the Declaration was borne out by, for example, article 2 of the treaty between the United Kingdom and the Federation of South Arabia admitting Aden to the Federation, which stated that nothing in the treaty was to affect British sovereignty over Aden. With regard to operative paragraph 1, which recognized the right of the people of the territories to self-determination and freedom from colonial rule, the United Kingdom representative had stated that his Government was also committed to that objective. Operative paragraph 2, which recommended that the people of the Territories should be given an early opportunity to decide their future under free and genuinely democratic conditions, could surely not be regarded as tying the Sub-Committee's hands. Finally, operative paragraph 3, calling upon the United Kingdom to release all political prisoners, and operative paragraph 8, requesting the Sub-Committee to submit recommendations for the speedy implementation of the Declaration in respect of the territories, could not in any sense prejudice the Sub-Committee's impartiality.

398. The United Kingdom representative's third argument, i.e., that the members of the Sub-Committee could not have been impartial because of certain speeches they had made and certain votes they had cast, was one which, if accepted, would mean the end of the United Nations. The United Kingdom representative had referred to him personally when he had said that one of the members of the Sub-Committee had used terms of passionate denunciation and had advocated a certain solution to the problem. It was quite true that he had done so, but on that occasion he had been speaking on behalf of his delegation. It was, however, a long-established United Nations practice that representatives could act either in the capacity of members of their delegations or as members of official missions dispatched in the name of the United Nations itself. Never before had he heard the contention that a representative of a Member State who had expressed his Government's views was automatically disqualified from serving as a member of a United Nations mission. One of the principles of the Charter was that impartial international observers could be sent to any part of the world to investigate any situation lying within the competence of the United Nations. The members of the Sub-Committee had been charged with the accomplishment of a specific task not as representatives of their Governments but as international observers.

399. The United Kingdom representative had also argued that the Controller of Immigration had been justified in sending his letter to airlines and shipping offices on the grounds that before its departure for the region the Committee had not stated that it would not visit Aden. In that connexion he referred the United Kingdom representative to a press release<sup>32/</sup> issued before the Sub-Committee's departure, on 22 May 1963, in which it had been indicated, inter alia, that in view of the fact that the United Kingdom had stated that it had been unable to reconsider its position concerning a visit by the Sub-Committee to Aden, the Sub-Committee would, in accordance with the resolution of the Special Committee, visit neighbouring countries. In the circumstances, the action taken by the immigration authorities at Aden had been totally unwarranted and indefensible.

---

32/ GA/COL/32.

400. The United Kingdom representative had spoken at some length on paragraphs 60-131 of the Sub-Committee's report. Those paragraphs reflected the views of the petitioners who had appeared before the Sub-Committee. It did not follow that the Sub-Committee had agreed with everything they had said. The Sub-Committee's own impressions were reflected in the conclusions and recommendations. Moreover, if the Sub-Committee had been allowed to visit Aden, its report might have contained different views emanating from other sections of the population.

401. With reference to the Sub-Committee's recommendations, the request that the views of the people should be ascertained in conditions of genuine political freedom and under suitable guarantees was not unreasonable. Indeed, he failed to understand why the United Kingdom did not apply in Aden the policies it was applying in its African Territories. All that he was asking was that what had been done in many other United Kingdom Territories should be done also in Aden.

402. The representative of Cambodia recalled that the United Kingdom representative had indicated that one of the reasons why his Government had not allowed the Sub-Committee to enter the Territory had been that it was composed of members whom the United Kingdom Government did not regard as impartial because of their statements and of the manner in which they had voted on a resolution in the Special Committee. The members of the Sub-Committee were indeed committed: they were unreservedly committed to the implementation of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples.

403. With reference to paragraph 46 of the Sub-Committee's report, to the drafting of which the United Kingdom representative had raised objections, he thought that the matter had been reported objectively. The paragraph referred to "the British authorities" and not to "the British Government". The fact of the matter was that the Sub-Committee had been prevented from visiting Aden, and its members, moreover, had been to a certain extent ostracized.

404. As for the United Kingdom representative's contention that the Sub-Committee's intentions had not been known at Aden, he drew attention to paragraph 43 of the report, in which it was stated that on 22 May 1963 the Committee had issued a Press release<sup>33/</sup> announcing its itinerary.

405. With reference to the contents of the report, he had already told the Committee that the Sub-Committee had merely endeavoured to reflect as faithfully as possible the statements made by the petitioners and the written communications received. The Sub-Committee could not be blamed for the fact that persons who favoured United Kingdom policies in Aden had not appeared before it or for the fact that it had been unable to visit the Territory.

406. He objected to the statement by the United Kingdom representative at the previous meeting that the report of the Sub-Committee on Aden was both inaccurate and tendentious. He referred the Committee to paragraph 49 of the report, from which it could be seen that at the beginning of every meeting - and all of them had been held in public and attended by the Press - the Chairman of the Sub-Committee had fully informed those present of the Sub-Committee's terms of reference. The Sub-Committee's conclusions were based on the statements by the petitioners and the large number of written communications and documents received. As could be seen from paragraph 50, foot-note 8, those documents, which included petitions, letters, cables, photographs and even official British documents such as warnings to the people, had been placed in the files of the Secretariat. Together with the records of the hearings, they were available to members of the Special Committee. Again, it was inaccurate to assert that the Sub-Committee's views were based on the statements of the representatives of two parties only. As could be seen from paragraph 159 of the report the Sub-Committee had in fact been able to hear a great many people belonging to many different sections of the population. Biographical details concerning the petitioners heard were given in paragraph 58. In the circumstances the report could not be called inaccurate or tendentious. The Sub-Committee had faithfully reported what it had seen and heard.

407. With reference to the Sub-Committee's recommendations, he had indicated, in submitting the report, <sup>34/</sup> that they reflected the aspirations of a large portion of the people; he had not said "of the entire people". Moreover those recommendations embodied a principle to which the majority of the Committee adhered. If the validity of resolutions which had not been adopted unanimously was questioned or if it was argued that resolutions could not be implemented if

---

34/ Paragraphs 351-353 above.

their provisions did not correspond with the Administering Power's policies, the Committee would be unlikely to achieve anything in the field of decolonization. 408. The representative of Venezuela, referring to the statement by the United Kingdom representative, said he had no doubt that the representative of the United Kingdom would have considered the report on Aden objective and impartial if it had concluded that the situation in Aden and the Aden Protectorates was idyllic, that harmony reigned between the Administering Power and the people, that law and order were maintained without any violence, that there were no exiles or political prisoners, that independence would soon be attained under a freely elected and representative government and that the methods employed in Aden could serve as an example for other colonial territories. The Venezuelan delegation also would have preferred to see such conclusions but unfortunately the facts had obliged the Sub-Committee on Aden to reach others.

409. The Sub-Committee had at no time considered entering Aden or the Aden Protectorates without the Administering Power's consent. His own delegation had proposed amendments to the draft resolution designed to achieve an understanding with the Administering Power; it had pressed for talks with that Power at the risk of being considered partial to it. It was therefore surprising that the United Kingdom representative should have asserted that due regard had not been paid to the position of the Administering Power. Only when the intransigent attitude of the United Kingdom had become certain and all possibilities of obtaining its co-operation had been exhausted had the Sub-Committee decided to carry out its mandate by visiting countries adjacent to Aden and the Aden Protectorates.

410. While no one would deny the Administering Power's right to refuse entry to a territory it administered, the action taken to warn transport companies against members of the Sub-Committee had been clearly vexatious. The United Kingdom Government should have shown consideration to the members of the Sub-Committee as diplomatic representatives of countries with which the United Kingdom maintained normal relations. Further, as a signatory of the United Nations Charter and of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, the United Kingdom was bound to respect a sub-committee representing the United Nations. Moreover, in preventing even transit through the Territory, the United Kingdom had violated provisions of international civil aviation agreements.

411. What was set forth in the Sub-Committee's report was not the opinion, much less the invention, of the members of the Sub-Committee, as the United Kingdom representative had implied. The report presented what the petitioners has said and what the Sub-Committee had been able to corroborate by means of documents and photographs. When there had been doubt concerning a fact or statement, it had been disregarded. Proof of that could be found in the records and files of the Sub-Committee, all of which were available for examination. His delegation was the first to regret that the Sub-Committee had not been able to hear representatives of the Administering Power, of the Federation of South Arabia or supporters of the Federation, who could, if they had wished, have come before the Sub-Committee in Yemen. Having been prevented from visiting the Territories concerned, the Sub-Committee had had no choice but to be guided by the testimony of the petitioners.

412. One of the salient facts noted in the report was the brutal repression of resistance by means of the bombing of defenceless populations. To everyone's surprise, the United Kingdom representative had not denied such bombings but had belittled their scope; and most surprising of all had been his impassive announcement that no napalm bombs had been used, which implied the use of bombs appropriate to the action.

413. The United Kingdom representative had termed the report inaccurate and tendentious and had accused its authors of bad faith, but he had offered no valid or convincing proof of his allegations. In reality, the Sub-Committee on Aden had performed work of which it could be proud. It had collected a body of facts and had presented them in its report. Those facts would stand as implacable, irrefutable accusations against the Administering Power.

414. The representative of Yugoslavia stated that he had not expected the representative of the United Kingdom to be pleased with the report of the Sub-Committee on Aden, but neither had he expected him to make defamatory allegations about members of the Sub-Committee and unfounded assertions about the Sub-Committee's report. The charge that the report was "both inaccurate and tendentious" was one which his delegation rejected vigorously and indignantly. The United Kingdom representative had said of the members of the Sub-Committee that "their hands had been tied" by the resolution requesting them to submit recommendations for the speedy implementation of the Declaration on the granting

of independence. The implication that it was wrong to make such recommendations and that the Declaration was in the nature of a subversive document was completely unacceptable.

415. Much had been said about the letter of the British authorities to the airlines and shipping companies. He believed it to be an unprecedented document in the annals of the United Nations and had expected expressions of regret, if not apologies, from the United Kingdom delegation. Instead, the United Kingdom representative had actually tried to justify the action. He had merely succeeded in making it plain that it had not been an error on the part of some local official but a premeditated act and part of the British Government's policy towards the Sub-Committee.

416. As to the United Kingdom representative's opinion that the Sub-Committee would not have gone to Aden as impartial observers, he observed that his own delegation was not neutral on the colonial question but, along with the majority of the Committee and the United Nations generally, it was working towards the rapid implementation of the Declaration on the granting of independence. The United Kingdom delegation was, however, hardly in a position to pass judgement on the question of impartiality when it came to Aden. He would not attempt to convince the Administering Power that its policy towards Territories in that part of the world was unfortunate; he wished, however, to draw the attention of members to the fact that the United Kingdom representative had contested the objectivity not only of the members of the Sub-Committee but of all the members of the Committee who had voted for the resolution on Aden.

417. The claim of the United Kingdom representative that the Aden military base was a stabilizing influence rather than a threat and that it guaranteed rather than impeded advancement towards independence was contradicted by other sources. The Observer, for instance, had found the main purpose of the base to be to safeguard oil interests in the Persian Gulf. Mr. J.J. Berreby, an authority on questions of the Arabian Peninsula, had described the important role played by the Royal Air Force in Aden and had noted that in 1957 it had engaged in two interventions, once in the Protectorate of Aden in January and February and once in the Sultanate of Oman in July and August.

418. The United Kingdom representative had attempted to refute the statements of the petitioners concerning the legislation restricting political activity and

/...

human rights, and also concerning repression in Aden and in the Protectorates. The petitioners' statements were borne out by two recent petitions from Aden. In his letter of 13 June 1963,<sup>35/</sup> Mr. Mohammed Salem Ali, Acting President of the Peoples Socialist Party, complained of new legislation which was intended to curb the activities of his party and the organizations supporting it. He also complained of arrests, deportations and sentences of imprisonment which had been inflicted on members of his party. Again, Mr. Abdullah Al-Asnag, Secretary-General of the the Aden Trade Union and President of the Peoples Socialist Party, complained in his letter of 1 July 1962<sup>36/</sup> that the police in Aden had arrested peaceful Arab demonstrators, and had deported five Arab merchants and businessmen. He also complained that the British authorities in Aden had arrested the Adeni poet Idris Ahmed Hambalah, Secretary-General of the Skilled Workers Union. Those facts were evidence of new persecutions of the Arab nationalists by the colonial authorities in Aden.

419. The United Kingdom representative had also raised the question of responsibility. The Yugoslav delegation had always held that the colonial Powers were responsible for applying the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples. At the third meeting of the Special Committee, the Yugoslav representative had stressed the special responsibility of the colonial Powers, which had increased as a result of the adoption by the General Assembly of resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1654 (XVI), for besides being Administering Powers, they were also members of the United Nations and were bound to comply with the provisions of the resolutions of the General Assembly. At the same time, the Yugoslav delegation had never recognized the absolute responsibility of the Administering Powers. On the contrary, it had always emphasized the increased responsibility of the United Nations in the sphere of decolonization. By adopting the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, operative paragraph 1 of which declared that the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constituted a denial of fundamental human rights, was contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and an impediment to the promotion of world

---

35/ A/AC.109/PET.112/Add.1.

36/ A/AC.109/PET.150.

peace and co-operation, and particularly by setting up the Special Committee, the United Nations had assumed new and precise obligations to colonial countries and peoples. As the members of the Sub-Committee had confirmed, the peoples still struggling for their independence had become aware of those obligations and they had confidence in the United Nations.

420. Lastly, he strongly endorsed the views expressed by the representative of Chile<sup>37/</sup> regarding the co-operation of the Administering Power. He himself had stated at the beginning of the Committee's work<sup>38/</sup> that in view of the achievements enumerated by the United Kingdom representative at the second meeting, the Committee was entitled to expect more constructive co-operation from that delegation than from certain other colonial Powers. It was regrettable that that expectation had not been borne out by results, at least so far as Aden was concerned. It was also regrettable that the Administering Power had seen fit to ignore operative paragraph 7 of General Assembly resolution 1654 (XVI), which invited the authorities concerned to afford the Special Committee their fullest co-operation in carrying out its task. Indeed, the Sub-Committee on Aden had had no co-operation from the Administering Power.

421. The representative of Madagascar recalled that, as a member of the Sub-Committee, he had helped to draft the report, the conclusions and recommendations of which he endorsed. That did not mean, however, that the report was any more to the taste of his delegation than to that of the United Kingdom representative. The report was in fact most unsatisfactory, for it had been impossible for the Sub-Committee to hear any petitioners inside Aden and the Aden Protectorates. The responsibility for that and for the resulting gap in the report lay with the United Kingdom, which had refused the Sub-Committee permission to enter Aden.

422. It was difficult not to conclude from the United Kingdom's refusal to admit the Sub-Committee to Aden that the Administering Power had unworthy reasons for opposing a United Nations visiting mission; at all events, its attitude made the Committee's work more difficult and tended to vindicate those who were inclined to condemn the Administering Power without trying to help it in its task of decolonization.

---

<sup>37/</sup> Paragraph 193 above.

<sup>38/</sup> A/5238, chapter I, paragraph 62.

423. The Malagasy delegation wished to draw attention to the varied nature of the statements made by those petitioners who had been heard in the countries adjoining Aden and the Protectorates. Although the petitioners were unanimous in demanding the immediate transfer of authority, not all were opposed to the Federation. What they did oppose was a Federation whose Ministers were not elected in a lawful and democratic manner. Some petitioners even proposed that the present Administration should be retained during a transitional period preceding independence, since, they contended, that would simplify everyone's work and avoid confusion. They felt that self-determination should be carried out under United Nations supervision.

424. While many petitioners favoured Aden's integration with Yemen, others vigorously repudiated any allegiance to the Government of Yemen and simply wanted independence, with no provision for annexation. In view of those contrasting positions, the Malagasy delegation, which had been a member of the Sub-Committee, did not feel that it was mistaken in expressing confidence in the sincerity of all those petitioners who asked that the Administering Power should give the people of Aden and the Protectorates an opportunity freely to express their wishes regarding their country's future. New elections, accompanied by the broadest possible safeguards, should therefore be held.

425. The United Kingdom representative had said that the Sub-Committee's hands had been tied. Did he mean that the Sub-Committee had started with preconceived ideas and that its members could not have gone to Aden as impartial observers? If so, the facts proved that he was wrong. He himself, as the representative of Madagascar on the Sub-Committee had frequently calmed excited petitioners and had cited his own country's orderly achievement of independence as an example to others. The members of the Sub-Committee had been impatient with certain petitioners who had indulged in violent diatribes against the United Kingdom, and, in fact, had disappointed some of the petitioners by refusing to hear them or not questioning them on their statements. In addition, the representative of Iraq, whose statements in the Committee had shown him to be a passionate defender of the Arab cause, had conducted himself at all times with the greatest tact and calmness. There were no grounds for suspecting the Sub-Committee of having had preconceived ideas.

426. The Malagasy people, who had attained independence in peaceful and, it might almost be said, amicable circumstances, felt that discussions based on sincerity and trust between the Administering Power and the people of Aden and the Protectorates could still produce a solution. Since confidence bred confidence, the Administering Power should agree to talk to everyone, including the political leaders who were held prisoners or had been exiled for political reasons. As a first step, it should restore confidence by halting all repressive measures against the people of the Territory. That would create the proper atmosphere for the forthcoming popular consultations with a view to independence.

427. At the 194th meeting, Cambodia, India, Iraq, Mali, Syria and Yugoslavia submitted a draft resolution.<sup>39/</sup> Tanganyika subsequently joined as a co-sponsor.<sup>40/</sup>

428. Introducing the joint draft resolution, the representative of Iraq drew attention in particular to the first part of operative paragraph 5 to the effect that the maintenance of the military base at Aden was opposed by all the petitioners and said that this was a statement of fact. Opposition to the base had been expressed by every petitioner who had stated his views on the subject. Even Sheikh Muhammad Farid, who was known to be close to the United Kingdom Government, had not approved of the maintenance of the base and had informed the Committee that his party had given its agreement to it because "that was the only price that was acceptable in order to have Aden in the Federation". The statement in operative paragraph 5 that the maintenance of the base was prejudicial to the security of the region was fully justified because it was clear from the size of the base that it had not been established for the defence of Aden. On the United Kingdom Government's own admission, it would be used for possible operations in the Persian Gulf and other parts of the Middle East, and, consequently, for the defence of United Kingdom interests in the region, irrespective of what the people of the region thought.

429. The recommendation in operative paragraph 6 could not be opposed even by the United Kingdom representative, who had stated that all parties agreed that the present franchise at Aden should be reviewed. With reference to the other parts of the Federation of South Arabia, he wondered whether the reservation in

---

<sup>39/</sup> A/AC.109/L.70.

<sup>40/</sup> A/AC.109/L.70/Add.1.

the United Kingdom representative's statement to the effect that electoral methods there would be brought more into line with the practice in other countries "as soon as local conditions make this practicable" did not represent a subterfuge designed to frustrate the people's desire to express its views and to delay the possibility of a popular consultation in complete freedom. In his view, the time had come for a consultation based on universal adult suffrage.

