

The United Nations  
**DISARMAMENT**  
**YEARBOOK**



Volume 40 (Part II): 2015

Office for Disarmament Affairs  
New York, 2016

The United Nations  
**DISARMAMENT  
YEARBOOK**



Volume 40 (Part II): 2015

## Guide to the user

The *United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, in print and electronic format, is designed to be a concise reference tool for diplomats, researchers, students and the general public on disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control issues under consideration by the international community.

Part I of the 2015 Yearbook was published in April this year. It contains all the resolutions and decisions of the seventieth session of the General Assembly.

Part II is divided among the main multilateral issues under consideration throughout the year. It presents developments and trends on the issues; a convenient issue-oriented timeline; and short summaries of First Committee and General Assembly actions taken on resolutions and decisions.

As much of the background information is condensed, it is helpful to consult previous editions for expanded historical knowledge. Factual information, presented where possible in tabular form, is provided in the appendices. Websites of United Nations departments and specialized agencies, intergovernmental organizations, research institutes and non-governmental organizations appear as footnotes.

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. These documents are available in the official languages of the United Nations at <https://documents.un.org/>. Specific disarmament-related documents can also be accessed through the disarmament reference collection at <https://www.un.org/disarmament/publications/library/>.

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## Contents

	<i>Page</i>
Foreword . . . . .	xi
Acknowledgements . . . . .	xv
Multilateral disarmament timeline Highlights, 2015 . . . . .	xvi
<b>Chapter I. Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation</b>	
Developments and trends, 2015 . . . . .	3
2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons . . . . .	5
<i>Main Committee I</i> . . . . .	7
<i>Main Committee II</i> . . . . .	9
<i>Main Committee III</i> . . . . .	12
Issues related to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty . . . . .	14
<i>Entry into force and universality</i> . . . . .	14
<i>Ninth Article XIV Conference</i> . . . . .	14
<i>Group of Eminent Persons</i> . . . . .	15
<i>Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization</i> . . . . .	16
<i>Highlights of outreach activities</i> . . . . .	17
<i>Integrated capacity-building, education and training</i> . . . . .	17
Bilateral agreements and other issues . . . . .	18
<i>Nuclear verification in the Islamic Republic of Iran</i> . . . . .	18
<i>Nuclear programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea</i> . . . . .	22
<i>Implementation of disarmament commitments by the nuclear-weapon States</i> . . . . .	24
<i>Implementation of the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms</i> . . . . .	26
<i>Alleged violations of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles</i> . . . . .	27
<i>Review of the strategic security policy of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization</i> . . . . .	28
Nuclear Security Summit process . . . . .	29
International Atomic Energy Agency verification . . . . .	30

<i>Safeguards conclusions</i> . . . . .	30
<i>Safeguards agreements, additional protocols and small quantities protocols</i> . . . . .	31
<i>Verification activities</i> . . . . .	32
<i>Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East</i> . . . . .	36
<i>Assurances of supply of nuclear fuel</i> . . . . .	37
Nuclear safety and security (IAEA) . . . . .	38
<i>Nuclear Security Plan 2014-2017</i> . . . . .	38
<i>Supporting the nuclear security framework globally</i> . . . . .	38
<i>Nuclear security guidance for member States</i> . . . . .	39
<i>Incident and Trafficking Database</i> . . . . .	40
<i>Nuclear security human resource development</i> . . . . .	40
<i>Nuclear security peer reviews</i> . . . . .	41
<i>Cybersecurity</i> . . . . .	42
<i>Risk reduction</i> . . . . .	42
Export controls . . . . .	42
<i>Nuclear Suppliers Group</i> . . . . .	42
<i>Missile Technology Control Regime</i> . . . . .	44
Missiles . . . . .	45
<i>Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation</i> . . . . .	45
1540 Committee and implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) . . . . .	47
<i>Status of implementation</i> . . . . .	47
<i>Monitoring and national implementation</i> . . . . .	48
<i>Assistance</i> . . . . .	49
<i>Cooperation with international, regional and subregional organizations</i> . . . . .	49
<i>Outreach, including to civil society and the private sector</i> . . . . .	51
Political declarations and other initiatives . . . . .	52
<i>International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons</i> . . . . .	52
<i>International Day against Nuclear Tests</i> . . . . .	54
<b>Chapter II. Biological and chemical weapons</b>	
Development and trends, 2015 . . . . .	57
Biological weapons. . . . .	58

<i>Fortieth anniversary of the Biological Weapons Convention</i> . . . . .	58
<i>Intersessional programme of the Biological Weapons Convention</i> . . . . .	59
<i>Meeting of Experts of the Biological Weapons Convention</i> . . . . .	61
<i>Meeting of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention</i> . . . . .	62
<i>Work of the Implementation Support Unit</i> . . . . .	64
Chemical weapons . . . . .	67
<i>Twentieth Session of the Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention</i> . . . . .	67
<i>Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons</i> . . . . .	68
<i>Mission to eliminate the declared chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic</i> . . . . .	70
<i>OPCW–United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism</i> . . . . .	71
Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons . . . . .	72
<i>Training for qualified experts</i> . . . . .	73
Export controls . . . . .	74
<i>Australia Group</i> . . . . .	74
<b>Chapter III. Conventional weapons</b>	
Development and trends, 2015 . . . . .	79
Arms Trade Treaty . . . . .	81
<i>First Conference of States Parties</i> . . . . .	81
Small arms and light weapons . . . . .	83
<i>Security Council</i> . . . . .	84
<i>Programme of Action on the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons</i> . . . . .	84
<i>Second Open-ended Meeting of Governmental Experts</i> . . . . .	85
<i>Coordinating Action on Small Arms</i> . . . . .	86
<i>Group of Interested States in Practical Disarmament Measures</i> . . . . .	87
<i>International Small Arms Control Standards</i> . . . . .	87
Ammunition . . . . .	88
<i>International Ammunition Technical Guidelines</i> . . . . .	89
Improvised explosive devices . . . . .	89
Transparency in conventional arms transfers and military expenditures . . . . .	90

<i>United Nations Register of Conventional Arms</i> . . . . .	90
<i>Objective information on military matters, including transparency of military expenditures</i> . . . . .	92
United Nations Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation in Arms Regulation . . . . .	94
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons . . . . .	95
<i>Informal Meeting of Experts on lethal autonomous weapon systems</i> . . . . .	95
<i>Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons</i> . . . . .	97
<i>Amended Protocol II: Group of Experts and Seventeenth Annual Conference</i> . . . . .	99
<i>Protocol V: Meeting of Experts and Ninth Conference of the High Contracting Parties</i> . . . . .	101
<i>Work of the Implementation Support Unit of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons</i> . . . . .	103
Cluster munitions . . . . .	104
<i>First Review Conference of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions</i> . . . . .	105
Anti-personnel mines . . . . .	107
Export controls . . . . .	109
<i>Wassenaar Arrangement</i> . . . . .	109
Annex I. Composite table of Member States that reported in 2015 to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms . . . . .	111
Annex II. United Nations Register of Conventional Arms: Participation of Member States in reporting on transfers of small arms and light weapons, 2004-2015 . . . . .	113
Annex III. Composite table of reports from Member States to the United Nations Report on Military Expenditures in 2015 . . . . .	117
<b>Chapter IV. Regional disarmament</b>	
Developments and trends, 2015 . . . . .	121
Nuclear-weapon-free zones . . . . .	123
<i>Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)</i> . . . . .	125
<i>African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty)</i> . . . . .	126
<i>Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia</i> . . . . .	127

<i>Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty)</i> . . . . .	128
<i>Establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction</i> . . . . .	130
United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs regional centres . . . . .	131
<i>United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa</i> . . . . .	131
<i>United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean</i> . . . . .	134
<i>United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific</i> . . . . .	135
Disarmament and arms regulation at the regional level . . . . .	136
<i>Africa</i> . . . . .	136
African Union . . . . .	136
Economic Community of Central African States . . . . .	138
Economic Community of West African States . . . . .	139
Regional Centre on Small Arms in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States . . . . .	140
Southern African Development Community . . . . .	141
<i>Americas</i> . . . . .	142
Central American Integration System . . . . .	142
Southern Common Market . . . . .	143
Union of South American Nations . . . . .	144
<i>Asia and the Pacific</i> . . . . .	144
Association of Southeast Asian Nations . . . . .	144
Pacific Islands Forum . . . . .	145
<i>Middle East</i> . . . . .	146
League of Arab States . . . . .	146
<i>Europe</i> . . . . .	147
European Union . . . . .	147
North Atlantic Treaty Organization . . . . .	149
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe . . . . .	150
Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Centre–Centre for Security Cooperation . . . . .	152

South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons . . . . .	153
<i>United Nations Development Programme</i> . . . . .	155
<b>Chapter V. Emerging, cross-cutting and other issues</b>	
Developments and trends, 2015 . . . . .	159
Emerging issues . . . . .	161
<i>Unmanned aerial vehicles</i> . . . . .	161
<i>Lethal autonomous weapons</i> . . . . .	162
<i>Explosive weapons in populated areas</i> . . . . .	163
<i>Outer space security</i> . . . . .	165
<i>Developments in the field of information and telecommunications     in the context of international security</i> . . . . .	168
Gender and disarmament . . . . .	169
<i>Global Study on Security Council resolution 1325 (2000)</i> . . . . .	170
<i>Gender and nuclear weapons</i> . . . . .	170
<i>Gender and conventional weapons</i> . . . . .	171
<i>UNODA regional centres</i> . . . . .	171
<i>Gender and peacekeeping</i> . . . . .	172
Cross-cutting issues . . . . .	173
<i>Terrorism and disarmament</i> . . . . .	173
<i>Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and     implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control</i> . . . .	176
<i>Relationship between disarmament and development</i> . . . . .	177
<i>Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament     and non-proliferation</i> . . . . .	177
<i>Role of science and technology in the context of international     security and disarmament</i> . . . . .	178
<b>Chapter VI . Disarmament machinery</b>	
Developments and trends, 2015 . . . . .	181
First Committee of the General Assembly . . . . .	183
<i>Nuclear weapons</i> . . . . .	184
<i>Other weapons of mass destruction</i> . . . . .	186
<i>Outer space</i> . . . . .	187

<i>Conventional weapons</i> . . . . .	187
<i>Emerging and other issues, including information security</i> . . . . .	188
<i>Financial stability of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research</i> . . . . .	189
Conference on Disarmament . . . . .	190
<i>Informal Working Group on a programme of work</i> . . . . .	192
<i>Informal Civil Society Forum</i> . . . . .	193
<i>Nuclear disarmament</i> . . . . .	194
<i>Fissile material</i> . . . . .	197
<i>Prevention of an arms race in outer space</i> . . . . .	199
<i>Negative security assurances</i> . . . . .	201
United Nations Disarmament Commission . . . . .	204
<i>Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation</i> . . . . .	205
<i>Conventional weapons</i> . . . . .	207
Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters . . . . .	208
Annex I. Members of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters . . . . .	211
 <b>Chapter VII. Information and outreach</b>	
Developments and trends, 2015 . . . . .	215
Disarmament and non-proliferation education . . . . .	217
<i>Disarmament education website—a resource for learning</i> . . . . .	218
<i>Training activities</i> . . . . .	219
Disarmament Information Programme . . . . .	219
<i>Print and e-publications</i> . . . . .	219
<i>Websites</i> . . . . .	221
<i>Exhibitions</i> . . . . .	221
<i>Events</i> . . . . .	222
<i>Briefings</i> . . . . .	223
<i>Media</i> . . . . .	223
United Nations Messenger of Peace on disarmament . . . . .	224
Disarmament fellowships, training and advisory services . . . . .	224
Vienna Office of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs . . . . .	226
United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research . . . . .	228

Annex I. United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs publications and other materials in 2015. . . . .	230
Annex II. United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research publications in 2015 . . . . .	233
Annex III. Events held on the margins of the First Committee 2015 session . . . . .	234
<b>Appendix I. Status of multilateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements . . . . .</b>	<b>239</b>
<b>Appendix II. Disarmament resolutions and decisions listed by chapter . . . . .</b>	<b>251</b>
<b>Appendix III. Acronyms. . . . .</b>	<b>307</b>

## Foreword

Welcome to Part II of the 2015 *United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*. This year I am pleased to remind readers that we celebrate the Yearbook's fortieth volume.

For four decades, the Yearbook has provided indispensable information on developments and trends in the field of disarmament. The beneficiaries have been not only States, but also civil society, students, teachers and all those who share the United Nations' goal of creating a safer and more peaceful world.

The Yearbook's 40 volumes reflect disarmament's role as a founding principle of the United Nations. As Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon likes to say, "Disarmament is part of the DNA of the United Nations."

As he has been throughout his tenure, in 2015, the Secretary-General was once again active in the cause of disarmament on behalf of the United Nations and the world's people. From small arms to chemical and nuclear weapons, Secretary-General Ban continues to bring global attention to these pressing issues.

In many ways, 2015 saw a continuation of the mixed trends and developments that characterized the previous year—some steps forward, some steps back.

The adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in September 2015 was a historic accomplishment. It was also a signal achievement for the cause of disarmament because the 2030 Agenda linked, for the first time, sustainable development with disarmament. By specifically highlighting the devastating impact that the illicit and unregulated arms trade has on lives and livelihoods, the 2030 Agenda has given significant impetus to tackling this grave threat to human security.

Efforts to alleviate human and especially civilian suffering were at the forefront of disarmament efforts in 2015.

Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) kill and injure more people annually than any other weapon except firearms. Between 2011 and 2015, more than 6,300 recorded IED explosions resulted in over 105,000 casualties.<sup>1</sup> In 2015, the international community directly addressed this threat, adopting by consensus the first General Assembly resolution on IEDs (70/46), which will—I hope—help to counter these inhumane weapons, together with Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW).

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<sup>1</sup> Action on Armed Violence, "AOAV's global Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IED) map", 4 April 2016. Available from <https://aoav.org.uk/2016/counter-improvised-explosive-devices-c-ied-mapping/> (accessed 4 August 2016).

States parties to the Arms Trade Treaty, established to bring transparency and accountability to the global arms trade, held their first meeting in 2015. The importance of this treaty in ending the human misery caused by the illicit arms trade is evident in the fact that, by the end of 2015, around two thirds of United Nations Member States had signed it.

Similarly, the first Review Conference of the Convention on Cluster Munitions adopted a strong declaration, demonstrating States parties' resolve to end the suffering these weapons create. The international community also continued to draw attention to the harm caused by the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, the casualties from which are 90 per cent civilian.

Humanitarian concerns played a prominent role in debates over nuclear disarmament. Building on the three international conferences focused on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, the General Assembly adopted several resolutions reflecting these concerns. These included a resolution establishing an open-ended working group in 2016 to “substantively address concrete effective legal measures, legal provisions and norms that will need to be concluded to attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons” (70/33).

Unfortunately, debate over nuclear disarmament in 2015 also highlighted widening divisions, in particular between nuclear-weapon States and their allies on the one hand, and non-nuclear-weapon States on the other, over the pace and scale of the implementation of disarmament commitments. This was prominently displayed not only at the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), but also in the ongoing stagnation of the Conference on Disarmament and the Disarmament Commission and in the failure to bring into force the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

The inability of the NPT Review Conference to reach a consensus outcome was a lowlight of the year. The absence of any real progress on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction—one of the main reasons for the inability to reach consensus—was particularly disappointing. States parties now need to step up efforts to address this issue so that the next review of the NPT, as the cornerstone of the disarmament and non-proliferation regime, will have a successful outcome.

At a regional level, progress was mixed. The successful completion of negotiations between the E3/EU+3 and the Islamic Republic of Iran on a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on the Iranian nuclear programme was a genuine high point. Although its implementation will remain challenging for the next several years, this outcome represented a significant success for non-proliferation, peace and security in the Middle East and beyond. Unfortunately, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea continued to defy the international community by pursuing its nuclear and missile programmes.

The year 2015 was one of commemoration. We celebrated the seventieth anniversary of the United Nations, while the Biological Weapons Convention—the first to outlaw an entire category of weapons of mass destruction—turned 40. However, we also commemorated the passage of seven decades since the first and last use of nuclear weapons in war and the centenary of the first use of chemical weapons in war.

Sadly, 100 years later, chemical weapons have re-emerged as a tool of war. Despite the removal and destruction of almost all the declared chemical weapons stockpile of the Syrian Arab Republic, the Syrian conflict continues to be the scene of ongoing allegations of the use of chemical weapons and toxic chemicals as weapons. In a united effort to identify the perpetrators of these crimes and bring them to justice, the Security Council unanimously passed resolution 2235 (2015), establishing the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons–United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism.

The rapid evolution of technology over the past decade has produced manifold benefits. However, it has also created opportunities for those with malign intent. In 2015, these emerging challenges continued to influence the disarmament agenda.

Space has been a security preoccupation for the international community since Sputnik. However, as our lives increasingly rely on space-based assets, security concerns have become more urgent. As chapter V illustrates, in the past year States undertook initiatives to ensure responsible use of and behaviour in outer space. These included efforts to enshrine transparency and confidence-building measures, and a possible code of conduct.

Two other potentially disruptive trends dominated headlines in 2015: cybersecurity and the increasing use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). A fourth Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security made incremental progress towards global norms for responsible behaviour of States in cyberspace. In response to many States' expressed concerns about the use of armed UAVs, the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs produced a report that examined, inter alia, concepts for improving transparency, oversight and accountability with regard to this technology.

The international community, through the CCW, also debated a still developing technology that could be equally disruptive. The CCW Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems debated issues including compliance with international law and the need for some form of human control at all times.

The year 2015 commemorated the seventieth anniversary of the first and last use of nuclear weapons in war. Yet 70 years later they continue to pose an existential threat to humanity. As Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said in September 2015, on the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear

Weapons, “The consequences of any further use of nuclear weapons, whether intentional or by mistake, would be horrific. When it comes to our common objective of nuclear disarmament, we must not delay—we must act now.”

Four decades ago, this Yearbook was established to generate new ideas and approaches to disarmament. Forty years later, the necessity of that purpose has not diminished.

Let us heed the Secretary-General’s call. Let us act now.

**Kim Won-soo**  
Under-Secretary-General  
High Representative for Disarmament Affairs  
August 2016

## Acknowledgements

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I would also like to thank the many organizations and entities that made substantive contributions and provided inputs to this publication.

**Katherine Prizeman**  
Editor-in-Chief  
August 2016

# Multilateral disarmament timeline

## Highlights, 2015

At the commemorative event marking the fortieth anniversary of the Biological Weapons Convention, Palais des Nations, Geneva (UN Photo/Jean-Marc Ferré)



Biological Weapons Convention entry into force, 40th Anniversary (26 Mar.)

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons entry into force, 45th Anniversary (5 Mar.)

Kim Won-soo, Acting United Nations High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, addresses the 2015 session of the Conference on Disarmament. (UN Photo/Jean-Marc Ferré)



Conference on Disarmament, 2nd session (25 May-10 June)



Agreement reached between the E3/EU+3 and the Islamic Republic of Iran on the Iranian nuclear programme (14 July)

Agreement reached between the E3/EU+3 and the Islamic Republic of Iran on the Iranian nuclear programme (14 July)

Convention on Cluster Munitions entry into force, 5th Anniversary (1 Aug.)

Conference on Disarmament, 3rd session (3 Aug.-18 Sept.)

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 35th Anniversary (1 Oct.)

Seized ammunition in Bria, Central African Republic (Flickr/UNMINUSCA)



Kinshasa Convention opening for signature, 5th Anniversary (19 Nov.)

Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe signing, 25th Anniversary (19 Nov.)

Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone signing, 20th Anniversary (15 Dec.)

Seventieth session of the First Committee of the General Assembly (7 Oct.-6 Nov.)



A demining team in the Democratic Republic of the Congo recovering abandoned ammunition from the battlefield and moving them to a safe location for destruction. (UN Photo/Sylvain Liechti)



The United Nations Headquarters marks the 70th anniversary of the General Assembly. (UN Photo/Cia Pak)

January February March April May June July August September October November December

Conference on Disarmament, 1st session (19 Jan.-27 Mar.)

United Nations Disarmament Commission session (6-24 Apr.)

1925 Geneva Protocol signing, 90th Anniversary (17 June)

South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty signing, 30th Anniversary (6 Aug.)

1st Conference of States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty (24-27 Aug.)

1st Review Conference of the Convention on Cluster Munitions (7-11 Sept.)

2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (27 Apr.-22 May)



United Nations Messenger of Peace Michael Douglas addresses an academic symposium and high-level panel on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, held at the opening of the Review Conference. (UN Photo/Eskinder Debebe)





**Chapter I**  
**Nuclear disarmament**  
**and non-proliferation**



Safeguards inspection at Urenco uranium enrichment plant at Almelo, Netherlands, on 13 October 2015. Through inspections, the International Atomic Energy Agency confirms that countries are using nuclear materials or technology for peaceful purposes only.  
© Dean Calma/IAEA (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0)

## CHAPTER I

### Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation

*The elimination of nuclear weapons would also free up vast amounts of resources that could be used to implement the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The consequences of any further use of nuclear weapons, whether intentional or by mistake, would be horrific. When it comes to our common objective of nuclear disarmament, we must not delay—we must act now.*

BAN KI-MOON, UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL<sup>1</sup>

#### Developments and trends, 2015

IN 2015, DIVISIONS DEEPENED BETWEEN STATES on the overall approach for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament at the global and regional levels amid stagnation in the traditional multilateral disarmament bodies and the advancement of new initiatives to take forward nuclear disarmament negotiations. These divisions were a key factor in the inability to reach agreement on a substantive outcome at the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Nonetheless, momentum generated over the past several years by the humanitarian movement for nuclear disarmament resulted in a decision by the General Assembly to take the next steps for the elaboration of effective legal measures for nuclear disarmament.

The outcome of the 2015 NPT Review Conference also signified a breakdown of the common vision established in 2010 for the implementation of practical steps leading to a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. Despite this setback, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, agreed upon in July by the E3/EU+3<sup>2</sup> and the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the resolution<sup>3</sup> of 15 December by the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors represented a considerable success for non-proliferation, peace and security in the Middle East and beyond.

Growing awareness of the humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons, built up in particular through the international conferences

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<sup>1</sup> Message on the occasion of the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, New York, 26 September 2015. Available from <http://www.un.org/en/events/nuclearweaponelimination/2015/sgmessage.shtml> (accessed 21 April 2016).

<sup>2</sup> China, France, Germany, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States.

<sup>3</sup> International Atomic Energy Agency, document GOV/2015/72. Available from <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov-2015-72-derestricted.pdf> (accessed 1 April 2016).

convened in 2013 and 2014 in Norway, Mexico and Austria, created heightened expectations for urgent action leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Increasing support for the humanitarian initiative resulted in the adoption of several new resolutions by the General Assembly aimed at taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations, as well as the conclusions and outcomes of the humanitarian conferences. Most notably, building upon the deliberations at the 2015 NPT Review Conference, the General Assembly decided to establish an open-ended working group in 2016 with a mandate, *inter alia*, to substantively address concrete effective legal measures, legal provisions and norms that will need to be concluded to attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons.

In various multilateral forums, non-nuclear-weapon States continued to express frustration with what they viewed as the slow pace of nuclear disarmament, amid continued development and modernization of nuclear-weapon systems in most nuclear-armed States. The nuclear-weapon States continued their regular engagement, including through conferences to review progress towards fulfilling the commitments made at the 2010 NPT Review Conference, and completed a glossary of key nuclear terms. The Russian Federation and the United States continued to implement their obligations under the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, including through incremental reductions in some categories of the aggregate stockpiles of strategic nuclear weapons. They remained unable to commence follow-on negotiations to address further reductions in their strategic nuclear arsenals or to address non-strategic nuclear weapons.

The international community was unable to realize any further progress towards the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, as none of the eight remaining annex 2 States completed steps for their signature or ratification. However, on 20 March, Angola ratified the Treaty, becoming the 164th State to do so.<sup>4</sup>

The Conference on Disarmament once again remained unable to break its deadlock and commence negotiations or discussions on the basis of an agreed programme of work. In an effort to enhance the participation of non-governmental organizations in the work of the Conference, on 19 March the then-Acting Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva, Michael Møller, convened an Informal Civil Society Forum on the Conference on Disarmament. The consensus report<sup>5</sup> of the Group of Governmental Experts

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<sup>4</sup> The treaty text and adherence status are available from <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/ctbt> (accessed 23 March 2016).

<sup>5</sup> *Study on a Treaty Banning the Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive Devices*, Disarmament Study Series, no. 35 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.16.IX.2). Available from <https://www.un.org/disarmament/publications/studyseries/no-35/> (accessed 1 April 2016).

established pursuant to General Assembly resolution 67/53 of 3 December 2012 gave new impetus to efforts to seek the commencement of negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, though divisions remained between States over the scope of such a treaty.

The United Nations Disarmament Commission, in its 2015 substantive session convened in New York from 6 to 24 April, agreed to consider two substantive items for the current three-year cycle, including one on nuclear matters entitled “Recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons”. Chaired by Kairat Abdrakhmanov (Kazakhstan), discussions in the working group devoted to agenda item 4 on nuclear matters were robust, although no consensus on substantive recommendations could yet be reached. This item will be addressed again during the subsequent substantive session, to be held in 2016.

Efforts to establish new nuclear-weapon-free zones and to increase cooperation between existing zones stagnated. The proceedings of the Third Conference of States Parties and Signatories of Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia were limited to a general exchange of views after the participants were unable to overcome a dispute regarding participation. The prospects became uncertain for pursuing the establishment of a zone in the Middle East free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction following the breakdown of the 2015 NPT Review Conference and the loss of a common vision for how to implement the practical steps agreed to in 2010.

There was no appreciable progress in 2015 towards the resumption of dialogue and negotiations leading to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea continued to advance its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes, contrary to the decisions of the Security Council, including through operational and construction activities at the Yongbyon nuclear complex and the testing of submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

## **2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

From 27 April to 22 May, the ninth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)<sup>6</sup> was convened at the United Nations Headquarters in New York. Representatives from 161 States parties, 1 observer State, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 10 intergovernmental organizations and 107 non-governmental

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<sup>6</sup> The treaty text and status of adherence are available from <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/npt> (accessed 31 March 2016).

organizations participated in the Review Conference.<sup>7</sup> The Conference was opened by the Chair of the third session of the Preparatory Committee, Enrique Román-Morey (Peru). At its first plenary meeting, the Conference elected by acclamation Taous Feroukhi (Algeria) as its President.

At the opening meeting, the Deputy Secretary-General, Jan Eliasson, delivered a message<sup>8</sup> on behalf of the Secretary-General. The IAEA Director General, Yukiya Amano, also addressed the Conference.<sup>9</sup>

Representatives from 121 States parties delivered statements during the general debate, which was held from 27 April to 1 May. Four observer specialized agencies and international and regional intergovernmental organizations also addressed the Conference. One meeting was devoted to statements by non-governmental organizations.<sup>10</sup>

The three Main Committees<sup>11</sup> were chaired by: Enrique Román-Morey (Peru), Main Committee I; Cristian Istrate (Romania), Main Committee II; and David Stuart (Australia), Main Committee III. The Conference established subsidiary bodies for each Main Committee as follows: Subsidiary Body 1, under Main Committee I and chaired by Benno Laggner (Switzerland), addressed “Nuclear disarmament and security assurances”; Subsidiary Body 2, under Main Committee II and chaired by Juan Ignacio Morro Villacián (Spain), addressed “Regional issues, including with respect to the Middle East and implementation of the 1995 Middle East resolution”; and Subsidiary Body 3, under Main Committee III and chaired by Kairat Abdrakhmanov (Kazakhstan), addressed “Peaceful uses of nuclear energy and other provisions of the Treaty; and improving the effectiveness of the strengthened review process”.

None of the Main Committees were able to reach consensus on the content of their draft substantive reports. Negotiations during the final week of the Conference failed to result in agreement on substantive issues

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<sup>7</sup> See “Final report of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons” (NPT/CONF.2015/1). For the list of participants, see NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/INF/7 and Add.1.

<sup>8</sup> Message to the opening plenary of the 2015 NPT Review Conference, New York, 27 April 2015. Available from <http://www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=8581> (accessed 1 April 2016).

<sup>9</sup> Statement to the opening plenary of the 2015 Review Conference, New York, 27 April 2015. Available from <https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/statement-2015-review-conference-parties-treaty-non-proliferation-nuclear-weapons-npt> (accessed 1 April 2016).

<sup>10</sup> Available from <http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/statements.shtml>. See also *Statements of Non-Governmental Organizations at the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*, Civil Society and Disarmament 2015 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.16.IX.3), available from <http://www.un.org/disarmament/publications/civilsociety/2015> (accessed 1 April 2016).

<sup>11</sup> The allocation of items to each of the Main committees is to be found in annex V of NPT/CONF.2015/1. Furthermore, it was decided that disarmament education and institutional issues would be dealt with by Main Committee I and Main Committee III, respectively.

amid persisting divergences on the issue of future practical steps to establish a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. Many States parties also expressed dissatisfaction with the level of ambition reflected in the forward-looking aspects of the text on nuclear disarmament and with the portrayal of the outcomes of the international conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. At its fifteenth and final plenary meeting, held on 22 May, the Conference adopted its procedural report.<sup>12</sup>

### **Main Committee I**

Main Committee I dealt with the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, disarmament and international peace and security; and security assurances. In addition, the Conference also decided that disarmament education would be dealt with by Main Committee I. The initial focus of Main Committee I was on the review portion of the text. Subsidiary Body 1 dealt with the elaboration of forward-looking elements, building upon the 2010 NPT Action Plan. During the final week of the Conference, the President convened closed consultations, facilitated by Benno Laggner, with a view to reaching agreement on forward-looking measures.

During the discussions in the Main Committee and the Subsidiary Body, States parties reaffirmed their commitment to the full and effective implementation of article VI, as well as the decisions and the resolution adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, the practical steps for nuclear disarmament contained in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, and the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions agreed upon at the 2010 Review Conference. The nuclear-weapon States reiterated their unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, to which all States parties were committed under article VI of the Treaty.

States parties reaffirmed the need for the nuclear-weapon States to comply with their nuclear disarmament obligations and to implement fully the agreed disarmament-related outcomes at past NPT Review Conferences in order to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear weapons. They took note of steps reported by the nuclear-weapon States, including their submission of information using a common reporting framework, the annual meetings of the nuclear-weapon States, the steps undertaken by the Russian Federation and the United States to implement their obligations pursuant to the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and the actions and declarations of the other nuclear-weapon States.

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<sup>12</sup> *2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document (NPT/CONF.2015/50 (Parts I and II))*.

Many States parties, however, continued to express concern over what they regarded as the slow pace of nuclear disarmament, noting that the total number of nuclear weapons still amounted to several thousands. They stressed that reductions in the deployment of nuclear-weapon systems could not substitute for the irreversible elimination of nuclear weapons. They also expressed concern over continued programmes for the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons, as well as for the modernization and qualitative improvement of existing nuclear weapons.

States parties reiterated their deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons. However, nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States expressed divergent views on the conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, held in Oslo in March 2013; Nayarit, Mexico, in February 2014; and Vienna in December 2014. Many States parties considered that those conferences had added to the knowledge of the catastrophic consequences and risks posed by nuclear weapons. They further emphasized that those concerns should underpin and lend urgency to efforts in the field of nuclear disarmament and that it was in the very interest of the survival of humanity that nuclear weapons were never used again under any circumstances. Nuclear-weapon States indicated that they were already aware of the humanitarian consequences of the testing and use of nuclear weapons. Some of the nuclear-weapon States affirmed that placing additional emphasis on the humanitarian consequences was not necessary.

Building upon the reports supplied by the nuclear-weapon States using a common reporting framework, States parties called upon the nuclear-weapon States to continue their engagement on a standard reporting form in accordance with the 2010 NPT Action Plan. They encouraged the nuclear-weapon States to take into account a number of additional items, without prejudice to nuclear security, in their reports to the forthcoming NPT review cycle, including the following: number, type (strategic or non-strategic) and status (deployed or non-deployed) of nuclear warheads; number and type of delivery vehicles; measures taken to reduce the role and significance of nuclear weapons in military and security concepts, doctrines and policies; measures taken to reduce the risk of unintended, unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons; measures taken to de-alert or reduce the operational readiness of nuclear-weapon systems; number and type of weapons and delivery systems dismantled and reduced as part of nuclear disarmament efforts; and amount of fissile material for military purposes.

States parties continued to reaffirm the need to implement agreed actions related to so-called “building blocks” that could contribute to the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons. In this connection, they urged the eight remaining States listed in annex 2 of the Comprehensive

Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty<sup>13</sup> to take the initiative to sign and ratify that Treaty without further delay and without waiting for any other State to do so. They also urged the Conference on Disarmament to immediately begin negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, taking into account all substantive work undertaken during the past NPT review cycle.

States parties expressed divergent views on the notion of a legal gap in the international framework for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons and on the next steps for the full implementation of article VI of the Treaty. States parties supportive of the humanitarian initiative called for the elaboration of effective legal measures, including legal provisions that contributed to and were required for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons. They considered that such legal provisions could include a stand-alone instrument, such as a nuclear-weapon-ban treaty or a comprehensive nuclear weapons convention, or a framework agreement comprising mutually supporting instruments that would establish the key prohibitions, obligations and arrangements for time-bound, irreversible and verifiable nuclear disarmament. Other States parties continued to believe that nuclear disarmament would be best achieved through an incremental, step-by-step approach based on the progressive and systematic elaboration of building blocks.

## **Main Committee II**

Main Committee II dealt with the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, safeguards and nuclear-weapon-free zones. It also handled both backward- and forward-looking elements on issues related to safeguards and nuclear-weapon-free zones. Subsidiary Body 2 focused on how to carry forward efforts related to the practical steps agreed to at the 2010 Review Conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. It also addressed other regional issues. On a regular basis, the President and Juan Ignacio Morro Villacián engaged in closed consultations on the issue of the Middle East until the end of the Conference.

In their discussions in Main Committee II, States parties reaffirmed that IAEA safeguards were fundamental to the non-proliferation regime and that nothing should be done to undermine the authority of the IAEA, the competent authority responsible for verifying compliance with safeguards agreements. They stressed the importance of ensuring that the Agency had sufficient political, technical and financial support to carry out its responsibilities under article III of the Treaty. Many States parties again underscored the importance of maintaining confidentiality of classified safeguards information.

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<sup>13</sup> The treaty text and adherence status are available from <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/ctbt> (accessed 31 March 2016).

States parties welcomed the fact that 172 States parties had comprehensive safeguards agreements in force, six more than in 2010,<sup>14</sup> and that 124 States parties had brought additional protocols into force.<sup>15</sup> Delegations also welcomed that 60 States parties had amended their small quantities protocols and that five other parties had rescinded theirs.<sup>16</sup>

States parties continued to express divergent views on strengthening the safeguards legal regime. They believed that while concluding an additional protocol was the sovereign decision of any State, it became a legal obligation when in force or applied provisionally. Many States considered the comprehensive safeguards agreement, together with the Additional Protocol, to constitute the current verification standard under the Treaty. Many other States stressed that there was a distinction between legal safeguards obligations and voluntary measures aimed at strengthening them. States welcomed the additional clarifications and information provided by the IAEA on the State-level approach to safeguards.

States parties underscored that implementing appropriate and effective levels of nuclear security was a national responsibility. They also stressed the importance of effective physical protection of all nuclear materials and facilities. They affirmed the central role of the IAEA in strengthening the nuclear security framework globally and encouraged the Agency to continue to assist States in strengthening their national regulatory controls of nuclear material.

States parties called upon all States to improve their capabilities to prevent, detect and respond to illicit trafficking, particularly in light of the threat of terrorism and the risk that non-state actors might acquire nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. Many States parties welcomed the role of the Nuclear Security Summits in this regard. They encouraged the IAEA, in coordination with Member States, to continue to play a constructive and coordinating role in initiatives related to nuclear security. States were encouraged to further minimize, on a voluntary basis, highly enriched uranium in civilian stocks and use, where technically and economically feasible.

States parties were urged to ensure that their nuclear-related exports did not assist in any way in the development of nuclear weapons. They expressed a variety of views regarding the development and application of export

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<sup>14</sup> See IAEA, “NPT Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements”, 30 April 2015. Available from <https://www.iaea.org/publications/factsheets/npt-comprehensive-safeguards-agreements> (accessed 11 February 2016).

<sup>15</sup> See IAEA, “Status of the Additional Protocol”, 26 February 2016. Available from <https://www.iaea.org/safeguards/safeguards-legal-framework/additional-protocol/status-of-additional-protocol> (accessed 1 April 2016).

<sup>16</sup> See IAEA, “Status of Small Quantities Protocols”, 26 February 2016. Available from <https://www.iaea.org/safeguards/safeguards-legal-framework/safeguards-agreements/status-small-quantities-protocols> (accessed 1 April 2016).

controls, as well as the conditions for new supply arrangements. Many States encouraged States parties to make use of multilaterally negotiated and agreed guidelines in developing their own national export controls. They reaffirmed that any new supply arrangements for nuclear materials or equipment should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of IAEA full-scope safeguards and a legally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons.

States parties welcomed the progress made by the nuclear-weapon States towards ratifying the relevant protocols to nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties, including the signatures and ratifications to the Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia<sup>17</sup> and the ongoing efforts pertaining to the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone.<sup>18</sup> Many States continued to call for nuclear-weapon States to review and withdraw any reservations related to the security assurances provided under the protocols to nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties.

With respect to the discussions in Subsidiary Body 2, States parties reaffirmed that the 1995 resolution on the Middle East remained an essential element of the outcome of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, on the basis of which the NPT had been indefinitely extended without a vote, and that the resolution remained valid until fully implemented. They expressed disappointment and deep regret that it was not possible to convene a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. Many States parties expressed appreciation for the efforts of the facilitator, Jaakko Laajava (Finland), as well as for the support by the host Government, Finland, and considered that new efforts were needed in order to hold the conference at an early date.

Ultimately, differences over how to convene such a conference and to carry forward the practical steps for the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, endorsed by the 2010 NPT Review Conference, proved insurmountable. Many States favoured a proposal that envisaged a more central role for the Secretary-General, where he was specifically called upon to convene a conference within a specified period of time to launch a process leading to the establishment of the zone. A number of States placed emphasis on the States of the region directly engaging with each other in order to reach agreement on the arrangements for such a conference, including its agenda. While consultations held during the Review Conference were able to achieve broad acceptance on a number of important elements in the proposal, substantial differences remained by the end of Conference and a number of delegations stated that they could not accept the version of the proposal reflected in the President's Working Paper (NPT/CONF.2015/WP.58).

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<sup>17</sup> The treaty text and its adherence status are available from <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/canwzf> (accessed 31 March 2016).

<sup>18</sup> The treaty text and adherence status are available from <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/bangkok> (accessed 31 March 2016).

With regard to other regional issues, States parties deplored the nuclear tests conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and urged it to refrain from any further nuclear test and to renounce its policy of building its nuclear forces. They recalled that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea could not have the status of a nuclear-weapon State under the Treaty. They urged it to abandon all its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes and to return to the NPT at an early date. They called upon the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to comply fully with its Security Council obligations. States parties reaffirmed their support for the Six-Party Talks and called upon the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to respond positively to diplomatic efforts aimed at creating favourable conditions for their resumption.

### **Main Committee III**

Main Committee III dealt with the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to the inalienable right of all parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II and other provisions of the Treaty. In addition, it was decided that institutional issues would be dealt with by the Main Committee. Its work focused on backward- and forward-looking elements pertaining to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Subsidiary Body 3 focused on the elaboration of measures to further strengthen the review process of the Treaty and to address the issue of withdrawal from the Treaty.

In their discussions in Main Committee III, States parties reaffirmed that nothing in the Treaty should be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I to IV of the Treaty. They affirmed that each State party's choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including its fuel cycle policies, should be respected without jeopardizing its policies or international cooperation agreements and arrangements for peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

States parties recalled that they had all undertaken to facilitate and had the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. They urged that preferential treatment be given to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, taking into account in particular the needs of developing countries, in all activities designed to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Many States parties called for the elimination of undue constraints that might impede transfers of nuclear technology and international cooperation in conformity with the Treaty. They underlined the

role of the IAEA in assisting developing States parties in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

States parties underscored the importance of the technical cooperation activities of the IAEA, including the central role of the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme. They acknowledged the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative as a flexible mechanism to mobilize additional resources for IAEA programmes and to complement the Technical Cooperation Fund. Many States also recognized that regional cooperative arrangements could be an effective means of providing assistance and facilitating technology transfer, complementing the technical cooperation activities of the IAEA.

States parties took note of various efforts pertaining to multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, including the establishment of a reserve of low-enriched uranium in the Russian Federation and of an IAEA low-enriched uranium bank, as well as the offer of Kazakhstan to host it. Many States parties considered that multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, including any mechanism for the assurance of nuclear fuel supply, should address the technical, legal and economic complexities surrounding those issues in a manner consistent with the rights of States parties under the Treaty.

States parties reaffirmed that, when developing nuclear energy, including nuclear power, its use must be accompanied at all stages by commitments to and ongoing implementation of safeguards, as well as appropriate and effective levels of safety and security, consistent with States parties' national legislation and respective international obligations. They recognized that the primary responsibility for nuclear safety rested with individual States and reaffirmed the central role of the IAEA in promoting international cooperation on matters related to nuclear safety, including through the establishment of nuclear safety standards. Many States emphasized that any measures and initiatives aimed at strengthening nuclear safety and security should be in conformity with the Treaty.

States parties welcomed the efforts of the IAEA in the aftermath of the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, including the outcomes of the IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety, the adoption of the Ministerial Declaration on Nuclear Safety,<sup>19</sup> the Fukushima Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety and the work towards publishing the Fukushima Report.<sup>20</sup> States parties emphasized the importance of States continuing to actively implement the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety.

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<sup>19</sup> IAEA, document INFCIRC/821. Available from <https://www.iaea.org/publications/documents/infcircs/declaration-iaea-ministerial-conference-nuclear-safety-vienna-20-june-2011> (accessed 1 April 2016).

<sup>20</sup> IAEA, document GC(59)/14. Available from <http://www-pub.iaea.org/books/IAEABooks/10962/The-Fukushima-Daiichi-Accident> (accessed 1 April 2016).

They also took note of the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety,<sup>21</sup> adopted by consensus at the Diplomatic Conference of the Convention on Nuclear Safety. All States that had not yet done so were encouraged to join the various legally binding and non-legally binding IAEA instruments on nuclear safety.

With respect to the discussions in Subsidiary Body 3, States parties emphasized the importance of making effective use of the time available during the meetings of the Preparatory Committee and the need to ensure coordination and continuity between review cycles, which could be accomplished through consultations between the past and incumbent Presidents and Chairs of the Main Committees. They welcomed the measures put into place by the Secretariat to reduce the financial and environmental costs of documentation through the use of the PaperSmart platform. They also recognized the value of using digital recordings of meetings.

States parties reaffirmed that each party to the Treaty, in exercising its national sovereignty, had the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decided that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty had jeopardized its supreme interests. In this regard, they reaffirmed the provisions contained in article X of the Treaty and discussed various means by which they could, individually or collectively, uphold the universality and integrity of the Treaty.

## **Issues related to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty**

### **Entry into force and universality**

The entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)<sup>22</sup> remained elusive in 2015 as 8 of the 44 States listed in annex 2 had yet to deposit their instrument of ratification of the Treaty. Nonetheless, ratification of Angola in March brought the CTBT closer to universality by raising the total number of ratifications to 164 out of 183 States signatories.

### **Ninth Article XIV Conference**

The ninth biennial Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT, also known as the Article XIV Conference, took place at United Nations Headquarters in New York on 29 September on the margins of the opening of the seventieth session of the General Assembly. The United Nations Secretary-General, in his capacity as depositary of the Treaty, convened the Conference, which was co-chaired by the foreign ministers of

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<sup>21</sup> IAEA, document INFCIRC/872. Available from <https://www.iaea.org/publications/documents/infcircs/vienna-declaration-nuclear-safety> (accessed 1 April 2016).

<sup>22</sup> The treaty text and adherence status are available from <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/ctbt> (accessed 31 March 2016).

Japan, Fumio Kishida, and Kazakhstan, Erlan Idrissov. Representatives from over 90 States attended the event, including 33 deputy prime ministers and other ministers from ratifying States. Also present were members of the Group of Eminent Persons, including the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini. In addition to more than 50 States parties and ratifying States, Daryl Kimball of the Arms Control Association also delivered a statement on behalf of a group of non-governmental organizations.<sup>23</sup>

At the opening of the Conference, the Secretary-General stated that the CTBT was essential to realizing a world free of nuclear weapons and that it would help ensure that the international community was no longer forced to live in the shadow of nuclear weapons.<sup>24</sup> In his remarks, Lassina Zerbo, the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), expressed his fervent wish that more be done to realize the universalization of the Treaty and called upon all States to show real leadership in advancing the entry into force of the Treaty.<sup>25</sup> As per usual practice, the Conference adopted the Final Declaration and Measures to Promote the Entry into Force of the CTBT, which affirmed that “a universal and effectively verifiable Treaty constitutes a fundamental instrument in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation”.<sup>26</sup>

In its annual resolution on the CTBT (resolution 70/73 of 7 December 2015), the General Assembly welcomed the Final Declaration of the Article XIV Conference and stressed the “vital importance and urgency of signature and ratification, without delay and without conditions, in order to achieve the earliest entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty”. The resolution was adopted with near-unanimous support (181 votes in favour), with just one vote against by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and three abstentions by India, Mauritius and the Syrian Arab Republic.

### **Group of Eminent Persons**

The Group of Eminent Persons (GEM) held two meetings in 2015. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea hosted the first one in Seoul on 25 and 26 June. In this context, Executive Secretary Zerbo noted that the Republic of Korea was acutely aware of the dangers posed by the destabilizing and destructive practice of nuclear explosive testing, and further

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<sup>23</sup> Statements from the ninth biennial Article XIV Conference are available from <https://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/article-xiv-conferences/afc2015/tuesday-29-september-2015/> (accessed 5 February 2016).

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> Ninth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, document CTBT-ART.XIV/2015/6, annex. Available from [https://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/Art\\_14\\_2015/FINAL\\_DECLARATION.pdf](https://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Art_14_2015/FINAL_DECLARATION.pdf) (accessed 5 February 2016).

emphasized his continued commitment to establishing a dialogue with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The Group assessed developments pertaining to the situation on the Korean Peninsula and discussed ways and means of further promoting the Treaty's entry into force. Deliberations culminated in the adoption of the Seoul Declaration,<sup>27</sup> which highlighted the dangers of nuclear testing and called upon the remaining annex 2 States to ratify the CTBT without delay.

The Government of Japan and the city of Hiroshima hosted the second 2015 GEM meeting on 24 and 25 August. In his opening statement, the Executive Secretary urged global leaders to use the momentum created by the recently reached agreement between the E3/EU+3 and the Islamic Republic of Iran to inject a much needed dose of hope and positivity in the current discussions on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. The Group discussed practical measures to advance efforts towards entry into force of the Treaty and sent a strong political message in support of the CTBT by adopting the Hiroshima Declaration,<sup>28</sup> which reaffirmed the entry into force of the Treaty as "one of the most essential practical measures for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation". In the Declaration, the Group also called for a "multilateral approach to engage the leadership of the remaining eight Annex 2 States with the aim of facilitating their respective ratification processes".

### **Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization**

The forty-fourth and forty-fifth sessions of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission were held on 18 and 19 June and from 16 to 18 November, respectively, under the chairmanship of Abel Adelakun Ayoko (Nigeria). In his opening remarks, the Executive Secretary highlighted the progress towards the full establishment, sustainment and recapitalization of the International Monitoring System. Among the 321 monitoring stations and 16 radionuclide laboratories located across the globe, combined with 40 noble gas detection systems, the number of installed facilities at the end of 2015 stood at 301, corresponding to 89 per cent of the total planned facilities.

Other highlights included the discussion of the 2016-2017 programme and budget proposals, the adoption of a new biennial funding mechanism as a means to streamline the budgetary process and the introduction of the 2014-2017 midterm strategy. Furthermore, the implementation of the enterprise resource planning system was noted as a major development in the Commission's work towards greater efficiency and effectiveness.

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<sup>27</sup> Available from [https://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/public\\_information/2015/GEM\\_Seoul\\_Declaration.pdf](https://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/user_upload/public_information/2015/GEM_Seoul_Declaration.pdf) (accessed 26 January 2016).

<sup>28</sup> Available from [https://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/public\\_information/2015/Hiroshima\\_Declaration-FINAL\\_Aug\\_25.pdf](https://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/user_upload/public_information/2015/Hiroshima_Declaration-FINAL_Aug_25.pdf) (accessed 26 January 2016).

## **Highlights of outreach activities**

The “CTBT: Science and Technology 2015 Conference” took place from 22 to 26 June at the Hofburg Palace in Vienna. It was the fifth in a series of multidisciplinary conferences designed to further enhance the strong relationship between the scientific and technological community and the CTBTO.

Like previous conferences, it provided a forum for scientists to exchange knowledge and share advances in monitoring and verification technologies of relevance to the CTBT. Such interaction helps ensure that the Treaty’s global verification regime remains at the forefront of scientific and technical innovation. In particular, four main themes were addressed at the 2015 Conference: the Earth as a complex system; events and their characterization; advances in sensors, networks and processing; and performance optimization.

Throughout 2015, the Executive Secretary engaged proactively with States in order to promote the CTBT, advance its entry into force and universalization, and promote the use of data products and verification technologies. Official visits were conducted at Argentina, Belgium, Israel, Japan, the Niger, the Republic of Korea, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Turkmenistan, the United Kingdom and the United States. The Executive Secretary held high-level meetings with many world leaders, inter alia, Pope Francis, President Hassan Rouhani of the Islamic Republic of Iran and President Vladimir Putin of the Russian Federation.

The CTBTO also continued to take advantage of various global, regional and subregional conferences and other gatherings in order to enhance the understanding of the Treaty and advance its entry into force, as well as sustain support towards the build-up of the Treaty’s verification regime. In particular, the Executive Secretary attended the World Economic Forum on Africa, held from 3 to 5 June in Cape Town, South Africa, and the fourteenth United Nations–Republic of Korea Joint Conference on Disarmament and Non-proliferation Issues, held on 7 and 8 December in Seoul.

## **Integrated capacity-building, education and training**

Over the course of 2015, the CTBTO continued to organize integrated capacity-building, education and training activities that sought to enhance understanding of the Treaty and its verification regime, including the civil and scientific applications of the verification technologies, while promoting the entry into force and universalization of the CTBT.

The CTBTO offered States signatories training courses and workshops on technologies associated with the International Monitoring System, the International Data Centre and on-site inspections, as well as on the political and legal aspects of the Treaty. Capacity-building for National Data Centre (NDC) staff and station operators continued to focus on Latin America and

the Caribbean, Eastern Europe, South-East Asia, the Pacific and the Far East. In 2015, activities included 9 NDC training courses, 11 station operator training courses, 10 technology workshops and technical meetings, 2 NDC development workshops and 3 NDC sessions on the margins of Science and Technology 2015 Conference. Equipment was also provided to NDCs to increase their capacity to actively participate in the verification regime by accessing and analysing International Monitoring System data and International Data Centre products.

The fourth annual CTBT Academic Forum was held in June as part of the Science and Technology 2015 Conference, thanks to the financial support of the European Union, Norway and the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority. The Forum is an interactive event for academics interested in CTBT education. As in previous years, participants were able to share practices on how to promote CTBT education worldwide and to explore opportunities for further engagement in CTBT-related research projects.

The CTBTO also launched a CTBT Research Fellowship initiative with the financial support of the European Union. Following a competitive application process, a candidate was selected to conduct research with the goals of fostering interdisciplinary cooperation with academia and CTBT-related university courses and of improving capacity-building activities. The selected research fellow submitted a final report in November.

## **Bilateral agreements and other issues**

### **Nuclear verification in the Islamic Republic of Iran**

#### ***Political framework for a comprehensive political agreement***

In the first half of 2015, the E3/EU+3 and the Islamic Republic of Iran continued negotiations towards agreement on a political framework for a joint comprehensive plan of action, which was to be achieved by 30 June in accordance with the decision of the parties to extend the November 2013 Joint Plan of Action by an additional seven months. The decision, announced on 24 November 2014, provided for agreement on a political framework for a comprehensive agreement within four months (by 31 March), with the remaining time to be used to finalize any possible remaining technical and drafting issues.

The parties held numerous rounds of negotiations on the political framework, culminating in eight days of talks from 25 March to 2 April in Lausanne, including participation by the ministers for foreign affairs of the parties. During the course of the negotiations, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and United States Secretary of State John Kerry held extensive bilateral talks. At the conclusion of the talks, the High Representative of the European Union, Federica Mogherini, and the Iranian

Foreign Minister announced that agreement had been reached<sup>29</sup> on the political framework for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the major elements of which they read out in a joint statement.<sup>30</sup>

These negotiations faced significant scrutiny from legislators in the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States. On 22 May, the United States Congress enacted the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015,<sup>31</sup> which established a 60-day review period during which Congress could vote to disapprove of the deal and to block the President from waiving United States sanctions. The Iranian parliament (Majles) also adopted legislation on 23 June mandating that the deal be in compliance with policies of the Supreme National Security Council.

### *Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action*

The final negotiations leading to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)<sup>32</sup> were held in Vienna (see also page 34 for further information on this subject). During the final round of negotiations, the parties were compelled to extend the 30 June deadline on several occasions. The ministers for foreign affairs of the parties again joined the final stages of the talks, which featured extensive bilateral engagement between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States.

On 14 July in Vienna, the E3/EU+3 and the Islamic Republic of Iran announced that they had reached agreement on the JCPOA. In a joint statement,<sup>33</sup> the European Union High Representative and the Iranian Foreign Minister called on “the world community to support the implementation of this historic effort”. The agreement was the culmination of more than a decade of often halting negotiations aimed at achieving a peaceful and diplomatic solution that would restore international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The key nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA included the following: reduction of the number of installed and operating centrifuges in the Islamic Republic of Iran for 10 years; limitation on the enrichment level of low-enriched uranium for 15 years; conversion of the Fordow Fuel

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<sup>29</sup> United States Department of State, “Parameters for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Nuclear Program”, 2 April 2015. Available from <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/04/240170.htm> (accessed 6 April 2016).

<sup>30</sup> European Union, “Joint Statement by European Union High Representative and Iranian Foreign Minister”, 2 April 2015. Available from [http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/2015/150402\\_03\\_en.htm](http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/2015/150402_03_en.htm) (accessed 5 February 2016).

<sup>31</sup> Available from <https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/1191/text/pl> (accessed 1 April 2016).

<sup>32</sup> See United States Department of State, “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action”. Available from <http://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/jcpoa/> (accessed 1 April 2016).

<sup>33</sup> Joint statement, Vienna, 14 July 2015. Available from [http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/2015/150714\\_01\\_en.htm](http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/2015/150714_01_en.htm) (accessed 1 April 2016).

Enrichment Plant to non-enrichment-related research and activities; redesign and conversion of the heavy-water research reactor at Arak to be less capable of producing plutonium; provisional application of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol pending its entry into force; and acceptance of monitoring and verification at uranium mines and milling sites, as well as at uranium centrifuge production and storage facilities.

The JCPOA included an implementation plan, which detailed the sequencing and timing for the various milestone “Days”. After 14 July (“Finalization Day”), the day the JCPOA was concluded, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the IAEA developed arrangements to implement all transparency measures. After 18 October (“Adoption Day”), 90 days following the adoption of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), which endorsed the JCPOA, the Islamic Republic of Iran informed the IAEA of its provisional application of the Additional Protocol. As of the day that the IAEA confirms that the Islamic Republic of Iran has implemented its initial nuclear-related commitments (“Implementation Day”), the European Union and the United States are to terminate or cease the application of certain economic sanctions. In accordance with Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), the sanctions imposed in previous resolutions on the Islamic Republic of Iran would be terminated and new restrictive measures on certain sensitive items would be enacted.

World leaders, including from the Middle East, quickly reacted to the 14 July announcement and welcomed the agreement. The Secretary-General, in a statement<sup>34</sup> delivered from Addis Ababa, warmly welcomed the agreement as historic and as a testament to the value of dialogue. He expressed admiration for the determination and commitment of the negotiators, as well as for the courage of the leaders who approved the deal.

### ***Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)***

As envisaged under the JCPOA, on 15 July the Security Council adopted resolution 2231 (2015), in which the Council endorsed the agreement and made the necessary decisions to support its full implementation. Under the resolution, upon certification by the IAEA that the Islamic Republic of Iran has undertaken the nuclear-related commitments required for Implementation Day, the provisions of past Security Council resolutions on the Islamic Republic of Iran<sup>35</sup> would be terminated automatically. The resolution has a duration of 10 years. After its expiration, its provisions will be terminated and the item “non-proliferation” will be removed from the list of matters of

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<sup>34</sup> Statement on agreement between the P5+1 and the Islamic Republic of Iran, Addis Ababa, 14 July 2015. Available from <http://www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=8831> (accessed 1 April 2016).

<sup>35</sup> Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), 1929 (2010) and 2224 (2015).

which the Council is seized. However, if the “snap-back” procedure under the JCPOA is triggered in the event of an unresolved case of significant non-performance by any of the parties, the resolution will not be terminated and all prior sanctions will be reinstated.

The resolution established new restrictive measures on the export to the Islamic Republic of Iran of sensitive nuclear items for 10 years, of ballistic missile-related items for eight years and of major conventional weapons for five years. Each of these restrictions would terminate earlier than their specified durations should the IAEA make the determination for the first time, in accordance with the Additional Protocol, that there are no undeclared nuclear activities or materials in Islamic Republic of Iran. At the same time, the resolution provided exceptions for the supply of nuclear items through a procurement channel in accordance with the JCPOA and permitted States to supply restricted missile-related items and conventional arms to the Islamic Republic of Iran, provided that the Council approves the supply in advance on a case-by-case basis.

### ***Road-map for the clarification of past and present outstanding issues regarding Iran’s nuclear programme***

In parallel to the conclusion of the JCPOA, on 14 July, the President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Ali Akbar Salehi, and IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano signed in Vienna the “Road-map<sup>36</sup> for the clarification of past and present outstanding issues regarding Iran’s nuclear programme (see also page 33 for further information on this subject). The purpose of the Road-map was to accelerate cooperation under the November 2013 Framework for Cooperation in order to resolve all outstanding issues by the end of 2015, which included a number of unresolved matters related to a possible military dimension to past nuclear activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

As agreed under the Road-map, the Islamic Republic of Iran provided the IAEA with written responses on all previously identified outstanding issues by 15 August. The IAEA completed its review of this information by 15 September and the two sides subsequently worked to remove any ambiguities through technical and expert meetings. On 2 December, Director General Amano submitted to the Board of Governors the “Final Assessment on Past and Present Outstanding Issues regarding Iran’s Nuclear Programme”.<sup>37</sup>

The IAEA overall assessment was that, prior to 2003, the Islamic Republic of Iran conducted a range of activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device as a coordinated effort. The IAEA noted that

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<sup>36</sup> IAEA, document GOV/INF/2015/14. Available from <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov-inf-2015-14.pdf> (accessed 2 June 2016).

<sup>37</sup> IAEA, document GOV/2015/68. Available from <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov-2015-68.pdf> (accessed 4 April 2016).

some of these activities continued until 2009. It concluded that none of these activities advanced beyond feasibility and scientific studies, and the acquisition of technical competencies and capabilities. The IAEA found no credible indications of the diversion of nuclear material in connection with the possible military dimension to the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

On 15 December, the Board of Governors met in an extraordinary session to consider the final assessment by the Director General. At the meeting, the Board adopted without a vote resolution GOV/2015/72,<sup>38</sup> sponsored by China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States. In the resolution, the Board noted the final assessment and also noted that all activities pursuant to the Road-map had been completed in accordance with the agreed schedule. It further noted that the final assessment closed the Board's consideration of the matter.

In the resolution, the Board also supported the verification, monitoring and other arrangements agreed by the IAEA and the Islamic Republic of Iran to implement the JCPOA and Security Council resolution 2231 (2015). In this regard, it specified that, as of Implementation Day under the JCPOA, all previous Board of Governors resolutions on the Islamic Republic of Iran would be terminated. Following Implementation Day, the Director General was requested to continue reporting to the Board on a quarterly basis on the implementation of the JCPOA in light of resolution 2231 (2015). From that point forward, the Board will then no longer be seized of its existing agenda item on the Islamic Republic of Iran and will consider future reports by the Director General under a new agenda item.

### **Nuclear programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea**

Efforts to resume dialogue on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula failed to make demonstrable progress in 2015, either through the Six-Party Talks<sup>39</sup> or any other avenue, despite some developments in inter-Korean relations. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea continued to stress the importance of nuclear deterrence in its military doctrine, including at the Conference on Disarmament in March where its Foreign Minister, Ri Su Yong, noted the need to "bolster its nuclear deterrent capability". Early in the year, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea offered to cease any further nuclear tests in exchange for a suspension of joint military exercises conducted in the region by the Republic of Korea and the United States. The United States did not accept the proposal. The Democratic People's Republic of

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<sup>38</sup> Available from <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov-2015-72-derestricted.pdf> (accessed 31 March 2016).

<sup>39</sup> China, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Japan, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation and United States.

Korea and the United States continued to maintain different views on whether discussions on peace or denuclearization should be pursued first. While the Democratic People's Republic of Korea called for the commencement of negotiations on a peace treaty, the United States stressed the importance of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea demonstrating commitment to denuclearization before other issues could be discussed.

The IAEA remained unable to verify the status of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear programme due to a lack of access to that country. The Agency continued to monitor developments at Yongbyon, mainly through satellite imagery.<sup>40</sup> It observed signatures consistent with the operation of the 5 MW(e) reactor, as well as ongoing renovation and new construction activities at various locations within the Yongbyon site, broadly consistent with statements by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that it was further developing its nuclear capabilities, including an extension to the Yongbyon Nuclear Fuel Rod Fabrication Plant. The Agency also observed activities that appeared to be related to mining and milling at the Pyongsan uranium mine and the Pyongsan uranium concentration plant.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea continued work on its ballistic missile programme, with an apparent focus on developing its sea-based missile capability. In May, State media reported that it had conducted a successful test of a submarine-launched ballistic missile. Non-government analysts assessed that the test was likely conducted from an underwater barge, rather than a submarine, and that it was probably a test of the vertical-launch ejection system and not a flight test of the missile. There were reports of two subsequent submarine-launched ballistic missile tests, in November and December, although the Democratic People's Republic of Korea did not acknowledge either test before the end of the year. Analysts assessed that the November test failed and that the December test may have been another successful ejection test. State media announced the testing of an anti-ship cruise missile from a patrol vessel in February and of "new type anti-ship rockets" in June. Despite a number of statements by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the lead-up to the tenth anniversary of the Korean Workers' Party affirming its right to launch satellites, it did not conduct or attempt any such launch in 2015.<sup>41</sup>

Regional tensions again increased in connection with the annual conduct of military exercises in the region by the Republic of Korea and the United States and the subsequent launches of ballistic missiles by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea

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<sup>40</sup> See IAEA, document GOV/2015/49-GC(59)/22. Available from [https://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC59/GC59Documents/English/gc59-22\\_en.pdf](https://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC59/GC59Documents/English/gc59-22_en.pdf) (accessed 4 April 2016).

<sup>41</sup> The Democratic People's Republic of Korea announced that it had conducted a nuclear test on 6 January 2016. It also conducted a launch placing an Earth observation satellite in orbit on 7 February 2016.

launched fewer missiles in reaction to the exercises compared to previous years, with a total of eight short-range Scud missiles and seven surface-to-air missiles reportedly tested on four separate occasions.

### **Implementation of disarmament commitments by the nuclear-weapon States**

The nuclear-weapon States of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)—China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States—also known as the P5, met in London from 4 to 5 February to review progress towards fulfilling the commitments made at the 2010 NPT Review Conference and to discuss the next steps for their cooperation to that end. This so-called “P5 process” was initiated to consider the implementation of obligations contained in the 2010 NPT Action Plan, particularly action 5 to “further enhance transparency and mutual confidence”.<sup>42</sup> The 2015 meeting in London was the sixth of its kind following previous conferences in Beijing (2014), Geneva (2013), Washington, DC (2012), Paris (2011) and London (2009). France offered to host a seventh meeting in 2016.

As in their previous meetings, the nuclear-weapon States issued a joint declaration<sup>43</sup> on this occasion reaffirming their commitment to a world without nuclear weapons in accordance with the goals of the NPT. The declaration also noted the intention of the nuclear-weapon States to deliver a joint statement<sup>44</sup> to the 2015 NPT Review Conference.

In the declaration, the nuclear-weapon States asserted, *inter alia*, that they remained committed to fostering strengthened dialogue and transparency through the P5 process. In this context, the nuclear-weapon States welcomed the achievement of a common reporting framework and a glossary of nuclear terms<sup>45</sup> as contributions to the implementation of the 2010 NPT Action Plan.

While referring to steps taken with a view to the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, the P5 underscored that “a step-by-step approach” remained the only practical and realistic pathway to nuclear

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<sup>42</sup> See *2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, vol. I* (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)), part I.

<sup>43</sup> United States Department of State, “Joint Statement from the Nuclear-Weapon States at the London P5 Conference”, 5 February 2015. Available from <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/02/237273.htm> (accessed 4 April 2016).

<sup>44</sup> “Statement by the People’s Republic of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America to the 2015 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Review Conference”, New York, 30 April 2015. Available from [http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/statements/pdf/P5\\_en.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/statements/pdf/P5_en.pdf) (accessed 4 April 2016). The joint statement delivered on that occasion in May 2015 featured many elements similar to those in the declaration.

<sup>45</sup> P5 Working Group on the Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms, *P5 Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms* (Beijing, China Atomic Energy Press, 2015). Available from <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/243287.pdf> (accessed 4 April 2016).

disarmament. As affirmed at previous P5 meetings and in other relevant forums, the nuclear-weapon States stressed that such an approach would require consideration of global strategic stability and the principle of undiminished and increased security for all. Therefore, incremental steps such as a common reporting template and a glossary of terms were deemed important in a step-by-step approach. In this vein, the nuclear-weapon States highlighted their understanding of the 2010 NPT Action Plan as a “road map for long term action”.

Support for the work of the IAEA and the United Nations disarmament machinery was also expressed. Particular emphasis was placed on the role of the Conference on Disarmament. The nuclear-weapon States “shared disappointment over the long-standing lack of consensus on a Programme of Work in the CD”, while nonetheless welcoming the informal substantive discussions held on the agenda items and the efforts of the Informal Working Group established to consider a programme of work.

As per the declaration, the nuclear-weapon States also discussed the non-proliferation regime established pursuant to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, in particular recalling commitments made at the 2010 NPT Review Conference to promote the Treaty’s universality and entry into force. In this regard, the nuclear-weapon States called upon all States to uphold national moratoriums, noting that all five nuclear-weapon States continued to fulfil this commitment.<sup>46</sup>

The nuclear-weapon States also welcomed the signing of the Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia in 2014, along with its subsequent ratification by France and the United Kingdom, while noting other relevant efforts to achieve its entry into force.

With regard to the ongoing difficulties of convening a conference on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, the nuclear-weapon States affirmed their full support for the efforts of the co-conveners.<sup>47</sup> They urged all the States of the region to redouble their efforts to reach consensus on arrangements so that a conference could be held.

The conference in London also featured for the first time active engagement with non-nuclear-weapon States and civil society representatives. An outreach event, in conjunction with the London-based organization Chatham House, was convened with a view to providing a forum for engagement with civil society. Non-nuclear-weapon States were invited to a briefing and discussion session as part of the meeting’s schedule.

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<sup>46</sup> Also mirrored in the P5 joint statement to the 2015 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Review Conference.

<sup>47</sup> Russian Federation, United Kingdom, United States and United Nations Secretary-General.

### Implementation of the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms

The Russian Federation and the United States continued to work towards the implementation of the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START). From 7 to 20 October in Geneva, the Russian Federation and the United States met for the tenth session of the Bilateral Consultative Commission under the New START, where they continued to discuss practical issues related to implementation of the Treaty. In particular, agreement was reached on changing the timing of the annual discussion of the exchange of telemetric information on launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).<sup>48</sup>

According to data published by the parties pursuant to the biannual exchange of data required by the Treaty, as at 1 September, the parties possessed aggregate total numbers of strategic offensive arms as laid out in the table below.

#### New START aggregate numbers of strategic offensive arms

<i>Category of data</i>	<i>United States</i>	<i>Russian Federation</i>
Deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs and deployed heavy bombers	762	526
Warheads on deployed ICBMs, on deployed SLBMs and nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers	1,538	1,648
Deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs, deployed and non-deployed launchers of SLBMs, and deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers	898	877

*Source:* Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, Fact Sheet, January 1, 2016. Available from <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/251152.pdf> (accessed 18 March 2016).

Compared with 2014, the numbers reflect an overall reduction except in the category “Deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs and deployed heavy bombers”. Russian possession of “Warheads on deployed ICBMs, on deployed SLBMs and nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers” also saw an increase.

As in 2014, the United States continued to publish a detailed breakdown of the numbers and types of deployed and non-deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers, as well as the number and types of test launchers.

<sup>48</sup> See also Mission of the United States in Geneva, “Tenth Session of the Bilateral Consultative Commission Under the New START Treaty”, 20 October 2015. Available from <https://geneva.usmission.gov/2015/10/20/press-release-tenth-session-of-the-bilateral-consultative-commission-under-the-new-start-treaty/> (accessed 4 April 2016).

### **Alleged violations of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles**

The Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (1987), also referred to as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, continued to fall under scrutiny in 2015. The Treaty, which originated as an indefinite bilateral agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, requires its parties to eliminate ground-launched ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM) with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometres in addition to any launchers compatible with such systems. Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, all with Treaty-accountable sites on their territory, agreed to accept on-site inspections and participate in the Special Verification Commission established under the Treaty following the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

On 5 June, the United States Department of State issued the yearly “Report on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments”.<sup>49</sup> In the report, the Department took note of the general principle that discrepancies in compliance and adherence could “constitute violations or simply differences in implementation approaches”. Nonetheless, it concluded that there were instances where legitimate questions could be raised in reference to Russian compliance with the INF Treaty. It stated that the Russian Federation continued to be in violation of its obligations in view of its 2014 testing of intermediate-range GLCM technology.

In the report, the Department of State also took note of Russian concerns over the United States Aegis Ashore Missile Defense System launcher. The Russian Federation had previously asserted that the United States was in non-compliance with the INF Treaty due to the inherent capability of that system to launch GLCMs in direct violation of the Treaty.<sup>50</sup> The concerns were dismissed in the report as unfounded on the basis that such technologies have no offensive capability. Also mentioned was the Special Verification Commission on the subject of Russian concerns over United States armed unmanned aerial vehicles and ballistic target missiles.

Despite the ongoing tensions related to alleged violations, both the United States and the Russian Federation stated that they remained committed to the INF Treaty.

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<sup>49</sup> Available from <http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/2015/243224.htm> (accessed 4 April 2016).

<sup>50</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “Comment by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the American accusations that Russia violates the INF Treaty”, 30 July 2014. Available from [http://archive.mid.ru/brp\\_4.nsf/0/A46210AFCF9BBF3D44257D27005C8FC5](http://archive.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/A46210AFCF9BBF3D44257D27005C8FC5) (accessed 4 April 2016).

