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QUESTIONS CONSIDERED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL
AT ITS 838th MEETING ON 7 AUGUST 1958

Report of the Secretary-General

1. In its resolution of 21 August 1958 (A/RES/1237(ES-III)) the General Assembly, in part IV, 2, invites the Secretary-General to report on developments under the resolution as appropriate, the first such report to be submitted not later than 30 September 1958. In conformity with this invitation the Secretary-General has the honour to present to the General Assembly the following first report:

The Resolution

2. The resolution under which this report is presented notes in the preamble "the Charter aim that States should 'practise tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours'". It further notes "that the Arab States have agreed, in the Pact of the League of Arab States, to 'strengthen the close relations and numerous ties which link the Arab States, and to support and stabilize these ties upon a basis of respect for the independence and sovereignty of these States, and to direct their efforts toward the common good of all the Arab countries, the improvement of their status, the security of their future and the realization of their aspirations and hopes'".

3. The first operative part of the resolution should be evaluated in the light of the reference to the "good neighbour policy" established as an aim in the Charter, and likewise in the Pact of the Arab League. It elaborates the Charter aim in calling upon all the Member States of the United Nations "to act strictly in accordance with the principles of mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, of non-aggression, of strict non-interference in each other's internal affairs, and of equal and mutual benefit, and to ensure that

their conduct by word and deed conforms to these principles". In the context of this appeal to all Member States, the resolution "welcomes the renewed assurances given by the Arab States to observe the provision of Article 8 of the Pact of the League of Arab States that 'Each Member State shall respect the systems of government established in the other member States and regard them as exclusive concerns of these States', and that 'Each shall pledge to abstain from any action calculated to change established systems of government'".

4. Part I contains the political essence of the resolution. Accepted by a unanimous vote, the principles elaborated in this part may be regarded as a renewed joint pledge of all Member States to pursue a policy of non-interference and non-aggression in relation to each other and to all nations in the region. More specifically, being co-sponsored by the ten Arab States, the principles represent an agreement of the Arab States, in implementation of this pledge, to adhere to a good neighbour policy as set out in Article 8 of the Pact of the Arab League. The other provisions of the resolution flow from the joint undertakings.

5. The second operative part of the resolution "requests the Secretary-General to make forthwith, in consultation with the Governments concerned and in accordance with the Charter, and having in mind part I of this resolution, such practical arrangements as would adequately help in upholding the purposes and principles of the Charter in relation to Lebanon and Jordan in the present circumstances". It is added that "the practical arrangements" envisaged, in helping to uphold the purposes and principles of the Charter in relation to the two countries mentioned, are expected also to "facilitate the early withdrawal of the foreign troops" from those countries.

6. The resolution states that the practical arrangements shall be made "having in mind part I" of the resolution. This emphasizes that they are not to be regarded as a substitute for a policy aiming at good neighbourly relations in accordance with part I, but as being made in order to support the general implementation of such a policy in relation to Lebanon and Jordan, and "thereby" to facilitate the withdrawal as part of a parallel development along the lines of the resolution.

7. Two limits are set for the arrangements, namely that they should be made in consultation with the Governments concerned, and that they should be in accordance with the Charter. This is a reminder especially of the fact that any arrangement

within one of the countries concerned must be with the consent of its Government. It is likewise a reminder of the fact that no measures can be taken which go beyond the limits authorized by the Charter in the case of such a resolution as the one under which action would be taken; the most important consequences of this is that it excludes the setting up of a force with military tasks under Chapter 7 of the Charter.

8. A central aim of the General Assembly in passing the resolution was to facilitate the early withdrawal of the foreign troops in Lebanon and Jordan. It appears from paragraph 6 above how this aim is integrated in the policy for which the resolution provides, with the significance given in it to a strict adherence to a good neighbour policy. There is, therefore, no need here for a further clarification of this point.