430. With reference to operative paragraph 7, he said that the information in the possession of the Sub-Committee indicated that laws restricting public freedoms did exist at Aden, that there were political prisoners and detainees, that people had been exiled and had not been allowed to return and that military expeditions were being undertaken. With reference to the last-named point, the United Kingdom representative himself had admitted at the previous meeting that bombings had in fact occurred.

431. The sponsors of the draft resolution attached particular importance to operative paragraph 8, which should be read in conjunction with operative paragraph 11. Unless there was one legislative organ and one Government for the whole of the Territory, there would be no unified authority with which the United Kingdom could negotiate the transfer of power and the granting of independence. The alternative, namely negotiations between the Administering Power and the various States in the Territory would lead to a chaotic situation.

432. As to operative paragraph 9, it could be seen from the report of the Sub-Committee that the petitioners had been unanimous in seeking United Nations participation, without which they did not think that the elections would be free and genuine. The draft resolution was not asking that the election should be held under United Nations supervision. He felt that the Administering Power should have no objection to a United Nations presence in a Non-Self-Governing Territory for the purpose of implementing one of the most important declarations ever adopted by the General Assembly, especially as the idea of a United Nations presence had been accepted even by many independent countries in recent years.

433. The representative of Bulgaria expressed complete disagreement with the statement made by the United Kingdom representative concerning the Report of

the Sub-Committee. The amazing allegations he had made were just one more attempt to justify and even glorify the colonial system and his country's record as a colonizer, shameful as that was. Such an attitude was an abuse of the Special Committee and showed utter disregard for the General Assembly resolutions on the elimination of colonialism. He fully endorsed the report of the Sub-Committee.

434. The representative of Poland said that the Sub-Committee on Aden was to be congratulated on its work; he supported the conclusions and recommendations contained in the report. The many petitioners heard by the Sub-Committee confirmed the existence of a very grave situation in Aden and the Aden Protectorates. It had arisen as a result of the Administering Power's plans to form the so-called South Arabian Federation, which was contrary to the interests of the people and had been rejected by an overwhelming majority of them. In addition, it was contrary to the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples. The tense situation those plans had produced was likely to endanger the peace of the region and could be improved only by the faithful implementation of the Declaration.

435. He associated himself with those representatives who had refuted the United Kingdom representative's unjustified allegations regarding the Sub-Committee and expressed disappointment at the unco-operative attitude of the Administering Power. The Polish delegation wished to dissociate itself entirely from the interpretation given by the United Kingdom representative regarding the sending of visiting missions or sub-committees to the Territories with which the Special Committee was concerned; although the Committee would always seek the co-operation of the Administering Power concerned, a refusal to co-operate could not in any circumstances constitute an insuperable obstacle to such visits. The Special Committee had been authorized by the General Assembly to send missions or sub-committees whenever it deemed them necessary, and it should continue to do so.

436. The representative of Tunisia associated himself with the disappointment expressed by other representatives regarding the statement made by the United Kingdom representative on the Sub-Committee's report. Tunisia would have preferred the report to be more complete; if it was not so, that was the

fault of the Administering Power, which had not been co-operative. In the past, Tunisia had had occasion to welcome the spirit of co-operation and the understanding shown by the United Kingdom - for instance, in Africa - and had hoped that the United Kingdom would show the same spirit in the Middle East. Tunisia had not abandoned hope that, at some future date, the United Kingdom would change its attitude.

437. He supported the draft resolution on Aden with one slight reservation he felt that the word "independence" should be inserted in operative paragraph 4 which reaffirmed the right of the people to self-determination. Although independence was mentioned elsewhere in the draft resolution, reference to it should also be made in paragraph 4, which, by its substance and its position, was one of the key paragraphs of the draft resolution.

438. The representative of Uruguay congratulated the members of the Sub-Committee on Aden on their complete and businesslike report. His delegation had every confidence in their impartiality and competence and considered the criticisms made of them to be unfounded and unnecessary. Moreover, he supported the conclusions and recommendations in the report and consequently the joint draft resolution,<sup>41/</sup> which was based on those conclusions and recommendations. Nevertheless, he had some doubts about the advisability of including certain provisions in the form in which they were drafted. He agreed in principle that military bases in Non-Self-Governing Territories could be used by the colonial Powers to buttress their domination, contrary to the legitimate desires of their peoples. It seemed to him, however, that, as his delegation had stated more than once, the question of the base should be settled by the people directly concerned after they had achieved sovereignty. For example, the news had recently been published that the new Government of Zanzibar, formed after the free elections recently held there, had asked for the removal of the military bases from its territory. That appeared to him to be a satisfactory procedure. The question of the base at Aden should be settled by the representatives of the people of Aden, and the United Nations sole concern in the matter should be to ensure that the base was not used to hinder the free expression of the people's will. The delegation of Uruguay would not press the point, since the paragraph in question

---

<sup>41/</sup> A/AC.109/L.700.

simply stated what the Committee considered to be desirable and did not make any direct recommendation. It would suggest, however, that the phrase "which is opposed by all petitioners" in paragraph 5 of the draft resolution should be deleted, since paragraph 167 of the Sub-Committee's report stated that "almost all" the petitioners had protested against the existence of the base. Moreover, that phrase somewhat weakened the draft resolution in that it gave the impression that the Committee was basing its opinion on the views of the petitioners only, and not on those of the people of Aden.

439. He also had some doubts about the drafting of operative paragraph 8, from which it might be inferred that the Committee was recommending the continuation of a unitary Government. It was for the United Nations to ensure that a form of government was in accord with the wishes of the people but it could not decide that a unitary government would be better for Aden than a less centralized form of government regardless of the wishes of the people of Aden. He therefore suggested that the words "for the whole of the territory" should be followed by the words "in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of the people".

440. Finally, with regard to operative paragraph 9, his delegation felt that a United Nations presence was necessary not only during the period of elections referred to in operative paragraph 8 but also during the consultations mentioned in operative paragraph 6.

441. The representative of India recalled that the United Kingdom representative had rejected the charge that the Federal Government was unrepresentative. That unilateral rejection was not substantiated by facts, as the Indian delegation had amply demonstrated at an earlier meeting.<sup>42/</sup> Moreover, the United Kingdom representative had himself acknowledged that "all parties agreed that the franchise in Aden should be reviewed". His delegation wished to know how long the United Kingdom Government proposed to take in reviewing the franchise and granting universal adult suffrage to the people of Aden, and when it intended to grant independence to the Territory. The Committee and the people of Aden could not be expected to wait indefinitely for the Administering Power's promises to be fulfilled. He earnestly hoped that the United Kingdom would live up to its high traditions and that in Aden too it would display the kind of courage and imagination that had been shown in other former colonies.

---

<sup>42/</sup> See paragraphs 214-220 above.

442. The representative of Syria noted that in the first stage of the debate on Aden his delegation had not wished to urge the Committee to take a stand before a thorough investigation had revealed all the facts of the situation. The Committee had, in fact, deemed it both useful and necessary to send missions to the Territories falling within the scope of its mandate and to hear petitioners and receive petitions from those Territories. However, over the past eighteen months it had become increasingly evident that the negative position of the United Kingdom Government on the sending of any mission was inflexible, contrary to the impression which had been given by the United Kingdom and some other delegations when they had propounded the idea of a consensus. If the United Kingdom Government and others which had registered reservations on the sending of missions and the hearing of petitioners were to refuse their co-operation, in spite of the approval of those procedures by the General Assembly, the Committee's entire undertaking might well be jeopardized.

443. The United Kingdom representative had advanced arguments to justify his Government's position on the sending of missions. Those arguments had already been answered by a number of members of the Committee, and indeed they were indefensible both from the standpoint of fact and of law. He personally had served on a mission to Trust Territories in the Pacific area, and he could not recall a single instance when its activities had been considered to be interference in the administration of those Territories or an attempt to assume any of the administrative responsibilities of the Administering Authorities. Visiting Missions had been recognized by the framers of the Charter as an indispensable auxiliary to the effective fulfilment of the aims of the Trusteeship System, and experience had shown that they had made a vital contribution towards the realization of that System's aims. In the light of that record, it seemed inconceivable that Member States should refuse to admit missions to Non-Self-Governing Territories on the ground that they represented attempts by the United Nations to meddle in the administration of those Territories. The United Kingdom's position in that respect had created a most disquieting situation for the Committee, and his delegation wished to associate itself with the expressions of disappointment and regret voiced by others for the lack of co-operation which the Administering Power had shown towards the Sub-Committee on Aden.

444. The Sub-Committee's report was very helpful in assessing the situation in Aden and the Aden Protectorates. It reflected the objectivity, fairness and diligence with which the members of the Sub-Committee had discharged their difficult task. In brief, the report corroborated what the Committee had already learned from the petitioners who had previously appeared before it, and what his delegation had known in advance to be the tragic reality of the situation in Aden, a situation which continued to deteriorate steadily. His delegation endorsed the conclusions and recommendations contained in the report and had accordingly co-sponsored the draft resolution.

445. The representative of Italy observed that one of the most interesting features of the discussion of Aden in the Committee had been that all the basic data of the problem had been laid before members at a very early stage. Furthermore, there seemed to be a large area of agreement on the substance of the problem. In that regard he had been very happy to note that the policy of the United Kingdom Government was "to bring the territory to independence as early as possible". From various expressions of agreement in regard to the draft resolution which his delegation had co-sponsored,<sup>43/</sup> he had gathered that all members of the Committee agreed on two points first, on the need to recognize the right of the people of Aden and the Aden Protectorates to self-determination and independence in accordance with the provisions of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples - and he would add that his delegation's ideas and aims seemed to go even further than was envisaged in some of the clauses of the draft resolution now being considered;<sup>44/</sup> and secondly, the need to give the people of those Territories an early opportunity to decide their future in accordance with their freely expressed will.

446. There was also a third point upon which all agreed, and that was the desire for the unification of the Territory of South Arabia. However, the three petitioners who had appeared before the Committee had approached the problem of independence quite differently. There were two possible methods by which the Declaration could be applied to Aden and the Federation of South Arabia.

---

<sup>43/</sup> A/AC.109/L.55.

<sup>44/</sup> A/AC.109/L.70.

The first was the one being applied by the Administering Power with the support of a considerable section of the population concerned, and it consisted of applying a procedure for the unification of the Territory and the creation of a government to which the British authorities would gradually transfer all functions and powers. That was a procedure which had been adopted in all the former British colonies which were now independent States. While the procedure might be comparatively slow - and his delegation would not object to discussing with the Administering Power the reasons for the alleged delay and to requesting it to use its best endeavours in order to grant independence in the shortest possible time - he could not agree with those who maintained that that method was without merit or was meant to conceal a desire to perpetuate the colonial regime.

447. The second method was that advocated by the sponsors of the draft resolution now being considered and was based on the premise that the evolution in the Territory in recent years had been devoid of value. The proposed method would in essence destroy all existing institutions and political structures in favour of others to be worked out in the future. It would tear down what existed and what was supported by one section of the population and replace it with something which was still only in the minds and aspirations of another section of the population. There was no proof that the new structure would be adequate and that it would enjoy the support of the population as a whole.

448. In those circumstances it would be difficult for his delegation to support unreservedly the idea underlying the draft resolution. He recognized that the situation in Aden was not entirely satisfactory, but that was, after all, in the nature of things. The core of the problem was the choice of the method to be adopted to facilitate the achievement of independence. There might be different views on that question, but it should be recalled that the Committee's practice had been to avoid taking sides and to invite the different parties and political movements to try to reach agreement among themselves on their future. In his view, that would be the most appropriate course of action for the Committee to take in the present instance.

449. Apart from that main objection to the draft resolution, there were a number of other points with which he was not in full agreement either because of the wording that had been chosen or because there was not sufficient evidence to substantiate them. As examples he would mention operative paragraph-7, which

raised a number of complex problems, and operative paragraph 5, which concerned the military base and on which his delegation had already expressed its view.<sup>45/</sup> His delegation could not support operative paragraph 5 and would vote against it if it was put to a separate vote.

450. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the report of the Sub-Committee on Aden testified to the gravity of the situation in the Territory. It also clearly demonstrated the very conscientious way in which the Sub-Committee had performed its task and had tried to avoid unsubstantiated judgements. The conclusions which the Committee had reached were based on facts and on facts alone.

451. He recalled the statement by the United Kingdom representative that it was necessary to distinguish between constitutional theory and practice, and stated that while it was indeed necessary to differentiate between constitutional theory and practice, it was a matter of differentiating between what was bad and what was very bad. The fact that constitutional theory in Aden was bad and incorrect had been shown by all the members of the Committee who had voted in favour of the interim resolution on Aden. The constitutional practice in Aden was, however, even worse, as could be seen from the Sub-Committee's report.

452. The United Kingdom representative had said that it was a perfectly normal procedure between neighbouring States that persons from foreign countries who abused the hospitality of the receiving country were returned home. The facts of the matter were, however, to be seen in paragraphs 116, 119 and 120 of the Sub-Committee's report. Some 7,000 people from "the South" had taken refuge in Yemen because of British attacks on their homes, others had fled to Saudi Arabia, thousands of United Kingdom troops were engaged in operations against the indigenous inhabitants, and the Royal Air Force had carried out thousands of sorties dropping heavy, light and napalm bombs and destroying coffee and cereal plantations. Those facts indicated how "peaceful" the United Kingdom base at Aden was and how it "protected" the interests of the inhabitants. The truth was that United Kingdom troops and police were driving the indigenous inhabitants themselves out of South Arabia into Yemen and Saudi Arabia. Moreover it could legitimately be asked how Yemen and Saudi Arabia could be regarded as States neighbouring upon the United Kingdom. The real problem in Aden was that of unconcealed colonial oppression which included the killing of persons who dared

---

<sup>45/</sup> Paragraphs 186-188 above.

to speak up for their rights. It was a problem of colonial domination versus the legitimate interests and aspirations of the indigenous inhabitants.

453. If the descriptions given by the petitioners did not correspond to the true state of affairs in Aden, why had the United Kingdom not invited the five responsible representatives of the United Nations to see the situation as it was? The fact of the matter was that the statement by the United Kingdom representative concerning the Sub-Committee's report was far removed from the truth.

454. The statement of the United Kingdom representative had to be viewed in the light of the conclusions and recommendations of the Sub-Committee, which were reflected in the draft resolution before the Committee. The draft resolution noted the "deteriorating situation in the territory, the continuation of which is likely to lead to serious unrest and threaten international peace and security", the statements of representatives and the reports received from the Territory proved the truth of that assertion. It was natural that the Committee and the United Nations should be deeply concerned with the United Kingdom's position, for it was that position which determined the situation existing in the Territory. The course of the struggle now taking place depended heavily on whether the United Kingdom would yield to the legitimate demands of the people of South Arabia or would persist in its policy of maintaining its rule in the area.

455. The United Kingdom representative's statement could only heighten the Committee's concern over the developments described in the Sub-Committee's report. It showed that the United Kingdom did not intend, at least not immediately, to alter its policy. Unfortunately, that might mean a further aggravation of the situation and the transformation of the present conflict into a real threat to world peace and security.

456. His delegation, with the rest of the Committee, would whole-heartedly welcome the solution envisaged in the draft resolution. But the facts presented in the report, and particularly the position of the United Kingdom Government, made it necessary to recognize the possibility that the question might attract the attention of the General Assembly and even the Security Council if no change for the better took place in the very near future. Nobody doubted that the people of South Arabia would eventually obtain their freedom and independence. The only question was at what price the victory would be won, and that depended entirely on the United Kingdom, since the people of South Arabia had already had their say.

457. His delegation endorsed the draft resolution. It considered operative paragraph 5 inadequate, however. No matter how events developed in the Territory, the maintenance of the military base could not be justified. Its dismantling was not only desirable but essential in order that the people might have a real opportunity of freely determining their future. They could hardly do so under the threat of bombing raids, and such raids had been carried out from the base. It had also been used for aggression against other Arab peoples, and there was no reason to suppose that it would not be so used again. It was not a stabilizing factor, as the United Kingdom representative had asserted; it was unheard of that stability should be achieved through guns and bombs. The base had more than once been used, however, to protect the British and American oil monopolies operating in the area. Accordingly, the Committee should call for the speediest removal of the military base in Aden.

458. The Soviet delegation had always taken the position that colonial peoples should attain their independence by peaceful means and not at the price of human sacrifice and bloodshed. It was from that point of view, that his delegation regarded the measures recommended in the draft resolution, which should receive the unanimous support of all members of the Committee interested in a peaceful solution of the problem.

459. The representative of Tanganyika expressed his appreciation of the work done by the members of the Sub-Committee on Aden and commended their report. Their task had been rendered more difficult by the Administering Power, which had accorded them the sort of humiliating treatment that had always been given to nationalist leaders and the supporters of independence movements. In contrast, the generous co-operation extended to the Sub-Committee by the United Arab Republic, Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Iraq was yet another demonstration of the seriousness with which those and other countries viewed the historic Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples.

460. It was essential for the Committee to recall again and again the precise provisions of that Declaration. Paragraph 5 made it clear that no pretext whatsoever should be used to delay or hinder the Declaration's immediate application. With its adoption and the attainment of independence by so many new countries, nothing could stop the majority of mankind from taking an active part in the elimination of colonialism from the world. For that reason his

delegation considered the allegations of interference in colonial territories as being a purely theoretical matter.

461. The information which the Committee had been able to gather concerning the regime in Aden and the Protectorates provided an illustration of the many deplorable aspects of the colonial occupation of a country by foreign people, and the report of the Sub-Committee put the colonial problems in the Territory in their proper perspective by recording and endorsing the unanimous demand of the petitioners for the immediate introduction of elections based on universal adult suffrage.

462. The representative of Australia pointed out that although his delegation agreed in many respects with the Sub-Committee's conclusions and the draft resolution, it would be compelled to vote against the draft resolution. It would vote against it because, to the extent that the draft did not express appreciation of the generally recognized fact that the United Kingdom authorities in Aden had acted in accordance with the letter and spirit of the Charter, it failed to present a balanced, fair and accurate picture of the situation in the Territory. Moreover, Australia did not believe that the situation was deteriorating or "likely to lead to serious unrest and threaten international peace and security", as stated in the fourth preambular paragraph, or that maintenance of the military base in Aden was "prejudicial to the security of the region", as stated in operative paragraph 5. Indeed, maintenance of the base was a most important factor in the security of the region. Finally, the Australian delegation considered that a number of statements in operative paragraph 7 were unfair to the Administering Power and not in keeping with the facts.

463. The representative of Iraq, replying on behalf of the sponsors, noted that a specific reference to independence in operative paragraph 4 would be redundant since "freedom from colonial rule in accordance with the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples" was tantamount to independence. The clause "which is opposed by all the petitioners" had been inserted in operative paragraph 5 because it was regarded by the sponsors as the most objective way of indicating popular opposition in the Territory to the maintenance of the military base at Aden. Since the Sub-Committee had been

prevented from visiting the Territory and had been unable to ascertain the feelings of the population on the spot, it could do no more than report what was the consensus of the petitioners.