## Review of the strategic security policy of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

On the occasion of a meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Defence Ministers in Brussels, a joint statement<sup>51</sup> was released on 25 June. In the statement, the Ministers noted their review of the operationalization of key decisions taken at the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales.<sup>52</sup> In particular, they noted significant progress made on the implementation of the Readiness Action Plan (RAP). As part of the Plan and the NATO principle of “collective defence”, NATO has pursued “adaptation measures” with a view to ensuring that a “long-term military posture and capabilities to enable it to respond more quickly to emergencies wherever they arise”.<sup>53</sup>

In line with the RAP provision of defensive “assurance measures” for Central and Eastern European NATO member countries to increase immediate military presence and activity for assurance and deterrence, as well as in pursuit of ballistic missile defence capability for a land-based interceptor site in Europe, the Aegis Ashore Missile Defense Facility at the Deveselu Military Base in Romania was activated on 18 December.

Additionally, major NATO military exercises were conducted in 2015 under assurance measures of the RAP. These included the following: *Joint Warrior* (11-23 April: naval exercise in the North Atlantic, 13,000 troops); *Dynamic MongOOSE* (4-15 May: anti-submarine warfare exercise off Norway, 5,000 troops); *Baltops* (5-20 June: naval and amphibious exercise in the Baltic Sea, 4,500 troops); *Sabre Strike* (8-19 June: land exercise in the Baltic States and Poland, 3,000 troops); *Noble Jump* (10-21 June: first deployment test for the new high readiness force to Poland, 2,100 troops); *Trident Joust* (17-28 June: headquarters exercise in Bulgaria, Romania and Italy, 1,500 troops); and *Trident Juncture* (21 October-6 November: Italy, Portugal and Spain, 25,000 troops).

The June joint statement of NATO Defence Ministers also reaffirmed the importance of the Defence Investment Pledge adopted at the Wales Summit and, additionally, emphasized the progression of work pertaining to an enhanced NATO Response Force (NRF). The NRF, launched in 2002, is composed of a joint multinational force trained to react at short notice to a full range of security challenges from crisis management to collective defence.

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<sup>51</sup> Available from [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news\\_121133.htm?selectedLocale=en](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_121133.htm?selectedLocale=en) (accessed 4 April 2016).

<sup>52</sup> NATO, “Wales Summit Declaration”, 5 September 2014. Available from [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_112964.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm) (accessed 4 April 2016).

<sup>53</sup> See NATO, “NATO’s Readiness Action Plan Fact Sheet”, May 2015. Available from [http://www.nato.int/nato\\_static\\_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf\\_2015\\_05/20150508\\_1505-Factsheet-RAP-en.pdf](http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2015_05/20150508_1505-Factsheet-RAP-en.pdf) (accessed 4 April 2016).

## **Nuclear Security Summit process**

The Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) process continued in 2015 with the convening of three preparatory Sherpa meetings for the 2016 NSS Summit to be hosted in Washington, DC, from 31 March to 1 April 2016. The preparatory meetings were held in Hua Hin, Thailand, from 11 to 13 February; Vilnius, Lithuania, from 29 June to 2 July; and Almaty, Kazakhstan, from 8 to 10 December.

The 2015 Sherpa preparatory meetings served to prepare for what is considered the final NSS meeting within the framework of the initiative introduced by United States President Barack Obama in his remarks in Prague in 2009,<sup>54</sup> during which he called nuclear terrorism the most immediate and extreme threat to global security.

During the first preparatory Sherpa meeting for the 2016 NSS in October 2014, the United States noted that the preparatory work for this “transitional” summit should focus on two principal priorities: to continue to strengthen national implementation of nuclear security through tangible nuclear security commitments from countries; and to build enduring global nuclear security architecture. The latter, as reflected in the previous Summit Communiqués,<sup>55</sup> consists of binding legal commitments, multilateral institutions, voluntary collectives and national bodies responsible for executing nuclear security. Emphasis is also placed on strengthening the five key multilateral institutions<sup>56</sup> and voluntary collectives within that architecture.

Discussions at the 2015 Sherpa meetings focused on means to take forward the work of the three previous summits, with particular emphasis on strategies to strengthen the nuclear security architecture both at the national and international levels prior to the 2016 NSS and beyond.

While participation in the NSS process remains robust with over 50 States regularly engaged in the process, the Russian Federation has not participated in relevant meetings since the latter part of 2014. In 2015, the Russian Federation did not participate in the Sherpa meetings. The Russian

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<sup>54</sup> Remarks by President Barack Obama in Prague as delivered, 5 April 2009. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-prague-delivered> (accessed 5 February 2016).

<sup>55</sup> 2010 Washington Communiqué: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/communiqu-washington-nuclear-security-summit>; 2012 Seoul Communiqué: [https://unoda-web.s3-accelerate.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/assets/content/spotlight/docs/Seoul\\_Communique.pdf](https://unoda-web.s3-accelerate.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/assets/content/spotlight/docs/Seoul_Communique.pdf); 2014 The Hague Communiqué: <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/237002.pdf> (accessed 5 February 2016).

<sup>56</sup> United Nations, International Atomic Energy Agency, International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.

Federation noted its intention to focus instead on preparations for a nuclear security conference to be hosted by the IAEA in December 2016.<sup>57</sup>

## **International Atomic Energy Agency verification**

The following is a brief survey of the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 2015 in the area of nuclear verification, nuclear security, peaceful uses of nuclear energy and nuclear fuel assurances.

A major pillar of the IAEA programme involves activities that enable the Agency to provide assurances to the international community regarding the peaceful use of nuclear material and facilities. The IAEA verification programme thus remains at the core of multilateral efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons by verifying that States are complying with their safeguards obligations.<sup>58</sup>

## **Safeguards conclusions**

In 2015, safeguards were applied for 181 States<sup>59,60</sup> with safeguards agreements in force with the Agency. At the end of each year, the IAEA draws safeguards conclusions for each State with a safeguards agreement in force for which safeguards are applied, based upon the evaluation of all safeguards-related information available to it for that year. For a “broader conclusion” to be drawn that “all nuclear material remained in peaceful activities”, a State must have both a comprehensive safeguards agreement<sup>61</sup> (CSA) and an additional protocol<sup>62</sup> (AP) in force. Additionally, the IAEA must have been able to conduct all necessary verification and evaluation activities for the State and have found no indication of anything that, in its judgement, would give rise to a proliferation concern. For States that have a CSA but no AP in force, the IAEA draws a safeguards conclusion regarding only the non-diversion of declared nuclear material, as the IAEA does not have sufficient tools to

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<sup>57</sup> See IAEA, “International Conference on Nuclear Security: Commitments and Actions”. Available from <http://www-pub.iaea.org/iaeameetings/50809/International-Conference-on-Nuclear-Security-Commitments-and-Actions> (accessed 5 February 2016).

<sup>58</sup> For more information, see IAEA, “Safeguards: Delivering Effective Nuclear Verification for World Peace”, available from <https://www.iaea.org/safeguards> (accessed 18 May 2016). See also article III, paragraph 1, of the NPT.

<sup>59</sup> These States do not include the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, where the Agency did not implement safeguards and, therefore, could not draw any conclusion.

<sup>60</sup> And Taiwan Province of China.

<sup>61</sup> CSAs are based on “The Structure and Content of Agreements between the IAEA and States required in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons” (IAEA, document INFCIRC/153 (Corrected), available from <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc153.pdf> (accessed 18 May 2016)).

<sup>62</sup> APs are based on “Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards” (IAEA, document INFCIRC/540 (Corrected), available from <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1997/infcirc540c.pdf> (accessed 18 May 2016)).

provide credible assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. For those States for which the broader conclusion has been drawn, the IAEA was able to implement integrated safeguards—an optimized combination of measures available under CSAs and APs—to maximize effectiveness and efficiency in fulfilling its safeguards obligations.

In 2015, of the 121 States that had both a CSA and an AP in force, the Agency concluded that all nuclear material remained in peaceful activities in 67 States.<sup>63</sup> The Agency was unable to draw the same conclusion for 54 States, as the necessary evaluation regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for each of these States remained ongoing. For these 54 States, and for the 52 States with a CSA but with no AP in force, the Agency concluded only that declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities.

In 2015, integrated safeguards were implemented for 54 States.<sup>64,65</sup> For the three States for which the Agency implemented safeguards pursuant to item-specific safeguards agreements based on INFCIRC/66/Rev.2, the Agency concluded that nuclear material, facilities or other items to which safeguards had been applied remained in peaceful activities. Safeguards were also implemented with regard to nuclear material in selected facilities in the five nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) under their respective voluntary offer agreements. For these five States, the Agency concluded that nuclear material in selected facilities to which safeguards had been applied remained in peaceful activities or had been withdrawn from safeguards as provided for in the agreements.

As at 31 December, 12 States parties to the NPT had yet to bring CSAs into force, pursuant to article III of the Treaty. For these parties, the Agency could not draw any safeguards conclusions.

### **Safeguards agreements, additional protocols and small quantities protocols**

The IAEA continued to implement the Plan of Action to Promote the Conclusion of Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols,<sup>66</sup> which

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<sup>63</sup> And Taiwan Province of China.

<sup>64</sup> Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Latvia, Libya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mali, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Palau, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Seychelles, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Ukraine, Uruguay and Uzbekistan.

<sup>65</sup> And Taiwan Province of China.

<sup>66</sup> Available from [https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/final\\_action\\_plan\\_1\\_july\\_2014\\_to\\_30\\_june\\_2015.doc.pdf](https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/final_action_plan_1_july_2014_to_30_june_2015.doc.pdf) (accessed 18 May 2016).

was updated in September.<sup>67</sup> The Agency organized regional and subregional events for States in Africa (held in Vienna), in South-East Asia (in Singapore) and in the Caribbean (in Panama City), and a briefing for a number of permanent missions, during which the IAEA encouraged the participating States to conclude CSAs and APs and to amend the small quantities protocols (SQPs) to their CSAs. Also, a national workshop on safeguards was organized for Mongolia. In addition, the Agency held consultations with representatives from a number of member and non-member States in Geneva, New York and Vienna at various times throughout the year. Over the course of 2015, Djibouti signed a CSA with an SQP and an AP and brought them into force, and Micronesia signed a CSA with an SQP. In addition, Cambodia and Liechtenstein brought an AP into force.

The IAEA also continued to communicate with States in order to implement the Board's 2005 decisions regarding SQPs, with a view to amending or rescinding such protocols. During the year, Togo amended its operative SQP to reflect the revised standard text and Azerbaijan, Jordan and Tajikistan rescinded their SQPs. Fifty-four States have operative SQPs in force based on the revised standard text.

## **Verification activities**

### ***Islamic Republic of Iran***

In 2015, the Director General of the IAEA submitted four reports<sup>68</sup> to the Board of Governors entitled "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran".

In 2015, the Islamic Republic of Iran continued to conduct enrichment-related activities, although it did not produce UF<sub>6</sub> enriched above 5 per cent U-235. The Islamic Republic of Iran also continued work on heavy water-related projects, although it neither installed any major components at the IR-40 reactor nor produced nuclear fuel assemblies for the IR-40 reactor at the Fuel Manufacturing Plant.<sup>69</sup>

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<sup>67</sup> Safeguards agreements and additional protocols are legal instruments that provide the basis for IAEA verification activities. The entry into force of such instruments, therefore, continues to be crucial to effective and efficient IAEA safeguards.

<sup>68</sup> IAEA, documents GOV/2015/15, GOV/2015/34, GOV/2015/50 and GOV/2015/65. Available from <https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iran/iaea-and-iran-iaea-reports> (accessed 18 May 2016).

<sup>69</sup> In 2015, the Islamic Republic of Iran was required by relevant binding resolutions of the Board of Governors and the United Nations Security Council to implement the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to its Safeguards Agreement, suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and suspend all heavy water-related activities. Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), adopted in July, included terms providing for the termination of the provisions of six Security Council resolutions adopted between 2006 and 2010.

On 14 July in Vienna, the IAEA Director General and the Vice-President of the Islamic Republic of Iran and President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Ali Akbar Salehi, signed the Road-map for the clarification of past and present outstanding issues regarding Iran's nuclear programme (see also pages 21-22 for further information on this subject).<sup>70</sup> The Road-map identified the necessary activities to be undertaken under the Framework for Cooperation in order to accelerate and strengthen cooperation and dialogue between the Agency and the Islamic Republic of Iran aimed at the resolution by the end of 2015 of all past and present outstanding issues that had not already been resolved by the Agency and the Islamic Republic of Iran, as set out in the annex to the Director General's report<sup>71</sup> of November 2011.

The activities set out in the Road-map, including technical-expert meetings and the conduct of safeguards activities by the Agency at particular locations in the Islamic Republic of Iran, were completed on schedule. The implementation of the Road-map facilitated a more substantive engagement between the Agency and the Islamic Republic of Iran.

On 2 December, the Director General provided a report to the Board of Governors on the final assessment<sup>72</sup> on past and present outstanding issues regarding the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Agency assessed that a range of activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device had been conducted in the Islamic Republic of Iran prior to the end of 2003 as a coordinated effort, and some activities took place after 2003. The Agency also assessed that these activities had not advanced beyond feasibility and scientific studies, and the acquisition of certain relevant technical competences and capabilities. The Agency had no credible indications of activities in the Islamic Republic of Iran relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device after 2009 and found no credible indications of the diversion of nuclear material in connection with the possible military dimensions to the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

On 15 December, the Board of Governors adopted resolution GOV/2015/72, in which, inter alia, it noted that all activities in the Roadmap had been completed in accordance with the agreed schedule and that that resolution thus closed the Board's consideration of this item.

Throughout 2015, the Agency continued to undertake monitoring and verification in relation to the nuclear-related measures set out in the Joint Plan of Action agreed upon by China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation,

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<sup>70</sup> GOV/INF/2015/14, <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov-inf-2015-14.pdf> (accessed 2 June 2016).

<sup>71</sup> IAEA, document GOV/2011/65. Available from <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2011-65.pdf> (accessed 18 May 2016).

<sup>72</sup> IAEA, document GOV/2015/68. Available from <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov-2015-68.pdf> (accessed 18 May 2016).

the United Kingdom, the United States (E3/EU+3) and the Islamic Republic of Iran, the aim of which was to reach a “mutually-agreed, long-term comprehensive solution that would ensure Iran’s nuclear programme will be exclusively peaceful”. The Joint Plan of Action was extended three times, most recently on 30 June, when the E3/EU+3 and the Islamic Republic of Iran requested the Agency to continue to undertake the necessary nuclear-related monitoring and verification activities in the Islamic Republic of Iran under the Joint Plan of Action until further notice.

On 14 July, the E3/EU+3 and the Islamic Republic of Iran agreed on a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) (see also pages 19-20 for further information on this subject).<sup>73</sup> In August, the Board of Governors, *inter alia*, authorized the Director General to implement the necessary verification and monitoring of the nuclear-related commitments of the Islamic Republic of Iran as set out in the JCPOA, and report accordingly, for the full duration of those commitments in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), subject to the availability of funds and consistent with the Agency’s standard safeguards practices; and authorized the Agency to consult and exchange information with the Joint Commission, as set out in the Director General’s report<sup>74</sup> on verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of resolution 2231 (2015). After the JCPOA Adoption Day on 18 October, the Agency began conducting preparatory activities related to the verification and monitoring of the nuclear-related commitments of the Islamic Republic of Iran under the JCPOA.

In October, the Islamic Republic of Iran informed the Agency pursuant to paragraph 8 of annex V of the JCPOA that, effective from the JCPOA Implementation Day on 16 January 2016, the Islamic Republic of Iran would provisionally apply the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement pending its entry into force, and would fully implement modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement.

While the Agency continued throughout 2015 to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material at the nuclear facilities and locations outside facilities declared by the Islamic Republic of Iran under its Safeguards Agreement, the Agency was not in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in the Islamic Republic of Iran and, therefore, was unable to conclude that all nuclear material in the Islamic Republic of Iran was in peaceful activities.

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<sup>73</sup> See “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action”, <http://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/jcpoa/> (accessed 1 April 2016).

<sup>74</sup> IAEA, documents GOV/2015/53 and Corr.1. Available from <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov-2015-53.pdf> and <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov-2015-53c1.pdf> (accessed 18 May 2016).

### **Syrian Arab Republic**

In September, the Director General submitted a report<sup>75</sup> to the Board of Governors entitled “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic”, covering relevant developments since the previous report<sup>76</sup> in September 2014. The Director General informed the Board of Governors that no new information had come to the knowledge of the Agency that would have an impact on the Agency’s assessment—that it was very likely that a building destroyed at the Dair Alzour site was a nuclear reactor that should have been declared to the Agency by the Syrian Arab Republic.<sup>77</sup> In 2015, the Director General renewed his call on the Syrian Arab Republic to cooperate fully with the Agency in connection with unresolved issues related to the Dair Alzour site and other locations. The Syrian Arab Republic has yet to respond to these calls.

In 2015, the Syrian Arab Republic indicated its readiness to receive Agency inspectors, and to provide support for the purpose of performing a physical inventory verification at the miniature neutron source reactor in Damascus. On 29 September, after considering the United Nations Department of Safety and Security’s assessment of the prevailing security level and making additional arrangements to ensure the safe transit of the inspectors, the Agency successfully carried out the physical inventory verification at the reactor.

On the basis of the evaluation of information provided by the Syrian Arab Republic, the results of the safeguards verification activities and all relevant information available to it, the Agency found no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful activities. For 2015, the Agency concluded for the Syrian Arab Republic that declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities.

### **Democratic People’s Republic of Korea**

In August, the Director General submitted a report<sup>78</sup> to the Board of Governors and General Conference entitled “Application of Safeguards in

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<sup>75</sup> IAEA, document GOV/2015/51.

<sup>76</sup> IAEA, document GOV/2014/44. Accessed <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2014-44.pdf> (accessed 18 May 2016).

<sup>77</sup> The Board of Governors, in its resolution GOV/2011/41 of June 2011 (adopted by a vote) had, inter alia, called on the Syrian Arab Republic to urgently remedy its non-compliance with its NPT safeguards agreement and, in particular, to provide the Agency with updated reporting under its safeguards agreement and access to all information, sites, material and persons necessary for the Agency to verify such reporting and resolve all outstanding questions so that the Agency could provide the necessary assurance as to the exclusively peaceful nature of the nuclear programme of the Syrian Arab Republic.

<sup>78</sup> IAEA, document GOV/2015/49-GC(59)/22. Available from [https://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC59/GC59Documents/English/gc59-22\\_en.pdf](https://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC59/GC59Documents/English/gc59-22_en.pdf) (accessed 18 May 2016).

the Democratic People's Republic of Korea", which provided an update of developments since the Director General's report of September 2014.

Since 1994, the Agency has not been able to conduct all necessary safeguards activities provided for in the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. From the end of 2002 until July 2007, the Agency was not able to implement and, since April 2009, has not been able to implement any verification measures in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and, therefore, could not draw any safeguards conclusion regarding the country.

Since April 2009, the Agency has not implemented any measures under the ad hoc monitoring and verification arrangement agreed upon between the Agency and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and foreseen in the Initial Actions agreed upon at the Six-Party Talks. No verification activities were implemented in the field in 2015, but the Agency continued to monitor the nuclear activities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea by using open source information, including satellite imagery and trade information. Using satellite imagery, the Agency continued to observe signatures during 2015, which were consistent with the operation of the 5 MW(e) reactor at Yongbyon. Renovation or expansion of other buildings was also seen within the Yongbyon site. However, without access to the site, the Agency could not confirm the operational status of the reactor or the purpose of the other observed activities. The Agency also continued to further consolidate its knowledge of the nuclear programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with the objective of maintaining operational readiness to resume safeguards implementation in the country.

### **Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East**

As requested in operative paragraph 13 of resolution GC(58)/RES/16 on the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East adopted at the fifty-eighth regular session of the General Conference of the IAEA in 2014, the Director General submitted to the IAEA Board of Governors and to the General Conference at its fifty-ninth regular session a report<sup>79</sup> on the implementation of this resolution. The report on the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East describes, inter alia, the steps undertaken by the Director General in his efforts to further the implementation of his mandate conferred by the IAEA General Conference in resolution GC(58)/RES/16 and by decision GC(44)/DEC/12 (2000).

In light of the discussions of the report at the September 2013 meeting of the Board of Governors, the Director General provided to member States of the IAEA the "background documentation for the 2012 Conference on the

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<sup>79</sup> IAEA, document GOV/2015/45-GC(59)/15. Available from [https://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC59/GC59Documents/English/gc59-15\\_en.pdf](https://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC59/GC59Documents/English/gc59-15_en.pdf) (accessed 18 May 2016).

establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction” that described the work the IAEA undertook and the experience gained with regard to modalities for a zone free of nuclear weapons in the Middle East region.<sup>80</sup>

### **Assurances of supply of nuclear fuel**

The Agency’s work in 2015 resulted in significant progress towards the establishment of the IAEA Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) Bank. In December 2010, the IAEA Board of Governors authorized the establishment of an IAEA LEU Bank.<sup>81</sup> Following an IAEA solicitation for a host State, Kazakhstan offered to host the IAEA LEU Bank, which will be located at the Ulba Metallurgical Plant in Ust Kamenogorsk, Kazakhstan. The IAEA LEU Bank will be a physical stock of LEU, under formal legal possession and control of the IAEA with enrichment levels of up to 4.95 per cent, and will serve as a supply mechanism of last resort in the event that an eligible member State’s supply of LEU is disrupted and cannot be restored by commercial means. Funds in excess of \$150 million have been pledged for the IAEA LEU Bank by the Nuclear Threat Initiative, the United States, the European Union, Kuwait, Norway, the United Arab Emirates and Kazakhstan. At current market prices, the procurement portion of the funds should permit acquisition of LEU sufficient for up to three reloads for a 1,000 MW(e) reactor.

The completion of the legal framework with Kazakhstan marked the transition of the IAEA LEU Bank project from assessment and feasibility studies to full-scale implementation. On 27 August, following approval by the Board of Governors of the text of the Host State Agreement (HSA), the HSA and two subsidiary technical agreements were signed in Astana. One subsidiary technical agreement is the Facility Operator Agreement between IAEA and Ulba Metallurgical Plant Joint-Stock Company, which will be the facility operator of the IAEA LEU Bank. The other subsidiary technical agreement is with the Ministry of Energy of Kazakhstan on the specific arrangements to be implemented for the establishment of the IAEA LEU Bank. This agreement established the Joint Coordination Committee co-chaired by the IAEA and Kazakhstan and a requirement to agree on a Plan of Specific Activities (PSA) within 90 days from the signature of the agreement; the Joint Coordination Committee met twice and approved the PSA within the 90-day period. Under the HSA, Kazakhstan shall have in place an adequate governmental, legal and

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<sup>80</sup> IAEA, document GOV/2013/33/Add.1-GC(57)/10/Add.1. Available from [http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC57/GC57Documents/English/gc57-10-add1\\_en.pdf](http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC57/GC57Documents/English/gc57-10-add1_en.pdf) (accessed 18 May 2016). The 2010 Review Conference of the NPT endorsed that the IAEA and other relevant international organizations be requested to prepare background documentation for the 2012 Conference, taking into account work previously undertaken and experience gained (NPT/ CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I), p. 30, para. 7 (d)).

<sup>81</sup> Other assurances of nuclear fuel supply mechanisms are described in previous editions of the *United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*.

regulatory framework, for the period during which the HSA is in force, for nuclear safety and security of the IAEA LEU Bank. The PSA provides a road map for demonstrating compliance with the applicable provisions of the IAEA Safety Standards and Security guidance documents as required by the HSA. Significant technical work continues in the areas of safety, specifically seismic safety, and security.

A feasibility study was completed on storage facility options and a new building is under consideration. In addition, a transit agreement with the Russian Federation to guarantee the transit of IAEA LEU and other Agency property to and from the Bank, as necessary, was finalized and signed in June.

## **Nuclear safety and security (IAEA)**

### **Nuclear Security Plan 2014-2017**

The IAEA continued to assist States, upon request, in making their national nuclear security regimes more robust, sustainable and effective. In implementing the Nuclear Security Plan 2014-2017,<sup>82</sup> it provided support to States in the following main areas: needs assessment, information security and cybersecurity; external coordination; the global nuclear security framework; coordinated research projects; self-assessments and peer reviews; human resources development; and risk reduction and security improvement.

The objective of the Plan is to contribute to global efforts to achieve effective security wherever nuclear and other radioactive materials are in use, storage and/or transport. The Plan provides for support to States, upon request, in their efforts to meet their national responsibilities and international obligations to reduce risks and to respond appropriately to threats.

### **Supporting the nuclear security framework globally**

The primary legally binding international instruments relevant to nuclear security are the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and the 2005 Amendment thereto, both being adopted under the auspices of the IAEA.

In 2015, Kyrgyzstan and San Marino ratified the CPPNM, and seven States—Botswana, Iceland, Italy, Morocco, San Marino, Turkey and the United States—ratified its 2005 Amendment. In December, the Agency organized the first Technical Meeting of Points of Contact and Central

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<sup>82</sup> IAEA, document GOV/2013/42-GC(57)/19. Available from <http://www-ns.iaea.org/downloads/security/nuclear-security-plan2014-2017.pdf> (accessed 18 May 2016). The Agency's first comprehensive plan of action to protect against nuclear terrorism was approved in March 2002 by the Board of Governors (GOV/2002/10), which at that time also approved the creation of a voluntary funding mechanism, the Nuclear Security Fund (NSF), in order to help implement the Plan. Further Nuclear Security Plans were approved by the Board of Governors in 2005 (GOV/2005/50) and 2009 (GOV/2009/54-GC(53)/18).

Authorities of States Parties to the CPPNM, held in Vienna and attended by more than 100 participants from 70 States. An aim of the meeting was to discuss ways of improving the ability of States parties to the CPPNM to meet their obligations under article 5, which requires States parties to make known to each other their points of contact and their central authorities responsible for physical protection, as well as for international cooperation, information exchange and assistance. Participants also discussed the roles and responsibilities of points of contact arising from the anticipated entry into force of the Amendment.<sup>83</sup>

### **Nuclear security guidance for member States**

The Agency develops comprehensive guidance on nuclear security, with the active involvement of experts from member States, which is issued in the IAEA Nuclear Security Series. In 2015, the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee began its second term. IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano established the Committee in 2012 to increase member States' input into the Series. During the year, the Agency published four implementing guides: "Security of Nuclear Information" (IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 23-G);<sup>84</sup> "Risk Informed Approach for Nuclear Security Measures for Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control" (IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 24-G),<sup>85</sup> jointly sponsored by the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL); "Use of Nuclear Material Accounting and Control for Nuclear Security Purposes at Facilities" (IAEA Nuclear Security

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<sup>83</sup> There is also the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, adopted under the auspices of the United Nations. Other legally binding international instruments include United Nations Security Council resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1540 (2004). The internationally accepted non-legally binding instruments that constitute the international legal framework for nuclear security, include, the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and the IAEA supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources. In addition, IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 13, entitled "Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities" (INFCIRC/225/Revision 5), containing recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities, provides comprehensive guidance for States on the requirements to be met on how to develop or enhance, implement and maintain a physical protection regime for nuclear material and facilities. Together with the nuclear security guidance—developed and published in the IAEA Nuclear Security Series—the global nuclear security framework encompasses legally binding and non-legally binding international instruments. These instruments and their effective implementation through, inter alia, training, information exchange, legislative assistance and capacity-building, is expected to bring about an effective nuclear security regime within a State.

<sup>84</sup> Available from <http://www-pub.iaea.org/books/IAEABooks/10774/Security-of-Nuclear-Information> (accessed 18 May 2016).

<sup>85</sup> Available from <http://www-pub.iaea.org/books/IAEABooks/10677/Risk-Informed-Approach-for-Nuclear-Security-Measures-for-Nuclear-and-Other-Radioactive-Material-out-of-Regulatory-Control> (accessed 18 May 2016).

Series No. 25-G),<sup>86</sup> and “Security of Nuclear Material in Transport” (IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 26-G).<sup>87</sup> In addition, the Agency published “Nuclear Forensics in Support of Investigations” (IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 2-G (Rev. 1)),<sup>88</sup> a revision of an earlier Agency publication on the topic. At the end of 2015, there were 25 publications in the IAEA Nuclear Security Series.

### **Incident and Trafficking Database**

The IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) system is a unique asset that assists the IAEA secretariat, participating States and selected international organizations in improving nuclear security. The ITDB is an essential component of the information platform that supports the implementation of the aforementioned IAEA Nuclear Security Plan 2014-2017.

As at 31 December, 131 States were participants in the ITDB programme (Annex). Cambodia, Guatemala, and Honduras joined the ITDB as participating States in 2015. Additionally, as at the end of 2015, the ITDB contained 2,889 confirmed incidents reported by participating States. Of these, 454 incidents involved unauthorized possession and related criminal activities, 762 incidents involved reported theft or loss and 1,622 incidents involved other unauthorized activities and events. In 71 cases, the reported information was not sufficient to determine the category of incident.

The triennial ITDB points of contact meeting was held in Vienna in July. A total of 98 participants representing 88 States and two international organizations attended the meeting. The meeting provided an opportunity for information-sharing among the ITDB member States, increasing awareness and understanding of the illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials, enhancing the understanding of the role played by the ITDB and planning for the future development of the programme. Participants in the meeting were also able to agree on a definition of “trafficking” for ITDB purposes.

### **Nuclear security human resource development**

Member States continued to benefit from education and training opportunities developed by the Agency to further strengthen national nuclear security regimes, including infrastructure. The Agency conducted a total of 108 security-related training courses and workshops (23 international

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<sup>86</sup> Available from <http://www-pub.iaea.org/books/IAEABooks/10763/Use-of-Nuclear-Material-Accounting-and-Control-for-Nuclear-Security-Purposes-at-Facilities> (accessed 18 May 2016).

<sup>87</sup> Available from <http://www-pub.iaea.org/books/IAEABooks/10792/Security-of-Nuclear-Material-in-Transport> (accessed 18 May 2016).

<sup>88</sup> Available from <http://www-pub.iaea.org/books/IAEABooks/10797/Nuclear-Forensics-in-Support-of-Investigations> (accessed 18 May 2016).

or regional, 85 national) in 2015, providing training to more than 2,300 participants.

The fifth Joint IAEA–International Centre for Theoretical Physics (ICTP) International School on Nuclear Security took place at ICTP in Trieste, Italy, in April and May. The two-week programme provided a comprehensive introduction to the field of nuclear security. The course was attended by 46 young nuclear professionals from regulatory bodies, universities, research institutions, government, ministries and operators using radioactive sources and law enforcement agencies in 43 member States.

The Agency also continued to coordinate efforts in education and training with its respective networks. The fourth annual meeting of the International Network for Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres was held at the Agency’s headquarters in February. The meeting was attended by 65 participants from 47 member States, the European Union, the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the World Institute for Nuclear Security.

In August, the Agency hosted the annual meeting of the International Nuclear Security Education Network. The meeting was attended by 97 participants from 37 member States.

### **Nuclear security peer reviews**

The IAEA continued to implement peer reviews and advisory services to help States evaluate their nuclear security regimes and needs, as well as to provide a basis for formulating plans. Such missions are conducted with a focus on national physical protection and identification of the legal, regulatory and practical measures for controlling nuclear and other radioactive material.

In 2015, the Agency began developing new guidelines for International Nuclear Security Advisory Service (INSServ) missions. The new INSServ guidelines will ensure that INSServ missions are compatible with, and complementary to, International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) missions, which assess a State’s nuclear security regime in relation to regulated activities for nuclear and other radioactive material, associated facilities and associated activities. The INSServ missions will be a peer review and advisory service for a State’s national nuclear security regime as it relates to nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control.

The Agency developed and organized a workshop to increase the pool of experts available for IPPAS missions. The workshop provided an overview of the IPPAS process, the objectives and scope of IPPAS missions, the roles and responsibilities of IPPAS team members, the IPPAS Guidelines and the IPPAS mission report. In 2015, the Agency developed an IPPAS database of all good practices from IPPAS mission reports. More than 70 per cent of the host countries have agreed to share this database with all States through the

Nuclear Security Information Portal. The IPPAS database does not disclose the country or the facility where the good practice information comes from. The Agency conducted four IPPAS missions in 2015.

### **Cybersecurity**

In June at IAEA Headquarters in Vienna, the Agency hosted the International Conference on Computer Security in a Nuclear World: Expert Discussion and Exchange. The conference was well-attended, drawing over 700 participants from 92 member States and 17 organizations, as member States often request support in developing comprehensive and resilient computer and information security systems.

### **Risk reduction**

The IAEA continued to advise States on formal threat characterization and assessment, the development, use and maintenance of Design Basis Threats, vulnerability analysis, and the development of methodologies for performance assessment of physical protection systems. Other activities such as securing of vulnerable radioactive sources, upgrading facilities and repatriating HEU also continued.

### **Export controls**

#### **Nuclear Suppliers Group**

The twenty-fifth plenary meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)<sup>89</sup> was held in Bariloche, Argentina, from 3 to 5 June, chaired by Rafael Mariano Grossi (Argentina).

At the 2015 plenary, the President of Argentina, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Héctor Timerman, delivered opening remarks. The Foreign Minister reaffirmed the unwavering support of Argentina to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and, in particular, the essential contribution that the NSG provided to this end. He reiterated the priorities of the Argentinean NSG chairmanship for 2014-2015, namely strengthening the work of the NSG while ensuring that legitimate trade and international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy were not hindered.

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<sup>89</sup> Currently, the participating Governments of the NSG are the following: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States. The European Commission and the Chair of the Zangger Committee participate as permanent observers.

As reflected in the public statement on the work of the 2015 plenary,<sup>90</sup> the Group expressed its concern on continued global proliferation challenges and reaffirmed its determination to continue to cooperate closely in order to deter, hinder and prevent the transfer of controlled items or technology that could contribute to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

The Group noted the specific proliferation challenges related to the actions of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. In this regard, the Group strongly condemned the nuclear tests conducted in 2006, 2009 and 2013 and reiterated its long-standing support for full implementation of all relevant Security Council resolutions and the joint statement of the Six-Party Talks of 19 September 2005.<sup>91</sup>

In reference to proliferation matters of relevance to the Islamic Republic of Iran, the NSG expressed the hope that the adoption of the understanding<sup>92</sup> on the key parameters for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action would ensure the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme.

Technical issues were also addressed at the plenary, in particular the updating of the NSG control lists. As a consequence, updated NSG control lists<sup>93</sup> were released in June, according to the exchange of views and agreement reached at the June plenary meeting. The Group emphasized the importance of updating NSG Guidelines to keep pace with technical developments in nuclear-related industries.

Options for increasing outreach to non-NSG members and raising public awareness of NSG-related matters were also addressed. The plenary noted the possibility of dedicated briefings to interested non-NSG partners and discussed means of increasing the visibility of NSG work at relevant international meetings.

It was decided that the Republic of Korea would assume the chairmanship of the NSG for 2016-2017, followed by Switzerland for 2017-2018.

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<sup>90</sup> Plenary Meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, public statement, Bariloche, Argentina, 3-5 June 2015. Available from [http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/images/2015\\_Public\\_Statement\\_Final.pdf](http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/images/2015_Public_Statement_Final.pdf) (accessed 5 February 2016).

<sup>91</sup> Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks, Beijing, 19 September 2005. Available from <http://www.ncnk.org/resources/briefing-papers/all-briefing-papers/six-party-talk-documents-archive> (accessed 5 February 2016).

<sup>92</sup> "Parameters for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action", <http://www.state.gov/r/prs/ps/2015/04/240170.htm> (accessed 6 April 2016). See also "Joint Statement", [http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/2015/150402\\_03\\_en.htm](http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/2015/150402_03_en.htm) (accessed 5 February 2016).

<sup>93</sup> These are the Trigger List and the Dual-Use List. See NSG, "Update of NSG Control Lists", June 2015. Available from <http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/en/recent-news> (accessed 5 February 2016).

## **Missile Technology Control Regime**

The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) held its twenty-ninth plenary week in Rotterdam from 5 to 9 October. Piet de Klerk (Netherlands) chaired the meeting on behalf of the Netherlands and Luxembourg, and will remain the Chair of the MTCR until the next plenary meeting in 2016.

As in previous annual meetings of the MTCR, members convened to review and evaluate MTCR activities over the previous 12 months with a view to intensifying efforts to achieve the regime's central objective—to prevent the proliferation of unmanned delivery systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction.

In this regard, the plenary provided the annual forum for MTCR so-called “partners”<sup>94</sup> to recall the importance of existing non-proliferation commitments in this area, in particular the obligations of States pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) on the issue of prevention of the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, including their means of delivery, by non-state actors.

As noted in the public statement<sup>95</sup> issued following the plenary meeting, the MTCR held a thorough exchange of information on missile proliferation developments since its last plenary meeting that was held in Oslo from 28 September to 3 October 2014, including country-specific matters involving the activities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Islamic Republic of Iran. In this context, the partners affirmed their unwavering support for the full implementation of Security Council resolutions issued in response to global non-proliferation concerns. The meeting also welcomed the adoption of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), in which the Council endorsed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, and noted its effect on previous resolutions<sup>96</sup> adopted by the Security Council on the topic of non-proliferation and the Islamic Republic of Iran.

With regard to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the plenary noted the resolutions<sup>97</sup> adopted by the Security Council in response to developments in its nuclear programme, including its ballistic missile

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<sup>94</sup> The MTCR has 34 members: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States.

<sup>95</sup> Plenary Meeting of the MTCR, public statement, Rotterdam, 9 October 2015. Available from <https://www.government.nl/documents/media-articles/2015/10/09/public-statement-from-the-plenary-meeting-of-the-missile-technology-control-regime-mtcr-rotterdam-9th-october-2015> (accessed 5 February 2016).

<sup>96</sup> Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008) and 1929 (2010).

<sup>97</sup> Security Council resolutions 1695 (2006), 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) and 2224 (2015).

programme. Other concerns were raised over global missile proliferation in the Middle East, North-East Africa and South Asia.

In relation to MTCR foundational documents, the meeting welcomed the increasing use of MTCR standards, namely the MTCR Guidelines and the Equipment, Software and Technology Annex, by non-partners. The partners welcomed the fact that Estonia and Latvia declared their adherence to the MTCR Guidelines as a basis for their national export controls concerning missile technology. In this regard, they reiterated their call to all States to support the non-proliferation aims of the Regime by observing its Guidelines and by establishing appropriate national legislation and law enforcement mechanisms. In encouraging all States to comply with the Guidelines, the partners underlined that the Guidelines were not designed to impede technological advancement and development, including space programmes, as long as such activities could not contribute to delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction. Space-launch vehicles have become an increasingly pressing matter in such discussions insofar as concerns have been raised over the dual-use nature of such delivery systems.

Issues related to membership were addressed at the meeting, although no decisions were made. The partners noted their intention to continue to consider individual applications for membership.

## **Missiles**

### **Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation**

The fourteenth annual regular meeting of the Subscribing States to The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOG) took place in Vienna from 28 to 29 May.

Participants from 63 delegations reaffirmed the importance of the Code as a unique multilateral confidence-building and transparency measure against ballistic missile proliferation. As in previous annual sessions, the participants stressed that the Code contributed to the strengthening of existing national and international security arrangements, as well as disarmament and non-proliferation objectives. The threat posed by ballistic missile proliferation was underscored as particularly challenging in regions such as the Middle East, North-East Asia and South Asia. In this regard, the increased number of ballistic missile launches in 2014-2015 by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was noted throughout the course of discussions.

The outgoing Chair of the multilateral regime, Peru, and the incoming Chair, Canada, briefed on previous efforts and future objectives, respectively. Peru focused, in particular, on efforts made to enhance universalization and implementation.

As it was to assume the HCOC chairmanship for 2015-2016, Canada introduced the objectives of its presidency, which were closely aligned with the goals of the previous Chair, namely the full and comprehensive implementation of the Code in all its aspects and strengthening outreach activities for advancing universalization.

Subscribing States, of which there are currently 137,<sup>98</sup> stressed the ongoing need to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery and to encourage new subscriptions to the Code, particularly by countries with space launch vehicle and ballistic missile capabilities.

Subscribing States also stressed the importance of full implementation of the Code, in particular with regard to pre-launch notifications and the timely submission of annual declarations, and declared their intention to encourage and achieve improved performance in those areas.

Subscribing States noted with appreciation the outreach activities conducted by the outgoing Chair and by interested Subscribing States and the European Union. Outreach events convened in 2015 included one organized by the Foundation for Strategic Research, on behalf of the European Union, on 18 March held on the margins of the Conference on Disarmament. On this occasion, a substantive round table was held on current and future challenges related to ballistic missile non-proliferation and arms control followed by a focused discussion on HCOC, including efforts towards its universality, full implementation and visibility. Additionally, the European Union and the Foundation for Strategic Research co-organized a workshop in support of the Code, held on 8 May in New York on the margins of the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This event brought together representatives from both Subscribing

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<sup>98</sup> Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Latvia, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) and Zambia.

and non-subscribing States with a view to addressing challenges and outlining future trends in ballistic missile proliferation.

## **1540 Committee and implementation of resolution 1540 (2004)**

### **Status of implementation**

The Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) (1540 Committee) submitted to the Council in December its review of the implementation of the resolution for 2015.<sup>99</sup> The Committee's activities covered the following main areas: monitoring and national implementation; assistance; cooperation with international, regional and subregional organizations, including the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) and the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001); and transparency and outreach.

In 2015, steady progress continued to be made in terms of the number of recorded legally binding measures taken by States. This progress was reflected in the revision of the matrices of all 193 Member States. The continuing special efforts to encourage the submission of national reports by those States that had not done so yielded three more such reports. Cabo Verde, Sao Tome and Principe and Zambia submitted their first reports, bringing the number of initial reports from States to 176. As at the end of 2015, 17 Member States<sup>100</sup> had yet to submit a first report to the Committee.

Visits to States by invitation and national round tables were important contributions in support of national reporting and the development of voluntary national implementation action plans. This effort also spurred the submission of seven additional voluntary national implementation action plans in 2015.<sup>101</sup>

Important steps were taken to begin the comprehensive review of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), to be submitted to the Security Council before December 2016. These steps included the development of modalities and a workplan for the review; a consultation with former members of the Committee's Group of Experts, designed as a direct contribution to the review;<sup>102</sup> and a retreat for the members of the Committee's working group on implementation and monitoring that focused on a provisional

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<sup>99</sup> S/2015/1052.

<sup>100</sup> Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Swaziland, Timor-Leste, and Zimbabwe.

<sup>101</sup> Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Senegal, Spain and Togo.

<sup>102</sup> On 23 October, the Institute for Security Studies of Pretoria, South Africa, presented their report on the meeting of Former Experts held in Cape Town in May 2015 to 1540 Committee Members, attended by 1540 Committee members and experts.

analysis of the data available to the Committee with a view to understanding the developments in implementation since the most recent comprehensive review.<sup>103</sup>

### **Monitoring and national implementation**

In 2015, the Committee continued to facilitate and monitor the implementation by States of resolution 1540 (2004). In accordance with the fourteenth programme of work,<sup>104</sup> the Committee considered 125 matrices. In 2014, 68 matrices were considered. All 193 revised matrices were sent to States for their review and, subsequent to the further revision of some matrices on the basis of comments received from 25 States, the Committee approved 183 matrices on 23 December.<sup>105</sup>

The Security Council, in its resolution 1977 (2011), encouraged States to provide, on a voluntary basis, additional information on their implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), including their effective national practices in implementing it. In 2015, 33 States provided additional information, described effective practices or provided comments and updates on their revised matrices, including on measures related to prohibiting non-state actors from using nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery. They also reported strengthened controls to prevent the illicit trafficking of such weapons and related materials.

Resolution 1977 (2011) also recognized the importance of the active engagement and dialogue of the Committee with States, including through visits to States at their invitation. In 2015, seven States<sup>106</sup> invited and received delegations from the Committee and its experts.

In terms of the Committee's fourteenth programme of work, the Committee encouraged an expansion of the network of points of contact and the development of training courses conducted at the regional level for points of contact. In this regard, a training course developed by the Committee's Group of Experts for national points of contact in the Asia-Pacific region took place in Qingdao, China, in September.

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<sup>103</sup> The 1540 Committee Working Group I (Monitoring and national implementation) and experts retreat, organized by the 1540 Committee in cooperation with UNODA, was held on 10 and 11 December at Greentree, New York, attended by the 1540 Committee Chair, Working Group members and experts.

<sup>104</sup> S/2015/75.

<sup>105</sup> Available from <http://www.un.org/en/sc/1540/national-implementation/1540-matrix/committee-approved-matrices.shtml> (accessed 8 February 2016).

<sup>106</sup> Antigua and Barbuda, Ghana, Jordan, Malawi, Senegal, Togo and Zambia.

## **Assistance**

In 2015, States submitted five new requests for assistance<sup>107</sup> to the Committee. In its role of facilitating technical assistance by matching offers with requests for assistance, the Committee and its experts continued to undertake dialogue with potential assistance providers. The Committee received letters from States and international organizations,<sup>108</sup> indicating their readiness to consider assistance requests and informing the Committee about current activities or possible areas in which assistance could be offered. The Committee relayed these responses to the States concerned so that the requesting States could take up the offers of assistance directly with the providers.

In response to the assistance request by Ghana, the Group of Experts visited that State to assist its Government in the drafting of a voluntary national implementation action plan. Two members of the 1540 Group of Experts visited Ghana from 12 to 15 October to work directly with the Government on its national action plan.

## **Cooperation with international, regional and subregional organizations**

The Committee continued to engage with international, regional and subregional organizations, including the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) and the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001).

The Committee intensified its collaboration with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the area of nuclear security, discussing ways of further improving future cooperation efforts, in particular in relation to enhancing complementarity and reducing duplication, specifically with regard to the development and implementation process for Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plans and voluntary national implementation action plans.

The Committee and its Group of Experts participated in an international maritime transport nuclear security exercise organized by Morocco and Spain in cooperation with the IAEA, held in Madrid from 27 to 29 October. The exercise took place in the territorial waters of both countries and illustrated the importance of reinforcing national capacities and international cooperation for the full and effective implementation of resolution 1540 (2004).<sup>109</sup>

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<sup>107</sup> Armenia, Cabo Verde, Ghana, Guyana and Zambia.

<sup>108</sup> Belarus, India, Russian Federation, International Atomic Energy Agency, International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Bank, World Customs Organization and World Organization for Animal Health.

<sup>109</sup> IAEA General Conference resolution 59/10 on nuclear security refers to resolution 1540 (2004).

The Committee continued its collaboration with other relevant international organizations, including the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Consultations were conducted between the OPCW and the 1540 Group of Experts on the provision of assistance to Member States. OPCW representatives also participated in regional meetings related to resolution 1540 (2004) implementation.

Other international organizations with which the Committee and its experts collaborated included the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the World Customs Organization, the World Health Organization and the World Organisation for Animal Health. This collaboration was strengthened through increased proactive interaction by the Group of Experts, offers made by these organizations in response to assistance requests and participation by their representatives in regional events.

In addition to international organizations, regional and subregional organizations continued to play an important role in enhancing the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). Cooperation with the African Union, in particular, was intensified in 2015. A major development was the planning of and preparation for the African Union Assistance and Review Conference, to be held in Addis Ababa in April 2016. The first of its kind, the Conference will offer a platform for those providing assistance related to resolution 1540 (2004) to directly engage with requesting States. Additionally, the Conference will enable States to discuss and elaborate measures to ensure effective provider-receiver partnerships, including modalities to secure sustainability of assistance.

The Committee also enhanced its cooperation with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). In 2015, the Conflict Prevention Centre, which serves as the OSCE focal point for the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), organized a number of national round tables and country-specific dialogues,<sup>110</sup> as well as the second annual meeting of the OSCE national points of contact held in cooperation with the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) in May in Belgrade.

Other regional activities included a seminar on voluntary national implementation action plans for resolution 1540 (2004) organized by the Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Centre in June, in cooperation with UNODA and the Government of Croatia. The seminar provided an opportunity to exchange views on the key elements of voluntary national implementation action plans and to share their experiences and lessons learned in the development, adoption and implementation of such plans.

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<sup>110</sup> Croatia, Montenegro, Republic of Moldova, Serbia, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan.

Cooperation with the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (UNREC), the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean and the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific also continued in 2015. The support of the regional centres proved indispensable to the conduct of various regional and country-specific meetings and consultations on resolution 1540 (2004). For example, UNREC assisted in organizing national round tables to help with the development of voluntary national implementation action plans in Senegal and Togo, and in conducting visits to Malawi and Zambia, at the request of the respective Governments.

### **Outreach, including to civil society and the private sector**

In 2015, the Committee and its experts continued to reach out to industry and the public, with the consent of the States, to generate wider awareness of the resolution and to facilitate its effective implementation.

In November, at the invitation of Germany, Committee members and the Group of Experts participated in the Fourth Wiesbaden Conference, organized in cooperation with UNODA.<sup>111</sup> The event was intended to be a contribution to the 2016 comprehensive review and included participants from various industry sectors, government agencies, intergovernmental organizations and academia. The Conference focused on taking stock of the results of previous conferences convened within the framework of the so-called “1540 Wiesbaden industry process” and discussing future approaches to improving industry dialogue in the framework of resolution 1540 (2004).

The 1540 Wiesbaden industry process seeks to develop a long-term sustainable cooperation between the 1540 Committee and the private sector to support the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). The Fourth Wiesbaden Conference provided a unique forum for private sector entities and companies to present their effective implementation practices and meet governmental export control regulators from numerous Member States from Asia, Europe, Latin and North America.

With the participation of industry associations and companies from the aerospace, banking, electronics, energy, health care, pharmaceutical and transport sectors, the Conference addressed the issue of effective implementation practices on resolution 1540 (2004), in particular on obtaining information on proliferation risks and different compliance programmes from the relevant industry sectors.

In 2015, there were 57 outreach events in which Committee members and experts participated. The Chair of the Committee participated in two such

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<sup>111</sup> For more information, see the conference report (S/2016/247).

activities, while Committee members attended seven and the Group of Experts went to 57.<sup>112</sup>

The Committee also enhanced outreach by inviting other organizations and institutions to speak to the Committee to exchange views on their respective roles with a view to enhancing the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004).<sup>113</sup>

Efforts to improve outreach were pursued on a continuing basis. A project was initiated in 2015 to redesign the Committee's website to enhance its usability and appeal. In cooperation with UNODA, the Committee posted on its website a video message on resolution 1540 (2004), conveyed by United Nations Messenger of Peace Michael Douglas, highlighting the threats of proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction by non-state actors.

## **Political declarations and other initiatives**

### **International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons**

The 2015 commemoration of the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons was held on 30 September as an informal meeting of the General Assembly. The President of the Assembly chaired the commemoration, with the Secretary-General also offering a message to the meeting.<sup>114</sup> As was the case last year, civil society also made an important contribution to commemorate and promote the International Day. Representatives of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons and the Marshallese Educational Initiative delivered statements.<sup>115</sup>

This was the second commemoration of the International Day, which was established through an initiative of the Non-Aligned Movement following from the first high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament in 2013.

Building on the momentum garnered from the constructive engagement at the 2013 high-level meeting, the member States of the Non-Aligned Movement took forward this initiative through the introduction of resolutions,

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<sup>112</sup> A full list of past outreach events is available from <http://www.un.org/en/sc/1540/transparency-and-outreach/outreach-events/events.shtml> (accessed 8 February 2016).

<sup>113</sup> Biological Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit; World Health Organization, the World Organization for Animal Health, INTERPOL; Inter-Parliamentary Union; International Nuclear Security Education Network; North Carolina State University; University at Albany of the State University of New York; University of Cape Town; and International Federation of Biosafety Associations.

<sup>114</sup> Available from <http://www.un.org/en/events/nuclearweaponelimination/2015/sgmessage.shtml> (accessed 22 December 2015).

<sup>115</sup> Available from <http://statements.unmeetings.org/media2/7651747/ms-ray-acheson.pdf> and <http://statements.unmeetings.org/media2/7651748/ms-tina-stege.pdf> (accessed 4 April 2016).

entitled “Follow-up to the high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament”, to the First Committee of the General Assembly in 2013, 2014 and 2015 (68/32, 69/58 and 70/34, respectively).

While also calling for the urgent commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a comprehensive nuclear weapons convention, the initiative of the Non-Aligned Movement included the declaration of 26 September as the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons devoted to furthering the total elimination of nuclear weapons, including through enhancing public awareness and education about the threat posed to humanity by nuclear weapons and the necessity for their total elimination, in order to mobilize international efforts towards achieving the common goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world. In this spirit, the active participation of Member States and civil society has been encouraged to promote this day and its overall objective.

Civil society has made important contributions to commemorate and promote the International Day. For example, in March 2014, the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) adopted a resolution,<sup>116</sup> which, inter alia, called upon Governments to support the International Day. Likewise, the member States of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean have also contributed to the commemoration of the International Day, including through the adoption of a declaration to commemorate the first International Day on 26 September 2014.<sup>117</sup>

Similar efforts in 2015 were also apparent. On 22 September, the Permanent Mission of Ecuador, UNFOLD ZERO and the NGO Committee for Disarmament in Geneva, in cooperation with the Geneva Branch of UNODA, organized a screening of the film *The Man Who Saved the World*, a documentary about the 26 September 1983 incident during the exercise *Able Archer*, which brought the world to the verge of a nuclear weapons exchange.<sup>118</sup> Also at this screening, María Fernanda Espinosa (Ecuador) presented to the United Nations a joint statement<sup>119</sup> of religious leaders, mayors and parliamentarians endorsed by individuals from more than 35

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<sup>116</sup> 130th IPU General Assembly, “Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free-World: The Contribution of Parliamentarians”, 20 March 2014. Available from <http://www.ipu.org/conf-e/130/Res-1.htm> (accessed 8 February 2016).

<sup>117</sup> Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean member States, document S/INF.1118. Available from [http://www.baselpeaceoffice.org/sites/default/files/imce/articles/News/opanal\\_member\\_states\\_declaration\\_sinf1118.pdf](http://www.baselpeaceoffice.org/sites/default/files/imce/articles/News/opanal_member_states_declaration_sinf1118.pdf) (accessed 8 February 2016).

<sup>118</sup> For more information, see <http://www.unfoldzero.org/26-september-2015/> (accessed 8 February 2016).

<sup>119</sup> Statement by parliamentarians, mayors and religious leaders to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the onset of the nuclear age and the foundation of the United Nations, “A Nuclear-Weapon-Free World: Our Common Good”, New York, 22 September 2015. Available from <http://www.unfoldzero.org/26-september-2015/#> (accessed 8 February 2016).

States, calling upon world leaders to commit to nuclear abolition and to replace nuclear deterrence with shared security approaches to conflicts. The text was adopted in Hiroshima on 6 August, during events to observe the seventieth anniversary of the atomic bombings in Japan, for presentation to the United Nations on the occasion of the 2015 commemoration of the International Day.

### **International Day against Nuclear Tests**

The informal meeting of the United Nations General Assembly to mark the 2015 observance of the International Day against Nuclear Tests was held on 10 September at United Nations Headquarters.<sup>120</sup> The President of the seventieth session of the General Assembly, the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the United Nations offered opening statements. Subsequently, a high-level interactive panel on the theme “Towards Zero: Resolving the Contradictions” was held in order to exchange views on how common ground may be reached among different approaches to achieving a world free of nuclear weapons.

Chaired by the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the United Nations, the panel included the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Kim Won-soo; the United States Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security of the United States, Rose Gottemoeller; the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, Lassina Zerbo; and the Acting Director of the New York Office of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Tracy Brown.

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<sup>120</sup> Through adoption of resolution 64/35, the General Assembly declared 29 August the International Day against Nuclear Tests. Introduced at the initiative of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the resolution commemorates the closure of the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site on 29 August 1991 with a view to raising awareness on the effects of nuclear-weapon test explosions and strengthening the international norm against all nuclear tests as a valuable step towards achieving a world free of nuclear weapons. The webcast of and statements made during the 2015 observance are available from <http://www.un.org/en/events/againstnucleartestsday/2015/events.shtml> (accessed 31 March 2016).



## Chapter II Biological and chemical weapons

A field exercise of the Secretary-General's Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons at Les Brûlis, France, in June 2015 (hosted and co-organized by UNODA and the Government of France).  
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## CHAPTER II

### Biological and chemical weapons

*Chemical weapons have not been consigned to the past. ... they have inflicted terror and death, including on civilians and children. ... The international community must hold the perpetrators to account.*

BAN KI-MOON, UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL<sup>1</sup>

#### Development and trends, 2015

IN THE CONTEXT OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, 2015 was once again dominated by developments in the Syrian Arab Republic—both with respect to activities to fully implement the destruction of the declared chemical weapons programme of the country, as well as in view of ongoing allegations regarding use. In this regard, the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs continued to exercise the Secretary-General's good offices to implement Security Council resolution 2118 (2013).

The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) recorded a number of important achievements in 2015, including near completion of the destruction of all chemical weapons declared by the Syrian Arab Republic.<sup>2</sup> The OPCW also continued to engage Syrian authorities to clarify elements of the initial declaration of the Syrian Arab Republic further to its accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention,<sup>3</sup> and to follow up on allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. In that context, the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission continued its work, issuing three reports to OPCW member States regarding three sets of incidents of alleged use of toxic chemicals as weapons. Two of those reports linked alleged incidents with confirmed exposure to chemical weapons.

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<sup>1</sup> Video message to the Twentieth Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, The Hague, 30 November 2015. Available from <https://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/SG-CWC-SP-message-2015.pdf> (accessed 1 June 2016).

<sup>2</sup> On 4 January 2016, Veolia, the United States firm contracted by the OPCW to dispose of part of the Syrian chemical weapons stockpile, announced that it had completed disposal of 75 cylinders of hydrogen fluoride at its facility in Texas, thus completing destruction of all chemical weapons declared by the Syrian Arab Republic.

<sup>3</sup> The full title is Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. Its text and adherence status are available from <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/cwc> (accessed 8 April 2016).

Moreover, on 7 August, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2235 (2015), which established the OPCW–United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM). In an important display of unity on the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic, members of the Security Council mandated the JIM to identify those actors responsible for the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. The JIM was mandated to conduct its work within one year, with the possibility of extension should the members of the Security Council deem it necessary.

With regard to the other category of weapons of mass destruction categorically banned through a legally binding instrument, 2015 represented a historic milestone for the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC),<sup>4</sup> which marked the fortieth anniversary of its entry into force.

While the universalization of the BWC continued to be a priority for States parties in 2015, efforts were also exerted to address the increasingly complex challenges posed by biological threats. In view of advances in the life sciences at an unprecedented speed, multidisciplinary research continued to prove its relevancy to combating biological threats at the international level. Given also the inherent dual-use nature of the life sciences, challenges related to the threat of the acquisition by non-state actors of biological agents with the potential to be weaponized were further underscored by States and civil society alike.

The year 2015 also marked the end of the four-year intersessional work programme mandated by the Seventh BWC Review Conference in 2011. The 2015 Meeting of States Parties set a new participation record, with an attendance of more than 600 participants, and provided an essential forum for approving arrangements for the Eighth Review Conference, to be held in November 2016 under the chairmanship of György Molnár (Hungary). In addition, 2015 also saw the highest participation in the BWC confidence-building measures with submissions made by 72 States parties.<sup>5</sup>

## **Biological weapons**

### **Fortieth anniversary of the Biological Weapons Convention**

On 26 March, the BWC celebrated the fortieth anniversary of its entry into force. The occasion was commemorated by the issuance of several

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<sup>4</sup> The full title is Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. Its text and adherence status are available from <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/bwc> (accessed 10 January 2016). Additional information on the Convention is available from [www.unog.ch/bwc](http://www.unog.ch/bwc) (accessed 10 March 2016).

<sup>5</sup> The list is available from [http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/\(httpPages\)/4FA4DA37A55C7966C12575780055D9E8?OpenDocument](http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/4FA4DA37A55C7966C12575780055D9E8?OpenDocument) (accessed 12 April 2016).

high-level statements,<sup>6</sup> including by the United Nations Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon; the Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, Sergey Lavrov; the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini; the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma; and United States Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, Rose Gottemoeller.

On 30 March, a commemorative event<sup>7</sup> was held in the Council Chamber in the Palais des Nations in Geneva, the same room in which the Committee of the Conference on Disarmament negotiated the BWC from 1969 to 1971. The event was organized by the BWC Implementation Support Unit, with the assistance of the Chair of the 2015 BWC Meeting of States Parties, Mazlan Muhammad (Malaysia), and the three depositary Governments of the BWC, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States. States parties, signatories and non-States parties, along with civil society, were invited to attend the commemoration.

The Acting Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva made welcome remarks during the event, while the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs addressed the meeting via video message. Representatives of the depositary Governments also addressed the commemorative event. Other speakers were Masood Khan, Director General of the Institute of Strategic Studies in Islamabad and President of the BWC Sixth Review Conference in 2006, and Caitriona McLeish, Senior Fellow of the University of Sussex.<sup>8</sup>

In the afternoon of 30 March, the Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding of the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, the Geneva Centre for Security Policy and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research also convened an academic seminar to mark the anniversary.

### **Intersessional programme of the Biological Weapons Convention**

As decided by the States parties to the BWC through the outcome document of the Seventh Review Conference, the structure of an intersessional

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<sup>6</sup> The statements are available from: <http://www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=8492> (United Nations Secretary-General); [https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/council-europe/3489/statement-by-high-representativevice-president-federica-mogherini-on-the-40th-anniversary-of-the-entry-into-force-of-the-biological-and-toxin-weapons-convention\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/council-europe/3489/statement-by-high-representativevice-president-federica-mogherini-on-the-40th-anniversary-of-the-entry-into-force-of-the-biological-and-toxin-weapons-convention_en) (European Union High Representative); [http://archive.mid.ru/brp\\_4.nsf/0/44B370EEE21377F943257E200031FC02](http://archive.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/44B370EEE21377F943257E200031FC02) (Russian Federation); <http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/the-african-union-calls-for-the-universalization-and-full-implementation-of-the-biological-weapons-convention> (African Union); and <https://blogs.state.gov/stories/2015/03/26/biological-weapons-convention-forty> (United States) (accessed 12 April 2016).

<sup>7</sup> Further information on the event, including links to remarks delivered, are available from <http://www.unog.ch/bwc/bwc40> (accessed 12 April 2016).

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

programme was retained for the 2012-2015 period, including annual Meetings of States Parties and annual Meetings of Experts. States parties affirmed that the purpose of the intersessional programme was to discuss and to promote common understanding and effective action on issues identified for inclusion in the intersessional programme.

To that end, the Seventh Review Conference decided that the intersessional programme for the 2012-2015 period would address three standing agenda items: (a) cooperation and assistance, with a particular focus on strengthening cooperation and assistance under article X; (b) review of developments in the field of science and technology related to the Convention; and (c) strengthening national implementation. Additionally, a fourth item was addressed in 2014 and 2015: how to strengthen implementation of article VII, including consideration of detailed procedures and mechanisms for the provision of assistance and cooperation by States parties.

Therefore, the 2015 meetings of the BWC constituted the last year of the current intersessional programme prior to the Eighth Review Conference to be held in 2016.

### **Topics covered by the standing agenda items of the 2012-2015 work programme of the Biological Weapons Convention**

<i>Standing agenda items</i>		
<i>Cooperation and assistance</i>	<i>Review of developments in the field of science and technology</i>	<i>Strengthening national implementation</i>
Reports on implementation of article X, and the operation of the assistance and cooperation database	Developments that have potential for uses contrary to the provisions of the Convention	Specific measures for the full and comprehensive implementation of the Convention
Challenges and obstacles to developing international cooperation, assistance and exchange in the biological sciences and technology	Developments that have potential benefits for the Convention	Ways and means to enhance national implementation, sharing best practices and experiences
Specific measures for the full and comprehensive implementation of article X	Measures for strengthening national biological risk management	Regional and subregional cooperation
Ways and means to target and mobilize resources, including financial resources, to address gaps and needs	Voluntary codes of conduct and other measures to encourage responsible conduct by scientists, academia and industry	National, regional and international measures to improve laboratory biosafety and biosecurity
	Education and awareness-raising about risks and benefits of life sciences and biotechnology	Any potential further measures

<i>Standing agenda items</i>		
<i>Cooperation and assistance</i>	<i>Review of developments in the field of science and technology</i>	<i>Strengthening national implementation</i>
Education, training, exchange and twinning programmes and other means of developing human resources	Developments relevant to the activities of multilateral organizations such as the World Health Organization, the World Organisation for Animal Health, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the International Plant Protection Convention and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons	
Capacity-building in biosafety and biosecurity and for detecting, reporting and responding to outbreaks of infectious disease or biological weapons attacks		
Coordination of cooperation with other relevant international and regional organizations, and other stakeholders	Any other developments of relevance to the Convention	

### **Meeting of Experts of the Biological Weapons Convention**

The fourth Meeting of Experts of the 2012-2015 intersessional programme was held in Geneva from 10 to 14 August. A total of 104 States took part, including 100 States parties, 3 signatory States and 1 State neither a party nor a signatory and with observer status.<sup>9</sup> Representatives from the United Nations and seven specialized agencies and other international organizations also attended the Meeting.<sup>10</sup>

At the invitation of the Chair, Mazlan Muhammad (Malaysia), and in recognition of the special nature of the topics under consideration, eight scientific, professional, commercial and academic organizations and experts participated in informal exchanges in the open sessions as guests of the Meeting of Experts.<sup>11</sup> Thirteen other non-governmental organizations and research institutes also attended the Meeting.<sup>12</sup> In total, over 450 individuals, including over 200 technical experts, gathered to consider the three standing agenda items and the biennial item (see “Intersessional programme of the Biological Weapons Convention” above).

As in previous years, the large number and diverse range of participants allowed the Meeting of Experts to draw upon expertise from national, regional and international perspectives. The benefits of a broad base of expertise were

<sup>9</sup> For the list of participants, see BWC/MSP/2015/MX/INF.5.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

evident throughout the formal and informal sessions, as well as during events held on the margins of the Meeting.

The substantive work of the Meeting began with a formal session through which States parties could make opening statements.<sup>13</sup> Non-governmental organizations and research institutes also had an opportunity to address delegations on the opening day as part of an informal session.<sup>14</sup> Two working sessions were then devoted to each of the standing agenda items and the biennial item.

The Meeting of Experts also benefited from a full schedule of side events<sup>15</sup> organized by private industry, academic and other non-governmental groups, as well as States and guests of the Meeting.

Delegations were also able to draw upon a variety of other resources, such as background papers<sup>16</sup> prepared by the Implementation Support Unit and working papers<sup>17</sup> from States parties on a range of substantive issues related to the BWC and its implementation. During the course of the Meeting, the Chair compiled considerations, lessons, perspectives, recommendations, conclusions and proposals drawn from the discussions and resources available, which were annexed to the factual report of the Meeting. The factual report<sup>18</sup> was adopted by consensus and the Meeting closed as scheduled on 14 August.

### **Meeting of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention**

The Meeting of States Parties was held in Geneva from 14 to 18 December. Participating in the Meeting were representatives from 111 States parties—the largest number of States parties ever to attend a BWC meeting—3 signatory States and 2 non-States parties.<sup>19</sup> The national delegations were joined by the United Nations, 6 specialized agencies or other international organizations and 27 non-governmental organizations and research institutes.<sup>20</sup> The participation of such a large number of non-governmental organizations was noteworthy. The 27 groups represented the largest number to attend a BWC intersessional meeting, thus demonstrating the importance of the meetings during the last year of the

<sup>13</sup> Available from [http://www.unog.ch/\\_\\_80256ee600585943.nsf/\(httpPages\)/46cac219b57f8b49c1257db20030bce8?OpenDocument&ExpandSection=8#\\_Section8](http://www.unog.ch/__80256ee600585943.nsf/(httpPages)/46cac219b57f8b49c1257db20030bce8?OpenDocument&ExpandSection=8#_Section8) (accessed 12 April 2016).

<sup>14</sup> The statements are available from [http://www.unog.ch/\\_\\_80256ee600585943.nsf/\(httpPages\)/46cac219b57f8b49c1257db20030bce8?OpenDocument&ExpandSection=10#\\_Section10](http://www.unog.ch/__80256ee600585943.nsf/(httpPages)/46cac219b57f8b49c1257db20030bce8?OpenDocument&ExpandSection=10#_Section10) (accessed 12 April 2016).

<sup>15</sup> Available from [http://www.unog.ch/\\_\\_80256ee600585943.nsf/\(httpPages\)/46cac219b57f8b49c1257db20030bce8?OpenDocument&ExpandSection=11#\\_Section11](http://www.unog.ch/__80256ee600585943.nsf/(httpPages)/46cac219b57f8b49c1257db20030bce8?OpenDocument&ExpandSection=11#_Section11) (accessed 12 April 2016).

<sup>16</sup> BWC/MSP/2015/MX/INF.2-4.

<sup>17</sup> BWC/MSP/2015/MX/3, annex II.

<sup>18</sup> BWC/MSP/2015/MX/3.

<sup>19</sup> For the list of participants, see BWC/MSP/2015/INF.3.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*

current intersessional programme. In total, over 600 participants took part in the Meeting.

The Meeting featured a general debate during which 42 States parties and three international organizations participated, followed by an informal session in which 15 non-governmental organizations took the floor to make short statements.<sup>21</sup>

States parties then devoted working sessions to each of the three standing agenda items and to the biennial item on how to strengthen implementation of article VII. During these working sessions, States parties identified broad areas of common understanding across the full scope of the Meeting topics. A working session was devoted to the Chair's report<sup>22</sup> on universalization activities and the report of the Implementation Support Unit (see section below on the work of the Unit).

With regard to building capacity through international cooperation and assistance, States parties affirmed the importance of the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of biological and toxin agents for peaceful purposes. To this end, they discussed means of strengthening cooperation and assistance under article X of the Convention. Among other areas of common understanding, they noted the value of taking steps to facilitate and ensure timely access to affordable drugs and vaccines and related diagnostic, preventive and therapeutic equipment to affected States, especially in developing countries, as highlighted by the outbreak of Ebola in West Africa in 2014.

On developments in science and technology, States parties reviewed a number of recent developments. In this context, they identified and discussed developments with potential benefits for the Convention, such as advances to agriculture, advances and research in biology, biotechnology, bioengineering and biomedical engineering, as well as advances in immunology and various enabling technologies. They also reviewed a number of other developments with potential for uses contrary to the provisions of the BWC.

On national implementation, States parties highlighted their willingness to find ways to improve domestic efforts related to the Convention. While taking into account differences in national circumstances and legal and constitutional processes, they agreed on the value of strengthening implementation of all provisions of the Convention. They welcomed the opportunity to learn from one another by sharing best practices and experiences, including in relation to national implementation, strengthening

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<sup>21</sup> Available from [http://www.unog.ch/unog/website/disarmament.nsf/\(httpPages\)/52f94df16e2c376ec1257ede0033c774?OpenDocument&ExpandSection=7#\\_Section7](http://www.unog.ch/unog/website/disarmament.nsf/(httpPages)/52f94df16e2c376ec1257ede0033c774?OpenDocument&ExpandSection=7#_Section7) (accessed 12 April 2016).

<sup>22</sup> BWC/MSP/2015/4.

national institutions and coordination among national law enforcement institutions.

States parties also further addressed the biennial item: how to strengthen the implementation of article VII, including consideration of detailed procedures and mechanisms for the provision of assistance and cooperation by States parties. They reaffirmed that States parties bore the responsibility for providing assistance and coordinating with relevant organizations in the case of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons. Pursuant to article VII of the Convention, they also reaffirmed their commitment to provide or support assistance, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, to any State party that so requested if the Security Council decided that such State party had been exposed to danger as a result of a violation of the Convention.

Closing the Meeting on 18 December, the Chair noted that, although the Convention was faced with many challenges on the eve of the Eighth Review Conference in 2016, delegations worked that week in an efficient, effective and productive manner in order to ensure a valuable contribution to the forthcoming Review Conference.