9. It deserves to be emphasized that the resolution in its second operative part refers only to "practical" arrangements. It thus does not in this context envisage, for example, renewed formal assurances from any or all of the countries concerned; such assurances obviously would be redundant in view of the assurances already given in the resolution.

10. The third operative part of the resolution refers to possible assistance regarding an Arab development institution designed to further economic growth in the Arab countries. Such an institution, and the co-operation among the Arab States for which it would provide, would represent a positive expression of the policy to which the Arab States have pledged themselves in the first part of the resolution.

The Task of the Secretary-General

11. As recalled above, the General Assembly in its resolution requests the Secretary-General to make certain practical arrangements for the purposes of the resolution. The scope of this task is obvious in the light of the preceding interpretation of the resolution. It may, however, be useful to define the mandate with somewhat greater precision.

12. As the task of the Secretary-General is limited to practical arrangements it is, in the first place, clear that it does not cover a mediation or good offices intended to further the implementation among the Arab States of their agreed

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policy. Were such mediation or good offices needed, it would be more natural to have it undertaken by the joint organ which the Arab States have created in the Arab League, especially as their pledge in the resolution directly refers to the Pact of the Arab League. Alternatively, were such assistance to be considered necessary, it could, on the basis of a direct request from the Arab States, be rendered either by the Secretary-General or by a Government or a group of Governments.

13. It may be noted, further, that the resolution does not give the Secretary-General a mandate to negotiate with the Arab States regarding additional or more specific assurances with regard to their policies. This, obviously, does not exclude any action which may properly be his under the Charter, or that, in consultations with the Governments concerned, he would seek all the clarification, regarding their intentions with respect to the implementation of the good neighbour policy, which he would consider necessary as a background for decisions on practical arrangements. A clear distinction should, however, be made between such clarifications and any further assurances regarding intentions formally given by one Government to another.

14. While the resolution does not - as was the case in the Suez question - establish negotiations regarding withdrawals as a task of the Secretary-General, he is, under the resolution, to facilitate "early withdrawal" by the practical arrangements he is requested to make. For that purpose he must inform himself about the intentions of the Governments concerned and consult with them with a view to clarifying the relationship between the practical arrangements to be made and the withdrawals. Likewise, he must maintain contact with Governments so as to be able to respond to the invitation of the General Assembly to him to report on the developments under the resolution also in this respect. These contacts or consultations, however, include responsibilities for him regarding the withdrawals only to the extent which follows from the relationship, established in the resolution, between the implementation of a good neighbour policy, the practical arrangements which the Secretary-General is in a position to make in its support, and the withdrawal.

15. What emerges as the task of the Secretary-General under the resolution is in the first instance to consult with the Arab Governments concerned regarding their views on the need for, and form of, practical arrangements as envisaged in the resolution. In the second place he has to see how he can relate the various

governmental positions, as determined in the course of the consultations, so that they can best serve and support the implementation of a general good neighbour policy, especially in relation to Lebanon and Jordan. In doing so, he must be guided by the desirability of achieving the highest degree of efficiency which respect for the views of the Governments concerned and adherence to the rules of the Charter permit. Were he to consider the measures possible under those conditions to be inadequate, or were the Governments concerned to consider them insufficient, this naturally should be brought to the attention of the General Assembly.

16. In judging the adequacy of the practical arrangements possible, he must be guided by the interpretation of the resolution set out above. While it cannot be a question for him of evaluating the arrangements as substitutes for the presence of foreign troops, as the arrangements are clearly not intended to be, he should consider them in the context of the withdrawals. This factor forms a part of his general evaluation, which must take into account especially the degree to which the pledges to a good neighbour policy seem to have already been translated into live reality. Were such a policy to be firmly established, no practical arrangements would be needed, while, on the other hand, in its absence, far-reaching and extensive measures would be required. In the period of transition, when it is justified to hope that the Arab nations will succeed in their efforts to establish a good neighbour policy but while frictions and departures from the main line may still be feared, the practical arrangements must in the first instance aim at keeping under review the degree of implementation of the general policy line and provide for means to set straight what may seem to be going wrong. This last mentioned situation appears to come close to the assumptions on which the resolution was based when it regarded the practical arrangements as steps in support of the policy laid down in the first operative part; reference may here again be made to the explicit statement in the resolution that the practical arrangements should be made "having in mind part I" of the resolution.