464. With regard to operative paragraph 8, he pointed out that the sponsors of the draft resolution had not intended to advocate any particular form of government; their objective was to enable the people of the Territory to choose a representative government which would have the authority to negotiate the transfer of power on their behalf. He accepted the Uruguayan suggestion to insert the phrase "in accordance with the wishes of the population" after the words "the whole of the territory" in the first part of the paragraph.

465. The presence of the United Nations in the Territory before the elections, as suggested in operative paragraph 9, was essential in order to guarantee that freedom of political activity would prevail while arrangements and preparations for the elections were being made.

466. Replying to the observations of the representative of Italy, he noted first that the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, which constituted the Committee's terms of reference, clearly stated that "inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence". Moreover, if it was true, as the representative of Italy had argued, that Aden, which had come under United Kingdom rule before Kenya became a British colony, was far less prepared for self-government and independence than Kenya, the responsibility rested with the Administering Power. The United Kingdom Government should not be the judge of when the Territory was ready for independence. Finally, the purpose of the draft resolution was not to destroy the existing political structures of Aden, but rather to prevent the fragmentation of administration by ensuring that the whole Territory, including those parts which were not included in the Federation, had one government based on popular elections with which arrangements could be made for the transfer of power and the proclamation of independence.

467. He categorically rejected the statement of the representative of Australia that the military base at Aden was a factor promoting the security of the region. The base was not intended to defend the region against aggression from outside, but rather, as the United Kingdom Government itself had admitted, to protect

British interests in the Middle East, particularly in the Persian Gulf. The protection of those interests against the wishes of the peoples concerned was clearly prejudicial to the security of the region. For those reasons, the sponsors of the draft resolution had inserted a reference to the desirability of eliminating the base in operative paragraph 5.

468. The representative of Chile supported the Tunisian suggestion that operative paragraph 4 of the draft resolution should contain a specific reference to independence. The phrase "freedom from colonial rule" was open to various interpretations and might be construed by an Administering Power to mean merely internal self-government; it should be replaced by the word "independence". Chile also supported the idea embodied in operative paragraph 5, but had the same misgivings concerning the wording of the paragraph as had been expressed earlier by the representative of Uruguay. Moreover, the question of the maintenance or elimination of the military base at Aden should be decided by the people of the Territory; the Committee should not prejudge that decision. Lastly, he noted that, although reference to the military base in Aden had been made in the conclusions of the Sub-Committee's report,<sup>46/</sup> it had not reappeared in the Sub-Committee's recommendations.

469. The representative of India said that while his delegation did not object to the amendment to operative paragraph 4 as suggested by the representatives of Tunisia and Chile, it would like to respect the wishes of the other co-sponsors and retain the paragraph in its present form. He added that the interpretation of operative paragraph 4 was quite clear to his delegation and pointed out that the paragraph mentioned the Declaration on the granting of independence.

470. The representative of Cambodia explained that the statement in the Sub-Committee's report did not represent only the opinion of the Sub-Committee; it was also the view of the petitioners. As to the military base at Aden, the Sub-Committee had not made a recommendation that it should be eliminated, and consequently, the draft resolution did not "request" the removal of the base or "call upon" the Administering Power to withdraw it; it simply "considered" that its maintenance was prejudicial to the security of the region. Moreover, an oblique

---

<sup>46/</sup> Report of the Sub-Committee on Aden, paragraph 167 (see Appendix to this chapter).

reference to the base had been made in paragraph 177 of the Sub-Committee's recommendations, for one of the reasons why the Sub-Committee felt that the situation was dangerous and might jeopardize peace and security was that the base might be used against the people to frustrate their desire for independence.

471. The Special Committee then adopted the draft resolution, as orally revised, by a vote of 19 to 3, with 2 abstentions.

472. The representative of the United Kingdom said that his delegation had voted against the draft resolution because it incorporated the conclusions and recommendations of the Sub-Committee on Aden, which were unacceptable to the United Kingdom Government.

473. In particular, the United Kingdom considered that the language of the fourth preambular paragraph was inappropriate since no convincing evidence had been adduced to show that the situation in the Territory was in fact deteriorating and still less that it was likely to threaten international peace and security. The refusal of the United Kingdom Government to allow the Sub-Committee to enter Aden was consistent with its declared policy opposing the sending of United Nations bodies to Non-Self-Governing Territories under its administration; it did not represent a departure from its declared objective of co-operating with the Committee in other respects. Accordingly, operative paragraph 2 was not a fair statement of the facts. Furthermore, his delegation rejected the view in operative paragraph 5 that the military base at Aden constituted a threat to the security of the region; indeed, it was a stabilizing factor in the area and a guarantee of the Federation's advance towards independence. With regard to operative paragraph 7, he once again denied the allegations of petitioners that the laws of Aden restricted fundamental freedoms. There were no political prisoners or detainees and no person had been sentenced to gaol for purely political offences. No citizens had been exiled or forbidden to reside in the Territory, although aliens who had abused the hospitality of Aden had been returned to their countries of origin.

474. The process of maintaining law and order in the Territory could not be described as "repressive action" and action by aircraft was not a normal feature of that process. However, such action against dissident tribesmen operating from remote places was sometimes a necessity, however regrettable. On the other hand, the frequency and extent of air action in the Territory had been greatly

exaggerated: the figure of 12,000 aircraft flights in South Arabia given in paragraph 116 of the Sub-Committee's report referred to all types of flights, including the transport of personnel, the movement of freight, leaflet-dropping and reconnaissance. Only a small proportion were ground-attack sorties and they had occurred some years previously when the Government of Yemen was actively encouraging frontier violations. In any case, there had been no use of bombs in Aden at least in the past twelve months.

475. The method and pace of constitutional advance advocated in other paragraphs of the draft resolution bore little relation to the particular circumstances of the Territory and to the present wishes of the Governments and peoples of the Federation. The United Kingdom Government's objective was independence at the earliest possible date, and it could most rapidly be achieved through the union of the different States of South Arabia in a federation. Substantial progress had been made towards that objective in the past four years and it was hoped that those States not yet in the Federation would soon decide to join. The exact form of the Federation was for the members themselves to decide.

476. The Government of the Federation or of any particular State in the Federation could not be said to be unrepresentative merely because it had not been constituted as a result of general elections held on the basis of universal adult suffrage. Nevertheless, the Government of Aden was considering a review of the franchise prior to elections and the rulers in the other States of the Federation were aware of the desirability of bringing their electoral methods into line with democratic processes. The States themselves should decide the question; the United Kingdom Government rejected the implication in the draft resolution that the present legislative organs should be destroyed and a new Constitution introduced which would coerce all States into the Federation and impose particular electoral methods on the different States. The United Kingdom intended to fulfil its Charter obligation to lead the Federation to self-government and independence in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants, and it would continue to work towards that goal in co-operation with the Government of the Federation.

477. The representative of Denmark said that he had abstained from the vote on the draft resolution, although his delegation supported those paragraphs which advocated respect for the right of self-determination of the people of Aden. It

had been unable, however, to support other paragraphs which it regarded as misleading or outside the Committee's competence. In particular, it could not accept operative paragraph 5 because the question of the maintenance of the base at Aden should be decided by the people of the Territory and its existence did not impede the attainment of the objectives of the Committee. Operative paragraph 7 (c) went too far: it was a generally recognized right of a State to expel foreigners who abused the laws of hospitality and few States represented in the Committee would be prepared to waive that right. The sub-paragraph was an inaccurate reflection of the view expressed by many petitioners that foreigners intending to make Aden their home should be granted the right to vote. Lastly, the Danish delegation had not been able to accept the wording of the fourth preambular paragraph.

478. The resolution on Aden adopted by the Special Committee at its 197th meeting on 19 July 1963 reads as follows:

The Special Committee,

Having considered the report of the Sub-Committee on Aden,

Bearing in mind the unanimous desire, expressed to the Sub-Committee by the petitioners, for the early end of colonial domination,

Considering the strong desire of the population for the unity of the territory,

Deeply concerned at the deteriorating situation in the territory, the continuation of which is likely to lead to serious unrest and threaten international peace and security,

Convinced of the necessity of consulting the people of the territory at the earliest possible time,

1. Expresses its thanks to the Sub-Committee for the work it has accomplished;

2. Expresses its deep regret at the refusal of the Government of the United Kingdom to co-operate with the Sub-Committee, particularly its refusal to allow the Sub-Committee to go to the territory, in pursuance of the tasks entrusted to it by the Special Committee;

3. Approves the conclusions and recommendations contained in the report of the Sub-Committee;

4. Reaffirms the right of the people of the territory to self-determination and freedom from colonial rule in accordance with the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples;
5. Considers that the maintenance of the military base in Aden, which is opposed by all the petitioners, is prejudicial to the security of the region and its early removal is, therefore, desirable;
6. Recommends that the people of Aden and Aden Protectorate be allowed to exercise their right of self-determination with regard to their future; such exercise of the right of self-determination to take the form of a consultation of the whole population, to be held as soon as possible on the basis of universal adult suffrage;
7. Calls on the Administering Power:
  - (a) to repeal all the laws which restrict public freedoms;
  - (b) to release all political prisoners and detainees and those who have been sentenced following actions of political significance;
  - (c) to allow the return of people who have been exiled or forbidden to reside in the territory because of political activities;
  - (d) to cease forthwith all repressive action against the people of the territory, in particular military expeditions and the bombing of villages;
8. Calls further on the Administering Power to make the necessary constitutional changes with a view to establishing a representative organ and the setting up of a government for the whole of the territory in accordance with the wishes of the population; such legislative organ and government to be constituted following general elections to be held on the basis of universal adult suffrage and with full respect for fundamental human rights and freedoms;
9. Recommends to the General Assembly that the necessary arrangements be made in consultation with the Administering Power, for effective United Nations presence before and during the elections referred to in the preceding paragraph;
10. Recommends that these elections should be held before the attainment of independence, which will be granted in accordance with the freely-expressed wishes of the inhabitants;

11. Recommends that conversations should be opened, without delay, between the government resulting from the elections mentioned above and the Administering Power for the purpose of fixing the date for the granting of independence and the arrangements for the transfer of power;

12. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit this resolution to the Administering Power;

13. Requests the Administering Power to inform the Secretary-General and the General Assembly at its eighteenth session of any action taken to implement this resolution.

APPENDIX

REPORT OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE ON ADEN<sup>a/</sup>

Chairman: Mr. Voeunsai Sonn (Cambodia)

CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION . . . . .	1 - 26	171 - 182
II.	ACTION TAKEN BY THE SUB-COMMITTEE TO CARRY OUT ITS MANDATE		
	A. Proposed visit to Aden . . . . .	27 - 32	163 - 164
	B. Proposed talks with the Administering Power . . .	33 - 36	164 - 165
	C. Visit to countries neighbouring Aden and Aden Protectorates . . . . .	37 - 46	165 - 167
III.	MEETINGS WITH REPRESENTATIVES AND LEADERS OF POLITICAL PARTIES, REPRESENTATIVES OF VARIOUS ORGANIZATIONS, REFUGEES AND OTHER PETITIONERS FROM ADEN AND ADEN PROTECTORATES		
	A. Meetings with petitioners . . . . .	47 - 58	168 - 179
	B. Summary of the situation in Aden and Aden Protectorates as presented by the petitioners . .	59 - 131	180 - 203
	C. Demands of the petitioners . . . . .	132 - 155	204 - 210
IV.	CONCLUSIONS OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE . . . . .	156 - 174	211 - 213
V.	RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE . . . . .	175 - 178	214 - 215

---

<sup>a/</sup> Previously issued under the symbol A/AC.109/L.63 and Add.1.

CONTENTS (Continued)

ANNEXES

	<u>Page</u>
I. CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM TO THE UNITED NATIONS . . . . .	216
A. Letter dated 14 May 1963 from the Vice-Chairman of the Special Committee addressed to the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations . . . . .	216
B. Letter dated 20 May 1963 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations addressed to the Vice-Chairman of the Special Committee . . . . .	216
II. COPY OF PHOTOSTATE OF LETTER DATED 23 MAY 1963 FROM THE CONTROLLER OF IMMIGRATION, ADEN TO "ALL AIRLINES AND SHIPPING" . . . . .	218
III. MAP OF THE TERRITORY . . . . .	219

## I. INTRODUCTION

1. The Special Committee on the situation with regard to the implementation of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples considered the question of Aden at its 149th to 164th and 169th meetings held on 17 April to 3 May and on 10 May 1963.
2. During its consideration of Aden the Special Committee heard three petitioners: Mr. S.A. Alhabshi, Secretary-General, South Arabians League; Mr. S.H. Sohbi, representing the Peoples Socialist Party and the Aden Trades Union Congress; and Sheikh Muhamed Farid, representing the Federation of South Arabia. The Special Committee had also heard, during its meetings in 1962, a statement by Mr. Mohamad Ali Luqman, Secretary-General of the Peoples Congress.
3. In the course of the general debate it was suggested that it might be useful for the Special Committee to send a visiting mission to Aden and the Aden Protectorates to contact the representatives of the people, examine conditions and report with recommendations on the best and most expeditious means of implementing the Declaration. This suggestion was supported by the majority of representatives.
4. Referring to this suggestion, the representative of the United Kingdom restated the objections of his Government, on grounds of principle, to the sending of visiting missions to the Non-Self-Governing Territories under their administration. He stated that under the Charter the responsibility for the administration of the Non-Self-Governing Territories rests with the Administering Member concerned and not with the United Nations. His Government had no intention of shifting, evading or sharing this responsibility, as they believed that divided responsibility could only lead to delay and confusion. He added that the presence of a visiting mission in United Kingdom Territories would clearly constitute an interference in the internal affairs of that Territory and that he had the authority of his Government to state that such a proposal would be unacceptable to them.
5. In reply to the statement by the representative of the United Kingdom it was pointed out that with the adoption of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples contained in resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, and of resolutions 1654 (XVI) of 27 November 1961 and 1810 (XVII) of 17 December 1962, the General Assembly had assumed a special

responsibility for ensuring the rapid attainment of independence by dependent territories and to this end had authorized the Special Committee to send missions to these territories so that it could acquaint itself with conditions prevailing in them. A mission to Aden would make it possible for the Special Committee to make an objective study of the facts and produce a correct and more detailed judgement of the situation there. It was also stated that the United Kingdom had not shown how the dispatch of a mission would further worsen the situation in the Territory.

6. At its 163rd meeting on 3 May 1963 the Special Committee adopted the following resolution by a vote of 18 to 5: (one member was absent)

"The Special Committee,

"Having considered the question of Aden and the Aden Protectorates,

"Having heard the statements of the petitioners from these territories,

"Noting that the Administering Power has not fully implemented the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples in respect of these territories,

"Noting that the constitutional provisions now in force are not consistent with the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples,

"Deeply concerned at the situation prevailing in Aden and Aden Protectorates as a result of the denial of political rights, and the detention of nationalist leaders - a situation, the continuation of which would endanger peace and security in Southern Arabia,

"1. Recognizes the right of the people of these territories to self-determination and freedom from colonial rule in accordance with the provisions of resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960;

"2. Recommends that the people of these territories should be given an early opportunity to decide their future under free and genuinely democratic conditions;

"3. Calls upon the Government of the United Kingdom to release all political prisoners, permit the return of all political leaders at present living in exile, remove all restraints on political activities and ensure political freedoms and human rights throughout all these territories;

"4. Decides to send to these territories a sub-committee to be nominated by the Chairman;

"5. Authorizes the sub-committee to visit, if necessary, other neighbouring countries;

"6. Requests the sub-committee to ascertain the views of the population especially those of the representatives and leaders of the various political parties, and hold talks with the Administering Power;

"7. Expresses the hope that the Administering Power will fully co-operate with the sub-committee;

"8. Requests the sub-committee to submit, not later than 10 June 1963, a report with recommendations for the speedy implementation, in respect of these territories, of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of the inhabitants."

7. At the 169th meeting on 10 May 1963 the Chairman of the Special Committee announced that he had nominated the following as members of the Sub-Committee on Aden: Cambodia (Chairman), Iraq, Madagascar, Venezuela and Yugoslavia.

8. The Sub-Committee was constituted as follows:

Mr. Voeunsai Sonn (Cambodia) (Chairman)

Mr. Adnan Pachachi (Iraq)

Mr. Rémi Andriamaharo (Madagascar)

Mr. Leonardo Diaz Gonzalez (Venezuela)

Mr. Miso Pavicevic (Yugoslavia).

9. The Sub-Committee was assisted by a secretariat consisting of Mr. J.A. Miles, Secretary of the Sub-Committee, Mr. H. Rifai, Political Affairs Officer, Mr. C. Mertvagos, Interpreter, and Miss C.E. Charpentier, Secretary.

10. The decision of the Special Committee to send a Sub-Committee to Aden marked the first occasion on which it had authorized a group of its members to visit one of the Territories with which it is concerned. The Sub-Committee was deeply conscious of the importance of the tasks assigned to it and looked forward to acquainting itself at first hand with the situation prevailing in Aden and the Protectorates and with the views of the population concerning their future. The Sub-Committee believed that as a result of this experience it would be able to make a significant contribution to the work of the Special Committee in bringing about the speedy implementation of the Declaration of the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples in Aden and the Protectorates.

11. Because of the importance the Sub-Committee attached to an actual visit to the Territory itself, the Sub-Committee felt that its first task should be to try to persuade the United Kingdom Government to reconsider the position it had taken in the Special Committee concerning the visit of the Sub-Committee to the Territory, as called for in paragraph 4 of the resolution.

12. The details of the efforts made by the Sub-Committee to this end are set out in a subsequent section of this report.<sup>b/</sup> Here the Sub-Committee wishes to stress its deep regret that the United Kingdom Government was unable to reconsider its position.
13. The Sub-Committee also regrets that its efforts to hold talks with the Administering Power, as called for in paragraph 6 of the resolution, were not successful.
14. When it became clear that it would not be possible to visit Aden and the Protectorates, the Sub-Committee considered the possibility of visiting neighbouring countries as had been provided for in paragraph 5 of the resolution. As a result, the Sub-Committee made arrangements to visit the United Arab Republic, Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Iraq, in order to interview persons from Aden and the Protectorates.
15. The Sub-Committee regrets that the time available to it for its visit to these countries was so short. No arrangements could be made until 20 May as it was not until then that the Sub-Committee knew finally that it would not be able to visit Aden. Furthermore, by the terms of the resolution, the Sub-Committee had been requested to present its report not later than 10 June. This left the Sub-Committee less than a week in which to arrange its itinerary and two weeks in which to carry out its work in the area.
16. The Sub-Committee arrived in Cairo on 25 May and on 26 and 27 May held meetings during which it interviewed ten petitioners.
17. The Sub-Committee arrived in Sana'a on 28 May where, on the following day, it interviewed fourteen petitioners and called on H.E. Mr. Moustafa Yakob, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Yemen. On 30 May, in Taiz, the Sub-Committee interviewed ten petitioners.
18. On 2 June, in Jeddah, the Sub-Committee interviewed seventeen petitioners. On the following day it called on His Royal Highness, Prince Faisal Bin Abdul Aziz, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia.
19. In Baghdad, on 5 June, the Sub-Committee interviewed five petitioners and called on H.E. Mr. Talib Hussein Shabib, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq.