The Meeting also considered progress towards universalization of the Convention and welcomed the accession of Mauritania and Andorra, which, respectively, joined the BWC in January and March. The Chair urged non-States parties to join the Convention, highlighting the role of the BWC as one of the main pillars of the international community's efforts against weapons of mass destruction. He also encouraged the States parties to promote the Convention and to provide assistance to States preparing to join the BWC.

The conclusion of the Meeting marked the end of the fourth and last year of the intersessional programme for the 2012-2015 period mandated by the Seventh BWC Review Conference in 2011. Consequently, the States parties also discussed and approved arrangements for the Eighth Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee session in 2016. They decided that the Review Conference would be held in Geneva from 7 to 25 November 2016, and that the Preparatory Committee would meet in Geneva for up to two days on 26 and 27 April and from 8 to 12 August 2016. They also approved the nomination of György Molnár (Hungary) as President of the Review Conference and Chair of the Preparatory Committee.

### **Work of the Implementation Support Unit**

At the 2015 Meeting of States Parties, the Implementation Support Unit (ISU) presented its regular annual report,<sup>23</sup> which included a summary of the Unit's efforts over the course of 2015 related to support provided for the implementation of the Convention. Activities covered include the administration of the confidence-building measures (CBMs), universalization

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<sup>23</sup> BWC/MSP/2015/3 and Add.1.

activities, maintenance of the database for assistance requests and offers, and facilitation of the BWC sponsorship programme.

The Unit's support for the administration of the Convention also included serving as the substantive secretariat for the Meeting of States Parties and the Meeting of Experts and preparing background information documents for those meetings. Other duties of the Unit in 2015 included following and reporting on scientific and technological developments; keeping in regular contact with relevant international organizations, as well as professional, commercial and academic institutions and associations; and organizing and participating in relevant workshops, seminars and meetings.

The Unit continued to develop the BWC website<sup>24</sup> with a view to increasing its utility not only for States parties but also for outreach and awareness-raising purposes. In 2015, the ISU continued to restructure and add material, including interactive maps, to the website. The sections dealing with universalization were enhanced, while a new section was created to cover the fortieth anniversary of the BWC. In addition, more prominence was given to the sections on the cooperation and assistance database and the sponsorship programme. The website was also restructured in order to bring it in line with the various agenda items of the intersessional programme. The ISU also increased its use of social media (particularly Facebook and Twitter)<sup>25</sup> in order to raise awareness about the BWC.


With regard to CBMs, the Unit maintained capabilities for electronic reporting, compiled and distributed submissions, provided routine assistance and substantive advice, took part in or organized workshops promoting the CBMs and followed up with States parties on their submissions. The ISU reported to the Meeting of States Parties in December, providing details on the submission of information under the CBMs. Recent years have seen a gradual, albeit slow, increase in levels of participation in this transparency exercise (see figure), reaching 72 States parties in 2015, which is the largest number of CBM submissions registered by the BWC ISU.

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<sup>24</sup> Available from <http://www.unog.ch/bwc> (accessed 12 April 2016).

<sup>25</sup> Available from <https://www.facebook.com/1972BWC> and <https://twitter.com/BWCISU> (accessed 12 April 2016).

**Participation in the Biological Weapons Convention confidence-building measures**



The ISU supported the Chair of the 2015 Meeting of States Parties in his activities to promote universalization, assisting him with correspondence with States not party to the Convention and preparing for and participating in his meetings with representatives of non-States parties. The Unit also supported States parties in promoting universalization, coordinating their activities and informing them about progress on accessions or ratifications. The ISU also provided information and advice about the Convention to several signatories and non-States parties. As data became available, the Unit consolidated and published information in the restricted area of its website.

The ISU continued to update the online database of requests for and offers to provide assistance relevant to the Convention. As at December, the database contained 59 offers of assistance from six States parties<sup>26</sup> and one group<sup>27</sup> of States parties, and 18 requests for assistance from five States parties.<sup>28</sup>

The ISU also administered the sponsorship programme designed to support and increase the participation of developing States parties in the meetings of the intersessional programme. In 2015, voluntary contributions to the sponsorship programme were received from four States parties: Australia, Canada, Finland and the Netherlands. In addition, other States parties

<sup>26</sup> Canada, Cuba, France, Germany, United Kingdom and United States.

<sup>27</sup> The 42 members of the Australia Group.

<sup>28</sup> The information is available to States parties from the restricted area of the BWC website: <http://www.unog.ch/bwc/restricted>.

supported the sponsorship programme through bilateral arrangements. As a result, through the BWC sponsorship programme, five States parties<sup>29</sup> were sponsored to participate in the Meeting of Experts and seven<sup>30</sup> were sponsored to participate in the Meeting of States Parties.

## **Chemical weapons**

### **Twentieth Session of the Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention**

The Twentieth Session of the Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)<sup>31</sup> took place from 30 November to 4 December. The Conference was attended by representatives of 134 States parties; 1 signatory State; 5 international organizations, specialized agencies and other international bodies; and over 80 representatives of 52 non-governmental organizations from around the world.<sup>32</sup> The United Nations Secretary-General addressed the Conference via video message.<sup>33</sup> During the week, a busy schedule of side events organized by civil society organizations and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) enabled discussions on a number of topical issues, including developments in science and technology relevant to the Convention.

The Conference reviewed the status of the implementation of the CWC across all programme areas covering disarmament and work related to preventing the re-emergence of chemical weapons, as well as assistance and protection and international cooperation. Delegates were briefed on the progress made by possessor States in their weapons-destruction activities and noted progress in the elimination of the Syrian Arab Republic's chemical weapons programme. The newest members of the OPCW, Myanmar and Angola, attended the Conference for the first time as CWC States parties.<sup>34</sup>

The Conference also established the Advisory Board on Education and Outreach, which will render specialized advice about making education and

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<sup>29</sup> Burundi, Cameroon, Cuba, Mongolia and Philippines.

<sup>30</sup> Afghanistan, Antigua and Barbuda, Burkina Faso, Cuba, Ghana, Sudan and Uganda.

<sup>31</sup> The full title is Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. Its text and adherence status are available from <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/cwc> (accessed 8 April 2016).

<sup>32</sup> See OPCW Conference of the States Parties, document C-20/5. Available from [https://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/CSP/C-20/en/c2005\\_e\\_.pdf](https://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/CSP/C-20/en/c2005_e_.pdf) (accessed 12 April 2016).

<sup>33</sup> The text of the video message is available from <https://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/SG-CWC-SP-message-2015.pdf> (accessed 12 April 2016).

<sup>34</sup> Myanmar deposited its instrument of ratification on 8 July and Angola deposited its instrument of accession on 21 September.

outreach activities of the OPCW and of States parties more effective and sustainable.

The continued engagement of the OPCW with the chemical industry and the scientific community has been further endorsed by the Conference and, for the first time, was included as an agenda item of the session. Delegates also voiced their support for a German-led initiative to advance ethical guidelines for chemistry professionals in relation to CWC obligations.<sup>35</sup>

The Conference designated 29 April each year—the date in 1997 when the Convention entered into force—as the International Day for the Foundation of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (“OPCW Day”). In addition, the Day of Remembrance for all Victims of Chemical Warfare was designated to occur annually on 30 November.

The Conference adopted the programme and budget for 2016. A special trust fund was created to cover the OPCW activities in the Syrian Arab Republic in order to account for the impact of these additional costs on the Organisation’s budget.

### **Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons**

By 31 December, a total of 70,494 metric tons of Category 1 chemical weapons had been declared by the possessor States parties. Of this amount, 64,438 metric tons, or 91.4 per cent of the total amount declared, had been destroyed under verification by the OPCW Technical Secretariat. The destruction of all Category 1 chemical-weapon stockpiles declared by India, Libya, the Syrian Arab Republic and a fourth State party was completed.

In total, 2,032 metric tons of Category 2 chemical weapons had been declared by the possessor States parties. The aggregate amount destroyed, as at 31 December, was 1,295 metric tons, or 63.7 per cent of the total amount declared. Albania, India, the Russian Federation, the Syrian Arab Republic and the United States had completed the destruction of all their declared Category 2 chemical weapons. Of the amount declared by Libya, 47.7 per cent had been destroyed. All Category 3 weapons had been destroyed.

The year 2015 also marked the completion of operations at four chemical weapons destruction facilities in the Russian Federation, namely Leonidovka, Shchuchye, Maradykovsky and Pochep. With 92 per cent of the Russian Federation’s stockpile having been eliminated by the end of 2015, remaining stocks will continue to be destroyed at the Kizner chemical weapons destruction facility. The United States completed destruction of 90 per cent of its stockpiles by the end of 2015. The United States began destruction

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<sup>35</sup> See OPCW, “Report of the Second Workshop on Ethical Guidelines for the Practice of Chemistry under the Norms of the Chemical Weapons Convention”. Available from [http://www.euchems.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Hague\\_Ethical\\_Guidelines\\_2nd\\_Workshop\\_Report.pdf](http://www.euchems.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Hague_Ethical_Guidelines_2nd_Workshop_Report.pdf) (accessed 12 April 2016).

operations for problematic munitions in Pueblo, Colorado, and the destruction operations at the main plant are expected to get under way at that facility from mid-2016. A delegation from the OPCW Executive Council visited Pueblo in March.

China and Japan continued to work together on abandoned chemical weapons recovery and destruction operations in China, specifically at Haerbaling and at the mobile destruction facility in Shijiazhuang. To this end, they jointly hosted a visit by a delegation from the OPCW Executive Council in June. In addition, the mobile destruction facility in Wuhan completed destruction operations in May. As at 31 December, a total of 38,875 abandoned chemical weapons had been verified as destroyed.

The OPCW industry verification activities continued throughout 2015. During the year, 241 inspections of chemical industry facilities were conducted in accordance with article VI of the Convention. Between entry into force of the Convention in 1997 and 31 December, a total of 3,081 inspections had been conducted worldwide.

In 2015, membership of the OPCW grew to 192 States parties. The Convention entered into force for Myanmar on 7 August and for Angola on 16 October. The Technical Secretariat also had constructive dialogue with South Sudan on options for joining the Convention. As at 31 December, Egypt, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Israel had not given any indication of taking further steps to join the Convention as States parties.

The OPCW Scientific Advisory Board continued to provide independent expert advice to the Director-General and his staff, meeting for its twenty-second session in June.<sup>36</sup> Prior to the session, the Board responded to the Director-General's request for further advice on assistance and protection.<sup>37</sup> The final report<sup>38</sup> from the Temporary Working Group on Verification, which had held its final meeting earlier in 2015, was endorsed at the twenty-second session. Recommendations from this report reached across verification

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<sup>36</sup> Documents of the Scientific Advisory Board are available from <https://www.opcw.org/about-opcw/subsidiary-bodies/scientific-advisory-board> (accessed 11 April 2016). The Board's report at its twenty-second session (SAB-22/1), dated 15 July 2015, is available from [https://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/SAB/en/sab-22-01\\_e\\_.pdf](https://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/SAB/en/sab-22-01_e_.pdf) (accessed 11 April 2016). The Director-General's response to the Board (EC-80/DG.7), dated 28 August 2015, is available from [https://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/SAB/en/ec80dg07\\_e\\_.pdf](https://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/SAB/en/ec80dg07_e_.pdf) (accessed 11 April 2016).

<sup>37</sup> Slavica Vucinic, "Response to the DG's request to the SAB to provide further advice on assistance and protection". Available from [https://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/Science\\_Technology/Diplomats\\_Programme/The\\_Science\\_of\\_Medical\\_Countermeasures\\_8\\_July\\_2015.pdf](https://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/Science_Technology/Diplomats_Programme/The_Science_of_Medical_Countermeasures_8_July_2015.pdf) (accessed 12 April 2016).

<sup>38</sup> OPCW, document SAB/REP/1/15. Available from [https://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/SAB/en/Final\\_Report\\_of\\_SAB\\_TWG\\_on\\_Verification\\_-\\_as\\_presented\\_to\\_SAB.pdf](https://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/SAB/en/Final_Report_of_SAB_TWG_on_Verification_-_as_presented_to_SAB.pdf) (accessed 12 April 2016).

activities, including those of article VI as outlined in an action plan<sup>39</sup> prepared by the Director-General.

In 2015, the Technical Secretariat continued to assist States parties in achieving full and effective implementation of the Convention and in developing relevant national capacities in the areas of assistance and protection against chemical weapons, national implementation and international cooperation. To achieve this, the Technical Secretariat continued to provide States parties with training courses, workshops and seminars, structured primarily around articles VII, X and XI of the Convention. Over EUR 4.6 million of regular budget funding in 2015 enabled the delivery of more than 130 training courses, workshops and seminars to some 1,750 participants from all regional groups.

The OPCW continued to strengthen its interaction with a wide range of stakeholders in the Convention, including chemical industry, science and academia, and representatives of civil society. Representatives of industry associations attended the Twentieth Session of the Conference of States Parties, during which a standing agenda item dedicated to the chemical industry and the scientific community was introduced for the first time. The Conference further supported the advancement of work on a code of ethics for professionals in the chemical sciences.

To further enhance its engagement with chemical industry representatives, the Technical Secretariat established the Chemical Industry Coordination Group with representatives of the International Council of Chemical Associations. The Group held its first meeting on 3 November, with a further meeting planned for the first quarter of 2016.

### **Mission to eliminate the declared chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic**

In 2015, the OPCW mission to eliminate the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic continued. All effluents produced as a result of the neutralization of sulfur mustard and methylphosphonyl difluoride aboard the *MV Cape Ray* were verified by the OPCW as destroyed at facilities in Germany (GEKA)<sup>40</sup> and Finland (Ekokem) in March and July, respectively.

Of the 14 remaining chemical weapons production facilities in the Syrian Arab Republic, 11 were destroyed. The Technical Secretariat verified the destruction of all five underground structures and six aircraft hangars, and oversaw the installation and testing of monitoring equipment, where required. One aircraft hangar remains inaccessible, owing to the security situation,

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<sup>39</sup> See OPCW Executive Council, document EC-80/DG.7, annex. Available from [https://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/SAB/en/ec80dg07\\_e\\_.pdf](https://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/SAB/en/ec80dg07_e_.pdf) (accessed 12 April 2016).

<sup>40</sup> *Gesellschaft zur Entsorgung von chemischen Kampfstoffen und Rüstungsaltlasten mbH*.

and two former production facilities are located in areas where the security situation has not yet permitted their destruction.

The Technical Secretariat also continued efforts to clarify certain elements of the Syrian Arab Republic's initial declaration. The OPCW Declaration Assessment Team issued its latest report<sup>41</sup> in October, identifying several outstanding issues. The Team is continuing its consultations with the Syrian authorities and is expected to issue a further report before the next regular session of the OPCW Executive Council in March 2016.

The OPCW Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) continued its work over the past year with the firm support of States parties. It issued three reports<sup>42</sup> to States parties in October regarding three separate sets of incidents of alleged use of toxic chemicals as weapons. Alarming, two of the reports linked alleged incidents with confirmed exposure to chemical weapons, resulting, in several instances, in death. The third report, together with a follow-up report in December, was not able to draw conclusions in relation to other incidents reported by the Syrian Government, or the circumstances in which evidence of exposure to sarin or a sarin-like substance might have occurred. The Director-General included these reports in his monthly reports to the United Nations Secretary-General.<sup>43</sup>

On 5 November, the Director-General established the new Trust Fund for Syria Missions to provide an additional funding source for missions and contingency operations related to the Syrian Arab Republic, such as the FFM and the Declaration Assessment Team.

### **OPCW–United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism**

On 7 August, the Security Council adopted resolution 2235 (2015), in which it reiterated its condemnation of the continuing use of toxic chemicals as weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic and established the OPCW–United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM), for a period of one year, with the possibility of future extension by the Security Council, if deemed necessary.

By Security Council resolution 2235 (2015), the JIM was mandated to identify to the greatest extent feasible individuals, entities, groups or Governments who were perpetrators, organizers, sponsors or otherwise involved in the use of chemicals as weapons, including chlorine or any other toxic chemical, in the Syrian Arab Republic where an OPCW FFM

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<sup>41</sup> OPCW Executive Council, document EC-80/P/S/1.

<sup>42</sup> See S/2015/908.

<sup>43</sup> For more information, see OPCW “Director-General circulates OPCW FFM Reports to States Parties”, 6 November 2015. Available from <https://www.opcw.org/news/article/director-general-circulates-opcw-ffm-reports-to-states-parties/> (accessed 12 April 2016). See also S/2015/56.

determines, or has determined, that a specific incident in the Syrian Arab Republic involved or likely involved the use of chemicals as weapons.

Virginia Gamba (Argentina) was appointed Head of the JIM by the Secretary-General and was joined by two deputies, Adrian Neritani (Albania) and Eberhard Schanze (Germany).

In resolution 2235 (2015), the Security Council further requested the Secretary-General, in coordination with the OPCW Director-General, to present a report to the Security Council and inform the OPCW Executive Council on progress made as of the date the JIM began its full operations. Pursuant to this request, the OPCW Executive Council was informed that the JIM began its work on 24 September and declared itself fully operational on 13 November.

In accordance with resolution 2235 (2015), the first substantive report of the JIM is due 90 days after the date it became fully operational, which would fall in February 2016. In the interim, the JIM initiated its work in the second half of 2015, including the establishment of offices in both New York and The Hague, with the intent of establishing a presence in Damascus. The JIM was created as a fully independent body, to which the OPCW Technical Secretariat was providing assistance, including through the work of its FFMs.

### **Secretary-General's Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons**

The most recent activation of the Secretary-General's Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons<sup>44</sup> came in 2013, and stood as the first such instance in over 20 years.<sup>45</sup> The activation of the Mechanism took place further to a request by the Syrian Arab Republic on 19 March 2013 for an investigation on its territory. Other United Nations Member States also subsequently requested the Secretary-General to investigate separate allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. Accordingly, the United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic was established on 21 March 2013 by the Secretary-General, based on the authority granted to him by the General Assembly and the Security Council.<sup>46</sup>

In recent years, and particularly following the 2013 activation of the Mechanism, efforts have been under way to ensure the operational readiness

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<sup>44</sup> The Mechanism's mandate is derived from General Assembly resolution 42/37 C of 30 November 1987. For further information, see <https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/secretary-general-mechanism/> (accessed 13 June 2016).

<sup>45</sup> See S/24065 and S/24344. The most recent previous investigations were conducted in Mozambique and in Azerbaijan in 1992.

<sup>46</sup> See A/67/997-S/2013/553 and A/68/663-S/2013/735.

of the Mechanism in the event that it was triggered, particularly in the form of specialized training for experts on the roster. In this regard, the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs conducted a lessons-learned activity in 2014 to distil the experience in the Syrian Arab Republic for the future, should the Mechanism be activated again.<sup>47</sup>

### **Training for qualified experts**

As stated in the Mechanism's guidelines and procedures<sup>48</sup> for the timely and efficient conduct of investigations, and in addition to the nomination of qualified experts and laboratories, Member States may also provide specialized training, developed in cooperation of the Office for Disarmament Affairs. In practice, training activities have focused on the use of biological weapons, in view of the mandate of the OPCW through the Chemical Weapons Convention, particularly the OPCW authority to conduct investigations of the alleged use of chemical weapons in States parties to the Convention<sup>49</sup> (currently totalling 192). In cases where the alleged use of a chemical weapon occurs in a State not party to the Convention, as was the case in 2013 with the Syrian Arab Republic, or in the case of such an alleged use in territory not controlled by a State party, the Secretary-General may cooperate with the OPCW in this regard, through the modalities set out in the 2012 Supplementary Arrangement to the 2001 Relationship Agreement between the United Nations and the OPCW.<sup>50</sup> It follows then that, with no equivalent standing institutional capacity in the context of investigations of biological weapons, the effectiveness of the Mechanism is particularly critical in this area.

In 2015, two training courses were conducted.<sup>51</sup> The first of the two was a basic training course on the Mechanism, which was offered by the Government of France and carried out in Paris and Saumur in June over a 10-day period. This training course included classroom instruction and gradual introduction to investigative techniques, culminating in a field exercise based on a scenario involving the alleged use of a biological weapon. The field exercise provided the qualified experts with an opportunity to apply the skills they had learned over the preceding week. Of particular value was the fact that the experts were afforded the opportunity to work with teams and field training facilities provided by the host Government, which permitted the experts to experience a realistic simulation of a field investigation.

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<sup>47</sup> For further information on the lessons-learned exercise, see <https://www.un.org/disarmament/publications/more/syrian-ll-report> (accessed 13 June 2016).

<sup>48</sup> See A/44/561.

<sup>49</sup> See Chemical Weapons Convention, Verification Annex, part XI.

<sup>50</sup> See A/55/988.

<sup>51</sup> Seven trainings have been conducted in total. The first took place in Sweden in 2009; the second in France in 2012; the third in Sweden in June 2014; the fourth in the United Kingdom in September 2014; and the fifth in Germany in November 2014.

This course was followed in August by a specialized course on negotiations and interviews, which was sponsored by the Government of the United Kingdom and took place at OPCW headquarters in The Hague. The course comprised not only the first course for qualified experts that was wholly devoted to these two areas, but also served as the first instance of integrated training with OPCW staff members. The course thus implemented one of the lessons learned following the 2013 investigation in the Syrian Arab Republic. Member States continued to express interest in hosting further trainings, and other courses for qualified experts on the roster were being planned.

The United Nations continued to increase its ongoing cooperation with other relevant international organizations within the framework of the Mechanism. This included not only the OPCW, but also the World Health Organization (WHO) and the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), with whom memorandums of understanding had been signed.<sup>52</sup> These arrangements set out the modalities of cooperation in the event of an investigation under the Mechanism. They furthermore serve as a platform to support and enhance underlying collaboration in this context, such as through the exchange of information. In addition, the OPCW, WHO, OIE and the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) have participated in training courses, both as instructors and as trainees.

## **Export controls**

### **Australia Group**

The 41 member countries<sup>53</sup> of the Australia Group and the European Union marked the Group's thirtieth anniversary at its annual plenary meeting held in Perth, Australia, from 1 to 5 June. Australia continued its role as informal Chair.

With a continuing focus on harmonizing export controls in order to ensure exports do not contribute to the development of chemical or biological

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<sup>52</sup> “Memorandum of Understanding between the World Health Organization and the United Nations Concerning WHO’s Support to the Secretary-General’s Mechanism for the Investigation of the Alleged Use of Chemical, Biological and Toxin Weapons”, 31 January 2011 (available from [https://unoda-web.s3-accelerate.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/assets/WMD/Secretary-General\\_Mechanism/UN\\_WHO\\_MOU\\_2011.pdf](https://unoda-web.s3-accelerate.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/assets/WMD/Secretary-General_Mechanism/UN_WHO_MOU_2011.pdf)); “Memorandum of Understanding between the World Organisation for Animal Health and the United Nations Concerning OIE’s Cooperation with the Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigation of the Alleged Use of Chemical, Biological and Toxin Weapons”, 25 June 2012 (available from [http://www.oie.int/fileadmin/Home/eng/About\\_us/docs/pdf/accords/UNODA\\_ANG.pdf](http://www.oie.int/fileadmin/Home/eng/About_us/docs/pdf/accords/UNODA_ANG.pdf)) (accessed 15 February 2016).

<sup>53</sup> Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States.

weapons, the meeting addressed technical issues, outreach and country-specific situations. Particular attention was paid to the progress made in relation to the total elimination of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic following its accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 2013. The Group noted, in particular, that the continued use of toxic chemicals as weapons was cause for alarm and expressed concern over outstanding ambiguities related to the declaration made to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons by the Syrian Government. In that context, full compliance with all provisions of Security Council resolution 2118 (2013) and the Chemical Weapons Convention was underscored. The Group also noted with disquiet other chemical and biological activities in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the region of the Middle East.

The members agreed to a range of measures to strengthen chemical and biological non-proliferation, inter alia:

- Intensification of its focus on emerging technologies that can be used for chemical and biological weapons;
- Expansion of outreach to non-members, as well as industry and academia, to highlight the threat posed by State and non-state actors seeking to acquire the know-how to develop chemical and biological weapons; and
- Consideration of the interest in membership from specific countries and the group's approach to future membership questions.

As in previous years, the role of technical experts was important to discussions on refining the controls applied to the chemical and biological items on the Australia Group control lists.<sup>54</sup> In particular, licensing and enforcement experts shared experiences and information on sensitive dual-use chemical and biological materials and related equipment.


The Group also recognized Kazakhstan's formal adherence to the Australia Group Guidelines pursuant to decisions taken at the 2014 plenary.<sup>55</sup> Participants urged all States to adhere by informing the Group's Chair of their political commitment to control the export of all items on the common control lists. The next meeting of the plenary will convene in Paris in 2016. The French Government's offer to host was accepted by the Group at the conclusion of the 2015 plenary.

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<sup>54</sup> Available from [www.australiagroup.net](http://www.australiagroup.net) (accessed 12 April 2016).

<sup>55</sup> See "Statement by the Chair of the 2014 Australia Group Plenary Meeting", 6 June 2014. Available from [www.australiagroup.net/en/media\\_june2014.html](http://www.australiagroup.net/en/media_june2014.html) (accessed 5 February 2016).





## Chapter III Conventional weapons



The United Nations Mine Action Service detonate mines and unexploded remnants of war on 24 March in the Ayii area of Magwi County, Eastern Equatoria State, South Sudan.

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## CHAPTER III

### Conventional weapons

*Small arms do not only make easy the taking and maiming of lives, but also kill economies and the social bonds on which every kind of collective institution and progress rely.*

ZEID RA'AD AL HUSSEIN, HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS<sup>1</sup>

### Development and trends, 2015

THE ILLICIT TRANSFER, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons remained a concern for States throughout 2015. Such concern demonstrated the critical importance of the regulation of international transfers of conventional arms and the prevention of their misuse, diversion and trafficking.

Against this background, 2015 saw the convening of the First Conference of States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty, which provided guidance for setting up the infrastructure to support the implementation of the Treaty, including important decisions related to the Treaty secretariat, the organization of meetings of States parties, the establishment of subsidiary bodies and the financing for these bodies and their activities.

In September, world leaders adopted the Agenda for Sustainable Development, which includes 17 Sustainable Development Goals, supported by 169 targets to be achieved by 2030.<sup>2</sup> Two targets under the Agenda's Goal 16 can potentially strengthen national and international efforts to improve conventional arms controls, combat arms trafficking and address the scourge of armed violence. Target 16.1 calls for a significant reduction of armed violence and related death rates, and Target 16.4 aims to significantly reduce illicit arms flows. These targets open the door for mainstreaming the prevention and combating of trafficking in conventional arms into broader development efforts.

Another promising trend has been the adoption by the United Nations Security Council of resolutions dealing with the issue of small arms. In 2015, the Council broadened the scope of its biennial consideration of the issue to address not only small arms but also light weapons. The ensuing Security Council resolution on small arms and light weapons (SALW), resolution 2220

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<sup>1</sup> Address to the United Nations Security Council's 7442nd meeting, New York, 13 May 2015. Available from <http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc11889.doc.htm> (accessed 16 June 2016).

<sup>2</sup> See General Assembly resolution 70/1 of 25 September 2015.

(2015), was hailed as an important reaffirmation of the Council's growing concern over the negative impact of the proliferation of illicit SALW on efforts to prevent and reduce armed conflict and to implement peacebuilding measures in countries affected by such conflict.

Convening the second Open-ended Meeting of Governmental Experts on small arms in 2015 was a clear reminder that the issue of SALW remains high on the agenda of the General Assembly. This meeting underscored that the International Tracing Instrument must be seen as a living instrument that, to remain relevant, needs to keep pace with new developments in SALW technologies.

Meanwhile, the increase in 2015 in the use of practical standards and guidelines developed by the United Nations, such as the International Small Arms Control Standards and the complementary International Ammunition Technical Guidelines, in assisting States to develop and implement effective national controls continues to be a highly promising trend. The utilization of these guidelines in 2015 continued to bring much-needed consistency and coherence to the approaches and assistance provided to Member States by United Nations entities and other actors in the area of small arms control. The increased use of these standards by Governments and by expert organizations in 2015 demonstrated the growing recognition of their practical value.

Another significant development in 2015 was the adoption by consensus of the General Assembly's first resolution on the issue of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). In resolution 70/46 of 7 December, the Assembly encouraged States to undertake a number of measures to combat the threat posed by IEDs and requested the Secretary-General to submit a report on the matter to the seventy-first session of the Assembly.

Other legal frameworks related to conventional arms, the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) and the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), marked important developments in 2015. The First CCM Review Conference convened in Dubrovnik, Croatia, from 7 to 11 September. The Conference adopted the Dubrovnik Declaration and the Dubrovnik Action Plan,<sup>3</sup> which demonstrated States parties' strong resolve to ending the humanitarian suffering caused by the use of cluster munitions.

The CCW States parties convened the second Meeting of Experts on lethal autonomous weapon systems, during which there was strong support among States parties for continuing to address this issue in the context of the CCW. The Convention also continued to make strides towards universalization with the accession of Algeria and the State of Palestine in 2015.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> CCM/CONF/2015/7, annex I and III.

<sup>4</sup> The accessions of Algeria (6 May 2015) and the State of Palestine (5 January 2015) have increased the total States parties to the Convention to 121 as at the end of 2015.

## **Arms Trade Treaty**

The historic adoption of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)<sup>5</sup> in 2013 marked a significant point in the international community's efforts to regulate the global trade in conventional arms and to promote peace and security. As at the end of 2015, close to two thirds of United Nations Member States had signed the ATT since its opening for signature on 3 June 2013<sup>6</sup> and 79 States had ratified or acceded to it.<sup>7</sup>

The impact of the Treaty's entry into force began to be felt in 2015, as the Treaty's obligations were cited in a range of calls made by civil society advocates and parliamentarians seeking to ensure responsibility and accountability in cases of alleged irresponsible transfers involving States parties.

### **First Conference of States Parties**

Pursuant to article 17 (1) of the Treaty, States parties began preparations for the First Conference of States Parties, required to be held within a year of the Treaty's entry into force. Matters to be addressed in the Conference included the adoption of the rules of procedure, the adoption of financial rules for the Conference and for the funding of any subsidiary bodies, and the consideration of the tasks and budget of the ATT Secretariat.

Preparations for the First Conference of States Parties to the ATT commenced in 2015 with the convening of two formal preparatory meetings. The First Preparatory Meeting was convened on 23 and 24 February in Port of Spain, with a second held in Geneva from 6 to 8 July. In addition to these meetings, informal consultations were held on 20 and 21 April in Vienna.

The issue of the location and institutional arrangements of the ATT Secretariat proved to be particularly challenging during the preparations for Conference. Three States parties, namely Austria, Switzerland and Trinidad and Tobago, offered to host the ATT Secretariat in Vienna, Geneva and Port of Spain, respectively. While many States parties supported Vienna and Geneva, as both cities host a number of international organizations and therefore already have relevant experts in place, the Latin American and Caribbean States parties, as well as some African States parties, favoured Port of Spain as the host of the ATT Secretariat. The view was expressed that the current

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<sup>5</sup> The treaty text and adherence status are available from <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/att> (accessed 28 June 2016).

<sup>6</sup> The ATT has 130 signatories. The Treaty was open for signature from 3 June 2013 until its entry into force on 24 December 2014.

<sup>7</sup> With the adoption of the ATT, States set international standards to help guide Governments in deciding whether or not to authorize arms transfers and established a mechanism to provide cooperation and assistance related to regulatory systems and safe stockpiles.

geographical distribution of international treaty secretariats is imbalanced in favour of Europe.

With regard to the institutional arrangements of the ATT Secretariat, there were divergent views as to whether it should be embedded in another organization, such as the United Nations, or if it should be a stand-alone secretariat. Although the former option would have significant practical advantages, as the ATT Secretariat would benefit from the administrative and logistical support of the organization in which it were embedded, a large number of States parties were in favour of an independent secretariat. In this context, the issue of the relationship between the ATT Secretariat and the United Nations was discussed among States parties. Some States parties expressed the view that the ATT Secretariat should have a formal link with the United Nations, while others cautioned against a formal link arguing that it may enable non-State party Member States of the United Nations to exert influence over the instrument.

There were also divergent views on matters related to the rules of procedure for the conferences of States parties, especially the rules governing decision-making. Formulating language on the rule for decision-making on matters of substance proved particularly challenging. While it was generally agreed that a two-thirds majority would be needed for the adoption of decisions on matters of substance submitted to a vote, the States parties diverged on whether the rule should require that every effort should be made to reach consensus on such matters before deciding to submit them to a vote. Equally controversial was the issue of the role of the President of the Conference in the pursuit of consensus.<sup>8</sup>

In the context of ongoing consultations on these matters, the Conference was held from 24 to 27 August in Cancún, Mexico. It was attended by 119 States,<sup>9</sup> of which 67 were States parties, 40 were non-State party signatories and 11 were observers; the Conference's final report<sup>10</sup> noted that the Niger, which also attended the Conference, had ratified the ATT but was not yet a State party. The Conference opened with a high-level ministerial segment, including a panel of United Nations and civil society representatives, as well as Mexican government officials. Subsequently, States parties offered general statements.

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<sup>8</sup> Rule 33 (1) of the rules of procedure adopted at the first Conference of States Parties provides that "The Conference shall make every effort to achieve consensus on matters of substance. In a last attempt to reach consensus, the President shall consider deferring action on that decision for a period up to 24 hours, provided that a decision can be reached before the end of the current session of the Conference." See ATT/CSP1/2015/WP.1/Rev.1.

<sup>9</sup> ATT, document ATT/CSP1/2015/5. Available from [http://www.thearmstradetreaty.org/images/PARTICIPANTS\\_LIST\\_ATT\\_CSP1\\_2015\\_5.pdf](http://www.thearmstradetreaty.org/images/PARTICIPANTS_LIST_ATT_CSP1_2015_5.pdf) (accessed 16 June 2016).

<sup>10</sup> ATT, document ATT/CSP1/2015/6. Available from [http://www.thearmstradetreaty.org/images/ATT\\_CSP1\\_2015\\_6.pdf](http://www.thearmstradetreaty.org/images/ATT_CSP1_2015_6.pdf) (accessed 16 June 2016).

Among the decisions taken, the Conference decided by consensus to locate the ATT Secretariat in Geneva as a stand-alone entity, and to hold its Second Conference of States Parties in 2016 in Geneva.<sup>11</sup>

Other decisions taken at the Conference included the selection of the Interim Head of the ATT Secretariat, the adoption of the rules of procedure for the conferences of States parties, the financial regulations for conferences and matters related to the ATT Secretariat. States parties also established the Management Committee to oversee financial matters, as well as matters related to the ATT Secretariat.<sup>12</sup>

Although a number of the decisions required by the Conference were taken, several others remained outstanding. The structure of the ATT Secretariat, the design of reporting templates and the establishment of an ATT trust fund were among the issues that the Conference was not able to agree on. On the issue of reporting templates, the Conference decided to “take note” of the templates, as contained in ATT/CSP1/2015/WP.4/Rev.2, that were offered by the Sweden facilitator on matters related to reporting but was unable to adopt them by consensus. The Conference decided to establish an informal working group on reporting with a view to continuing work on this matter.

To address the range of outstanding issues, including reporting, States parties decided to convene an extraordinary session of the Second Conference of States Parties, scheduled for early 2016 in Geneva.<sup>13</sup>

The Conference also elected Emmanuel E. Imohe (Nigeria) as President of the second Conference, which will take place in the second half of 2016 in Geneva.

## **Small arms and light weapons**

With the adoption in 2015 of the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda,<sup>14</sup> Member States recognized the role of addressing the illicit trade in arms as an integral part of the world’s social and economic development efforts. In 2015, the international community continued to acknowledge that illicit flows of small arms and light weapons (SALW), in particular,

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<sup>11</sup> With regard to the selection of the interim Head of the ATT Secretariat, three candidates were considered: Paul Beijer (Sweden), Dumisani Dladla (South Africa) and Guy Pollard as an independent candidate. Following presentations by the candidates to the Conference and informal consultations, the Conference selected the representative of South Africa to serve for a period of one year until the Second Conference of States Parties.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> ATT article 17 (5) states, “Extraordinary meetings of the Conference of States Parties shall be held at such other times as may be deemed necessary by the Conference of States Parties, or at the written request of any State Party provided that this request is supported by at least two-thirds of the States Parties.”

<sup>14</sup> More information is available from <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/?menu=1300> (accessed 16 June 2016).

undermine security and the rule of law and are often a factor behind the forced displacement of civilians and human rights violations.

### **Security Council**

On 13 May, the Security Council held an open debate on the issue of SALW on the basis of the Secretary-General's report on the subject contained in S/2015/289. This debate built on positive developments related to addressing the illicit flow of SALW following adoption of the first Security Council resolution on small arms, resolution 2117 (2013). In 2015, the Council adopted a second resolution on this issue, resolution 2220 (2015), by a vote of nine in favour and none against, with six abstentions.<sup>15, 16</sup>

Through the 2015 resolution, the Security Council identified a range of areas in which international cooperation could be bolstered, recognizing the importance of well-targeted and monitored sanctions regimes, appropriate United Nations peacekeeping mandates, effective reintegration and demobilization programmes, security sector reform and the role of women. The Council also called for enhanced reporting synergies on the illicit use of small arms, particularly with regard to the protection of civilians in armed conflict and in the context of counter-terrorism efforts. It further noted the utility of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms in helping sanctions committees determine if an exemption to an arms embargo was justified. Finally, the Council created a precedent in acknowledging the urgent need to address the issue of ammunition in the context of small arms regulation.

### **Programme of Action on the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons**

#### ***Periodic review of implementation***

Since the adoption of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects in 2001, Member States have worked to implement the Programme of Action at the national, regional and international levels. Similarly, States have sought means of enhancing implementation of the complementary International Tracing Instrument, which was adopted in 2005 within the framework of the Programme of Action.

A review conference is convened every six years to assess progress in the implementation of these two agreements. The most recent review conference

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<sup>15</sup> Angola, Chad, China, Nigeria, Russian Federation and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of).

<sup>16</sup> The Security Council began giving specific focus to the issue of small arms in 1999, when it held its first open debate in small arms that resulted in an unprecedented Presidential Statement on small arms (S/PRST/1999/28). In 2007, another Presidential Statement was issued (S/PRST/2007/24).

was held in New York in 2012. Between review conferences, the United Nations convenes biennial meetings of States, in which Governments discuss challenges and opportunities for the implementation of these instruments. Additionally, Governments have twice agreed to hold open-ended meetings of governmental experts that aim to benefit from the expertise of technical specialists on matters pertaining to small arms control.

### **Second Open-ended Meeting of Governmental Experts**

The second Open-ended Meeting of Governmental Experts, held in New York from 1 to 5 June, had a technical mandate and was aimed to allow free discussion of topics among experts on the full and effective implementation of the Programme of Action. The Meeting resulted in the Chair's summary<sup>17</sup> and as such did not represent a negotiated consensus outcome document.

The Secretary-General's 2014 report<sup>18</sup> on new technologies set the tone for the Meeting, which considered new developments in SALW technologies and their implications for the implementation of the Programme of Action and the International Tracing Instrument. The report was prepared pursuant to the request made by Member States at the Second Review Conference for the Programme of Action in 2012.<sup>19</sup> Member States requested that the Secretary-General submit an initial report, drawing on the views of States, for their consideration at relevant future meetings on, inter alia, the implications of recent developments in manufacturing, technology and design for effective marking, record-keeping and tracing of SALW.

During the Meeting, States considered that recent developments in such technologies had the potential to both positively and negatively impact the illicit arms trade. States also reflected on other technological advances related to the illicit trade in SALW, such as the use of polymers and interchangeable or modular parts. In the same vein, States considered the development of three-dimensional (3D) printing of weapons, which offer the possibility of new forms of "craft production", thus posing additional control challenges. Other technologies with potential positive effects for marking and tracing of weapons were discussed such as pin codes and fingerprint technology. Likewise, "microstamping", by which a code is imprinted on the weapon or on the cartridge as the weapon is fired, was recognized as one of several new options for weapons tracing. Participants also focused on the issue of the possible transfer of such technologies as part of international cooperation and assistance under the Programme of Action.

The Meeting was broadly considered a successful expert meeting, during which several key issues emerged. These included the potential need,

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<sup>17</sup> Available from <https://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/salw/mge2> (accessed 16 June 2016).

<sup>18</sup> A/CONF.192/BMS/2014/1.

<sup>19</sup> See A/CONF.192/2012/RC/4.

as formulated by a number of States, to update the International Tracing Instrument, which could entail the development of additional guidance related to modular weapons, 3D printing and stockpile management technology.

The Meeting also addressed the issue of ammunition with several States calling for the consideration of this matter under the Programme of Action. While the issue of ammunition remained generally divisive, the growing call to include ammunition within the framework of the Programme of Action was encouraged by the Secretary-General in his 2015 report<sup>20</sup> to the Security Council on the issue of SALW, which encouraged a greater focus on ammunition and the inclusion of the issue of ammunition in the ensuing Security Council resolution (resolution 2220 (2015)).

A call for a dedicated trust fund for the full and effective implementation of the Programme of Action was made at the Meeting. Some States indicated that the existing facilities of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), including the United Nations Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation (UNSCAR), were already performing such a function (for more information on UNSCAR, see page 94).

### **Coordinating Action on Small Arms**

Seven meetings of the Coordinating Action on Small Arms (CASA), the internal coordination mechanism for the United Nations on matters pertaining to small arms, ammunition and the arms trade, were held in 2015. CASA continued to meet regularly via videoconference, linking New York, Geneva and Vienna. In recent years, the 23 United Nations partners<sup>21</sup> of CASA collectively addressed relevant policy issues, such as the Arms Trade Treaty, the development of voluntary implementation standards and guidelines, the reduction and prevention of armed violence and conventional ammunition stockpile management.

In 2015, CASA continued to carry out activities to enhance coordination and integration within the United Nations system on multidisciplinary issues related to small arms. Such activities included the provision of coordinated inputs into the Secretary-General's report to the Security Council on small arms, delivery of joint statements, support to UNSCAR and oversight of the implementation of the International Small Arms Control Standards project.

Importantly, CASA partners exchanged views and explored approaches for achieving Targets 16.1 and 16.4 of Sustainable Development Goal 16, related to the reduction of all forms of violence and the reduction of illicit arms flows.<sup>22</sup> CASA also discussed relevant human rights issues related to Human Rights Commission resolution 29/10 of 2 July 2015.

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<sup>20</sup> S/2015/289.

<sup>21</sup> Available from <http://www.poa-iss.org/CASA/CASA.aspx> (accessed 16 June 2016).

<sup>22</sup> See General Assembly resolution 70/1 of 25 September 2015.

### **Group of Interested States in Practical Disarmament Measures**

In 2015, the Group of Interested States in Practical Disarmament Measures (GIS) continued to support the United Nations small arms process. Established in 1998 and mandated by the General Assembly, the GIS continued to work to facilitate consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures.<sup>23</sup> In 2015, GIS focused specifically on the facilitation of international assistance in the implementation of the Programme of Action on small arms. In this vein, the meetings of GIS provided opportunities to share lessons learned from projects implemented in the Sahel region, enhance financial support to UNSCAR and explore possible cross-cutting approaches between practical disarmament and the global development agenda, particularly pertaining to the reduction of illicit arms flows.

In particular, on the margins of the second Open-ended Meeting of Governmental Experts, a GIS meeting was convened by the Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations in its capacity as Co-Chair of the GIS. UNODA serves as the other Co-Chair. The meeting was held on 3 June, during which preparations for the sixth Biennial Meeting of States in 2016 and the 2018 Review Conference of the Programme of Action were presented. Also featured was a briefing on conflict-tracing in Africa by the Director of the non-governmental organization Conflict Armament Research.

### **International Small Arms Control Standards**

In 2015, the United Nations, international and regional organizations and training institutes continued to utilize the International Small Arms Control Standards (ISACS)<sup>24</sup> to assist the Governments of more than 80 countries in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean and South-East Europe to build more effective national controls over SALW.<sup>25</sup>

Examples of national capacity-building in 2015, which drew heavily on ISACS, include the promotion of better SALW control in the Pacific Region by the Pacific Small Arms Action Group, support provided by the United Nations Development Programme to the Government of Nepal to assess the safety and security of SALW stockpiles, support to the Government of Madagascar to combat organized cattle raiding in the south of the country, and support to the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina on raising awareness of the potential

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<sup>23</sup> See General Assembly resolution 52/38 G, operative paragraph 4, of 9 December 1997.

<sup>24</sup> Further information is available from <http://www.smallarmsstandards.org/isacs/> (accessed 14 June 2016).

<sup>25</sup> The ISACS provide voluntary, practical guidance on putting in place effective national controls over the full life cycle of small arms, so as to reduce the risk of their falling into the hands of criminals, terrorists and those who would misuse them. ISACS are developed by more than 20 United Nations entities that participate in CASA, in cooperation with experts worldwide. For more detailed information on the formulation of the ISACS, see <http://www.smallarmsstandards.org/> (accessed 16 June 2016).

dangers of small arms. Other related capacity-building activities were the following:

- Support provided by the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean to the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Peru on matters of small arms control;
- Assistance provided by the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa to Togo in the context of election preparations;
- SALW capacity-building support provided by the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific to Bangladesh and the Philippines;
- An initiative by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) to harmonize end-user controls over conventional weapons;
- Assistance provided by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime to West African States in strengthening SALW stockpile management;
- Ongoing joint United Nations efforts to build the capacity of Somalia to manage arms imported under the partially suspended arms embargo.

Full details of these and other uses of ISACS in 2015 are available from [www.smallarmsstandards.org/isacs-news](http://www.smallarmsstandards.org/isacs-news).

In 2015, an ISACS Assessment Tool,<sup>26</sup> developed by UNIDIR, was downloaded by over 100 organizations operating in more than 50 countries. The Tool facilitates the application of the standards in the design, monitoring and evaluation of small arms control policies, programmes and practices, and assists in the conduct of national self-assessments of SALW controls.

CASA released an additional ISACS module (ISACS 03.30, entitled “National regulation of civilian access to small arms and light weapons”) in 2015, bringing the total number of modules now available for download from the ISACS website to 13. Operational ISACS modules were also translated into French.

## **Ammunition**

In 2015, the Security Council paid particular attention to the issue of ammunition both during its open debate on small arms and light weapons in May and through the subsequent adoption of a second resolution on small arms, resolution 2220 (2015). Work related to the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG) also continued in 2015, which were developed

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<sup>26</sup> Available from <http://www.smallarmsstandards.org/tools/> (accessed 16 June 2016).

in response to the request of the General Assembly to develop guidelines for adequate ammunition management.<sup>27</sup>

### **International Ammunition Technical Guidelines**

In 2015, the United Nations SaferGuard Programme focused on updating the IATG; furthering cooperation with expert stakeholders, such as the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, the Mines Advisory Group and the Small Arms Survey; and improving coordinated certification procedures.<sup>28</sup>

An updated version of the IATG (Version 2)<sup>29</sup> was released in 2015. The IATG were regularly reviewed to reflect developing ammunition stockpile management norms and practices and to incorporate changes due to amendments to appropriate international regulations and requirements.

As in previous years, the General Assembly considered the United Nations SaferGuard Programme, including the IATG, under a resolution entitled “Problems arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus” (70/35), adopted on 7 December. In this resolution, the Assembly invited States to identify their surplus ammunition and to assist one another with destruction efforts, noted the release of the updated IATG in 2015 and welcomed their continued application in the field. Moreover, it welcomed the establishment of the SaferGuard quick-response mechanism, which allowed ammunition experts to be deployed rapidly to assist States in the urgent management of ammunition stockpiles, including in the aftermath of unintended explosions of ammunition, and encouraged States wishing to improve their national stockpile management capacity to contact the SaferGuard programme.

### **Improvised explosive devices**

In 2015, Afghanistan took the lead within the General Assembly to develop a resolution focused on the need for an effective global, comprehensive and coordinated approach to counter the proliferation of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in settings of violent extremism and instability.

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<sup>27</sup> See General Assembly resolution 63/61 of 2 December 2008.

<sup>28</sup> The United Nations SaferGuard Programme oversees the dissemination of the IATG, which are detailed standards for voluntary use by countries that wish to improve the safety and security of their ammunition storage sites. In 2011, the General Assembly welcomed the completion of the IATG, as well as the establishment of the United Nations SaferGuard Programme for ammunition stockpile management.

<sup>29</sup> Available from <http://www.un.org/disarmament/un-safeguard/guide-lines/> (accessed 16 June 2016).

In resolution 70/46, adopted by consensus on 7 December, the General Assembly included a call for the consistent collection of data, awareness-raising, options for the regulation of components, international technical assistance, cooperation and victim assistance. Furthermore, the Assembly highlighted the need for increased assistance, better training and improved international coordination.

Through the resolution, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to prepare a report to the Assembly for its seventy-first session, providing initial building blocks and recommendations for ways forward on the matter of addressing the threat posed by IEDs.

## **Transparency in conventional arms transfers and military expenditures**

### **United Nations Register of Conventional Arms**

The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) was established by the General Assembly in 1991, with a view to promoting transparency in international transfers of conventional arms. Under UNROCA, Member States of the United Nations annually report on their exports and imports of conventional arms that took place in the previous calendar year, according to the following seven categories: (a) battle tanks; (b) armoured combat vehicles; (c) large-calibre artillery systems; (d) combat aircraft; (e) attack helicopters; (f) warships; and (g) missiles and missile launchers. Member States are also encouraged to provide additional background information, such as their military holdings, procurement through national production and international transfers of small arms and light weapons (SALW).

Submission of reports to the Register is voluntary, and the submitted reports are published in reports of the Secretary-General and in a United Nations database available from <https://www.unroca.org/>.

### **Annual report to UNROCA**

UNROCA derives its mandate from the resolution of the General Assembly entitled “Transparency in armaments”. In 2013, the General Assembly decided that this resolution was thereafter to be adopted on a triennial basis. Consequently, no new resolution was submitted for the seventieth session of the General Assembly’s First Committee, which convened in 2015.


Pursuant to the most recent resolution on this issue (68/43), UNODA sent a note verbale in February to all Member States calling for the submission of reports to UNROCA for the calendar year 2014. In response, 54 States submitted reports, including “nil reports”, on transfer of conventional arms that took place in 2014. Of these, 35 submissions were included in the report

of the Secretary-General on the matter and 12 were in the addenda to the report.<sup>30</sup> All the reports, including seven that were received after the issuance of the addenda, are available in the electronic database of UNROCA.

The number of reports received in 2015 represented a slight decrease from the previous year, when 58 States submitted reports to the Register. Of the 54 reports received in 2015, 11 were “nil” reports, meaning that the submitting States had no transfers of weapons in the seven UNROCA categories in 2014. Twenty-eight reports contained information on exports and 26 contained information on imports in the seven categories. In addition, 24 States provided background information on military holdings, 17 on procurement through national production and 37 on international transfers of SALW.

A table listing the reports received by the Secretary-General, as well as the kind of information included in those reports, is presented in annex I to this chapter. The percentage of reports containing information on transfers of small arms is shown in the figure below. The complete list of States that have provided information on international transfers of small arms since 2004 is presented in annex II to this chapter.

### Reporting on small arms and light weapons transfers as a percentage of total submitted reports



As in the previous years, the rate of participation by Member States differed significantly from region to region. The rates remained high for Eastern Europe (17 of 23 States) and Western Europe and other States (22 of 30 States), but were much lower for the other regions: Africa (0 of 54 States); Asia and the Pacific (8 of 53 States); Latin America and the Caribbean (7 of 33 States), as shown in Table 1.

<sup>30</sup> A/70/168 and Add.1.

**Table 1. Regional participation of Member States in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms: 2006-2015**

<i>Total Member States by region</i>	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Africa (54)	16	15	8	4	4	2	2	2	1	0
Asia and the Pacific (53)	27	26	21	18	16	18	11	13	9	8
Eastern Europe (23)	21	22	22	19	19	21	16	19	19	17
Latin America and the Caribbean (33)	21	20	11	13	8	17	6	9	8	7
Western Europe and other States (30)	30	30	29	26	25	27	21	26	21	22
<b>Total</b>	<b>115</b>	<b>113</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>54</b>

### **UNROCA database**

UNROCA presents the data provided by States on the interactive, map-based information platform “The Global Reported Arms Trade”,<sup>31</sup> which contains information submitted by Member States to UNROCA since 1992. The site allows officials, researchers, journalists and the general public to view, gather and compare the UNROCA data submitted by Member States, such as direct comparison of data on any transfer submitted by exporting and importing States.

The database has an accompanying online reporting facility that enables Member States to enter and submit their annual reports directly into the database, thus greatly enhancing the efficiency of the operation of UNROCA.

### **Objective information on military matters, including transparency of military expenditures**

The United Nations Report on Military Expenditures<sup>32</sup> is a commitment established by the General Assembly in 1980 to increase transparency in military spending. Under the relevant resolution, Member States are called upon to voluntarily provide information on their military expenditures for the latest fiscal year for which data are available. Member States are encouraged to provide such information in the templates developed by the United Nations using the standardized or simplified form or, for those Member States who did not have military expenditures, to provide “nil reports”. The United Nations makes the submitted information publicly available through reports of the Secretary-General and an online database.

<sup>31</sup> Available from <https://www.unroca.org/> (accessed 14 June 2016).

<sup>32</sup> It was originally called the Standardized Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures and was renamed in 2011 as a result of a review of the instrument by a group of governmental experts.

### **Annual report on military expenditures**

Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 68/23 of 5 December 2013, UNODA sent a note verbale in February to all Member States calling for the submission of reports on States' annual military expenditures. In response, 46 States submitted reports, including four "nil reports". The report of the Secretary-General on the matter included 36 of the submissions received and the addendum to the report contained seven submissions.<sup>33</sup> All the military expenditure reports, including three that were received after the issuance of the addendum, are available in the electronic database.<sup>34</sup>

The number of reports submitted in 2015 declined in relation to 2014, when 68 Member States submitted reports. A table listing all reports received by the Secretary-General, as well as the kind of information received, is included in annex III to this chapter.

In 2015, as in previous years, the rate of participation varied greatly across regions. The regional distribution of the States that reported in 2015 was as follows: 1 from Africa; 7 from Asia and the Pacific; 14 from Eastern Europe; 7 from Latin America and the Caribbean; and 17 from Western Europe and other States (see table 2). This regional distribution is noticeably similar to the distribution of reporting under UNROCA.

**Table 2. Regional participation of Member States in the United Nations Report on Military Expenditures: 2006-2015**

<i>Total Member States by region</i>	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Africa (54)	4	2	5	2	4	3	2	3	4	1
Asia and the Pacific (53)	17	15	13	9	13	11	9	4	11	7
Eastern Europe (22)	19	19	21	19	17	20	14	21	19	14
Latin America and the Caribbean (33)	14	14	11	7	5	10	11	11	12	7
Western Europe and other States (30)	26	28	27	21	21	23	16	22	22	17
<b>Total</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>46</b>

<sup>33</sup> See A/70/139 and Add.1.

<sup>34</sup> Available from <http://www.un-arm.org/Milex/home.aspx> (accessed 16 June 2016).

## **United Nations Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation in Arms Regulation**

The year 2015 marked the third year of operation of the United Nations Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation in Arms Regulation (UNSCAR), which was established in 2013 to serve as a multi-donor flexible funding mechanism for projects aimed at supporting the implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty and the Programme of Action. In this respect, UNSCAR aims to improve the effectiveness of assistance through better coordination and matching of needs with resources. Since its inception, UNSCAR has funded 39 projects for a total amount of US\$ 5.89 million. These projects focused on activities to support the ratification, accession and implementation of the Treaty, to assist in the implementation of the Programme of Action and to explore synergies in the implementation of those two instruments.<sup>35</sup>

In the 2014-2015 cycle, UNSCAR funded 18 projects from implementing partners from all three eligible categories (United Nations entities, regional organizations and civil society organizations). These projects produced a variety of outputs, including the drafting of model legislation on arms trade, the development of online training modules, the adoption of a bilateral border control action plan and the organization of practical training courses on weapons destruction and stockpile management. In addition, 11 projects were selected for implementation in 2016, including projects that will support the sixth Biennial Meeting of States to consider the implementation of the Programme of Action.

Projects are funded through an annual competitive call for proposals, which is published on the UNSCAR website in the second quarter of each year. In addition, UNSCAR funds “special-circumstances projects” in response to emergency situations requiring rapid intervention. These projects are not constrained by the call for proposals and can therefore be submitted at any time during the year.

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<sup>35</sup> See the UNSCAR website (available from <https://www.un.org/disarmament/UNSCAR/> (accessed 16 June 2016)) for more information, including funded projects in 2013 and 2014, as well as selected proposals in 2015 and donor countries.

## Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons

*The CCW and its Protocols are among the most vital tools at the international community's disposal to ensure that this and future generations enjoy a safer and more secure world.*

**BAN KI-MOON, UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL**<sup>36</sup>

The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)<sup>37</sup> is an instrument of international humanitarian law that addresses weapons deemed “excessively injurious” or to have “indiscriminate effects”. Its five Protocols address weapons that injure by fragments undetectable by X-ray; landmines and other devices; incendiary weapons; blinding laser weapons; and explosive remnants of war. The following are highlights of work carried out under the CCW in 2015: the convening of the second Meeting of Experts on lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS); the continued progress on universalization (Algeria and the State of Palestine joined the Convention);<sup>38</sup> the improved reporting rate under the CCW compliance mechanism, with the highest number of reports submitted in 2015;<sup>39</sup> and the start of preparations for the Fifth Review Conference in 2016.

### **Informal Meeting of Experts on lethal autonomous weapon systems**

For the second year, CCW States parties held an informal Meeting of Experts on LAWS. The meeting took place from 13 to 17 April in Geneva and was chaired by Michael Biontino (Germany), assisted by the Friends of the Chair.<sup>40</sup> The Meeting commenced with a general exchange of views followed

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<sup>36</sup> Message to the 2015 Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, as read out by Michael Møller, Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva, Geneva, 12 November 2015. Available from [http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/\(httpAssets\)/4C3E13ED17F9DF57C1257F5B005E44A0/\\$file/2015\\_CCW\\_MHP\\_Director+General+Speech.pdf](http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/4C3E13ED17F9DF57C1257F5B005E44A0/$file/2015_CCW_MHP_Director+General+Speech.pdf) (accessed 16 June 2016).

<sup>37</sup> The full name is the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects. The CCW entered into force on 2 December 1983. Its text and adherence status are available from <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/ccwc> (accessed 16 June 2016).

<sup>38</sup> The accessions of Algeria (6 May 2015) and the State of Palestine (5 January 2015) have increased the total States parties to the Convention to 121.

<sup>39</sup> In 2015, 55 States parties submitted national reports under the CCW compliance mechanism, a modest progress compared to the 52 reports submitted in 2014.

<sup>40</sup> Serving as Friends of the Chair were the following: Yvette Stevens (Sierra Leone) and Urs Schmid (Switzerland) on technical issues; Päivi Kairamo (Finland) and Youngjip Ahn (Republic of Korea) on characteristics of LAWS; Zsuzsanna Horvath (Hungary) on possible challenges to IHL due to increasing degrees of autonomy; Marta Mauras (Chile) and Ravinatha Aryasinha (Sri Lanka) on overarching issues; and Filloreta Kodra (Albania) on transparency.

by five substantive sessions.<sup>41</sup> Each session commenced with introductory presentations from experts in their respective fields of expertise. The first two substantive sessions addressed technical issues, such as the state of play concerning the development of autonomous technologies and autonomy in weapon systems; where and when these technologies become feasible in combat; and the technical challenges to be overcome towards developing fully autonomous weapon systems, particularly with regard to the identification of targets.

The third substantive session focused on the military rationale for autonomous functions in weapon systems and the possible reasons for limiting such functions. The experts underlined the fact that LAWS had the potential to provide a State with technological superiority, advanced military capabilities and greater protection for their troops. Technology already outperforms human performance in areas such as disseminating large amounts of information in a complex environment, facial recognition and flight navigation. How LAWS will be utilized in the future was a topic of much debate. Whereas some experts argued that the objective of these weapon systems was to be fully autonomous, others made the case that such systems could not replace humans at the tactical or strategic levels but instead would supplement certain functions in low levels of operation.

To pave the way for an eventual definition of LAWS, a session on the characteristics of LAWS addressed how autonomous weapon systems could be differentiated from other weapon systems. This session also addressed how dual-use technology could impede the differentiation of civilian from military applications. There was an intense debate on the concept of “meaningful human control”, with several delegations assessing the concept as vague and unhelpful, whereas others called for further exploration as to how the concept could identify what were and were not LAWS.

The discussions on international humanitarian law (IHL) examined the level of human supervision of a weapon system implicit in the targeting rules, given the increasing trend towards autonomy in weapon systems. Delegations also discussed the need to clarify applicable IHL rules. The International Committee of the Red Cross noted that the use of LAWS in compliance with IHL would depend on a range of factors, such as the system’s specific tasks, whether it was offensive or defensive, the context in which it was used (air, ground or sea) and the system’s level of mobility. While there were calls for the prohibition of LAWS, others referred to the detailed requirements of the current targeting rules and cautioned against prematurely regulating such weapons. A prominent issue was legal weapons reviews, as required under both

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<sup>41</sup> The substantive sessions discussed the following: (a) technical issues; (b) characteristics of LAWS; (c) possible challenges to international humanitarian law due to increasing degrees of autonomy; (d) overarching issues; and (e) transparency.

article 36 of the Additional Protocol I of 1977<sup>42</sup> and customary international law. Encouraging more States to implement legal weapons reviews, ensuring that States had the legal and technical capacities for carrying robust testing of new systems and sharing best practices in a multilateral forum are a few examples of the proposals put forward. At the same time, there were questions as to whether these essentially national processes could contribute to building trust and confidence among States.

The other three substantive sessions of the Meeting of Experts addressed human rights, ethics, international and regional security and the role of transparency. In the session on the way forward, there was strong support for continuing the work on the issue of LAWS within the framework of the CCW. The two most anticipated issues that will feature prominently in CCW work in 2016 and merit further consideration are how to move forward on LAWS and what should be the end result. In accordance with the Meeting of Experts' mandate, the Chairperson prepared a report<sup>43</sup> under his own responsibility, which was submitted to the Meeting of the High Contracting Parties.

### **Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons**

The Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the CCW, chaired by Ravinatha P. Aryasinha (Sri Lanka), was held in Geneva on 12 and 13 November.<sup>44</sup> Key issues on the agenda were LAWS, mines other than anti-personnel mines and preparations for the Fifth CCW Review Conference in 2016. During the general exchange of views, delegations addressed the issue on LAWS and what should be the way forward within the framework of the CCW.<sup>45</sup> Some delegations considered LAWS to be a new issue requiring further discussion, while others considered the possibility of addressing specific aspects of LAWS, such as its definition and launching negotiations within a group of governmental experts, which was the forum used in the past under the CCW for negotiating legally binding instruments. The Meeting

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<sup>42</sup> "Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I)", *Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law applicable in Armed Conflicts*, vol. 1 (Bern, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 1978), pp. 115-183.

<sup>43</sup> CCW/MSP/2015/3.

<sup>44</sup> The Meeting's Final Report is contained in CCW/MSP/2015/9.

<sup>45</sup> Delegations that participated in the debate on LAWS were: Belgium, Brazil, China, Croatia, Cuba, France, Germany, India, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Pakistan, Poland, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, International Committee of the Red Cross, Article 36, Human Rights Watch and Open Roboethics Initiative.

decided to renew the mandate<sup>46</sup> to continue the discussions on LAWS. A new element in the mandate was the possibility of agreeing by consensus on recommendations for further work to be submitted to the Fifth Review Conference for its consideration.

Before the Meeting of the High Contracting Parties, UNODA, the United Nations Mine Action Service and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining jointly hosted a one-day informal meeting on mines other than anti-personnel mines (MOTAPM), otherwise known as anti-vehicle mines. While intensive work has been undertaken within the framework of the CCW on MOTAPM, whether or not this weapon requires further regulation under international humanitarian law remains a contentious issue. The informal meeting addressed the development of military doctrine on MOTAPM, the current status of international humanitarian law applicable to MOTAPM, the clearance challenges and developmental impact on affected States and the possible solutions.

During the Meeting of the High Contracting Parties, there was a robust debate on whether the current rules of international humanitarian law adequately addressed the humanitarian impact of MOTAPM.<sup>47</sup> While some delegations maintained that any problems posed by MOTAPM were due to inadequate implementation of CCW Amended Protocol II and the misuse of these weapons by non-state actors, others argued that there was a need for specific rules to address matters such as the detectability of MOTAPM and limiting their lifespan.

In preparation for the Fifth CCW Review Conference, States parties decided that the Preparatory Committee would take place from 31 August to 2 September 2016 and the Review Conference from 12 to 16 December 2016. Tehmina Janjua (Pakistan) was appointed President-designate of the Review Conference.

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<sup>46</sup> The mandate is the following: “The Meeting decided to convene an informal meeting of experts of up to five days during the week of 11 to 15 April 2016 to discuss further the questions related to emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS), in the context of the objectives and purposes of the Convention. The Chairperson of the meeting of experts will submit a report in his personal capacity to the 2016 Fifth Review Conference of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention. The meeting of experts may agree by consensus on recommendations for further work for consideration by the 2016 Fifth Review Conference.” The Meeting of Experts will be chaired by Michael Biontino (Germany) and will take place from 11 to 15 April 2016 in Geneva.

<sup>47</sup> States and organizations participating in the debate were the following: Belarus, China, Cuba, France, India, Ireland, Israel, Russian Federation, Switzerland, United States, the United Nations Mine Action Service on behalf of the United Nations Inter-Agency Coordination Group on Mine Action, UNODA and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining.

## **Amended Protocol II: Group of Experts and Seventeenth Annual Conference**

Amended Protocol II seeks to limit the indiscriminate damage caused by landmines, booby-traps and other devices, and requires States parties to take all feasible precautions to protect civilians when using these types of weapons. It is the only instrument of international humanitarian law that specifically addresses improvised explosive devices (IEDs). As at the end of 2015, there were 102 States parties to Amended Protocol II. Raimonds Jansons (Latvia) presided over the Seventeenth Annual Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II, held on 11 November, assisted by Fu Cong (China), Alice Guitton (France) and Francisco Villagrán de León (Guatemala), as Vice-Presidents.<sup>48</sup> The Group of Experts, whose meeting took place on 9 and 10 April, focused on the operation and status of the Protocol and IEDs. The work of the Group was led by the Coordinators,<sup>49</sup> who facilitated the substantive deliberations and conveyed the results of those discussions to the Seventeenth Annual Conference.

The discussions on IEDs in the Group of Experts' meeting covered five main topics: (a) the humanitarian impact of IEDs and their impact on the security of States; (b) the consideration of a one-time voluntary questionnaire<sup>50</sup> on national measures and international cooperation in countering IEDs; (c) information exchange on national measures and best practices; (d) the consideration of a database, portal or platform as a tool for information-sharing; (e) and the way ahead on IEDs.

Affected States continued to share their experiences of the overall impact that IEDs had on communities, development and governance. The rise of IED use in populated areas had a direct impact on the increase of humanitarian aid workers being killed or injured. A further consequence was the rising cost of humanitarian operations due to increased insurance costs. Afghanistan, Colombia and Mali spoke on their implementation of counter-IED measures. Afghanistan stated that the rule of law, security, governance, diplomatic engagement and public awareness were the five pillars of its counter-IED strategy. Colombia drew attention to the evolution of the devices used by armed actors in its territory. Owing to rapid development of the technology, Colombia has seen four generations of IEDs. Mali said that it was only beginning to deal with the IED problem as jihadists and drug traffickers currently used those devices to delineate their territories, posing a major challenge for the Government. Overall, insurgency tactics, the lack of

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<sup>48</sup> The final document of the Seventeenth Annual Conference is contained in CCW/AP.II/CONF.17/6.

<sup>49</sup> The Coordinators were the following: on the operation and status of Amended Protocol II, David Pusttai (Hungary); and on improvised explosive devices, Erwan Roche (France), assisted by the Co-Coordinator, Igor Moldovan (Republic of Moldova).

<sup>50</sup> CCW/AP.II/CONF.17/WP.1.

technical capacity in affected States and the rapid development of technology contributed to the ongoing challenges faced by these countries in mitigating the IED problem.

The purpose of launching a one-time voluntary questionnaire was to enhance international cooperation and assistance and strengthen national capacities in six key areas,<sup>51</sup> including through the creation of a network of national points of contact. States parties were expected to submit their responses to the CCW Implementation Support Unit by the end of October.

In view of a need for greater coordination at the international level to prevent the use of IEDs, Australia reported on its efforts and those of the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) to organize the first International Counter-IED Leaders' Forum,<sup>52</sup> which gathered key leaders from Government, law enforcement and the military sectors to bridge the information gap between law enforcement and military communities and to develop linkages between counter-IED and counter-terrorism efforts. The meeting highlighted the IED problem at the global level and the need to find a viable solution, requiring responses in multiple areas and on several levels, including in the operational, humanitarian and political sectors. A second meeting of the Leaders' Forum process is expected to take place in 2016.

On developing best practices, Australia provided a progress report of an existing information exchange database as a tool for improving information-sharing and strengthening cooperation among the States parties.<sup>53</sup> This issue will be the subject of further discussion as questions remain concerning which organization would host the database, data ownership and access restrictions.

The session on the way ahead provided States parties with an opportunity to discuss possible options for further work on IEDs ahead of the Fifth CCW Review Conference in 2016.

The Seventeenth Annual Conference agreed to continue work on IEDs in 2016,<sup>54</sup> in particular to focus on information exchange on national measures and best practices to prevent the diversion of explosives for use in IEDs and enhance information-sharing on detection and counter-measure techniques. The Conference also agreed to prepare a summary and an analysis of the responses received from States parties to the one-time questionnaire on national counter-IED frameworks.

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<sup>51</sup> These were risk assessment, legal framework, counter-IED organization, national point of contact for cooperation, expertise and capabilities open for cooperation and information-sharing.

<sup>52</sup> The Forum was held in Canberra from 2 to 4 September. Participants included the CCW ISU and representatives of 75 countries and five international organizations.

<sup>53</sup> The AXON Global IED Partnership trial, aimed at gathering information on IED incidents worldwide in order to help better understand the threat of its evolution and intended to create a network and improve cooperation, began in April 2014 and was in its final phase.

<sup>54</sup> CCW/AP.II/CONF.17/6, para. 29.

On the status and operation of Amended Protocol II,<sup>55</sup> the Group of Experts reviewed and assessed the information submitted under “Form E” of the national annual reporting form.<sup>56</sup> Under Form E, States parties are required to submit information on cooperation and assistance. The Implementation Support Unit presented the results of the analysis and found that seven States parties submitted information on their efforts to support cooperation and assistance; 20 States parties reported on assistance received. Of the 20, 2 had also provided assistance to other States. States parties needing assistance were advised to clearly specify the type of assistance they required.

During the year under review, 59 of the 102 States parties to Amended Protocol II submitted national annual reports. The Seventeenth Annual Conference agreed to task the Group of Experts<sup>57</sup> in 2016 to analyse the implementation of the Protocol by the States parties through the information provided by the States as submitted in “Form F” on issues related to other relevant matters of the national annual report. The Group of Experts meeting will be held on 7 and 8 April 2016 and the Eighteenth Annual Conference will convene on 30 August 2016. The President of the Conference will be Janis Karklins (Latvia).

### **Protocol V: Meeting of Experts and Ninth Conference of the High Contracting Parties**

Protocol V seeks to both remedy and prevent the humanitarian suffering caused by explosive remnants of war (ERW). While significant progress has been made towards clearing and destroying landmines, the global contamination from ERW is an almost insurmountable problem. There are currently 87 States parties to Protocol V.