Consultations

17. Noting the request to work out the practical arrangements in consultation with the Governments concerned, noting further that such consultations, in order to be fruitful, to all possible extent should be directly with the Governments

in the various countries and noting that the resolution had been sponsored by all the Governments concerned, I regarded the decision as implying a joint invitation to visit the capitals of the nations most directly concerned with the problem, for personal talks. Consequently I went to the region on 25 August 1958. I visited Amman 27-28 August and again 8-9 September. I visited Cairo 3-5 September and Baghdad 7-8 September. I finally visited Beirut 10-12 September.

18. In the consultations, which without exception proved highly useful, I based my position on the interpretation of the resolution and of the mandate of the Secretary-General explained above. Thus, I invited the Governments to present their views on practical arrangements and on the situation into which they have to be fitted, while abstaining, myself, from presenting any definite proposals for their consideration and from pressing for the acceptance of any specific line of action of the United Nations. I further sought an elucidation of the intentions of the Governments regarding part I of the resolution, and the good neighbour policy set out therein, with a view to getting as specific a basis as possible for my decisions regarding practical measures in support of such a policy in line with the principles explained in the previous part. It was not within my competence to translate the elucidations achieved into additional assurances of a formal nature.

19. For natural reasons the impending change of government in Lebanon limited the possible scope of discussions in that country. The significance of this limitation was, however, reduced by the fact that I had decided to postpone all decisions based on the consultations until after my return to Headquarters, and by the possibility to renew the contacts at a later stage before the presentation of a report.

20. I wish to avail myself of this opportunity to express my appreciation for the way in which governments in the area engaged in a full and frank discussion of the difficult and delicate matters involved, thus strengthening the ties of co-operation between the United Nations and themselves. I believe that the consultations properly pursued will render this co-operation increasingly fruitful.

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Practical Arrangements: General Considerations

1. The practical arrangements for the purposes mentioned in the resolution, as explained above, must be adjusted to the development of the good neighbour policy to which Member Governments have pledged themselves in the resolution. The implementation of the joint pledge is still at an early stage and it is therefore premature to pass a judgement on the degree of success with which it may meet. From all the Governments contacted, I have heard firm expressions of an intention to translate the terms of the resolution into a living reality. At the same time, however, most of the Governments found reasons, although in varying degree, to complain about the way in which, so far, the joint pledge to a good neighbour policy had been implemented by others.

2. It is undoubtedly true that, so far, we have not reached the stage in which mutual confidence is restored and departures from the desirable line of action are such rare occurrences as to make it possible to disregard them. However, it seems reasonable to work on the assumption that the impact of the intention of all Governments to translate the words of the resolution into deeds will increasingly be felt and that, therefore, the implementation of the good neighbour policy will meet with growing success. Regarding developments which have taken place after the consultations, I wish to mention, especially, encouraging contacts about the supply of oil to Jordan through the Syrian region and the supply of oil from Iraq on a commercial basis.

3. For the present, practical arrangements made by the Secretary-General may be developed on the aforementioned assumption and with a view to strengthening the forces working in the desirable direction. Were the assumption later to prove unwarranted, a reconsideration of the practical arrangements would become necessary. In the ultimate case of a failure of the good neighbour policy they would have to be so developed as to present a more solid guarantee for the line of action which they are intended to support.