---

<sup>b/</sup> Paragraphs 27-32.

20. In the short time available to it the Sub-Committee was able to interview fifty-six petitioners in five different cities. In addition it received a large number of documents which included supplementary statements and evidence submitted by petitioners; statements by petitioners who were unable to be heard personally; and letters and telegrams. The Sub-Committee's meetings in all centres were well-attended by large numbers of people, most of whom were from Aden and Aden Protectorates. In a number of places the Sub-Committee had to arrange for one person to speak on behalf of many others who had also wished to speak. Furthermore, in Yemen, the Sub-Committee wished to visit other centres such as El-Beida and Ko'toba and in Saudi Arabia it would have liked to visit Riyadh, for in all of these places it was informed that there were petitioners who were anxious to meet it. Unfortunately, because of lack of time this was not possible.

21. These facts alone give a clear indication of the interest and enthusiasm which was aroused by the visit of the Sub-Committee. But what is more difficult to convey are the feelings of gratitude, trust and hope in the United Nations and in the Special Committee which the Sub-Committee could not fail to notice among the people it met.

22. As a result of its visit the Sub-Committee was able to gain a clearer and more detailed picture of the situation in Aden and the Protectorates. Through being able to speak with and question leaders and representatives of important political parties as well as individuals and the representatives of many other organizations the Sub-Committee was provided with ample evidence as to the aspirations of the people. It is regrettable that the Sub-Committee was not able to exchange views with representatives of the other parties and organizations existing in Aden and the Protectorates. This however was no fault of the Sub-Committee. Nevertheless, in coming to its conclusions and in making its recommendations, the Sub-Committee also took into consideration the memorandum sent to the Special Committee by the United National Party<sup>c/</sup> and the text of the statement made by Sheikh Muhamed Farid before the Special Committee on 24 April 1963<sup>d/</sup> together with his answers to questions put to him.

23. The Sub-Committee wishes to express its gratitude and appreciation to the Governments of the United Arab Republic, Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Iraq for the

---

c/ A/AC.109/PET.114.

d/ A/AC.109/SR.154.

generous hospitality, assistance and facilities accorded to it in the course of its work in Cairo, Sana'a, Taiz, Jeddah and Baghdad.

24. The Sub-Committee also wishes to express its appreciation for the valuable assistance it received from the Directors and staff of the United Nations Information Centres in Cairo, Beirut and Baghdad, the Resident Representatives of the Technical Assistance Board in Cairo and Riyadh, and the officer-in-charge of the International Civil Aviation Organization in Jeddah.

25. Finally, the Sub-Committee wishes to place on record its appreciation of the valuable assistance it received from the members of the Secretariat who accompanied it on its mission. All performed their duties in a most conscientious and competent manner, and deserve the compliments and thanks of the Sub-Committee.

26. This report was adopted by the Sub-Committee on 1 July 1963.

## II. ACTION TAKEN BY THE SUB-COMMITTEE TO CARRY OUT ITS MANDATE

### A. Proposed visit to Aden

27. By paragraph 4 of its resolution on Aden, the Special Committee decided to send a Sub-Committee to the Territories of Aden and Aden Protectorates and in paragraph 7 it expressed the hope that the Administering Power would fully co-operate with the Sub-Committee.

28. Following the announcement by the Chairman of the Special Committee on 10 May 1963 at the 169th meeting of the Special Committee, a letter dated 14 May 1963<sup>e/</sup> was addressed by the Vice-Chairman to the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom informing him of the composition of the Sub-Committee and requesting the United Kingdom Government to reconsider its position concerning the visit of the Sub-Committee to Aden.

29. At its first meeting at Headquarters, the Sub-Committee decided to endeavour by every means to persuade the United Kingdom Government to co-operate with the Sub-Committee and allow it to visit the Territory. The Sub-Committee was anxious to establish contact with the people of the Territory and inform itself at first hand of the situation prevailing there and the views of all sections of the population. To this end the Chairman of the Sub-Committee had a meeting with the representative of the United Kingdom to the Special Committee on 15 May 1963, to whom he conveyed the Sub-Committee's firm intention to carry out its mandate as set out in paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of the Special Committee's resolution on Aden. He drew attention, in particular, to the decision of the Special Committee that the Sub-Committee should visit Aden and the Aden Protectorates. The Chairman also recalled that the Special Committee had expressed the hope that the Administering Power would fully co-operate with the Sub-Committee. The Chairman was informed that these views would be conveyed to the United Kingdom Government, along with the letter of 14 May 1963 from the Vice-Chairman of the Special Committee.

30. By a letter dated 20 May 1963<sup>f/</sup>, the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom informed the Vice-Chairman of the Special Committee that the request contained in his letter of 14 May 1963 had been conveyed to the United Kingdom

---

<sup>e/</sup> See Annex I, A.

<sup>f/</sup> See Annex I, B.

Government but that, for the reasons already explained in the Special Committee, his Government was unable to reconsider its position concerning a visit by the Sub-Committee to Aden.

31. The Sub-Committee has carefully considered the arguments put forward by the delegation of the United Kingdom in the Special Committee in support of its position, but it is unable to agree with them. In its view, the United Nations has responsibilities with regard to Non-Self-Governing Territories deriving from the provisions of the Charter concerning these Territories and from the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples adopted by the General Assembly. The Sub-Committee also is unable to accept the argument that "divided responsibility can only lead to delay and confusion". The leading role that the United Nations has played in assisting Territories to attain their independence proves the usefulness of its efforts. It is up to the Administering Power to give the United Nations its full co-operation. Finally, the Sub-Committee notes with regret that the United Kingdom considers the presence of a visiting mission in the Territories of Aden as an interference in the internal affairs of these Territories. This entirely distorts the spirit behind the proposed visit which was aimed at ascertaining the views of the population so as to implement the Declaration on the granting of independence.

32. The Sub-Committee cannot stress too strongly its deep regret and disappointment at the position taken by the United Kingdom Government. This decision not only prevented the Sub-Committee from performing one of the specific tasks given it by the Special Committee, but also, through refusing the Sub-Committee access to the very Territory with which it was concerned, denied it one of the most effective means of carrying out the main tasks assigned to it.

B. Proposed talks with the Administering Power

33. By paragraph 6 of its resolution on Aden the Special Committee requested the Sub-Committee to hold talks with the Administering Power.

34. During his meeting with the United Kingdom representative to the Special Committee on 15 May 1963, the Chairman of the Sub-Committee also referred to the question of talks with the Administering Power as provided for by the resolution. The Sub-Committee believed that such talks would be useful as they would provide an opportunity for a frank exchange of views and would enable the Sub-Committee to

receive clarifications concerning United Kingdom policy in the Territory. In his view, these talks could take place in London or in New York.

35. At a second meeting, on 20 May 1963, the United Kingdom representative to the Special Committee informed the Chairman that he had received no special instruction from his Government on the question of these talks and that probably they would not be necessary since his delegation had clearly expressed its point of view in the Special Committee.

36. The Sub-Committee regrets that there was no opportunity for what it believed could have been fruitful and useful discussions.

C. Visit to countries neighbouring Aden and Aden Protectorates

37. By paragraph 5 of its resolution on Aden the Special Committee authorized the Sub-Committee to visit, if necessary, other neighbouring countries.

38. While awaiting the outcome of the efforts that were being made to arrange for the Sub-Committee to visit Aden and the Protectorates and to hold talks with the Administering Power, the Sub-Committee considered the possibility of visiting neighbouring countries in accordance with paragraph 5 of the Special Committee's resolution. The Sub-Committee took the view that, in the event of the United Kingdom not changing its position on the visit of the Sub-Committee to the Territory, it would be necessary for it to visit neighbouring countries in order to carry out the main tasks assigned to it.

39. The Sub-Committee therefore decided in principle to visit these countries for the purpose of interviewing refugees and other petitioners known to be residing there.

40. The Chairman of the Sub-Committee then addressed letters to the Permanent Representatives of Saudi Arabi, the United Arab Republic and Yemen informing them of the desire of the Sub-Committee to visit their countries with a view to obtaining information which might be of assistance to it in the performance of its tasks. The Permanent Representative of Iraq also conveyed an invitation from his Government to visit his country for the same purpose. The Sub-Committee subsequently received replies from the Permanent Representatives of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Republic and Yemen stating that their Governments welcomed the proposed visit to their countries.

41. When, on 20 May 1963, the Sub-Committee knew that it would not be able to visit Aden, it set about arranging its itinerary. It decided that it should visit Cairo, Sana'a, Jeddah and Baghdad in that order. It also decided to plan its itinerary in such a way as to enable it to visit other centres in Yemen should this prove to be possible.

42. The Sub-Committee found it extremely difficult to plan a detailed itinerary. In the first place it could devote only a short time, two weeks at the most, to its visit and, secondly, it had only a few days in which to make the necessary arrangements. A particular difficulty was that of fitting the Sub-Committee's plans to the schedules of the airline companies. Finally it was able to agree on the following itinerary:

Cairo	Arrive 25 May
Sana'a	" 28 May
Jeddah	" 1 June
Baghdad	" 4 June.

43. As soon as the Sub-Committee had completed its plans for carrying out its tasks it arranged for them to be announced in a press release<sup>g/</sup> which was issued by the Office of Public Information. This press release was sent to the United Nations Information Centres in Cairo and Baghdad, the two centres responsible for the areas in which the Sub-Committee would be working. Despite the limited time available to publicize the Sub-Committee's itinerary, the action taken by the Information Centres in informing the representatives of the Press in the area ensured that the Sub-Committee's terms of reference and the dates of its meetings were well-known before its arrival. The Sub-Committee wishes to commend the Office of Public Information for the way in which it carried out this task.

44. The Sub-Committee encountered some difficulties in travelling long distances in so short a time. Nevertheless, it was able to adhere to its original schedule of meetings in the various centres. It was also able, through the assistance of the Yemen Government, to add Taiz to the centres at which it held meetings.

45. In this connexion, the Sub-Committee wishes to draw attention to an action taken by the United Kingdom Government concerning the Sub-Committee's visit. While in Sana'a, one of the petitioners handed to the Sub-Committee a photostat copy of a letter<sup>h/</sup> dated 23 May 1963, marked "Confidential" and addressed by

<sup>g/</sup> Press release GA/COL/32 of 22 May 1963.

<sup>h/</sup> See Annex II.

the Controller of Immigration to "All Airlines and Shipping". This letter gave the names of the five members of the Sub-Committee and read as follows:

"This is to inform you that should any of the five persons named above arrive in Aden State by any of your Agency Aircraft or Ships, they will not be permitted to land. It is therefore suggested that you should advise owners of airlines and shipping under your Agency not to accept any booking from these persons for journey to Aden or any journey that would necessitate their stay in Aden in transit. Please acknowledge receipt of this circular."

46. The Sub-Committee wishes to register its strong objection to this action directed against the members of an officially constituted body of the United Nations. Not having received authority to go to the Territories of Aden and Aden Protectorates, the Sub-Committee had decided to abide by this decision, which, however, was contrary to the Special Committee's resolution of 3 May 1963. But the British authorities have suspected the good faith of the members of the Sub-Committee.

III. MEETINGS WITH REPRESENTATIVES AND LEADERS OF POLITICAL PARTIES,  
REPRESENTATIVES OF VARIOUS ORGANIZATIONS, REFUGEES AND OTHER  
PETITIONERS FROM ADEN AND ADEN PROTECTORATES

A. Meetings with petitioners

47. It quickly became apparent to the Sub-Committee that its visit to countries neighbouring Aden and the Protectorates had been awaited with keen interest by a great number of people and organizations inside and outside the Territory. At Cairo, Sana'a and Baghdad the Sub-Committee was greeted by sizeable demonstrations and its meetings in all centres were well-attended by deputations of people from different parts of the Territory.

48. The Sub-Committee decided that its meetings should be open to the press and, as far as space allowed, to the public. All petitioners were therefore heard in public with the exception of four who, at their own request, were heard by the Sub-Committee in private.

49. At the beginning of each meeting, the Chairman fully informed those present of the mandate given to the Sub-Committee by the Special Committee. In the context of the resolution of 3 May 1963 which recognized "the right of the people of these territories to self-determination and freedom from colonial rule in accordance with the provisions of resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960" and which recommended that "the people of these territories should be given an early opportunity to decide their future under free and genuinely democratic conditions", the Sub-Committee had been requested to ascertain the views of the population, especially those of the representatives and leaders of the various political parties. The Sub-Committee had been sent to these territories, but it had also been authorized to visit, if necessary, other neighbouring countries. In the report it would submit to the Special Committee, it would take into account the views expressed by the petitioners and would make recommendations for the speedy implementation, in respect of these territories, of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples.

50. The Sub-Committee heard fifty-six petitioners: ten in Cairo, fourteen in Sana'a, ten in Taiz, seventeen in Jeddah and five in Baghdad. It also received eighty-five written petitions, telegrams and supplementary statements and a large

number of publications, photographs and other documentary evidence.<sup>i/</sup> One petition had been signed by approximately 9,000 persons inside the Territory.

51. The Sub-Committee's inability to visit the Territory itself was deplored by most petitioners who addressed it or forwarded messages to it. On the whole they considered the refusal of the United Kingdom to allow the Sub-Committee into the Territory as yet another proof of its disregard of the rights of the people and of its reluctance to let the world know the truth about conditions prevailing there. The Sub-Committee was informed by people who had recently come from Aden of the interest the visit to neighbouring countries had aroused in the Territory and of the demonstrations that had taken place there. These and subsequent demonstrations had also been widely reported in the press.

52. A number of petitioners asked the Sub-Committee to visit other centres where they stated there were persons from Aden and Aden Protectorates who wished to interview it. The centres mentioned were Al-Baida and Ko'toba in Yemen, Riyadh in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Indonesia. The Sub-Committee explained, however, that the short time available to it made it impossible to visit any additional centres.

53. The Sub-Committee wishes to draw attention to efforts made by the United Kingdom Government and the local authorities in Aden and the Protectorates to prevent people from leaving Aden to meet the Sub-Committee. In Taiz, the Sub-Committee received from a petitioner the Arabic version of a letter from the Commander to the Deputy Commander of Operations, dated 24 May 1963 and circulated to all officers in the border control posts. The letter ordered the setting up of two new temporary posts as of 24 May 1963 at Nobet-et-Dakim and Um-Rajah, to reinforce control of the roads leading to Yemen. The order stated that only Yemeni citizens and citizens of the Federation residing in the North would be allowed to proceed after registering their names, addresses and places of work. Other Federation citizens should be stopped and ordered back. All cars not belonging to the Federation Government and proceeding south were to be stopped and all passengers in them were to be interrogated and their identity established. Citizens of the Federation and Yemeni citizens genuinely proceeding to Aden to work were to be permitted to do so. However, persons of other nationalities were to be asked to produce their travel documents (passports); full particulars of the person

<sup>i/</sup> These documents, most of which are in Arabic, have been placed in the files of the Secretariat and are available to members on request.

or persons concerned were to be reported immediately by wireless to Headquarters. Such person or persons were to be detained until orders were received from Headquarters.

54. The Sports Union in Aden informed the Sub-Committee by cable and letter that its President, Mr. Idris Ahmed Hambala had been arrested at Mukeiras airport in the Federation as he was trying to board a plane to Yemen to meet the Sub-Committee. The order for his arrest, he was told, came from the British Supreme Command in Aden. The Sub-Committee was also informed by the President of the Aden Municipal Council that some of his colleagues had been prevented from coming to meet the Sub-Committee. He also stated that during a broadcast of proceedings in the Federal Council the so-called Minister of External Affairs, Mr. Farid, had said that the Government would take all necessary measures and would impose punishment on anyone who tried to contact the Sub-Committee.

55. Furthermore, in a letter dated 28 May 1963 from the Deputy Secretary General of the Aden Trade Union Congress, which the Sub-Committee received at Taiz, it was stated that the people of the region had expressed a "sincere and hearty welcome" to the Sub-Committee and had taken great pains to prepare for "a real show of their self-determination and resentment to the present structure". However, the authorities, namely the Federal Government and the British administration, had taken measures which they summarized as follows:

"1. Issued special confidential instructions to airlines and shipping agents not to transport any members of your Sub-Committee. Your names have been circulated and all airlines and shipping agents have been warned to ensure that you neither stop nor transit our region.

"2. The State and Federal Police have been alerted and mobilized for twenty-four hours a day duty. In this respect, it is worthwhile to annotate that Police control is a responsibility of the 'Democratic' British administration.

"3. Very strict instructions have been given to all categories of forces, whether forming part of the military/nuclear base or Federal armies to suppress any form of demonstration or expression even if that meant shooting the people.

"4. All the available vehicles and craft of the military base have been kept readily prepared for short notice call to deport workers originating from North or the neighbouring States across the borders into the desert.

"5. A close scrutiny and as far as practicable restriction of movement to and from Yemen of all the citizens, with detailed investigation of each person

or vehicle and its contents to ensure that infiltration of the people to meet members of your Sub-Committee does not occur at any cost and consequently those nationalist elements who happen to see you to be refused re-entry into their region.

"6. Extensive distribution of secret pamphlets and leaflets terrifying workers and citizens with the possibility of imprisonment and deportations if they hasten to express themselves.

"7. Very close pursuit like shadows of prominent members of the Peoples Socialist Party and the TUC at all times.

"8. Plain-dressed police spreading rumour of various terrorist acts that will be given effect by government if the public express their real feelings against the present authorities even if such expression was in the most peaceful manner."

56. The Sub-Committee deplures these measures taken by the United Kingdom Government and the local authorities in Aden and the Protectorates. It considers them totally unjustifiable and an unwarranted attempt to prevent the Sub-Committee from carrying out its tasks.

57. The Sub-Committee wishes to express its gratitude to the many petitioners who gave it their views and provided it with information on the Territories either in person or in writing. Many petitioners travelled long distances and endured hardship in order to meet the Sub-Committee while others took considerable personal risks and exposed themselves to possible imprisonment or other forms of punishment.

58. The petitioners who were interviewed by the Sub-Committee are listed below, with a brief personal note on each, based on the information provided by him or her to the Sub-Committee.

#### Petitioners heard in Cairo

- (1) Mr. Nasser Oragi, member of the Peoples Socialist Party. He was born in Aden, his father coming from Al-Baida in Yemen and his mother from one of the Aden Protectorates. He, along with twenty others, had been sentenced to one month's imprisonment for taking part in a demonstration in Aden. In February 1963, on the expiration of his sentence, he had been released from prison and in April 1963 he had come to Cairo to assist the party's office in that city.
- (2) Mr. Mohamed Ali Algifri, President of the South Arabians League, formerly President of the Legislative Council and President of the Supreme Court in

the Sultanate of Lahej. He had been expelled from Lahej in 1956, and since 1958 his arrest had been ordered by the British authorities. He is presently living in exile in Cairo.