In 2015, Shameem Ahsan (Bangladesh) served as President of the Ninth Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Protocol V, assisted by Rytis Paulauskas (Lithuania) and Henk Cor van der Kwast (Netherlands) as Vice-Presidents. The Coordinators were Diana Kazina (Latvia) for article 3 on clearance, removal or destruction of ERW and article 4 on recording, retaining and transmission of information; Jim Burke (Ireland) for generic preventive measures; Aviateur Lode Dewaegheneire (Belgium) for national reporting; and Julio Mercado (Argentina) and Friend of the Coordinator, Fernando Guzman (Chile), for victim assistance. The Meeting of Experts took place on 7 and 8 April and the Ninth Conference on 9 and 10 November.<sup>58</sup>

In 2015, much of the work carried out under Protocol V focused on assessing the progress made by States parties on the implementation of the

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<sup>55</sup> See CCW/AP.II/CONF.17/3.

<sup>56</sup> Form E is entitled “Measures taken on international technical information exchange, on international cooperation on mine clearance, and on technical cooperation and assistance”.

<sup>57</sup> CCW/AP.II/CONF.17/6, para. 27.

<sup>58</sup> The final document of the Ninth Conference is contained in CCW/P.V/CONF/2015/11.

Protocol's obligations and the challenges encountered. For example, during the discussions on clearance, affected States were encouraged to identify their national authority responsible for ERW and to report on their progress in surveying and assessing the threat posed by ERW, as well as on their progress on clearance. Responses were received from China, Greece, Latvia, Peru and Ukraine. The Eighth Conference agreed to "continue the exchange of information on the most difficult explosive ordnance disposal clearance operations, such as clearance in sand desert areas and the areas where intensive battles took place". The purpose of these discussions was to assist States in addressing these challenges and to share lessons learned. Belarus, Iraq, the Russian Federation, the United Nations Mine Action Service and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining spoke on their respective experiences in dealing with these clearance challenges. From the presentations provided, no single solution emerged to these particular clearance challenges. The lessons learned were practical and included the need for a timely assessment; development and implementation of a clearance strategy; regular and updated training programmes for personnel, with an emphasis on specialized training and practical exercises; and development of new technologies for clearance and adapting them to the particular environment.

Article 4 obligates armed forces to record and retain information on the use and abandonment of explosive ordnance, and then upon the cessation of hostilities to share this information with the party in control of the affected territory or with clearance organizations. Ireland provided an update on encouraging a culture of reporting within its Irish armed forces, and Sweden reported on its new article 4 procedures. There was a short discussion on the need to improve the quality of information transferred under article 4 and the possibility of identifying a single focal point for receiving and transferring this information.

The work on generic preventive measures for the second year concentrated on the management of munitions sites. The Coordinator presented a questionnaire to States parties that addressed issues such as the national focal point for the management of munitions sites, the implementation of standard operating procedures and whether these were informed by the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines, measures to maintain storage areas, records of personnel entering sites, records of munitions stored and their maintenance, the regularity of inspections of sites, and procedures for removing degraded munitions.<sup>59</sup> All responses identified

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<sup>59</sup> The following States parties either made statements or submitted written responses to the questions: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, Cuba, Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Greece, India, Italy, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Malta, Pakistan, Poland, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden and United States.

a focal point and answered positively that standard operating procedures had been implemented, while a range of responses were provided on the remaining questions. For example, regarding recording requirements with respect to personnel entering munitions sites, information received included requiring all personnel entering the sites to be pre-approved in advance of each entry, restricting access only to designated personnel and registering the biometric data of designated personnel.

Under victim assistance, affected States were encouraged to speak about the availability of data on victims; the medical, rehabilitation and psychological support services accessible to victims; measures undertaken to support the social and economic inclusion of victims, especially their employment; establishment of a focal point within Governments; national laws on the protection and promotion of the rights of persons with disabilities; and inclusion of victims into national plans on persons with disabilities and overall development frameworks. Under Protocol V, 19 States parties<sup>60</sup> have identified themselves as having victims of ERW on their territory or under their jurisdiction. Although significant progress has been made in the area of victim assistance and in raising awareness of this issue, many affected States still faced challenges, such as providing accessible medical care for victims and employment opportunities.

In 2015, 54 of the 87 States parties to Protocol V submitted national reports. Also, States parties approved new guidance on reporting under victim assistance. The discussions on cooperation and assistance were an opportunity for donor States and organizations to outline the assistance they can provide and for affected States to outline their specific needs. A working paper on cooperation and assistance, which included the requests of affected States and support provided by donors, was prepared by the CCW Implementation Support Unit.

In accordance with the decisions made at the Ninth Conference, in 2016 the work under Protocol V will concentrate on how to take forward implementation over the next review cycle and how to best assist affected States. The Meeting of Experts will be held on 6 and 7 April 2016 and the Tenth Conference on 29 August 2016, and the President will be Henk Cor van der Kwast.

### **Work of the Implementation Support Unit of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons**

In 2015, the major areas of work for the CCW Implementation Support Unit were providing both substantive and administrative support to the Chairs,

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<sup>60</sup> Albania, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Chile, China, Croatia, Ecuador, Georgia, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Nicaragua, Peru, Russian Federation, Senegal, Tajikistan, Ukraine and Zambia.

Friends of the Chair and Coordinators responsible for leading the work of the meetings of experts on Amended Protocol II, Protocol V and LAWS, as well as the CCW Meeting of the High Contracting Parties and the conferences of the High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II and Protocol V. This work included promoting implementation of Amended Protocol II and Protocol V and assessing progress and challenges.

Another major area of work was the universalization of the CCW and its Protocols. In 2015 new initiatives in this area included organizing briefings led by the officeholders with members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the League of Arab States, and continuing to follow up directly with non-States parties. The Implementation Support Unit continued to be involved in a range of other activities, such as the organization of the CCW Sponsorship Programme; updating the annual reporting databases of the CCW, Amended Protocol II and Protocol V and following up with those States that had not reported; updating the CCW website; and facilitating communications between States parties and organizations relevant to work on the CCW.

## **Cluster munitions**

The Convention on Cluster Munitions<sup>61</sup> prohibits, under any circumstances, the use, development, production, stockpiling or transfer of cluster munitions, and establishes clear deadlines for the destruction of the existing stockpiles and for the clearance and destruction of cluster munition remnants located in cluster munition-contaminated areas.

As at the end of 2015, the Convention had 108 signatories and 98 States parties, 14<sup>62</sup> of which acceded to or ratified the Convention after the Fifth Meeting of States Parties in September 2014. In May 2015, the Director of the Convention's Implementation Support Unit, Sheila Mweemba, took up her functions.<sup>63</sup>

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<sup>61</sup> The Convention's text and adherence status are available from [http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/cluster\\_munitions](http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/cluster_munitions) (accessed 16 June 2016).

<sup>62</sup> Belize, Canada, Colombia, Congo, Guinea, Guyana, Iceland, Mauritius, Paraguay, Rwanda, Slovakia, Somalia, South Africa and State of Palestine.

<sup>63</sup> See CCM/MSP/2014/INF/1.

## First Review Conference of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions

In accordance with article 12 (1) of the Convention,<sup>64</sup> General Assembly resolution 63/71 of 2 December 2008<sup>65</sup> and the decision of the Fifth Meeting of States Parties,<sup>66</sup> the United Nations Secretary-General convened the First Review Conference in Dubrovnik, Croatia, from 7 to 11 September. Two preparatory Meetings were also held in Geneva on 5 February and 24 June.<sup>67</sup> Preparations for the First Review Conference were facilitated by an informal intersessional meeting that took place in Geneva on 22 and 23 June and focused on the Dubrovnik Action Plan.<sup>68</sup>

Ninety-two States participated in the First Review Conference, including 9 signatories and 22 non-signatory States.<sup>69</sup> The First Review Conference was presided over by Zoran Milanović (Croatia), assisted by Josko Klisovic (Croatia) and Dijana Pleština (Croatia). The Bureau also included four Vice-Presidents<sup>70</sup> elected by acclamation by the Meeting.

The United Nations Secretary-General sent a message<sup>71</sup> to the meeting, which was delivered by the Director and Deputy to the United Nations High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Virginia Gamba. Christine Beerli, Vice-President of the International Committee of the Red Cross, and Branislav

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<sup>64</sup> “A Review Conference shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations five years after the entry into force of this Convention. Further Review Conferences shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations if so requested by one or more States Parties, provided that the interval between Review Conferences shall in no case be less than five years. All States Parties to this Convention shall be invited to each Review Conference”.

<sup>65</sup> In its resolution 63/71, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General “to render the necessary assistance and to provide such services as may be necessary to fulfil the tasks entrusted to him by the Convention on Cluster Munitions”.

<sup>66</sup> CCM/MSP/2014/6, para. 33.

<sup>67</sup> See CCM/CONF/2015/PM.1/2 and CCM/CONF/2015/PM.2/2.

<sup>68</sup> CCM/CONF/2015/7, annex III.

<sup>69</sup> For the list of participants, see CCM/CONF/2015/INF.1. The United Nations Children’s Fund, the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Mine Action Service and UNODA participated in the work of the Conference as observers, pursuant to rule 1 (2) of the rules of procedure. The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and the Cluster Munition Coalition also attended the meeting. The European Union, ITF Enhancing Human Security, James Madison University, the Mines Advisory Group, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, RACVIAC Centre for Security Cooperation, Regional Cooperation Council and The Halo Trust took part in the work of the Conference as observers, pursuant to rule 1 (3) of the rules of procedure.

<sup>70</sup> They were Costa Rica, Lebanon, Norway and Zambia.

<sup>71</sup> Message to the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Dubrovnik, Croatia, 7 September 2015. Available from <http://www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=8949> (accessed 16 June 2016).

Kapetanovic, representative of the Cluster Munition Coalition, also addressed the Conference.

During the high-level segment, where over 60 representatives of States parties, observer States and observer organizations addressed the Conference,<sup>72</sup> the Meeting adopted the 2015 Dubrovnik Declaration with reservations<sup>73</sup> from Australia, Canada, Lithuania and the United Kingdom. The Conference also adopted the financial procedures<sup>74</sup> for the Implementation Support Unit and encouraged States parties to provide financial contributions. Reservations or declarations<sup>75</sup> to this decision were made by a number of States. At the same time, the Conference also adopted the budget and workplan<sup>76</sup> of the Implementation Support Unit, which was presented by its Director, Sheila Mweemba.

The Review Conference also welcomed the Croatia Progress Report,<sup>77</sup> which monitored progress in implementing the Vientiane Action Plan up to the First Review Conference, submitted by Costa Rica, in its capacity as President of the Fifth Meeting of States Parties, and the new coordinators,<sup>78</sup> who will guide the informal intersessional activities in 2015 and 2016.

The Review Conference designated Henk Cor van der Kwast (Netherlands) as President of the Sixth Meeting of States Parties to be held in Geneva with its dates and duration to be announced in early 2016. The Meeting also decided in favour of a change in the presidential period to begin before meetings of States parties. In light of this change, the Presidency of the Netherlands would start on 1 January 2016 and end with the closure of the Sixth Meeting of States Parties.

Regarding the periodicity of future meetings, the Conference decided that, until the next Review Conference, one meeting of States parties would take place annually with no additional intersessional meetings and would

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<sup>72</sup> CCM/CONF/2015/7, para. 20.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, annex II.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, annex V.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, annex VI.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, annex IV.

<sup>77</sup> CCM/CONF/2015/6.

<sup>78</sup> The Coordinators are the following: working group on the general status and operation of the Convention—Czech Republic (until the end of the Sixth Meeting of States Parties) and Switzerland (until the end of the Seventh Meeting of States Parties); working group on universalization—Zambia (until the end of the Seventh Meeting of States Parties) working with Ecuador; working group on victims assistance—Chile (until the end of the Seventh Meeting of States Parties) working with Australia; working group on clearance and risk reduction—Norway (until the end of the Seventh Meeting of States Parties) working with Bosnia and Herzegovina; working group on stockpile destruction and retention—Mexico (until the end of the Seventh Meeting of States Parties) working with France; and working group on cooperation and assistance—Iraq (until the end of the Seventh Meeting of States Parties) working with Austria. The Coordinator on reporting is Costa Rica and the Coordinator on national implementation measures is New Zealand.

continue to be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.<sup>79</sup> The Review Conference also decided that the dates, duration and venue of the meetings would remain within the purview of the President to decide with the default location being Geneva.

At the seventieth session of the First Committee of the General Assembly, States adopted resolution 70/54 on 7 December, entitled “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions”, the first resolution adopted on the subject since 2009. Moreover, unlike previous iterations, resolution 70/54 was adopted by a vote in light of the addition of substantive language related to implementation of the Convention.

## **Anti-personnel mines**

Pursuant to the provisions of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction<sup>80</sup> and to the relevant decision of the Third Review Conference, held in Maputo from 23 to 27 June 2014, the States parties agreed that as of 2015 until the end of 2018 a meeting of the States parties will be convened each year at the end of November or the beginning of December, and that the Fourteenth Meeting of the States Parties would be held in Geneva from 30 November to 4 December 2015.

Following the decision<sup>81</sup> of the Third Review Conference, the informal intersessional meeting of the States parties to the Convention, which replaced the former one-week intersessional work programme, took place on 25 and 26 June in Geneva under the overall responsibility of Bertrand de Crombrughe de Picquendaele (Belgium).

Updates were presented on the work of the newly created committees,<sup>82</sup> including information on action taken under sections III and IV of the Maputo Action Plan<sup>83</sup> and the implementation of article 5 with a focus on the status of 31 States parties that have not yet been in a position to destroy or ensure the

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<sup>79</sup> By operative paragraph 7 of resolution 70/54 of 7 December 2015, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General of the United Nations to continue to convene the Meetings of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions and to continue to render the necessary assistance and to provide such services as may be necessary to fulfil the tasks entrusted to him by the Convention and the relevant decisions of the First Review Conference.

<sup>80</sup> Article 11, paragraph 1, of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction. The treaty text and adherence status are available from [http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/mine\\_ban](http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/mine_ban) (accessed 16 June 2016).

<sup>81</sup> APLC/CONF/2014/4, para. 32.

<sup>82</sup> Committee on Article 5 Implementation, Committee on Cooperative Compliance, Committee on Victim Assistance, and Committee on Enhancing Cooperation and Assistance.

<sup>83</sup> APLC/CONF/2014/4, annex I.

destruction of all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under their jurisdiction or control. The meeting also considered the financial challenges faced by the mine action community and their impact on States' efforts to fulfil their obligations. Allegations of violations of the Convention and other alleged instances of the use of anti-personnel mines were discussed, as well as the status of stockpile destruction in accordance with article 4 of the Convention.

The informal intersessional meeting of the States parties to the Convention also included a thematic discussion on fostering partnerships, with an introduction by the Chair of the Committee on the Enhancement of Cooperation and Assistance. Two panels addressed the issue, one focused on key elements of traditional partnerships and the other on the role and the potential for the private sector to provide support for demining.

Bertrand de Crombrugghe de Picquendaele presided over the Fourteenth Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention, held from 30 November to 4 December in Geneva. The meeting heard a message<sup>84</sup> from the United Nations Secretary-General, delivered by the Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva and Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, and a keynote address by Princess Astrid of Belgium. The meeting also heard statements from Didier Reynders, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs and European Affairs of Belgium; Georges Martin, Deputy State Secretary of Switzerland; Christine Beerli, Vice-President of the International Committee of the Red Cross; Megan Burke, Director of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines; and Barbara Haering, President of the Council of Foundation of the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining.

The Meeting considered reports on the work of the Convention's four committees, established by the Third Review Conference.<sup>85</sup> It welcomed the announcement by Finland on the completion of the destruction of its stockpiles in accordance with article 4 of the Convention and appealed to those States parties that had missed their respective destruction deadlines to intensify efforts to comply with their obligations.

The Meeting noted with appreciation the declaration by Mozambique on the completion of its obligations under article 5 to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control. Following a thorough process of examination and assessment,<sup>86</sup> the Meeting also granted five States<sup>87</sup> an extension to their article 5 deadline.

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<sup>84</sup> Message to the Fourteenth Meeting of the States Parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, Geneva, 2 December 2015. Available from [http://www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/MSP/14MSP/day1/01e\\_CEREMONIAL\\_OPENING\\_-\\_UN\\_Secretary-General.pdf](http://www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/MSP/14MSP/day1/01e_CEREMONIAL_OPENING_-_UN_Secretary-General.pdf) (accessed 16 June 2016).

<sup>85</sup> APLC/CONF/2014/4, para. 25 and annex III.

<sup>86</sup> APLC/MSP.7/2006/5, para. 27.

<sup>87</sup> Cyprus, Ethiopia, Mauritania, Niger and Senegal.

In order to address the unsatisfactory status of reporting under article 7 in terms of overall compliance, the President presented the “Guide to Reporting”<sup>88</sup> to serve as a comprehensive tool for assisting States parties in the fulfilment of their article 7 reporting obligations. The Meeting also expressed concern about the allegations of use of anti-personnel mines in various parts of the world.

With regard to administrative and financial issues related to the budget and functioning of the Convention’s Implementation Support Unit (ISU), which faced an unprecedented crisis due to inadequate funding, the Meeting decided to strengthen financial governance and transparency within the ISU.<sup>89</sup> The measures included the following: (a) adoption of a four-year ISU workplan based on anticipated workload and budgetary estimates; (b) endorsement of yearly ISU budgets; (c) establishment of a financial security buffer equal to one year of ISU expenditures related to core support, to be used in case of a shortfall in contributions at the closure of the accounts of a given year; and (d) distinction between core and enhanced support provided by the ISU and the conditions for the provision of the latter. The Meeting also agreed on a selection procedure for the recruitment of a new ISU Director and on principles for future recruitment.<sup>90</sup>

On 30 November, a special plenary meeting was devoted to a high-level session on victim assistance, with the participation of Princess Astrid of Belgium, Didier Reynders and a number of mine explosion survivors from different parts of the world.

It was decided that the Fifteenth Meeting of the States Parties would be held in Santiago from 28 November to 2 December 2016. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile was elected by acclamation as President of the Fifteenth Meeting.

## **Export controls**

### **Wassenaar Arrangement**

In 2015, Participating States of the Wassenaar Arrangement<sup>91</sup> continued to work towards the detection and denial of undesirable exports and to further

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<sup>88</sup> APLC/MSP.14/2015/WP.2.

<sup>89</sup> APLC/MSP.14/2015/L.1; see also APLC/MSP.14/2015/33, para. 33.

<sup>90</sup> APLC/MSP.14/2015/33, annex I.

<sup>91</sup> The Participating States of the Wassenaar Arrangement are the following: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovenia, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States.

refine the existing Wassenaar control lists with a view to making them more readily understood and user-friendly for licensing authorities and exporters.

The twenty-first plenary meeting of the Wassenaar Arrangement was held in Vienna from 2 to 4 December under the chairmanship of Gonzalo de Salazar Serantes (Spain).<sup>92</sup> During the plenary meeting, Participating States noted various achievements made in 2015, inter alia:

- Progress on a comprehensive and systematic review of the Wassenaar Control Lists to ensure their continued relevance;
- Addition of new export controls in a number of areas, including on an additional explosive material;
- Clarification of existing controls regarding biological agent protection and detection equipment, electronic devices for military helmets and equipment that performs analogue-to-digital conversion;
- Adoption of new “Best Practice Guidelines for Transit or Transshipment”;
- Issuance of “Elements for the Effective Fulfilment of National Reporting Requirements”, intended to assist all countries in meeting their international reporting obligations related to conventional arms transfers;
- Exchange of information on transfers of arms and dual-use goods.

Participating States affirmed that in 2016 the Wassenaar Arrangement would conduct further work on addressing new challenges, including emerging technologies of concern, in order to keep pace with advances in technology, research and innovation, taking into account the evolution of the international scene. The next regular plenary meeting will take place in Vienna in December 2016 under the chairmanship of Finland.

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<sup>92</sup> See Wassenaar Arrangement, “Statement issued by the Plenary Chair”. Available from <http://www.wassenaar.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Plenary-Chair-Statement-2015.pdf> (accessed 16 June 2016).

## Annex I

**Composite table of Member States that reported in 2015  
to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms**

State	Data on exports	Data on imports	Background information		
			Military holdings	Procurement through national production	International transfers of small arms and light weapons
1. Andorra	nil	nil			
2. Austria	✓				✓
3. Belarus	✓	nil			
4. Belgium	✓	✓	✓		
5. Brazil	✓	✓			
6. Bulgaria	✓	✓	✓	nil	✓
7. Canada	✓	✓	✓		✓
8. China	✓				
9. Croatia	nil				✓
10. Cyprus	nil	nil			
11. Czech Republic	✓	nil	✓	nil	✓
12. Denmark	✓	nil		✓	✓
13. El Salvador	nil	nil			
14. Estonia		✓	✓		✓
15. Finland	✓	nil	✓		✓
16. France	✓		✓	✓	✓
17. Germany	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
18. Greece	✓	✓	✓		✓
19. Grenada	nil	nil			✓
20. Hungary	✓	nil	✓		✓
21. India	nil	✓			
22. Ireland	nil	nil	✓	nil	✓
23. Italy	nil	✓	✓	nil	✓
24. Jamaica	nil	nil			✓
25. Japan	nil	✓	✓	✓	✓
26. Kazakhstan	✓	✓			✓

State	Data on exports	Data on imports	Background information		
			Military holdings	Procurement through national production	International transfers of small arms and light weapons
27. Latvia	nil	✓			✓
28. Lebanon	nil	nil			
29. Lithuania	nil	✓	✓	nil	✓
30. Luxembourg	nil	nil			
31. Mexico	nil	nil			✓
32. Mongolia	nil	nil			
33. Montenegro	✓				
34. Netherlands	✓	✓	✓	nil	✓
35. Norway	nil	nil			✓
36. Poland	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
37. Portugal	nil	✓			✓
38. Republic of Moldova	nil	nil			
39. Romania	✓	✓	✓	nil	✓
40. Russian Federation	✓				
41. Serbia	✓	✓			✓
42. Singapore	✓	✓			
43. Slovakia	✓	✓	✓	nil	✓
44. Slovenia	nil	nil			✓
45. Spain	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
46. Sweden	✓	✓	✓	nil	✓
47. Switzerland	✓	nil	✓		✓
48. Trinidad and Tobago			✓		✓
49. Turkey	✓	✓			✓
50. Ukraine	✓	✓			✓
51. United Kingdom	✓	nil	✓	✓	✓
52. United States	✓	✓	✓	✓	
53. Uruguay	nil	nil			nil
54. Viet Nam		✓			

## Annex II

**United Nations Register of Conventional Arms:  
Participation of Member States in reporting on  
transfers of small arms and light weapons, 2004-2015**

<i>Year of Secretary-General's report</i>	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
<i>Number of reports on SALW transfers</i>	5	5	4	37	48	47	42	49	32	36	34	37
1. Albania				✓	✓		✓		✓	✓	✓	
2. Andorra								✓				
3. Antigua and Barbuda				✓	nil	nil	nil					
4. Argentina <sup>a</sup>					nil	nil	nil	nil	✓	✓		
5. Armenia					✓	✓	✓					
6. Australia					✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
7. Austria								✓	✓		✓	✓
8. Bangladesh				✓	✓	✓						
9. Belgium						✓						
10. Bolivia (Plurinational State of)						✓						
11. Bosnia and Herzegovina				✓	✓		✓	✓				
12. Brunei Darussalam					✓							
13. Bulgaria						✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
14. Canada				✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
15. Chile					✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		
16. Colombia					✓		✓					
17. Comoros							nil					
18. Croatia					✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
19. Cyprus				✓		nil						
20. Czech Republic				✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
21. Denmark				✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
22. El Salvador					nil							
23. Estonia												✓
24. Fiji					nil							

United Nations Disarmament Yearbook 2015: Part II

Year of Secretary-General's report	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Number of reports on SALW transfers	5	5	4	37	48	47	42	49	32	36	34	37
25. Finland		✓									✓	✓
26. France		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
27. Ghana					nil							
28. Georgia				✓	✓							
29. Germany				✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
30. Greece				✓	✓		✓	✓				✓
31. Grenada								✓			✓	✓
32. Guyana								nil				
33. Haiti				✓								
34. Hungary				✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
35. Iceland								✓				
36. Indonesia					✓	✓						
37. Ireland						✓	✓	✓		nil		✓
38. Italy					✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓
39. Jamaica				✓								✓
40. Japan <sup>b</sup>		PNP	✓	✓	✓	✓						
41. Kazakhstan						✓	✓		✓	✓		
42. Latvia	✓			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
43. Lebanon						nil	nil					
44. Liechtenstein				✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	
45. Lithuania				✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
46. Luxembourg					Y							
47. Malaysia									✓	✓		
48. Mali				nil								
49. Malta					nil	nil	nil	nil	nil	nil		
50. Mexico				✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
51. Mongolia								nil				
52. Montenegro					✓			✓	✓			

<i>Year of Secretary-General's report</i>	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
<i>Number of reports on SALW transfers</i>	5	5	4	37	48	47	42	49	32	36	34	37
53. Netherlands	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
54. New Zealand				✓	✓	✓						
55. Norway					✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
56. Panama				✓		✓						
57. Peru						✓	✓					
58. Philippines				nil		✓						
59. Poland	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
60. Portugal				✓	✓	✓	nil	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
61. Republic of Korea				✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		
62. Republic of Moldova				nil	nil	✓	✓					
63. Romania					✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓
64. Saint Lucia				nil								
65. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines						✓						
66. San Marino							✓					
67. Senegal				✓								
68. Serbia							✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
69. Slovakia				✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
70. Slovenia					✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓
71. Spain							✓	✓			✓	✓
72. Swaziland				nil	nil	nil						✓
73. Sweden	✓			✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓
74. Switzerland						✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
75. Thailand							✓		✓			
76. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia							✓					
77. Togo				nil	nil							
78. Trinidad and Tobago				✓				✓ <sup>c</sup>		✓		✓
79. Turkey				✓	✓	✓		✓		✓	✓	✓

<i>Year of Secretary-General's report</i>	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
<i>Number of reports on SALW transfers</i>	5	5	4	37	48	47	42	49	32	36	34	37
<b>80. Ukraine</b>					✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓
<b>81. United Kingdom</b>	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓
<b>82. Uruguay</b>											nil	nil

<sup>a</sup> From 2008 to 2010, Argentina also reported on military holdings of SALW.

<sup>b</sup> Japan reported procurement of SALW through national production (PNP) from 2004 to 2009. It is not counted into the total number of States that reported on SALW transfers.


<sup>c</sup> Trinidad and Tobago provided information on military holdings in SALW.

## Annex III

**Composite table of reports from Member States to the  
United Nations Report on Military Expenditures in 2015**

Reporting States	Form of submission		
	Standardized	Simplified	"Nil" report
1. Albania	✓		
2. Argentina	✓		
3. Armenia		✓	
4. Australia	✓		
5. Austria	✓		
6. Belarus	✓		
7. Belgium	✓		
8. Brazil	✓		
9. Bulgaria	✓		
10. Burkina Faso	✓		
11. Canada	✓		
12. China	✓		
13. Colombia		✓	
14. Croatia	✓	✓	
15. Cyprus		✓	
16. Czech Republic		✓	
17. El Salvador		✓	
18. Finland	✓		
19. Germany	✓		
20. Grenada			✓
21. Hungary		✓	
22. India		✓	
23. Japan	✓	✓	
24. Kazakhstan	✓		
25. Latvia	✓		
26. Lebanon		✓	
27. Liechtenstein			✓
28. Lithuania	✓		
29. Luxembourg	✓		

<i>Reporting States</i>	<i>Form of submission</i>		
	<i>Standardized</i>	<i>Simplified</i>	<i>"Nil" report</i>
30. Malta	✓		
31. Nauru			✓
32. Philippines	✓		
33. Portugal	✓		
34. Romania	✓		
35. Russian Federation		✓	
36. San Marino			✓
37. Slovakia		✓	
38. Slovenia		✓	
39. Spain	✓		
40. Sweden		✓	
41. Switzerland	✓		
42. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	✓		
43. Trinidad and Tobago	✓		
44. Turkey		✓	
45. United States	✓		
46. Uruguay		✓	



**Chapter IV**  
**Regional disarmament**



A specialized course of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean on evidence management of illicit small arms and ammunition at San Jose, Costa Rica, on March 2015.

## CHAPTER IV

### Regional disarmament

*The United Nations and regional organizations strive for a common approach to today's challenges. Our views may diverge at times, but as long as we are committed to peace, security and human rights, we will stay on course to a more secure future.*

BAN KI-MOON, UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL<sup>1</sup>

#### Developments and trends, 2015

THROUGHOUT 2015, States continued to stress the importance of regional approaches to disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control as a means of promoting international peace and security, including through activities by the United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament.

The year 2015 brought contrasting developments in the area of regional disarmament. While some nuclear-weapon-free zones had important advances, others were met with challenges. In a positive development, the Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia was ratified by three nuclear-weapon States in 2015: China, the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom. Moreover, the United States announced on 27 April that the Protocol had been submitted to the United States Senate for ratification. The year was also significant for the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, with 6 August marking the thirtieth anniversary of the Treaty's adoption and signature in Rarotonga.

Nevertheless, challenges related to the establishment of new nuclear-weapon-free zones persisted, principally related to the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East. At the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, States parties were unable to reach consensus on next steps to achieve a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. The United Nations Secretary-General expressed regret that States parties were unable to arrive at a new collective vision on how to achieve that goal, and also expressed his readiness to support efforts to promote and sustain the inclusive regional dialogue necessary for that purpose.

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<sup>1</sup> Remarks during the Security Council debate on maintenance of international peace and security, New York, 18 August 2015. Available from [http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/statments\\_full.asp?statID=2716#.V0c9N\\_krIUE](http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/statments_full.asp?statID=2716#.V0c9N_krIUE) (accessed 26 May 2016).

The Security Council held two debates, on 9 March and 11 May, to consider cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations in maintaining international peace and security. These debates took place in the context of the Council's December 2014 Presidential Statement,<sup>2</sup> wherein the Security Council reiterated that cooperation with regional organizations on matters related to international peace and security could improve collective security. The Council further underscored in the statement the importance of developing effective partnerships between the United Nations and regional organizations and recognized that regional organizations were well positioned to understand the root causes of armed conflict, which could help prevent or resolve such conflicts.

Throughout 2015, the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) continued to strengthen its cooperation with regional organizations in the area of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation, in particular through the activities of its three regional centres for peace and disarmament, specifically in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, and Latin America and the Caribbean.<sup>3</sup> The Weapons of Mass Destruction Branch of UNODA and the regional centres significantly increased their cooperation with regional organizations—for example with the African Union, the Caribbean Community and the Organization of American States—with a view to providing assistance to Member States, at their request, on implementation of their obligations pursuant to Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) related to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to non-state actors. Various regional meetings and capacity-building activities were convened to that end.

The regional centres also continued their support to regional frameworks on peace, security and disarmament, such as the African Union Agenda 2063.<sup>4</sup> The United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa undertook various practical disarmament and capacity-building activities with a view to contributing to the realization of the objective “Silencing the Guns by 2020”, which was set by the African Union in its First Ten-Year Implementation Plan (2014-2023). The Regional Centre also provided support to discussions on disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation held by the 11 States members of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa.

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<sup>2</sup> S/PRST/2014/24.

<sup>3</sup> The regional centres are the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa; the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean; and the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific.

<sup>4</sup> The agenda was adopted on 26 May 2013 by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government at the African Union Fiftieth Anniversary Summit, held in Addis Ababa.

The regional centres, as in previous years, supported Member States in their respective regions in their implementation of disarmament and arms control instruments. In particular, the regional centres focused in 2015 on the provision of information and assistance related to the Arms Trade Treaty, as well as the Biological Weapons Convention. Moreover, the regional centres continued to promote regional dialogue and confidence-building through the hosting of regional conferences, such as the fourteenth United Nations–Republic of Korea Joint Conference on Disarmament and Non-proliferation Issues and the twenty-fifth United Nations Conference on Disarmament Issues.

## **Nuclear-weapon-free zones**

As at the end of 2015, the five existing nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) treaties had 111 signatories and 100 States parties.<sup>5</sup> In addition, on 25 February, on the occasion of the 2015 NPT Review Conference, Mongolia submitted a memorandum<sup>6</sup> reaffirming its commitment to “consolidating ... its international security and nuclear-weapon-free status” and to continuing cooperation with States parties of other NWFZs. The United Nations has recognized Mongolia’s self-declared status as a single-State NWFZ by adopting the General Assembly resolution entitled “Mongolia’s international security and nuclear-weapon-free status”.<sup>7</sup>

The first NWFZ created in a densely populated area, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, also known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco, will achieve its landmark fiftieth anniversary in 2017. Since 2002, with Cuba’s deposit of its instrument of ratification, all 33 States of the region have signed and ratified the Treaty. The Treaty of Tlatelolco has proven to be an innovative and successful regional approach to nuclear disarmament and served as a model for other regions in the creation of NWFZs. The Treaty was also the first such treaty to define the term “nuclear weapon” and to require legally binding negative security assurances from the nuclear-weapon States (see the table below for the adherence status of the protocols to the five NWFZ treaties).

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<sup>5</sup> NWFZs exist in five regions of the world and were established under the Treaty of Tlatelolco (1967) in Latin America and the Caribbean; the Rarotonga Treaty (1985) in the South Pacific; the Bangkok Treaty (1995) in South-East Asia; the Pelindaba Treaty (1996) in Africa; and the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia (2006). Their texts and adherence status are available from <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/> (accessed 31 May 2016).

<sup>6</sup> NPT/Conf.2015/8.

<sup>7</sup> The latest version of this resolution is contained in General Assembly resolution 67/52 of 3 December 2012.

## Status of ratification of the negative security assurance protocols to the NWFZ treaties

As at 31 December 2015

		China	France	Russian Federation	United Kingdom	United States
Additional Protocol II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco	Signed	21 Aug. 1973	18 July 1973	18 May 1978	20 Dec. 1967	1 Apr. 1968
	Ratified	12 June 1974	22 Mar. 1974	8 Jan. 1979	11 Dec. 1969	12 May 1971
Protocol 2 to the Treaty of Rarotonga	Signed	10 Feb. 1987	25 Mar. 1996	15 Dec. 1986	25 Mar. 1996	25 Mar. 1996
	Ratified	21 Oct. 1988	20 Sep. 1996	21 Apr. 1988	19 Sep. 1997	— <sup>a</sup>
Protocol to the Bangkok Treaty	Signed	—	—	—	—	—
	Ratified	—	—	—	—	—
Protocol I to the Pelindaba Treaty	Signed	11 Apr. 1996	11 Apr. 1996	5 Nov. 1996	11 Apr. 1996	11 Apr. 1996
	Ratified	10 Oct. 1997	20 Sep. 1996	5 Apr. 2011	12 Mar. 2001	— <sup>b</sup>
Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia	Signed	6 May 2014	6 May 2014	6 May 2014	6 May 2014	6 May 2014
	Ratified	17 Aug. 2015	17 Nov. 2014	22 June 2015	30 Jan. 2015	— <sup>c</sup>

<sup>a</sup> The Protocol was submitted on 2 May 2011 to the United States Senate for its consent to ratification (United States, *Message from the President of the United States Transmitting Protocols 1, 2, and 3 to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, signed on behalf of the United States at Suva on March 25, 1996* (Washington, DC, United States Government Printing Office, 2011), available from <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CDOC-112tdoc2/pdf/CDOC-112tdoc2.pdf> (accessed 13 January 2015)).

<sup>b</sup> The Protocol was submitted on 2 May 2011 to the United States Senate for its consent to ratification (United States, *Message from the President of the United States Transmitting Protocols I and II to the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, signed on behalf of the United States at Cairo, Egypt, on April 11, 1996, including a Third Protocol Related to the Treaty* (Washington, DC, United States Government Printing Office, 2011), available from <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CDOC-112tdoc3/pdf/CDOC-112tdoc3.pdf> (accessed 13 January 2015)).

<sup>c</sup> The Protocol was submitted on 27 April 2015 to the United States Senate for its consent to ratification (United States, *Message from the President of the United States Transmitting the Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia, signed at New York on May 6, 2014* (Washington, DC, United States Government Printing Office, 2015), available from <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CDOC-114tdoc2/pdf/CDOC-114tdoc2.pdf> (accessed 13 January 2015)).

Recognizing the progress made on increased collaboration within and between zones at the first and second Conferences of States Parties and Signatories to Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia, held in Mexico City from 26 to 28 April 2005 and in New York on 30 April 2010, respectively, the General Assembly decided to hold the third such Conference in New York in 2015.<sup>8</sup> It was convened on 24 April, the eve of the 2015 NPT Review Conference. However, due to a divergence of opinion on procedural matters that proved to be irreconcilable, the third Conference was unable to commence formal discussions. Nevertheless, Indonesia, speaking in its capacity as the President of the third Conference, stated at the 2015 NPT Review Conference that Indonesia would “continue to be relentless in consolidating and expanding on the

<sup>8</sup> See General Assembly resolution 69/66 of 2 December 2014.

commonalities of all States parties and signatories to nuclear-weapon-free zones and Mongolia”.<sup>9</sup>

### **Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)**

With a view to commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the Treaty of Tlatelolco on 14 February 2017, the XXIV Regular Session of the General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL), held on 26 November in Mexico City, adopted a resolution entitled “50th Anniversary of the Treaty of Tlatelolco”.<sup>10</sup> By this resolution, the General Conference decided to organize a high-level international seminar on the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the NWFZ in Latin America and the Caribbean and other matters related to nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, as well as to hold the XXV Regular Session of the General Conference at the ministerial level on 13 and 14 February 2017, in Mexico City.

During the XXIV Regular Session, the General Conference also adopted a resolution entitled “External Relations of OPANAL”,<sup>11</sup> in which it sought to enhance cooperation with the United Nations and other multilateral and regional disarmament and non-proliferation regimes. By this resolution, the General Conference instructed the OPANAL Secretary-General to participate in the Open-ended Working Group established by the General Assembly in its resolution 70/33 of 7 December 2015, entitled “Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations”, and also to study ways of developing the relationship of OPANAL with UNODA and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), based on the mandates adopted by the member States.

As in the previous year, the OPANAL member States made a declaration<sup>12</sup> on the occasion of the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September. In the 2015 declaration, the member States demanded that nuclear weapons not be used again under any circumstances by any actor, which could be assured only by the prohibition and transparent, verifiable and irreversible elimination of all nuclear weapons. The member States also called for decisive efforts to overcome the nuclear disarmament stalemate and to advance towards a convention banning and totally eliminating

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<sup>9</sup> Desra Percaya, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations, statement at the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, New York, 29 April 2015. Available from [http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/statements/pdf/ID\\_en.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/statements/pdf/ID_en.pdf) (accessed 13 January 2016).

<sup>10</sup> OPANAL General Conference, document CG/Res.11/2015. Available from <http://www.opanal.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/CG-Res-11-2015.pdf> (accessed 11 January 2016).

<sup>11</sup> OPANAL General Conference, CG/Res.02/2015. Available from <http://www.opanal.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/CG-Res-02-2015.pdf> (accessed 11 January 2016).

<sup>12</sup> A/C.1/70/2, annex.

nuclear weapons, thus fulfilling the first resolution of the United Nations General Assembly.<sup>13</sup> The member States further stressed their commitment to humankind, primarily to children and youth, to keep their territories free from nuclear weapons and to continue to work towards their total elimination.

In the political declaration<sup>14</sup> of the third Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) Summit, held in Belén, Costa Rica, on 28 and 29 January, the Heads of State and Government of Latin American and Caribbean countries reiterated that complete, transparent, irreversible and verifiable nuclear disarmament was an important goal of CELAC States and that the only effective guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons was their total elimination and prohibition. In that context, the States members of CELAC supported the negotiation of a universal, legally binding instrument proscribing nuclear weapons with a multilaterally agreed timetable. As they had done at the previous Summit, States adopted a special declaration<sup>15</sup> on nuclear disarmament, in which they emphasized the urgent need for a nuclear-weapon-free world and recognized OPANAL as the specialized body of CELAC for nuclear disarmament.

### **African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty)**

At its fifth ordinary session held on 18 and 19 May at the African Union (AU) headquarters in Addis Ababa, the African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE)<sup>16</sup> discussed the implementation of the four pillars of its programme of work: monitoring States parties' compliance with their Treaty obligations; nuclear and radiation safety and security; peaceful applications of nuclear sciences and technology; and partnerships and technical cooperation. AFCONE also agreed on practical steps to expedite the operationalization of its secretariat that will be situated in Pretoria and headed by an Executive Secretary. The session also provided a platform for consultations with the African Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training related to Nuclear Science and Technology, which is an intergovernmental agreement established to further strengthen and enlarge the

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<sup>13</sup> General Assembly resolution 1 (I) of 24 January 1946.

<sup>14</sup> CELAC, "Political Declaration of Belén, Costa Rica, III Summit of Heads of State and Government of the CELAC", 4 February 2015. Available from <http://www.celac2015.go.cr/political-declaration-of-belen-costa-rica-iii-summit-of-heads-of-state-and-government-of-the-celac/> (accessed 11 January 2016).

<sup>15</sup> CELAC, "Special Declaration 16: Of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States on the urgent need for a nuclear weapon free world", 4 February 2015. Available from <http://www.celac2015.go.cr/special-declaration-16-of-the-community-of-latin-american-and-caribbean-states-on-the-urgent-need-for-a-nuclear-weapon-free-world/> (accessed 31 May 2016).

<sup>16</sup> AFCONE, established in 2010 by the States parties to the Pelindaba Treaty, is mandated to monitor and support States parties in complying with their non-proliferation obligations pursuant to the Treaty, as well as to promote cooperation in the peaceful applications of nuclear science and technology.

contribution of nuclear science and technology to socioeconomic development in Africa. The scope of the activities related to the agreement covers a wide range of peaceful applications of nuclear techniques that contribute towards the achievement of national and regional development goals.

On 4 November, the AU Commission Chairperson, Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, and the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation of the Republic of South Africa, Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, signed the Host Country Agreement for the establishment of the headquarters of AFCONE. The Agreement would allow AFCONE and its secretariat to function fully and effectively to implement the mandate of the Pelindaba Treaty. The AU Commission Chairperson stressed the positive role that the AFCONE would play in advancing the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts and called on all States that had not yet done so to ratify and accede to the Treaty and its Protocols without further delay. The South African foreign minister expressed the satisfaction of the Government to host the pan-African organization, noting the significant contribution towards the ultimate goal of achieving a world without nuclear weapons.

On 2 December, AFCONE held its sixth ordinary session at the AU headquarters and discussed the means to achieve the full and effective operationalization of AFCONE. Its transitional secretariat will submit to the next AFCONE session, to be held in 2016, a detailed update on the progress made in this regard and proposals on the way forward.

On 3 and 4 December, a training workshop on formulation of initial annual national reports by States parties to the Pelindaba Treaty was held at the AU headquarters. This training workshop aimed to provide participants with the opportunity to exchange views and information on the issue of reporting, as required under article 13 of the Treaty. In accordance with this provision, AFCONE developed detailed guidelines for States parties, circulated in 2014 before the workshop, to facilitate the annual reporting process.

### **Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia**

After signing the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia on 6 May 2014, the five nuclear-weapon States continued to pursue ratification of the Treaty's negative security assurance Protocol in 2015. Following the ratification by France in 2014, three more States ratified the Protocol in 2015: the United Kingdom on 30 January, the Russian Federation on 22 June and China on 17 August.

On 27 April, during the 2015 NPT Review Conference, United States Secretary of State John Kerry announced that President Obama had submitted

the Protocol to the United States Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.<sup>17</sup>

### **Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty)**

Following the signature of the Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia by the five nuclear-weapon States on 6 May 2014, the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ), also known as the Bangkok Treaty, became the only remaining NWFZ without legally binding negative security assurances in force. Despite decades-long efforts by its States parties to secure the early signing and ratification of the negative security assurance Protocol without reservations by the nuclear-weapon States, no tangible progress was made towards that end in 2015.

The five nuclear-weapon States issued a joint statement<sup>18</sup> at the London meeting of the so-called “P-5 process” on 6 February, in which they “expressed hope that progress would be made on the signature of the Protocol to the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, and encouraged the parties to that Treaty to continue to engage constructively in order to find solutions to outstanding issues”. During the 2015 NPT Review Conference, the nuclear-weapon States made another joint statement,<sup>19</sup> noting that consultations continued with the States parties to the SEANWFZ Treaty, again encouraging the latter to continue to engage “in order to find solutions to outstanding issues”. Nevertheless, in the same statement the nuclear-weapon States affirmed, “We remain ready to sign the SEANWFZ Protocol.”

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member States continued to reiterate at various regional forums their commitment to continue to work with the nuclear-weapon States to resolve all outstanding issues pertaining to the signing and ratifying of the Protocol of the SEANWFZ Treaty. Such forums include the twenty-sixth and twenty-seventh ASEAN Summits, held in Malaysia from 26 to 28 April and from 18 to 22 November, respectively, and the tenth East Asia Summit, held in Malaysia on 22 November. Furthermore, Malaysia submitted the “Memorandum on

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<sup>17</sup> See remarks at the 2015 NPT Review Conference, New York, 27 April 2015. Available from [http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/statements/pdf/US\\_en.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/statements/pdf/US_en.pdf) (accessed 12 January 2016).

<sup>18</sup> Joint statement issued by China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, London, 6 February 2015. Available from <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/joint-statement-from-the-nuclear-weapon-states-at-the-london-p5-conference> (accessed 11 January 2016).

<sup>19</sup> Statement by China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States to the 2015 NPT Review Conference, New York, 30 April 2015. Available from [http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/statements/pdf/P5\\_en.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/statements/pdf/P5_en.pdf) (last accessed 11 January 2016).

activities relating to the Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon Free Zone<sup>20</sup> on 13 April to the 2015 NPT Review Conference. In the Memorandum, Malaysia underscored that, as France, the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom had indicated that they had intended to submit reservations to the Protocol before signing the instrument, accession to the Protocol by all the nuclear-weapon States had ultimately been delayed.

In addition to ongoing consultations with the nuclear-weapon States regarding the SEANWFZ Protocol, the ASEAN States agreed to a 10-year (2016-2025) political and security road map (ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint 2025),<sup>21</sup> including a five-point action plan on the SEANWFZ Treaty, on 22 November at the twenty-seventh ASEAN Summit held in Kuala Lumpur. Through this road map, the ASEAN member States agreed to the following five actions on the SEANWFZ Treaty:

(a) Enhance the work of the SEANWFZ Commission to ensure effective implementation of the SEANWFZ Treaty and its Plan of Action<sup>22</sup> through specific work programmes/projects;

(b) Intensify the ongoing efforts of the State parties to the SEANWFZ Treaty and the nuclear-weapon States to resolve all outstanding issues in accordance with the objectives and principles of the SEANWFZ Treaty pertaining to the signing and ratifying of the Protocol to the Treaty at the earliest possible time;

(c) Continue to submit the biennial SEANWFZ resolution to the First Committee of the General Assembly;

(d) Promote an enhanced role of the SEANWFZ and its States parties in relevant multilateral forums and frameworks on disarmament and non-proliferation, including the NPT Review Conferences; and

(e) Encourage accession by all ASEAN member States to relevant instruments, such as the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the IAEA additional protocols.

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<sup>20</sup> NPT/Conf.2015/23.

<sup>21</sup> ASEAN secretariat, *ASEAN 2025: Forging Ahead Together* (Jakarta, 2015), pp. 17-57. Available from <http://www.asean.org/storage/2015/12/ASEAN-2025-Forging-Ahead-Together-final.pdf> (accessed 26 May 2016).

<sup>22</sup> ASEAN, "Plan of Action to Strengthen the Implementation of the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (2013-2017)", 30 June 2013. Available from [http://www.asean.org/storage/images/Statement/poa%20to%20strengthen%20the%20implementation%20of%20the%20seanwfz%20treaty%202013-2017\\_adopted.pdf](http://www.asean.org/storage/images/Statement/poa%20to%20strengthen%20the%20implementation%20of%20the%20seanwfz%20treaty%202013-2017_adopted.pdf) (accessed 25 May 2016).

### **Establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction**

During the first half of 2015, the conveners<sup>23</sup> and facilitator<sup>24</sup> for the Conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction renewed their efforts to engage with the States of the region through the convening of direct and informal consultations on the agenda, modalities and outcome for the Conference. In this regard, they sought to convene a sixth informal meeting with the States of the region, following the same format of the meetings held in Glion, Switzerland, in October 2013, November 2013 and February 2014, as well as in Geneva in May and June 2014.

In January, the facilitator sent letters to the League of Arab States, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Israel, renewing his proposal to convene a drafting session in Geneva to address outstanding issues and to seek agreement on the modalities for the Conference. Until the opening of the 2015 NPT Review Conference, the facilitator and States of the region engaged in further correspondence on the matter of the proposed drafting session.

At the 2015 Review Conference, the States parties to the NPT were unable to reach consensus on the next steps for taking forward a Middle East zone. A divergence of opinion was evident among various States, including among the depositary Governments. Following the outcome of the 2015 NPT Review Conference, the Secretary-General expressed regret, in particular that States parties were unable to arrive at a new collective vision on how to achieve such a zone. In this connection, he expressed his readiness to support efforts to promote and sustain the inclusive regional dialogue necessary to attain that goal. (See chapter I for information on the Review Conference.)

At the fifty-ninth session of the IAEA General Conference, the Group of Arab States introduced, for a third consecutive year, a draft resolution entitled “Israeli nuclear capabilities”. The General Conference decided not to accept the resolution by a recorded vote of 43 in favour and 61 against, with 33 abstentions.

At the seventieth session of the General Assembly First Committee, many States expressed deep dissatisfaction over the lack of agreement on the way forward for the establishment of a Middle East zone. A number of States recalled the proposal of Egypt to the 2015 NPT Review Conference, however, no detailed discussion on next steps took place. Egypt introduced its two annual resolutions on the Middle East, namely the “Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East” (70/24) and “The

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<sup>23</sup> Secretary-General of the United Nations, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and the United States.

<sup>24</sup> Jaakko Laajava (Finland).

risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East” (70/70), which were adopted by the General Assembly on 7 December.<sup>25</sup>

## **United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs regional centres**

### **United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa**

The United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (UNREC) continued to support disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation efforts of African States throughout 2015, engaging more than 1,000 representatives from Governments and regional organizations and more than 2,000 members of civil society through a wide range of activities.

In particular, UNREC continued its technical assistance to the Mali National Commission on small arms through practical disarmament training on marking and registering of weapons. The Regional Centre, in cooperation with the United Nations Development Programme, conducted a survey of illicit small arms flows in six Sahel countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Nigeria), as well as three neighbouring countries (Cameroon, Central African Republic and Senegal). These projects laid the groundwork for a comprehensive three-year assistance project, funded by the European Union, on physical security and stockpile management of small arms in the Sahel region.

UNREC, in cooperation with the Liberia National Commission on Small Arms and Light Weapons and the United Nations Mission in Liberia, conducted a training session on the marking and registration of small arms and light weapons (SALW). The Centre also organized, in partnership with the African Union for member States of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), a workshop on identifying and tracing SALW, as well as their ammunition. The training was done within the framework of the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons and took place on 29 October with the participation of practitioners and officials from the national police forces, SALW commissions and foreign affairs ministries of Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Gabon, the Congo and Sao Tome and Principe.

UNREC, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the African Union and the Economic Commission of West African States (ECOWAS) carried out activities tailored to the needs of States regarding

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<sup>25</sup> The former, as in previous years, was adopted by consensus and the latter by a recorded vote of 157 in favour and 5 against, with 20 abstentions.

implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT).<sup>26</sup> UNREC organized an awareness-raising workshop for African Small Island Developing States; a workshop on synergies and complementarities among the ATT, the ECOWAS Convention on SALW, the Programme of Action and other related instruments; and a workshop on the human rights and gender-related obligations contained in the ATT. Additionally, the Regional Centre and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute developed and populated a database of over 250 ATT-related cooperation and assistance activities carried out by States, international and regional organizations and civil society organizations in sub-Saharan Africa from 2011 to 2015.<sup>27</sup>

In collaboration with the Geneva Branch of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, UNREC supported the implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention<sup>28</sup> through outreach and legislative assistance seminars in Benin and Burkina Faso, as well as through a regional workshop for East African States. In support of the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), the 1540 Committee<sup>29</sup> secretariat and its Panel of Experts, the Regional Centre conducted country visits to Malawi, Senegal, Togo and Zambia with a view to the full and effective implementation of the resolution's obligations.

UNREC also continued to participate in and provide substantive input to the meetings of the African Union–Regions Steering Committee on Small Arms and Light Weapons and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, as well as to the ministerial meetings of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa.

### ***Ministerial meetings of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa***

The United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa held its fortieth ministerial meeting in Luanda from 1 to 5 June. The Committee discussed the impact of Boko Haram's activities in Cameroon and Chad and also reviewed the situation in the Central African Republic. The meeting welcomed the outcomes of the Bangui Forum for National Reconciliation and invited partners to assist in the urgent provision

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<sup>26</sup> The treaty text and adherence status are available from <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/att> (accessed 31 May 2016).

<sup>27</sup> For more information, see <http://att-assistance.org> (accessed 26 May 2016).

<sup>28</sup> The full title is Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. Its text and adherence status are available from <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/bwc> and additional information are available from <https://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Bio/> (accessed 26 May 2016).

<sup>29</sup> The Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) is also known as the 1540 Committee.

of necessary financing for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration activities, as well as for elections.

The Committee also discussed the situation in Burundi and requested ECCAS to support subregional and international efforts to resolve the crisis. It also recommended that States ratify the Central African Convention for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and All Parts and Components That Can Be Used for Their Manufacture, Repair and Assembly, also known as the Kinshasa Convention,<sup>30</sup> with a view to bringing the Convention into force. The meeting further encouraged the signature and ratification of the ATT and the continued development of regional strategies on counter-terrorism and the non-proliferation of arms in Central Africa.

UNREC and ECCAS briefed the Committee on the status of the implementation of existing legal instruments for disarmament and non-proliferation, including the Kinshasa Convention, the ATT and Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), highlighting in particular the importance of ratifying the Kinshasa Convention. The regional coordinator for the United Nations integrated strategy on counter-terrorism and the non-proliferation of arms in Central Africa informed the Committee about the workshops that had been held to advance the development of the integrated counter-terrorism strategy.

The forty-first ministerial meeting of the Committee was held in Libreville from 23 to 27 November. As in the previous meeting, UNREC and ECCAS briefed the Committee on the status of implementation of existing legal instruments for disarmament and non-proliferation. The Committee also adopted the strategy on counter-terrorism and the non-proliferation of SALW in Central Africa and its plan of action, and decided to conduct a regular evaluation of the strategy and its plan of action at meetings of the Committee. Regarding combating the threats posed by the group Boko Haram, Cameroon and Chad shared their experiences and the Committee encouraged the ECCAS secretariat to continue its efforts to hold a joint summit with ECOWAS with a view to developing a joint strategy to combat Boko Haram. The Committee also discussed piracy and maritime security. In that regard, it requested the United Nations to support the effective operationalization of the Interregional Coordination Centre. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime also provided a briefing on efforts to combat drug trafficking and transnational organized crime in Central Africa.

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<sup>30</sup> The treaty text and adherence status are available from <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/kinshasa> (accessed 31 May 2016).

## **United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean**

Over the course of 2015, the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (UNLIREC) promoted adherence to and assisted in the implementation of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation instruments and standards on the international and regional levels.

In an effort to contribute to addressing the challenge posed by the illicit trafficking in and uncontrolled proliferation of small arms and light weapons across the region, as well as to assist in the implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons and the International Tracing Instrument, UNLIREC supported related efforts by Caribbean and Central American States. In this context, the Centre trained over 280 security sector officials on forensic firearms ballistics and the presentation of firearms evidence in cases of illicit trafficking.

UNLIREC provided technical assistance to Central and South American States in the destruction and marking of SALW, as well as in enhancing the physical security and management of both State and private security service providers' conventional arms stockpiles. This programme resulted in the destruction of more than 2,000 seized weapons and the marking of 1,000 SALW in 2015.

As part of its assistance package designed to prevent armed violence in Central America, UNLIREC held three national technical workshops on SALW stockpile management: in Guatemala in February, as well as in the Dominican Republic and in Honduras in April. At the workshops 86 security sector officials, including 14 women, were trained on physical security and stockpile management based on the International Small Arms Control Standards and the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines. The courses addressed definitions and classifications of small arms, ammunition and explosives, small arms proliferation and armed violence, risk management and security plans. Practical exercises were held at the conclusion of the workshops.

Additionally, UNLIREC provided legal and policy assistance in the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to non-state actors. The Regional Centre hosted a regional seminar in March to promote the exchange of information and best practices in the priority areas of the adoption of control lists, existing legal frameworks and potential challenges in the region. More than 30 representatives, including 18 women, from five Caribbean States participated. The seminar was also attended by members of the Expert Group of the Committee established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and representatives from the Caribbean Community, the

International Maritime Organization, the United States Department of State, the Organization of American States, the University of Georgia, the Stimson Center and the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre.

The Regional Centre provided assistance in the development of national implementation action plans on resolution 1540 (2004) in Grenada and the Dominican Republic. It also supported the carrying out of risk assessments in the context of port and maritime security, as well as the detecting and handling of sensitive dual-use materials. The UNLIREC assistance programme related to the resolution reached over 170 national staff in the region.

The Centre supported approximately 130 Central American national personnel in their implementation of the ATT, in particular through an introductory training course and workshops on national control systems.

### **United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific**

The United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific (UNRCPD) continued its efforts to promote disarmament and non-proliferation, peace and arms control education and confidence-building through dialogue in Asia and the Pacific.

In June, UNRCPD assisted Bangladesh through a capacity-building workshop on preparing to accede to the ATT, as well as on implementing the United Nations Programme of Action on SALW and the International Tracing Instrument with the use of the International Small Arms Control Standards. The Centre also helped build the capacity of the Maldives to implement the Programme of Action and the ATT, with a focus on maritime security. An initial consultation visit was followed by a needs assessment and a desk review by experts. In a final visit, experts' recommendations were presented and discussed with national officials. UNRCPD also conducted a national inter-agency round-table discussion in Indonesia in September to discuss the latest developments related to the ATT, as well as broader discussions on the nature of the Treaty's provisions, benefits and implications of accession.

In November, the Centre organized in the Philippines a workshop on strengthening national capacity to control SALW and to implement the Programme of Action. Government officials discussed national legislation and national operational standards, including utilizing the International Small Arms Control Standards Assessment Tool. The workshop identified steps to improve assistance mechanisms and the management of small arms.

In order to promote regional security dialogue and confidence-building, UNRCPD organized two annual conferences on disarmament and non-proliferation issues for senior-level representatives from Government, intergovernmental organizations, academia and civil society organizations. In August, in cooperation with the Government of Japan and the City of

Hiroshima, UNRCPD organized the twenty-fifth United Nations Conference on Disarmament Issues, entitled “Towards a World Free of Nuclear Weapons”, in Hiroshima. Coinciding with the seventieth anniversary of the United Nations and of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Conference discussed the outcomes of the 2015 NPT Review Conference, the importance of nuclear-weapon-free zones, the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons and the role of civil society and education in renewing efforts towards realizing the ultimate goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.

In December, UNRCPD co-organized with the Republic of Korea the fourteenth United Nations–Republic of Korea Joint Conference on Disarmament and Non-proliferation Issues in Seoul, entitled “Unfinished Business of Building a More Secure World”. This Conference addressed various issues, including the implications of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action<sup>31</sup> on the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran, outer space security, the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit and practical steps to revive denuclearization talks with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Other issues addressed during the course of the conference were outer space security and the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit.

With regard to peace and disarmament education, UNRCPD continued its cooperation with Nepal on integrating peace and disarmament elements into the national school curriculum. The project reaches approximately 400,000 schoolchildren in Nepal every year to cultivate a culture of peace.

## **Disarmament and arms regulation at the regional level**

### **Africa**

#### ***African Union***

*Weapons of mass destruction–related activities, including the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004)*

The African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE) held its fifth and sixth ordinary sessions in Addis Ababa on 18 and 19 May and on 2 December, respectively. The sessions reviewed the implementation status of the AFCONE programme of work.

The African Union (AU) Commission convened a preparatory meeting for the 2016 AU Review and Assistance Conference on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) in Africa. The meeting was held on 24 and 25 September in Vienna to review assistance requests and exchange views on the agenda and expected outcomes of the conference.

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<sup>31</sup> See United States Department of State, “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action”. Available from <http://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/jcpoa/> (accessed 1 April 2016).

The AU Commission also convened a meeting on the Biological Weapons Convention on 29 and 30 October in Addis Ababa in order to enhance understanding of the Convention, raise awareness regarding its implementation and promote its universality.

On 3 and 4 December in Addis Ababa, AFCONE conducted a training workshop on elaboration by Pelindaba Treaty States parties of the initial annual national reports. A reporting guide and forms were introduced and discussed during the session.

*Activities related to conventional arms, in particular the Arms Trade Treaty*

The fifth and sixth meetings of the AU-Regions Steering Committee on Small Arms and Light Weapons and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration were held on 23 and 24 June in Addis Ababa and on 17 and 18 November in Abuja, respectively. The meetings reviewed projects implemented during the year, discussed challenges, opportunities and priorities agreed upon for 2016.

The AU Commission convened the Senior Government Officials Meeting on the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) on 25 and 26 June in Addis Ababa. The objective of the meeting was to promote the Treaty's universality and implementation and inform member States of the outcome of the preparatory process of the First Conference of States Parties. The AU Commission also organized a training course, held on 27 and 28 October in Addis Ababa, for Central African member States on the identification and tracing of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and their ammunition.

The AU Commission completed the preparatory phase and launched the project "Enhanced SALW Control and Physical Security and Stockpile Management in the Greater Sahel Region", which aims to enhance information-sharing and coordination of activities among States, donors and implementing agencies.

*Activities related to general security and disarmament*

The first phase of the AU Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Capacity Programme (2012-2015)<sup>32</sup> was completed with the following accomplishments:

- (a) Deployment of DDR experts to the AU Mission for the Central African Republic and Central Africa, the AU Mission for Mali and the Sahel and the AU Mission in Somalia;
- (b) Establishment of the DDR Resource and Research Centre;

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<sup>32</sup> Available from <http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/auddrcp-final-project-document.october-2012.signature.pdf> (accessed 31 May 2016).

(c) Initiation of the process for developing the DDR Compendium and Training Manual;

(d) Completion of the development of seven operational guidance notes covering detention, women and children, reintegration, national initiatives, foreign fighters and countering violent extremism;

(e) Technical and operational support to the Central African Republic, Somalia, South Sudan and the Sudan on various DDR components and processes.

*Other relevant activities or institutional developments*

The AU Commission and the Republic of South Africa signed on 4 November a host agreement on the establishment of the headquarters of AFCONE. The operational documents for the establishment of the AU Mechanism for Police Cooperation were finalized and submitted to the relevant organs for endorsement. These include the statute, structure, programme of work, three-year plan and funding modalities.

***Economic Community of Central African States***

The States of Central Africa, meeting as member States of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and being mindful of the threat posed by the uncontrolled proliferation of small arms in the region, decided on a set of measures known as the Sao Tome Initiative.

The Initiative led to the adoption on 30 April 2010 of the Kinshasa Convention. The main challenge in implementing this legal instrument is ensuring that it enters into force. As at the end of 2015, five countries, namely Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Congo and Gabon, had deposited their instruments of ratification with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the depositary of the instrument. In accordance with article 35, paragraph 2, the Convention will enter into force 30 days after the sixth instrument of ratification has been deposited.

The ECCAS secretariat has continued to assist countries that do not yet have institutional coordination mechanisms to establish national committees on combating the proliferation of SALW, including five pilot countries. Experts from member States are provided with valuable information and practical advice. Meetings have already been organized in Cameroon, the Congo and Gabon. Further meetings are expected to take place in Chad and the Central African Republic.

Although the ATT entered into force on 24 December 2014, its implementation in Central Africa is subject to ratification by member States in the subregion. Its implementation is also expected to be done while bearing in mind the Kinshasa Convention. As at the end of 2015, the only member States of ECCAS that had ratified the ATT were the Central African Republic and

Chad. The remaining countries had signed the Treaty, except the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Equatorial Guinea, which have not signed or ratified the Treaty. ECCAS continued to take steps to encourage States to ratify the Convention and implement the measures set forth therein.

### ***Economic Community of West African States***

#### *Activities related to conventional arms*

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Commission, through its Small Arms Division, organized in April a meeting of independent experts to work towards the establishment of a regional database and small arms register consistent with article 10 of the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials (ECOWAS Convention). This was done in order to enable the region to have an effective record-keeping system related to weapons import, export and manufacture. The draft document, containing ways to establish the database, is due for adoption by governmental experts of ECOWAS member States.

The annual meeting of national commissions on SALW, held in June, was aimed primarily at enhancing cross-border collaboration, information exchange and experience-sharing among key stakeholders in the ECOWAS region. The meeting participants evaluated regional cross-cutting policies and programmes and set standards based on international best practices.

ECOWAS also organized a capacity-building training course in the Niger and Nigeria in August to raise awareness and instruct security officers about standards of and compliance with the ECOWAS Convention. The course established criteria for seeking exemptions, including details of supply chain and end-use or end-user certification.

The support to SALW-focused civil society organizations for the implementation of programmes and activities of the Convention continued. ECOWAS supported the Annual Forum of the West Africa Action Network on Small Arms, an effort at enhancing regional, national and community control of the menace posed by SALW. The civil society organizations from member States reviewed the peace and security situation in the region and discussed lessons learned in the context of emerging issues.

The Commission partnered with agencies within the disarmament community for joint activities and projects. In this connection, the Commission benefited from collaboration with the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, the AU Commission, the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the Small Arms Survey, Saferworld, the Mines Advisory Group and the Bonn International Center for Conversion.

*Weapons of mass destruction–related activities*

The ECOWAS Commission's partnership with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons resulted in a meeting with ECOWAS national authorities in August in Grand Bassam, Côte d'Ivoire. The meeting resulted in the elaboration of a programme against threats of chemical-weapon attacks, incidents or emergencies in the ECOWAS region.

**Regional Centre on Small Arms in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States**

To enhance arms accountability, the secretariat of the Regional Centre on Small Arms in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States (RECSA) provided 10 arms-marking machines in 2015 to various member States, namely Burundi (1), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2), Kenya (2), Rwanda (1), Uganda (2) and the United Republic of Tanzania (2). These machines contributed to the arms-marking exercises in the above-mentioned countries.

RECSA, with the support of the United States Government, continued to implement a project aimed at enhancing regional security through marking and electronic record keeping to reduce the risks of diversion of State-owned firearms in East African countries. The project supported selected RECSA member States<sup>33</sup> in arms marking and electronic record keeping. To enhance traceability, RECSA provided training and installed the RECSA Small Arms Tracing Software System in Kenya, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania. Steel boxes to enhance the secure storage of firearms in field stations were also provided to the Kenya Police Service.

RECSA, with support from the African Development Bank, carried out awareness-building workshops in the Central African Republic, the Congo and Somalia. The workshops were designed for senior government officials to sensitize them to the process of creating national commissions responsible for the control of SALW in their respective countries.

A study on the complementarities among the ATT, the United Nations Programme of Action on SALW, the Nairobi Protocol<sup>34</sup> and the Kinshasa Convention was validated in November 2014 and published in March 2015. The research informed a regional sensitization conference in Nairobi convened under the project to mobilize member States to sign and/or ratify the ATT. At the end of the regional workshop, member States expressed support for the ATT and showed willingness to engage their Governments to ratify or accede to it.

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<sup>33</sup> Kenya, Uganda and United Republic of Tanzania.

<sup>34</sup> Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa.

In 2015, all 15 RECSA member States' national focal points and coordinators were trained on the Nairobi Protocol, other international instruments on SALW, project management and the responsibilities of States parties under the ATT. The training was a refresher course on the duties of coordinators in charge of SALW control at the national level. The RESCA secretariat also developed guidelines on the establishment of national institutions responsible for SALW.

The United Republic of Tanzania, with technical support from RECSA, enacted a new law<sup>35</sup> on SALW that is harmonized with the Nairobi Protocol and other international instruments on SALW.

### ***Southern African Development Community***

In 2015, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) conducted three simultaneous operations as part of their disarmament programme. On 26 and 27 March, simultaneous joint operations were conducted to seize illicit firearms from criminals and, as a result, six firearms were confiscated. The second set of operations was conducted on 9 and 10 July, during which 15 firearms were seized.

The third operation, involving eight SADC member States, was conducted in collaboration with the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) on 10 and 11 December, during which 211 firearms and 972 live ammunitions were recovered. The recovered firearms were composed of 17 rifles, 50 handguns, 2 MK4 rifles, 30 shotguns, 14 submachine guns, 2 man-made firearms, 57 muzzle-loading guns, 9 G3s, 3 Singapore assault rifles and 5 AK-47s, while 262 suspects were arrested for different offences during the operations. Three SADC member States reported 3,406 firearms destroyed in 2015.

The SADC region also provided peacekeeping mission support in the Democratic Republic of the Congo through the Intervention Brigade as part of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). The Democratic Republic of the Congo continued to implement the Nairobi Declaration, which was signed on 12 December 2013 in Nairobi between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the "March 23 Movement". A total of 2,985 ex-combatants in the Kamina and the Kitona military bases have benefited from vocational training, preparing them for a socioeconomic reintegration into society, as part of the MONUSCO-led disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration process.

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<sup>35</sup> United Republic of Tanzania, "The Firearms and Ammunition Control Act, 2015". Available from <http://parliament.go.tz/polis/uploads/bills/acts/1452063088-ActNo-2-2015-Book-1-10.pdf> (accessed 26 May 2016).

The SADC secretariat also participated in the regional workshop, held in Nairobi on 27 and 28 January, on the national implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention for East Africa at the invitation of the European Union and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA).

## **Americas**

### ***Central American Integration System***

In 2015, the member States of the Central American Integration System (SICA) took various steps to control trafficking in firearms and reduce firearms-related violence in accordance with the Framework Treaty on Democratic Security in Central America.<sup>36</sup> Efforts were also pursued through the Central American Programme on Small Arms and Light Weapons Control, adopted by the eight SICA member countries<sup>37</sup> in June 2003.

Arms control having been established as a priority at the fifty-eighth ordinary meeting of the Central American Security Commission held on 11 August, the Commission of Chiefs of Police of Central America, Mexico, the Caribbean and Colombia carried out four regional operations against illicit arms. A subcommission on weapons, as well as a group of experts, was also established to exchange information and monitor transnational cases.

With the support of specialized units in the region, the Central American Programme on Small Arms Control mapped the routes and modus operandi of illicit arms trafficking, adding information on the Caribbean coast and supporting operational decision-making with a mapping tool and the identification of strategic targets. Additionally, two framework laws were drafted, one to modernize and harmonize legislation on firearms, ammunition, explosives and other related materials and the other to modernize and harmonize legislation on private security services. Both frameworks are being discussed at the national level and at the Forum of Presidents of the Legislatures of Central America and the Caribbean Basin. Moreover, specialized training on combating various methods of illicit arms trafficking was provided to 4,500 public servants, including judges, prosecutors, investigators, armed forces, customs officers and border police, as well as forensic laboratories, judicial and police academies and public prosecutors' offices, in all eight countries.

In a strategic alliance with the General Secretariat of INTERPOL, training was provided on the use of the Illicit Arms Records and Tracing Management System (iARMS) weapons-tracing tool and the fingerprints and DNA databases.

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<sup>36</sup> Available from <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/RuleOfLaw/CompilationDemocracy/Pages/FrameworkTreaty.aspx> (accessed 26 May 2016).

<sup>37</sup> Belize, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama.

With regard to weapons of mass destruction, the SICA States have also prohibited the manufacture, possession and use of weapons of mass destruction through respective national legislation. These States have also adhered to United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).