4. On the basis of this assumption it seems reasonable to conclude that the practical arrangements should, on the one hand, provide means for the United Nations to keep the implementation of part I, and the policy it establishes, continuously within its purview and, on the other hand, provide means for the United Nations, in case of departures from a good neighbour policy, as set out in

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the resolution, to take appropriate diplomatic or political action. The two sets of arrangements, although naturally closely related, should be kept strictly apart so that neither the arrangements for the purview may come to be used also for diplomatic purposes, nor the character of the diplomatic arrangements may be distorted by their being used also for the purpose of the purview. The natural link between the two sets of arrangements is the office of the Secretary-General which would receive reports on the findings, made in the course of the purview, and decide on the political or diplomatic action to be taken through the means created for that purpose.

25. It should be noted that in the case of Lebanon, the United Nations has already extensive arrangements for keeping within its purview one aspect of the implementation of the good neighbour policy, that is, possible infiltration or smuggling of arms across the border. In considering the practical arrangements to be made, the work of this organization, the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL), has had to be re-evaluated with a view to deciding on its possible role within the new set of practical arrangements to be made.

Practical Arrangements in relation to Jordan

26. The representative of the Government of Jordan stated in the debate of the General Assembly at the Emergency Special Session that his Government did not accept the stationing of a United Nations force in Jordan nor the organization of a border observation group in the country for purposes similar to those served by UNOGIL in Lebanon. This view was restated to me in the consultations in Amman.

27. As from the beginning it had been also my view that neither a United Nations force nor a border observation group would adequately serve the purposes of the resolution in relation to Jordan, I accepted this stand of the Government of Jordan. Consequently the consultations in Jordan were limited to co-operation to which all Arab States, in co-sponsoring the resolution, had pledged themselves. It was felt that by working in that direction, the United Nations would most adequately further all the purposes of the resolution. The spirit and direction of the consultations in Jordan thus corresponded fully to the interpretation of the resolution which I have given in this report.

28. With the wide area of agreement existing from the beginning, the consultation regarding a formula under which the United Nations could assist in relation to

Jordan did not present any problems of principle. The basis for the consideration was the need to provide, as explained above, both for keeping current developments under the resolution in relation to Jordan within purview and for proper diplomatic arrangements for any subsequent action by the United Nations which might be rendered necessary by the findings made.

29. It was agreed that the most practical location of a United Nations organ, designed to keep under purview the adherence of all to the principles set out in part I of the resolution in relation to Jordan, would be Jordan itself. In recognition of this, Jordan stated its willingness to serve as host country for a United Nations representative, properly staffed, to serve "as a special representative of the Secretary-General to assist in the implementation of the resolution, specifically with a view to help in upholding the purposes and principles of the Charter in relation to Jordan in the present circumstances".

30. The stationing in Jordan of a United Nations organ, for the purposes mentioned, gave rise to a practical problem because the new organ with this location would require an established and guaranteed line of communication. For practical reasons this would involve also the Governments of Lebanon and the U.A.R. However, as both these Governments have undertaken to grant all the facilities, including liaison offices in Beirut and Damascus, needed in support of the establishment of a United Nations organ in Jordan, I have concluded that the practical problems can be resolved and that the new organ can be stationed in Amman.

31. In the light of this conclusion, based on the stands taken by the Governments of Jordan, Lebanon and the U.A.R., Ambassador Spinelli, Under-Secretary in charge of the European Office of the United Nations in Geneva, has been assigned to go to Amman in order to work out the necessary practical arrangements for the new operation with the Governments concerned. He proceeded to Amman on 27 September. In the course of his stay there he will also, on a preliminary basis, serve as special representative with the terms of reference mentioned above. When his duties in Geneva make a replacement necessary, a new representative will be appointed on a more definite basis.

32. Pending a study of the situation by Ambassador Spinelli and his report on that matter, it is premature to say how large a staff would be needed and how it might best be composed. In deciding on the size and nature of the staff, decisive

importance will have to be given to the wide range of tasks the representative and his staff will have to perform, concerned as they are with any relevant departures from the principles set out in part I of the resolution in relation to Jordan.