- (3) Mr. Kassim Sallam, member of the Yemeni Student Organisation which includes students from both Yemen and the Territory.
- (4) Mr. Amzeeb Saleh, President of the South Arabian Students Organization, Cairo, a position he had occupied for the last two and a half years; he had left Aden for Cairo four years ago. He stated that of about 300 students from Aden and the Protectorates in Cairo, 150 belonged to his organization.
- (5) Mr. Ali Fakhri, President of the South Arabians Youth Movement in Aden and the Protectorates. He had been a teacher in Aden until December 1958 when, along with eight or ten other teachers, he had been dismissed from the public service to prevent him from exercising the right to strike in protest against the deteriorating working conditions. This treatment had compelled him to leave Aden as a refugee. He had been in Cairo for four years and President of his organization for two years. His organization had 300 members, some of whom were in Cairo and others in Aden and the Protectorates.
- (6) Mr. Ali Abdulkarim, deposed Sultan of Lahej. Following the occupation of Lahej by British troops on 18 April 1958, he had immediately gone to London to protest against this action to the British Government. After waiting unsuccessfully for two months for an interview with the Secretary of State for the Colonies, he had left England and had then received a cable from the Secretary of State through the British Consul General in Milan telling him that the British Government had, by Order-in-Council dated 11 July 1958, withdrawn their recognition of him as Sultan of Lahej and that he had been forbidden to return to his country.
- (7) Mr. Mohamed Ali Luqman, member of the Peoples Congress in Aden. He addressed the Sub-Committee in his personal capacity. Mr. Luqman was heard by the Special Committee in 1962.
- (8) Mr. Mohamed ben Abubaker ben Farid, elected Deputy Sheikh of Upper Aulaqi. He had left his country for exile five years ago, returned to Aden in 1959, but had to flee again in 1960. He spoke on behalf of 50,000 people from his tribe.
- (9) Mr. Mohamed Abdulhadi 'Ugil, President of the National Salvation Movement, Aden. He had been a qadi (religious judge) in Aden until seven months ago

when he had left after learning that he would be tried with other nationalists for having organized a march in protest against the entry of Aden into the Federation. He had been under the surveillance of British authorities and was arrested for seven hours. He had left Aden on the pretext of going to London for medical care but had remained in Cairo.

- (10) Mr. Abdullah Wali Barahmi, President of the Yemeni Youth Club.

Petitioners heard in Sana'a

- (1) Mr. Hussein Mahfouz, from the state of Dathina, spoke on behalf of the following regions, representatives of which were also present: Yafei (Upper and Lower), Sha'ar, Radfan, Qu'aiti, Haushabi (Upper and Lower), 'Auzali (Upper and Lower), Dathina, Aulaqi (Upper and Lower), Hadhramaut, Beni-Helal and Al-Fadhli. The names of the other representatives were as follows: Mr. Nasser Alawi Saqqaf, Sultan Abdullah ben Omar Harharah, Sheikh Mansur M. 'Awas, Sheikh Ahmed Aulaqi, Sheikh Hassan Saleh Mihrabi, Sheikh Hassan Hassan M. Azraqi, Sheikh Khedir A. Jifri, Mr. Ali M. Haushabi, Lieutenant Majd Ali Sahati, Lieutenant Najib Hamdi, Lieutenant Thabet Subeihi, Sheikh Ali A. Fadhli, Sheikh Seif Muqbil Qotaibi, Sheikh Abdulhamid Qotaibi, Sheikh Rajeh Qotaibi, Sheikh Abdullah S. Aulaqi, Sergeant Hussein A. Moflihi, Sergeant Mohamed H. Auzali and Corporal Saleh Kassem Auzali. Mr. Mahfouz had left Dathina in 1956 following attempts by the British authorities to force him to co-operate with them. He had been a refugee in the mountains and in Yemen since that date. The people he represented were also refugees in Yemen. Three had left their homes and were living with their families either in villages in Yemen or in caves in the mountains. The petitioner also submitted a written petition signed by 154 refugees in Yemen.
- (2) Mr. Nasser Alawi Saqoaf, member of the same group. He had to leave the country in 1956 after a battle with the British forces.
- (3) Mr. Abdullah Asnag, President of the Peoples Socialist Party and General Secretary of the Aden Trades Union Congress. Mr. Asnag was accompanied by Mr. Ali Qadi, also from the Aden Trades Union Congress. Both were born in Aden and Mr. Asnag had been in prison twice for the cause. During the previous week Mr. Asnag had addressed a general meeting of the T.U.C. and had told the workers to speak their minds to the Sub-Committee. He had also advised them that if they were prevented they should resort to strikes and demonstrations if necessary. The following day there were indications that he would be

prosecuted for those statements so he and Mr. Qadi had obtained airline tickets under false names to enable them to avoid being arrested and prevented from meeting the Sub-Committee.

- (4) Mr. Abdoh Hussein Adhal, ex-member of the Aden Legislative Council. He was born in Aden and was now an agent for a British concern in Aden, Boots Pure Drug Co. Ltd. (Nottingham). He stated that he had told no one of his trip to meet the Sub-Committee as he had been afraid of being arrested.
- (5) Mr. Taha Ahmed Muqbil, member of the movement of Arab Nationalists, "an underground movement in Aden and a nationalist movement throughout the Arab world".
- (6) Mr. Mohamed Hassan Khalifa, member of the Peoples Congress Party in Aden. He had been imprisoned for one year in 1940 for having asked for more education. He operated a British Petroleum service station in Aden.
- (7) Captain Abdullah Ali Mourshed, member of the Progressive Socialist Youth. He was born in Aden. He had made technical studies in Aden and was now an officer in the Yemen Revolutionary Army. He had been imprisoned by the British and had come to Yemen after his release three months ago. His movement was composed of teachers, technicians and educated people and aimed at achieving socialism and unity of the Arab world.
- (8) Sheikh Mohammed Salen Al-Musli, of Upper Yafei. He had fought with other tribesmen to prevent the British from occupying his region. He lost two fingers in an ambush organized by agents of the British. He had left Upper Yafei three months ago.
- (9) Sheikh Abdullah Musa'ed Al-Mus'abi of Beihan.
- (10) Sheikh Muqbel Ba'azeb of Lower Aulaqi, who described himself as chief of resistance fighters against the British. He had taken refuge at Al-Baida in Yemen. His family were still in the mountains within the Territory.
- (11) Mr. Mubarak 'Obeid had come from Al-Rolfa in Hadhramaut six months ago. Twenty years ago his people, the tribe of Al-Jaber, had been attacked by British airplanes and his father had emigrated to Indonesia. The petitioner returned to Hadhramaut two years ago, where the British had watched him day and night. His father had been forbidden from returning to Hadhramaut.
- (12) Mr. Salem Awad, of Lower Aulaqi. He had left the country four years ago.
- (13) Mr. Ali Mohamed Kasmi, a sergeant in the Yemeni Republican Guard. He spoke on behalf of the soldiers who had left the Army of the Federation.

- (14) Mr. Abdullah ben Omar Kahtan Harhara, deposed Sultan of Upper Yafei. His father had signed a treaty with the British. When Great Britain tried to control the Sultanate, the petitioner rejected the treaty and took refuge in Yemen. The British managed to install his cousin as the new Sultan by giving him money to distribute among the tribes. The new Sultan was now in Aden while the people were in revolt against him. Only his sons and the British soldiers were in the Sultanate.

Petitioners heard in Taiz

- (1) Mr. Mohamed Aidaroos, deposed Sultan of Lower Yafei. He spoke on behalf of 300,000 citizens of the South, and on behalf of the following representatives and leaders of the people who were also present: Sheikh Ali Abubaker ben Farid, Deputy Sheikh of the Upper Aulaqi; Sheikh Fadh Mohamed Saleh Shaghiri, of the Sha'ar tribes and of the Daleh Emirate; Princes Abdulhamed and Ahmad, sons of the Sultan of Haushabi; Sheikh Ahmed Alawi As-So'bi, of Beihan Emirate; Sheikh Ahmed Salem Al-Himyari, of the Wahidi; Sheikh Abdulla Mohamed Al-Abdi of Dathina. After the death of his father, he had been elected Sultan by the tribes in January 1960. The British Government, however, appointed his ten-year old brother as Sultan, after twenty days of his exercising the powers of the Sultanate.
- (2) Mr. Ali Alway Moulhi, President of the Aden Municipal Council and member of the Legislative Council. He was accompanied by the following members of the Municipal Council: Mr. Saleh Mohammed Fadhl (elected member for Crater); Mr. Ahmed Yusuf Said (elected member for Mu'alla); Mr. Mohammed Abbas Ahmed (elected member for Crater); Mr. Hussein Mohammed 'Air (elected member for Mu'alla). Mr. Moulhi had been elected to the present Legislative Council after the Government's declaration that the Council would fulfil the desires and wishes of the people as a whole, but had been disappointed to find out that the Government had lied. He considered himself lucky to have been able to escape the control of the British Government and other members of the Legislative Council in leaving Aden to meet the Sub-Committee.

- (3) Miss Radia Insan, Secretary of the Arab Woman Association. She had been imprisoned along with another colleague of hers (also present) for ten weeks and had to pay a fine of 100 shillings for leading a demonstration in January 1963. The British had tried to suppress the Association and its movement of emancipation. There were about 500 members in the Association, including young persons, married women and civil servants.
- (4) Mr. Idriss Hariri, member of the Arab Youth Organization, Aden, born in Aden. He had left the country in 1956 but had returned in January 1963. He had spent most of this period in Saudi Arabia. Presently he was a professor of Arabic at St. Anthony's Boys School in Aden. The petitioner stated that his Organization had over 4,000 members and enjoyed the support of the masses in the Territory, as evidenced by the several thousand signatures collected among all sections of the population in "occupied Yemen". Many of these petitions had been seized by the police.
- (5) Mr. Osman Seif Said, representing the "Forces and Associated Organizations Local Employees Union", born in Aden, had been jailed three times by the British since 1962 for taking part in demonstrations. He spoke on behalf of 7,000 workers in the military base in Aden. He was no longer working at the base. He had arrived from Aden an hour or two earlier disguised as a Northern Yemenite.
- (6) Major Mohamed Ahmed Daghem, on behalf of the Sobeiha tribes. In 1940 he had entered the colonial forces, fought with the British in the last world war, and received several medals. In 1944 he was transferred to the border of the Protectorate. There, he stated, he had discovered the real intentions of the British: they had organized a committee which was supposed to give the people freedom. They had said they would grant the country its freedom if they could keep the right of defence. The people had accepted these conditions in order to be able to continue to live. They were to be responsible themselves for security, but if there were incidents the British could intervene. In 1956 the Sultan of Lahej left the country. The petitioner was then Commander of the armed forces of the Sultanate. When the British tried to occupy the Sultanate, he had opposed them. The new Sultan had tried to bribe him and make him work with him, but he had refused. The petitioner was now a Major in the Yemeni armed forces.

- (7) Mr. Ahmed Omar Mohamed, on behalf of the Government and Local Government Employees Union in Aden.
- (8) Mr. Mohamed Ahmed Thabet, on behalf of the Congress of Graduates of Universities and Higher Institutions, Aden.
- (9) Mr. Ju'eil Saleh, on behalf of the Youth Organization of Dathina.
- (10) Mr. Salem Saleh, on behalf of the General and Port Workers Union, Aden.

Petitioners heard in Jeddah

- (1) Mr. Abdullah Algifri, Director of the South Arabians League Office in Jeddah. He had been Director of Public Education in Lahej until he was arrested by the British on 18 April 1958. After having been detained in Socotra, he had been set free on condition he would not return to Aden or Lahej or any of the Protectorates.
- (2) Mr. Ahmed Salem Benzaguer, on behalf of the Students of South Arabia. He was 18 years old and had been in Saudi Arabia with his brother for twelve years and was in his second year of secondary education.
- (3) Mr. Ahmed Mohamed Al-Shakka', from the Wahidi Sultanate. He had been in Saudi Arabia for 18 years and was a public servant.
- (4) Mr. Hussein Salem Khalifi, from the Khalifa Sheikhdome. He had left the Sheikhdome with others several years ago after their farms had been destroyed by British bombing.
- (5) Mr. Abdulrab Naqib, born in Upper Yafei, 18 years old. His father had been fighting the British forces. Two and a half months ago he had gone to see the Governor in Aden in order to discuss terms for ending the fighting, but the terms offered by the Governor, such as joining the Federation, had been impossible to accept and he had gone back to the Protectorate. A few days later his father and two brothers were killed by hired agents. The petitioner spoke on behalf of the sons of the insurrectionists who had taken up arms against the British. He said there were about 300 of them in Saudi Arabia who were for the most part students. Fifteen of them had been sent to Saudi Arabia by the South Arabians League. Some still received some financial help from their parents, in Yemen or in the Territory itself, but others were in dire need of help.

- (6) Mr. Saleh ben Lahwal, representing the South Arabians League Office in Jeddah. He was originally from Hadhramaut and was presently a civil servant in Saudi Arabia.
- (7) Mr. Hassan Al-Beiti, on behalf of the South Arabians born in Indonesia. He was one of many who had returned to South Arabia but, being unable to find work, had come to Saudi Arabia.
- (8) Mr. Mohamed Ahmed Thabet, on behalf of scholarship holders from the South Arabians League.
- (9) Mr. Mohsen Awad Habtour, on behalf of the South Arabians League Office in Mecca.
- (10) Mr. Mohamed Abubaker Ajrami, representing about 150 resistance fighters from areas in Hadramaut (Wahidi, Aulaquis, Yafei, 'Auzalis, Beihan, Daleh, Al-Katib, Fadhli, Subeiha, Dathina, etc.) who were for the moment in Saudi Arabia. He had left Hadhramaut about 13 months ago and was planning to go back.
- (11) Mr. Hassen ben Obeidellah Saqqaf, from Hadhramaut.
- (12) Mr. Omar Badahdah, from Hadhramaut.
- (13) Mr. Saleh Sourour, from Lahej.
- (14) Mr. Ahmed Salem, from the Aulaqis.
- (15) Mr. Sulaiman Saleh, from Dathina.
- (16) Mr. Ahmed Smit, representing the Youth Movement of which there were branches in Cairo, Aden and all the Protectorates.
- (17) Mr. Abdurrahman Daoud Al-Gailani, from Mukalla in Hadhramaut. He had held several posts in the Protectorate, the last of which was First Assistant to the State Secretary in Qu'aiti.

Petitioners heard in Baghdad

- (1) Mr. Abdussalam Khalil, student.
- (2) Mr. Abdullah Salem Bawazir, student.
- (3) Mr. Wahib Abdurrahim, student.

The three above petitioners represented 43 students from Aden and the Protectorates and Yemen in Iraq. They wanted to return home for the summer holidays and expressed fear of reprisals by the British authorities.

- (4) Mr. Mahfouz Afif, from Kathiri. He had been home for the last time two and a half years ago.

- (5) Mr. Hassan Ahmed Salah, from Lower Yafei. He stated that he was forbidden from returning home. There were many others in Kuwait whose names were on a black list and who could not return to the Territory.

These two petitioners spoke on behalf of more than 5,000 people from the Territory residing in Kuwait.

B. Summary of the situation in Aden and Aden Protectorates as presented by the petitioners

59. In this section the Sub-Committee has attempted to summarize the statements made by petitioners concerning the situation in Aden and Aden Protectorates on the basis of the large volume of oral and written statements submitted. The Sub-Committee wishes to point out that, in general, where it has used the statements of a particular person or a particular party, it does not wish to give the impression that these views were held by these individuals or parties alone. These statements have been used because they seemed best to illustrate what the petitioners said as a whole.

United Kingdom Policy

60. Petitioners pointed out that the British had originally occupied Aden in pursuit of their own interests and that today the policy of the United Kingdom in the Territory was still directed by motives of self-interest. They drew particular attention to the military base that was being maintained in Aden which they objected to on the grounds that it was an instrument of colonial domination. In the petition submitted in Sana'a signed by 154 persons, the base was described in this way:

"British colonialism has during the last few years established an enormous military base in Aden with branches over the rest of the area. In 1960 it transferred to it its military command for all the Middle East after the people's struggle had forced it to evacuate its bases in Egypt, Iraq, and other parts of Africa and Asia. It has concentrated all its interests on this base and on its expansion in our occupied land. This base is considered the cornerstone of Western colonialist plans in the area, and all actions of the British aim at attempting to preserve it at a time when all peoples, the United Nations and its Special Committee on Colonialism have asked for the liquidation of colonialism throughout the world. Aden has become a British military barracks with British air, land and sea forces flowing into it every day."

61. Petitioners held that the base constituted a threat not only to Aden and the Aden Protectorates but also to the whole Arab world. In the past it had been used against their Arab brothers in Egypt and in Oman and so long as it remained would serve as a base for colonial aggression in the area. Furthermore it was now being transformed into a nuclear and thermo-nuclear base which menaced the peace of the world and which would draw them into conflicts in which they had no interest.

62. They also pointed out that the United Kingdom policy was aimed at maintaining its colonial rule over the area. This policy was being carried out by force and by terror through the British troops in the base and in the Protectorates. Another means was through establishing "governments" of hand-picked supporters of their policies to whom, in any case, only limited powers had been delegated. This was equally true of the "governments" set up in Aden itself, in the Protectorates and in the recently created "Federation of South Arabia".

63. Petitioners also drew attention to the fragmentation of their country as another means employed by the British to continue their colonial rule. For more than 100 years the British had enforced the division of their country into twenty-five separate political units. On this point Mr. Ali Fakhri said: "The Territory has an area of about 112,000 square miles and a population of about one and a half million, but the United Kingdom has deepened the division and given rise to new States, thus making the number more than twenty-four 'States' of Sultanates, Emirates and Sheikhdoms with different authorities, boundaries, customs, taxes, duties - and imposed on each of this big crowd of Sultans, Princes and Sheikhs a treaty of protection and persuaded them to believe that those treaties were legal and right. Sirs, the present world has never seen or heard of such a small territory with so little population, with such a big crowd of 'Heads of States' as that in the Aden Protectorate." This was in keeping with the British policy of maintaining their colonial rule by creating and sustaining division among the people. Development in all fields had thus been prevented and obstacles had been placed in the way of the growth of the nationalist movement for liberation from colonial oppression.

64. Petitioners also pointed to the repressive legislation enacted by the British controlled Governments which not only denied the people their basic human rights but created an atmosphere of terror and oppression. Further obstacles were thus placed in the way of the nationalist movement and every means was used to suppress it. In the Protectorates this situation had led to armed insurrections.

The Governments in Aden and Aden Protectorates

65. Petitioners were unanimous in rejecting the various Governments in Aden and Aden Protectorates, namely the Government of the State of Aden, the Governments in the various protected states and the Government of the Federation of South Arabia. Petitioners stated that they were controlled by the British either directly or through people who allowed themselves to be used as tools of the British. They were therefore false or sham governments, unrepresentative of the people and all legislation passed by them was unlawful.