### ***Southern Common Market***

Created in 1991, the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) continued to serve throughout 2015 as a political forum for coordinating positions among its full members<sup>38</sup> and associated States.<sup>39</sup> In 2015, the Working Group for Firearms and Ammunition, the specialized MERCOSUR body addressing conventional arms matters such as the prevention, fight and eradication of the production and illicit trade of SALW and other related materials, was a useful information-sharing mechanism regarding legal and other kinds of measures adopted by member and associated States. The Working Group aimed to strengthen regional cooperation and coordination concerning control and trade of conventional arms throughout the region.

The Group focused on following up and encouraging the regional implementation of the most recent developments on disarmament at the United Nations, both within the General Assembly's First Committee and in the Security Council. Member States of MERCOSUR welcomed the adoption of several resolutions by the United Nations Security Council, especially resolution 2220 (2015), which emphasized the impact of the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of SALW on civilians. Member States also recognized the need for regional implementation of the ATT.

Furthermore, the Working Group followed up on the incorporation by MERCOSUR member States of rules for SALW and other related materials, such as the Agreement for Information Sharing on the illicit production and traffic of firearms, ammunition, explosives and other related materials, and the Joint Mechanism for registration of purchasers and sellers of firearms, ammunition, explosives and other related materials.

Recognizing the relevant role that the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime plays by giving assistance in the ratification and implementation of international treaties related to crime, as well as in the development of domestic legislation for peace and disarmament, the Working Group invited the Office to participate in a working session. Following that rationale of including relevant players, the Working Group also invited civil society organizations to take part in a special session, taking into account their influence in raising public awareness to curb the illicit traffic in SALW.

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<sup>38</sup> Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of).

<sup>39</sup> Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru and Suriname.

In addition to the coordination efforts of the Working Group, the MERCOSUR efforts concerning disarmament included the joint declaration<sup>40</sup> approved by the Meeting of Ministers of Justice and the Meeting of Ministers of Homeland Affairs, which declared 15 March as the South American Day for Voluntary Disarmament. The declaration also outlined the importance of promoting this date by launching public awareness campaigns for disarmament and a culture of peace.

### ***Union of South American Nations***

The South American Defense School, with headquarters in Quito, was established in 2014 at the fourth Meeting of Ministers of Defense of the Union of South American Nations held in Cartagena. In 2015, Antonio Jorge Ramalho (Brazil) was elected Executive Secretary on 16 April for a two-year term. A decision was taken that the School's activities should start in 2016, through virtual and classroom courses and that its purpose would be to contribute to the consolidation of the principles and objectives established in the Statute of the South American Defense Council through education and training. Teaching and researching on common topics for the region and specific ones to member States would contribute to the gradual progress of a shared vision on defence and regional security matters.

### **Asia and the Pacific**

#### ***Association of Southeast Asian Nations***

The Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty) was signed in 1995 by 10 South-East Asian States and entered into force in 1997. In April 2015, Malaysia, as the Chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), submitted a memorandum of activities relating to the Bangkok Treaty to the 2015 NPT Review Conference in New York, with updates on the Treaty and on the progress made in the last five years. A positive development was the signature of the Lao People's Democratic Republic of the Additional Protocol to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards Agreement in November 2014.

The ASEAN commitment to implement the Bangkok Treaty and its Plan of Action<sup>41</sup> was reaffirmed in the Chairman's statement<sup>42</sup> at the twenty-seventh

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<sup>40</sup> See MERCOSUR, "Día Suramericano del Desarme Voluntario". Available from <http://www.mercosur.int/innovaportal/v/7422/5/innova.front/dia-suramericano-del-desarme-voluntario> (25 May 2016).

<sup>41</sup> "Plan of Action to Strengthen the Implementation of the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (2013-2017)", [http://www.asean.org/storage/images/Statement/poa%20to%20strengthen%20the%20implementation%20of%20the%20seanwzfz%20treaty%202013-2017\\_adopted.pdf](http://www.asean.org/storage/images/Statement/poa%20to%20strengthen%20the%20implementation%20of%20the%20seanwzfz%20treaty%202013-2017_adopted.pdf) (accessed 1 June 2015).

<sup>42</sup> Available from <http://www.asean.org/storage/images/2015/November/27th-summit/statement/Final-Chairmans%20Statement%20of%2027th%20ASEAN%20Summit-25%20November%202015.pdf> (accessed 31 May 2016).

ASEAN Summit in November. ASEAN Leaders agreed to intensify ongoing efforts of the Treaty States parties and the nuclear-weapon States to resolve all outstanding issues pertaining to the signature and ratification of the Treaty's Protocol by the nuclear-weapon States at the earliest possible time. The Leaders also welcomed the adoption by the United Nations General Assembly of resolution 70/60 on the Treaty on 7 December during its seventieth session. The ASEAN Leaders further welcomed the designation of the ASEAN Network of Regulatory Bodies on Atomic Energy as an ASEAN Sectoral Body under the ASEAN Political-Security Community Pillar in annex 1 of the ASEAN Charter.

Under the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) framework of cooperation, the seventh ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament was held in Kuala Lumpur in June, during which participants discussed the outcomes of the 2015 NPT Review Conference, as well as current initiatives in strengthening global non-proliferation efforts. Also under the ARF, Mongolia and the Philippines co-hosted a workshop in Ulaanbaatar in September to promote and discuss Mongolia's unique single-state nuclear-weapon-free status.

An emerging topic discussed in the ARF sphere was the safety and security of outer space. The third ARF Space Security Workshop in Beijing from 30 November to 1 December reaffirmed the importance of ensuring the long-term sustainability and security of the space environment and preventing the militarization and weaponization of space.

### ***Pacific Islands Forum***

In 2015, disarmament issues continued to feature on the security agenda of the Pacific Islands Forum—the political community of 16 countries in the South and North Pacific region. The Pacific Islands Forum secretariat provided policy advice and coordinated the provision of information and assistance to member States on various disarmament issues, including those described below. The secretariat also convened the 2015 meeting of the Forum Regional Security Committee, the Forum's key mechanism for facilitating regional dialogue and cooperation on security issues.

### ***South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty***

The year 2015 represented a significant year for the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, with 6 August marking the thirtieth anniversary of the Treaty's adoption and signature in Rarotonga. Over this period, the Treaty established a strong regional legal framework to ban the use, testing and possession of nuclear weapons, as well as the dumping of radioactive waste across the region.

Under the three Protocols to the Treaty, the NPT nuclear-weapon States undertake to apply the Treaty to their territories in the Pacific region, refrain

from the use or threat of use of nuclear explosive devices against any party and not to test nuclear explosive devices in the nuclear-weapon-free zone. All the nuclear-weapon States have signed the Protocols, and all but the United States have ratified them. In 2015, the Forum continued to advocate its expectation that the United States ratify the Protocols as soon as possible.

### *Arms Trade Treaty*

In 2013, leaders of the Pacific Islands Forum welcomed the Forum members who had already signed the ATT and encouraged all Forum member States that were members of the United Nations to consider signing the Treaty as soon as practicable. As at the end of 2015, four Pacific Islands Forum member countries have ratified the Treaty, and an additional four have signed it.<sup>43</sup>

The Forum Regional Security Committee endorsed the model law to assist Pacific States to implement the ATT—an initiative of New Zealand developed in consultation with the Forum secretariat and legal officials from Pacific countries. The secretariat has since worked to promote awareness of the model law and to support its implementation.

### *Unexploded ordnance from the Second World War*

In 2015, the secretariat continued to support member countries' access to the services of demining companies and to raise awareness about unexploded ordnance, which remains a human security problem for many Forum countries, threatening public health, safety and the environment. The Forum's Regional Strategy on unexploded ordnance aims to improve coordination between Governments, donors and demining organizations to mitigate and remove the threats posed by unexploded ordnance.

## **Middle East**

### ***League of Arab States***

One of the many roles of the League of Arab States (LAS), composed of 22 States, is to coordinate and elaborate regionally and internationally a common Arab position regarding arms control and disarmament issues.

### *Weapons of mass destruction-related activities*

The LAS held five meetings of the "Arab Senior Officials Committee in Charge of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction Issues". Based on the Senior Officials Committee recommendations, the LAS Ministerial Council adopted resolution 7881, dated 9 March, and resolution 7946, dated 13 September, entitled "Establishing a Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle

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<sup>43</sup> The Pacific Islands Forum States that have ratified the Treaty are Australia, New Zealand, Samoa and Tuvalu. Those that have signed are Kiribati, Nauru, Palau and Vanuatu.

East”. The resolution addressed the Arab preparations and the outcomes of the 2015 NPT Review Conference, as well as the Arab coordination during the fifty-ninth IAEA General Conference.

#### *Other relevant activities or institutional development*

The LAS and the Arab Nuclear Forum co-organized a conference entitled “Regional Security and Challenges Facing the Arab Region” in Cairo on 22 and 23 February. The LAS and UNODA also agreed to sign a memorandum of understanding on the development of partnership on peace and disarmament initiatives that will set the scope and modalities to strengthen cooperation and create synergy to carry out their respective activities.

## **Europe**

### ***European Union***

The actions of the European Union (EU) in 2015 continued to be guided by the European Security Strategy (2003/2008), the EU Strategy Against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (2003) and the EU Strategy to Combat Illicit Accumulation and Trafficking of SALW and their Ammunition (2005), including, in particular, the principle of support to effective multilateralism. The EU member States continued to implement the 2013 Council conclusions on enhanced EU efforts in combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

Considering the NPT as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament in accordance with article VI and an important element in the further development of nuclear energy applications for peaceful purposes, the EU engaged actively at the 2015 NPT Review Conference by delivering substantive statements on all three pillars of the Treaty and submitting three working papers.<sup>44</sup>

On 14 July, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)<sup>45</sup> was agreed upon in Vienna, bringing an end to long-standing concerns over the exclusively peaceful nature of the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The EU played a central role as facilitator of the E3/EU+3.<sup>46</sup> The United Nations Security Council endorsed the agreement through resolution 2231 (2015). The EU High Representative will serve as the coordinator of the Joint Commission overseeing the JCPOA implementation.

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<sup>44</sup> Available from <http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/working-papers.shtml> (accessed 26 May 2016).

<sup>45</sup> “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action”, <http://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/jcpoa/> (accessed 1 April 2016).

<sup>46</sup> China, France, Germany, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States.

The EU continued to attach great importance to core responsibilities of the IAEA in the field of non-proliferation; nuclear energy, safety and security; and technical cooperation. Practical arrangements concluded in 2013 to ensure complementarity in activities undertaken by the EU Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence Initiative and the IAEA were implemented.

The EU confirmed its commitment to the promotion of the universalization and early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty by the adoption of a Council decision<sup>47</sup> on 12 October providing an additional EUR 3 million for the activities of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization.

The EU continued to strongly support the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) as the cornerstone of international efforts to prevent biological agents or toxins from being developed, produced or otherwise acquired and used as weapons. On 16 November, a Council decision<sup>48</sup> on the EU position for the Eighth BWC Review Conference in 2016 was adopted.

Likewise, the EU remained committed to pursuing the universalization and full national implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention.<sup>49</sup> With the adoption on 17 February of a new Council decision,<sup>50</sup> the EU continued to substantially contribute to the promotion of core activities of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) through dedicated funding of over EUR 2.5 million. Furthermore, on 30 November, the EU adopted a Council decision<sup>51</sup> providing EUR 4.6 million in support of Security Council resolution 2235 (2015), which established the OPCW–United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism to identify the perpetrators of chemical attacks in the Syrian Arab Republic.

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<sup>47</sup> Council of the European Union, Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/1837 of 12 October 2015, *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 266 (13 October 2015), pp. 83-95. Available from <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32015D1837&from=EN> (accessed 31 May 2016).

<sup>48</sup> Council of the European Union, Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/2096 of 16 November 2015, *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 303 (20 November 2015), pp. 13-18. Available from [http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/\(httpAssets\)/D0A11B6E285166E1C1257F030058310E/\\$file/eur-lex.europa.pdf](http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/D0A11B6E285166E1C1257F030058310E/$file/eur-lex.europa.pdf) (accessed 31 May 2016).

<sup>49</sup> The full title is Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. Its text and adherence status are available from <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/cwc> (accessed 31 May 2016).

<sup>50</sup> Council of the European Union, Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/259 of 17 February 2015, *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 43 (18 February 2015), pp. 14-28. Available from <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32015D0259&from=EN> (accessed 31 May 2016).

<sup>51</sup> Council of the European Union, Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/2215 of 30 November 2015, *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 314 (1 December 2015), pp. 51-57. Available from <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2015/2215/oj> (accessed 31 May 2016).

In 2015, in line with its long-standing support of the ATT, the EU continued to promote its universalization and effective implementation further to its entry into force in December 2014. In addition to these diplomatic efforts, the EU-funded ATT implementation support programme provided technical assistance to a number of beneficiary countries in strengthening their national systems in line with the requirements of the Treaty.

In the context of promoting the implementation of proposals for transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities, the EU convened a meeting entitled “Multilateral Negotiations on an International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities” at the United Nations Headquarters in New York from 27 to 31 July with the assistance of UNODA. The meeting was well attended and allowed for rich and substantial discussions both on the substance and on the process regarding a potential multilateral code of conduct.

Supported by the Council decision<sup>52</sup> covering the period 2014-2017, the EU Non-Proliferation Consortium of think tanks organized in 2015 a number of events with the participation of officials, experts and international civil society, including an ad hoc seminar on 8 and 9 April in Algiers on preparations for the 2015 NPT Review Conference, organized jointly with the Algerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as the annual EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Conference on 11 and 12 November in Brussels.

### **North Atlantic Treaty Organization**

Throughout 2015, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) remained committed to arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament. To this end, NATO registered concerns over security and stability in Central and Eastern Europe and continued to call for full compliance with all international obligations and commitments, including the Budapest Memorandum, the Helsinki Final Act and the NATO-Russia Founding Act.

In 2015, the NATO Allies<sup>53</sup> submitted seven proposals at the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) to modernize the “Vienna Document 2011 on confidence- and security-building measures” and increase transparency, while continuing to implement the letter and the spirit of all its arms control commitments and obligations.<sup>54</sup> In this context, NATO conducted with robust transparency its largest exercise in decades, *Trident Juncture 2015*, inviting observers from all OSCE participating States under the Vienna

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<sup>52</sup> Council of the European Union, Council Decision 2014/129/CFSP of 10 March 2014, *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 71 (12 March 2014), pp. 3-13. Available from <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014D0129&qid=1397641005964&from=EN> (accessed 31 May 2016).

<sup>53</sup> There are currently 28 member countries of NATO, which are referred to as “Allies”.

<sup>54</sup> OSCE, document FSC.DOC/1/11. Available from <http://www.osce.org/fsc/86597> (accessed 31 May 2016).

Document and hosting five Russian Federation verification teams. The United Nations also participated as an observer.

NATO also remained focused in 2015 on combating weapons of mass destruction threats, including chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats, by providing various forums for discussion among Allies and partners. NATO convened its eleventh Annual Conference on Weapons of Mass Destruction Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation in Qatar, bringing together 50 countries and international organizations. Outreach events related to weapons of mass destruction were also conducted in Prague and Brussels. In a similar vein, NATO attended the 2015 NPT Review Conference and the annual Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Regarding CBRN defence, NATO continued to develop its capabilities through the Combined Joint CBRN Defence Task Force, the Joint CBRN Defence Centre of Excellence in the Czech Republic, the Science for Peace and Security Programme, the Weapons of Mass Destruction Non-Proliferation Centre, and the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre.

NATO also remained committed to support the United Nations Programme of Action on SALW and the ATT. NATO convened regular meetings with partner nations on issues related to SALW and developed an online information-sharing platform as a global coordination tool. NATO also supported regional initiatives to address threats related to SALW in Central Asia and North Africa. As at 2015, NATO and its partners had destroyed more than 626,000 weapons and 162,000,000 rounds of ammunition. The Alliance also continued to contribute to the efforts to implement United Nations Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) in all of its efforts related to SALW and arms control.

In 2015, NATO conducted seven courses on arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation at the NATO School with a total of 168 participants.

### ***Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe***

#### ***Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction***

In coordination with the United Nations Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), its Group of Experts and UNODA, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) continued to assist interested participating States in implementing resolution 1540 (2004) by, inter alia, the development of national implementation action plans and the facilitation of their implementation. In addition, regional coordination workshops and tailored events, such as the annual meeting of OSCE points of contact on resolution 1540 (2004), were held throughout the year, organized jointly by the OSCE and UNODA.

### *Small arms and light weapons and stockpiles of conventional ammunition*


The OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre and UNODA initiated a joint project to synchronize and enable voluntary online simultaneous submission of SALW reports to both organizations. The OSCE also produced a study of OSCE participating States entitled “Participation in Arms Transfers Reporting Instruments”, which compared various reporting requirements on arms transfers with those of various international organizations. These efforts aimed to streamline reporting and reduce the reporting burden.

The OSCE organized the second round table on SALW in Yerevan in July to follow up the recommendation provided in 2014. As a result, Armenia submitted to the OSCE later in 2015 a request for assistance on SALW.

By developing holistic projects, mobilizing financial resources and delivering targeted assistance, the OSCE provided support to the OSCE participating States to fulfil their commitments under the OSCE documents on SALW and on stockpiles of conventional ammunition. In 2015, more than EUR 4 million were allocated for projects in Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Montenegro, the Republic of Moldova, Serbia and Tajikistan, which resulted in the reduction of surplus weapons and ammunition, increased physical security and improved stockpile management. The OSCE placed special emphasis on assisting the civilian authorities in Ukraine to address the existing challenges in clearing contaminated territories from explosive remnants of war by developing and implementing a project to increase the capacity and efficiency of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine.

As presented in a 2015 report,<sup>55</sup> participating States destroyed 1,055,094 pieces of SALW in 2014. Of these, 1,050,496 were deemed as a surplus and 4,598 were seized from illegal possession and trafficking (see figure below).

### **Destruction of small arms and light weapons in the OSCE area**



<sup>55</sup> See OSCE, “Twenty-Second Meeting of the Ministerial Council 3 and 4 December 2015”. Available from <http://www.osce.org/mc/230741?download=true> (accessed 25 May 2016).

### *Activities related to general security and disarmament*

The Vienna Document 2011 was extensively used with regard to the crisis in and around Ukraine. A total of 26 countries sent military inspectors and observers in accordance with the Vienna Document. The “Mechanism for Consultation and Co-operation as regards unusual Military Activities” under the Vienna Document’s chapter III was invoked 21 times, while 25 verification activities were conducted under chapter IX.

Throughout 2015, OSCE participating States made significant progress in implementing the initial set of OSCE confidence-building measures,<sup>56</sup> adopted in December 2013, to reduce the risks of conflict stemming from the use of information and communication technologies. These efforts complemented the work of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, which is supported by UNODA.

### ***Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Centre–Centre for Security Cooperation***

The “Cooperative Security Environment with focus on Arms Control Pillar” (CSE Pillar) has been one of the longest-running focuses of the Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Centre–Centre for Security Cooperation (RACVIAC) since its inception in 2000. The identified spectrum of regional needs in the Pillar ranges from training inspections to training of the trainers for the implementation of legally and politically binding treaties.

In 2015, more than 200 experts in the fields of arms control and cooperative security took part in CSE Pillar activities, with almost all countries of the region profiting from being partners in its activities. The following activities on weapons of mass destruction and arms control, with a focus on confidence- and security-building measures, were carried out in 2015 under the CSE Pillar:

- Chemical Weapons Convention Workshop;
- Symposium on Mine Action (combination of the Workshop on the Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions and the Ottawa Convention Seminar);
- Effective Practices of the Implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004);

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<sup>56</sup> OSCE, document PC.DEC/1106. Available from <http://www.osce.org/pc/109168?download=true> (accessed 31 May 2016). In early 2016, OSCE participating States achieved expert-level consensus on a second set of confidence-building measures designed to build processes and capabilities for dealing individually and collectively with common cyberthreats.

- Proliferation Security Initiative event;
- Open Skies Treaty Aerial Observation Course;
- Vienna Document 2011: Verification and Compliance Course;
- Arms Control Symposium: Developments in the Conventional Arms Control Field;
- Physical Security and Stockpile Management Workshop;
- Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control (Dayton Agreement Article IV) Orientation Course.

The Pillar's activities are designed as a combination of lectures or presentations, followed by discussions and exchange of experience. Most of them include a well-developed practical part, for example activities on the Open Skies Treaty, the Vienna Document 2011 and the Dayton Agreement.

By training contemporary and future leaders and experts to respond effectively to security challenges and arms control issues, CSE Pillar offers a valuable forum to RACVIAC countries and participants in their continuous search for practical solutions and applicable methods in the field of security-building activities. The viability of arms control and confidence-building actions is maintained through these activities, by strengthening the officers' or experts' theoretical and practical knowledge and making an impact on political decision makers and national think tanks.

CSE Pillar's success is based on bringing together experts—politicians, diplomats and military and academic personnel—to discuss arms control topics closely matching the current security and political developments.

CSE Pillar promotes independent policy and professional dialogue and cooperation across countries and organizations. Through building capacity, it serves to stabilize and develop common operating techniques.

### ***South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons***

The South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC) worked to strengthen the capacities of national and regional stakeholders to control and reduce the proliferation of SALW, thus contributing to enhanced stability, security and development of South-Eastern Europe.

The EU continued to support SEESAC disarmament and arms control activities in South-Eastern Europe through the “EU Support of SEESAC

Disarmament and Arms Control Activities in South East Europe” project.<sup>57</sup> The main achievements in 2015 included the following:

- Increasing stockpile security by upgrading the security of storage locations in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina;
- Organizing a regional and national physical security and stockpile management course;
- Reducing stockpiles by destroying 4,092 SALW and 2,048 parts and components, including a regional destruction effort on 9 July (International Gun Destruction Day);
- Improving capacities for marking, tracing, and registration of SALW in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo<sup>58</sup> and Serbia, as well as coordinating two regional meetings of the South East Europe Firearms Expert Network, a process which was highlighted by the United Nations Secretary-General in his biennial report on small arms and light weapons;<sup>59</sup>
- Fostering regional cooperation, information-sharing and knowledge transfer through regional meetings of SALW commissions, bilateral exchange visits and the consolidation of the South East Europe Arms Law Compendium;
- Supporting collection and awareness-raising projects by aiding the implementation of two national campaigns in Serbia and Montenegro, and publishing the report on data of small arms and light weapon incidents in Serbia entitled *Targeting Weapons: Misuse of Firearms in Serbia*.<sup>60</sup>

To raise awareness about the dangers of celebratory shooting, SEESAC implemented the online regional campaign “Celebrate with Your Heart, Not Your Gun”,<sup>61</sup> which reached over 5 million people and received over 26 million views of the ads published. In addition, with the support of Norway, SEESAC finalized its Arms Transfers Control Programme in the Western Balkans. Under this project, SEESAC organized three meetings of the Regional Information Exchange Process; supported the publication of the

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<sup>57</sup> See Council of the European Union, Council Decision 2013/730/CFSP of 9 December 2013, *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 332 (11 December 2013), pp. 19-30. Available from <http://www.seesac.org/res/files/failovi/590.pdf> (accessed 31 May 2016).

<sup>58</sup> References to Kosovo shall be understood to be in the context of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999).

<sup>59</sup> S/2015/289.

<sup>60</sup> SEESAC, *Targeting Weapons: Misuse of Firearms in Serbia* (Belgrade, 2015). Available from <http://www.seesac.org/dl.php?n=Oru%C5%BEje+na+meti%2FTargeting+Weapons+-+EN&f=res/files/publication/948.pdf> (accessed 31 May 2016).

<sup>61</sup> For more information, see the campaign website. Available from <http://www.seesac.org/DontRuinTheParty> (accessed 31 May 2016).

Regional Report on Arms Exports in 2013 (the seventh in the series)<sup>62</sup> and of the national annual reports on arms exports of Albania,<sup>63</sup> Montenegro,<sup>64</sup> Serbia<sup>65</sup> and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,<sup>66</sup> and developed the Weapons Categorization Tool<sup>67</sup> to help countries in the region with reporting to international bodies.

### United Nations Development Programme

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) advanced the implementation of practical disarmament within the Economic Commission of West African States Conflict Prevention Framework in Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, the Niger, Nigeria and Sierra Leone. The initiative resulted in the voluntary handing over and collection of weapons in Danané, Toulepleu and Ouaninou in western Côte d'Ivoire before the 2015 elections. It also led to a high-level awareness-raising campaign in the Niger, which resulted in the landmark South-South community disarmament cooperation between the Niger and Mali.

Furthermore, the project, which commenced in 2015, deepened the confidence of the cross-border communities between Liberia and Sierra Leone with 17 specialized training programmes benefiting over 250 persons, including at least 75 women. These programmes targeted selected national commissions, security apparatus and civil society organizations within the Mano River Union and the Sahel countries. Additionally, the project conducted

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<sup>62</sup> SEESAC, *Regional Report on Arms Exports in 2013* (Belgrade, 2015). Available from: <http://www.seesac.org/dl.php?n=Regional+Report+on+Arms+Exports+in+2013+-EN&f=res/files/publication/945.pdf> (accessed 31 May 2016).

<sup>63</sup> Albanian State Export Control Authority, *Annual Report on Export Control for 2013* (UNDP/SEESAC, 2015). Available from <http://www.seesac.org/dl.php?n=STATE+EXPOR T+CONTROL+AUTHORITY+Annual+Report+on+Export+Control+for+2013+-EN&f=res/files/publication/981.pdf> (accessed 31 May 2016).

<sup>64</sup> Montenegro Ministry of Economy, *2011 Annual Report on Foreign Trade in Controlled Goods* (Montenegro, UNDP/SEESAC, 2015), available from <http://www.seesac.org/dl.php?n=2011+ANNUAL+REPORT+ON+FOREIGN+TRADE+IN+CONTROLLED+GOODS+-EN&f=res/files/publication/978.pdf>; and *2014 Annual Report on Foreign Trade in Controlled Goods* (Montenegro, UNDP/SEESAC, 2015), available from <http://www.seesac.org/dl.php?n=2014+ANNUAL+REPORT+ON+FOREIGN+TRADE+IN+CONTROLLED+GOODS+-EN&f=res/files/publication/986.pdf> (accessed 31 May 2016).

<sup>65</sup> Serbia Ministry of Trade, Tourism and Telecommunications, *2013 Report on Performed Activities of Export and Import of Arms, Military Equipment and Dual-Use Goods, Arms Brokering and Technical Assistance* (Serbia, UNDP/SEESAC, 2015). Available from <http://www.seesac.org/dl.php?n=2013+Report+on+Performed+Activities+of+Export+and+Import+of+Arms%2C+Military+Equipment+and+Dual-Use+Goods%2C+Arms+Brokering+and+Technical+Assistance+-EN&f=res/files/publication/941.pdf> (accessed 31 May 2016).

<sup>66</sup> The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, *Annual Arms Export Report 2014* (UNDP/SEESAC, 2015). Available from <http://www.seesac.org/dl.php?n=Annual+Arms+Export+Report+2014+-EN&f=res/files/publication/990.pdf> (accessed 31 May 2016).

<sup>67</sup> See SEESAC, "SEESAC Develops a Weapons Categorization Tool", 22 October 2015. Available from <http://www.seesac.org/news.php?id=690> (accessed 31 May 2016).

17 training sessions on stockpile management and security, record keeping, partnership and resource mobilization, and a knowledge- and experience-sharing workshop on contemporary trends regarding SALW control for national commissions and selected beneficiaries from targeted countries.

With UNDP support, 46 sites for weapons storage facilities were identified and 23 stockpile management facilities were enhanced in line with United Nations standards, including through the procurement of storage containers to be provided to enhance stockpile management in all the pilot countries. Community needs assessments and action plans were carried out in collaboration with community leaders and chiefs of villages in Touba, Odienné, Man and Guiglo (Côte d'Ivoire) and Abala, Banibangou, Inates, Gorouol, Tillia and Tchintabaraden (Niger). Finally, technical assessments of the rehabilitation of secure storage containers in gendarmerie camps in these countries were started, as well as micro projects such as potable water and school and health centre rehabilitation in order to further encourage the voluntary relinquishment of small arms.



**Chapter V**  
**Emerging, cross-cutting**  
**and other issues**



Inspire One, an unmanned aerial vehicle from the 4th Combat Camera Squadron, films the wreckage of two tanks on 20 May 2015 at a training exercise in Twentynine Palms, California.  
© United States Air Force photo/Steven A. Ortiz

## CHAPTER V

### Emerging, cross-cutting and other issues

*The Secretary-General's position on armed UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles] has been clear: they must only be used in accordance with international humanitarian law and international human rights law. It remains imperative for the international community to reach consensus on the interpretation of established international principles and their application to the use of armed UAVs. At the same time, it must be acknowledged that UAVs have unique characteristics that make them particularly susceptible to misuse in comparison to other technologies.*

KIM WON-SOO, HIGH REPRESENTATIVE FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS<sup>1</sup>

### Developments and trends, 2015

THROUGHOUT 2015, Member States continued to consider approaches to emerging disarmament and non-proliferation issues, including in established multilateral forums.

International discussions on lethal autonomous weapons continued to focus on the nature and degree of control that should be exercised over the development and employment of such systems to ensure compliance with international humanitarian law and to address human rights and ethical and security concerns. Many State and other actors considered that humans must retain control over the critical functions of weapon systems, namely the selection and engagement of targets. While divergent views persisted on the required degree of control, many States and civil society promoted a principle that any attack must be subject to meaningful human control.

States and civil society expressed greater interest in turning to United Nations disarmament bodies to address concerns regarding the proliferation of armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and their use, especially outside areas of active hostilities. In October, the United Nations published a study on armed UAVs that examined, inter alia, characteristics of UAVs; the application of international law to their use; implications for international peace and security; and concepts for improving transparency, oversight and accountability. At the seventieth session of the General Assembly's First

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<sup>1</sup> Foreword in *Study on Armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Prepared on the Recommendation of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters* (United Nations publication, 2015). Available from <https://www.un.org/disarmament/publications/more/drones-study/> (accessed 20 June 2016).

Committee, a growing number of States raised concerns about the use of armed UAVs outside conflict zones, citing the United Nations study as a basis for further discussion.

The United Nations, States, the International Committee of the Red Cross and civil society continued to draw attention to the harm caused by the use of explosive weapons in populated areas and on the need to develop a political commitment to put an end to such use. Austria and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs worked to advance the development of a political commitment that would oblige States to refrain from the use in populated areas of explosive weapons with wide-area impacts, as called for by the Secretary-General.

In June, the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security adopted a substantive consensus report on norms, rules and principles of the responsible behaviour of States in the cybersphere, as well as confidence-building measures, international cooperation and capacity-building, and the application of international law to the use of information and communications technologies.

The United Nations and Member States also pursued the implementation and advancement of transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs) in outer space activities through various forums, including through an unprecedented joint ad hoc meeting of the First and Fourth Committees of the General Assembly. In line with the implementation of TCBMs, States continued to advance proposals for political measures to ensure responsible use of and behaviour in outer space, including codes of conduct and declarations of no first placement of weapons in outer space. United Nations entities also increased their efforts to coordinate their support to States in the implementation of TCBMs in line with existing mandates.

Fittingly, given the international community's focused attention to the women, peace and security agenda in 2015 due to the fifteenth anniversary of the Security Council adoption of resolution 1325 (2000), gender considerations were increasingly prominent in disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control discussions. The Conference on Disarmament held for the first time an informal meeting on gender and disarmament in August, and several States raised gender considerations at the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and at the seventieth session of the First Committee.

In the 2015 Global Study reviewing the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000), a connection was drawn between the global arms trade and the insecurity of women and girls across the world. The study contained a call for renewed efforts to more broadly realize a core goal of resolution 1325 (2000) and the United Nations—to make greater investments in human welfare rather

than armaments. On 13 October, the Security Council adopted its eighth resolution on women, peace and security. Resolution 2242 (2015), *inter alia*, encouraged the empowerment of women to participate in the design and implementation of efforts to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons.

## **Emerging issues**

### **Unmanned aerial vehicles**

#### ***United Nations study***

Following a recommendation<sup>2</sup> by the Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters in 2014, the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) published a study<sup>3</sup> on UAVs in October. The study was prepared in cooperation with the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and the Human Rights Institute at the Columbia University Law School.

Examined in the study were the characteristics of UAVs, the application of international law to the use of armed UAVs to conduct targeted strikes outside areas of active hostilities, the implications for international peace and security, and ideas for improving transparency, oversight and accountability in the development, acquisition, stockpiling, transfer and use of armed UAVs. It was found that the development of transparency and confidence-building measures could be effective in addressing issues posed by the use of armed UAVs outside areas of active hostilities, and that such measures could be pursued through unilateral, bilateral, plurilateral or multilateral means. The study concluded that the widespread acceptance of transparency and confidence-building measures would benefit from their development within a multilateral framework with meaningful engagement from civil society.

To facilitate the development of the various aspects of the study that addressed improving transparency, oversight and accountability in the use of UAVs, UNODA and UNIDIR co-organized an international seminar on improving transparency, oversight and accountability for any use of armed UAVs outside areas of active hostilities, held in Geneva on 15 and 16 June.

At the seventieth session of the First Committee, a growing number of States raised concerns over the use of armed UAVs outside of conflict zones. They considered that any use of armed UAVs should be strictly in accordance with international law and called for new measures to increase transparency, accountability and regulation of their use. The United Nations study was cited as a basis for further discussion.

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<sup>2</sup> See A/69/208.

<sup>3</sup> *Study on Armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles*, <https://www.un.org/disarmament/publications/more/drones-study/> (accessed 20 June 2016).

### **Discussions in the Human Rights Council**

For a second consecutive year, the Human Rights Council adopted a resolution<sup>4</sup> introduced by Pakistan on ensuring use of remotely piloted aircraft or armed drones in counter-terrorism and military operations in accordance with international law, including international human rights and humanitarian law. The resolution was adopted by a vote of 29 to 6, with 12 abstentions. In the resolution, the Council, *inter alia*, invited the High Commissioner for Human Rights and relevant special procedures of the Human Rights Council and the human rights treaty bodies to pay attention, within the framework of their mandates, to violations of international law as a result of the use of remotely piloted aircraft or armed drones.

In a similar vein, in a 23 April statement<sup>5</sup> by the White House Press Secretary, the United States announced an independent review into two counter-terrorism operations involving the use of armed UAVs: one in January 2015 in the border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan, which resulted in the death of an American hostage, an Italian hostage and an American member of Al-Qaida not specifically targeted; and another, also in January and in the same region, resulting in the death of an American Al-Qaida member not specifically targeted. On 29 April, a group of United Nations human rights experts<sup>6</sup> issued a statement<sup>7</sup> welcoming the announced review and stressed the need to ensure transparency and accountability.

### **Lethal autonomous weapons**

The High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)<sup>8</sup> convened a second informal meeting of experts on lethal autonomous weapon systems from 13 to 17 April. At the meeting, which was chaired by Michael Biontino (Germany), States, civil society actors and United Nations entities discussed technical issues, characteristics of autonomous weapon systems, possible challenges to international

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<sup>4</sup> A/HRC/RES/28/3.

<sup>5</sup> The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "Statement by the Press Secretary", 23 April 2015. Available from <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/04/23/statement-press-secretary> (accessed 25 April 2016).

<sup>6</sup> Ben Emmerson, Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism; Juan Méndez, Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; Christof Heyns, Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions; and Gabriela Knaul, Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers.

<sup>7</sup> See "UN rights experts welcome US review of lethal drone attacks, urge transparency and accountability", 29 April 2015. Available from <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=50722#.Vx4mxPkIUE> (accessed 25 April 2016).

<sup>8</sup> The full title is Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects. Its text and adherence status are available from <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/ccwc> (accessed 22 April 2016).

humanitarian law, overarching issues such as human rights and ethical and security considerations, and the way forward.<sup>9</sup>

During the seventieth session of the First Committee, more than 30 States and five groups<sup>10</sup> included autonomous weapon systems in their statements, more than at the two previous First Committee sessions. Many States welcomed and called for further deliberations on the topic in the context of the CCW. This included a number of calls for a strengthened mandate, including the establishment of an open-ended group of governmental experts within the CCW to build on the work of the informal expert meetings. In this connection, many States stressed the need to ensure meaningful human control over the use of any weapon system.

At the 2015 annual Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the CCW, States and non-governmental organizations discussed perspectives on ways forward. The Parties agreed to convene a third informal experts meeting in April 2016 with an expanded mandate so that the meeting may agree by consensus on recommendations for further work to be considered at the Fifth Review Conference of the High Contracting Parties to the CCW in 2016.

Strong civil society engagement on the issue of autonomous weapons also continued in 2015. On 28 July, an open letter<sup>11</sup> signed by a large number of artificial intelligence and robotics researchers was released at the opening of the International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence in Buenos Aires. The letter called for a ban on offensive autonomous weapons beyond meaningful human control.

### **Explosive weapons in populated areas**

In his 2015 report<sup>12</sup> to the Security Council on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, the Secretary-General reiterated his calls upon parties to conflict to refrain from using explosive weapons with a wide-area impact in densely populated areas and upon Member States to consider making a political commitment to this effect. He also reported having recommended that the Security Council call upon parties to conflict to refrain from such use, and said that Member States should develop targets and indicators to monitor progress in reducing the impact of explosive weapons in populated areas.

At the seventieth session of the First Committee, a large number of States expressed concern over the harm caused by the use of explosive weapons in populated areas and urged further consideration of the issue, including

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<sup>9</sup> See CCW/MSP/2015/3.

<sup>10</sup> Africa Group, Arab Group, European Union, Non-Aligned Movement and Nordic Countries.

<sup>11</sup> Future of Life Institute, "Autonomous Weapons: an Open Letter from AI and Robotics Researchers". Available from <http://futureoflife.org/open-letter-autonomous-weapons/> (accessed 25 April 2016).

<sup>12</sup> S/2015/453.

the development of a political commitment, as called for by the Secretary-General. Calls were also made for a study of the gendered impacts of the use of such weapons.

This issue was also considered at various events connected to a diverse set of meetings in 2015, including the Humanitarian Affairs Segment of the Economic and Social Council (19 June, Geneva), the Intersessional Meeting of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (26 June, Geneva), the seventieth session of the First Committee (19 October, New York), and the thirty-second International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (9 December, Geneva).

In addition, various informal expert-level meetings on this issue were convened. The International Committee of the Red Cross held such a meeting in Chavannes-de-Bogis, Switzerland, on 24 and 25 February.<sup>13</sup> The meeting focused on building a common understanding of the impact on civilians, the applicable legal framework and the effects of specific technologies when used in populated areas.

The third expert meeting on preventing harm from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas was convened by Austria and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in Vienna on 21 and 22 September. Representatives from States, the International Committee of the Red Cross, United Nations entities, civil society and academia attended the meeting, which focused on the development of a political commitment on the use of explosive weapons in populated areas. Discussions contributed to building a common understanding on the scope and objectives of such a commitment. Participants also discussed the form such a commitment could take and a number of key elements it could include.

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<sup>13</sup> See “Expert Meeting: Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas Humanitarian, Legal, Technical and Military Aspects, Chavannes-de-Bogis, Switzerland, 24 to 25 February 2015”. Available from <https://www.icrc.org/en/download/file/10297/icrc-explosive-weapons-report.pdf> (accessed 25 April 2016).

## **Outer space security**

*Outer space has increasingly become congested, contested and competitive. This has led to growing concern that an accident or miscalculation could escalate into conflict. We must find a way to manage these new challenges.*

**KIM WON-SOO, HIGH REPRESENTATIVE FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS<sup>14</sup>**

### ***Prevention of an arms race in outer space, including non-placement of weapons***

In 2015, during the general debate of the Conference on Disarmament, States continued to elaborate national positions regarding legally binding proposals under the agenda item “prevention of an arms race in outer space”. On the proposal of the President of the Conference from Mongolia, one plenary meeting of the Conference was dedicated to this agenda item on 9 March.<sup>15</sup> This item was also considered in two informal plenary meetings on 13 and 20 August under the coordinatorship of the United Kingdom.

Also under this agenda item, China and the Russian Federation submitted a letter to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, transmitting comments<sup>16</sup> on a proposed treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space and of the threat or use of force against outer space objects (PPWT). The comments, offered in response to a United States analysis<sup>17</sup> of the updated draft PPWT of June 2014 previously submitted to the Conference by China and the Russian Federation, addressed various issues related to prior discussions on a PPWT, including scope, verification and terrestrially based anti-satellite weapons.

Proposed as an interim measure, pending the negotiation and adoption of a legally binding PPWT, the Russian Federation has encouraged unilateral pledges of “no first placement”. Introduced by the Russian Federation for a second consecutive year, the General Assembly adopted the resolution “No first placement of weapons in outer space” (70/27), calling upon States to make a political commitment not to be the first to place weapons in outer space and underscoring that a number of States had already made such commitments, namely Argentina, Armenia, Belarus, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Cuba, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, Sri Lanka and Tajikistan.

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<sup>14</sup> Opening remarks at the fourteenth United Nations–Republic of Korea Joint Conference on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Issues, Seoul, 7 December 2015. Available from <https://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Kim-7-Dec-2015-Seoul.pdf> (accessed 25 April 2016).

<sup>15</sup> See the 2015 report of the Conference on Disarmament (CD/2046).

<sup>16</sup> CD/2042.

<sup>17</sup> CD/1998.

### ***Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities***

General Assembly resolution 70/53, entitled “Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities”, was adopted by consensus without a vote in December. Co-sponsored by major space-faring States China, the Russian Federation and the United States for a second consecutive year, the resolution was built upon previous iterations. In the resolution, the Assembly called for various United Nations bodies, including the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, the Conference on Disarmament and the Disarmament Commission, to hold discussions on a regular basis on prospects for implementing transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs). It also called upon Member States and all relevant United Nations entities and organizations to support the implementation of the full range of conclusions and recommendations in the report<sup>18</sup> of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE). The Assembly also requested the Secretary-General to submit a report to the seventy-second session of the General Assembly, including an annex of the view of Member States, on coordination of TCBM implementation within the United Nations system.

Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 68/50 of 5 December 2013, UNODA previously transmitted the recommendations of the GGE to the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, the Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament for consideration, as appropriate. In February, UNODA also solicited information from all Member States on major military outer space expenditures for inclusion in the United Nations report on military expenditures, in line with the recommendation contained in the report of the GGE.

Throughout 2015, other relevant United Nations entities considered ways to assist Member States in the implementation of the TCBMs in outer space activities, in accordance with General Assembly resolutions 68/50, 69/38 of 2 December 2014 and 70/53 of 7 December 2015. To that end, UNODA and the Office for Outer Space Affairs met regularly at all levels over the course of 2015 in order to ensure effective coordination and to identify activities that relate uniquely to their mandates.

### ***Joint ad hoc meeting of the First and Fourth Committees***

On 22 October, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 69/38, the First and Fourth Committees<sup>19</sup> convened a joint ad hoc meeting on possible challenges to space security and long-term sustainability. Convening the

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<sup>18</sup> A/68/189.

<sup>19</sup> The First and Fourth Committees of the General Assembly are also known as the Disarmament and International Security Committee and the Special Political and Decolonization Committee, respectively.

meeting reflected the growing interest of Member States to coordinate the implementation of TCBMs in outer space among policy communities dealing with the security aspects and peaceful use of outer space.

States held a general exchange of views on a range of issues related to outer space security and long-term sustainability, including discussion on both voluntary and legally binding measures. With regard to voluntary measures, the meeting provided for useful discussion on the further advancement of TCBMs in outer space activities, including the negotiation of an international code of conduct, which could, inter alia, establish norms for responsible behaviour in outer space. Several States also expressed support for unilateral commitments not to be the first to place weapons in outer space and for the development of guidelines for the long-term sustainability of outer space in the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.<sup>20</sup> Importantly, throughout the discussions, a number of States expressed interest in holding further meetings to continue to address outer space security in a comprehensive manner.

### ***International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities***

In support of efforts to pursue political commitments to encourage responsible action in and peaceful uses of outer space, Member States have considered elements for an International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities. Delegations from 109 States, 6 intergovernmental organizations, 6 non-governmental organizations and several United Nations entities participated in the meeting convened at the initiative of the European Union on multilateral negotiations on such a code of conduct. The multilateral meeting was held from 27 to 31 July at United Nations Headquarters in New York under the chairmanship of Sergio Marchisio (Italy). The meeting served as a useful forum for consideration of the next steps for the potential development and adoption of a multilateral code of conduct.

Delegations at the meeting held a substantive exchange of views on the main issues relating to a possible code, such as its purpose, scope and general principles, cooperation mechanisms and organizational aspects. Without conducting negotiations, participants discussed possible elements of a code, including those contained within the draft code of conduct circulated by the European Union dated May 2015, as discussed in three rounds of open-ended consultations, held in Kiev in May 2013, Bangkok in November 2013 and Luxembourg in May 2014.

Participants noted the value of an international code of conduct and discussed a breadth of matters in a constructive atmosphere. At the conclusion of the meeting, the Chair assessed that, based on the discussions

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<sup>20</sup> See “Updated set of draft guidelines for the long-term sustainability of outer space activities” (A/AC.105/C.1/L.348).

and considering the importance afforded to the principles of openness, transparency, universality and inclusiveness, the way forward most supported by participants would be the pursuit of negotiations within the framework of the United Nations through a mandate of the General Assembly.

### **Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security**

On 2 December 2014, the General Assembly adopted resolution 69/28, entitled “Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security”. In operative paragraph 3 of the resolution, the Assembly invited all Member States, taking into account the assessments and recommendations contained in the report<sup>21</sup> of the Group of Governmental Experts, to continue to inform the Secretary-General of their views and assessments on the following questions: (a) general appreciation of the issues of information security; (b) efforts taken at the national level to strengthen information security and to promote international cooperation in that field; (c) the content of the concepts mentioned in paragraph 2 of the resolution; and (d) possible measures that could be taken by the international community to strengthen information security at the global level.

Replies received from 13 Governments<sup>22</sup> were included in the Secretary-General’s report on the subject published in 2015.<sup>23</sup>

#### **Group of Governmental Experts**

The Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, established pursuant to resolution 68/243 of 27 December 2013, met in four sessions in 2014 and 2015. The GGE successfully adopted a report<sup>24</sup> at the final session held from 22 to 26 June 2015. This was the fourth such GGE that examined the existing and potential threats from the cybersphere and possible cooperative measures to address them.<sup>25</sup>

In the report, the GGE significantly expanded the discussion of norms related to information security. The Group also recommended that States cooperate to prevent harmful information and communications technology (ICT) practices and not knowingly allow their territory to be used for internationally wrongful acts using ICT. It called for the increased exchange of information and assistance to prosecute terrorist and criminal use of ICTs,

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<sup>21</sup> A/68/98.

<sup>22</sup> Canada, Cuba, El Salvador, Georgia, Germany, Netherlands, Panama, Peru, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Spain and United Kingdom.

<sup>23</sup> A/70/172.

<sup>24</sup> A/70/174.

<sup>25</sup> The first, second and third Groups of Governmental Experts met in 2004, 2009-2010 and 2012-2013, respectively.

and emphasized that, in doing so, States should guarantee full respect for human rights, including privacy and freedom of expression.

The GGE further recommended that a State should not conduct or knowingly support ICT activity that intentionally damaged or otherwise impaired the use and operation of critical infrastructure. States should also take appropriate measures to protect their critical infrastructure from ICT threats.

Furthermore, the Group identified in the report a number of voluntary confidence-building measures to increase transparency and suggested that States consider additional ones to strengthen cooperation. Finally, the GGE called for regular dialogue with broad participation under the auspices of the United Nations and through bilateral, regional and multilateral forums.

By resolution 70/237 of 23 December 2015, the General Assembly welcomed the 2015 GGE report and called upon Member States to be guided by the report in their use of ICTs. The Assembly also called upon them to promote further, at multilateral levels, the consideration of existing and potential threats in the field of information security, as well as possible strategies to address the threats emerging in this field, consistent with the need to preserve the free flow of information.

## **Gender and disarmament**

In 2015, the world celebrated the fifteenth anniversary of the landmark Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security. Activists and practitioners urged peace and security decision makers to return to the original intention of the resolution, namely the prevention of armed conflict and meaningful disarmament.

The fifteenth anniversary culminated in the unanimous adoption on 13 October of the eighth Security Council resolution on women, peace and security. In resolution 2242 (2015), the Council, *inter alia*, made a strong statement on the role of women in combating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. It encouraged the empowerment of women to participate in the design and implementation of efforts to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons. It also called upon Member States, United Nations entities and other organizations to take into account the impact of conflict and post-conflict environments on security, mobility, education and economic opportunities for women and girls. The Council also addressed the mitigation of the risk of women becoming active players in the illicit transfer of small arms and light weapons.

### **Global Study on Security Council resolution 1325 (2000)**

In resolution 2122 (2013), the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to conduct a review of the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000) to mark the fifteenth anniversary of its adoption. The Secretary-General requested Radhika Coomaraswamy, former Under-Secretary-General and Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, to act as lead author of the review, referred to as the Global Study, with UN-Women to act as secretariat. To inform the study, the lead author held intensive regional consultations, conducted a civil society survey and commissioned research papers. Submissions to the study were received from more than 60 Member States, regional organizations and United Nations entities, including UNODA.

The Global Study, entitled *Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace*,<sup>26</sup> considered the implementation of the four pillars of the women, peace and security agenda—prevention, participation, protection and peacebuilding—as laid out in resolution 1325 (2000) and subsequent resolutions. The Global Study contained a resounding call to accelerate disarmament and drew a strong connection between the global arms trade and the insecurity of women and girls across the world. It called for the United Nations to take the lead in halting increasing militarization and the normalization of violence at local, national and international levels, and underlined the importance of women peacebuilders. Appealing to the connection made in resolution 1325 (2000) between gender equality and peace, the study pointed to growing military expenditure in order to illustrate the international community's failure to realize a core goal of the United Nations and of resolution 1325 (2000)—to make greater investments in human welfare rather than armaments.

The Global Study also articulated the linkages between small arms violence, gender-based violence and organized crime, and made recommendations on increasing Member State and private sector accountability in connection with the Arms Trade Treaty.<sup>27</sup>

### **Gender and nuclear weapons**

At the initiative of the presidency of the Netherlands, the Conference on Disarmament held an informal meeting on gender and disarmament on 11 August. The discussion was set within the context of implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), including the high-level review of its implementation.

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<sup>26</sup> Available from <http://wps.unwomen.org/~media/files/un%20women/wps/highlights/unw-global-study-1325-2015.pdf> (accessed 26 April 2016).

<sup>27</sup> The treaty text and adherence status are available from <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/att> (accessed 22 April 2016).

Several States noted their support for the normative framework created by resolution 1325 (2000), paying special attention to its particular connection to disarmament. The first of its kind, the informal meeting addressed gender as an issue that cuts across all items on the Conference's agenda, including those related to weapons of mass destruction. Several States used their national statements to recognize how men and women are affected differently by issues related to weapon systems, including nuclear weapons. Delegations widely welcomed the discussion and expressed interest in integrating this issue into the work of the Conference on a more regular basis in the future.

Several States also raised gender considerations in their statements to the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the seventieth session of the First Committee. On 7 December, the General Assembly adopted a new resolution (70/50) on the ethical imperatives for a nuclear-free world. Introduced by South Africa, the resolution contained, *inter alia*, a declaration that greater attention must be given to the impact on women of a nuclear-weapon detonation and the importance of their participation in discussions, decisions and actions on nuclear weapons.

### **Gender and conventional weapons**

In his biennial report<sup>28</sup> to the Security Council on small arms and light weapons, as requested by the Council in resolution 2117 (2013), the Secretary-General noted the highly gendered nature of the causes and consequences of the use of weapons. In this regard, the Secretary-General recommended that recognition of the gendered nature of armed violence and conflict inform policy and programmatic responses as a root cause. He also recommended the full and meaningful participation of women in policymaking, planning and implementation processes related to combating the misuse and illicit transfer of small arms, in line with the women, peace and security agenda.

### **UNODA regional centres**

The United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (UNREC) continued to support gender-focused activities and the participation of women at all levels of decision-making. In February, UNREC and the Mali National Commission on Small Arms and Light Weapons organized a large-scale public event to highlight the role of women in disarmament and arms control. Over 1,200 people, including almost 1,000 women, attended the event, which was broadcast on national television to mark International Women's Day. In December, UNREC organized, jointly with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Commission of the African Union, a workshop on Arms Trade Treaty obligations relating to human rights and gender issues.

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<sup>28</sup> S/2015/289.

The United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific promoted a gender perspective in all its activities by ensuring the highest possible female participation at its events and by selecting female experts whenever possible. Through its Peace and Disarmament Education Programme with the Government of Nepal, which aims to reach approximately 400,000 girls and boys, the Centre also included gender concepts related to disarmament and peace education into Nepal's school curriculums.

The United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (UNLIREC) continued to include gender issues as a theme in the design and implementation of all its projects. In particular, UNLIREC developed a tool for assessing the gender-related risks involved in conventional arms transfers in the framework of the implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty. UNLIREC made a significant effort to include women in its activities; in 2015, female participation reached almost 30 per cent on average.

The UNODA Vienna Office designed the Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education Partnership to develop training courses on disarmament and non-proliferation education and to promote networks and outreach activities. In particular, this project includes the development of the initiative Women Scholarship for Peace to train 170 young female professionals on peace, disarmament and non-proliferation.

## **Gender and peacekeeping**

### ***Mine action***

The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) ensures that the United Nations Gender Guidelines for Mine Action Programmes are being implemented throughout all its activities.

UNMAS encourages national authorities to collect data disaggregated by sex and age in order to facilitate affected States' adherence to the Guidelines. According to the monitoring and evaluation mechanism for the Strategy of the United Nations on Mine Action 2013-2018 managed by UNMAS, the number of national authorities collecting data disaggregated by sex and age rose from 46 to 55 per cent between 2014 and 2015.<sup>29</sup> Likewise, integration of gender-sensitive approaches when conducting assessments rose from 69 to 83 per cent, and when designing programmes, from 63 to 81 per cent.

In addition, throughout the year, UNMAS trains over 400 women as deminers, explosive ordnance disposal experts or mine-risk education officers. By participating in mine action activities, women are being integrated as active agents of peace in their countries and directly contributing to the protection of civilians and peacebuilding.

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<sup>29</sup> See A/70/207.

## ***Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in peacekeeping***

Women are increasingly involved in combat and associated with armed forces. They are also essential to community reintegration and peacebuilding and are strongly affected by decisions made during the demobilization of men. Consequently, the role of women has become central to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) processes. A decade on from the drafting of the Integrated DDR Standards,<sup>30</sup> which put a strong emphasis on gender mainstreaming in DDR processes, DDR activities have moved well beyond simply demobilizing male combatants. In 2015, 44 per cent of DDR beneficiaries were female, including female combatants, as well as women who played other roles in armed forces and groups.

## **Cross-cutting issues**

### **Terrorism and disarmament**

#### ***Conventional arms and terrorism***

A range of existing instruments deal with the link between conventional arms and terrorism. Specifically, small arms and light weapons, in particular their illicit trade, have proved to be a potent force multiplier for terrorist groups. The United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects seeks to, inter alia, address the link between terrorism, organized crime, trafficking in drugs and the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons by stressing the international efforts and cooperation to combat both the supply and demand aspects of this trade. Under the Programme of Action, Governments agreed to take measures to improve national small arms laws, import and export controls, stockpile management and weapons tracing, as well as to engage in regional and international cooperation and assistance.<sup>31</sup>

In a similar vein, the Arms Trade Treaty, which entered into force on 24 December 2014, requires States parties involved in the transfer of conventional arms within the scope of the Treaty to take measures to prevent their diversion. This requirement not only recognizes the fact that the goal of preventing weapons from reaching illicit hands cannot be achieved with trade regulation alone, but also requires a serious effort to prevent and combat diversion.

In addition to small arms and light weapons, improvised explosive devices are often used for perpetrating acts of terrorism. In this context, UNODA assisted States in preparing for the adoption on 7 December of a

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<sup>30</sup> Available from <http://unddr.org/iddrs.aspx> (accessed 26 April 2016).

<sup>31</sup> Available from <http://www.poa-iss.org/PoA/pohtml.aspx> (accessed 26 April 2016).

General Assembly resolution on countering the threat posed by improvised explosive devices (70/46).

For more information on small arms and light weapons, improvised explosive devices and the Arms Trade Treaty, see chapter III.

### ***Weapons of mass destruction and terrorism***

The troubling combination of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism also generated action by the international community in 2015.

On 7 December, the General Assembly adopted without a vote resolution 70/36 on measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. In the resolution, the Assembly called upon Member States to support international efforts to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery and urged Member States to strengthen national measures and cooperation with relevant regional and international organizations in this regard. Sixteen Member States, the European Union and 11 international organizations provided contributions<sup>32</sup> compiled in the Secretary-General's report<sup>33</sup> on measures related to the linkage between the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) also addresses the linkage between weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. In the resolution, the Security Council decided that all States should refrain from providing any form of support to non-state actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, particularly for terrorist purposes. Throughout 2015, the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) undertook various activities in order to fully and effectively implement the resolution, which incorporated counter-terrorism elements. (For more information on the Committee and the implementation of the resolution, see chapter I.)

In support of the implementation of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, UNODA continued to maintain the roster of experts and laboratories provided by Member States under the Secretary-General's Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons. The Secretary-General can call upon the experts to carry out fact-finding activities to investigate reports of the alleged use of chemical and biological weapons. (For more information on the Secretary-General's Mechanism, see chapter II.)

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<sup>32</sup> The submissions were made pursuant to General Assembly resolution 69/39 of 2 December 2014.

<sup>33</sup> See A/70/169 and Add.1.

### ***Information and communications technology and terrorism***

In 2015, the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security recognized the increasing possibility of the use of information and communications technology (ICT) for terrorist purposes. Such risks included terrorist attacks against ICTs or ICT-dependent critical infrastructure, which, if left unaddressed, could threaten international peace and security. The Groups called for States to exchange information to deal with such threats and encouraged further work in capacity-building to address the terrorist use of ICTs. (For more information about the Group, see the section on information technology and international security in this chapter.)

### ***Contribution of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to global counter-terrorism efforts***

The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) continued to support global counter-terrorism efforts within its mandate through full and effective implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention.<sup>34</sup> The OPCW Technical Secretariat also maintained and continued to explore new collaborative relationships with relevant United Nations, international, regional and subregional organizations.

The OPCW Open-Ended Working Group on Terrorism established a sub-working group to examine specific technical issues in detail and to make practical recommendations on how the OPCW could further contribute to global counter-terrorism efforts.

As a way to facilitate discussion within the sub-working group, the Technical Secretariat issued topical papers throughout 2015 related to the legal accountability of non-state actors under the Convention, measures to prevent the hostile use of toxic chemicals and effective response to such use. The sub-working group, which is composed of representatives of States parties, convened its first meeting on the topic of legal accountability in November. In addition, representatives from the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe addressed the Open-Ended Working Group on Terrorism on their programme of work related to non-state actors and highlighted areas of potential cooperation with the OPCW.

The Technical Secretariat also continued to conduct various capacity-building activities aimed at enhancing assistance and protection capabilities against the use or threat of use of chemical weapons, including national

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<sup>34</sup> The full title of this treaty is the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. Its text and adherence status are available from <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/cwc> (accessed 22 April 2016).

and regional courses in emergency response. The OPCW continued its chemical safety and security management programme, which began in 2009. The seminars and workshops organized under this programme provided a forum for professionals in the field to exchange best practices and lessons learned. Given that the adoption of comprehensive national legislative and administrative measures is also important to address the threat of non-State actors, the Technical Secretariat continued to support States parties in their drafting of national legislation. A number of courses were conducted for national customs authorities given their important role in monitoring chemical trade to prevent illicit transfers.

In cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, the OPCW continued to co-chair the project of the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Taskforce related to enhancing inter-agency interoperability and coordinated communications in the event of an attack using a chemical or biological weapon. In 2015, the project brought together representatives of 17 international organizations, including the United Nations, to analyse which of the specific activities undertaken in each organization's response to such an attack could benefit from enhanced coordination. The next phase of the project is intended to address the areas that could be enhanced by testing them through field or table-top exercises.

*Cooperation in promoting implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004)*

The OPCW contributed to events sponsored by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) and by UNODA to promote the implementation of the resolution at the international, regional and national levels. The Technical Secretariat also supported the Committee's clearing house role with regard to requests for assistance from States.

**Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control**

Emphasizing the importance of the observance of environmental norms in the preparation and implementation of disarmament and arms limitation agreements, and mindful of the detrimental environmental effects of the use of nuclear weapons, the General Assembly adopted without a vote on 2 December 2014 resolution 69/55, entitled "Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control".

In that resolution, the Assembly called upon States to pursue unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures to ensure the application of scientific and technological progress in international security, disarmament and other related spheres without detriment to the environment or to attaining

sustainable development. The Assembly also invited Member States to communicate to the Secretary-General the measures they had adopted to promote the objectives envisaged in the resolution and requested that he submit a report containing that information to the General Assembly at its seventieth session. The replies received from six Governments<sup>35</sup> are contained in the Secretary-General's report on the subject.<sup>36</sup>

At its seventieth session, the General Assembly adopted without a vote resolution 70/30 on 7 December, in which it made a similar request to Member States for information and to the Secretary-General for a report containing that information to be submitted at its seventy-first session.

### **Relationship between disarmament and development**

On 25 September at a historic United Nations summit, States adopted the Sustainable Development Goals,<sup>37</sup> which build on the success of the Millennium Development Goals and aim to go further to end all forms of poverty. The sustainable development agenda is composed of 17 goals, each of which has specific targets to be achieved over the next 15 years. Goal 16, to promote just, peaceful and inclusive societies, includes as a target to significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows by 2030, marking the first time the sustainable development agenda and disarmament have been directly linked.

In the General Assembly resolution on disarmament and development adopted by consensus on 2 December 2014 (69/56), the Assembly encouraged the international community to achieve the Millennium Development Goals and to make greater efforts to integrate disarmament, humanitarian and development activities. As in previous years, the Assembly urged the international community to devote part of the resources made available by the implementation of disarmament and arms limitation agreements to economic and social development, and invited Member States to provide the Secretary-General with information regarding measures and efforts to this end. Eight States<sup>38</sup> and the European Union submitted replies, which are contained in the report of the Secretary-General and its addendum.<sup>39</sup>

### **Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation**

As in previous years, in its resolution 69/54 of 2 December 2014, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to seek the views of

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<sup>35</sup> Cuba, Panama, Portugal, Qatar, Spain and Ukraine.

<sup>36</sup> A/70/155.

<sup>37</sup> Available from <http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/> (accessed 26 April 2016).

<sup>38</sup> Argentina, Armenia, Cuba, El Salvador, Jamaica, Portugal, Spain and Ukraine.

<sup>39</sup> A/70/163 and Add.1.

Member States on the promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation and to submit a report to the General Assembly at its seventieth session. Replies received from 11 Governments<sup>40</sup> are contained in the Secretary-General's report on the subject.<sup>41</sup>

At its seventieth session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 70/31 on 7 December by a vote of 129 States in favour to 4 against, with 50 abstentions, by which it decided to include the same subject in the provisional agenda of its seventy-first session.

### **Role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament**

By its decision 70/514 of 7 December, the General Assembly decided without a vote to include in the provisional agenda of its seventy-first session the item entitled "Role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament".

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<sup>40</sup> Argentina, Armenia, Cuba, El Salvador, Georgia, Portugal, Qatar, Serbia, Spain, Sudan and Ukraine.

<sup>41</sup> A/70/157.



**Chapter VI**  
**Disarmament machinery**

Michael Møller, Acting Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General to the Conference, opened the first Informal Civil Society Forum on the Conference on Disarmament held at the Palais des Nations in Geneva on 19 March 2015.

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## CHAPTER VI

### Disarmament machinery

*The international community simply cannot afford a Conference on Disarmament that does not help us move towards the goal of a safer world.*

BAN KI-MOON, UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL<sup>1</sup>

### Developments and trends, 2015

ALTHOUGH THE DISARMAMENT MACHINERY continued to struggle in producing concrete results, States exerted various efforts throughout 2015 to revitalize multilateral disarmament negotiations and deliberations. In this regard, the General Assembly established a new open-ended working group as its subsidiary body to address effective measures required for attaining and maintaining a world without nuclear weapons. Members of the Conference on Disarmament also engaged in discussions by convening various informal meetings on its core agenda items. In the context of the thirty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, States also addressed the Institute's future financial stability during the 2015 session of the First Committee of the General Assembly and took steps to ensure its fiscal longevity.

Despite these efforts and given the inability to reach a substantive outcome at the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, States continued to express considerable concern over the ongoing deadlock in the Conference on Disarmament, which was unable to commence substantive negotiations on any of its agenda items for another consecutive year owing to the continuing lack of consensus on a programme of work. The United Nations Disarmament Commission, completing its first session in a new three-year cycle, also illustrated a significant divergence of views among States on its agenda items, especially related to agenda item 1, on recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Although the Conference on Disarmament continued to face challenges, the six presidents of the 2015 session, as well as the Secretary-General of the Conference, exerted efforts to reinvigorate multilateral disarmament

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<sup>1</sup> Message to the Conference on Disarmament, delivered by Michael Møller, Acting Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, 20 January 2015. Available from <http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sgsm16475.doc.htm> (accessed 27 June 2016).

discussions. In March, the Informal Civil Society Forum met with a view to inspiring substantive discussions and engaging civil society more closely in the work of the Conference. The Forum formed part of the ongoing efforts by the Secretary-General of the Conference to facilitate initiatives that can help address the substantive impasse in the negotiating body.

Although consensus on a programme of work remained elusive, Conference members engaged in a range of discussions to more clearly understand national views and to outline the most contentious issues, inter alia, a negotiating mandate for a treaty addressing fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and the pursuit of a comprehensive nuclear weapons convention. The Conference also re-established, by decision CD/2022, the Informal Working Group on a programme of work, which provided a venue for a series of consultations over a relatively short period of time in order to garner support for a programme of work.

At its 2015 substantive session, the Disarmament Commission adopted an agenda that would serve for the period 2015-2017, on the understanding that consultations would continue on ways and means to implement General Assembly resolution 69/77 of 2 December 2014. To this end, States continued to consider means of enhancing the functioning of the Disarmament Commission, including possible consideration of a third substantive agenda item.

While the Conference on Disarmament and the Disarmament Commission faced ongoing challenges, the First Committee of the General Assembly featured a range of new initiatives in 2015 and provided for a robust discussion of the full spectrum of disarmament and international security questions. These included addressing the threat posed by improvised explosive devices, as well as establishing a new group of governmental experts on information security.

The humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons featured broadly in national statements during the First Committee and were reflected in a number of new resolutions, including two presented by Austria (70/47, 70/48). Adoption of these new resolutions illustrated the growing momentum of the humanitarian dimension of nuclear disarmament, principally among non-nuclear-weapon States, and the increasingly urgent calls for action on nuclear disarmament in light of their catastrophic humanitarian consequences. Building on the momentum of the humanitarian discourse, the General Assembly established an open-ended working group in 2016 to “substantively address concrete effective legal measures, legal provisions and norms that will need to be concluded to attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons” (resolution 70/33). The open-ended working group was proposed by Mexico and supported by a majority of States, although the nuclear-weapon States opposed the establishment of a body that would not operate according to the rule of consensus. Hence, none of the five nuclear-weapon States supported the resolution in the General Assembly.

The unprecedented joint ad hoc meeting of the First and Fourth Committees of the General Assembly represented an important innovation for the seventieth session of the General Assembly. On 22 October, States exchanged a range of views on issues related to outer space safety and security, as well as sustainability, engaging in a robust discussion on the need for various legally binding and voluntary measures to secure outer space and ensure its long-term sustainable use, including implementation of transparency and confidence-building measures. (For more information on the joint ad hoc meeting, see page 166 in chapter V.)

## **First Committee of the General Assembly**

The First Committee held its seventieth session from 8 October to 6 November. The Committee experienced an unprecedented level of participation,<sup>2</sup> as delegations advanced several new proposals for nuclear disarmament, re-established a group of governmental experts on information security and authorized a new report by the Secretary-General on improvised explosive devices. The Committee also sought a solution to the financial situation facing the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. Under its Chair, Karel Van Oosterom (Netherlands), the Committee convened 7 meetings devoted to general debate, 12 meetings for thematic discussions and 6 devoted to action on all draft resolutions and decisions.

As in previous years, the thematic debate addressed the following seven clusters: (a) nuclear weapons; (b) other weapons of mass destruction; (c) outer space (disarmament aspects); (d) conventional weapons; (e) other disarmament measures and international security; (f) regional disarmament and security; and (g) disarmament machinery. Over the course of the thematic debate, the Committee also held exchanges with the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs and other high-level officials in the field of arms control and disarmament, including the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and representatives of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. Representatives of civil society delivered presentations on a range of issues, including nuclear disarmament, autonomous weapons, armed drones, cyberweapons, gender and disarmament, cluster munitions, anti-personnel landmines, explosive weapons, outer space, small arms and light weapons, the arms trade and incendiary weapons.

The Committee also held exchanges with the Directors of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin

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<sup>2</sup> A total of 112 statements were delivered during the general debate and 273 statements were delivered during the thematic debate. In total, this represents 10 more interventions than in 2014 and 90 more than in 2011.

America and the Caribbean, the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, and the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa.

During its thematic discussion on disarmament machinery, the Committee convened a panel exchange with the last President of the 2015 session of the Conference on Disarmament, the Chair of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, the Chair of the Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters and the Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). In this context, many States expressed concern over the financial situation of UNIDIR, particularly in light of its transition to a new administrative platform and the International Public Sector Accounting Standards, and expressed support for measures to increase its long-term financial stability.

Following the conclusion of the First Committee in December, the General Assembly adopted the 55 draft resolutions and two decisions transmitted to it by the Committee. Of those drafts, only 28 (49 per cent) were adopted without a vote.<sup>3</sup> The General Assembly took a total of 41 recorded votes, including on separate provisions.

The following sections are overviews of key substantive discussions at the First Committee session. In addition, a more detailed presentation of the resolutions by chapter topic, with summaries of statements by Member States, can be found in appendix II.

## **Nuclear weapons**

The discussion on nuclear weapons in the First Committee underscored deepening divisions between States, resulting from their inability to reach a substantive consensus at the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).<sup>4</sup> Deliberations were also largely underpinned by the growing momentum of the humanitarian initiative for nuclear disarmament. In this regard, the Committee adopted a number of new resolutions and faced contending proposals for advancing nuclear disarmament negotiations.

Against this backdrop, the discourse on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons formed the basis for the urgent call by many States for the elaboration of new effective legal measures for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons. Austria delivered a statement<sup>5</sup> on behalf of

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<sup>3</sup> At its sixty-ninth session, the Committee adopted 63 drafts, with 33 (52 per cent) adopted without a vote.

<sup>4</sup> The treaty text and status of adherence are available from <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/npt> (accessed 31 March 2016).

<sup>5</sup> See A/C.1/70/PV.9. See also Thomas Hajnoczi, Permanent Representative of Austria to the United Nations at Geneva, statement to the First Committee, New York, 19 October 2015 (available from <http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/gadis3527.doc.htm> (accessed 29 June 2016)).

the “Humanitarian Initiative on Nuclear Weapons”, presenting a summary of the findings of the Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, held in December 2014, and reaffirming that the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of a nuclear-weapon detonation, whether by accident or design, represented an unacceptable risk to humanity. Australia also delivered a joint statement<sup>6</sup> on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, endorsed by 28 States,<sup>7</sup> in which they underscored that substantive disarmament progress would be facilitated by the creation of conditions that addressed international security and ongoing tensions between States.