33. Regarding the parallel diplomatic arrangements which are necessary in order to give the organ stationed in Jordan its full value, the Government of Jordan expressed a preference for diplomatic representatives of the Secretary-General in the capitals of the Arab neighbour countries. However, the stationing of such diplomatic representatives in Baghdad and Cairo was not considered desirable, for the present, by the Governments of Iraq and the U.A.P. This question has not been raised with the Governments of Lebanon and Saudi Arabia.

34. In my own view the necessary diplomatic arrangements could either take the form suggested by the Government of Jordan or else be achieved through the designation for the purpose, by the Secretary-General, of an official stationed at Headquarters but going, as necessary, to the capitals concerned for consultations and negotiations. Although the more extensive arrangements envisaged by the Government of Jordan might best help to unburden the office of the Secretary-General, I have concluded that, irrespective of the stands taken by the Governments of Iraq and U.A.R., the last-mentioned arrangement, that is to say, the designation of a high-level representative at Headquarters for the diplomatic actions that may be called for in various capitals, is the more adequate one. One reason for this conclusion is that there is a considerable likelihood that diplomatic representatives on the senior level stationed in various capitals would not have current work to do of a sufficient scope and regularity to render possible the recruitment of men of the desirable standing and experience or to justify the considerable costs involved. Another consideration of great importance is that the arrangement would lend itself to misunderstandings as it might be viewed as indicating an intention of the United Nations to establish a "presence" in various parts of the area going beyond the purposes of the resolution. The arrangement might therefore introduce an element of friction and suspicion in the relations between the States concerned and the United Nations.

35. Were a local diplomatic representation to be established, it should obviously cover the whole area. It would, therefore, be impossible to reduce the weight of the objections mentioned by a compromise, limiting the representation to only some of the capitals concerned. In these circumstances the most satisfactory

arrangement has seemed to me to be the assignment for the purpose of a special representative at Headquarters, who would proceed to the area and visit the various Governments on behalf of the Secretary-General, as need be. The Government of Jordan, recognizing the reasons for my conclusion, has accepted it while maintaining its stand that local diplomatic representation in all the capitals from its viewpoint would have been preferable. The other Governments concerned have assured me of their willingness to receive a diplomatic representative of the Secretary-General from Headquarters, as I might find it necessary.

36. Under the planned practical arrangements there will thus be two officials assigned to assist the Secretary-General, for purposes of the resolution: one keeping within his purview the implementation of the principles of the resolution by all nations in relation to Jordan; one serving as a special representative of the Secretary-General in such direct contacts of a diplomatic nature with the Governments concerned as the Secretary-General may find called for in the light of the findings of the representative charged with the purview. The last mentioned representative would for practical reasons be stationed in Jordan, while the diplomatic spokesman would be at Headquarters.

37. It follows from the principles reflected in the planned arrangements that the representative in Amman would be in contact with the Government of Jordan as host Government and with the Secretary-General, but not directly with any other Government in the area, while on the other hand the diplomatic representative would be entitled to take up discussions with those other Governments on behalf of the Secretary-General, but would not be in direct contact with the Government of Jordan. The liaison offices in Beirut and Damascus would be directly subordinated to the representative stationed in Amman, with the task of assisting him in questions relating to the line of communication to be established.

38. The reports to the Secretary-General from the representative stationed in Amman would not be public documents unless the situation were found to call for their circulation as official documents of the United Nations. Such circulation, which might serve as a basis for action by the General Assembly or the Security Council, represents obviously an alternative line of action open to the Secretary-General in such cases as would seem to him to call for stronger measures than diplomatic démarches. Were the findings to be of a serious nature, they may, under present circumstances, be regarded as indicating a threat to peace and security in the sense of Article 99 of the Charter. This fact, and the

possibilities for action which it opens for the Secretary-General, lends added weight to the planned arrangements as a means to help in upholding the purposes of the Charter in relation to Jordan.