66. The views presented by petitioners on the constitutional status of Aden itself are best illustrated by reference to a memorandum submitted by the Peoples Socialist Party. In this memorandum it was pointed out that although, under the new constitution, Aden is now called the State of Aden its status had not been changed. It still remained a colony, despite its misleading name. The memorandum also drew attention to the wide powers exercised by the United Kingdom and the Governor, now called the High Commissioner. The Governor was appointed by the United Kingdom Government and every Ordinance to have effect had to be consented to by him; if he refused consent to any Ordinance, then it became of no effect. He also had the power to stop or "block" any Bill while it was being discussed in the Legislative Council. The Governor also had the power to make legislation himself, without reference to the Legislative Council, for the "peace, order and good government of the Colony". The memorandum pointed out that the flexibility of this last phrase enabled the Governor to legislate on any subject he wished. In addition, the United Kingdom Government might disallow any Ordinance passed by the Legislature in Aden, such Ordinance having no effect from the date it was disallowed. The United Kingdom Government also reserved the same power as the Governor to legislate for the "peace, order and good government of the Colony".

67. The memorandum also drew attention to regulations or subsidiary legislation which could be enacted by the Governor, the Governor-in-Council, a Minister or an official such as the Commissioner of Police. This subsidiary legislation could have very wide effects and could essentially change the law of the country.

The powers of making subsidiary legislation were in many cases discretionary and were not subject to review by courts of law or by any representative institution. Furthermore, subsidiary legislation was never laid before the Legislative Council.

68. Petitioners also condemned the present Legislative Council. It was characterized as a completely unrepresentative body which had been elected in 1958 under a narrowly restricted franchise. It was pointed out that at that time the population of the Colony was about 200,000 but that the property qualifications and in particular the provision that those not born in Aden had to be British subjects in order to vote, had resulted in the right to vote being given to only 5,000 male persons. Many thousands of potential Arab voters had thus been excluded, while on the other hand, foreigners who happened to be British subjects, including temporary expatriates and British officers, were given the right to vote. Because of this a boycott was organized as a result of which, according to official figures published by the Government, 73 per cent of the 5,000 who had the right to vote had boycotted the elections.

69. Petitioners also pointed out that although the term of this Legislative Council was due to expire at the end of 1962, no elections had been held and the life of the Council had been extended by one year. They felt that elections should have been held at this time as important changes affecting the status of the country were being introduced by the United Kingdom Government. First, there were the proposals for the accession of Aden to the Federation of South Arabia, to which, to the knowledge of the Government, there had been great public opposition. There were also the proposals for so-called "constitutional development" which included the introduction of a semi-Cabinet system of Government. There was, therefore, in the words of the Peoples Socialist Party memorandum, "a strong case for holding a general election to test the opinion of the people on these gravely important issues before they are introduced".

70. It was also pointed out in this memorandum that in 1958 the twelve elected members had stood for election as individuals and not as representatives of political parties with plans and programmes. A number of political parties had been formed since then and it was "proper and in accordance with established

constitutional practice" that before the introduction of a semi-Cabinet system of government there should have been an opportunity for the newly formed parties to contest a general election. The party that won a majority of seats would then form the Government and could "truly and democratically claim to represent the people in any negotiations for merger in any Federation" or in any negotiations affecting the status and future of the whole country.

71. Petitioners also drew attention to the method used to elect the four new members of the Legislative Council in 1962. Instead of being elected by the people they were elected by the Legislative Council itself sitting as an electoral college. This procedure had been opposed as undemocratic and unconstitutional. Mr. Adhal, in a written submission to the Sub-Committee, stated that by this means the Government had been able to see that its own candidates were elected. All the members elected in this manner were now Ministers. One, the present Minister for Education, had been defeated previously in the last elections to the Legislative Council held in 1959. Another, the present Minister of State, had been defeated a few weeks previously in the Municipal elections.

72. The Peoples Socialist Party memorandum concludes its discussion of the question of elections as follows:

"Since 1958 the Government has been very scared to face the country in a general election. Every possible means and device was invented to avoid facing the country in a general election at a time when there is every reason (constitutional and legal) for the Government to hold a general election."

73. Petitioners also drew attention to the amount of corruption associated with the Government in Aden. They stated that two Ministers, the Minister of Works and the Minister of State, had been found guilty of corruption as a result of public inquiry into municipal affairs instituted by the Governor in 1962. In this connexion they handed to the Sub-Committee a copy of the Report of the Municipality Inquiry Commission, dated 16 July 1962 and indicated references to Councillor Mustapha Abdilla Abdo and to the then President of the Municipal Council, Mr. Hasson Ismail Khodabux-Khan. In the former case the Commission criticized Mr. Abdo for participating in Council debates on a matter in which he had a pecuniary interest. The allegations against Mr. Khodabux-Khan related to bribery in connexion with Municipal Council elections. In one case the Commission found that Mr. Khodabux-Khan had offered the bribes and in the other case, in the

absence of any denials, it concluded that the allegations were true. In the memorandum submitted by the Peoples Socialist Party it was pointed out that the Government took no action against any person indicated by the Commission. The memorandum continues:

"More fantastic is that the Government appointed many of those either specifically found to be guilty by the Commission or indirectly found to be so as ministers of state. Thus persons found by a judge of the Supreme Court of the country acting together with two other members to be guilty of corruption were appointed as Ministers responsible for the running of the public affairs of the country and presumed to be men of honesty and integrity."

The Government was therefore "clearly encouraging corruption" and "openly condoning it". Furthermore the press and individuals had been unable to say anything about this state of affairs because of the fear of prosecution for sedition under the Higher Commissioner's discretionary powers.

74. Petitioners also attacked the system of government in the Protectorates. They said that the Protectorates were ruled by British advisers through feudal Emirs, Sheikhs and Sultans. These advisers had been forced on the rulers after Advisory Treaties had been imposed on them. Any rulers or officials who opposed British policy or who refused to follow directions given by these advisers were removed and replaced by persons who were more pliable. On this point, Mr. Mohamed Aidaroos, deposed Sultan of Lower Yafei, said: "Great Britain has installed its own agents and protected itself behind them. All the Sultans and Princes set up by the British have been installed after the exile, arrest or persecution of the legitimate Sultans." Illustrating this type of action by the British Government the deposed Sultan of Lahej stated that the British had withdrawn their recognition of him as Sultan following his protest against the occupation of Lahej by British troops. He had been informed that he was forbidden to return to the Territory and that an order for his arrest would be issued. At the same time Mr. Mohamed Ali Algifri, formerly Chairman of the Legislative Council and President of the Supreme Court in Lahej, and his brother, Mr. Abdullah Algifri, formerly Director of Education in Lahej had been removed from office. The latter had been arrested, sent to the island of Socotra for six months where he had been set free on condition that he did not return to Aden and Aden Protectorates. Petitioners also referred to other examples of similar actions taken against rulers who refused to obey the British including Sultan Mohamed Aidaroos of Lower Yafei;

Sheikh Ali Abubakr bin Farid, Deputy Sheikh of Upper Aulaqi; the Sheikh of Shu'aib and the Emir of Dhala.

75. Petitioners stated that the British were interested only in maintaining their colonial rule. They forced the rulers to support them and deliberately held back political, economic, social and educational development. The result was that the people were subjected to a completely archaic and arbitrary system of government in which they had no say whatsoever. Representative institutions did not exist, justice was dispensed in an arbitrary manner and social and economic conditions were a disgrace. Backwardness was being maintained in order to prolong British colonial domination. Further details given by petitioners of British rule in the Protectorates are contained in paragraphs 114-131 below.

#### The Federation of South Arabia

76. Petitioners devoted particular attention to the Federation of South Arabia which had been created in 1959 and to which Aden had acceded in January 1963. They condemned it as a "false" and "fictitious" federation created by the British in order to further their own colonial interests and maintain their colonial domination in the area. One petitioner, Mr. Adhal, described it as a "disguise to enable the British to preserve their authority there, to maintain their military base and thus control neighbouring countries". Another, Mr. Mohamed Aidaroos, deposed Sultan of Lower Yafei, said "Great Britain has followed the policy of divide and rule, a policy of arrests and murders, threats and tyranny for more than 100 years, and now that it sees the people cannot endure any more, they are instituting a Federation in the hope that they will thus prevent the people from demanding their rights".

77. In support, petitioners stated that the Federation had been created by the British and that the people had not been consulted. On this point Mr. Mohamed Aidaroos said: "The population of the South have never refused and will never refuse a true federation for themselves which would be in their own interests and in the interest of their present and future, because they believe in the unity of all the Arab people, but they refuse this Federation because it is done by the British".

78. Petitioners also held that the Federation was also completely controlled by the British. The Constitution of the Federation stated clearly that nothing in it affected the terms of the treaties which had been imposed on the rulers of the

individual states and by which they had been subjected to British control. The rulers were still under the orders of the British advisers. Also, by the provisions of the Constitution of the Federation, all the important powers had been reserved for the High Commissioner or the United Kingdom Government.

79. Petitioners also drew attention to the provisions in the Constitution of the Federation which allowed the United Kingdom complete freedom of action for its troops which in fact were being used to suppress the movement for liberation and unity.

80. Petitioners stated that the Federation was a completely unrepresentative body in which the people played no part. The persons sitting on the Federal Council from the Protectorates had been appointed by the feudal rulers who did not represent the people. In the case of Aden, petitioners drew attention to the fact that its twenty-four members of the Federal Council had been appointed by the High Commissioner without reference to the people. In dealing with this matter the Peoples Socialist Party memorandum stated: "This is considered by us as a major step backward in the constitutional development of the country. We are by virtue of the Federation back into the old system of nomination of members of the Legislature. The right of electing representatives to the legislature is again lost".

81. The principal objection by petitioners to the Federation concerned the threat it represented to their ultimate desire for real unity based on the will of the people. They felt that by establishing this "false federation" the British were attempting to divert the people from realizing their goal of true unity and independence. They stated that their own people saw through this sham and recognized it as a manoeuvre by the British to "tie the Territory to colonialism", as was being shown by their active opposition to it. They were afraid, however, that the outside world, not knowing the truth about the Federation, would accept it as a genuine step towards unity and independence.

82. Petitioners also pointed out that the Federation was an incomplete union, since it did not include all states and division continued to exist.

83. Petitioners dealt at some length with active opposition to the Federation in the Territory. They stated that opposition and resistance in the Protectorates "had been met by a policy of force and mass aggression". Details of opposition in the Protectorates are contained in paragraphs 114-125 below.

84. The events surrounding the accession of Aden to the Federation were also related by petitioners. They referred to this action as "annexation" and pointed out that it had never been approved by the people of Aden, who were opposed to the Federation. The persons who had carried on the negotiations with the British did not represent the people of Aden but were tools of the British.

85. Petitioner stated that in September 1962, when the proposals had been debated in the Aden Legislative Council, opposition had been expressed in the Council by some of its members and outside by mass demonstrations by the people. These demonstrations, in which some 15,000 people had taken part, had been broken up in brutal fashion by the police who had attacked the people with bullets and tear gas. People had been killed and wounded and many arrests had been made. As related by one petitioner, Mr. Oragi, Radio Aden had broadcast that nobody had been killed but after his party, the Peoples Socialist Party, had published a list of those killed, the British had published an article saying that there were very few dead and that those killed had been shot, not by the British, but by Arabs. The British had wanted to decline responsibility but they had forgotten that it was they who had given the orders and supplied the arms.

86. Another petitioner, Mr. Adhal, said that during the debate on the issue there was a "climate of terror in the whole country". Mr. Moulhi, a member of the Legislative Council, said that during the debate in the Legislative Council on 24 September 1962 a British Adviser (Hobson) had come into the Chamber and had advised him to accept the Federation in order to protect himself which meant that "if he did not accept he would be killed".

87. Mr. Adhal also pointed out that when the Legislative Council had "voted on the future of Aden and approved its annexation to the Federation" it had included seven Englishmen, five of whom were civil servants, the other two representing British commercial and oil interests.

Legislation restricting political activities and human rights

88. Petitioners had much to say concerning legislation in the Territory which restricted political activities and human rights. While the following paragraphs are based to a large extent on the detailed examination of this legislation contained in the memorandum submitted by the Peoples Socialist Party, many petitioners stressed the effect of these laws on the political life of the Territory. Specifically, attention was drawn to legislation affecting the Press, the labour movement, societies and organizations, personal rights (including imprisonment without trial and summary deportation), public gatherings, and the law of sedition.

(a) Legislation affecting the Press

89. The discretionary powers given to the Governor under section 5 (1) of the Press and Registration of Books Ordinance were described as placing the Press "under the mercy of the High Commissioner" who could "at any time and without showing any reason stop any newspaper from publication". The relevant section read as follows:

"5 (1) It shall not be lawful for any person to print, publish or edit or assist in the printing or editing of any newspaper within the Colony, unless the printing and publication of such newspaper shall be authorized by a licence in writing for that purpose granted by the Governor and signed by the Chief Secretary, which licence the Governor may, at his discretion, grant, refuse or revoke."

90. It was pointed out that there was no right of appeal to the courts against the use by the High Commissioner of his discretionary powers which, it was stated, had been used extensively. The following newspapers were among those that had been closed down:

- |     |                  |                    |
|-----|------------------|--------------------|
| 1.  | Al-Baath         | (Weekly newspaper) |
| 2.  | Al-Omal          | " "                |
| 3.  | Al-Amel          | " "                |
| 4.  | Al-Nahda         | " "                |
| 5.  | Al-Fagr          | " "                |
| 6.  | Al-Zaman         | " "                |
| 7.  | Akhbar Al-Janoob | " "                |
| 8.  | Al-Makeeka       | " "                |
| 9.  | Al-Fikr          | " "                |
| 10. | Al-Fadool        | " "                |
| 11. | Al-Ayam          | (Daily newspaper)  |

91. It was stated that by this means every paper which stood in opposition to the Government had been banned. Among these papers were those representing the point of view of the Aden Trades Union Congress and the Peoples Socialist Party. Those few papers which still continued to publish were very ineffective in discharging their function of expressing public opinion on the vital issues which faced the country.

(b) Legislation affecting the labour movement

92. It was stated that the Industrial Relations (Conciliation and Arbitration) Ordinance had "taken away the right to strike and had placed the worker at the mercy of the employer". Because of section 24 (1) of this Ordinance, which stated that: "No person shall take part in a strike and no employer shall impose or maintain a lockout, whether in connexion with a trade dispute or otherwise", the Ordinance had been widely construed as to render it illegal to strike, whether there was a trade dispute or not. As a result hundreds had been imprisoned, fined and deported. In particular, it was this Ordinance that had been used to suppress the general cessation of work in the whole country in protest against the Government's policy of merging Aden with the "very much unwanted Federation".

93. Attention was also drawn to the power given to the Registrar of Trade Unions under the Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Ordinance to cancel a trade union. This power of cancellation by an administrative organ was "contrary to the Geneva Labour Conventions to which the British Government was a party".

94. Mr. Asnag drew attention to a new Labour Ordinance that had been announced over the radio which would allow the Government to interfere in the recruitment of personnel. By this Ordinance preference would be given to (1) Aden born persons, (2) Commonwealth citizens, (3) others. This would discriminate against Yemeni workers who made up to 60 per cent of the working population.

(c) Legislation affecting societies and organizations

95. It was stated that a Societies Ordinance would come into force very shortly, which would affect "political parties, the Trades Union Congress, all clubs and almost every representative institution of every kind and description".

96. It was pointed out that by section (6) sub-section (5) of this Ordinance the Registrar could refuse to register a local society where he was satisfied that it was a branch of or affiliated to or connected with any organization or group of a political nature established outside the Colony. Commenting on this, the memorandum said that it was "intended to deal a most dangerous blow to the connexions that the Aden Trades Union Congress and other democratic institutions in Aden have with similar democratic institutions outside Aden like the International Labour Organisation, or other similar bodies which the Registrar can hold to be of political nature".

97. Attention was also drawn to section (6) sub-section (6) which stated that the Registrar "shall refuse to register a local society where it appears to him that such society has among its objects or is likely to pursue or be used for any unlawful purpose or any purpose prejudicial to or incompatible with peace, welfare, or good order in the Colony, or that the interests of peace, welfare or good order in the Colony would otherwise be likely to suffer prejudice by reason of the registration of such society". This provision was described as being "couched in such wide terms that the Registrar can in fact at any time refuse to register a society if the Government feels that it is politically expedient to do so".

98. It was also pointed out that section (8) of the Ordinance gave the Registrar discretionary power to cancel the registration of any local society if he was satisfied that it was expedient to do so, on the grounds that: (a) the society concerned had without his consent become affiliated to any organization or group of a political nature established outside the Colony, or (b) the interests of peace, welfare or good order in the Colony would in his opinion be likely to suffer prejudice by reason of the continued registration of the society. In its comment on these provisions the memorandum said that "the power given to the Registrar, who is an administrative authority, to cancel a representative institution like the Aden Trades Union Congress or the Peoples Socialist Party is contrary to all the Geneva conventions and recommendations to which the British Government is a party".

99. Attention was also drawn to sections (21) and (22) of the Ordinance under which, contrary to English principles of criminal law, a person is presumed to be guilty until he proves his innocence. Sections (24), (25) and (26) of the Ordinance were also cited. These "gave the police very wide powers to search premises on mere suspicion and to arrest persons and interrogate them".

(d) Legislation affecting personal rights

(1) Imprisonment without trial

100. Attention was drawn to section 334 of the Aden Criminal Procedure Ordinance which provided that "when any person accused of any nonbailable offence and detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, appears or is brought before a court he may be released on bail by him or it, but he shall not be so released if there appears reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or that it is expedient in the public interest that he be not released on bail".

101. It was pointed out that the phrase "or that it is expedient in the public interest that he be not released on bail" was designed to enable the Aden Government to imprison without trial its political opponents and had in fact been used and was still being used for this purpose. Among those who had been arrested and remanded to prison before any trial were the following leaders of the political and labour movements:

1. Abdulla Ali Murshed, a Trade Union leader;
2. Idris Hambala, a Trade Union leader and a member of the Peoples Socialist Party;
3. Abdulla Al-Asnag, General Secretary of the Aden Trades Union Congress and President of the Peoples Socialist Party;
4. Abdulla Ali Obaid Wahti, distributor of newspaper of the Aden Trades Union Congress.

All had applied for bail at their trials but the Crown had objected that it was not expedient in the public interest that they be released on bail and bail had been refused to them all.

(2) Summary deportation

102. Attention was drawn to the wide discretionary power given to the Governor under section 4 of the Vagrants and Undesirables Ordinance. Under this section the Governor may make an order for the departure of any person not being a British subject born in Aden who is, inter alia, "a person who for political or any other reason is not in his opinion a suitable person to reside in the Colony".

103. It was stated that this power had been widely exercised to deport political leaders, labour movement leaders and workers. Even a one-day strike rendered a labourer liable to deportation without any trial, and in fact mass deportations of hundreds of workers had been effected. This legislation puts "workers, ordinary citizens, political and labour movement leaders under a constant threat and menace. A person whose political views are not very much liked by the authorities finds himself deported by the authorities if it just happens that he was born over the border". Attention was also drawn to the hardship and human suffering caused by these mass deportations not only to the individuals concerned but also to their wives and families who were often left penniless.

(3) Legislation affecting public gatherings

104. In the memorandum it was stated that all public meetings, gatherings and demonstrations were banned in Aden. The authorities in Aden had even gone to the extent of prohibiting the exhibition of symbols, placards or pictures on buildings. The banning of public meetings had rendered it impossible for political parties and other democratic representative institutions to inform the public of their programmes, plans and aims. With a crippled Press and the banning of public meetings there was now virtually no means for expressing one's views publicly. The organization of democratic institutions like political parties and other representative institutions could not function under this state of affairs which existed in Aden.