The Committee adopted three new resolutions that addressed the humanitarian approach to nuclear disarmament, including two introduced by Austria. Resolution 70/47, “Humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons”, carried forward the joint statements delivered at previous sessions of the Committee and meetings of NPT States parties, including the position that nuclear weapons should never be used again under any circumstances. Resolution 70/48, “Humanitarian pledge for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons”, included the text of the international pledge presented by Austria at the 2014 Conference in Vienna and a call for all States to identify and pursue effective measures “to fill the legal gap” for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons.

The General Assembly also adopted resolution 70/50, “Ethical imperatives of a nuclear-weapon-free world”, introduced by South Africa. In this new resolution, the Assembly sought to place the humanitarian and environmental effects of nuclear weapons at the centre of related discussions, decisions and actions. It included a number of elements from the above-mentioned joint humanitarian statements and the outcomes of the conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons.

Following from the proposals considered at the 2015 NPT Review Conference and building upon the humanitarian discourse, many States expressed support for a new process to elaborate effective measures for nuclear disarmament. During the proceedings of the First Committee, States expressed divergent views on objectives, scope and modalities for such a process. The Islamic Republic of Iran and Mexico each introduced proposals in this regard, although the former ultimately decided to withdraw its draft resolution. The General Assembly adopted resolution 70/33, by which it established an open-ended working group in 2016 with a primary aim of

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<sup>6</sup> See A/C.1/70/PV.11. See also John Quinn, Permanent Representative of Australia to the United Nations, New York, 21 October 2015 (available from <https://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/21-October-Australia.pdf> (accessed 27 June 2016)).

<sup>7</sup> Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Ukraine.

substantively addressing concrete effective legal measures, legal provisions and norms that will need to be concluded to attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons.

### **Other weapons of mass destruction**

As in 2014, discussions on chemical weapons focused largely on the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic with many States expressing concern over findings that chlorine had been used as a weapon and that allegations of such use persisted. Furthermore, States underscored the importance of addressing the alleged discrepancies in the declaration of the Syrian Arab Republic pursuant to the Chemical Weapons Convention.<sup>8</sup> In this connection, many States welcomed the establishment by the Security Council in resolution 2235 (2015) of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons–United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism, which is mandated to identify “to the greatest extent feasible” individuals, entities, groups or Governments perpetrating, organizing, sponsoring or otherwise involved in the use of chemicals as weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic (see chapter II for more information on the Joint Investigative Mechanism).

For the second consecutive year, consensus could not be reached on the resolution traditionally introduced by Poland supporting implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention owing to divergent views over how the text reflected the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic. Four States<sup>9</sup> abstained from the resolution as a whole and a number of States either voted against or abstained in separate votes on new paragraphs that referred to the reports of the fact-finding mission of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and outstanding discrepancies in the declaration of the Syrian Arab Republic.

In light of the Eighth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention<sup>10</sup> to be held in 2016, many States expressed support for strengthening the Convention but expressed divergent views on how that might be achieved. Some States offered specific proposals related to the review of science and technology, as well as offers of assistance under article VII of the Convention. The most contentious issue, however, was verification. States of the Non-Aligned Movement and the BRICS (Brazil, Russian Federation, India, China and South Africa) called for the resumption

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<sup>8</sup> The full title of this treaty is the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. Its text and adherence status is available from <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/cwc> (accessed 28 June 2016).

<sup>9</sup> China, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Russian Federation and Syrian Arab Republic.

<sup>10</sup> The full title of this treaty is Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. Its text and adherence status are available from <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/bwc> (accessed 28 June 2016).

of negotiations of a legally binding verification protocol. In this connection, the Russian Federation recalled its proposal for the establishment of an open-ended working group in 2017 to begin discussions leading to a legally binding instrument. The United States, on the other hand, reiterated that such a protocol would not address all the issues currently facing the Biological Weapons Convention and that States should rather focus on what it considered to be practical measures, such as strengthening national implementation, enhancing expert deliberations, reinforcing the Implementation Support Unit and establishing a steering committee.

The General Assembly adopted with a vote the annual resolution “Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction” (70/74).

### **Outer space**

Discussions on outer space security were robust as States continued to express support for the implementation of transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities. Many States also continued to support negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, including on the basis of the Chinese-Russian draft treaty<sup>11</sup> on preventing the placement of weapons in outer space.

For a second consecutive year, the Russian Federation introduced a resolution calling for voluntary declarations on the non-first placement of weapons in outer space, as an interim step towards a legally binding instrument. This proposal continued to face scepticism from some Western States.

### **Conventional weapons**

Much of the Committee’s consideration of conventional weapons focused on the implementation and universality of existing instruments. Key milestones were achieved in 2015 with the convening of the first Conference of States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty<sup>12</sup> and the first Review Conference of the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM).<sup>13</sup>

A resolution on the CCM was introduced for only the second time since 2009. Whereas the 2009 version was of a procedural nature, enabling its adoption without a vote, the new resolution (70/54) referenced the various outcomes from the first CCM Review Conference, resulting in a number of non-States parties voting against or abstaining from it.

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<sup>11</sup> CD/1985.

<sup>12</sup> The treaty text and adherence status are available from <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/att> (accessed 28 June 2016).

<sup>13</sup> The treaty text and adherence status are available from [http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/cluster\\_munitions](http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/cluster_munitions) (accessed 28 June 2016).

The Committee again adopted without a vote its annual resolutions dealing with small arms and light weapons, ammunition stockpiles and the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.<sup>14</sup>

For the first time, the Committee took steps to counter the threat posed by improvised explosive devices (IEDs). It adopted without a vote a new resolution, introduced by Afghanistan and co-sponsored by Australia and France, which sought to strengthen efforts by States to combat the proliferation and impact of IEDs through exercising vigilance on the production, sale, transfer and storage of IED components, encouraging better international cooperation and information-sharing, and the adoption of effective counter-IED policies. The General Assembly also requested the Secretary-General to prepare a report in 2016 in light of the resolution and, inter alia, to provide initial building blocks and recommendations for ways forward on the issue.

### **Emerging and other issues, including information security**

States continued to draw attention to a number of emerging and cross-cutting disarmament and international security issues. Many States welcomed the ongoing discussion on the issue of lethal autonomous weapon systems in the context of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and supported a strengthened mandate, such as the convening of an open-ended meeting of governmental experts in 2016. A growing number of States raised concern over the use of armed unmanned aerial vehicles. In this connection, the recent study<sup>15</sup> published by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs on the recommendation of the Advisory Board for Disarmament Matters was cited as a basis for further discussion on this topic. A large number of States also continued to express concern over the harm caused by the use of explosive weapons in populated areas and urged further consideration of the issue.

More than 80 States<sup>16</sup> co-sponsored the Russian Federation–led resolution entitled “Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in

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<sup>14</sup> The full title of the treaty is Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects. Its text and adherence status are available from <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/ccwc> (accessed 28 May 2015).

<sup>15</sup> *Study on Armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Prepared on the Recommendation of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters* (New York: United Nations, 2015). Available from <https://www.un.org/disarmament/publications/more/drones-study/> (accessed 27 June 2016).

<sup>16</sup> Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Belarus, Belgium, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Portugal,

the context of international security” (70/237), which was adopted without a vote in the Committee. While this demonstrated a strong collective desire by Member States to address the growing challenges posed by existing and future cyberthreats, the discussions also revealed continuing differences over how international law should be applied, the merit of legally binding approaches, the need to curtail the militarization of cyberspace and the importance of upholding fundamental rights and freedoms, such as free speech and privacy.

Following the successful outcome in 2015 of the fourth Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, resolution 70/237 re-established the Group of Governmental Experts, to meet in 2016 and 2017, in order to continue studying existing and potential threats related to information security and possible cooperative measures to address them.

See chapter V for further details on information technology and international security.

### **Financial stability of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research**

Many States expressed support for the work of UNIDIR amid concerns regarding its financial stability, as it integrated its business model with system-wide administrative and financial reforms. While States generally welcomed the recommendations on the situation by the Secretary-General’s Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, key donor countries also insisted on an independent assessment of the Institute’s staffing and management structure.

With 2015 representing the thirty-fifth anniversary of the Institute, the General Assembly, in the quinquennial resolution introduced by France (70/69), requested the Secretary-General on an exceptional basis to submit a funding proposal for the 2018-2019 biennium, taking into account the Advisory Board’s recommendations. The Assembly also requested the Secretary-General to commission a third-party assessment, to commence in 2018, on the future structural, financial, administrative and operational aspects of the Institute. Separately, the Department of Management was requested to produce its own assessment by 2016, which would inform the Secretary-General’s funding proposal.

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Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Senegal, Serbia, Slovakia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Uzbekistan, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

## **Conference on Disarmament**

On the occasion of the opening of the 2015 session of the Conference on Disarmament, the Secretary-General stressed that the international community could not afford a Conference on Disarmament “that did not help us move forward the goal of a safer world”.<sup>17</sup> While acknowledging the determined and creative efforts of the past year to bring the Conference back to work, the Secretary-General indicated that the effectiveness of the Conference would ultimately be judged on a single criterion: its ability to conclude disarmament treaties.

Despite the efforts of the six presidents of the 2015 session—Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Netherlands and New Zealand—to identify agreeable language for a programme of work that would allow the resumption of negotiations, the Conference could not agree on a consensual text. In a similar vein, during the high-level segment from 2 to 9 March, many States suggested ways and means for the Conference to adopt a programme of work, although consensus on these proposals could still not be reached.

During the presidency of Mexico from 19 January to 15 February, the Conference adopted an agenda<sup>18</sup> for the 2015 session. The President, Jorge Lomónaco (Mexico), submitted a draft programme of work,<sup>19</sup> a draft decision<sup>20</sup> on civil society participation and a draft decision<sup>21</sup> on the establishment of a working group to review the methods of work of the Conference. However, no agreement could be reached among members of the Conference on the Mexican proposals.

The high-level segment, held during the presidency of Mongolia from 16 February to 15 March, featured statements by over 35 ministers of foreign affairs and senior diplomats. In the absence of any prospect for a programme of work, the President, Vaanchig Purevdorj (Mongolia), dedicated one plenary session for substantive discussions on each of the four core items on the agenda of the Conference, namely nuclear disarmament, fissile material, prevention of an arms race in outer space and negative security assurances.<sup>22</sup>

The Mongolian presidency conducted consultations on three draft decisions: a schedule of activities; the re-establishment of an informal working

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<sup>17</sup> Message to the Conference on Disarmament, <http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sgsm16475.doc.htm> (accessed 27 June 2016).

<sup>18</sup> CD/2008.

<sup>19</sup> CD/WP.584.

<sup>20</sup> CD/WP.585/Rev.2.

<sup>21</sup> CD/WP.586/Rev.1.

<sup>22</sup> Agenda items 1 and 2 were discussed on 24 and 26 February, focusing on nuclear disarmament during the first meeting, and a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices during the latter meeting. The prevention of an arms race in outer space was discussed on 9 March and negative security assurances on 10 March.

group with a mandate to produce a programme of work robust in substance and progressive over time in implementation; and the establishment of an informal working group to review the methods of work of the Conference on Disarmament. No consensus, however, could be achieved on any of the three proposals.

As had been the practice the last several years, the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) delivered a statement<sup>23</sup> on 10 March on the occasion of International Women's Day. The WILPF representative used this occasion to announce that the organization would no longer follow the proceedings of the Conference and would cease engagement with the body, citing the lack of substantive negotiations as the reason for its decision. WILPF noted it would reengage with the Conference if it began substantive work.

Mohamed Auajjar (Morocco), the third President for 2015 from 16 to 27 March and from 25 May to 7 June, held intensive consultations on a package of draft decisions covering the same issues previously addressed by the Mexican presidency. Owing to the reservations of a number of delegations, the President decided to remove the draft decision on an informal working group to review the methods of work, which allowed the Conference to reach consensus on the decisions renewing the mandate of the Informal Working Group<sup>24</sup> to produce a programme of work and on a schedule of activities.<sup>25</sup>

The informal meetings on the substantive agenda items held under the schedule of activities were chaired by four Coordinators: Amr Ramadan (Egypt) for agenda items 1 and 2, with a general focus on nuclear disarmament; Michael Biontino (Germany) for agenda items 1 and 2, with a general focus on the ban of the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices; Matthew Rowland (United Kingdom) for agenda item 3, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space; and Ravinatha P. Arjasinha (Sri Lanka) for agenda item 4, on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

In accordance with decision CD/2021, the Coordinators, in their personal capacity, submitted to the President reports reflecting the discussions under each agenda item. Many delegations expressed the view that the discussions were rich in substance and had improved the understanding of delegations with regard to national positions.

Under the presidency of Maung Wai (Myanmar) from 8 June to 5 July, the Informal Working Group on a programme of work commenced its discussions

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<sup>23</sup> Available from [http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/cd/2015/statements/part1/10March\\_WILPF.pdf](http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/cd/2015/statements/part1/10March_WILPF.pdf) (accessed 28 June 2016).

<sup>24</sup> CD/2022.

<sup>25</sup> CD/2021.

(6 to 10 July), which continued during the first week of the Presidency of the Netherlands. In addition to the discussions in the framework of the Informal Working Group on a programme of work, the Myanmar presidency undertook further consultations to build consensus on the establishment of an informal working group on the methods of work.

Henk Cor van der Kwast (Netherlands) and Dell Higgie (New Zealand) presided over the third part of the 2015 session of the Conference on Disarmament, the former from 3 to 23 August and the latter from 24 August to 18 September. The Dutch presidency conducted consultations on a draft decision<sup>26</sup> on the appointment of a special coordinator on the methods of work, which was tabled for adoption on 8 July, but failed to reach consensus.

Also under the presidency of the Netherlands, the Conference held informal meetings in addition to those already set under the schedule of activities. To this end, meetings took place on 4 August on the status of nuclear disarmament and possible further steps, and on 6 August on the ban of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices. Other informal meetings were held on negative security assurances (7 August), gender and disarmament (11 August) and the prevention of an arms race in outer space and possible further steps (19 August).

Under the presidency of New Zealand, the sixth and final President for the 2015 session, the Conference was able to adopt its final report<sup>27</sup> on 18 September, following intense negotiations.

### **Informal Working Group on a programme of work**

The Informal Working Group on a programme of work, established by decision CD/2022, provided a venue for a series of consultations, over a relatively short period of time, with a view to garnering support for a programme of work. Co-chaired by the President of the Conference for June (Morocco) and Päivi Kairamo (Finland), delegations of both member and non-member States of the Conference participated actively. Despite these positive exchanges, the discussions did not lead to a consensus that would have enabled the Conference to reach agreement on a programme of work. After several bilateral, regional and Informal Working Group consultations, the Co-Chair concluded that a consensus could not be reached to take forward a programme of work in relation to any of the four core issues, or any other agenda item of the Conference on Disarmament.

The report<sup>28</sup> of the Co-Chair, adopted by the Conference on 17 August, contained the following conclusions:

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<sup>26</sup> CD/WP.589.

<sup>27</sup> CD/2046.

<sup>28</sup> CD/2033.

(a) The focus on the core agenda items should remain as a priority in order to find a consensus formula for a comprehensive and balanced programme of work;

(b) Should a consensus emerge on any possible new items, the current agenda of the Conference on Disarmament is flexible enough for the Conference to deal with any such item;

(c) The primary objective of the Conference is to negotiate legally binding instruments, which should remain as the primary objective. Also, politically binding agreements, as well as other proposals, could be considered possibly as a stepping stone towards legally binding agreements;

(d) The Conference on Disarmament, if agreed, could continue to consider holding structured in-depth deliberations, with greater specificity and allocation of time on agenda items, including through the participation of scientific and technical experts on specific topics, to enhance understanding and common ground beneficial to future negotiations that the Conference could undertake; and

(e) It would seem to be helpful to continue to explore further on how to take forward the above-mentioned and other ideas in a structured and inclusive manner.

### **Informal Civil Society Forum**

On 19 March, the Acting Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General to the Conference, Michael Møller, convened the first Informal Civil Society Forum, which was one of his proposals in June 2014 to re-energize the negotiating mandate of the Conference. At that time, the Acting Secretary-General had proposed the holding of an informal civil society forum, with the possibility of recurring meetings should the forum prove to be a constructive opportunity for engagement until such a time that the Conference decided to adapt its rules of procedure to allow greater and more formal interaction with civil society.

The Acting Secretary-General opened the Forum by recognizing the challenges posed by organizing such a forum, while highlighting the positive contribution that civil society had made to disarmament and arms control in the past.<sup>29</sup> In this regard, the Acting Secretary-General expressed gratitude to the donor States that had made the Forum possible through financial contribution, namely Australia, Finland, India, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland.

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<sup>29</sup> See the Acting Secretary-General's remarks available from [http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600583A0B/\(httpPages\)/2BDEC20AB6F68841C1257E0D004801B9?OpenDocument&year=2014](http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600583A0B/(httpPages)/2BDEC20AB6F68841C1257E0D004801B9?OpenDocument&year=2014) (accessed 27 June 2016).

In a video message<sup>30</sup> to the Forum, the United Nations Secretary-General stressed the important role of civil society in serving as a catalyst for innovation and a repository of expertise. The Secretary-General further underscored that the 2015 Forum should not be seen as an isolated event but rather as a platform upon which to build, with a view to initiating more regular engagement with civil society.

Following the opening remarks, the discussions in the Forum were structured around five panels—on nuclear disarmament, a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, negative security assurances, the prevention of an arms race in outer space and the way forward—with the participation of representatives from member States and civil society. The main conclusions of the discussions were compiled in the Chairman’s Summary<sup>31</sup> that was circulated to all participants. The panel discussions revealed a divergence of views on all the core agenda items, with participants offering a range of solutions to take forward the work of the Conference.

## **Nuclear disarmament**

*The urgent need for nuclear disarmament has also become more apparent as the international community comes to understand more about the humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons.*

**BAN KI-MOON, UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL**<sup>32</sup>

As in previous years, nuclear disarmament was addressed principally under agenda items 1 and 2, namely “Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament” and “Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters”.<sup>33</sup>

Pursuant to the proposal of the Mongolian presidency, one plenary meeting on agenda items 1 and 2, with a general focus on nuclear disarmament, was held on 24 February. The established views of members of the Conference were expressed with regard to taking forward nuclear disarmament negotiations. The States of the Non-Aligned Movement reiterated their preferred course of action constituted by the early commencement of negotiations in the Conference on a comprehensive nuclear weapons convention. The five nuclear-weapon States under the Treaty on the

<sup>30</sup> Available from <http://www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=8467> (accessed 27 June 2016).

<sup>31</sup> Available from [http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/%28httpAssets%29/1DB7D1EAC3845F42C1257E140035C90F/\\$file/Chairman's+Summary+Informal+CD+Civil+Society+Forum.pdf](http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/%28httpAssets%29/1DB7D1EAC3845F42C1257E140035C90F/$file/Chairman's+Summary+Informal+CD+Civil+Society+Forum.pdf) (accessed 27 June 2016).

<sup>32</sup> Message to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, 20 January 2015. Available from [http://unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/%28httpAssets%29/ECC716AB613DD3D6C1257DD30057857A/\\$file/1330+UNSG+message.pdf](http://unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/%28httpAssets%29/ECC716AB613DD3D6C1257DD30057857A/$file/1330+UNSG+message.pdf).

<sup>33</sup> See CD/2008.

Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) focused on the conclusions of the latest meeting held in London on 4 and 5 February convened within the framework of the so-called “P5 process” that seeks to review progress achieved by the nuclear-weapon States towards fulfilling the commitments made under the Action Plan adopted by consensus at the 2010 NPT Review Conference.<sup>34</sup> The nuclear-weapon States reaffirmed support for a progressive, step-by-step approach to nuclear disarmament, underscoring the NPT as the cornerstone for the non-proliferation regime and the foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. A number of delegations expressed the view that the next steps to achieving nuclear disarmament should focus on concluding a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) and securing the entry into force the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.<sup>35</sup>

Nuclear disarmament was also discussed during the informal meetings chaired by Amr Ramadan (Egypt) held within the framework of the schedule of activities.<sup>36</sup> During these discussions on 11 and 18 June, four different approaches towards nuclear disarmament were highlighted: (a) a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons; (b) an approach focusing on the legal provisions required for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world to be established in the framework of one or a set of legal instruments; (c) a building-block approach that constitutes a pragmatic process of nuclear disarmament allowing for parallel and simultaneous steps on a multilateral, plurilateral, bilateral or unilateral basis; and (d) a step-by-step approach, which builds on previously concluded efforts and instruments through selecting feasible measures that lead to significant reductions in the numbers of nuclear warheads and takes into account the dynamics of the surrounding security environment.

In the context of these discussions, several delegations reflected on the outcome of the 2015 NPT Review Conference, regretting its inability to reach a substantive outcome. In his personal capacity, the Coordinator of the informal discussions called the lack of a substantive outcome at the 2015 NPT Review Conference one of the most striking symptoms of the malaise of the disarmament machinery. Several delegations also stressed that while the preservation of the current nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament regime was a collective responsibility, the nuclear-weapon States should proactively contribute to the dual objectives of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Furthermore, repeated calls were made for ways to strengthen the implementation of the NPT, including through efforts

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<sup>34</sup> See the note verbale dated 17 February 2015 from the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom addressed to the Secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the P5 statement issued at the P5 conference on 5 February 2015 in London (CD/2018).

<sup>35</sup> The treaty text and adherence status are available from <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/ctbt> (accessed 31 March 2016).

<sup>36</sup> See the report of informal discussions on agenda items 1 and 2, with a general focus on nuclear disarmament (CD/2043/Rev.1, annex I).

that built upon the Action Plan of the 2010 NPT Review Conference and the draft outcome document of the 2015 Review Conference, bearing in mind that the latter was not consensually adopted. Other interventions from some non-nuclear-weapon States focused on urgent calls for identifying possible “effective measures” in order to advance the implementation of article VI of the NPT.

Against the backdrop of the 2015 NPT Review Conference, delegations commented on article VI of the NPT displaying a divergence of views on aspects such as the existence of a so-called legal gap and of the necessity for time-bound commitments on disarmament negotiations. The Coordinator noted in his report that, as highlighted by some, the terminological-related aspects of nuclear disarmament were still underdeveloped, whereas some terms were interchangeably used to define nuclear disarmament, such as “complete elimination of nuclear weapons”, “world without nuclear weapons”, or “world free from nuclear weapons”. Such a practice was deemed by a number of delegations as unacceptable for forums dealing with sensitive security-related matters like the Conference on Disarmament.<sup>37</sup>

The “Humanitarian Pledge”, an initiative spearheaded by Austria at the conclusion of the Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons in December 2014, was also referenced in terms of next steps for taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations.<sup>38</sup> Several States noted that, given the deep concern over the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, all States parties to the NPT must urgently renew their commitment to fully implement existing obligations under article VI of the Treaty and to identify and pursue effective measures “to fill the legal gap for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons”. In support of the principles and objectives contained in the Humanitarian Pledge, a number of delegations drew attention to the indiscriminate nature of a nuclear-weapon detonation and its devastating impact that could go far beyond national borders, arguing that the only way to guard against a detonation—whether by accident, miscalculation or design—was to ensure the total elimination of nuclear weapons. In contrast, other States cautioned against any effort pursued outside of the NPT framework, stating that such efforts would serve only to weaken the NPT regime.

The Dutch presidency organized an informal meeting on 4 August on the status of nuclear disarmament and possible further steps. Invited speakers included Kelsey Davenport, Director of Nonproliferation Policy at the Arms Control Association, and Mark Fitzpatrick, Director of the Non-Proliferation

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<sup>37</sup> Ibid.

<sup>38</sup> “Pledge presented at the Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons by Austrian Deputy Foreign Minister Michael Linhart”, 9 December 2014. Available from [https://www.bmeia.gv.at/fileadmin/user\\_upload/Zentrale/Aussenpolitik/Abrüstung/HINW14/HINW14\\_Austrian\\_Pledge.pdf](https://www.bmeia.gv.at/fileadmin/user_upload/Zentrale/Aussenpolitik/Abrüstung/HINW14/HINW14_Austrian_Pledge.pdf) (accessed 27 June 2016).

and Nuclear Policy Programme at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, who briefed the Conference in their capacity as advisers to the delegation of the Netherlands.

### **Fissile material**

In line with past practice, the issue of prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices was discussed under agenda items 1 and 2 of the Conference, namely “Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament” and “Prevention of nuclear war including all related matters”.

One plenary meeting, with a general focus on the ban of the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, was held on 26 February under the presidency of Mongolia. Many delegations referred to such a ban as the next logical step towards nuclear disarmament and called for an early start of negotiations in the Conference. No consensus, however, emerged on this matter due to ongoing opposition to commencement of negotiations based on the so-called Shannon Mandate contained in document CD/1299.

A potential ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices was also discussed during informal meetings held on 2 and 9 July within the framework of the schedule of activities. Chaired by Michael Biontino (Germany), States considered the scope, required definitions and appropriate verification system of a potential treaty, as well as its legal and institutional aspects. While general consensus emerged that a treaty should be non-discriminatory, multilateral, internationally and effectively verifiable and legally binding, its objective and scope remained heavily debated. In particular, the issue of “existing stocks” of weapons-grade fissile material produced before the entry into force of a treaty remained a point of stark divergence among delegations. While some noted that the scope of a future treaty should be defined before formal negotiations, many States were of the opinion that its scope should be determined in the course of negotiations. The view was expressed that the scope essentially defined the legal parameters of a treaty and, therefore, the debate should not be limited to discussion on the inclusion or exclusion of stocks.<sup>39</sup>

Some delegations that had taken part in the Group of Governmental Experts<sup>40</sup> on a possible FMCT noted the detailed and technical nature of the discussions and the important contribution of the Group to providing a

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<sup>39</sup> See the report on the informal meetings of the Conference on Disarmament on agenda items 1 and 2, with a general focus on the ban of the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices, held on 2 and 9 July 2015 (CD/2043/Rev.1, annex II).

<sup>40</sup> The Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) was established by General Assembly resolution 67/53 of 3 December 2012 to make recommendations on possible aspects that

better understanding of required elements of a treaty. Universal support for and acceptance of the Group and its report,<sup>41</sup> however, were not expressed. One delegation, in particular, questioned the value of the Group's report and suggested that the discussions within the Conference could have achieved the same results.

Two official documents were submitted to the Conference on the matter of fissile material. France introduced a draft FMCT<sup>42</sup> on 9 April and Pakistan submitted a working paper<sup>43</sup> dated 24 August outlining its views on a "fissile material treaty". The working paper included a detailed proposal for addressing past production of fissile material in a manner that captures existing stocks under a fissile material treaty's verification regime.

Over the course of debate on this issue, including reactions to the working paper submitted by Pakistan, some States referenced multiple subcategories within the general term of "existing stocks" and proposed various definitions. A number of States gave preference to a specific definition of "fissile material", which should be embraced in the treaty. Some States preferred the safeguards concept of special fissionable material of the IAEA, as outlined in article XX of its Statute, to be used as treaty definition for fissile material, while others favoured the use of the safeguards concept of unirradiated direct use material of the IAEA. The point was made that a treaty-specific definition of weapons-grade material could also be used. Such discussions illustrated the considerable complexity of the fissile material issue in the context of the Conference.

Throughout the informal discussions in July, the view was expressed that accounting of all past production would be problematic and would hamper the verification of a future treaty and that these stocks should, therefore, not fall under the purview of an FMCT but should instead be covered by another treaty with other objectives, such as arms control. There was general agreement that a treaty must not hinder the peaceful and civilian use and development of nuclear energy but that the diversion of material designated from that purpose would need to be prohibited.

The question of how to define "fissile material production facilities" was raised, as well as the need to define the operational status and the scale of the facilities. Many States said that they preferred a definition containing only enrichment and reprocessing facilities that produced at least a minimum-quantity of fissile material in order to make verification processes viable

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could contribute to but not negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

<sup>41</sup> The GGE report (A/70/81) was sent to the Conference of Disarmament by the Secretary General of the United Nations on 22 June 2015 and became a document of the Conference on Disarmament (CD/2023).

<sup>42</sup> CD/2020.

<sup>43</sup> CD/2036.

and cost-effective. Other States stressed the need to include small-scale and closed-down facilities in order to eliminate possible loopholes. Some States preferred the whole fuel cycle to be covered by a potential treaty. Some suggested that downstream facilities, such as storage, should also be taken into consideration, especially in order to prevent diversion.

Despite a vast array of diverging views, there was general agreement that the Conference on Disarmament would be the appropriate forum for negotiations of a treaty addressing fissile material. In the absence of a consensus on the commencement of negotiations, the delegations participating in the informal discussions agreed that further in-depth discussions, with the inclusion of technical experts, should continue.

At the initiative of the Dutch presidency, an informal meeting on the ban of the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices was organized on 6 August during which two speakers briefed the Conference—Mark Hibbs of the Nuclear Policy Program of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Zia Mian of the International Panel on Fissile Materials in their capacity as advisers to the delegation of the Netherlands.

### **Prevention of an arms race in outer space**

The issue of prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS) was discussed under agenda item 3. One plenary meeting on this agenda item was held on 9 March, during which delegations referenced the growing impact of new technologies and their military application, as well as the challenges posed by an increase in space debris. States also discussed the updated draft treaty on the prevention of placement of weapons (PPWT) in outer space and of the threat or use of force against outer space objects,<sup>44</sup> submitted by China and the Russian Federation. While many delegations welcomed the draft treaty, some expressed concern that the draft treaty would not prevent the development and deployment of anti-satellite weapons or be verifiable.

In accordance with the schedule of activities, two informal meetings were convened on this agenda item on 13 and 20 August.<sup>45</sup> These structured discussions, which were coordinated by Matthew Rowland (United Kingdom), built upon the discussions held in 2014 on the same issue.<sup>46</sup>

Delegations showed great interest in the topic and welcomed the depth of the discussions. Several delegations highlighted that this agenda item had become increasingly relevant owing to the growing interest in and utilization of space-based assets. As a result, States noted the challenges posed by

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<sup>44</sup> CD/1985.

<sup>45</sup> See the report of the Coordinator on the informal meetings on agenda item 3 held on 13 and 20 August 2015 (CD/2043/Rev.1, annex III).

<sup>46</sup> See CD/1995 and CD/1996.

increasing amounts of space debris and called for more urgent consideration of the issue, including in the context of the Conference on Disarmament.

While robust discussions took place, a clear divergence of views emerged. The Coordinator of the informal discussions invited delegations to reflect on definitions of military aggression in space, which yielded varying views. Delegations offered definitions with difficult levels of nuance, such as “damage inflicted to space objects controlled by other States and/or clear verbal expression of the intention to commit such acts”, or “aggression against land-sea-air targets with weapons deployed from outer space”. Some States also noted that current military aggression in space would most likely originate from earth or terrestrially based weapons. Delegations also took the opportunity to consider the applicability of the United Nations Charter in space, in particular Article 51 concerning the right of self-defence. In this regard, some delegations highlighted the lack of a common understanding of territorial integrity or an armed attack in the context of outer space.

Much attention was paid to the updated draft PPWT submitted by China and the Russian Federation. Some argued that the draft PPWT did not provide a sufficient basis to begin negotiations under that agenda item as the international community would still need to define a weapon in outer space prior to formal discussions. Others argued that such definitional hurdles were not insurmountable and that a verification protocol could be concluded following the treaty’s entry into force, perhaps when the necessary technology existed or became economically feasible. Some delegations also regretted that the PPWT failed to address attacks on space objects originating from earth or terrestrial anti-satellite weapons.

Reference was also made to the report<sup>47</sup> of the Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities. Several States supported the implementation of voluntary measures that would build confidence in outer space activities, stating that they would complement the existing international legal framework. In this regard, reference was also made to the European Union–led initiative to develop an International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities. Various views were also expressed on the possible forum for negotiation of an International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities (ICOC), inter alia, the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), the Conference on Disarmament or a forum outside the United Nations framework. The view was expressed that an ICOC should be limited exclusively to peaceful uses, while others opposed that limitation, noting that it precluded dual-use space technology.

Further to the discussions regarding transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities, the Chief of Committee Services and Research Section of the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs

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<sup>47</sup> A/68/189.

and Secretary of COPUOS briefed delegations, noting that the Committee was considering how it could contribute to the implementation of the recommendations of the Group of Governmental Experts.

On 19 August, an informal meeting on further steps was convened at the initiative of the Dutch presidency. Matthew Rowland provided a brief overview of recent developments, including a review of discussions on the agenda item held during the 2015 session under the schedule of activities. Additionally, two speakers were invited to brief the Conference in their capacity as advisers to the Netherlands—Sergio Marchisio of the Sapienza University of Rome and Andreas Kos of the European External Action Service.

Sergio Marchisio provided an overview of the latest developments related to the European Union's initiative on an ICOC highlighting outcomes of the "Multilateral Negotiations on an International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities" held in New York from 27 to 31 July. He underlined that the European Union's initiative was grounded in the mandates provided by General Assembly resolutions 61/75 of 6 December 2006 and 62/43 of 5 December 2007 to take forward concrete proposals to implement transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities. He acknowledged that several delegations called for future discussions on a potential code to be conducted on the basis of a mandate by the United Nations, in an open, inclusive, participatory, transparent and non-discriminatory manner. In this regard, it was noted that many participants in the July meeting considered that the General Assembly would be the most appropriate forum for negotiations, owing to its universal membership and its ability to address all issues of a cross-cutting, multi-committee nature. Other participants were of the view that the negotiations could be conducted through an ad hoc diplomatic process with the endorsement of the United Nations.

Andreas Kos, who had served as the Chairman of the July negotiations on an International Code of Conduct, provided an overview of the topics addressed at the July meeting, including discussions on the most appropriate forum for future negotiations and elements of a future code, such as the scope and key definitions.

### **Negative security assurances**

The importance of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, as contained in agenda item 4, was also addressed throughout the 2015 session of the Conference on Disarmament.

One plenary meeting on this agenda item was held on 10 March at the initiative of the Mongolian presidency. Reiterating their long-standing position, the members of the Conference that were part of the Non-Aligned Movement stressed that unilateral declarations, protocols to the nuclear-

weapon-free zones and Security Council resolutions were insufficient measures to provide assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. In this regard, Pakistan recalled the draft international convention<sup>48</sup> to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons tabled in 1979. In a similar vein, South Africa stressed that an international legally binding instrument should be negotiated within the NPT framework, either as a separate agreement or a protocol to the Treaty in light of the commitment made by non-nuclear-weapon States under the NPT to forgo the development of nuclear weapons. India recalled its “no-first-use” policy against nuclear-weapon States and non-use against non-nuclear-weapon States. India further underscored, as outlined in its working paper<sup>49</sup> on nuclear disarmament, specific measures pursuant to this agenda item including a global no-first-use agreement.

The nuclear-weapon States also offered their views regarding this agenda item, underscoring efforts they had undertaken to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The United States recalled its 2010 Nuclear Posture Review,<sup>50</sup> according to which it would not use nor threaten to use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the NPT that was in compliance with its non-proliferation obligations. China recalled its unconditional no-first-use pledge, while France emphasized its doctrine of deterrence as purely defensive.<sup>51</sup>

Regarding protocols to existing nuclear-weapon-free zones, both France and the Russian Federation indicated their readiness to sign the Protocol to the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone,<sup>52</sup> although the Russian Federation specified that that would happen only “with the usual reservations on national interest”. In this regard, the United States noted that it would continue its efforts alongside the other nuclear-weapon States to engage in discussions with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations with a view to signing the Protocol.

An informal meeting of the Conference on “negative security assurances” was held on 7 August under the presidency of the Netherlands. Chile introduced the topic as former Coordinator of the informal discussions on negative security assurances held in 2014 under the 2014 schedule of

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<sup>48</sup> CD/10.

<sup>49</sup> CD/1816.

<sup>50</sup> United States Department of Defense, *Nuclear Posture Review Report* (Washington, D.C., 2010). Available from [http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/NPR/2010\\_Nuclear\\_Posture\\_Review\\_Report.pdf](http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/NPR/2010_Nuclear_Posture_Review_Report.pdf) (accessed 28 June 2016).

<sup>51</sup> See Presidency of the French Republic, “Discours sur la dissuasion nucléaire - Déplacement auprès des forces aériennes stratégiques. Istres (13)”, 19 February 2015. Available from <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/discours-sur-la-dissuasion-nucleaire-deplacement-aupres-des-forces-aeriennes-strategiques-istres-3/> (accessed 28 June 2016).

<sup>52</sup> The treaty text and adherence status are available from <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/bangkok> (accessed 28 June 2016).

activities. In the discussions, delegations reiterated their positions presented in the plenary of 10 March in preparation for the discussions under the 2015 schedule of activities.

In accordance with the schedule of activities, an informal meeting was convened on 27 August on agenda item 4, entitled “Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons”. The discussions were conducted under the coordination of Ravinatha P. Aryasinha (Sri Lanka), during which delegations analysed various challenges to and opportunities for commencing international negotiations on a universal agreement on negative security assurances. Delegations also discussed the main elements of a possible international instrument and made suggestions on possible ways forward.

In this context, a majority of States reiterated the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States to receive unequivocal and legally binding security assurances from nuclear-weapon States. As indicated in the report of the Coordinator,<sup>53</sup> many delegations reiterated that the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons was their total elimination and, pending the achievement of that objective, negative security assurances could function as a transient measure. In contrast, the nuclear-weapon States asserted that the unilateral pledges made through Security Council resolution 984 (1995), the commitments taken through the nuclear-weapon-free zones and the assurances given in national security doctrines provided sufficient guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States that were party to the NPT and in full compliance with their obligations. In response, several non-nuclear-weapon States, as well as China in light of its unconditional no-first-use policy, expressed the view that the existing assurances were not satisfactory given their non-legally binding nature, lack of universality, openness for interpretation and the varying qualifiers associated with them.

The role of nuclear-weapon-free zones was also discussed during the August informal meeting. Delegations stressed that such zones, while important, were not universal. Furthermore, a number of States stressed that not all nuclear-weapon States had ratified the respective protocols and in some instances protocols had been ratified with unilateral reservations and interpretative declarations.

A large number of delegations identified the need for a legally binding instrument on negative security assurances. On the way forward, some delegations noted that the issue of negative security assurances constituted the most urgent and feasible item for negotiations on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. In this regard, support was expressed for the establishment of a subsidiary body to commence negotiations, as part of a comprehensive and balanced programme of work.

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<sup>53</sup> CD/2043/Rev.1, annex IV.

## **United Nations Disarmament Commission**

The United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) held the first substantive session of its new three-year cycle in New York from 6 to 24 April under the chairmanship of Fodé Seck (Senegal).

At its organizational session on 19 January, the Commission took up the question of the election of its officers<sup>54</sup> and the provisional agenda.<sup>55</sup> In this context, States discussed the possibility of including a third agenda item. However, as there was no apparent agreement on this issue, the Chairman concluded that additional informal consultations would be required.

The 2015 session consisted of 10 plenary meetings;<sup>56</sup> 9 meetings for Working Group I, dedicated to the agenda item on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation; and 8 meetings allocated to Working Group II, on the agenda item addressing confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms. Three of the plenary meetings were dedicated to a general exchange of views that took place on 7 and 8 April,<sup>57</sup> during which 42 delegations delivered statements.<sup>58</sup>

On 24 April, following three weeks of deliberations in respective working groups and plenary sessions, the Commission adopted by consensus the reports of the Commission<sup>59</sup> and its subsidiary bodies<sup>60</sup> to be presented to the General Assembly at its seventieth session.

Following the formal opening of the substantive session on 6 April, the Chairman held informal consultations and determined that the most viable pathway forward was to preserve the two traditional agenda items, one addressing nuclear and the other conventional weapons, on the understanding that consultations would continue on a possible third item. He noted that that approach was consistent with paragraph 5 of General Assembly resolution

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<sup>54</sup> During the 2015 session, the Bureau of the Commission was constituted as follows: Chair: Fodé Seck (Senegal); Vice-Chairs: Representatives of Chile, Iraq, Italy, Portugal and Serbia; and Rapporteur: Lachezara Stoeva (Bulgaria).

<sup>55</sup> See A/CN.10/PV.343.

<sup>56</sup> See A/CN.10/PV.344-353.

<sup>57</sup> See A/CN.10/PV.348-350.

<sup>58</sup> Representatives of the following countries made statements during the general exchange of views: Algeria, Austria, Bahrain (on behalf of the Group of Arab States), Brazil, Cambodia, Chile, China, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Ecuador (on behalf of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States), Egypt, Georgia, Guatemala, India, Indonesia (on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries), Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) and Viet Nam.

<sup>59</sup> A/70/42.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, paras. 17-18.

69/77 of 2 December 2014, which called for focused deliberations in the UNDC, bearing in mind the proposal to include a third agenda item.

Subsequently, the Commission adopted its agenda for the 2015 session on its second day of deliberations on 7 April. With the understanding that consultations would continue on a possible third item, the Commission decided that the 2015-2017 cycle would address the following: (a) recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (agenda item 4); and (b) practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional weapons (agenda item 5). Kairat Abdrakhmanov (Kazakhstan) was elected as Chair of Working Group I and Bouchaib Eloumni (Morocco) as Chair of Working Group II.

### **Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation**

With regard to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, States reiterated the vital importance of strengthening the regime established by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), especially in view of the 2015 Review Conference. They expressed hopes that the 2015 NPT Review Conference would achieve a successful outcome that would strengthen the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, as well as pave the way towards the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.

Many non-nuclear-weapon States, particularly members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), the Group of African States and the Group of Arab States, expressed deep concern about the lack of progress in the implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations by the nuclear-weapon States, pursuant to article VI of the NPT. In particular, the NAM stressed that nuclear disarmament should not be conditional upon confidence-building measures or any non-proliferation efforts. The NAM underlined, echoed by CELAC and the Arab Group, that General Assembly resolution 68/32 of 5 December 2013, “Follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament”, provided a concrete road map to achieve the objective of nuclear disarmament.<sup>61</sup> The nuclear-weapon States reiterated their commitment to article VI of the NPT and affirmed the view that the Treaty remained vital to the non-proliferation regime.

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<sup>61</sup> The proposals were the following: (a) negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament for early conclusion of a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons to prohibit their possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use and to provide for their destruction; (b) commemoration of 26 September as the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons; and (c) convening, no later than 2018, of a United Nations High-level International Conference on Nuclear Disarmament.

Many States welcomed the increasing attention paid to the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons in various disarmament forums. Reporting on the outcomes of the Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, held in December 2014, Austria highlighted its national pledge, particularly its call for all States parties to the NPT to identify and pursue effective measures to fill the legal gap to achieve the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons.<sup>62</sup> Mexico noted that the three conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, held in Oslo, Nayarit and Vienna, had made a significant contribution to better understanding the impact and risk posed by nuclear weapons and urged that the findings be considered in all forums where nuclear disarmament was discussed, including the Disarmament Commission.

Many States stressed the importance of an early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and called for the immediate commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) in the Conference on Disarmament. Kazakhstan, Co-President of the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT with Japan from 2015 to 2017, stressed that the entry into force of the CTBT was crucial to strengthening the NPT. The United States expressed the hope that the final report<sup>63</sup> of the Group of Governmental Experts on an FMCT, established under General Assembly resolution 67/53 of 3 December 2012, would motivate and revitalize the dialogue on the FMCT within the Conference on Disarmament. Pakistan affirmed its long-held position that a fissile material treaty negotiated multilaterally at the Conference on Disarmament would have to address existing stockpiles.

Several Member States stressed the importance of nuclear-weapon-free zones and their contribution to the nuclear non-proliferation regimes. In particular, they called for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. States belonging to the Arab Group, as well as those of the

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<sup>62</sup> Austria noted that the Chair's summary had drawn eight key irrefutable conclusions from the process with respect to the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, the risks associated with the existence of those weapons and the legal and moral dimension of that weaponry. It also noted that Austria's national pledge included the inescapable conclusions that needed to be drawn from the humanitarian arguments, such as the following: (a) its commitment to presenting the fact-based discussions, findings and compelling evidence of the Vienna Conference in all relevant forums, in particular the NPT Review Conference and the United Nations framework; (b) its call on all States parties to the NPT to identify and pursue effective measures to fill the legal gap in the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons; and (c) its pledge to cooperate with all the relevant stakeholders regarding its efforts to stigmatize, prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons in the light of their unacceptable humanitarian consequences and associated risks.

<sup>63</sup> *Study on a Treaty Banning the Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive Devices*, Disarmament Study Series, no. 35 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.16.IX.2). Available from <https://www.un.org/disarmament/publications/studyseries/no-35/> (accessed 14 July 2016).

NAM, CELAC and the African Group, reiterated their deep disappointment that the conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, as mandated by the 2010 NPT Review Conference, had not yet been convened. Bahrain, speaking on behalf of the Arab Group, reiterated that the creation of such a zone was one of its highest priorities, and reaffirmed the need to effectively implement all relevant decisions.

Regarding nuclear non-proliferation, a number of States welcomed the political framework for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action<sup>64</sup> agreed upon by the Islamic Republic of Iran and the E3/EU+3 on 2 April. They expressed hopes that the negotiating parties would soon reach a complete and comprehensive resolution ensuring the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme.

States also continued to draw attention to proliferation concerns related to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which they noted to be the only country that had conducted nuclear tests in the twenty-first century. States also expressed concern over the country's actions to advance its nuclear- and ballistic-missile capabilities. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea was called upon to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes, including its uranium-enrichment programme, in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, in compliance with its international obligations.

### **Conventional weapons**

In reference to conventional weapons, many States welcomed the entry into force of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) on 24 December 2014. They expressed the hope that the ATT would establish the highest international standards for regulating the international arms trade and that it would provide a new multilateral framework for transparency and accountability. CELAC called for the ATT to be implemented in a balanced, transparent and objective manner, respecting the sovereign right of all States to ensure their self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. In addition, Mexico announced that Mexico City would host the first Conference of States Parties to the ATT from 24 to 27 August.

Many States stressed that the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons continued to threaten peace and stability in various regions, especially in the Middle East, North Africa and the Sahel. Several Arab and African States expressed concern that the illicit trade in such weapons constituted a source of supply to terrorists groups and organized crime cells. In this context, States reaffirmed the importance of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light

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<sup>64</sup> United States Department of State, "Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action". Available from <http://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/jcpoa/> (accessed 1 April 2016).

Weapons in All Its Aspects and of the International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons. They welcomed the successful outcome of the fifth Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Implementation of the Programme of Action in June 2014 and expressed hope that further progress would be made at the second Meeting of Governmental Experts to be held in June. The Russian Federation stressed the need to take specific measures and effective steps aimed at preventing the illegal trade in small arms and light weapons, inter alia, by introducing a universal ban on the transfer of such weapons to non-state actors.

A number of States noted that practical confidence-building measures in the area of conventional weapons played an important role in promoting understanding, transparency and cooperation among States and enhancing stability and security. However, several States also stressed that such measures should be adopted in strict compliance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, bearing in mind their voluntary nature. States reaffirmed the validity and importance of the existing transparency instruments adopted under United Nations auspices, particularly the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and the United Nations Report on Military Expenditures. China expressed the belief that one of the most pressing tasks was to increase the number of countries participating in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms.

### **Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters**

The Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters<sup>65</sup> held its sixty-third session in Geneva from 28 to 30 January and its sixty-fourth session in New York from 29 June to 1 July. During those sessions it focused its deliberations on three substantive agenda items: (a) the role of arms control in managing conflicts; (b) new challenges to disarmament and the increasing role of non-state actors; and (c) the humanitarian consequences of nuclear use. In July, the Secretary-General submitted a report<sup>66</sup> to the General Assembly summarizing the Advisory Board's deliberations and recommendations.

The Advisory Board had an exchange of views on the first agenda item at its two sessions in 2015. With respect to the role of arms control in managing conflicts, the Board recommended that the Secretary-General commission a study by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) to chart and assess the history of arms control measures in peacekeeping activities, in particular peacekeeping missions of the United Nations and such regional organizations as the African Union and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. On the basis of that assessment, the Board further

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<sup>65</sup> For a list of members of the Board, see annex I to this chapter.

<sup>66</sup> A/70/186.

recommended that UNIDIR prepare a handbook of measures implemented by such peacekeeping missions.

Members of the Advisory Board also recommended that the Secretary-General consider including training on weapons control and disarmament when planning relevant United Nations peacekeeping missions and that weapons control and disarmament experts be included in the team of experts on peacekeeping missions. It further recommended that the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs provide comments and recommendations on the mandate of United Nations missions, especially in view of recommendations of the recent report<sup>67</sup> of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations.

The Advisory Board engaged in a very active discussion on the second agenda item at both 2015 sessions. Recognizing that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides the appropriate framework for conducive peaceful coexistence both within a State and between States, the Board recommended the creation of a United Nations commission that, in accordance with principles enunciated in the Declaration, would regularly monitor and report on materials contained in officially sanctioned textbooks that seek to demonize peoples on the basis of race, religion, nationality or gender; speeches by national leaders that seek to inspire hatred against other States or against individuals within their States; and utterances made in public and in social media that seek to foster racial, ethnic, gender, cultural or religious discrimination, division or hatred.

The Advisory Board recommended that the commission exercise responsibility for keeping track of indicators of radicalization and extremism and that the Secretary-General call upon the international community and regional organizations to strengthen early warning of hate speech and organized activity designed to promote sectarian or extremist agendas. The Board also recommended that the Secretary-General encourage States to conduct national assessments of risks related to extremism and radicalization and that action be taken to empower the Human Rights Council and strengthen its capacity to undertake periodic reviews of Member States that were vulnerable to and/or complicit in the promotion of extremist groups and agendas.

With respect to the humanitarian consequences of nuclear use, the Board underscored the importance of the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty for humanitarian and other reasons, and the cessation of nuclear testing. It noted that the humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons required further study, as different scenarios of use could be envisaged. The Board, therefore, recommended that the Secretary-General commission such a study. It also recommended that the Secretary-General

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<sup>67</sup> A/70/95-S/2015/446.

urge nuclear-weapon States to increase transparency in security measures undertaken to provide greater assurances regarding their efforts to limit risk. The Board suggested that benchmarking and peer review could be useful additional measures in view of the national security concerns associated with transparency on nuclear-weapon safety and security. Finally, the Advisory Board recommended that the Secretary-General open a discussion in relevant forums on how nuclear deterrence took into account humanitarian concerns or how it could do so.

Serving as the Board of Trustees of UNIDIR, the Advisory Board approved the workplan and budget of the Institute for the 2015-2016 period and approved the submission to the General Assembly of the report<sup>68</sup> of the Director of the Institute on the activities and financial status of UNIDIR.

The Board noted that, in addition to its own past recommendations, the General Assembly, the Office of Internal Oversight Services and others had drawn attention to the need for a larger portion of UNIDIR institutional staff costs to be covered by the subvention from the regular budget. The Board stressed in that regard that, since the early 1990s, the purchasing power of the subvention had decreased substantially. The Board stressed the need to provide UNIDIR with sufficient working capital and in that regard welcomed the establishment of a revolving capital fund, the Stability Fund, in January.

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<sup>68</sup> A/70/177.

## **Annex I**

### **Members of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters**

- István Gyarmati (Chair), Ambassador, Professor, President, Centre for Democracy Public Foundation, and Head of the International Centre for Democratic Transition, Budapest
- Wael al-Assad, Ambassador, Representative of the Secretary-General for Disarmament and Regional Security and Director of Multilateral Relations, League of Arab States, Cairo
- Mely Caballero Anthony, Associate Professor and Head of the Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
- Choi Sung-joo, Ambassador for International Security Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Seoul
- Rut Diamint, Professor of International Relations, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Buenos Aires
- Trevor Findlay, Professor, William and Jeanie Barton Chair in International Affairs, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Ottawa
- Anita Friedt, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear and Strategic Policy, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, Department of State, Washington, DC
- Vicente Garrido Rebolledo, Professor, King Juan Carlos University, and Director, International Affairs and Foreign Policy Institute, Madrid
- Camille Grand, Director, Foundation for Strategic Research, and Chair, EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, Paris
- Pervez Hoodbhoy, Professor, School of Science and Engineering, Lahore University of Management Sciences and Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad
- Eboe Hutchful, Professor, Africana Studies, Wayne State University, Detroit
- Togzhan Kassenova, Associate, Nuclear Policy Programme, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC
- Fred Tanner, Ambassador, Senior Adviser to the Secretary-General of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe/Liaison, Swiss chairmanship of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2014, Vienna
- Wu Haitao, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary for Disarmament Affairs and Deputy Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations Office at Geneva and other International Organizations in Switzerland, Geneva

Vladmir A. Orlov, Director, PIR Center, Moscow

Jarmo Sareva (ex officio member), Director, United Nations Institute for  
Disarmament Research, Geneva



## Chapter VII Information and outreach



As representatives of children, Hiroshima sixth-grade students Yuro Kuwahara (left) and Yuka Hosokawa (right) deliver an oath of peace during the memorial ceremony at Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park on 6 August 2015 to mark the seventieth anniversary of the first atomic bombing.

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## CHAPTER VII

### Information and outreach

*And that is why the work of academics and scholars is so crucial ... Your research allows us to consider many possibilities for moving beyond entrenched military doctrines or seemingly fixed political positions. Your scholarship inspires debate. Your teaching fosters understanding. And with understanding, we can challenge the fears that allow nuclear weapons to be used to intimidate, coerce and control. And so, in a very real sense, your work can and will bring us closer to a world free of nuclear weapons.*

MICHAEL DOUGLAS, UNITED NATIONS MESSENGER OF PEACE<sup>1</sup>

### Developments and trends, 2015

THE UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS (UNODA) continued to promote its information and outreach activities through 2015. As in past years, a primary focus remained reaching out to a global audience through the UNODA website. The Office also continued to partner with permanent missions to the United Nations, the United Nations Department of Public Information and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in holding events, implementing activities and issuing publications. The leverage gained by these partnerships extended the Office's reach to multiple media outlets with a view to promoting the disarmament agenda of the United Nations.

In addition to the *United Nations Disarmament Yearbook* for 2014, UNODA released several publications that focused on a range of issues in 2015, including, inter alia, armed unmanned aerial vehicles, confidence-building measures in the context of the Biological Weapons Convention and the Secretary-General's Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons.

The UNODA website continued to feature new content on a regular basis with the aim of providing the latest information to Member States, conference participants, NGOs and the general public. As a result, end users were able to access daily updates of documents and statements, including video messages. Users also continued to benefit from a key feature of the UNODA website, namely the ability to retain news items and related information. Moreover, the

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<sup>1</sup> Remarks to the Academic Symposium during the NPT Review Conference, New York, 28 April 2015. Available from <https://unoda-web.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/md-academicssymposium.pdf> (accessed 10 May 2016).

general public profited from the website by virtue of its role as a repository of information, data and material.

The web analytics of UNODA online media (website and Twitter account) showed considerable activity in 2015. In collaboration with the United Nations Department of Public Information, a dedicated website was designed and launched for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Furthermore, the websites for the International Day against Nuclear Tests and the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons were updated to reflect the latest developments related to these commemorative activities.

UNODA also created a website and application to launch the 2015 United Nations Poster for Peace Contest to commemorate the seventieth anniversary of the first United Nations General Assembly resolution adopted on 24 January 1946. As the first General Assembly resolution established the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, the contest sought to raise awareness of the need for nuclear disarmament. The contest also served to inspire citizens across the globe to add their voices and use their artistic talents to promote a world free of nuclear weapons.

With regard to disarmament education, UNODA continued to add updated content to the dedicated disarmament education website to commemorate the seventieth anniversary of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the forty-fifth anniversary of the entry into force of the NPT, as well as to highlight the nexus between gender and disarmament.

During disarmament-related meetings and conferences, UNODA facilitated civil society participation, which remained a vital component to ensuring broad and effective disarmament information and outreach. To this end, UNODA collaborated closely with NGOs at the forefront of such participation. This included supporting the accreditation and registration process for the 2015 NPT Review Conference, the second Open-ended Meeting of Governmental Experts on the Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, and the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

As a guiding medium for its information and outreach, UNODA continued to administer the Disarmament Information Programme in close collaboration with the United Nations Department of Public Information. Bearing in mind the purpose of the Programme to inform, educate and generate public understanding of the importance of multilateral action in the field of arms control and disarmament, UNODA undertook various activities aimed at providing information on relevant disarmament matters. As in previous years, the Programme's objectives were guided by the priorities of Member States as presented in General Assembly resolutions. It was funded from the regular

budget and from extrabudgetary resources through the Voluntary Trust Fund for the United Nations Disarmament Information Programme.

The year 2015 also provided various opportunities for UNODA to continue its advocacy of disarmament and non-proliferation issues with Member States and civil society. To this end, UNODA expanded its interaction with the media, think tanks, academia and civil society organizations, all of which played a critical role in building and encouraging public opinion on disarmament and non-proliferation efforts.

## Disarmament and non-proliferation education

In paragraph 2 of resolution 69/65 of 2 December 2014, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to review the results of the implementation of the 34 recommendations contained in the United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education. The report,<sup>2</sup> submitted to the General Assembly at its sixty-ninth session in June 2014, also contained a review of possible new opportunities for promoting disarmament and non-proliferation education.

On 30 January, two representatives of UNODA participated in the information fair of the sixteenth Conference of the Committee on Teaching About the United Nations for the second consecutive year. The 2015 Conference focused on the achievements of the United Nations since the signing of its founding Charter in 1945. The participants considered the future of the United Nations and invited educators and students from around the United States to explore ways for them to help address the global community's many concerns.

The Committee attracted over 400 elementary, secondary and tertiary educators and university students from a diverse range of fields. The Conference provided UNODA the opportunity to promote understanding and awareness of disarmament by engaging in discussions with Conference participants from a range of educational backgrounds. Informational material was also distributed, including the publication *Disarmament: a Basic Guide*, fact sheets on various subjects, such as disarmament and non-proliferation education, and bookmarks that provided a link to teaching materials on the disarmament education website.<sup>3</sup>

The year 2015 also represented an important anniversary year in the context of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation—the seventieth

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<sup>2</sup> A/69/113 and Add.1.

<sup>3</sup> See UNODA publications available from <https://www.un.org/disarmament/publications/> and the Disarmament Education website available from <https://www.un.org/disarmament/education/index.html> (accessed 10 May 2016).

anniversary of the first United Nations General Assembly resolution,<sup>4</sup> adopted on 24 January 1946, establishing the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. To commemorate the occasion, UNODA organized the Poster for Peace Contest, which started on 24 October 2015 and will end on 24 January 2016. This was the second time that the United Nations held such a contest; the previous one was in 1982.

The contest sought to raise awareness of the need for nuclear disarmament, as well as to inspire citizens across the globe to add their voices and use their artistic talents to promote a world free of nuclear weapons, in line with the objective of the first General Assembly resolution. In order to reach a wider global audience, the contest was organized in partnership with the Office of the President of the General Assembly of the United Nations, the United Nations Foundation, the World Federation of United Nations Associations and the United Nations Academic Impact. The contest attracted 4,149 entries worldwide from 123 countries and the specially designed website ([www.unposterforpeace.org](http://www.unposterforpeace.org)) received over 200,000 page views from over 180 countries. The winners illustrated the diversity of the entries in both their artistic entries and their geographic backgrounds, thus underscoring the truly global importance of the objective of a world free of nuclear weapons.<sup>5</sup>

### **Disarmament education website—a resource for learning**

A number of new content elements were added to the disarmament education website<sup>6</sup> in 2015. In order to sensitize and educate the public so that it might grasp the present-day reality of the threats posed by the existence of nuclear weapons, UNODA organized four film screening events in April and May as a way to commemorate the seventieth anniversary of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the forty-fifth anniversary of the entry into force of the NPT. One of the films that was screened at the event, *What Happened That Day?* by Masaaki Tanabe of the Film Production Committee for the Restoration of the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park, was added to the film section of the disarmament education website. This is the sixth and final documentary film by Masaaki Tanabe, an atomic bomb survivor from Hiroshima. Using computer-generated graphics, the film provides a truly revealing look at what happened on the day of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, 6 August 1945, and a glimpse into the harsh reality of the devastation caused.

In order to promote information-sharing on present-day disarmament issues, UNODA interviewed Shorna-Kay Richards, Deputy Permanent Representative of Jamaica to the United Nations, on the topic of gender and

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<sup>4</sup> General Assembly resolution 1 (I).

<sup>5</sup> The winning artworks are available from <https://www.unposterforpeace.org/> (accessed 10 May 2016).

<sup>6</sup> Available from [www.un.org/disarmament/education](http://www.un.org/disarmament/education) (accessed 10 May 2016).

disarmament. The podcast interview focused on the important linkage between gender considerations and disarmament objectives, in particular the relevant resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on women, disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control.<sup>7</sup>

### **Training activities**

UNODA provided opportunities for young professionals to receive disarmament experience under the United Nations Associate Expert Programme. In New York and Geneva, UNODA mentored more than 30 graduate students through the United Nations 2015 internship programme. Moreover, UNODA, in collaboration with Hibakusha Stories, a New York-based NGO that brings atomic bomb survivors to New York City high schools to tell their stories, organized biannual briefings by hibakusha (atomic bomb survivors) for United Nations tour guides, staff and permanent mission interns.

On 3 November, UNODA co-sponsored a workshop at the United Nations on nuclear disarmament for 30 teachers from New York City high schools as part of their continuing education activities. As part of its ongoing efforts on disarmament education, UNODA has organized annual workshops for high school teachers on nuclear disarmament. This was the fourth such workshop held in collaboration with Hibakusha Stories and Youth Arts New York. The goal of the day-long workshop was to instruct the teachers on the basic issues of nuclear disarmament, with a view to providing them with the resources and information to educate their students on this pressing global matter.

## **Disarmament Information Programme**

### **Print and e-publications**

The *United Nations Disarmament Yearbook* continued to serve as the flagship publication of UNODA. Its 2014 edition was distributed to all permanent missions and was also publicly accessible in electronic format from the Office's website.

In 2015, UNODA published one title under the UNODA Occasional Paper series: *2015 Sessions of the Nuclear Discussion Forum* (No. 27). The Office also released a publication under the Civil Society and Disarmament series entitled *Statements of Non-Governmental Organizations at the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*. The publication featured the views of representatives of NGOs that participated in the segment of the Review Conference devoted to NGO interventions.

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<sup>7</sup> For the latest resolution on the subject, see General Assembly resolution 69/61 of 2 December 2014.

UNODA also published in 2015, as part of the Disarmament Study Series, the *Study on a Treaty Banning the Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive Devices* (No. 35). This edition of the Disarmament Study Series focused on the work conducted in 2014 and 2015 by the Group of Governmental Experts established under General Assembly resolution 67/53 of 3 December 2012 to make recommendations on possible aspects that could contribute to, but not negotiate, a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

The Office's other print publications in 2015 highlighted a range of issues of prominence in the realm of disarmament. A study on armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) was prepared on the recommendation of the Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters contained in its report<sup>8</sup> following its 2014 sessions. Published in October and with the assistance of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and the Human Rights Institute at the Columbia University School of Law, the study examined the basic characteristics of UAVs; ways in which international law applied to the use of armed UAVs to conduct targeted strikes outside areas of active hostilities; and ideas for improving transparency, oversight and accountability in the development, acquisition, stockpiling, transfer and use of armed UAVs. The study's primary conclusion was a recommendation for further study on UAVs to be conducted under the auspices of UNIDIR, with the assistance of a geographically representative group of experts. (For more information on UAVs, see chapter V.)

In May, UNODA also published the report entitled "Secretary-General's Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical, Bacteriological (Biological) or Toxin Weapons: a lessons-learned exercise for the United Nations Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic". Based on the experience of the United Nations investigation mission in the Syrian Arab Republic conducted in 2013, this publication provided concrete conclusions and recommendations for strengthening the application of the Secretary-General's Mechanism and supported the conclusion that the mechanism was an effective, impartial and objective tool for the investigation of alleged use of chemical or biological weapons. (See chapter II for more information on the Secretary-General's Mechanism.)

With the support of the European Union, UNODA published the "Guide to Participating in the Confidence-Building Measures of the Biological Weapons Convention", which provided practical advice and guidance to officials responsible for preparing submissions of confidence-building measures in support of the Biological Weapons Convention. (See chapter II for more information on the Convention and its confidence-building measures.)

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<sup>8</sup> A/69/208.

UNODA also continued to produce what was previously a quarterly e-publication (UNODA Update) that highlighted recent events and activities of UNODA and other disarmament forums, providing links to more comprehensive material and documents available online, including the UNODA website. The individual articles in the Update were published on the website when they became available, closer to real time, and also collated in a quarterly mode.

A feature on the website of UNODA is a series of two-page fact sheets on various topics for which the Office is responsible. In 2015, 34 of these concise fact sheets were updated on a quarterly basis.

UNODA produced business-card-sized outreach materials called Everyday Disarmament Cards, which provide 10 examples of how the United Nations works for disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control, underscoring the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction, an end to all forms of indiscriminate weapons, prevention of the illicit arms trade, and promotion of meaningful controls on emerging weapons technologies. The cards were translated from English into Chinese, French, German, Korean and Spanish and are available online from <https://www.un.org/disarmament/publications/more/everydaycards/>.

See also annex I to this chapter for more information on 2015 UNODA publications.

## **Websites**

The principal UNODA website continued to serve as a significant outreach and research tool, providing substantive disarmament and non-proliferation information to the public, including researchers, practitioners and Government officials. While content continued to be updated regularly throughout 2015, technical features such as slide shows and the ability to carry out customized searches were also improved. The number of visits to the website was 53,000 per month, with 70,000 page views per month. The five most regularly visited content areas were those on nuclear weapons, the Arms Trade Treaty, biological weapons, small arms and light weapons, and chemical weapons. The highest website traffic occurred during the beginning of the seventieth General Assembly session from September to December.

## **Exhibitions**

Exhibitions played an important role in advocacy and in providing disarmament-related information at various conferences and other related events. Discussions between the United Nations Department of Public Information and UNODA on the installation of a new disarmament exhibit in the renovated General Assembly Building continued throughout the first half of 2015. By end of June, the artefacts were moved back from the Conference Building to the third floor of the General Assembly Building and a large

display on military expenditure was housed in the revamped disarmament section of the United Nations tour route. This portion of the tour garnered considerable attention from visitors.

On 30 September, UNODA launched an ad hoc exhibit on the role of the United Nations in contributing to the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons. This exhibit was prepared with a view to raising awareness of the second International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, which is officially commemorated on 26 September every year. The display featured key statements from the eight United Nations Secretaries-General over the years on the importance of achieving nuclear disarmament.

### **Events**

In 2015, there was significant media and civil society interest in a number of events requiring information and outreach support in New York.<sup>9</sup> These included, inter alia, the International Day against Nuclear Tests (29 August, observed at the United Nations Headquarters on 11 September) and the second observance of the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons (26 September, observed at the United Nations Headquarters on 30 September).

As part of its outreach efforts, UNODA continued to organize and host a range of meetings, seminars and events. At an event on 13 April at the United Nations Headquarters held on the margins of the United Nations Disarmament Commission session, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) launched its 2014 data on global military expenditures. Hosted by SIPRI and UNODA with the sponsorship of the Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations, the event aimed not only to provide an overview of trends in global arms spending, but also to connect these to recent developments in international peace and security. The launch of the SIPRI data was followed by an expert panel.

A documentary film series on nuclear disarmament was held on the margins of the 2015 NPT Review Conference in May. The series complemented the formal discussions at the Conference. UNODA selected four films representative of varying approaches to nuclear disarmament in order to highlight the complexity of the issue at hand.

Peter Anthony's documentary *The Man Who Saved the World* served as the opening film for the series. The film dramatically depicted the vulnerability of nuclear weapons to human error. This reality was explored further in the film *Countdown to Zero* by Lucy Walker, which was structured around the notion that nuclear security is prone to "accident, miscalculation and madness". Robert Frye's sobering documentary *In My Lifetime*,

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<sup>9</sup> For more information on events held in 2015, see the UNODA Update series. Available from <https://www.un.org/disarmament/update/> (accessed 10 May 2016).

challenged viewers to question whether it was possible to rid the world of these destructive weapons by taking on the complex realities of the nuclear world. The film *What Happened That Day?* by Masaaki Tanabe provided the audience with an emotional portrayal of the personal experiences of atomic bomb survivors in Japan. The screenings were open to the general public, which provided young people with an opportunity to engage with one of the most important and least understood security issues facing our world.

On 18 September, the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs met with NGOs working in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation. The aim of this meeting was to improve coordination and collaboration between NGOs and UNODA. It was also an occasion to assess the advances and challenges in the field of disarmament. Ten NGOs were represented and participants briefed the High Representative on their campaign strategies for the coming year.

For a list of events held on the margins of the 2015 meetings of the First Committee and the United Nations Disarmament Commission, see annex III to this chapter.

### **Briefings**

In 2015, staff members of UNODA undertook briefing engagements focusing on education and training activities involving a range of target audiences. While most of the participants were student visitors from university programmes, other briefings were provided to United Nations Association members from various countries, junior diplomats and other foreign ministry personnel. Briefings were also provided to high school teachers for continuing education purposes and to NGO representatives. In addition, staff members participated in panels and events on arms control, disarmament and security issues organized by research institutes, universities or think tanks.

### **Media**

Throughout 2015, the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs and senior staff of UNODA participated in interviews with several television, radio and print outlets. Media interest in disarmament was focused on the 2015 NPT Review Conference, with particular interest in UNODA views on upholding the credibility of the NPT in the run-up to the next Review Conference to be held in 2020. Considerable attention was also paid to the 2013 United Nations investigation of the alleged use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. In addition, initiatives about the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons became an increasing area of interest for the media. All of the interviews of the High Representative are available in the “Spotlight” section of the UNODA website (<https://www.un.org/disarmament>).

The Secretary-General's disarmament-related video messages<sup>10</sup> were also featured on the UNODA website. The Secretary-General addressed the fourteenth United Nations–Republic of Korea Joint Conference on Disarmament and Non-proliferation Issues, the twentieth Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention and the fifty-ninth regular session of the International Atomic Energy Agency General Conference. The High Representative's video message on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the Biological Weapons Convention was also featured on the website. In the same vein, the UNODA Director recorded a video message to the spring student-teacher conference of the Critical Issues Forum held in Hiroshima.

### **United Nations Messenger of Peace on disarmament**

The United Nations Messenger of Peace on disarmament, Michael Douglas, continued to support the work of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation.

Michael Douglas recorded six public service announcements,<sup>11</sup> which were released throughout the year. He addressed a variety of issues, including the seventieth anniversary of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the importance of disarmament in promoting development, the fortieth anniversary of the Biological Weapons Convention, the significance of United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) in preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and the need for meaningful controls on emerging weapons systems through instruments such as the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. He also underscored the critical role played by civil society groups in efforts to end the scourge of the illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons.

The Messenger of Peace on disarmament also gave the keynote address<sup>12</sup> to the academic symposium entitled “Fresh Ideas for the Future”, held on 28 April as an event on the margins of the 2015 NPT Review Conference at United Nations Headquarters.

### **Disarmament fellowships, training and advisory services**

Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 69/75 adopted on 2 December 2014, UNODA continued to offer training to junior diplomats and Government officials in the field of disarmament, non-proliferation and

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<sup>10</sup> Disarmament-related video messages are available from <https://www.un.org/disarmament/spotlight-2015/> (accessed 11 May 2016).

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>12</sup> Available from <https://unoda-web.s3-accelerate.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/md-academicsymposium.pdf> (accessed 11 May 2016).

international security under the auspices of the United Nations Programme of Fellowships on Disarmament. Since the programme was launched by the General Assembly in 1978 at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament,<sup>13</sup> UNODA has trained approximately 930 officials from over 160 Member States, a large number of whom hold disarmament and other related positions within their respective Governments. The programme has enabled fellows to participate more effectively in regional and global disarmament efforts and has created an informal network of officials from various regions of the world working cooperatively and constructively in pursuit of disarmament and non-proliferation goals.