Practical Arrangements in relation to Lebanon

39. During his stay in Lebanon, the Secretary-General had the privilege of getting the views of the Lebanese authorities on practical arrangements which, in their view, would adequately help in upholding the purposes of the Charter in relation to Lebanon. It was felt that the United Nations Observation Group, set up under a resolution of the Security Council, 11 June 1958, while continuing to serve the general purposes mentioned in that resolution, presents a practical arrangement in the sense of the resolution of the General Assembly, 21 August 1958, and in present circumstances, with the further development of it envisaged, adequately helps in upholding the purposes of the Charter in relation to Lebanon.

40. It was found unnecessary for the time being to consider any additional practical arrangements under the General Assembly resolution. Decisive significance was, in this context, attached to the successful implementation of part I of the resolution, that is, to the development of the good neighbour policy in the area, to which the Arab Governments have pledged themselves in the resolution. The United Nations operation, now organized in Lebanon, was considered as helpful in the development of such a policy. After the withdrawal of foreign troops from Lebanon, the question of the Observation Group and of alternative or additional practical arrangements under the resolution would have to be considered in the light of the degree of success with which the implementation of part I of the resolution of 21 August 1958 had met.

41. In the finding that no additional arrangements were needed in Lebanon, with the Observation Group to be developed as envisaged, it was recognized that the terms of reference of the Group precluded it from reporting on all the possible departures from a satisfactory implementation by Arab States of the principles of the resolution in relation to Lebanon. This marks a basic difference between the Observation Group in Lebanon and the planned arrangement in relation to Jordan. The Observation Group must follow any infiltration and smuggling of arms, and its reports are public. The special representative in relation to Jordan should follow

any departures from the principles of the resolution and report to the Secretary-General, for further action, but his findings would not be public unless their nature would seem to call for a circulation of a report in the United Nations. One reason why no additional arrangement in Lebanon, similar to the one organized in relation to Jordan, has been found to be necessary, is that in the cases not covered by the UNOGIL it is felt that the matters may be drawn directly to the attention of the Secretary-General, who can follow them up, using the official assigned to assist him with the diplomatic action necessary under the resolution. This stand may have to be reconsidered in the light of experience at a stage when the withdrawal has taken place.

Withdrawals of United States and British Forces

The Governments of Lebanon and of the United States have been fully informed about the conclusions drawn after my consultations in the region and about the arrangements made or planned regarding the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon. In view of the information thus conveyed, the Government of Lebanon and the United States Government are at present discussing a schedule for the completion of the withdrawal of the United States forces. I am informed that it is the intention of the two Governments that the total withdrawal of the forces shall begin in the near future and be completed as expeditiously as possible, they hope by the end of October, provided the international security situation with respect to Lebanon continues to improve in the framework of a successful implementation of part I of the resolution of 21 August 1958. The two Governments concerned plan to announce their decision shortly. A memorandum received by me from the Government of the United States is annexed to this report (Annex I).

I have informed the Governments of Jordan and of the United Kingdom about these conclusions and the arrangement in relation to Jordan set out in this report, including the designation of a Special Representative who is now in Amman to elaborate, in consultation with the Government of Jordan, the organizational details of the arrangement. I have further informed them about the situation, as known to me, regarding the resumption of oil deliveries to Jordan and related matters. Taking this information into account, the Governments of Jordan and of the United Kingdom are discussing the fixing of dates for the beginning and the completion of the withdrawal of British forces. It is their intention that,

provided satisfactory progress is being made, the withdrawal shall begin during the month of October and that it shall be completed as quickly as the situation in the area allows. The two Governments concerned hope to be able to announce their decision on 1 October. A memorandum on the matter which I have received from the Government of the United Kingdom, is annexed to this report (Annex 2).

Assistance in Economic Co-operation

In the course of the consultations in the Middle East I had an opportunity to touch also upon the question of possible assistance regarding an Arab development institution referred to in part III of the resolution of 21 August 1958.