105. An example of the way in which the power given to the police to forbid public meetings was given by Mr. Asnag. His party had wanted to hold a meeting in connexion with the visit of the Sub-Committee and had received the following reply from the Commissioner of Police:

"I should be glad if you would refer to your application dated 19th May, 1963, in which you ask for permission to hold a series of public meetings in connection with the visit to Aden which you expect to take place by the Sub-Committee of the Committee for the Liquidation of Colonialism.

"As you are no doubt aware, permission for this Sub-Committee to visit Aden was not granted by the United Kingdom Government. In the circumstances, the question of holding public meetings in this regard does not arise and I regret therefore that permission to hold these public meetings cannot be granted."

(f) The Law of Sedition

106. It was pointed out that under the English Law of Sedition the Crown has to prove that violence was advocated by the accused, but that under the Aden Penal Code opposition to the Government, even if it did not advocate violence, could still be seditious. This rendered a person in Aden liable to imprisonment for sedition even though he advocated opposition to the Government by peaceful means. Prosecution for sedition had become an easy means of removing political opponents and placing them in gaol. It had in fact become a means of tyranny and suppression that was being freely and frequently used, particularly in times of crisis. It was pointed out that Mr. Abdulla Asnag, Secretary-General of the Aden Trades Union Congress and President of the Peoples Socialist Party, had been gaoled for twelve months following a prosecution for sedition.

107. Representatives of the Peoples Socialist Party also registered strong objections to a new law on sedition (No. 6 of 1963) recently enacted by the Supreme Council of the Federation of South Arabia. They pointed out that this law provided that "anyone who claims that the Federation is a part of any other State or advocates such a view is liable to a punishment of five years imprisonment or a fine of 10,000 shillings or both". Since their party believed that the "South" formed part of Yemen this was apparently an attempt to make their party illegal.

Political Prisoners

108. Petitioners stated that contrary to the statements of the United Kingdom there were political prisoners in Aden. The repressive legislation and the way it was being used to suppress political opposition made this inevitable. The

United Kingdom had always declared that there were no political prisoners because they considered them as ordinary criminals.

109. Referring to the fact that some political prisoners, including the leaders, had been released, petitioners pointed out that this did not indicate an act of generosity or a change of policy by the British. These prisoners had been released simply because their sentences had expired.

110. They also pointed out that when political prisoners had been released, the British authorities had seen that they were dismissed from their jobs. Many had been forced to flee the country.

111. A number of petitioners said that they had been imprisoned because of their political activities. They also gave the names of other persons who had been political prisoners among whom were those referred to in paragraph 101 above. Miss Radia Ihsan, a petitioner at Taiz, and Miss Safinaz Khalifa, who accompanied the delegate of the Peoples Socialist Party when he spoke before the Sub-Committee in Cairo, had also been political prisoners. Both had been imprisoned as a result of the demonstrations of 24 September 1962 against the "annexation of Aden to the Federation".

112. It was stated that there were no special prisons for political prisoners and that conditions in the prisons were bad. The men were detained with criminals while women, such as Miss Ihsan and Miss Khalifa, were imprisoned with prostitutes and mentally sick women. Prisoners were also tortured and whipped.

113. Petitioners said that conditions in prisons in the Protectorates were even worse. One practice there was to chain the hands and feet of prisoners together. When the British wished to torture prisoners they were often handed over to a Sultan of a protectorate who, by such methods as tying them to a horse's tail and dragging them, would force them to confess. The British disavowed responsibility for these acts but they should be considered British acts because it was the British Government that supported the Sultans.

#### Repression in the Protectorates

##### (a) Peace and security

114. Events relating to peace and security in the area were emphasized by nearly all the petitioners. They described, sometimes at great length, what they called the reign of terror and the repression existing in the Protectorates. The world,

it was stated, knew nothing or very little about the attacks constantly carried out by the British forces, particularly the Royal Air Force, against the people of the Protectorates; little was known about the people killed or wounded, the villages destroyed, the crops burnt, the cattle lost, the hundreds imprisoned and the refugees scattered in the hills or in neighbouring countries. Nor did the world know about the stout resistance which the people had been displaying against British domination and in defence of their freedom. No news agencies had been in these areas to report on these military actions, the destruction left behind and the damage done to the local inhabitants. Each area had carried out its resistance alone, without being able to get any help from outside. The Sub-Committee received a great number of photographs taken in various localities in the Protectorates showing homes destroyed by bombs, burnt plantations, refugees living in caves and armed fighters.

115. The following paragraphs contain descriptions given by petitioners which seem best to illustrate the events referred to in those areas.

116. Mr. Mohamed Abubaker ben Farid, who was in exile in Cairo, said that it was only in 1951-1952 that British forces had occupied his region, Upper Aulaqi. Until 1959 the people had struggled politically against the British and refused to co-operate with them. Then suddenly in May 1959, without any warning, British aircraft and tanks carried out their first attack against their villages and homes. From the hills, the tribesmen organized their resistance, but in May 1960 the British sent 4,000 soldiers into the area and hundreds of people were forced to take refuge in Yemen and Saudi Arabia. About 12,000 sorties had been effected by the Royal Air Force against the Aulaqis and surrounding areas. The petitioner presented to the Sub-Committee a partial list of forty destroyed homes and the names of nine women who had been killed in the bombings and nine men who had been imprisoned, all of whom he had known personally.

117. In a written statement, Mr. Abdulhadi Al-Himyari, a sheikh from Wahidi Sultanate, said that British bombing from the air had destroyed homes and burnt crops in Hamiyeh, Al-Kheir, Raidat-Ibn-Rashid and Ayath and that the following towns and villages had been shelled with mortars: Mithaf, Haurah, Khabar, Gheil-Basardah, Maifa'ah, Qalitah, Gheil-Saidi, Jebaal-Nu'man, Badiyan, Jordan and 'Amaqin, all in Wahidi.

118. Mr. Hussein Mahfouz told the Sub-Committee in Sana'a that since 1954 British air attacks had hit Belhareth and Mis'abin in Beihan, Rubaizi, Mahajer and Ma'an in Upper Aulaqi, Khalifah of Beni-Helal, Bakazem in Lower Aulaqi, Maraqqshah and Najfein in Fadhli, Damani and Sha'wi in the Auzalis, Mayaser and Al-Hasanah in Dathina, Sobeiha and 'Abadel in Lahej, the Haushabi region, Radfan, Sha'ar, Azariqa, Hamadeh and Al-Awaas in Dhaleh, the regions of Lower and Upper Aulaqi, Himyar in Wahidi, and various tribes of coastal and inland Hadhramaut. Many people had been killed and thousands had lost their homes and gone to the hills or to Yemen.

119. Mr. Mohamed Saleh Al-Musli described the resistance of the people of Upper Yafei against British infiltration for more than twenty-five years. Since 1959 the British had been trying to push Upper Yafei into the Federation and had attacked several villages (Thi-sarah, Mahjabah, Ad-darb) and burnt coffee plantations from the air. The unity of the people had prevented them until now from carrying out their plans. At present the pro-British Sultan was in Aden while his son and followers were in the seat of the Sultanate and receiving British supplies, arms and ammunition from the air. Many warnings had been dropped over the area by British planes. One such warning presented to the Sub-Committee by the petitioner was dated 31 October 1961 and read as follows:

"WARNING

"Despite our repeated warnings, Al-Musli and the other trouble-makers are still continuing their hostile activities and breaches of the peace. It has been decided to take action from the air against Al-Musli's house and the cultivated land adjoining it.

"We accordingly warn you to remove your women and children immediately to a distance of about one mile from Al-Musli's house. If you fail to do so, you will be responsible for the consequences."

120. Mr. Mohamed Aidaroos, the deposed Sultan of Lower Yafei, said that approximately 7,000 people from "the South" had taken refuge in Yemen because of British attacks on their homes. In Lower Yafei, the situation was now very tense with daily provocations and threats from the British. For the past five years the British had committed a long series of aggressions in the Sultanate. The Royal Air Force sorties with heavy and light bombs, rockets and heavy machine-guns had been as follows:

- 28 March 1958 - Wadi Hattat: one man, one woman and two children killed,  
22 camels and other property destroyed, three people wounded.
- 16 June " - Destruction of Sultan's residence.
- 17 " " - Filsan (town): bombed for four consecutive days.
- 18 " " - Sharyan (village): bombed for three consecutive days.
- 24 July " - Dar Daqqah (near Qarah, the principal town of Upper Yafei).  
Ma'azabeh: bombed without warning.
- 6 Jan. 1959 - Filsan: bombed again.
- 30 Oct. 1960 - Qarah: several houses and mosque destroyed. Soraq: bombed  
for three days.
- 1 June 1961 - Qarah, Soraq: bombed for three days.
- 2 June " - Filsan, Kharbeh, Shaab el-Bareh, Al-Khulwah, Yabas, Zahah,  
Tha-Shareq, Barek, Zalman, Naoom, Hilam, Abr, Matrah,  
Hajeb, etc. 25,000 inhabitants took refuge in the hills  
throughout the attack in which light bombs were used.
- 16 July " - Al-Far' village: completely destroyed.
- 25 " " - Al-Keileh village: attack with rockets.
- 2 August " - Ben-Ma'bad village: attack with rockets.
- 27 " " - Sathan, Kamme, Danbeh, Jahili (villages): bombed with  
heavy bombs and rockets for a whole week.
- From 10 Feb.  
to 9 April  
1962 - For 57 days the Royal Air Force carried out an attack with  
heavy, light and napalm bombs and destroyed the coffee and  
cereal plantations. Nearly 90,000 people (70 per cent of  
the population of Lower Yafei) became homeless and were  
dispersed in caves and in the mountains.

In Upper Yafei, the villages bombed were: Thi-Farah, Maslah, Mahjabiah, Ad-Darb  
(17 June 1959), Kharbeh Ad-Darb, Hadqiyah, Thi-Sarah (8 June 1961, for twenty-one  
days) and Maslah (31 October 1961, for two days).

121. The petitioner also referred to similar events in the Emirates of Dhaleh and Beihan, the Sheikdoms of Sha'ar, Al-Qatib and Dathina, the Sultanates of Fadhli, Lahej, Upper and Lower Aulaqis and in the regions of Wahidi and Auzali.

122. The petitioner submitted to the Sub-Committee twenty-seven copies of warnings issued over a period ranging from 16 June 1958 till 3 July 1962. Some of the warnings emanate from the British Adviser and Agent for the Western Protectorate; others from the Federal Minister for Internal Security, Mr. Saleh ben Hussein or from his deputy Sharif Hussein, or simply from the Ministry of Internal Security in the Federation. They are warnings addressed to the inhabitants of various towns and villages or of Yafei as a whole. The towns and villages concerned are: Dar-al-Laqwad, Filsan, Sharyan, Dar-al-Duqqah, Qarah, Soraq, Al-Bareh, Al-Khulwah, Yabas, Zahah, Barek, Kharbeh, Ad-Darb, Umdarb, Hadaqiyah, Mahjابه. Most of these documents refer to the activities of Mahamed Aidaroos and warn the people of reprisals for supporting him in terms such as these:

(a) "Warning to the inhabitants of Dar-al-Laqwad.

"Since Mohammed Aidaroos is using Dar-al-Laqwad for his criminal activities, the village will now be demolished and you must leave immediately. If you attempt to remove anything from the village, you will be attacked at once." (Warning dated 16 June 1958)

OR:

(b) "To the inhabitants of Filsan:

"We warned you not to give assistance to Mohammed Aidaroos, but you have not heeded this warning and Mohammed Aidaroos and his criminals have since continued their unlawful acts against the Sultanate. Your village and lands will therefore be punished and will be attacked now and in the next few days. You must leave at once without taking anything from your homes and you must not return to your village or lands until Mohammed Aidaroos ceases his criminal acts and you are pardoned by the authorities. If you disobey this order, you will be responsible for the consequences." (Warning dated 17 June 1958)

OR:

(c) "To the inhabitants of Thi-Sarah.

"We warned you that any person having contact with a foreign Government and engaging in subversive acts, including disloyalty to the ruler of your country, would be punished.

"You all know that Mohamed Saleh Al-Musli has been agitating and conspiring with foreigners against your Government. For this reason he must be punished and his house must be demolished today. You must leave your homes immediately and stay away until his house has been demolished. If you do not heed this warning, you will be responsible for the consequences."  
(Warning dated 6 June 1961)

Other warnings tell the inhabitants that the Government will confiscate the property of anyone who helps the rebels, that it will protect the people of the coastal area, that the security forces have no intention of invading the interior of Yafei, that the Government is now convinced that Mohamed Aidaroos has left Qarah and that it will allow the people to return to their homes, that Mohsen Hammud, the deputy of Aidaroos, should be driven out and that the people should declare their allegiance to Mahmud Aidaroos, and that the rumours about the possibility of letting Mohamed Aidaroos return to Qarah are false.

(b) Oppression of rulers opposed to colonialism

123. Petitioners also pointed out that the policy of the United Kingdom was to stir up rivalries and enmities among the various rulers and to remove and persecute any ruler who did not co-operate with it. The deposed Sultan of Lahej described to the Sub-Committee the circumstances of his removal and exile after opposing British military occupation of the Sultanate and direct interference in its affairs (see paragraph 74). The deposed Sultan of Lower Yafei, Mr. Mohamed ben Aidaroos, stated "The policy of the British colonialists with regard to the rulers is firmly based on threats, subterfuge, treachery and deception". In February 1960, the British Governor had ignored his election by the people as Sultan of Lower Yafei and had appointed his ten-year old brother in his place. He had been forbidden from seeing his brother or even sending him a letter. His property in the coastal area, which had been occupied by the British, had been confiscated. The Government had spread rumours that he was in great conflict with his younger

brothers and opponents. It had used all sorts of means to create differences between the tribes and accused him of being the instigator of all the trouble in the area. The British had tried to occupy the rest of the Sultanate by force, but despite the frequent bombings, had been unable to do so. In June 1961, he had left Qarah, the capital of the Sultanate, after announcing to the people that he would go to London to complain to the British Government against the actions of the Aden Government. At Al-Baida (in Yemen) he had learned that the Government had issued a warning stating that should he return to the region, the worst destruction would befall Lower Yafei. He then had decided to stay at Al-Baida in order to spare the people new sufferings, and had appointed his cousin to act on his behalf. However, his departure had not prevented the British from continuing their bombing missions over Yafei for fifty-seven consecutive days.

124. The tribes of the Sultanate had refused to yield to British warnings or to be provoked by the British attacks. Thousands of leaflets had been dropped calling on the people to obey his young brother Mahmud and to recognize the Federal Government, but the people had persisted in refusing to do so. They considered the Federation as a subterfuge by which the United Kingdom wanted to continue its domination of the region. The people were all in favour of unity and were looking for a true federation in their own interest, and not a federation of colonial agents and stooges.

125. The deposed Sultan of Upper Yafei, Mr. Abdullah ben Omar Kahtan Harhara, stated that the United Kingdom had signed a treaty with his father, but had broken it a few years later and sought to control the Sultanate. Upon his father's death, the British had installed his cousin, Mr. Mohamed ben Saleh Harhara, as Sultan by supplying him with money to distribute among the various tribes. The petitioner's property had been taken by his cousin. Later, the people had risen against the new Sultan and forced him to go and live in Aden.

#### Economic, social and educational conditions

126. Many petitioners referred to the conditions of poverty and economic backwardness which, they stated, many years of British colonialism had left in the area. The United Kingdom, it was stated, had no interest whatsoever in the development of the region or the welfare of its inhabitants. On the contrary,

it had stood in the way of economic and social progress, preferring to maintain ignorance and poverty and an archaic feudal system. Many thousands had been forced to emigrate because of the lack of means of livelihood in their country. Many of these emigrants had tried to invest money in the Territory but had been prevented from doing so by the British authorities.

127. Some petitioners referred to the Port of Aden and stated that its revenues had been used by the British Government for its own benefit and not for the Territory's development. The British Government had not built a single paved or asphalt road outside Aden and had always insisted that the country was poor. Agricultural methods were still very primitive, although some cotton growing had been introduced lately. In this connexion, the exiled Sultan of Lahej, Mr. Ali Abdulkarim, told the Sub-Committee that prior to his departure from the Territory the people had tried to introduce a few schemes for growing cotton, for developing the land and for building new schools. With the assistance of the United Nations, the people had started to build two dams which would have multiplied the irrigated area. But the work had stopped since then and the schemes had been discontinued. Mr. Ali Fakhri pointed out that the per capita income was less than ten pounds ten shillings. In towns as in villages, electricity or drainage had hardly been seen, and something like half of the Colony and Protectorates had no protected water-supply.

128. In the field of education, the petitioners were also unanimous in decrying the lack of schools, particularly in the Protectorates. Several of them asserted that not a single school existed in their region. A few people were able to send their children away to study, but the great majority remained illiterate. Petitioners from Hadhramaut stated that less than 10 per cent of the children in the towns would go to the few elementary schools, while in the villages there were no schools at all. There was only one intermediate school to which forty pupils were admitted yearly. In the Western Protectorate there was one intermediate school which admitted three students from each sultanate. From both the Western and Eastern Protectorates, twenty students were admitted every year to the secondary school in Aden, out of a population of one and a half million.

129. Petitioners also stated that scholarships in Aden were usually granted to children of immigrants, partly because they received better education in their own primary schools. The educational standard in most schools was low.

Mr. Ali Fakhri stated that, until 1956, the British authorities, through the whole century of their rule, had failed to bring to the Territory a single Arab engineer, doctor, lawyer, pharmacist or qualified nurse.

130. Petitioners referred to the closing by British authorities of the Cultural Club in Hadhramaut in 1958. The authorities had stated that the Club had "damaging principles" and had persecuted its members. Reference was also made to the closing of the Girls' School in Aden for one year.

131. Petitioners also described the "extreme lack of health facilities in the Territory". There was only one hospital in Aden. In the Protectorates there were only two dispensaries, two pharmacists and four doctors. Patients had to travel sometimes for three days to be treated. There were only 104 hospital beds for a population of one and a half million and an area of about 112,000 square miles.

C. Demands submitted by petitioners

(1) Immediate ending of colonial rule

132. The desire for an immediate end to colonial rule and appeals for urgent measures to bring about full independence were unanimously expressed by all those who addressed the Sub-Committee, submitted written memoranda, sent telegrammes or demonstrated before it at airports and meeting-places. Political parties and organizations such as the Peoples Socialist Party, the South Arabians League, the Peoples Congress, the Arab Nationalist Movement, the National Salvation Movement, the Progressist Socialist Youth, associations such as the Arab Wcman Association and the Congress of Graduates of Universities and Higher Institutions, labour organizations such as the Aden Trades Union Congress, youth clubs, representatives of various tribes, sheikhdoms and sultanates, people engaged in active resistance, refugees, exiled Sultans and public figures from Aden, expressed time and again the anxious desire of the people in Aden and the Protectorates for freedom and independence. Referring to the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, petitioners asked for the speedy implementation by the United Kingdom of all the provisions of the Declaration.