In 2015, young diplomats and other officials from the following 25 Member States participated in the programme: Argentina, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Gabon, Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, Haiti, Japan, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Malawi, Mexico, Myanmar, Nepal, Russian Federation, Serbia, Switzerland, Thailand, Togo, Turkey, United States, Uzbekistan and Zimbabwe.

The programme started in Geneva on 24 August, exposing the fellows first to the issues on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. Furthermore, fellows engaged with aspects of the work and implementation of various treaty regimes, in particular the Biological Weapons Convention, the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and the Convention on Cluster Munitions.<sup>14</sup> This first segment also included a one-day study visit to Bern and Thun, organized by the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs of Switzerland.

During the second segment of the programme, the fellows participated in study visits to several international organizations and in arrangements of relevance in the field of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation. These included, inter alia, the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, and several export control regimes (such as the Wassenaar Arrangement, Zangger Committee and Nuclear Suppliers Group in Vienna), as well as the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the International Court of Justice in The Hague. At the invitation of the Governments of China, Germany, Japan, Kazakhstan and the United States, the fellows also participated in country-specific study visits during this period.

The third segment of the programme took place at the United Nations Headquarters in New York in October, during which the fellows followed

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<sup>13</sup> S-10/2, para. 108.

<sup>14</sup> For the text and adherence status of these treaties, see the UNODA Disarmament Treaties Database. Available from <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/> (accessed 10 May 2016).

the work of the First Committee of the General Assembly, which deals with disarmament and international security. The fellows also had the opportunity to participate in various events about these issues held on the margins of the First Committee session. After completing the programme at Headquarters on 30 October in New York, the 2015 fellows were awarded certificates of participation by the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs.

Over the course of the 2015 programme, the fellows engaged in a wide variety of academic activities, including lectures by senior diplomats, officials of international organizations and academia. In addition to theoretical discussions, participants engaged in negotiation simulation exercises on the work of the CTBTO and the NPT Review Conference; field visits to a weapons destruction facility, a nuclear reactor, disarmament research laboratories; and simulations of chemical weapons inspections and of demining and counter-improvised explosive device activities.

The fellowship programme continued to make a concrete contribution to the process of promoting deliberations and negotiations on disarmament and to preparing a younger generation of diplomats and Government officials to tackle complex challenges in an evolving international security environment.

### **Vienna Office of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs**

The Vienna Office of UNODA continued to foster collaborative working relationships with global and regional organizations working in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation throughout 2015. The Office continued to act as a catalyst to energize dialogue, build capacity and transfer knowledge. The activities of the Office in Vienna centred on a strong spirit of collaboration among partners with a view to generating a common vision for the future of disarmament and non-proliferation education. The Office's work also focused on linking disarmament and development in order to contribute to efforts by Member States to implement the Sustainable Development Goals in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

During this period, the Vienna Office established cooperation with 25 entities working on disarmament, non-proliferation, peace and development-related areas, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and the United Nations Industrial Development Organization, as well as with other relevant regional intergovernmental organizations, such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the League of Arab States. Cooperation with regional and international organizations constituted a crucial component of assistance to States in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation education, in particular in

the development of the Women Scholarship for Peace initiative. A part of the Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (DNP) Education Partnership spearheaded by UNODA, the project focuses on the development of online training courses on disarmament and non-proliferation and its relationship to development, while providing 140 scholarships for women from the Global South.

The DNP Education Partnership assembles and tailors curriculums with a view to creating an online training platform and to promoting DNP educational networks and outreach activities. The Vienna Office continued to lead this initiative in 2015 by promoting interaction with service providers of DNP activities and by assisting in the establishment of networks between global and regional organizations, NGOs, research and educational centres and other key stakeholders in Vienna and beyond. A steering team was created with heads and other representatives of permanent missions, regional organizations and NGOs aimed at providing advice and strategic guidance on ways and means to develop this initiative.

In 2015, the DNP Education Partnership initiated preparations for training courses and the first Women Higher Education for Peace Vienna Forum to be held in July 2016, showcasing new and promising professional opportunities in the field of peace, disarmament, non-proliferation and development.

The Office in Vienna continued its close interaction with Member States, civil society and information outlets such as the Inter Press Service and the United Nations Information Services. Partnerships with academia such as the Academic Council on the United Nations System, the United Nations–mandated University for Peace (UPEACE) and the Vienna Centre for Disarmament and Non-proliferation were also fostered during this period. Such collaborative activities led to the drafting of training course modules to be administered in countries of the global South by UPEACE.

The Office continued providing substantive support to Permanent Missions to the United Nations and to the OSCE in Vienna. In particular, consultations were carried out with the League of Arab States to draft and agree upon a memorandum of understanding in order to facilitate the exchange of information and identify possible areas of assistance. Specific areas for cooperation were considered, such as training related to combating trafficking in small arms and light weapons.

The participation of the Office in several briefings throughout the year allowed for the promotion of its activities in a variety of forums, including, inter alia, the Women Ambassadors in Wien meeting in July; the twenty-third IAEA Women in Nuclear (WiN) Global Annual Conference with the theme “WiN Meets Atoms for Peace” held in August; the Women in All Things Nuclear Conference in September; the IAEA Programme Committee Meeting

in October for the 2016 International Conference on Nuclear Security; and the thirty-fifth anniversary of UPEACE in December. To commemorate the seventieth anniversary of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki nuclear bombings, the Office supported the organization of the Genbaku No Hi (Atomic Bomb Awareness Day) event on 5 August.

Other activities of the Vienna Office in support of the objectives of disarmament and non-proliferation included the organization of a preparatory meeting for the Review and Assistance Conference on the Implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) to be held in Addis Ababa in 2016. (For more information on Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), see chapter I.)

The Office also continued providing professionals with the opportunity to see first-hand the day-to-day work of UNODA and gain knowledge of the disarmament and non-proliferation agenda, which was achieved through outreach events of the United Nations Office at Vienna such as the Shadowing Programme held on 18 and 19 November.

## **United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research**

The year 2015 marked the thirty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). Over the past 35 years, UNIDIR has built a strong reputation for innovation and problem-solving in the field of disarmament. At a time when the multilateral disarmament machinery has struggled to deliver the expected results, UNIDIR has continued to fulfil its mandate on behalf of Member States. It has provided “thought leadership” through fact-based analysis, new ideas on emerging issues and fresh perspectives, and has acted as a convener and facilitator in multilateral disarmament-related matters.

In a number of respects, 2015 was a successful year for the Institute. Voluntary contributions increased by approximately 20 per cent and the number of donors increased from 20 in 2014 to 30 in 2015. For the first time in many years, a major private foundation was among the top donors of UNIDIR. As a sign of the Institute’s growing level of activity, the number of events organized or co-organized by UNIDIR increased from 25 in 2014 to 35 in 2015. In setting its research direction and agenda, UNIDIR adopted an increasingly strategic approach, staying abreast of today’s rapidly changing geopolitical context and current and impending developments in international security related to disarmament and arms control. The Institute sees these developments as guidance for the sort of policy research the broader disarmament community is likely to need in this area in order to make progress.

A part of its current strategic direction, UNIDIR has worked to break down silos not only within its traditional areas of research—by not confining

work to particular weapon-specific portfolios—but also between disarmament, security and sustainable development. As noted in paragraph 77 of the 2015 annual report<sup>15</sup> of the UNIDIR Director, greater emphasis has been placed on connecting the Institute’s work to the larger set of global issues to which Member States have committed as priorities, particularly the post-2015 development agenda and humanitarian and health issues. In this regard, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are of particular importance and of direct relevance to UNIDIR in several respects.

In 2015, the Institute worked together with other United Nations agencies and Member States to advance sustainable development goals for the benefit of all. In its future project proposals and reports, UNIDIR plans to explain how the projects relate and contribute to the SDGs and their implementation, as well as how the work reflects the aims of United Nations Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security.

A selection of the Institute’s key activities in 2015 is briefly described below. A full account of UNIDIR activities for the period January to December 2014 and its proposed programme of work and financial plan for 2015 and 2016 are contained in the Director’s annual report. The Board of Trustees of the Institute considered and approved the report for submission to the General Assembly at the sixty-fourth session of the Secretary-General’s Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, held in New York from 29 June to 1 July. UNIDIR continued to undertake research in four programme areas, namely weapons of mass destruction, conventional weapons, emerging security issues, and security and society. Through the implementation of individual projects, UNIDIR continued to engage participation in and organization of conferences and seminars and the issuance of publications (see annex II to this). UNIDIR staff also participated in numerous conferences held by partner organizations and continued to provide hands-on advice and support to both Member States and officeholders of various Geneva-based disarmament bodies.

In 2015, the Institute continued its work related to nuclear disarmament. As part of its multi-year project “Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons”, UNIDIR focused on extending facts-based analysis and understanding within the disarmament community about the humanitarian risks and consequences of nuclear weapons in the current international landscape. The Institute also acted as the expert consultant to the Secretary-General’s Group of Governmental Experts on possible aspects that could contribute to, but not negotiate, a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

The Institute’s work in the area of emerging security issues in 2015 included the annual conferences on space security and on cyberstability, as well as the conclusion of the International Law and State Behaviour in

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<sup>15</sup> A/70/177.

Cyberspace Meeting Series, which covered issues such as regional cooperation and the applicability of international law with respect to cyberspace.<sup>16</sup> Two meetings within the framework of this project were convened in 2015, in Nairobi on 3 and 4 March and in Muscat on 3 and 4 June. The Institute also continued its work on research related to the development of autonomous robotic weapons systems; the future conduct of warfare; and the societal, ethical and moral considerations of such emerging technologies.

In the conventional weapons area, UNIDIR work included the project “Weapons and Ammunition Management in Somalia”, which enhances the capacity of national lawmakers and relevant security authorities in Somalia who are tasked with supporting or leading the review of national frameworks related to weapons and ammunition control. UNIDIR continued to support the implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty and worked closely with Member States in this regard.

In 2015, Member States acknowledged the crucial role of UNIDIR in providing objective research in the field of disarmament with the adoption of General Assembly resolution 70/69 on 7 December. With regard to the Institute’s financial stability, in the resolution, the Assembly requested the Secretary-General, on an exceptional basis, to submit a funding proposal for the biennium 2018-2019, taking into account the recommendations of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters contained in its report.<sup>17</sup> The Secretary-General was also requested to commission a third-party assessment to commence in 2018 on the future structural, financial, administrative and operational aspects of the Institute.

## **Annex I**

### **United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs publications and other materials in 2015**

*United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 39 (Parts I and II): 2014. New York: United Nations, 2014 (Sales Nos. E.15.IX.3 and E.15.IX.4). Available from <https://www.un.org/disarmament/publications/yearbook/volume-39-2014/>.

*2015 Sessions of the Nuclear Discussion Forum*. UNODA Occasional Papers, No. 27, December 2015. New York: United Nations, 2015 (Sales No. E.16.IX.4). Available from <https://www.un.org/disarmament/publications/occasionalpapers/no-27/>.

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<sup>16</sup> See UNIDIR list of conferences available from <http://www.unidir.org/Conferences/listConferences/idProgramme:3> (accessed 10 May 2016).

<sup>17</sup> A/70/186.

*Statements of Non-Governmental Organizations at the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.* Civil Society and Disarmament: 2015. New York: United Nations, 2015 (Sales No. E.16.IX.3). Available from <https://www.un.org/disarmament/publications/civilsociety/volume-2015/>.

*Study on a Treaty Banning the Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive Devices.* Disarmament Study Series, No. 35. New York: United Nations, 2015 (Sales No. E.16.IX.2). Available from <https://www.un.org/disarmament/publications/studyseries/no-35/>.

*Programmes Financed from Voluntary Contributions: 2014-2015.* New York: United Nations, 2015. Available from <https://www.un.org/disarmament/publications/xb-report/volume-2014-2015/>.

*Study on Armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Prepared on the Recommendation of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters.* New York: United Nations, 2015. Available from <https://www.un.org/disarmament/publications/more/drones-study/>.

The Secretary-General's Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical, Bacteriological (Biological) or Toxin Weapons: a lessons-learned exercise for the United Nations Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic. New York: United Nations, 2015. Available from <https://www.un.org/disarmament/publications/more/syrian-ll-report/>.

Guide to Participating in the Confidence-Building Measures of the Biological Weapons Convention. New York: United Nations, 2015. Available from <https://www.un.org/disarmament/publications/more/cbm-guide/>.

UNODA Update (online news updates): 1st Quarter, 2nd Quarter, 3rd Quarter and 4th Quarter. Available from <https://www.un.org/disarmament/update/>.

Fact Sheets on Disarmament Issues. Available from <https://www.un.org/disarmament/factsheets/>.

### **Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa**

*UNREC Focus* (newsletter): No. 25 (May 2015); No. 26 (July 2015); No. 27 (September 2015); and No. 28 (November 2015). Available from <http://unrec.org/default/index.php/en/2015-03-01-10-56-47>.

UNREC factsheet, January and April 2015. Available from <http://unrec.org/default/index.php/en/2015-03-01-11-35-5/unrec-facts-sheets>.

Pamphlet: UNREC and its works in Africa. Available from [http://unrec.org/default/phocadownload/UNREC/brochures/UNREC\\_EN.pdf](http://unrec.org/default/phocadownload/UNREC/brochures/UNREC_EN.pdf).

Leaflets: Maritime Security in Gulf of Guinea; Physical Security and Stockpile Management Activities to Reduce the Risk of Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons and their Ammunition in the Sahel Region; and Supporting the Counter Terrorism Implementation Task Force in its fight against the acquisition of Small Arms and Light Weapons and their ammunition by Foreign Terrorist Fighters in the Lake Chad basin. Available from <http://unrec.org/default/index.php/en/2015-03-01-11-35-5/unrec-facts-sheets> and [http://unrec.org/default/phocadownload/UNREC/brochures/CTITF\\_EN.pdf](http://unrec.org/default/phocadownload/UNREC/brochures/CTITF_EN.pdf).

Online database: Mapping Arms Trade Treaty–Relevant Cooperation and Assistance Activities in Sub-Saharan Africa. Available from [www.att-assistance.org](http://www.att-assistance.org).

### **Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean**

17 Standard Operating Procedures for firearms forensic ballistics

UNLIREC factsheets: Defence White Papers; Arms Trade Treaty Implementation Course; Stockpile Management and Weapons Destruction; Firearms Operational Forensic Ballistics; Small Arms Control and the Private Security Sector; Women and Disarmament; and United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). Available from <http://www.unlirec.org>.

UNLIREC newsletter: No. 18 (July 2015) and No. 19 (December 2015). Available from [http://www.unlirec.org/newsletter\\_eng.aspx](http://www.unlirec.org/newsletter_eng.aspx).

### **Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific**

UNRCPD newsletter. No. 6 (August to December 2014) and No. 7 (January to September 2015). Available from <http://unrcpd.org/publications/newsletter/>.

UNRCPD factsheet, November 2015. Available from <http://unrcpd.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/UNRCPD-leaflet-Nov-2015.pdf>.

The Teacher's role for creating a safe society. *Shishak Magazine* (Kathmandu), 7th year, issue 83 (15 February 2015), pp. 49-50.

Teachers as ambassadors for peace. *Shishak Magazine* (Kathmandu), 7th year, issue 84 (15 March 2015), pp. 50-51.

In my mind, a good teacher. *Shishak Magazine* (Kathmandu), 7th year, issue 85 (17 April 2015), pp. 48-49.

Teachers having conflict management skills will live longer. *Shishak Magazine* (Kathmandu), 7th year, issue 86 (23 May 2015), pp. 60-61.

Disarmament—our role, and our concern. *Shishak Magazine* (Kathmandu), 7th year, issue 87 (16 June 2015), pp. 64-65.

## Annex II

### United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research publications in 2015

- Borrie, John, Tim Caughley and Nick Ritchie. NPT Success and the Humanitarian Initiative: A Range of Initiatives Is Required to Achieve a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World. ILPI-UNIDIR NPT Review Conference Series, Paper No 5 of 5, 2015. PDF e-book.
- Caughley, Tim. Analysing Effective Measures: Options for Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament and Implementation of NPT Article VI. ILPI-UNIDIR NPT Review Conference Series, Paper No 3 of 5, 2015. PDF e-book.
- Golston, Daniel with Ben Baseley-Walker. *The Realities of Middle Power Space Reliance*. UNIDIR Resources. Geneva: UNIDIR, 2015. PDF e-book.
- Graff Hugo, Torbjørn. On Builders and Blockers: States Have Different Roles to Play to Complete the Nuclear Disarmament Puzzle. ILPI-UNIDIR NPT Review Conference Series, Paper No 4 of 5, 2015. PDF e-book.
- Hayashi, Nobuo. On the Ethics of Nuclear Weapons: Framing a Political Consensus on the Unacceptability of Nuclear Weapons. ILPI-UNIDIR NPT Review Conference Series, Paper No 2 of 5, 2015. PDF e-book.
- Miller, Derek B. and Lisa Rudnick. Recommendations for Incorporating Evidence-Based Design into the IAWG's Training Programme on DDR. Geneva: UNIDIR, 2015. PDF e-book.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Implementing Evidence-Based Design into Practice: Recommendations to the United Nations Inter-Agency Working Group on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. Geneva: UNIDIR, 2015. PDF e-book.
- Miller, Derek B., Lisa Rudnick with Leor Levy. Towards Cyber Stability: A User-Centred Tool for Policymakers. UNIDIR Resources. Geneva: UNIDIR, 2015. PDF e-book.
- Ritchie, Nick. The Humanitarian Initiative in 2015: Expectations are Building for the Need for Nuclear Disarmament Progress. ILPI-UNIDIR NPT Review Conference Series, Paper No 5 of 5, 2015. PDF e-book.
- UNIDIR. *Addressing Improvised Explosive Devices: Options and Opportunities to Better Utilize UN Processes and Actors*. UNIDIR Resources. Geneva: UNIDIR, 2015. PDF e-book.

- \_\_\_\_\_. *Space Security 2015—Conference Report*. UNIDIR Resources. Geneva: UNIDIR, 2015. PDF e-book.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Compendium of Regional Seminars*. UNIDIR Resources. Geneva: UNIDIR, 2015. PDF e-book.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *UNIDIR Cyber Stability Seminar 2015: Regime Coherence*. UNIDIR Resources. Geneva: UNIDIR, 2015. PDF e-book.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Eurasia Regional Seminar: Conference Report*. UNIDIR Resources. Geneva: UNIDIR, 2015. PDF e-book.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *The Weaponization of Increasingly Autonomous Technologies in the Maritime Environment: Testing the Waters*. UNIDIR Resources, No 2. Geneva: UNIDIR, 2015. PDF e-book.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *The Weaponization of Increasingly Autonomous Technologies: Considering Ethics and Social Values*. UNIDIR Resources, No 3. Geneva: UNIDIR, 2015. PDF e-book.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Meeting Summary—Examining Options and Models for Harmonization of End Use/r Control Systems. Informal Expert Group Meeting, Vienna, 22-23 April 2015*. UNIDIR Resources. Geneva: UNIDIR, 2015. PDF e-book.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Africa Regional Seminar: Conference Report*. UNIDIR Resources. Geneva: UNIDIR, 2015. PDF e-book.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Asia-Pacific Regional Seminar: Conference Report*. UNIDIR Resources. Geneva: UNIDIR, 2015. PDF e-book.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Regional Perspectives on Norms of Behaviour for Outer Space Activities*. Geneva: UNIDIR, 2015.
- The International Community and IEDs: building coordinated processes and responses*. UNIDIR and the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, 2015. PDF e-book.

### Annex III

#### Events held on the margins of the First Committee 2015 session

- 9 October Cyber weapons and Autonomous Weapons: Potential Overlap, Interaction and Vulnerabilities (organized by UNIDIR)
- 13 October Briefing by the Director of UNIDIR (organized by UNIDIR)
- 22 October Links between Space Security and Initiatives for Space Sustainability at the United Nations on the Occasion of the Joint Session of the First and Fourth Committees (organized by UNIDIR and Secure World Foundation)

- 26 October Applying Small Arms and Ammunition Guidelines in Conflict-Affected Areas: Lessons Learned and Tools for Solutions (organized by UNIDIR)
- 27 October Initiating a Global Dialogue on Strengthening End User Control Systems: Can Harmonization Help Tackle Diversion? (organized by UNIDIR)
- 28 October United Nations Military Transparency Instruments: What They Are and How to Report to UNODA (organized by UNODA)



**Appendix I**  
**Status of multilateral arms regulation  
and disarmament agreements**



## **A P P E N D I X I**

### **Status of multilateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements**

The most up-to-date information on disarmament treaties and their status of adherence is available from the UNODA website at:

<http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/>

The data contained in this appendix has been provided by the depositaries of the treaties or agreements. Inclusion of information concerning the treaties and agreements of which the United Nations Secretary-General is not the depositary is as reported by the respective depositaries and implies no position on the part of the United Nations with respect to the data reported.

#### **Secretary-General of the United Nations**

Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies

Arms Trade Treaty

Central African Convention for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and All Parts and Components That Can Be Used for Their Manufacture, Repair and Assembly (Kinshasa Convention)

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

Convention on Cluster Munitions

Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects

Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction

Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention)

#### **African Union**

African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty)

#### **Canada and Hungary**

Treaty on Open Skies

### **France**

Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (1925 Geneva Protocol)

### **Kyrgyzstan**

Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia

### **Mexico**

Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)

### **Netherlands**

Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe

### **Organization of American States**

Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Materials

Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions

### **Pacific Islands Forum**

South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Rarotonga Treaty)

### **Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States**

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction

Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (Partial Test Ban Treaty)

Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty)

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (Sea-bed Treaty)

### **Thailand**

Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty)

### **United States**

Antarctic Treaty

## **Actions reported in the period 1 January to 31 December 2015**

The following list shows actions, if any, during the period from 1 January to 31 December 2015 with regard to multilateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements, as reported by the depositaries. The order in which the agreements are listed is according to the date of signature or opening for signature.

A new State party in the following list is based on the date of deposit with the respective depositary of a State's instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession. However, please refer to the footnotes to ascertain whether that State actually becomes a State party at a later date, as some treaties only enter into force for a State after a specified period of time from the date of deposit. If a State expressed its consent to be bound by a means other than ratification, the date of deposit is further noted as follows: (a) = accession, (A) = acceptance, (AA) = approval, (P) = consent to be bound, and (s) = succession.<sup>1</sup>

In the case of multi-depositary clauses, depositary action may be completed with one or more of the several depositaries. The following notation indicates where the reported action was completed: (M) = Moscow, (L) = London and (W) = Washington.

Certain treaties that establish nuclear-weapon-free zones (Bangkok Treaty, Pelindaba Treaty, Rarotonga Treaty, Treaty of Tlatelolco and Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia) have associated protocols concerning security guarantees from the nuclear-weapon States and some also have protocols for States outside the zone of application, but which have some territory within the zone. They are at different stages with regard to signature, ratification and entry into force. Full details can be found at <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/>.

### **Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (1925 Geneva Protocol)**

SIGNED AT GENEVA: 17 June 1925

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 8 February 1928

DEPOSITARY: France

NEW PARTIES:	Colombia	—24 November
	The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	—20 August

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 140

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<sup>1</sup> A glossary of terms relating to treaty actions is available from [http://treaties.un.org/Pages/Overview.aspx?path=overview/glossary/page1\\_en.xml](http://treaties.un.org/Pages/Overview.aspx?path=overview/glossary/page1_en.xml) (accessed 5 May 2015).

### **Antarctic Treaty**

SIGNED AT WASHINGTON: 1 December 1959

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 23 June 1961

DEPOSITARY: United States

NEW PARTIES:	Iceland	—13 October (a)
	Kazakhstan	—27 January (a)
	Mongolia	—23 March (a)

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 53

### **Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (Partial Test Ban Treaty)**

SIGNED BY THE ORIGINAL PARTIES<sup>2</sup> IN MOSCOW: 5 August 1963

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON: 8 August 1963

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 10 October 1963

DEPOSITARY: Russian Federation (M), United Kingdom (L) and United States (W)

NEW PARTIES: None

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 126

### **Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty)**

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON: 27 January 1967

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 10 October 1967

DEPOSITARY: Russian Federation (M), United Kingdom (L) and United States (W)

NEW PARTIES: Azerbaijan —9 September (a) (L)

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 104

### **Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Tlatelolco)**

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT MEXICO CITY: 14 February 1967

ENTERED INTO FORCE: for each Government individually

DEPOSITARY: Mexico

NEW PARTIES: None

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 33

#### **Amendment to article 7<sup>3</sup>**

NEW PARTIES: None

#### **Amendment to article 25<sup>4</sup>**

NEW PARTIES: Grenada —3 March

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<sup>2</sup> The original parties are the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States.

<sup>3</sup> Amendment adopted by the General Conference of OPANAL, pursuant to resolution 267 (E-V) of 3 July 1990.

<sup>4</sup> Amendment adopted by the General Conference of OPANAL, pursuant to resolution 268 (XII) of 10 May 1991.

**Amendment to articles 14, 15, 16, 19 and 20<sup>5</sup>**

NEW PARTIES: Grenada —3 March (a)

**Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON: 1 July 1968

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 5 March 1970

DEPOSITARY: Russian Federation (M), United Kingdom (L) and United States (W)

NEW PARTIES: State of Palestine —10 February (a) (M)

12 February (a) (L)

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 191

**Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (Sea-bed Treaty)**

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON: 11 February 1971

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 18 May 1972

DEPOSITARY: Russian Federation (M), United Kingdom (L) and United States (W)

NEW PARTIES: None

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 94

**Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction**

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON: 10 April 1972

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 26 March 1975

DEPOSITARY: Russian Federation (M), United Kingdom (L) and United States (W)

NEW PARTIES: Andorra —2 March (a) (W)

Mauritania —28 January (a) (L)

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 173

**Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques**

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT GENEVA: 18 May 1977

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 5 October 1978

DEPOSITARY: Secretary-General of the United Nations

NEW PARTIES: Kyrgyzstan —15 June (a)

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 77

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<sup>5</sup> Amendment adopted by the General Conference of OPANAL, pursuant to resolution 290 (VII) of 26 August 1992.

### **Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies**

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT NEW YORK: 18 December 1979

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 11 July 1984

DEPOSITARY: Secretary-General of the United Nations

NEW PARTIES:<sup>6</sup> None

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 16

### **Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects**

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT NEW YORK: 10 April 1981

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 2 December 1983

DEPOSITARY: Secretary-General of the United Nations

NEW PARTIES:<sup>7</sup> Algeria —6 May (a)

State of Palestine —5 January (a)

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 121

#### **Amendment to Article 1 of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (entered into force on 18 May 2004)**

NEW PARTIES: Algeria —6 May (P)

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 82

#### **Amended Protocol II (entered into force on 3 December 1998)**

NEW PARTIES: None

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 102

#### **Protocol IV (entered into force on 30 July 1998)**

NEW PARTIES: Algeria —6 May (P)

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 105

#### **Protocol V (entered into force on 12 November 2006)**

NEW PARTIES: None

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 87

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<sup>6</sup> Article 19, paragraph 4, states:

“For each State depositing its instrument of ratification or accession after the entry into force of this Agreement, it shall enter into force on the thirtieth day following the date of deposit of any such instrument.”

<sup>7</sup> Article 5, paragraphs 2 and 3, of the Convention state:

“2. For any State which deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession after the date of the deposit of the twentieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, this Convention shall enter into force six months after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

“3. Each of the Protocols annexed to this Convention shall enter into force six months after the date by which twenty States have notified their consent to be bound by it in accordance with paragraph 3 or 4 of Article 4 of this Convention.”

### **South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Rarotonga Treaty)**

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT RAROTONGA: 6 August 1985

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 11 December 1986

DEPOSITARY: Secretary-General of the Pacific Islands Forum

NEW PARTIES: None

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 13

### **Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe**

SIGNED AT PARIS: 19 November 1990

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 9 November 1992

DEPOSITARY: Netherlands

NEW PARTIES: None

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 30

#### **Agreement on Adaptation**

ADOPTED AND SIGNED AT ISTANBUL: 19 November 1999

NOT YET IN FORCE<sup>8</sup>

NEW SIGNATORIES: None

TOTAL NUMBER OF SIGNATORIES: 30

NEW PARTIES: None

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 3

### **Treaty on Open Skies**

SIGNED AT HELSINKI: 24 March 1992

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 1 January 2002

DEPOSITARY: Canada and Hungary

NEW PARTIES: None

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 34

### **Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction**

SIGNED AT PARIS: 13 January 1993

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 29 April 1997

DEPOSITARY: Secretary-General of the United Nations

NEW PARTIES:<sup>9</sup> Angola —16 September (a)  
Myanmar —8 July

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 192

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<sup>8</sup> Article 31, paragraph 3, states:

“This Agreement on Adaptation shall enter into force 10 days after instruments of ratification have been deposited by all States Parties listed in the Preamble, after which time the Treaty shall exist only in its amended form.”

<sup>9</sup> Article XXI, paragraph 2, states:

“For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Convention, it shall enter into force on the 30th day following the date of deposit of their instrument of ratification or accession.”

**Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone  
(Bangkok Treaty)**

SIGNED AT BANGKOK: 15 December 1995

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 27 March 1997

DEPOSITARY: Thailand

NEW PARTIES: None

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 10

**African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty)**

SIGNED AT CAIRO: 11 April 1996

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 15 July 2009

DEPOSITARY: Secretary-General of the African Union

NEW PARTIES: None

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 39

**Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty**

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT NEW YORK: 24 September 1996

NOT YET IN FORCE<sup>10</sup>

DEPOSITARY: Secretary-General of the United Nations

NEW SIGNATORIES: None

TOTAL NUMBER OF SIGNATORIES: 183

NEW PARTIES: Angola —20 March

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 164

**Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling,  
Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their  
Destruction (Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention)**

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT OTTAWA: 3 December 1997

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 1 March 1999

DEPOSITARY: Secretary-General of the United Nations

NEW PARTIES:<sup>11</sup> None

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 162

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<sup>10</sup> Article XIV, paragraph 1, states:

“This Treaty shall enter into force 180 days after the date of deposit of the instruments of ratification by all States listed in Annex II to this Treaty, but in no case earlier than two years after its opening for signature.”

<sup>11</sup> Article 17, paragraph 2, states:

“For any State which deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession after the date of the deposit of the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, this Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.”

### **Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials**

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT WASHINGTON, DC: 14 November 1997

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 1 July 1998

DEPOSITARY: Organization of American States

NEW PARTIES:<sup>12</sup> None

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 31

### **Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions**

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT GUATEMALA CITY: 7 June 1999

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 21 November 2002

DEPOSITARY: Organization of American States

NEW PARTIES: None

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 16

### **Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia**

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT SEMIPALATINSK: 8 September 2006

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 21 March 2009

DEPOSITARY: Kyrgyzstan

NEW PARTIES: None

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 5

### **Convention on Cluster Munitions**

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT OSLO: 3 December 2008

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 1 August 2010

DEPOSITARY: Secretary-General of the United Nations

NEW PARTIES: <sup>13</sup>	Canada	—16 March
	Colombia	—10 September
	Iceland	—31 August
	Mauritius	—1 October (a)
	Paraguay	—12 March
	Rwanda	—25 August
	Slovakia	—24 July

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<sup>12</sup> Article XXV states:

“This Convention shall enter into force on the 30th day following the date of deposit of the second instrument of ratification. For each State ratifying the Convention after the deposit of the second instrument of ratification, the Convention shall enter into force on the 30th day following deposit by such State of its instrument of ratification.”

<sup>13</sup> Article 17, paragraph 2, states:

“For any State that deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession after the date of the deposit of the thirtieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, this Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.”

Somalia	—30 September
South Africa	—28 May
State of Palestine	—6 January (a)

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 98

**Central African Convention for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and All Parts and Components That Can Be Used for Their Manufacture, Repair and Assembly (Kinshasa Convention)**

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT BRAZZAVILLE: 19 November 2010

NOT YET IN FORCE<sup>14</sup>

DEPOSITARY: Secretary-General of the United Nations

NEW SIGNATORIES: None

TOTAL NUMBER OF SIGNATORIES: 11

NEW PARTIES: Cameroon —30 January

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 5

**Arms Trade Treaty**

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT NEW YORK: 3 June 2013

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 24 December 2014

DEPOSITARY: Secretary-General of the United Nations

NEW PARTIES: <sup>15</sup>	Barbados	—20 May
	Belize	—19 March
	Central African Republic	—7 October (a)
	Chad	—25 March
	Cote d'Ivoire	—26 February
	Dominica	—21 May
	Ghana	—22 December
	Liberia	—21 April
	Mauritania	—23 September
	Mauritius	—23 July (a)
	Niger	—24 July
	Paraguay	—9 April
	Republic of Moldova	—28 September
	San Marino	—29 July
	Seychelles	—2 November
	Switzerland	—30 January
	Togo	—8 October
	Tuvalu	—4 September

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 79

<sup>14</sup> Article 36, paragraph 1, states:

“This Convention shall enter into force 30 days after the date of deposit of the sixth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.”

<sup>15</sup> Article 22, paragraph 2, states:

“For any State that deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, this Treaty shall enter into force for that State ninety days following the date of deposit of its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.”

**Appendix II**  
**Disarmament resolutions**  
**and decisions listed by chapter**



## APPENDIX II

### Disarmament resolutions and decisions listed by chapter

At its seventieth session, the General Assembly adopted 55 resolutions and two decisions related to disarmament, which are arranged in the present appendix by chapter topic. The highlights of each resolution and decision are presented first, followed by corresponding general statements and explanations of vote of Member States during the First Committee session. Additional voting information is found in the boxes,<sup>a</sup> including cross-references to Part I of the Yearbook.

#### Chapter I. Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation

##### 70/25. Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

The General Assembly recommended that further intensive efforts be devoted to the search for a common approach or common formula and that the various alternative approaches, particularly those considered in the Conference on Disarmament, be further explored. It also recommended that the Conference actively continue intensive negotiations to reach agreement and conclude effective international agreements on security assurances, taking into account the widespread support for the conclusion of an international convention and giving consideration to any other proposals designed to secure the same objective.

*First Committee.* In a general statement, **Cuba** reiterated its demand for the urgent adoption of a legally binding international instrument whereby nuclear-weapon States would provide universal and unconditional security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of such weapons.

After voting in favour, **Japan** said that the draft resolution should not prejudice the discussion in the Conference on Disarmament. It strongly hoped that each Conference on Disarmament member State would demonstrate its flexibility and that the Conference would break its long-standing stalemate and advance its substantive work on negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT).

**Introduced by:** Pakistan (20 Oct.)

**GA vote:** 127-0-55 (7 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** 121-0-56 (2 Nov.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 15-19.

<sup>a</sup> Abbreviations used in the boxes: o.p. = operative paragraph; p.p. = preambular paragraph. The order of the numbers for the voting statistics indicates the votes in favour, the votes against and the abstentions, respectively.

### **70/28. 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its Preparatory Committee**

The General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to render the necessary assistance and to provide such services, as may be required, for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and its Preparatory Committee.

**Submitted by:** Algeria (5 Nov.)

**GA vote:** 176-0-3 (7 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** 175-0-3 (5 Nov.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 28-30.

### **70/33. Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations**

The General Assembly reaffirmed the urgency of securing substantive progress in multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations and to this end decided to convene an open-ended working group to substantively address concrete effective legal measures, legal provisions and norms that would need to be concluded to attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons. The Assembly decided that the open-ended working group shall also substantively address recommendations on other measures that could contribute to taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations. It also decided that the open-ended working group shall convene in Geneva, in 2016; hold its organizational session as soon as possible; and submit a report on its substantive work and agreed recommendations to the General Assembly at its seventy-first session, which would assess progress made, taking into account developments in other relevant forums. The Assembly called upon States participating in the open-ended working group to make their best endeavours to reach general agreement.

**Submitted by:** Sponsors (19 Oct.)<sup>b</sup>

**GA vote:** 138-12-34 (7 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** 135-12-33 (5 Nov.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 45-49.

**First Committee.** General statements were delivered by the following:

- **France**, speaking also on behalf of the People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, stated that a convention of prohibition would not eliminate nuclear weapons but would undermine the NPT regime. It expressed the view that an incremental, step-by-step approach was the only practical option that took into account all factors affecting global strategic security and stability. It asserted that all States could help to fulfil that goal of nuclear disarmament if they resolved regional tensions, addressed proliferation challenges head on, promoted collective security and made progress in all areas of arms control and disarmament. It expressed openness to alternative channels of discussion, not excluding an appropriately mandated open-ended working group, provided that they were conducive to a constructive dialogue. It stressed that the draft

<sup>b</sup> The initial draft resolution was introduced by Mexico. The revised draft resolution was submitted by the sponsors.

resolution ignored security considerations in its attempt to promote nuclear disarmament.

- The **Islamic Republic of Iran** expressed the view that there had been a complete lack of progress on the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments. It believed that the draft resolution demonstrated a strong interest among non-nuclear-weapon States for breaking the current impasse in the field of nuclear disarmament.
- **Brazil** stressed that the wide variety of measures proposed in the draft resolutions<sup>c</sup> reflected the legitimate and paramount interest of Member States in the promotion of nuclear disarmament and their determination to pursue all avenues towards achieving that goal.

After voting in favour, the following States took the floor:

- **Egypt** stated that the establishment of the working group as a subsidiary body of the General Assembly under its rules of procedure would result in an outcome report that would reflect the collective aspiration of the international community to eliminate the threats caused by the existence of nuclear weapons. It stated that that measure would advance the work of the international disarmament machinery. Egypt asserted that the goal of a similar process should focus on reaching a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons to prohibit their possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use, and would provide for their complete and irreversible destruction.
- **Cuba** stated that, bearing in mind the stagnation at the Conference on Disarmament for far too many years, it understood the call of a majority of States to begin negotiations on nuclear disarmament in the General Assembly. It would have preferred that the working group could have had a better-defined and clearer mandate aimed at agreements on concrete and effective legal measures towards nuclear disarmament. It reiterated its support for a working group that would carry out its work in New York where all Member States were represented. It believed that 15 days would not be sufficient time to comply with the mandate and hoped the working group would continue its work in 2017.

Having voted against the draft resolution, the **Russian Federation**<sup>d</sup> expressed its belief that the open-ended working group had no chance of being successful, which, it said, ignored the principles of inclusive and consensus-negotiating processes on arms control. It drew attention to the preamble to the NPT, which stated that nuclear disarmament must occur in keeping with the agreement on complete disarmament and the elimination of nuclear weapons under comprehensive control. It underlined its intention to engage in serious negotiations on strengthening strategic stability and international security for the benefit of all States. It stated that only in that way and under those conditions would any results in arms control and disarmament occur.

After abstaining on the draft resolution, the following explained their positions:

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<sup>c</sup> This statement was also delivered with respect to resolutions 70/45 and 70/51.

<sup>d</sup> This statement was also delivered with respect to resolution 70/57, on which it abstained.

- **Japan** supported the establishment of an open-ended, inclusive working group so as to attain collaboration between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States would be attained. It stated that, regrettably, that objective had not yet been achieved. It expected that the discussions at the open-ended working group would address various approaches for nuclear disarmament and would contribute to steady progress through constructive dialogue.
- **India** believed that the open-ended working group established outside the Conference on Disarmament had an unclear mandate and that it might not lead to an inclusive process or productive outcomes for nuclear disarmament. It believed that, given the divisive nature of the current discourse, genuine dialogue involving all Member States was urgently needed.
- **Germany** believed that an open-ended working group should be inclusive with regard to participation. It argued that participation of nuclear-weapon States was indispensable to paving the way for substantial and tangible progress.
- **Australia** stated that it had been a strong supporter for an open-ended working group that was inclusive but would allow a robust debate on how to advance nuclear disarmament. It proposed an open-ended working group, as set out in the draft outcome document at the NPT Review Conference. It stressed that an important criterion was ensuring that the mandate and the rules of procedure would encourage participation from nuclear-weapon States. It welcomed the opportunity to work with willing partners to shape an inclusive and robust process, which should cover practical and effective measures that would truly advance the nuclear disarmament agenda.
- **Cyprus** believed that the draft resolution lacked reference to the need for enlargement of the Conference on Disarmament. It emphasized that its abstention was in no way related to the establishment of an open-ended working group in Geneva, which was an element it fully supported.

### **70/34. Follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament**

The General Assembly stressed the need to establish a preparatory committee for the United Nations high-level international conference on nuclear disarmament to review the progress made in that regard, to be convened no later than 2018, and requested the President of the General Assembly to organize, on 26 September every year, a one-day high-level plenary meeting of the Assembly to commemorate and promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons. The Assembly decided that the high-level plenary meeting should be held with the participation of Member and observer States, represented at the highest possible level, as well as with the participation of the President of the General Assembly and the Secretary-General. It requested the Secretary-General to undertake all arrangements necessary to commemorate and promote the International Day,

**Submitted by:** Indonesia, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (2 Nov.)

**GA vote:** 140-26-17 (7 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** 133-26-17 (2 Nov.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 50-54.

including through the United Nations Offices at Geneva and Vienna, as well as the United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament.

**First Committee.** In a general statement, **Cuba** said that the draft resolution promoted specific action to be taken to achieve nuclear disarmament, including the urgent commencement of negotiations aimed at the adoption of a convention banning nuclear weapons and calling for their destruction. It welcomed the designation of 26 September as the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons and reiterated the appeal for convening, at the latest in 2018, of a high-level international conference on nuclear disarmament.

After voting in favour, the following explained their votes:

- **New Zealand**, speaking also on behalf of Austria, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Malta, San Marino and Sweden, asserted that a world free of nuclear weapons should include explicit, unequivocal undertakings by the nuclear-weapon States, and believed that efforts towards that goal should include legally effective measures to reinforce those obligations. It stressed that any nuclear disarmament initiative should give prominence to the humanitarian consequences of detonation and it therefore welcomed the acknowledgement in the draft resolution of such consequences of any use of nuclear weapons, including by accident, miscalculation or design. It emphasized that although it supported the draft resolution, it believed that a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons was not the sole option for achieving a world free of nuclear weapons.
- **Switzerland** said that it preferred a collective and inclusive strategy and a unified United Nations membership to achieve nuclear disarmament. It favoured deeper actions among the authors of the draft resolution and other States during the drafting process in order to overcome outstanding differences. It wished to see explicit references to the NPT Review Conference's outcome documents and other developments linked to the Treaty review cycle. It said that the urgent call for compliance with legal obligations and for fulfilment of nuclear disarmament commitments extended to non-proliferation obligations. It did not believe that a comprehensive convention was the only option for achieving a world without nuclear weapons and shared the view that additional legal instruments were needed. It stated that the 2018 conference would provide an opportunity to take stock of and give new impetus to efforts towards achieving a world without nuclear weapons.

Having voted against the draft resolution, the following delivered statements:

- The **Netherlands**, speaking also on behalf of Australia, Belgium, Canada, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland and Slovakia, expressed support for the long-term goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. They believed, however, that the draft resolution included only limited references to the NPT, which they regarded as the central instrument for the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free world. They welcomed the reference to article VI of the NPT but would have preferred a broader reference to the Treaty. They were concerned that the aim of the proposed 2018 meeting was unclear and believed that a preparatory committee for that meeting was unnecessary. They

were of the view that the draft resolution addressed only one core issue and supported a Conference on Disarmament programme of work advancing the four core issues. It was convinced that negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention without the participation of the nuclear-weapon States would not contribute to the goal of disarmament.

- The **United Kingdom**, also speaking on behalf of France and the United States, said that the draft resolution did not reflect their views. They believed that nuclear proliferation and the non-compliance with the respective obligations of a few States constituted the most serious threat to international peace and security. They viewed the only reference to the NPT in the draft resolution as insufficient, incidental and unbalanced. They were puzzled that there was no reference to the 2010 Action Plan and reiterated that the NPT was the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime and the basis for nuclear disarmament efforts. They believed that planning the 2018 conference was not consistent with the NPT. They favoured an early commencement of negotiations for an FMCT at the Conference on Disarmament and the prompt entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). It recalled that, in the NPT Action Plan, all NPT States concurred that the next priority step was an FMCT.

After abstaining in the vote, **Bulgaria** spoke on behalf of Cyprus, Finland, Greece, Moldova, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia and itself, stating that their concerns about the draft resolution remained the same. They believed in a world free of nuclear weapons and considered disarmament and non-proliferation as mutually reinforcing goals that should be pursued through successive steps involving all nuclear-weapon States. Bulgaria explained that they viewed the 2018 conference as a parallel effort that could distract focus from the NPT. They agreed that the Conference on Disarmament should start substantive work as soon as possible. They favoured a comprehensive and balanced programme that included the four core issues of the Conference on Disarmament and opposed having a nuclear weapons convention as the first priority in the Conference. Bulgaria stressed the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons and expressed that banning nuclear weapons would not guarantee their elimination.

### 70/37. Reducing nuclear danger

The General Assembly called for a review of nuclear doctrines and for immediate and urgent steps to reduce the risks of unintentional and accidental use of nuclear weapons. The Assembly requested the Secretary-General to intensify efforts and support initiatives that would contribute towards the full implementation of the recommendations of the Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters that would significantly reduce the risk of nuclear war, and to continue encouraging Member States to consider the convening of an international conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers.

**First Committee.** Before voting in favour, **Brazil** said that it agreed that the risks of unintentional and accidental use of nuclear weapons must be reduced. It added that measures such as reviewing nuclear doctrines, de-alerting, and de-targeting

**Introduced by:** India (20 Oct.)

**GA vote:** 127-48-10 (7 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** 119-48-11 (2 Nov.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 62-65.

nuclear weapons, while relevant, could not be a substitute for multilateral agreements conducive to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

After voting against the draft, **New Zealand** stated that it failed to understand why paragraph 2 singled out only the five nuclear-weapon States in its call for a reduction in the risks of unintentional and accidental use of nuclear weapons. It believed that this was the responsibility of all States that possessed nuclear weapons and that omission created a credibility gap.

### **70/38. Follow-up to nuclear disarmament obligations agreed to at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

The General Assembly expressed concern that the ninth NPT Review Conference was not able to reach agreement on a substantive final document. The Assembly recalled that the 2010 NPT Review Conference reaffirmed the continued validity of the practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. The Assembly also noted that the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences had agreed that legally binding security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty strengthened the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

**Introduced by:** Iran (Islamic Republic of) (22 Oct.)

**GA vote:** 121-48-12; 124-3-49, p.p. 6 (7 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** 113-46-15; 115-5-49, p.p. 6 (2 Nov.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 66-70.

*First Committee.* After abstaining on the draft resolution as a whole, the following delivered statements:

- **Pakistan** said that, as a non-party to the NPT, it neither subscribed to nor was bound by the conclusions and decisions of that Treaty, including those relating to its universality.
- **India** stated that its position with regard to the NPT was well known and that there was no question of India joining the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State.

### **70/39. Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices**

The General Assembly urged the Conference on Disarmament to agree on and implement a balanced and comprehensive programme of work that included the immediate commencement of negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices on the basis of document CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein. It welcomed the adoption by consensus of the report of the Group of Governmental Experts (A/70/81) and called upon the Secretary-General to seek the views of Member States on the report of the Group of Governmental Experts and to submit a report on the subject to the General Assembly at its seventy-first session. Furthermore, it urged Member States to give due

**Introduced by:** Canada (20 Oct.)

**GA vote:** 179-1-5 (7 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** 175-1-5 (5 Nov.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 71-73.

consideration to the Group's report, called upon the Conference on Disarmament to fully examine the report and consider further action as appropriate, and encouraged members of the Conference to include in their delegations technical experts to facilitate deliberations. The Assembly called upon future negotiators of a treaty to take into account the work of the Group as appropriate in their deliberations.

Before voting in favour, **Indonesia** stated that it had urged and would continue to urge the Conference to agree on and implement a balanced and comprehensive programme of work, paying particular attention to the urgent commencement of negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear weapons convention, which would prohibit the possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer and use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and would regulate the destruction of such weapons.

Before it voted against the draft, **Pakistan** argued that fundamental differences continued to exist on vital issues of the proposed treaty, such as definitions, scope, stocks, verifications and entry into force. It believed that to make progress in the Conference on Disarmament it was essential to take into account and address the security concerns of all States. It stated that no treaty had ever been agreed, nor would be, by the negotiating States unless their legitimate security concerns were accommodated. It added that it was obliged to take a clear position on an FMCT and maintained that no country could be expected to compromise its fundamental security interests for an instrument free of cost for all other concerned countries.

After abstaining in the vote, the two States below explained their positions:

- **Israel** stated that it had long supported the notion that an FMCT was subsumed in the concept of a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, the essential prerequisites for which were far from being fulfilled.
- The **Islamic Republic of Iran** questioned the factuality of paragraph 2 on the grounds that the Group of Governmental Experts was mandated to prepare, not adopt, its report. It pointed out that there were many differences of opinions among the governmental experts and that their report contained only a few consensual recommendations. It disagreed with paragraph 4, arguing that whether the Conference on Disarmament would consider any report and how it would do so was exclusively the prerogative of the Conference.

### **70/40. United action with renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons**

The General Assembly urged all States, in particular the eight remaining States listed in annex 2 to the CTBT, to take individual initiatives to sign and ratify the Treaty without further delay and to maintain all existing moratoriums on nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending the entry into force of the Treaty. It also urged all States concerned to immediately commence negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive

**Submitted by:** Sponsors (2 Nov.)

**GA vote:** 166-3-16; 173-3-4, o.p. 5; 171-2-7, o.p. 15; 171-1-9, o.p. 19 (7 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** 156-3-17; 164-3-5, o.p. 5; 165-2-5, o.p. 15; 162-1-9, o.p. 19 (2 Nov.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 74-84.

devices and its early conclusion, and to declare and maintain moratoriums on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices pending the entry into force of the treaty. It strongly urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to refrain from conducting further nuclear tests, to renounce its policy of building its nuclear forces, to abandon all its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes and to return to the NPT and International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. It also urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to cease all ongoing nuclear activities immediately, to fully comply with its obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions and to take concrete steps to honour its relevant commitments under the joint statement of the Six-Party Talks of 19 September 2005. While noting that it was the sovereign decision of any State to conclude an additional protocol, the Assembly strongly encouraged all States that had not done so to conclude and bring into force as soon as possible the Model Additional Protocol to the Agreement(s) between States and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards approved by the Board of Governors of the Agency on 15 May 1997.

**First Committee.** Before voting against the draft resolution as a whole, the following delivered statements:

- **China** stated that it had always held that certain moratoriums, such as on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, as referenced in paragraph 15, could be neither clearly defined nor effectively verified and had no practical significance.
- The **Democratic People's Republic of Korea** believed that its nuclear deterrent was a reliable guarantee for defending its interests and security and for safeguarding regional peace and security in the face of aggressive attempts by outside forces.

The following States spoke before abstaining in the vote as a whole:

- **Ecuador** expressed regret that the points it raised the previous year on the draft resolution were not taken into account, having suggested to include a reference to a legally binding universal instrument on negative security assurances. It noted that the few references to such guarantees included in the previous year's text had been deleted.
- **Egypt** stated that the operative paragraphs of the draft resolution demanding that all NPT States parties take effective measures for nuclear disarmament were unfair and legally unfounded. It maintained that nuclear disarmament should not be associated with any other security concerns. Furthermore, it believed that it was a priority for the remaining nuclear-weapon States to accede to the CTBT before urging the other States listed in annex 2 to join the CTBT. It argued that moving the Middle East paragraph from the operative to the preambular part could send the wrong signal about its importance.

After voting in favour of the draft as a whole, the following explained their positions:

- **Brazil** shared the goal of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and acknowledged improvements to the text, including references to the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons. It believed, however, that the text could have been more ambitious and should have included an

explicit mention of the fact that the nuclear-weapon States had not yet fully implemented their obligations under article VI of the NPT; a reference to the need that a treaty on fissile material should serve both disarmament and non-proliferation objectives by also dealing with existing stocks; and a reference to supporting the commencement of negotiations on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, not excluding an international legally binding agreement.

- **New Zealand** expressed disappointment at the low level of ambition in the text, which it considered to be weaker than in previous years, including because of the deleted references to the need for States that possessed nuclear weapons to remove them from high-alert status. It also regretted that there was no reference to the need for legally effective measures in the context of article VI.

Having voted against the draft as a whole, the **Russian Federation** said it could not agree with what was being done in the area of the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons. It believed that no additional discussions were needed on the matter. It explained that focusing on the humanitarian aspects just created the illusion of moving forward and instilled unfounded expectations. It maintained that any cut to nuclear arsenals should be carried out in a way that strengthened international security and strategic stability. It argued that there needed to be a clear interlinkage between nuclear and general and complete disarmament, as stipulated in article VI of the NPT, as well as among strategic, offensive and defensive weapons, as clearly stipulated in its agreement on the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with the United States.

After abstaining on the draft resolution as a whole, the following delivered statements:

- **Pakistan** expressed disappointment in the lack of engagement and consultation during the review of the draft text. It stated that, in accordance with its clear and consistent position, it rejected the unrealistic call for accession to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State. It disagreed with the proposal for the immediate commencement of negotiations on an FMCT. It reiterated that the call for the conclusion of comprehensive safeguards agreements applied only to the States that had, out of their free consent, assumed such legal obligations under the NPT.
- **France** supported the next steps for nuclear disarmament—the CTBT’s entry into force and the rapid launch of FMCT negotiations. It noted with concern the evolution of the draft resolution, arguing that there was no consensus on the approach that highlighted the consequences of nuclear-weapon use underpinning efforts towards nuclear disarmament. It underlined the importance of promoting the requisite conditions for the total elimination of nuclear weapons, emphasizing the need for concrete, gradual measures fully in line with the security context. It stated that discounting the realities of strategic developments and discrediting the nuclear deterrent without taking into account their strategic realities could only weaken support for the NPT. It emphasized that nuclear security and disarmament were clearly distinct topics and linking them would be an artificial exercise.

- **India** stated that it had stressed the need for a step-by-step process underwritten by a universal commitment and an agreed multilateral framework for achieving global and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament, but it believed that the draft resolution fell short of that objective.
- The **Islamic Republic of Iran** considered unacceptable the assertion in the eighth preambular paragraph that the fulfilment of nuclear disarmament obligations was conditional upon the enhancement of international peace and security. It stated that the draft resolution was completely silent with respect to the need for the urgent commencement of negotiations on nuclear disarmament in the Conference on Disarmament.

### **70/47. Humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons**

The General Assembly stressed that it was in the interest of the very survival of humanity that nuclear weapons never be used again, under any circumstances and emphasized that the only way to guarantee that nuclear weapons would never be used again was their total elimination. The Assembly stressed that the catastrophic effects of a nuclear-weapon detonation, whether by accident, miscalculation or design, could not be adequately addressed and expressed its firm belief that awareness of the catastrophic consequences of nuclear weapons must underpin all approaches and efforts towards nuclear disarmament. It also called upon all States, in their shared responsibility, to prevent the use of nuclear weapons, to prevent their vertical and horizontal proliferation and to achieve nuclear disarmament and urged States to exert all efforts to totally eliminate the threat of those weapons of mass destruction.

**Introduced by:** Austria (19 Oct.)

**GA vote:** 144-18-22 (7 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** 136-18-21 (2 Nov.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 111-114.

*First Committee.* In a general statement, the following took the floor:

- **Australia**, also speaking on behalf of Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Turkey, expressed their collective regret that the draft resolutions<sup>e</sup> did not reflect the realities and imperatives of the coexistence of humanitarian and security principles and instead contributed to increasing international divisions, including by seeking to marginalize and delegitimize certain policy perspectives and positions. In their view, the draft resolutions, both in their content and how they had been managed, did not bring the international community closer to disarmament goals.
- **Austria** believed that the evidence on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons and the risks associated with those weapons should be at the centre of all deliberations and the implementation of obligations and commitments with regard to nuclear disarmament. It hoped that the draft resolutions<sup>f</sup> would receive the broadest possible support among Member States.

<sup>e</sup> This statement was also delivered with respect to resolutions 70/48 and 70/50.

<sup>f</sup> This statement was also delivered with respect to resolution 70/48.

Before voting against the draft, the **United Kingdom** delivered a statement<sup>g</sup> on behalf of France, the United Kingdom and the United States, saying that devastating humanitarian consequences could result from the use of nuclear weapons, but that neither the consequences nor the concerns were new. They believed that a ban on nuclear weapons would risk undermining the NPT, which would create uncertainty comparable to the period before the entry into force and near universality of the NPT when many regions were faced with the prospect of nuclear proliferation and mistrust impeded access to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It maintained that a step-by-step approach was the only way to combine the imperatives of disarmament and of maintaining global stability.

After abstaining, **Pakistan**<sup>h</sup> said that it believed that the subject of nuclear weapons, while relevant and important, could not exclusively be reduced to the paradigm of the humanitarian dimension.

Having voted in favour of the draft, the following expressed their views:

- **India** stated that its participation in the meetings in Oslo, Nayarit and Vienna on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons was premised on the hope of gaining international support for increased restraints on the use of such weapons, which it believed would correct an imbalance in the international legal discourse that had focused almost exclusively on restraints on possession.
- **Japan**<sup>i</sup> asserted that, while it continued to pursue the total elimination of nuclear weapons in a way that was compatible with its security policy, which included extended deterrence, the recognition of the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons had always been the basis of its approach towards nuclear disarmament. It emphasized that recognition of the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons should serve as a catalyst or bridge-builder for unifying the international community, and not as a dividing factor. It held the view that the language in paragraph 4, “awareness of the catastrophic consequences of nuclear weapons must underpin all approaches and efforts towards nuclear disarmament”, advanced nuclear disarmament in a way that was consistent with its national and security policy.
- **Finland** believed that there was a need for a stronger sense of urgency to achieve progress on nuclear disarmament. It argued that the involvement of the nuclear-weapon States was necessary for further progress and concrete steps on nuclear disarmament, including further reductions. It supported the commencement of negotiations on an FMCT in the Conference on Disarmament without further delay.
- **Cuba**<sup>j</sup> stated that it welcomed the draft resolutions and supported all three initiatives, stressing that there was no justification for the existence of nuclear weapons nor for the billions spent on such weapons, especially in a world that needed those resources to promote peace, sustainable development and dignity for its inhabitants.

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<sup>g</sup> This statement was also delivered with respect to resolutions 70/48 and 70/50.

<sup>h</sup> Ibid.

<sup>i</sup> Ibid.

<sup>j</sup> Ibid.

After abstaining, the following took the floor:

- **Germany**, also speaking on behalf of Albania, Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Georgia, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Turkey, said that realistic progress could be achieved only if both security and humanitarian principles were given due consideration. They did not believe that that was achieved in the draft resolutions,<sup>k</sup> which did not consider the distinct security situations of various States. They supported a constructive, open, inclusive and genuine dialogue where all points of view would be given due respect and acknowledgement. They were disappointed with the slow pace of nuclear disarmament but maintained that focusing prematurely on legal measures or perceived legal gaps was not a substitute for steadfast efforts to proceed with a pragmatic approach to nuclear disarmament. In their view, considerations of humanitarian consequences should be a positive strand in finding a common way forward to achieve a world without nuclear weapons.
- **Norway** believed that the emerging common understanding of a facts-based humanitarian initiative had been undermined, and the initiative was associated by many with efforts to achieve a legal instrument banning nuclear weapons. It maintained that under the current political circumstances, those efforts would not advance the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. Norway stated that it could not support draft resolutions that it, as well as its North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies, saw as parts of a package that would result in further polarization of the international community and aimed at the process leading to a legal ban on nuclear weapons.
- The **Democratic People's Republic of Korea** stated that although it supported the primary purpose of the draft resolutions,<sup>l</sup> it abstained in the voting due to the unique security environment on the Korean peninsula.
- **China**<sup>m</sup> believed that the objective of nuclear disarmament could not be realized in a single step, nor could it be promoted in disregard of the global security environment.

### **70/48. Humanitarian pledge for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons**

The General Assembly stressed the importance of having fact-based discussions and presenting findings and compelling evidence on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons in all relevant forums and within the United Nations framework, as they should be at the centre of all deliberations and the implementation of obligations and commitments with regard to nuclear disarmament. It urged all NPT

**Introduced by:** Austria (19 Oct.)

**GA vote:** 139-29-17 (7 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** 128-29-18 (2 Nov.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 115-118.

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<sup>k</sup> Ibid.

<sup>l</sup> Ibid.

<sup>m</sup> Ibid.

States parties to renew their commitment to the urgent and full implementation of their existing obligations under article VI and called upon all States to identify and pursue effective measures to fill the legal gap for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons and to cooperate with all stakeholders to achieve that goal. Subsequently, it requested all States possessing nuclear weapons, pending the total elimination of their nuclear-weapon arsenals, to take concrete interim measures to reduce the risk of nuclear-weapon detonations, including by reducing the operational status of nuclear weapons and moving nuclear weapons away from deployment and into storage, diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in military doctrines and rapidly reducing all types of nuclear weapons.

**First Committee.** In a general statement, **Brazil** said that it intended to vote in favour of the draft resolution, expressing its support for the scope, specific provisions and ultimate objectives of the draft resolution. It said that it was not, however, in a position to co-sponsor the draft due to its concern over the term “human security” used in paragraph 2. It believed that the concept of human security was not sufficiently developed and lacked the precision needed to underpin an official international document.

After voting in favour, **Switzerland** delivered a statement on behalf of Sweden and Switzerland, saying that although they had not signed the humanitarian pledge in a national capacity, they voted in favour of the draft resolution and supported its overall intention. They shared the view that there was a need to identify legal measures to achieve and maintain a nuclear-weapon-free world. They did not believe that there was a legal gap in existing law or in treaties such as the NPT or the CTBT, but it was clear in disarmament law that, whereas biological and chemical weapons were banned, nuclear weapons were not. They believed that, in order to implement article VI of the NPT, legal instruments were needed to achieve and maintain a nuclear-weapon-free world, however, they did not see a nuclear ban treaty as the only available legal option.

Having abstained in the vote, the following explained their positions:

- **India** said that although it participated in the conferences in Oslo, Nayarit and Vienna, it did not view the humanitarian pledge as an agreed outcome of those meetings. It indicated that it had not joined the humanitarian pledge and expressed its belief that there were inherent dangers in proposals that further fragmented the disarmament agenda or splintered the established disarmament machinery. It was of the view that the pledge fell short of the requirements of a comprehensive nuclear weapons convention.
- **Finland** maintained that sufficient political agreement on nuclear disarmament was needed before the creation of the legal instruments referred to in the draft resolution.

## 70/50. Ethical imperatives for a nuclear-weapon-free world

The General Assembly called upon all States to acknowledge the catastrophic humanitarian consequences and risks posed by a nuclear-weapon detonation, whether by accident, miscalculation or design and acknowledged the ethical imperatives for nuclear disarmament and the urgency of achieving and maintaining a nuclear-weapon-free world, which was a “global public good of the highest order”, serving both national and collective security interests. The Assembly stressed that all States shared an ethical responsibility to act with urgency and determination, with the support of all relevant stakeholders, to take the effective measures, including legally binding measures, necessary to eliminate and prohibit all nuclear weapons, given their catastrophic humanitarian consequences and associated risks.

**Introduced by:** South Africa (20 Oct.)

**GA vote:** 132-36-16 (7 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** 124-35-15 (2 Nov.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 125-129.

**First Committee.** After voting in favour, the following delivered statements:

- **New Zealand** said that it agreed with the draft resolution’s overall intention, its strong focus on the humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons and its emphasis on the need for effective measures, including legally binding measures, to prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons.
- **Cuba** believed that no justification could be put forward for threatening human lives and the well-being of the planet that would support the continued use of nuclear weapons.

After abstaining, the following expressed their views:

- **India** recalled its support for the first resolution of the General Assembly in 1946 (resolution 1 (I)) and the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, stating that the draft resolution was a reminder of the long struggle for nuclear disarmament that had been waged in the Assembly and outside. It stressed that the illegality of nuclear weapons could not just be a matter of *opinio juris*; it was necessary for the international community to negotiate and conclude specific legal instruments for that purpose. India said that it had proposed a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and had supported a comprehensive nuclear weapons convention, adding that it remained prepared to take those proposals forward in the Conference on Disarmament.
- **Sweden**, speaking also on behalf of Switzerland, stated that it was unfortunate how international law and ethical principles were mixed in the draft resolution. They believed that it was important to protect international law as a system of legally binding rules and not merely as imperatives of morality, otherwise the system risked being undermined. In their view, while ethical and moral obligations played an important role, the strength of international law was that it was a rules-based system that obliged States to act in accordance with its rules and ensured that States were responsible for violations.

## 70/51. Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments

The General Assembly called upon Member States to give due prominence to the humanitarian imperatives and to the urgency of achieving that goal. The Assembly urged all States possessing nuclear weapons to decrease the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems in a verifiable and transparent manner and to ensure that all nuclear weapons were removed from high-alert status. It called upon the nuclear-weapon States to take steps towards constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons. It also called upon all NPT States parties to work towards the full implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference and expressed disappointment and deep concern at the lack of a substantive outcome of the 2015 NPT Review Conference, including on the process to establish a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. It expressed its profound disappointment at the failure to convene a conference in 2012 on the establishment in the Middle East of such a zone. Finally, it urged Member States to pursue multilateral negotiations without delay, in good faith, on effective measures for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world, and to that end urged Member States to explore options and support efforts to identify, elaborate and negotiate legally binding effective measures for nuclear disarmament.

**Introduced by:** South Africa (5 Nov.)

**GA vote:** 142-7-36; 172-6-3, o.p. 13 (7 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** 135-7-38; 163-5-7, o.p. 13 (5 Nov.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 130-139.

*First Committee.* Before voting against the draft resolution as a whole, the **Democratic People's Republic of Korea** expressed its concern that paragraph 14 of the draft resolution failed to achieve fairness and balance by singling out the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to fulfil its commitments under the Six-Party Talks agreement.

After voting against the draft as a whole, the following shared their views:

- **India** said that it could not accept the call to accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State.
- The **United Kingdom**, speaking also on behalf of France and the United States, said that they regretted that the draft resolution did not achieve an equitable balance among the three NPT pillars—disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful use of nuclear energy. Moreover, they believed that new elements and language in the current text continued to take Member States further away from their common understandings and to introduce new concepts that were never part of the 2010 NPT Action Plan. They also regretted that the notion of a step-by-step approach to disarmament had almost disappeared and were very concerned by the increasing focus on parallel processes.

The following abstained in the vote as a whole and then explained their positions:

- The **Republic of Korea** voiced its concern about some of the new elements added to the text, including paragraphs 6, 8 and 19. It reiterated its support for the rest of the draft resolution, including its full agreement with paragraph 14 on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear programmes.
- **Norway** expressed that verification of disarmament was important and that the Committee needed initiatives that could inspire States to undertake common efforts towards their shared goal. It believed that substantive and genuine progress was needed, such as further reductions to the arsenals of the United States and the Russian Federation, the entry into force of the CTBT and timely negotiations for an FMCT. However, it stressed that deliberations on legal instruments or a ban on nuclear weapons might lead to further polarization and the undermining of the NPT.
- **Pakistan** was dismayed by the ritualistic and unrealistic assertion in paragraph 13 that called upon Pakistan to unconditionally accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State. It could not accept references to NPT review conferences and their recommendations, reiterating that, as a non-party to the NPT, Pakistan neither subscribed to nor was bound by the conclusions and decisions of the Treaty.

## 70/52. Nuclear disarmament

The General Assembly encouraged States parties to the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone and the nuclear-weapon States to intensify ongoing efforts to resolve all outstanding issues, in accordance with the objectives and principles of the Treaty, pertaining to the signing and ratifying of the Protocol to the Treaty. It urged the nuclear-weapon States to commence plurilateral negotiations among themselves at an appropriate stage on further deep reductions of their nuclear weapons, in an irreversible, verifiable and transparent manner, as an effective measure of nuclear disarmament. The Assembly called for the conclusion of an international legal instrument on unconditional security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the threat or use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, and for the convening, no later than 2018, of a United Nations high-level international conference on nuclear disarmament to review the progress made in that regard.

**Introduced by:** Myanmar (21 Oct.)

**GA vote:** 127-43-15; 177-2-3, o.p. 16 (7 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** 119-42-16; 163-3-6, o.p. 16 (2 Nov.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 140-149.

*First Committee.* General statements were delivered by the following:

- **Cuba** believed in important practical actions aimed at achieving the prohibition and total elimination of nuclear weapons.
- **Myanmar** stressed its belief that the total elimination of nuclear weapons was the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

After voting in favour of the draft as a whole, the **Democratic People's Republic of Korea** said that it remained unchanged in its support for the principled position of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries on nuclear disarmament.

Having abstained in the vote, the following explained their positions:

- **Pakistan** could not agree to the call for the full implementation of action plans of previous NPT review conferences in line with its well-known position on the NPT. It stated that it was ironic that a draft resolution on nuclear disarmament continued to reflect only the non-proliferation-centric aspect of the FMCT negotiations.
- **India** did not support certain references in the draft resolution to the NPT, on which its position was well known. It complimented Myanmar, the main sponsor, for retaining vital principled positions.
- **Japan** said that, in order to steadily implement concrete measures for nuclear disarmament, it attached importance to united actions by the international community, including the nuclear-weapon States.

### **70/56. Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons**

The General Assembly underlined the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there existed an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. The Assembly called upon all States to immediately fulfil that obligation by commencing multilateral negotiations leading to an early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination.

**Introduced by:** Malaysia (30 Oct.)

**GA vote:** 137-24-25 (7 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** 129-24-24 (2 Nov.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 162-166.

*First Committee.* In a general statement, **Cuba** pointed out that nuclear disarmament could not continue to be endlessly postponed or burdened with conditions and the Committee should take concrete steps to achieve nuclear disarmament.

After voting in favour, the following took the floor:

- **Pakistan** said that its support could not be construed as endorsement of the outcomes of action plans of NPT Review Conferences.
- **Sweden** did not believe that the immediate commencement of negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention in the Conference on Disarmament was the only possible way forward.

Having abstained, **Japan** stated that it considered conditions not yet ripe to commence multilateral negotiations for a nuclear weapons convention. It gave assurance that it would continue to exert maximum efforts to achieve a world without nuclear weapons.

## 70/57. Universal Declaration on the Achievement of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World

The General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration on the Achievement of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World and invited States, agencies and organizations of the United Nations system and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to disseminate the Declaration and to promote its implementation. The Assembly requested the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its seventy-third session a report on the implementation of the Declaration.

**Introduced by:** Kazakhstan (5 Nov.)

**GA vote:** 133-23-28 (7 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** 131-22-28 (5 Nov.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 167-171.

**First Committee.** The following delivered general statements:

- **Kazakhstan** recalled that the idea of the universal declaration was conceived in 2010 at the first Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, DC and said that, despite each country's national position and actions in relation to the NPT, the declaration on a nuclear-weapon-free world embodied the greater basic principles that should lead the international community towards achieving that goal. For Kazakhstan, it was not a question of "either/or" but rather of diplomatically negotiating with all. While being a strong advocate of the path to zero nuclear weapons, it understood the position of the five permanent members of the Security Council and was engaged in constructive dialogue with them. It believed that the declaration was of the utmost importance and would bring all countries together over time. It considered the declaration "universal" because it enshrined the common oneness of all.
- **Uganda** stated that the total elimination of nuclear weapons was a shared responsibility and that the United Nations should play a vital role in achieving that objective.

Before voting in favour, the following explained their positions:

- **Palau** stated that the draft resolution and its declaration advanced practical steps towards nuclear disarmament to prevent the unjustifiable suffering and humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons to peoples and future generations. As States moved to implementation of the ambitious 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, Palau believed that States would need all the resources they could gather to truly transform the world.
- **Austria** regretted that it was not possible to adopt a strong and genuinely universal declaration on nuclear disarmament. However, it believed that the efforts of Kazakhstan had paid off in producing a draft resolution and declaration that contained many good elements and strong calls for action.
- **Cuba** considered the declaration an innovative and timely proposal that would contribute to efforts being undertaken by the vast majority of the international community to achieve the complete prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons in the shortest possible time frame. It stated that, although the declaration did not entirely reflect its position owing to various limitations and shortcomings, Cuba believed the overall balance was positive.