In the light of these preliminary contacts, I have, after my return, on 26 September 1958, addressed identical letters to the ten co-sponsoring Arab Governments in which I have set out in what respects, at various stages of the development, the United Nations might be of assistance, were the Governments to wish to avail themselves of the services of the Organization in their joint economic efforts. In the letter, I mentioned that the Governments would be welcome to study the results of certain studies undertaken jointly by the International Bank and the United Nations Secretariat. The preliminary results of these studies, to which I referred in my intervention in the General Assembly of 8 August 1958, had been summarized in an internal memorandum dated 26 March 1958. This memorandum would be put at the disposal of interested Arab Governments if they so desired.

From my contacts, I drew the conclusion that, while there was a widespread interest in a constructive approach to the development problem along the lines on which the Arab League had already embarked, it was felt that a successful re-activation of economic co-operation might require that some further progress should be made in the political field, and also that financial surpluses should become available from national sources beyond what, in view of imperative domestic needs which have to be met, seemed likely within the immediate future.

In these circumstances, I believe that the information given in the letter referred to above, represents what for the moment the United Nations can usefully contribute in furtherance of the aim mentioned in part III of the resolution. On the basis of this information, the Arab Governments may now themselves evaluate what assistance they might wish to seek in pursuance of the letter and of this part of the resolution of 21 August 1958.

MEMORANDUM

In view of improvements in the international aspects of the Lebanese security situation owing to the steps which have been taken with respect to the situation in Lebanon, it has already been possible for the United States Government, in agreement with the Lebanese authorities, to withdraw a portion of its forces. The United States Government has now been informed by the Secretary-General of his view, shared by the Lebanese authorities, that the United Nations Observation Group set up under the resolution of the Security Council of 11 June 1958 presents a satisfactory practical arrangement within the meaning of the resolution of the General Assembly of 21 August 1958, and in present circumstances is, or can be made, adequate to uphold the purposes and principles of the Charter in relation to Lebanon. The United States Government has also been informed by the Secretary-General of the planned augmentation of the United Nations observation group in Lebanon and of his view, likewise shared by the Lebanese authorities, that for the time being it is unnecessary to consider any additional practical arrangements under the General Assembly resolution of 21 August with regard to Lebanon.

In view of the above information conveyed to the United States Government by the Secretary-General, the United States Government has informed the Secretary-General that it is discussing with the Government of Lebanon a schedule for the completion of the withdrawal of United States forces. It is the intention of the United States and Lebanese Governments that the total withdrawal of United States forces shall begin in the near future and be completed as expeditiously as possible, we hope by the end of October, provided the international security situation with respect to Lebanon continues to improve in the framework of successful implementation of part I of General Assembly resolution of 21 August 1958. The Governments of the United States and Lebanon plan to announce their decision shortly.

27 September 1958

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MEMORANDUM

1. Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have taken note of the arrangements which the Secretary-General is making, in agreement with the Governments directly concerned, for the stationing of a United Nations Representative in Amman, for the establishment of Liaison Offices in Beirut and Damascus and for the appointment of a diplomatic agent to maintain such contact as may be necessary between the Secretary-General and the Arab capitals other than Amman. The United Kingdom Government understand that the object of these measures is to keep under continuous review the implementation of the Resolution of 21 August in relation to Jordan under present circumstances, and to provide means, in the event of a failure to implement the resolution, for the United Nations to take appropriate action.
2. The United Kingdom Government have been informed by the Secretary-General that the Governments concerned have again expressed their intention to conduct their relations with Jordan in accordance with the Resolution of 21 August, and in particular have expressed their willingness to restore Jordan's normal communications by land and air across their territories.
3. The United Kingdom Government have accordingly informed the Secretary-General that, taking this information into account, they are discussing with the Government of Jordan the fixing of dates for the beginning and completion of the withdrawal of British forces. It is the intention of the United Kingdom and Jordanian Governments that, provided satisfactory progress is being made on the lines set out in paragraphs 1 and 2 above, the withdrawal shall begin during the month of October and that it shall be completed as quickly as the situation in the area allows. The Governments of the United Kingdom and Jordan hope to be able to announce their decision on 1 October.

28 September 1958