133. Several petitioners stressed the fact that all the people were united in asking for independence. Thus, the President of the South Arabians League, Mr. Mohamed Ali Algifri, stated that although there were some divergencies of views between the various parties, they were all one in their stand against British colonialism and the efforts of the United Kingdom to prolong its domination of the area.

134. Several petitioners also warned against what they termed British future plans in the area, aiming at consolidating the present so-called Federation and its rulers who had not been elected democratically and did not represent the people. It was pointed out that the United Kingdom had imposed on the Federation treaty conditions which would enable it to continue to dominate the whole area.

135. Mr. Ali Abdulkarim, the deposed Sultan of Lahej, stated that the United Kingdom wished to grant some sort of false independence to the Territory. Mr. Abdullah Asnag, President of the Peoples Socialist Party, asserted that the

United Kingdom was taking immediate measures to change the present constitutional arrangements and declare the independence of the area under its present government. Such a government could not belong to the world community. Any action by the United Kingdom aiming at suppressing the wishes of the people would be in violation of the United Nations Charter and should be repudiated by the United Nations. The United Nations should intervene to restore full democratic institutions in the Territory. Other petitioners stated that the United Kingdom, by granting a fictitious independence, would be seeking to maintain its domination and prevent the reunification of "the South" with "Northern Yemen". This would not be acceptable to the people.

136. Intervention by the United Nations in the situation was reiterated by a great number of petitioners who, on the whole, appealed to the United Nations to take urgent measures to end British domination in the whole of South Arabia.

## (2) Dissolution of the Federation

137. As stated earlier in this report (paras. 76-87), nearly all the petitioners pointed out that the Federation established by the United Kingdom was only a disguise to enable it to maintain its domination over the area. The petitioners therefore demanded the dissolution of the Federation. The Treaty of Friendship and Protection between the United Kingdom and the Federation (1959) had only confirmed all the previous treaties concluded without the consent of the people. Those who had accepted it had done so under the orders of their British "advisers" who had "negotiated" it with the British Governor in Aden. Similarly, the Treaty providing for the accession of Aden to the Federation had been imposed by the United Kingdom and had openly stated that nothing in its provisions should affect British sovereignty over Aden.

138. Petitioners pointed out that the Federation had actually brought no changes, except for a concentration of power in the hands of the British High Commissioner. It was a development for the worse, not the better. The United Kingdom still exercised absolute control over both the internal and external affairs of the Federation. It still occupied the Territory and had the right to use it for military purposes. It still controlled its natural and mineral wealth. And it provided a stratagem to perpetuate the separation of the South from "Northern Yemen".

Petitioners therefore demanded that the treaties signed between the United Kingdom and the so-called Federation be considered null and void. They stated that the unlawful Federal and Supreme Councils should be dissolved, along with the Aden Legislative and Executive Councils. These bodies should be replaced by truly representative bodies elected democratically by the people.

(3) Supervised elections or plebiscite

139. The petitioners indicated the means by which they wished these objectives to be achieved. Most petitioners expressed the desire that before independence the people should be given the opportunity to express their wishes on the future of their country either by elections or by a plebiscite conducted under the supervision of the United Nations.

140. As a prerequisite they demanded the dissolution of the present unrepresentative legislative bodies and the repeal of all repressive legislation which suppressed basic human rights and made it impossible to engage in normal political activities. They drew attention in particular to the laws affecting the Press and publications, the labour movement, societies and organizations, personal rights (including those providing for imprisonment without trial and for summary deportation), public gatherings and the laws of sedition.<sup>i/</sup> They also asked for the release of all political prisoners and for the return of those exiled or forbidden to re-enter the country.

141. All petitioners laid emphasis on the need for strict international control by the United Nations of any elections or plebiscite that were held. They felt that this was necessary as a guarantee that the elections would be conducted fairly and in an atmosphere free from terror, repression and intimidation.

142. Some petitioners, including supporters of the Peoples Socialist Party and the South Arabians League, laid emphasis on the need for a transitional period before any elections or plebiscite took place. They believed that this was necessary to enable the exiled leaders to return to their country and for the political parties to prepare the people for the elections. They stressed that during this transitional period the administration should be conducted by some neutral authority, and not by the British or the present authorities in Aden and the Protectorates. Some petitioners suggested that the United Nations itself should take over the administration during this period, others suggested a United Nations

---

<sup>i/</sup> See paras. 88-107 above.

presence, a neutral commission designated by the United Nations, or administration by neutral Powers or by the Arab League.

143. Most petitioners believed that general elections should be held simultaneously throughout the whole of the Territory. One petitioner, representing the Peoples Congress, felt that elections should be held first in Aden, where they were due to be held by the end of this year, to be followed a year later by general elections throughout the Protectorates.

144. Other petitioners suggested that a plebiscite be held to determine the wishes of the people as to their future. By this means the people could express their views on such questions as the future form of government, unification with Yemen and whether any union with Yemen should be on a federal or a unitary basis. Those who made these suggestions were equally insistent that the plebiscite should be under international control and that it should be preceded by a transitional period during which freedom of political activity would be guaranteed.

145. All petitioners demanded that the elections or plebiscite should be held on the basis of universal adult suffrage. They objected to the present electoral laws which extended the franchise to foreigners who were British subjects but prevented many Arabs from voting. Many petitioners believed that the right to vote should be granted to all foreigners who became citizens or who had the intention of making Aden their home. The Peoples Socialist Party believed that all Yemenis in the Territory should be given the vote. Speaking on the question of the franchise the President of the South Arabians League said that his organization wished to see the right to vote extended so as to include the greatest number of Arabs that was possible. The League was in agreement with the Peoples Socialist Party on this point, but they differed as to the actual percentage.

(4) Evacuation of the British Military Base in Aden and other military installations in the Protectorates

146. Evacuation of the British military bases was demanded by nearly all of those who addressed the Sub-Committee or who submitted written petitions in Cairo, Sana'a, Taiz, Jeddah or Baghdad. British military occupation of the Territory was considered as the main instrument with which the United Kingdom Government had imposed its domination and the concrete symbol of colonial rule in the area. It

was pointed out that the base had been and was still being used to repress the people's wishes and demand for freedom. The armed attacks on towns and villages in the Protectorates, the forceful occupation of sultanates and sheikhdoms, the conditions of "terror", "aggression" and "repression", were all carried out and created by the British forces operating from the base and other military installations.

147. The base, according to petitioners, had been used not only against the people of the Territory, but also against other countries in the Middle East, particularly during the Suez crisis in 1956. It constituted a constant threat to peace and security in the region. In its original memorandum addressed to the Governor of Aden on 24 September 1962<sup>k/</sup> and restated to the Sub-Committee in Cairo and Sana'a, the Peoples Socialist Party had stated: "The colonial administration has turned Aden into an atomic base against the wishes of its peace-loving people, thus making it a target of attack in both hot and cold wars. As Arabs, we want nothing to do with either. The Administration has drawn upon the indiscriminate and unwarranted use of British forces of occupation in suppressing the people ... The presence of these troops has not only deprived our people of the best large areas of our homeland, thereby causing the ever-present acute shortage in housing, but is also directly responsible for the steep rise in the cost of living over the past fifteen years ...". The Party demanded the evacuation of the military base.

148. Mr. Taha Muqbil, representing the Movement of Arab Nationalists, stated that the British Military Command in Aden was spending about 12 million pounds yearly and was now building military installations which would cost 20 million pounds during the coming three years. The base might become a nuclear base as the British had announced the arrival recently of a great number of Thunderbird rockets. Reports in the British Press had mentioned Aden as one of the main bases for the storage of nuclear weapons.

149. According to some petitioners, some of the places where British forces were stationed were Khormaskar, Majrad, Rayan, Qotton, Mafa'a, the Kuria-Muria and Kamaran Islands.

(5) Unification of the area

150. All petitioners stated that the people of the area desired the unity of the Territory and opposed its fragmentation into many small states. Some felt that reunification with Yemen would be an inevitable consequence of independence.

151. Some petitioners proposed the unification of Aden and Aden Protectorates under one truly democratic and centrally-controlled government, elected freely under international supervision. In this connexion, Mr. Abdullah Algifri considered that the country, owing to its small population, should become a unitary state. This view had been voiced by Mr. Shaikhan Alhabshi before the Special Committee.<sup>1/</sup>

152. Petitioners who demanded unification with Yemen stated that, geographically and historically, Aden and the Protectorates (including the islands of Kuria-Muria, Perim, Socotra and Kamaran) were an integral part of "Natural Yemen". "Northern" and "Southern" Yemen had always been bound by strong political, economic and national ties as well as common interests and aspirations. "Occupied Southern Yemen" had been separated from the rest of Yemen by colonialism, and it was colonialism which was trying to prevent their reunification. Representatives of the Peoples Socialist Party and of the Aden Trades Union Congress pointed out that the Sedition Act recently passed by the British authorities had made it illegal to advocate reunification with Yemen, contrary to the aims pursued by these organizations. They declared that all in Aden were in favour of union with Yemen first and the unity of the Arab world as a second step.

153. The Federation of South Arabia, petitioners also said, had been devised by the United Kingdom in order to prolong the division of Yemen and to create a separatist entity among the people. It aimed at combatting the Arab liberation movement and the trend towards Arab unity. The people were determined to oppose these attempts and to struggle for the preservation of national unity.

154. The petitioners stated that their demands in this field were also based on the right of self-determination which the United Nations had recognized and encouraged for all peoples.

---

<sup>1/</sup> A/AC.109/SR.149.

(6) Other demands

155. Various other demands were formulated by petitioners in oral as well as written statements. They are summarized as follows:

- (a) The United Nations should ask the United Kingdom to cease taking repressive action against the population of areas which were not yet under its direct control or were not yet part of the Federation.
- (b) Immigration into Aden should be stopped, except for technicians and experts.
- (c) Priority in jobs should be given to indigenous persons. Summary dismissals and expulsion of people born in "the North" should also be stopped.
- (d) Oil concessions granted by the British to foreign companies should be considered null and void.
- (e) International aid should be provided to refugees and scholarships to students from the Territory.

#### IV. CONCLUSIONS OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE

156. The Sub-Committee considers that it has done everything in its power to carry out the mandate given to it by the Special Committee. It was not, however, permitted to visit Aden and Aden Protectorates and was unable to hold talks with the Administering Power.
157. The Sub-Committee therefore feels that it did not receive full co-operation from the United Kingdom, although the Special Committee had expressed the hope that such co-operation would be extended in accordance with the recommendation made by the General Assembly in resolution 1810 (XVII).
158. In visiting neighbouring countries, the Sub-Committee was merely carrying out one of the provisions of the Special Committee's resolution of 3 May 1963. Since it was unable to visit the territories concerned, it went where individuals from Aden and Aden Protectorates could appear before it to present their views on conditions in their country and on its future.
159. The Sub-Committee was in fact able to hear a great many people belonging to many different sections of the population: representatives and leaders of political parties, trade union delegates, elected representatives, former Sultans or tribal chiefs, civilians and soldiers, civil servants, business men, farmers, students, and men and women belonging to various organizations.
160. The Sub-Committee's visit to countries neighbouring Aden and Aden Protectorates made it possible for these people to present their views and demands with regard to their country's future. This is a positive aspect of the work of the Special Committee in its efforts to seek the most suitable ways and means for the speedy implementation of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples.
161. One of the most heartening results of these hearings was the many testimonials they provided of the earnest faith and hope placed in the United Nations as an instrument for the peaceful liberation of the peoples under colonial rule.
162. The Sub-Committee found a general desire to put an end to colonial domination. The few differences of opinion encountered did not concern the objective sought but rather the means and the conditions for the achievement of that objective.
163. A great deal of concern was expressed about the United Kingdom's plan to grant independence while preserving the existing institutions and governments.

Large sections of the population affirmed that, in those circumstances, independence would mean perpetuating a reactionary system of government and maintaining foreign influence in a new guise.

164. The entire population is also eager for national unity, but the present Federation - which, it should be noted, does not include all the States in the area - represents merely an artificial unity imposed upon them and governed by provisions which ensure United Kingdom control.

165. The various treaties signed with the United Kingdom, including the Treaty of Friendship and Protection concluded in February 1959 by the Federation, are regarded by all petitioners as null and void.

166. The Sub-Committee also found a very strong movement in favour of the union of the Territories with Yemen. This movement continues to have a powerful impact on political activity in the country.

167. In addition, almost all the petitioners protested against the maintenance of the military base in Aden. The base was prejudicial to the security of the region and it seems desirable that it should be eliminated.

168. Repressive laws and police methods are a major source of discontent, particularly in Aden itself, where the trade union movement is subjected to constant abuse by the local authorities.

169. Economic, social and educational conditions in the Protectorates have caused grave concern and are often laid at the door of the colonial regime.

170. A number of petitioners mentioned the rising of the inhabitants who were unwilling to submit to the foreign yoke. They spoke of the struggle they are carrying on and of the repressive measures taken by the United Kingdom authorities. Since they are determined to continue the struggle, there will be further unrest in the Territory. If this situation continues, the political, economic and social development of the Territory cannot but suffer.

171. All these findings have led the Sub-Committee to the conclusion that action by the United Nations is urgently necessary. Such action must be designed not only to bring about the speedy implementation of the Declaration but also to put an end to the upheavals which threaten the peace and security of the area.

172. The Sub-Committee considers that the population should be consulted on a very much broader basis than in the past. Such a consultation of the people, undertaken in accordance with the right of self-determination, should be carried

out on the basis of universal suffrage and in full enjoyment of fundamental human rights and freedoms.

173. It should be accompanied by all the necessary safeguards to enable the people to express their will and their wishes in all freedom. The United Nations could provide these safeguards.

174. In order to ensure that independence is granted in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of the inhabitants, the consultation should be held before independence. This procedure would result in the transfer of powers to a truly representative Government.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE

175. In operative paragraph 8 of the resolution of 3 May 1963 on Aden, the Special Committee requested the Sub-Committee to submit "a report with recommendations" for the speedy implementation, in respect of Aden and Aden Protectorates, of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples.

176. On the basis of its findings and conclusions, the Sub-Committee makes the following recommendations:

- I. The people of Aden and Aden Protectorates must be allowed to exercise their right of self-determination with regard to their future. The exercise of the right of self-determination must take the form of a consultation of the whole population, to be held as soon as possible:
  - on the basis of universal adult suffrage;
  - and with respect for fundamental human rights and freedoms.
- II. The Administering Power should therefore be asked to:
  - (a) repeal all the laws which restrict public freedoms;
  - (b) release all political prisoners and detainees and those who have been sentenced following actions of political significance;
  - (c) to allow the return of people who have been exiled or forbidden to reside in the Territory because of political activities;
  - (d) to cease forthwith all repressive action against the people of the Territory, in particular military expeditions and the bombing of villages.
- III. The Administering Power should also be asked to dissolve the present legislative organs and to make the necessary constitutional changes for holding general elections with a view to establishing a representative organ and the setting up of a Government for the whole of the Territory.
- IV. A United Nations presence is required, both before and during the elections referred to above. It should be decided upon by the General Assembly, upon the proposal of the Special Committee.
- V. The elections must be held before the attainment of independence, which will be granted in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of the inhabitants.

VI. Conversations should be opened without delay between the Government resulting from the elections mentioned above and the Administering Power for the purpose of fixing the date for the granting of independence and the arrangements for the transfer of power.

177. In making these recommendations, the Sub-Committee has in mind the rapid implementation in this Territory of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples. It feels, however, that it is also its duty to draw the attention of the Special Committee to the need to put an end to a dangerous situation the continuance of which is likely to threaten international peace and security.

178. Lastly, the Sub-Committee wishes to point out that these recommendations are in keeping with the provisions of operative paragraphs 1 and 2 of the resolution of 3 May 1963 on Aden, the principles of which are accepted by nearly all the members of the Special Committee.

ANNEXES

ANNEX I

CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE  
UNITED KINGDOM TO THE UNITED NATIONS

- A. Letter dated 14 May 1963 from the Vice-Chairman of the Special Committee addressed to the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations

I have the honour to enclose a copy of the resolution on Aden adopted by the Special Committee on the situation with regard to the implementation of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples at its 163rd meeting on 3 May 1963 (A/AC.109/42).

In accordance with operative paragraph 4 of the resolution, the Chairman of the Special Committee has nominated the following to be members of the Sub-Committee on Aden:

Chairman of the Sub-Committee: H.E. Mr. Voensai Somn (Cambodia)

Members: Iraq, Madagascar, Venezuela and Yugoslavia.

On behalf of the Special Committee, I should like to take this opportunity to request your Government to reconsider its position concerning the visit by the Sub-Committee to Aden, with a view to co-operating with it in order to ensure the greatest possible success to its endeavours.

(Signed) Carlos Maria VELAZQUEZ  
Vice-Chairman  
Special Committee

- B. Letter dated 20 May 1963 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations addressed to the Vice-Chairman of the Special Committee

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's letter No. TR.412/2 of the 14th of May enclosing a copy of the Resolution on Aden adopted by the Special Committee on the situation with regard to the implementation of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples at its 163rd meeting on the 3rd May, 1963 and informing me that the Chairman of

the Committee has nominated His Excellency Mr. Voeunsai Sonn (Cambodia) as Chairman and representatives of Iraq, Madagascar, Venezuela and Yugoslavia as members of the Sub-Committee on Aden.

With reference to the last paragraph of Your Excellency's letter, I regret to have to inform you that my Government, to whom the contents of your letter were duly conveyed, have instructed me to inform Your Excellency that, for the reasons already explained to the Special Committee by my Delegation, it is unable to reconsider its position concerning a visit by the Sub-Committee to Aden.

(Signed) Patrick DEAN  
Permanent Representative

ANNEX II

COPY OF PHOTOSTAT COPY OF LETTER DATED 23 MAY 1963 FROM THE CONTROLLER  
OF IMMIGRATION, ADEN, ADDRESSED TO "ALL AIRLINES AND SHIPPING"

Telephone No 3811

Immigration and Passports  
Department  
P.O. Box 1178  
Maalla, ADEN

Ref. No. I.C.9C.

CONFIDENTIAL

23rd May, 1963.

ALL AIRLINES AND SHIPPING

CIRCULAR

1. His Exc. Mr. NOEUNSAY SONN - CAMBODIA.
2. His Exc. Dr. ADNAN M. PACHACHI - IRAQ.
3. Dr. LEONARDO DIAZ GONZALEZ - VENEZUELA.
4. His Exc. MEMBER MISO PAVICEVIC - YUGOSLAVIA.
5. His Exc. MEMBER LOUIS RAKOTOMALALA OR  
Member REMI ANDRIAMAHARO - MADGASCAR.

This is to inform you that should any of the five persons named above arrive in Aden State by any of your Agency Aircraft or Ships, they will not be permitted to land.

It is therefore suggested that you should advise owners of airlines and shipping under your Agency not to accept any booking from these persons for journey to Aden or any journey that would necessitate their stay in Aden in transit.

Please acknowledge receipt of this circular.

(Signature illegible)  
CONTROLLER OF IMMIGRATION.