Before abstaining, **Australia** spoke on behalf of Bulgaria, Finland, Greece, Portugal, Romania and itself, stating that there were problematic references in the declaration that they could not agree to, notably paragraph 4 of the declaration and the conclusions it drew in relation to the application of international law.

After voting in favour, the following took the floor:

- **Sweden** emphasized the importance of nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals in accordance with their obligation in article VI of the NPT. It believed that such commitment meant that total elimination was unequivocal and unconditional and should be pursued as such.
- **India** stated that despite the reference in the draft resolution to the NPT, it was not restricted to the framework of the Treaty, being a universal declaration on nuclear disarmament. It hoped that the declaration would re-energize international efforts for that goal. With respect to paragraph 4 of the declaration, it recalled the 1996 opinion of the International Court of Justice, stating that the use of nuclear weapons should comply with international law, including international humanitarian law, and with treaty obligations. As no such explicit prohibition on use existed in the declaration, India proposed the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. It stated that the draft resolution was an important contribution to the international discourse on nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

After voting against the draft, the **United Kingdom** stated, also on behalf of France and the United States, that all States could help achieve nuclear disarmament by creating the necessary security environment through resolving regional tensions, tackling proliferation challenges, promoting collective security and making progress in all areas of disarmament. They believed that the declaration did not contribute to that goal, either by reinforcing the three pillars of the NPT, supporting the full implementation of the 2010 Action Plan or acknowledging the necessary security environment conducive to further practical steps towards nuclear disarmament. In their view, assertions in the text regarding nuclear-weapon use and international law were unfounded.

Having abstained on the draft resolution, the following spoke:

- **New Zealand** believed that the vote on the draft resolution made it clear that the international community could unite behind the document. It supported the repetition from the 2010 NPT Review Conference document regarding the catastrophic consequences of nuclear weapons and the need for compliance at all times, but it did not see how the declaration would advance the cause of a nuclear-weapon-free world and move all States beyond the status quo.
- **Pakistan** recognized that the declaration became more streamlined and concise, however, some key conceptual divergences could not be bridged. It said that it could not support proposals that emanated from treaties to which it was not party or that did not take into account the globally agreed principles of rights and obligations of States.

### 70/59. Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes

The General Assembly requested the Conference on Disarmament to intensify efforts towards an early conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons, one that takes into account radioactive wastes, and to include in its report to the General Assembly at its seventy-first session the progress recorded in the negotiations on the subject.

**Submitted by:** Sponsors (2 Nov.)

**GA vote:** w/o vote (7 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** w/o vote (2 Nov.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 177-179.

### 70/62. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons

The General Assembly reiterated its request to the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations in order to reach agreement on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, and requested the Conference to report to the General Assembly on the results of those negotiations.

**Introduced by:** India (20 Oct.)

**GA vote:** 130-48-8 (7 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** 121-49-8 (2 Nov.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 185-187.

*First Committee.* Before voting in favour, **Brazil** said that it shared the understanding that nuclear weapons constituted a threat to the survival of mankind and should never again be used. However, it stressed the need to go beyond the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, which it believed should be completely eliminated as they constituted a threat to international peace and security.

After voting in favour, the following delivered statements:

- **Pakistan** stated that the subject of nuclear weapons needed to be tackled through an urgent commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament for a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons. It explained that, given the existential threat to Pakistan, it exercised its legitimate right to defend itself through a credible nuclear-deterrent capability.
- **India** drew attention to the fact that some States at the forefront of the humanitarian discourse voted against the draft resolution, appealing to them to reconsider their position and narrow the credibility gap between precept and practice.

After voting against the draft, the following shared their views:

- **New Zealand** remained unconvinced by the assertion that a multilateral agreement focused simply on prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would be an effective or useful contribution to a nuclear-free world. It believed that a draft resolution directed at the issue of such a prohibition was seriously deficient if it failed to recall the need for States to comply at all times with international humanitarian law.
- **Switzerland** strongly believed that a draft resolution aiming at the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons should have an appropriate reference to the pertinence of the international non-proliferation regime. In its view, practical

steps to prevent the use of nuclear weapons should include renouncing the modernization of nuclear weapons and reducing their role in national doctrines. It was prepared to continue dialogue with the sponsors of the draft resolution to develop a text that could enjoy broader support.

### 70/70. The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East

The General Assembly stressed that the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference was an essential element of the outcome of the 1995 Conference and of the basis on which the Treaty had been indefinitely extended without a vote in 1995. It reiterated that the resolution would remain valid until its goals and objectives had been achieved. The Assembly called for immediate steps towards the full implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East.

**Submitted by:** Sponsors (2 Nov.)

**GA vote:** 157-5-20; 170-2-4, p.p. 5; 171-2-4, p.p. 6 (7 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** 151-5-19; 164-3-4, p.p. 5; 165-3-3, p.p. 6 (2 Nov.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 215-220.

**First Committee.** In a general statement on the nuclear cluster, the **European Union**, speaking also on behalf of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Montenegro, Serbia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, said that they deeply regretted that a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems had not been convened. They maintained that dialogue and building confidence among all stakeholders was the only sustainable way to agree on arrangements for a meaningful conference to be attended by all States of the Middle East on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at. It welcomed the historic agreement of 14 July between the E3+3 and the Islamic Republic of Iran. In that regard, it welcomed the decision taken by the Islamic Republic of Iran on 18 October to provisionally apply the IAEA additional protocol.

Before voting in favour of the draft resolution as a whole, the **Islamic Republic of Iran** explained that the draft resolution underlined the serious threat posed by the nuclear-weapons programme of Israel to the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT in the Middle East. It recalled that, through the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, 189 NPT States parties unanimously called upon Israel to accede to the NPT without any conditions and put all its nuclear activities under international safeguards.

Intending to vote against the draft resolution as a whole, the following explained their positions:

- **Israel** believed that the text's authors had neglected to address the Syrian Arab Republic as a continual proliferation threat in the region and had disregarded the threat that the Islamic Republic of Iran posed to peace and security in the Middle East and beyond. It added that the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Libya and the Syrian Arab Republic had violated their obligations under the NPT. It noted the absence of a reference to the direct regional consultations in 2013 and 2014 between Israel and its neighbours to convene a conference on regional security and a Middle East free from weapons of mass destruction, including delivery means. It argued that the draft was detached from the reality of what the peoples of the Middle East have been experiencing.

- The **United States** expressed its belief that unbalanced resolutions and singling out one State for criticism while ignoring substantial security concerns and compliance challenges would not advance the goal of a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. It remained committed to supporting efforts to convene a conference on the establishment of such a zone. It encouraged all the regional States to call for renewed regional dialogue so that real progress could be made.

After voting in favour of the draft as a whole, the following delivered statements:

- **Pakistan** was disappointed by the continued but unrealistic call for it to join the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State.
- While the **Democratic People's Republic of Korea** supported the main objective of the draft resolution, it dissociated itself from references to a general call for universal adherence to the NPT, as that did not conform to its position.
- **Switzerland** regretted that specific measures adopted by the 2010 NPT Review Conference regarding the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free from nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction were not implemented as planned.

After abstaining on the draft resolution as a whole, **India** said that it believed that the focus of the draft resolution should be limited to the region that it intended to address.

### **70/73. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty**

The General Assembly shared the grave concern of the Security Council about the nuclear test conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 12 February 2013, recalled Council resolutions 1718 (2006) of 14 October 2006 and 1874 (2009) of 12 June 2009, called for full compliance with the obligations under the relevant resolutions and reaffirmed its support for the Six-Party Talks. It also welcomed the ratification of the Treaty by Angola, since it considered that every ratification was a significant step towards the early entry into force of the Treaty.

**Introduced by:** Australia (20 Oct.)

**GA vote:** 181-1-3; 177-0-4, p.p. 6 (7 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** 174-1-3; 168-0-3, p.p. 6 (2 Nov.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 228-232.

**First Committee.** After voting in favour of the draft resolution as a whole, the following shared their views:

- **Pakistan** believed that the entry into force of the CTBT would be facilitated when the major erstwhile proponents of the CTBT decided to ratify it. It also believed that acceptance of the CTBT obligations on a regional basis in South Asia would help to expedite its entry into force.
- **Israel** said that it was not able to support references inserted into the sixth preambular paragraph to the NPT and its Review Conference, given that the draft resolution dealt with the CTBT. With regard to paragraph 1, it believed that the completion of the verification regime was a prerequisite for the entry into force of the Treaty and also constituted a major consideration for

ratification for Israel, along with the regional security situation in the Middle East, including adherence to and compliance with the Treaty by States in the region.

- **Brazil** was disappointed at the inability of the draft resolution to reflect the hard-won consensus on the topic of the modernization of nuclear weapons in the final declarations of the Article XIV Conferences held in 2013 and 2015, in which all countries were called on to refrain from the development and use of new nuclear-weapon technologies or any action that would undermine the object and purpose of the Treaty. It stated that a qualitative nuclear arms race and vertical proliferation undermined the core objectives of the Treaty and its role as a nuclear disarmament instrument. It believed that the reliance of States possessing nuclear weapons on subcritical tests to further modernize their nuclear arsenals must be addressed clearly and emphatically by all those who supported the Treaty.
- The **Islamic Republic of Iran** dissociated itself from the references in the draft resolution to Security Council resolutions.

After voting against the draft as a whole, the **Democratic People's Republic of Korea** stated that the Security Council remained silent with regard to the annual nuclear war exercises conducted by the United States in the Republic of Korea against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. It stated that it could not accept the call to accede to the CTBT due to the unique security environment on the Korean peninsula.

## Chapter II. Biological and chemical weapons

### 70/41. Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction

The General Assembly underscored the substantial unresolved issues, including the gaps, inconsistencies and discrepancies regarding the declaration of the Syrian Arab Republic to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) pursuant to the Chemical Weapons Convention identified by the OPCW Technical Secretariat in its report EC-80/P/S/1; stressed the importance of fully verifying that the declaration and related submissions of the Syrian Arab Republic were accurate and complete; noted that the OPCW Executive Council requested the Technical Secretariat and the Syrian Arab Republic to expedite their efforts to resolve those gaps, inconsistencies and discrepancies; and further requested the OPCW Director General to provide a report to the Executive Council at its eighty-first session that details all unresolved issues, in particular specifying those on which no further progress had been possible.

**Introduced by:** Poland (6 Nov.)

**GA vote:** 174-0-4; 152-3-17, p.p. 5; 150-3-20, o.p. 10 (7 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** 167-0-4; 141-4-17, p.p. 5; 136-4-20, o.p. 10 (6 Nov.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 85-92.

**First Committee.** In a general statement, **Poland** said that 2015 marked 100 years since chemical weapons had first been used on a large scale. It referred to the ongoing activities of the international community on cases of the use of chemical

weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. It expressed that achieving consensus on that particular issue proved once again to be extremely challenging. It said that many delegations called for the draft resolution to provide unequivocal support for all efforts to investigate and clarify any cases of the use of chemical weapons under any circumstances. This call was included in the draft resolution.

Before voting in favour of the draft resolution as a whole, the following countries explained their votes on preambular paragraph 5 and operative paragraph 10:

- **Cuba** believed that the draft resolution included politicized elements that did not reflect in a balanced way the work carried out under the Convention over the past year. It argued that the fifth preambular paragraph included an unnecessary reference to Security Council resolutions, which had no link to the core goal of the draft resolution at the First Committee. It supported a path of consensus based on texts that, in a factual and non-politicized manner, would reflect the work of States parties to the Convention.
- The **Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela** stated that, by including the fifth preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 10, the draft resolution had been politicized and had opened the door to disunity. It maintained that no country or small group of countries should have the power to sow disharmony and discord in an area in which consensus had always prevailed.
- **South Africa** expressed regret over the deletion of references in the original draft resolution to the significant progress made in the elimination of the Syrian Arab Republic's chemical weapons programme, which illustrated the vital importance of international cooperation. It believed that the draft resolution should have recognized that significant progress was made despite serious challenges resulting from the ongoing conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic and the allegations of the use of chemical weapons. It maintained that the draft resolution should have acknowledged the unprecedented short time within which the destruction of the chemical weapons of the Syrian Arab Republic was achieved. It expressed concern over efforts to politicize the work of the OPCW.
- **Nicaragua** said that it would abstain in the separate voting on the paragraphs concerning the destruction programme in the Syrian Arab Republic, which it believed would change the nature of the draft resolution. It argued that the paragraphs that acknowledged the progress that had been achieved in the destruction of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic should not have been omitted and that the efforts of the Syrian Arab Republic and its cooperation with the OPCW had not been taken into account. It stated that in order to adopt the draft resolution by consensus once again, it would be necessary to restore its character, with a focus on challenges and progress.
- **India** said that the sponsor of the draft resolution, Poland, as well as other sponsors of resolutions that were traditionally adopted by consensus, bore a special responsibility to ensure consensus continued. It stated that those delegations should be aware that if consensus was broken repeatedly, there would be a regrettable possibility of alternative resolutions coming up on the same subject.

- **Algeria**, which intended to abstain in the separate voting on two paragraphs of the draft resolution, explained that addressing technical details related to the work of the OPCW did not serve the purposes of the draft resolution or any party, nor did it advance the issue of destruction of the Syrian Arab Republic's chemical weapons. It believed that the discussion of technical issues must remain within the OPCW in order to avoid politicization of the issue.

Before abstaining on the draft resolution as a whole, the following States delivered statements:

- The **Russian Federation** believed that the previous year's resolution (69/67) unacceptably targeted individual countries, which had led to the draft resolution losing consensus support. It stated that it made efforts, with the help of Poland, to restore the traditional, balanced nature of the draft resolution and to adopt it by consensus. It expressed that it was puzzled when other partners chose a different route, which it argued would increase tension around the Syrian Arab Republic and would undermine the Convention.
- The **Syrian Arab Republic** demanded that the United Nations exert the necessary pressure on Arab, regional and international parties sponsoring terrorism in the Syrian Arab Republic to cease such support and stop supplying them with conventional and chemical weapons. It reiterated its demand to cease making unfounded accusations against the Syrian Government. It stated that, after the elimination of the chemical programme in the Syrian Arab Republic, only technical issues remained, which were being followed up by the Syrian Arab Republic with the OPCW in a constructive and cooperative manner. It believed that the draft resolution was no longer a technical one to be adopted by consensus but rather a resolution that targeted certain countries to serve political interests aimed at attacking the Syrian Government.
- The **Islamic Republic of Iran** argued that a collapse of consensus for the draft resolution, resulting from politically motivated attempts of the United States to highlight the issue of the implementation of obligations of a specific State party to the Convention in an unbalanced manner, could have been avoided if the sponsor had taken into account everyone's views in a transparent and unbiased manner. It stated that the main aim of the draft resolution was to reflect the global consensus and the need for the full implementation of the Convention and to uphold the international norm against the use of chemical weapons. The Islamic Republic of Iran welcomed the substantial progress achieved in the destruction process of the Syrian production facilities.

After voting in favour of the draft resolution as a whole, the following States took the floor:

- **Ecuador** said that it was obliged to abstain in the separate voting on the fifth preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 10, as they introduced an imbalance into the purposes and objectives of the draft resolution, the goal of which was to assess the implementation of the Convention and not to refer explicitly to specific situations of a technical nature to be addressed by the OPCW, pursuant to the Convention itself.

- **Egypt** stated that there was a lack of progress towards the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. It supported linking accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention to universalization in the region of the Middle East of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It noted that there remained only one State in the Middle East that was not a party to any of the three multilateral treaties on weapons of mass destruction.
- **Pakistan** considered it unfortunate that the long-standing consensus on this important resolution had broken down. It expressed concern over the lack of balance in the range of issues covered in the resolution, as well as the failure to bridge the gaps. It urged the sponsor to make every effort in the future to revive the spirit of consensus on the resolution by taking into account the need for balance and conciseness.
- The **United States** delivered a statement on behalf of Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Montenegro, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Qatar, the Republic of Croatia, the Republic of Korea, the Republic of Moldova, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the United States, which voted in favour of the fifth preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 10. The United States said that it was important that the draft resolution capture the realities and state of play regarding Syrian obligations under the Convention. It further stated it was important to address the efforts of the international community to identify those involved in the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic through the establishment of the OPCW–United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism. It explained that establishing the Joint Investigative Mechanism sent a clear message to those involved in chemical weapons attacks in the Syrian Arab Republic that the international community had tools to identify them. It continued to express strong support for the Joint Investigative Mechanism, the OPCW fact-finding mission and the OPCW Declaration Assessment Team. It said that the international community must act to exclude completely the possibility of the continued use of chemical weapons.
- **Belarus**, which abstained in the vote on the fifth preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 10, was of the view that a concrete situation in a specific country with concrete, positive results achieved in a very short period of time had been interpreted in a very ambiguous way. It said that States must clearly recognize the signal that would be sent to the General Assembly through the adoption of the draft resolution. It stressed that the most important thing was that there were fewer chemical weapons on the ground. It shared the view that politicization of issues of international security, disarmament and arms control, and the artificial exacerbation of tensions were counterproductive and unacceptable.
- **Turkey**, which voted in favour of the fifth preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 10, believed, however, that the facts on the ground in the Syrian Arab Republic were not sufficiently reflected in the text of the

draft resolution. It stated that the repeated use of chemical weapons and the systematic use of barrel bombs by the Syrian regime against its own people remained undiminished, in defiance of existing international norms and obligations, first and foremost the Chemical Weapons Convention and the relevant Security Council resolutions. It said that, as it had underscored from the outset, the complete destruction of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic should be kept as the main priority of the Convention's States parties and the OPCW.

- **Nigeria** abstained in the voting on operative paragraph 10 because it doubted the paragraph's relevance in the draft. It explained that the issues raised in operative paragraph 10, in which OPCW was already engaged, fell clearly and directly under OPCW responsibility. It believed that the request in the text requiring the OPCW Director General to provide a report detailing all unresolved issues was unnecessary because the OPCW already reported to its Executive Council and did not require the authority of the General Assembly or the First Committee to do so. It regretted that the draft resolution, which had been adopted without a vote in the past, had become politicized. It voted in favour of the draft resolution as a whole but said that it would reconsider its position if the politicization continued.
- **Israel** expressed concern over the erosion of the absolute norm against the use of chemical weapons. It endorsed the message contained in the decision of the OPCW Executive Council and the draft resolution that those individuals responsible for the use of chemical weapons should be held accountable. It welcomed the establishment of the OPCW–United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism and supported it as an important step in the attribution of responsibility. It hoped that this would deter future use.

After abstaining on the draft resolution as a whole, **China** said that it regretted that the draft resolution failed to place sufficient weight on the issue of chemical weapons left behind by certain countries in the Second World War. It welcomed the progress made in the destruction of the Syrian Arab Republic's chemical weapons. It argued that the draft resolution failed to fully acknowledge the headway made in resolving the issue of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic and inappropriately highlighted some remaining technical questions, which was neither balanced nor fair.

#### **70/74. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction**

The General Assembly noted with appreciation the outcome of the intersessional process agreed by the Seventh Review Conference and the contributions of States parties and relevant international organizations to, as well as presentations by the scientific and academic institutions and non-governmental organizations concerning, the discussion and promotion of common understandings and effective action on the standing agenda items entitled "Cooperation and assistance, with

**Introduced by:** Hungary (22 Oct.)

**GA vote:** w/o vote (7 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** w/o vote (3 Nov.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 233-236.

a particular focus on strengthening cooperation and assistance under Article X”, “Review of developments in the field of science and technology related to the Convention” and “Strengthening national implementation”.

### Chapter III. Conventional weapons

#### 70/21. Objective information on military matters, including transparency of military expenditures

The General Assembly welcomed the establishment of a group of governmental experts, on the basis of equitable geographical representation, to review the operation and further development of the Report on Military Expenditures, including the establishment of a process for periodic reviews in order to ensure the

continued relevance and operation of the Report, commencing in 2016. The Assembly requested the Secretary-General to promote international and regional or subregional symposiums and training seminars and to support the development of an online training course by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, with a view to explaining the purpose of the standardized reporting system for the Report on Military Expenditures, facilitating the electronic filing of reports and providing relevant technical instructions; to report on experiences gained during such symposiums and training seminars; and to provide, upon request, technical assistance to Member States lacking the capacity to report data and to encourage Member States to voluntarily provide bilateral assistance to other Member States.

*First Committee.* After the action on the draft resolution, **Cuba** expressed its support for the draft resolution but also stated that the establishment of another group of experts was unnecessary, favouring transparent discussions instead among Member States. In addition, it noted that any eventual recommendation that might be considered by the Group of Governmental Experts should not alter the voluntary nature of participation in the Instrument.

#### 70/29. Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons and collecting them

The General Assembly encouraged the international community to support the implementation of the Economic Community of West African States Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials, and encouraged States in the Sahelo-Saharan region to facilitate the effective functioning of national commissions to combat the illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons. In this regard, the Assembly also encouraged the collaboration of civil society organizations in the efforts of the national commissions.

**Introduced by:** Romania (26 Oct.)

**GA vote:** w/o vote (7 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** w/o vote (4 Nov.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 1-5.

**Introduced by:** Mali, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Economic Community of West African States (4 Nov.)

**GA vote:** w/o vote (7 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** w/o vote (4 Nov.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 31-34.

**First Committee.** After the action on the draft resolution, the **Islamic Republic of Iran** stated that the ATT undermined the fundamental principles of international law, particularly the principle of the prohibition of the crime of aggression.

### **70/35. Problems arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus**

The General Assembly noted that the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines are being used to support ammunition stockpile management efforts in nearly 90 countries by national authorities and through a network of more than 20 partners from international and regional organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector.

**Introduced by:** France (26 Oct.)

**GA vote:** w/o vote (7 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** w/o vote (4 Nov.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 55-58.

The General Assembly recalled the release of the updated version of the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines and the continued implementation of the SaferGuard knowledge resource management programme for the stockpile management of conventional ammunition, in accordance with the recommendations contained in the report of the Group of Governmental Experts. It also welcomed the continued application of the Guidelines in the field, including the implementation software and training materials, and encouraged, in this regard, the safe and secure management of ammunition stockpiles in the planning and conduct of peacekeeping operations, including through the training of personnel of national authorities and peacekeepers, utilizing the Guidelines.

**First Committee.** After the action on the draft resolution, **Pakistan** said that it believed that the Treaty on the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe represented a good model of a comprehensive approach to conventional arms control. It emphasized that the largest stockpiles of conventional armaments and their ammunition were maintained by major military powers and that they should therefore take the lead in assessing surplus stockpiles and their safe disposal.

### **70/46. Countering the threat posed by improvised explosive devices**

The General Assembly strongly urged States to develop and implement all necessary national measures to promote the exercise of vigilance by their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction and firms incorporated in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction that were involved in the production, sale, supply, purchase, transfer and storage of precursor components and materials that could be used to make improvised explosive devices. It also urged Member States to fully comply with all relevant United Nations resolutions, including those related to the prevention of the use and access by terrorist groups of materials that could be used to make improvised explosive devices. The Assembly stressed the need for States to take appropriate measures to strengthen their own national ammunition stockpile management in order to prevent the diversion

**Introduced by:** Afghanistan (6 Nov.)

**GA vote:** w/o vote (7 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** w/o vote (6 Nov.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 106-110.

of materials for making improvised explosive devices to illicit markets, illegal armed groups, terrorists and other unauthorized recipients.

**First Committee.** After action on the draft resolution, the following States delivered statements:

- **Pakistan** said that the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) provided the most adequate forum for addressing the issue of improvised explosive devices. It explained that the strength of the CCW lay in its legal framework that minimized human suffering without sacrificing the justifiable security obligations of States. In addition, Pakistan favoured a graduated approach in terms of reporting, believing that Member States should have been able to offer their views first before a report was issued by the Secretariat.
- **Austria** emphasized that the problem of improvised explosive devices should not be isolated from the broader humanitarian challenge of the use of explosive weapons in populated areas. It pointed out that the toll of such weapons on civilians in populated areas was unacceptable and called on all parties to comply with international humanitarian law and to develop policy standards to curb the use of those weapons.
- **Cuba** underscored that the draft resolution was clearly limited to the use of improvised explosive devices by illegal armed groups, terrorists and other unauthorized holders of such devices. It pointed out, however, that it did not agree with the entire content of the draft resolution, citing paragraphs 6, 10 and 16.

### **70/49. The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects**

The General Assembly requested the Secretary-General, taking into account the recommendations and requests made by the Fifth Biennial Meeting of States, to submit a report dedicated to these issues and on the implementation of the present resolution for consideration at the Sixth Biennial Meeting of States, in 2016, and to the General Assembly at its seventy-first session.

**Introduced by:** South Africa (26 Oct.)

**GA vote:** w/o vote (7 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** w/o vote (6 Nov.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 119-124.

### **70/54. Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions**

The General Assembly urged all States outside the Convention on Cluster Munitions to join as soon as possible, whether by ratifying or acceding to it, and all States parties that are in a position to do so to promote adherence to the Convention through bilateral, subregional and multilateral contacts, outreach and other means,

**Submitted by:** Sponsors (4 Nov.)<sup>n</sup>

**GA vote:** 139-2-40 (7 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** 130-2-40 (4 Nov.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 154-157.

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<sup>n</sup> The initial draft resolution was introduced by Croatia. The revised draft resolution was submitted by the sponsors.

and stressed the importance of the full and effective implementation of and compliance with the Convention, including through the implementation of the Dubrovnik Action Plan. It expressed strong concern regarding recent allegations, reports or documented evidence of the use of cluster munitions in different parts of the world and urged all States parties to provide the Secretary-General with complete and timely information as required under article 7 of the Convention in order to promote transparency and compliance with the Convention.

**First Committee.** Before voting against the draft resolution, the **Russian Federation** stated that the Convention on Cluster Munitions had been drafted without the participation of the main producers of cluster munitions and added that the Convention did not substantively address the real problems regarding cluster munitions.

Before abstaining on the draft resolution, **Viet Nam** said that it had not yet joined the Convention on Cluster Munitions but that it had been implementing relevant obligations regarding the destruction and clearance of remnants, cluster munitions and victim assistance. It mentioned plans to carry out 52 projects on clearance of post-war bombs and mines in the 12 most affected provinces from 2016 until 2020.

After voting in favour, the following States delivered statements:

- **Austria** emphasized that States parties to the Convention, in the political declaration adopted at the recent First Review Conference, had strongly condemned any use of cluster munitions by any actor—a reflection of the Convention’s spirit that was indispensable for its effective implementation. It would have liked to have seen that reflected in the text of the draft resolution.
- **Mexico** stated that it deeply regretted that the draft failed to condemn the use of cluster munitions by any actor in any circumstances and in any place, despite the recent announcements that cluster munitions had been used in recent armed conflicts in various places throughout the world.
- **Singapore** said that, like many other countries, it believed that legitimate security concerns and the right to self-defence could not be disregarded. It added that a “blanket ban” on all cluster munitions and anti-personnel landmines could be counter-productive. It expressed its support for international efforts to resolve the humanitarian concerns over anti-personnel landmines and cluster munitions, saying that it would continue working with the international community to find durable and global solutions.
- The **Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela** pointed out that the Convention was adopted with significant exceptions, disregarding the latest developments and technologies used in cluster munitions. It pointed out that, since that time, there had been no change or update to the Convention, which suggested that a significant quantity of cluster munitions currently used in many armed conflicts were not regulated.
- **Cuba** stated that its support for the draft resolution did not imply a change in its well-known concerns with regard to the ambiguities and inconsistencies that characterized some provisions of the Convention. It explained that it was currently undertaking the necessary constitutional processes for accession to the Convention.

After abstaining on the draft resolution, the following States explained their position:

- **Argentina** stated that the Convention's prohibition of certain arms was discriminatory in nature and created a technological and military imbalance among States parties. In addition, it argued that the Convention had more than 100 ratifications but covered only 10 per cent of the arsenals of cluster munitions worldwide. It explained that it had participated in the Oslo process and as an observer in various meetings of States parties, but that it was not in a position to sign the Convention for the time being.
- The **United States** considered the draft resolution, particularly paragraphs that called for the Convention's full implementation, applicable only to States parties to the Convention. In its view, when used properly in accordance with international humanitarian law, cluster munitions with low unexploded ordnance rates provided an advantage against military targets and could produce less collateral damage than highly explosive weapons. It pointed out that the Martens Clause did not particularly prohibit cluster munitions. It explained that it did not accept that the Convention represented a standard that reflected customary international law that would prohibit cluster munitions in armed conflict.
- **Poland**, speaking also on the behalf of Estonia, Finland, Greece and Romania, stated that the most competent and effective framework for addressing the issue of cluster munitions was the CCW, as it included both main producers, possessors and users, as well as non-users.
- The **Republic of Korea** stated that, although it shared the humanitarian concern related to the use of cluster munitions, it was not in a position to join the Convention because of the security situation in the Korean peninsula. However, it explained that that did not mean it was less concerned about the problems associated with anti-personnel mines and that it was still committed to mitigating the suffering caused by their use. In that respect, the Republic of Korea was exercising tight regulations over anti-personnel landmines and had been enforcing an indefinite extension of the moratorium on their export since 1997.
- **Cyprus** said that it signed the Convention in 2009 and that relevant legislation for its ratification had been forwarded to Parliament in 2011. However, the ratification process was still ongoing because of circumstances related to the security situation on the island. It remained hopeful that those issues would be resolved so that it could ratify the Convention and vote in favour of the draft resolution in the future.
- **Latvia** expressed its belief that the humanitarian point of view must be balanced with security concerns and strategic defence considerations. Nevertheless, it maintained its commitment to act in accordance with the provisions of the Convention. It also stated that it neither produced nor possessed cluster munitions nor did it store or use them. It also pointed out that although it was not a State party to the Convention, its position could be revisited in a midterm perspective.

- The **Islamic Republic of Iran** stated that, by bypassing the United Nations disarmament machinery, States had been excluded from the process leading to the conclusion of the Convention. It argued that, in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, all States had a vital interest in and a right to participate on an equal basis in multilateral disarmament negotiations that had a direct bearing on their national security. It said that it had joined the consensus on the adoption of resolutions 63/71 and 64/36 on the Convention on the basis of their procedural nature. However, it pointed out that it had abstained in the current year because the draft resolution was of a substantive nature and called for the implementation of an instrument that it had not participated in nor was a signatory to.
- **Brazil** said that it had not participated in the Oslo process and that it considered the Cluster Munitions Convention to contain serious loopholes, such as allowing the use of cluster munitions equipped with technologically sophisticated mechanisms for an indefinite period of time. It concluded by stating that the effectiveness of the Convention was undermined by the interoperability clause (article 21).

### **70/55. Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction**

The General Assembly invited all States that had not signed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction to accede without delay. It urged the remaining State that had signed but had not yet ratified the Convention to ratify it without delay. It stressed the importance of the full and effective implementation of and compliance with the Convention. The Assembly also requested the Secretary-General to undertake the preparations necessary to convene the Fifteenth Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention.

**Introduced by:** Belgium (27 Oct.)

**GA vote:** 168-0-17 (7 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** 159-0-19 (4 Nov.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 158-161.

**First Committee.** Before voting in favour, **Morocco** reiterated its support for the important humanitarian objectives of the Convention, in particular the protection of civilians from harm caused by anti-personnel mines. It said that, since 2006, it had submitted a voluntary report pursuant to article 7 of the Convention and in that spirit had been participating in meetings of States parties and in the Review Conferences of the Convention. It added that its accession to the Convention was a strategic goal linked to the security imperatives of its territorial integrity.

After voting in favour, **Libya** stated that the Convention did not address the damage inflicted on States by the remnants of war and explosives resulting from occupation or fighting in its territories between foreign countries. It also pointed out that the Convention did not create a mechanism to help affected countries suffering from mines used by colonial States.

After abstaining on the draft resolution, the following States explained their positions:

- **India** stated that the availability of militarily and cost-effective alternative technologies could considerably facilitate the goal of the complete elimination of anti-personnel landmines.
- **Egypt** pointed out the unbalanced nature of the Convention, which had been developed and concluded outside the framework of the United Nations. It viewed the Convention as lacking balance between the humanitarian concerns related to the production and use of anti-personnel landmines and their legitimate military use in border protection, especially in countries with long borders and which faced remarkable security challenges. It added that the Convention did not impose any legal responsibility on a State to remove anti-personnel landmines it had placed in the territory of others, making it impossible for any State, particularly Egypt, to meet the demining requirement on its own.
- The **Democratic People's Republic of Korea** said that it shared the humanitarian concern associated with the use of anti-personnel mines but, due to the unique security environment on the Korean peninsula, was not in a position to give up the use of mines, in keeping with its right to self-defence.
- **Cuba** stated that it was not possible to renounce the use of mines to maintain its sovereignty and territorial integrity, pursuant to the right to legitimate self-defence enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.
- **Pakistan** explained that landmines continued to play an important role in the defence needs of many States, particularly those in areas of conflict and disputes. It reiterated its commitment to pursuing the goal of a universal and non-discriminatory ban on anti-personnel mines in a way that took into consideration the legitimate defence needs of all States. Given its security obligations and need to guard its long borders, which were not protected by any natural obstacle, the use of landmines formed an important part of its defence strategy.

## **70/58. The Arms Trade Treaty**

The General Assembly welcomed the decisions taken at the First Conference of States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty, held in Cancun, Mexico, from 24 to 27 August 2015. It called upon all States that had not yet done so to ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty, according to their respective constitutional processes and called upon those States parties in a position to do

so to provide assistance to requesting States in order to promote the universalization of the Treaty. The Assembly stressed the vital importance of the full and effective implementation of and compliance with all provisions of the Treaty by States parties, and urged them to meet their obligations under the Treaty. It also urged all States to implement effective national measures to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit and unregulated trade in conventional arms in fulfilment of their respective international obligations and commitments.

**Introduced by:** Nigeria (27 Oct.)

**GA vote:** 157-0-26; 151-0-25, o.p. 3  
(7 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** 150-0-26 (4 Nov.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see  
Yearbook, Part I, pp. 172-176.

**First Committee.** Before abstaining on the draft resolution, the following delivered statements:

- **Cuba** argued that the adoption of the Treaty had been forced through a premature vote in the General Assembly, despite absence of States' full agreement; that the Treaty contained many ambiguities in the definition of legal provisions; that the Treaty was unbalanced and favoured weapon-exporting countries, establishing privileges that undermined other States' legitimate interests, including international security; that the Treaty parameters whereby exporting countries assessed the approval or denial of weapons transfers were subjective and could be manipulated; and that the Treaty legitimized the international arms transfer to organizations and individuals without the recipient State's consent, constituting a violation of the principles of non-interference in States' internal affairs, political independence and territorial integrity.
- The **Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela** expressed its belief that the Treaty lacked the necessary balance in nature and scope. It stated that the draft resolution did not address the problems of overproduction and stockpiling of conventional weapons by the major producers and exporters.
- **Armenia** emphasized that, in order to become an effective, inclusive and viable international instrument, the Treaty should have been adopted by consensus, bringing on board all major players. It stated that it had significant concerns regarding the preamble and principal sections and that the Treaty contained loopholes for political speculation that would hinder the sovereign right to self-defence and prevent countries from legitimate access to relevant technologies.
- The **Plurinational State of Bolivia** noted that there had been no consensus throughout the negotiations on the draft resolution and for that reason believed that the text contained many gaps and errors. Therefore, it stated that the draft resolution would jeopardize world security and peace.
- **Nicaragua** expressed concern that the Treaty did not address the prohibition of weapons transfers to non-state actors; the lack of clear reaffirmation of the sovereign right of States to acquire, manufacture, export, import or stockpile conventional weapons for legitimate defence needs; and the absence of a prohibition on weapons transfers to States threatening to use force for regime change in other States. It also noted with grave concern a bias in favour of exporting countries over importing countries, which could affect national security, pointing out that there was no reference to the excessive production and growing stockpiles of conventional weapons by the principal exporters and producers.

After voting in favour, two States took the floor:

- **China** expressed support for the objectives and purposes of the Treaty, adding that it was carefully studying accession to the Treaty. However, it maintained that it still had reservations about the manner in which the Treaty was adopted by a vote in the General Assembly and noted that the current security situation in certain regions had highlighted gaps in the Treaty. It also stated that it

would like to strengthen cooperation with all parties and jointly construct a normative and reasonable arms trade order.

- **Pakistan** pointed out that the timely resolution of issues, such as the absence of definitions and the lack of accountability of exporters, could be vital in making the Treaty effective. It stated that the Treaty's success would be determined by its non-discriminatory implementation and the strict adherence by States parties to the Treaty principles.

After abstaining in the vote, the following explained their positions:

- **India** stated it had raised some concerns about the number of gaps that remained in the final text during the negotiations of the Treaty and pointed out that it remained to be seen if the entry into force of the Treaty would have a meaningful impact on the ground. India said that it would continue to review the Treaty from the perspective of the country's defence, security and foreign policy interests.
- **Ecuador** regretted that the Treaty contained various shortcomings, in particular the imbalance between the rights and obligations of exporter and importer countries; the lack of a mention of core principles of international humanitarian law; the absence of an express prohibition of transfer of weapons to unauthorized non-state actors; the lack of an express reference to the crime of aggression; and the possibility that articles related to criteria could be used as a mechanism for exerting undue political process. It explained that the authorities of its country had been studying the Treaty and its implications, with a view to deciding whether or not to accede to it.
- **Egypt** expressed its reservation over adopting an important international instrument through a vote, asserting that neglecting consensus established a negative precedent that undermined the basis on which most international agreements on disarmament had been developed. In its view, another missing element was the criteria by which an exporter would determine the application of the Treaty. In that regard, it believed that the international community was meant to rely chiefly on the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, which included only seven categories of weapons, excluding small arms and light weapons. It stressed that it would continue to call for addressing the elements of overproduction and the increasing stockpile of conventional weapons of major arms exporters and producers.
- The **Syrian Arab Republic** expressed regret that the Treaty served the interests of certain States at the expense of others, pointing out that the Treaty was not consensual and did not take into consideration the views of many Member States, including the Syrian Arab Republic. It argued that the Treaty did not reflect the proposal made by a number of States, including the Syrian Arab Republic, to include a reference to foreign occupation and the right to self-determination for people under occupation.
- The **Islamic Republic of Iran** stated that, in the Treaty, the political and commercial interests of particular arms-exporting States had prevailed over the fundamentals of international law and that the Treaty had failed to uphold the ban of the crime of aggression as the most fundamental principle of international law.

### **70/71. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects**

The General Assembly stressed the importance of transparent and inclusive preparation for the Fifth Review Conference of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention, to be held in 2016.

*First Committee.* After the action on the draft resolution, **Libya** expressed its belief that the CCW Protocols did not take into consideration the situation of States, including Libya, that were affected by remnants of war and mines. It stated that the Protocols did not address the question of mines that dated back to the Second World War or the responsibility of the States that had placed those mines to compensate the victims.

**Introduced by:** Poland (22 Oct.)

**GA vote:** w/o vote (7 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** w/o vote (4 Nov.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 221-223.

## **Chapter IV. Regional disarmament**

### **70/22. Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace**

The General Assembly requested the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee to continue his informal consultations with Committee members and to report through the Committee to the General Assembly at its seventy-second session.

**Introduced by:** Indonesia, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (29 Oct.)

**GA vote:** 128-3-45 (7 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** 116-3-46 (5 Nov.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 6-8.

### **70/23. African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty**

The General Assembly encouraged States parties to the Treaty to conclude additional protocols to their safeguards agreements on the basis of the model protocol approved by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency on 15 May 1997.

*First Committee.* After voting in favour, the following States explained their votes:

- **India** conveyed its assurance that it would respect the status of the African nuclear-weapon-free zone.
- The **Democratic People's Republic of Korea** asserted that it would respect the status of the nuclear-weapon-free zones in South-East Asia and Africa.

**Introduced by:** Nigeria, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Group of African States (22 Oct.)

**GA vote:** w/o vote (7 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** w/o vote (2 Nov.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 9-10.

## 70/24. Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East

The General Assembly called upon all countries of the region that had not yet done so, pending the establishment of the zone, to agree to place all their nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, and requested the Secretary-General to continue to pursue consultations with the States of the region and other concerned States and to seek their views on the measures outlined in chapters III and IV of the study annexed to the report of the Secretary-General of 10 October 1990 (A/45/435) or other relevant measures in order to move towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East.

**Submitted by:** Egypt (2 Nov.)

**GA vote:** w/o vote (7 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** w/o vote (2 Nov.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 11-14.

*First Committee.* After action on the draft resolution, two States took the floor:

- **Israel** stated that its position stemmed from and reflected its positive attitude towards a meaningful regional process aimed at the establishment of direct engagement and dialogue towards a more secure, peaceful Middle East free from conflicts, wars and all weapons of mass destruction. It believed that the text recognized the importance of a credible regional security process as an imperative in the attainment of a Middle East free of all weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Israel expressed concern that the Middle East lacked mechanisms that could foster dialogue and enhance greater understanding between regional players.
- The **Islamic Republic of Iran** regretted that no progress had been made so far in the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East.

## 70/42. Confidence-building measures in the regional and subregional context

The General Assembly called upon Member States to refrain from the use or threat of use of force in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. It also called upon Member States to pursue confidence- and security-building measures through sustained consultations and dialogue and urged States to strictly comply with all bilateral, regional and international agreements, including arms control and disarmament agreements to which they were party. The Assembly encouraged the promotion of bilateral and regional confidence-building measures.

**Introduced by:** Pakistan (29 Oct.)

**GA vote:** w/o vote (7 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** w/o vote (5 Nov.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 93-95.

### 70/43. Regional disarmament

The General Assembly called upon States to conclude, wherever possible, agreements for nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and confidence-building measures at the regional and subregional levels. It welcomed the initiatives towards disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and security undertaken at those levels, and supported and encouraged efforts aimed at promoting confidence-building measures, easing regional tensions and furthering disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation at the regional and subregional levels.

**Introduced by:** Pakistan (29 Oct.)

**GA vote:** w/o vote (7 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** w/o vote (5 Nov.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 96-97.

### 70/44. Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels

The General Assembly requested the Conference on Disarmament to consider the formulation of principles to serve as a framework for regional agreements on conventional arms control and looked forward to the subsequent report on the subject. It requested the Secretary-General, in the meantime, to seek the views of Member States on the subject and to submit a report to the General Assembly at its seventy-first session.

**Introduced by:** Pakistan (29 Oct.)

**GA vote:** 82-1-2; 143-1-35, o.p. 2 (7 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** 169-1-5; 133-1-36, o.p. 2 (5 Nov.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 98-101.

*First Committee.* After voting against the draft resolution, **India** stated that, in 1993, the United Nations Disarmament Commission adopted by consensus guidelines and recommendations for regional disarmament. In its view, there was no need, therefore, for the Conference on Disarmament to engage in formulating principles on the same subject at a time when it had several other priority issues on its agenda. India also believed that the security concerns of States extended beyond narrowly defined regions.

### 70/45. Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas

The General Assembly called upon all States concerned to continue to work together in order to facilitate adherence to the protocols to nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties by all relevant States that had not yet done so. In that regard, it welcomed the ratification by China, France, the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom of the Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia and the steps taken by the United States towards the ratification of the protocols to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia, to the Pelindaba Treaty and to the Treaty of Rarotonga, and encouraged progress with a view to concluding consultations between the nuclear-weapon States and the parties to the Bangkok Treaty on the Protocol to that Treaty.

**Introduced by:** New Zealand (21 Oct.)

**GA vote:** 178-4-1 (7 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** 174-4-1 (5 Nov.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 102-105.

**First Committee.** After voting against the draft resolution, the **United Kingdom** delivered a statement on behalf of France, the United Kingdom and the United States. It expressed their belief that it was contradictory to propose the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone composed largely of the high seas and to say that it would be fully consistent with international law relating to the freedom of the high seas and the right of passage through maritime space, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. It questioned whether the real goal of the draft resolution was the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone covering the high seas. It argued that that ambiguity had not been sufficiently clarified.

### **70/60. Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty)**

The General Assembly encouraged States parties to the Treaty and the nuclear-weapon States to intensify ongoing efforts to resolve all outstanding issues, in accordance with the objectives and principles of the Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, pertaining to the signing and ratifying of the Protocol to that Treaty at the earliest.

**Introduced by:** Sponsors (30 Oct.)

**GA vote:** w/o vote (7 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** w/o vote (5 Nov.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 180-182.

**First Committee.** After the action on the draft resolution, **India** conveyed its assurance that it would respect the status of the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone.

### **70/61. United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament**

The General Assembly appealed to Member States in each region that were able to do so, as well as to international governmental and non-governmental organizations and foundations, to make voluntary contributions to the United Nations regional centres in their respective regions to strengthen their activities and initiatives. It also requested the Secretary-General to provide all support necessary, within existing resources, to the regional centres in carrying out their programmes of activities.

**Introduced by:** Indonesia, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (29 Oct.)

**GA vote:** w/o vote (7 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** w/o vote (5 Nov.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 183-184.

**First Committee.** In a general statement, **Cuba** said that it supported the work of the United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament, which helped to inform and educate public opinion and garner support for the goals of disarmament, development and the promotion of peace. It added that the activities of the regional centres must continue to be developed with States of the regions in question and on the basis of the centres' mandates.

### 70/63. United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean

The General Assembly took note of the report of the Secretary-General (A/70/138), and expressed its appreciation for the important assistance provided by the Regional Centre to several countries in the region, including through capacity-building and technical assistance activities, as well as in the management and securing of national weapons stockpiles and in the identification and destruction of surplus, obsolete or seized weapons and ammunition, in particular the establishment of a regional training centre in Port of Spain to manage weapons stockpiles.

**Introduced by:** Peru, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Group of Latin American and Caribbean States (30 Oct.)

**GA vote:** w/o vote (7 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** w/o vote (5 Nov.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 188-191.

*First Committee.* In a general statement, **Cuba** emphasized that, while it welcomed and recognized the importance of voluntary financial contributions that some countries provided to facilitate the work of the regional centres, the interests of donors in specific terms could not affect the balanced implementation of the mandates that the Member States had assigned to the regional centres.

### 70/64. Regional confidence-building measures: activities of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa

The General Assembly encouraged Member States to provide assistance to those States members of the Standing Advisory Committee that had ratified the Arms Trade Treaty and encouraged those that had not yet done so to ratify the Treaty. The Assembly also encouraged the Economic Community of Central African States and the Economic Community of West African States to accelerate joint efforts to adopt a comprehensive strategy to more effectively and urgently combat the threat posed by Boko Haram. In this regard it welcomed plans to convene a summit, and urged the two subregional organizations to adopt a common strategy and develop active cooperation and coordination. Finally, the Assembly invited those States members of the Committee that had not already done so to contribute to the Trust Fund of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee.

**Submitted by:** Angola, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Economic Community of Central African States (5 Nov.)

**GA vote:** w/o vote (7 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** w/o vote (5 Nov.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 192-198.

*First Committee.* After action on the draft resolution as a whole, the following States explained their positions:

- Although **Cuba** supported the text as a whole, it wished to dissociate itself from the fifth preambular paragraph, which welcomed the Arms Trade Treaty.
- The **Islamic Republic of Iran** wished to disassociate itself from the fifth preambular paragraph for the same reason enumerated in its explanation of vote on the draft resolution entitled “The Arms Trade Treaty” (resolution 70/58).

- **Indonesia** wished to dissociate itself from the fifth preambular paragraph, as it was not in a position to support the Arms Trade Treaty at the time.

### **70/65. United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific**

The General Assembly took note of the current temporary relocation of the Regional Centre to Bangkok in the aftermath of the earthquake of 25 April 2015 in Nepal, and noted that the activities of the Centre had been carried out as planned. The Assembly requested the Secretary-General to make arrangements for the early resumption of the operations of the Regional Centre from Kathmandu.

**Introduced by:** Nepal (28 Oct.)

**GA vote:** w/o vote (7 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** w/o vote (5 Nov.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 199-201.

*First Committee.* After action on the draft resolution, the following States delivered statements:

- Speaking also on behalf of the United Kingdom, the **United States** stated that if the draft resolution resulted in any programme budget implications, it must be properly vetted by all appropriate parties. It expressed their heartfelt sympathies to the people of Nepal affected by the tragic earthquake on 25 April 2015.
- **South Africa** referred to implications arising from the movement of the Regional Centre from Kathmandu to Bangkok.

### **70/66. United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa**

The Assembly urged, in particular, States members of the African Union to make voluntary contributions to the Trust Fund for the Regional Centre in view of the celebration in 2016 of the thirtieth anniversary of the Centre's establishment and in conformity with the decision taken by the Executive Council of the African Union in Khartoum in January 2006.

**Introduced by:** Nigeria, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Group of African States (26 Oct.)

**GA vote:** w/o vote (7 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** w/o vote (5 Nov.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 202-205.

### **70/72. Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region**

The General Assembly reaffirmed that security in the Mediterranean was closely linked to that of Europe, as well as to international peace and security. It called upon all States of the Mediterranean region that had not yet done so to adhere to all the multilaterally negotiated legal instruments related to the field of disarmament and

**Introduced by:** Algeria (29 Oct.)

**GA vote:** w/o vote (7 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** w/o vote (5 Nov.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 224-227.

non-proliferation and encouraged them to strengthen confidence-building measures by promoting openness and transparency on all military matters, by participating, inter

alia, in the United Nations Report on Military Expenditures and by providing accurate data and information to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms.

## Chapter V. Emerging, cross-cutting and other issues

### 70/26. Prevention of an arms race in outer space

The General Assembly invited the Conference on Disarmament to establish a working group under its agenda item entitled “Prevention of an arms race in outer space” as early as possible during its 2016 session.

**First Committee.** The following delivered general statements:

- The **Russian Federation** reconfirmed its political commitment not to place weapons in outer space.
- **Cuba** stated that the adoption of international transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities was timely and necessary as a complement to any treaty on prevention and prohibition of the placement of weapons in outer space. It reiterated that any code of conduct or similar measure for confidence-building that could be proposed needed to be unequivocal with regard to the prohibition of the placement of arms in space.<sup>o</sup>
- **China** affirmed that it had consistently used outer space for peaceful purposes and had always been against an arms race in and the weaponization of outer space.<sup>p</sup>

After voting in favour of the draft resolution, **Japan** supported the development of an international code of conduct for outer space activities.<sup>q</sup>

### 70/27. No first placement of weapons in outer space

The General Assembly reiterated that the Conference on Disarmament had the primary role in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement or agreements on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects. It urged an early start of substantive work based on the updated draft treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space and of the threat or use of force against outer space objects submitted by China and the Russian Federation at the Conference on Disarmament. The Assembly stressed that, while such an agreement had not yet been concluded, other measures could contribute to ensuring that weapons were not placed in outer space.

**Submitted by:** Sri Lanka (3 Nov.)

**GA vote:** 179-0-2 (7 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** 173-0-3 (3 Nov.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 20-24.

**Introduced by:** Russian Federation (23 Oct.)

**GA vote:** 129-4-46 (7 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** 122-4-47 (3 Nov.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 25-27.

<sup>o</sup> This statement was also delivered with respect to resolutions 70/27 and 70/53.

<sup>p</sup> Ibid.

<sup>q</sup> This statement was also delivered with respect to resolution 70/53.

**First Committee.** The following countries delivered general statements:

- The **Russian Federation** reiterated that the draft resolution was a call for dialogue to all United Nations Member States to consider the possibility of globalizing the important initiative and political commitment not to place weapons in outer space. It said that the process of non-placement of weapons in outer space and also the development of treaties to prevent weapons being placed in outer space and their use or threat of use of force against space objects were also crucial, as were efforts to prevent an arms race in outer space.
- **Ukraine** said that it intended to vote against the draft resolution due to its lack of credibility.
- **Chile** emphasized that the fact that a State or group of States declared that they would not be the first to place weapons in outer space could not be interpreted in any circumstances as tacit acceptance of a right to place weapons in outer space in response to another State or group of States that were identified as having done so.

Before voting in favour, the following delivered statements:

- **Mexico** wished to make it clear that a declaration by a single country or group of countries that they would not be the first to place weapons in outer space should not be understood in any way as a tacit endorsement or acceptance of a supposed right to place weapons in outer space or to launch weapons into outer space from Earth should they not be the first to do so or in response to an attack.
- **Costa Rica** emphasized that the fact that one State or a group of States declared that they would not be the first to place weapons in outer space did not mean that there was no need for a clear and categorical prohibition of the placement of nuclear weapons in outer space.

Before voting against the draft resolution, the **United States** highlighted that, in applying the consensus criteria of the Group of Governmental Experts on transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities, it found that the initiative did not adequately define what constituted a “weapon in outer space”; it would not be possible to effectively confirm a State’s political commitment “not to be the first to place weapons in outer space”; and the no-first-placement initiative focused exclusively on space-based weapons and was silent about anti-satellite weapons. It stated that it continued to engage in sustained dialogue to identify, develop and implement tangible transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities that were consistent with the recommendations of the 2013 report of the Group of Governmental Experts.

Before abstaining, **Luxembourg**, on behalf of the 28 States members of the European Union, as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Iceland and Norway, expressed concern at the principle of “no first placement of weapons in outer space”, which it believed did not adequately respond to the objective of strengthening trust among States. It drew attention to the ambiguity of the idea as it might entice States to prepare to be second or third to place weapons in outer space. It also remained concerned about the continued development of all anti-satellite, including terrestrially based, weapons and capabilities, underlining the importance of addressing such

developments promptly. It believed that it was more useful to address the behaviour in and the use of outer space to further discussions and initiatives on how to prevent space from becoming an arena for conflict and to ensure the long-term sustainability of the space environment. It asserted that the updated draft resolution on prevention of an arms race in outer space, as submitted by China and the Russian Federation, did not represent a basis for substantive work on the subject in the Conference on Disarmament.

After voting in favour, the following explained their positions:

- **India** expressed support for the substantive consideration of the prevention of an arms race in outer space in the Conference on Disarmament along with other proposals introduced. It believed that, while not a substitute for legally binding instruments, transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities could play a useful and complementary role. It noted that discussions on a draft international code of conduct for outer space activities should be inclusive both in process and substance to ensure a product of universal acceptance and anchored in the United Nations. It saw the “no first placement of weapons in outer space” proposal as an interim step and not a substitute for concluding substantive, legal measures to ensure the prevention of an arms race in outer space, which should continue to be a priority for the international community.
- The **Islamic Republic of Iran** explained that, although the placement of other weapons in outer space was not expressly prohibited under international law, it believed such placement would contravene the established global principle of the use of outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes. It attached importance to paragraph 5 of the draft resolution, which called upon all States to uphold that principle and to commit to refraining from placing weapons in outer space pending the conclusion of an international agreement to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects.

After abstaining, the States below explained their positions:

- **Australia** asserted that the draft resolution did not adequately deal with the question of what constituted a weapon in outer space, including by distinguishing between a space object and a space weapon. It believed that a no-first-placement pledge would not be effectively verifiable and that the draft resolution’s focus on space-based weapons did not address the threat of terrestrially based weapons. In its view, the most serious threat to space-based systems were those that were terrestrially based, such as anti-satellite missiles and high-energy lasers, which the draft resolution did not address.
- **Japan** argued that supporting the draft resolution could have the effect of leading States that had never even thought about placing weapons in outer space to consider being the second or third to place them. Therefore, such a declaration could even facilitate an arms race in outer space by encouraging such States to start developing offensive counter-space capabilities so that they would not be left behind. It was seriously concerned about actual, not abstract, development and deployment of anti-satellite, including terrestrially based, weapons capabilities. It urged the international community to address the issue as a priority.

- **Switzerland** believed that, while it awaited the negotiation of a legally binding instrument, political and confidence-building measures had an important role to play. It was of the view that developing ground-based systems that could attack or harm space facilities, including tests of such systems, were also a serious source of concern that may be more urgent than the placement of weapons in outer space. It said that it remained available to evaluate the concepts presented in the draft resolution and how to best ensure broader support.

### **70/30. Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control**

The General Assembly called upon States to adopt unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures to contribute to ensuring the application of scientific and technological progress within the framework of international security, disarmament and other related spheres without detriment to the environment or to its effective contribution to attaining sustainable development. It invited all Member States to communicate to the Secretary-General the measures they had adopted and requested the Secretary-General to submit a report containing that information to the Assembly's seventy-first session.

**Introduced by:** Indonesia, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (30 Oct.)

**GA vote:** w/o vote (7 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** w/o vote (4 Nov.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 35-36.

**First Committee.** In a general statement, **Cuba** said that environmental norms needed to be taken fully into account in the negotiation of disarmament and arms control treaties and agreements, and that, as noted in the draft resolution, all States must observe such norms when implementing the treaties and conventions to which they were party.

After the action on the draft resolution, the following delivered statements:

- **France**, speaking also on behalf of the United Kingdom, emphasized that they operated under stringent domestic environmental impact regulations for many activities, including the implementation of arms control and disarmament agreements, and that they saw no direct connection between general environmental standards and multilateral arms control.
- The **United States** explained that it abstained on the action on the draft resolution and that it operated under stringent domestic environmental impact regulations for many activities, including the implementation of arms control and disarmament agreements. It did not see a direct connection, as stated in the draft resolution, between general environmental standards and multilateral arms control, and did not consider this a matter germane to the First Committee.

### 70/31. Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation

The General Assembly reaffirmed multilateralism as the core principle in disarmament and non-proliferation negotiations and called, once again, upon all Member States to renew and fulfil their individual and collective commitments to multilateral cooperation as an important means of pursuing and achieving their common disarmament and non-proliferation objectives. It requested the Secretary-General to seek the views of Member States on the issue and to submit a report thereon to the General Assembly at its seventy-first session.

**Introduced by:** Indonesia, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (27 Oct.)

**GA vote:** 129-4-50 (7 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** 122-4-51 (4 Nov.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 37-41.

*First Committee.* In a general statement, **Cuba** said that the draft resolution made a significant contribution to its quest for effective and sustainable multilateral solutions in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation. In its view, the text appropriately reaffirmed that multilateralism was the core principle for disarmament negotiations.

### 70/32. Relationship between disarmament and development

The General Assembly reiterated its invitation to Member States to provide the Secretary-General with information regarding measures and efforts to devote part of the resources made available by the implementation of disarmament and arms limitation agreements to economic and social development, with a view to reducing the ever-widening gap between developed and developing countries.

**Introduced by:** Indonesia, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (30 Oct.)

**GA vote:** w/o vote (7 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** w/o vote (4 Nov.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 42-44.

*First Committee.* In a general statement, **Cuba** reiterated that disarmament and development were two of the most important challenges facing humankind, stating that it was unacceptable that \$1.75 trillion was dedicated to military expenditure that could be invested in combating poverty and promoting sustainable development and peace. It called on all delegations to support the draft resolution.

After action on the draft resolution, France and the United States took the floor.

- Speaking also on the behalf of the United Kingdom, **France** clarified that the notion of a symbiotic relationship between disarmament and development appeared questionable to them because the conditions conducive to disarmament were not necessarily dependent only on development, as seen in the increasing military expenditure of some developing countries. It reiterated that there was no automatic link but rather a complex relationship between the two.
- The **United States** expressed its belief that disarmament and development were two distinct issues. It concluded by stating that it did not consider itself bound by the final document of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development adopted in 1987.

### 70/36. Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction

The General Assembly called upon all Member States to support international efforts to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and urged them to strengthen national measures in that regard. It appealed to them to consider early accession to and ratification of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, and requested the Secretary-General to compile a report on measures already taken by international organizations on issues relating to the linkage between the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It also requested the Secretary-General to seek the views of Member States on additional relevant measures for tackling the global threat posed by terrorists acquiring weapons of mass destruction and to report to the General Assembly at its seventy-first session.

**Introduced by:** India (20 Oct.)

**GA vote:** w/o vote (7 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** w/o vote (3 Nov.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 59-61.

*First Committee.* After action on the draft resolution, **Pakistan** expressed its belief that, although terrorists and non-state actors were more likely to acquire and use chemical or biological weapons than nuclear weapons, the international community must not lower its guard in preventing the development and use of dirty bombs. It stated that international cooperation, including the initiation of negotiations on a radiological weapons convention, should be given serious consideration. It also noted the threat posed by the dual nature of biotechnology.

### 70/53. Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities

The General Assembly encouraged Member States, with a view to promoting the practical implementation of transparency and confidence-building measures, to hold regular discussions in the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, the Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament on the prospects for their implementation. It called upon Member States and the relevant entities and organizations of the United Nations system to support the implementation of the full range of conclusions and recommendations contained in the report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-building Measures in Outer Space Activities. It requested the Secretary-General to submit at its seventy-second session a report on the coordination of transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities in the United Nations system, with an annex containing submissions from Member States giving their views on transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities.

**Introduced by:** Russian Federation (23 Oct.)

**GA vote:** w/o vote (7 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** w/o vote (6 Nov.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 150-153.

*First Committee.* After the action on the draft resolution, **India** said that transparency and confidence-building measures could play a useful and complementary role. It regretted that India had not been included in the Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities convened in 2013. In its view, a group of governmental experts with

more inclusive participation of all relevant space-faring nations would have ensured a more balanced and coherent report, thus making an effective and meaningful contribution to international efforts with respect to outer space activities.

### **70/237. Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security**

The General Assembly called upon Member States to be guided in their use of information and communications technologies by the 2015 report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security. The Assembly also requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a group of governmental experts to be established in 2016 on the basis of equitable geographical distribution, to continue to study, with a view to promoting common understandings, existing and potential threats in the sphere of information security and possible cooperative measures to address them and how international law applies to the use of information and communications technologies by States, as well as norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviour of States, confidence-building measures and capacity-building.

**Introduced by:** Russian Federation (30 Oct.)

**GA vote:** w/o vote (23 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** w/o vote (6 Nov.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 237-240.

*First Committee.* Sweden delivered a general statement on behalf of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia and Uruguay. It said that the Group of Governmental Experts had made a significant contribution towards developing common understandings with regard to norms of responsible behaviour by States, confidence-building measures and the application of international law to the use of ICTs by States. It welcomed the adoption by consensus of the report and encouraged States to build and advance that important work.

### **70/514. Role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament (decision)**

The General Assembly decided to include in the provisional agenda of its seventy-first session the item entitled "Role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament".

**Introduced by:** India (30 Oct.)

**GA vote:** w/o vote (7 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** w/o vote (4 Nov.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, p. 241.

## Chapter VI. Disarmament machinery

### 70/67. Report of the Conference on Disarmament

The General Assembly called upon the Conference on Disarmament to further intensify consultations and to explore possibilities for overcoming its ongoing deadlock of almost two decades by adopting and implementing a balanced and comprehensive programme of work at the earliest possible date during its 2016 session, bearing in mind the decision on the programme of work adopted by the Conference on 29 May 2009, as well as other relevant present, past and future proposals. Furthermore, the Assembly welcomed the efforts of the Co-Chair of the informal working group, which was re-established by the decision of the Conference on Disarmament with a mandate to produce a programme of work robust in substance and progressive over time in implementation, including her report adopted by the Conference, contained in document CD/2033.

**Introduced by:** New Zealand (28 Oct.)

**GA vote:** w/o vote (7 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** w/o vote (5 Nov.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 206-208.

**First Committee.** In a general statement, the **Islamic Republic of Iran** said that it strongly believed that any instrument that banned the production and provides for the total elimination of fissile material for nuclear weapons, or other nuclear explosive devices, should be comprehensive and non-discriminatory and must be of a nuclear disarmament nature, covering past, present and future production and providing for a verifiable declaration and the total elimination of all stocks of such materials at a fixed date.

### 70/68. Report of the Disarmament Commission

The General Assembly welcomed the fact that the Disarmament Commission adopted the provisional agenda for its substantive session of 2015, on the understanding that consultations would continue on ways and means to implement resolution 69/77, and that the Commission decided that the agenda for its substantive session of 2015 should serve for the period 2015-2017. It recommended that the Disarmament Commission continue consideration of the following items at its substantive session of 2016: recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; and practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional weapons. Finally, it noted that the Disarmament Commission encouraged the Chairs of its working groups to continue, during the intersessional period, informal consultations on the agenda item allocated to each of the groups.

**Introduced by:** Senegal, on behalf of the members of the Bureau of the Disarmament Commission (27 Oct.)

**GA vote:** w/o vote (7 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** w/o vote (5 Nov.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 209-211.

### **70/551. Open-ended Working Group on the Fourth Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament (decision)**

The General Assembly decided: (a) to hold at a later date an organizational session of the Open-ended Working Group on the Fourth Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament for the purpose of setting a date for its substantive sessions in 2016 and 2017 and that the Working Group should submit a report on its work, including possible substantive recommendations, before the end of the seventy-second session of the General Assembly; and (b) to include in the provisional agenda of its seventy-first session under the item entitled “General and complete disarmament” a sub-item entitled “Convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament”.

**Introduced by:** Indonesia, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (27 Oct.)

**GA vote:** 149-0-5 (23 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** 173-0-4 (5 Nov.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 242-243.

**First Committee.** In a general statement, **Cuba** expressed its belief that the convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (SSOD-IV) would have a positive impact and serve to revitalize and update the United Nations disarmament machinery and could no longer be put off.

After voting in favour of the draft resolution, **Germany**, speaking also on behalf of Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden, expressed the conviction that the United Nations disarmament machinery urgently needed political impulses towards revitalization and the resumption of its main task, negotiating multilateral instruments in the field of disarmament. It supported the draft resolution’s aim to start the implementation of resolution 65/66 by holding at a later stage an organizational session of the Open-ended Working Group on the Fourth Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament. It noted also, however, that the pursuit of an SSOD-IV was neither an alternative nor a reason for postponing efforts to overcome the stalemate of the Conference on Disarmament and implementing relevant disarmament and non-proliferation commitments.

Taking the floor on behalf of France, the United States and itself, the **United Kingdom** stated that, as they had done with regard to General Assembly resolution 65/66, the three delegations abstained on budgetary and substantive grounds, as the reasons for their previous abstention remained valid.

## Chapter VII. Information and outreach

### 70/69. Thirty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

The General Assembly appealed to all Member States to continue to make financial contributions to the Institute and strongly encouraged them to un earmark these contributions so as to contribute to its viability and the quality of its work over the long term, welcomed the establishment of a revolving capital fund (the Stability Fund) in January 2015, and encouraged Member States to contribute to this fund. The Assembly requested the Secretary-General to continue to give the Institute administrative and other support, and as an exceptional, one-off measure to preserve the future of the Institute and without setting a precedent, to submit, in the context of the programme budget for the biennium 2018-2019, a funding proposal taking into account additional resources in the light of the recommendations contained in the latest report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters. It further requested the Secretary-General to commission an assessment by an independent third party with a mandate to prepare a report on the future structural, financial, administrative and operational aspects of the Institute, outlining a sustainable and stable funding structure and operating model as required to achieve the mandate and objectives of the Institute beyond the biennium 2018-2019, and to report in this regard, taking into account the aforementioned assessment, to the General Assembly at its seventy-third session.

**Introduced by:** France (27 Oct.)

**GA vote:** w/o vote (7 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** w/o vote (6 Nov.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 212-214.

**First Committee.** In a general statement on behalf of Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden and Switzerland, **France** stated that the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) faced major challenges that year in the implementation of new accounting norms and tools, especially given its small structure, funding models and operating methods, which differed from other United Nations bodies. It therefore noted that the support of Member States and of the United Nations system for the efforts of UNIDIR to implement a modernized and rationalized management model was critical. It asserted that that would not be enough, however, as the international community needed to thoroughly rethink the management and financing model of UNIDIR in order to ensure its viability in the long run.

After action on the draft resolution, the following two States took the floor:

- The **United States**, also speaking on behalf of Japan and the United Kingdom, underscored the continued commitment of their delegations to support the independence of UNIDIR, its transition to Umoja and International Public Sector Accounting Standards and resolving its staffing and core funding concerns. In their view, however, in order to give UNIDIR the long-term support it required, it needed more than an infusion of funds. With regard to commissioning an independent assessment to help outline a sustainable funding structure and business model for UNIDIR's future, their delegations believed that the assessment results should guide the amount of the subvention

increase in the 2018-2019 budget discussion and that the assessment should be completed in advance of the budget cycle, so that the recommendations could help inform the request for a subvention increase.

- **Netherlands** expressed its belief that UNIDIR should concentrate on research that benefited Member States, was useful for discussion in the different disarmament forums and focused on new developments in the field of disarmament. Furthermore, it recognized that UNIDIR faced certain challenges, which, in its opinion, were not limited to the financial situation of the Institute. In view of the need for an efficient and results-oriented organization, it affirmed that UNIDIR would benefit from an assessment of its current business model and format, adding that, together with the Institute, the international community had to deal with the institutional, administrative, financial and structural challenges of the Institute in the coming years.

**Appendix III**  
**Acronyms**



## APPENDIX III

### Acronyms

AFCONE	African Commission on Nuclear Energy
AP	additional protocol
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ATT	Arms Trade Treaty
AU	African Union
BWC	Biological Weapons Convention; Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction
CASA	Coordinating Action on Small Arms
CBM	confidence-building measure
CBRN	chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear
CCM	Convention on Cluster Munitions
CCW	Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects; Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
CELAC	Community of Latin American and Caribbean States
COPUOS	Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
CPPNM	Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
CSA	comprehensive safeguards agreement
CSE	Cooperative Security Environment with focus on Arms Control Pillar
CTBT	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
CTBTO	Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization
CWC	Chemical Weapons Convention; Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction
DDR	disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
DNP	Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States

ERW	explosive remnants of war
EU	European Union
FFM	Fact-Finding Mission
FMCT	fissile material cut-off treaty
GEM	Group of Eminent Persons
GGE	Group of Governmental Experts
GIS	Group of Interested States in Practical Disarmament Measures
GLCM	ground-launched cruise missile
HCOC	The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IATG	International Ammunition Technical Guidelines
ICBM	intercontinental ballistic missile
ICOC	International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities
ICT	information and communications technology
IED	improvised explosive device
IHL	international humanitarian law
INF	Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
INTERPOL	International Criminal Police Organization
ISACS	International Small Arms Control Standards
ISU	Implementation Support Unit
ITDB	Incident and Trafficking Database
JCPOA	Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
JIM	Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons–United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism
LAS	League of Arab States
LAWS	lethal autonomous weapon system
LEU	low-enriched uranium
MERCOSUR	Southern Common Market
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MOTAPM	mines other than anti-personnel mines
MTCR	Missile Technology Control Regime
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDC	National Data Centre
New START	Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms

NGO	non-governmental organization
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NSG	Nuclear Suppliers Group
NSS	Nuclear Security Summit
NWFZ	nuclear-weapon-free zone
OIE	World Organisation for Animal Health
OPANAL	Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean
OPCW	Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PPWT	draft treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space and of the threat or use of force against outer space objects
RACVIAC	Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Centre–Centre for Security Cooperation
RAP	Readiness Action Plan
RECSA	Regional Centre on Small Arms in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SALW	small arms and light weapons
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SEANWFZ	Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone
SEESAC	South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons
SICA	Central American Integration System
SLBM	submarine-launched ballistic missile
SQP	small quantities protocol
TCBM	transparency and confidence-building measure
UAV	unmanned aerial vehicle
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNIDIR	United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
UNLIREC	United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
UNODA	United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs
UNRCPD	United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific
UNREC	United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa

UNROCA	United Nations Register of Conventional Arms
UNSCAR	United Nations Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation
UPEACE	University for Peace
WHO	World Health Organization
WILPF	Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

# United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs

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