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Chairman: Mr. Lester B. PEARSON (Canada).

Request for the inclusion of an additional item in the agenda of the seventh session: item proposed by Burma (A/2375)

[Agenda item 7]

At the invitation of the Chairman, U Kyin (Burma) took a place at the Committee table.

1. The CHAIRMAN invited the representative of Burma to make a statement on his delegation's proposal (A/2375).
2. U KYIN (Burma) said that, as would be seen from the supplementary statement which had been circulated to delegations the previous day, the acts of aggression by Formosan troops, which were the subject of the complaint by the Union of Burma, had been taking place on a steadily increasing scale since early in 1950. Formosan troops were attacking the armed forces of Burma both along the entire 800 miles of the eastern border of Burma and within Burmese territory, where they were co-operating with Karen insurgents. The latter development was a source of particularly grave concern to the Burmese Government. The Burmese armed forces were still engaged in rounding up the remnants of insurgents forces within its territory, and the need to take action against the Formosan troops imposed a serious strain on its resources of material and manpower.
3. In the course of the fighting a large number of Formosan troops had been killed and some 500 captured. Information obtained from prisoners and on the battlefields left the Burmese Government in no doubt as to the identity of its enemies and as to the method by which they had entered the country and by which they were supplied. The supplementary statement which

had been distributed, accompanied by a map on which the battlefields were marked, made it clear that serious violations of sovereignty and territorial integrity of Burma had taken place.

4. If the Burmese Government had not submitted its case earlier to the United Nations, it had not been out of diffidence or neglect, but rather out of a desire to settle the dispute without burdening the United Nations. But efforts to settle the dispute outside the United Nations had failed and the situation was deteriorating daily. The Burmese Government had therefore had no alternative but to submit its complaint to the United Nations and to request its immediate consideration by the General Assembly.
5. The CHAIRMAN invited members to express their views on the Burmese proposal, pointing out that at the current stage the Committee was concerned only with a question of procedure and that the substance of the Burmese proposal was not under discussion.
6. Mr. TSIANG (China) considered that the title of the new item proposed by Burma was incorrectly worded, since the correct title of the Government he represented was the Government of the Republic of China. That was the title his Government itself used; it had been used in the United Nations Charter and was used in United Nations communications to his Government. He therefore proposed that the title of the proposed new item should be appropriately amended.
7. As regards the desirability of including the item in the General Assembly's agenda, the Chinese Government had always sought to promote good relations with Burma as with all its other neighbours. The sacrifices China had made in fighting the Japanese in Burma

had been acknowledged by the Burmese Government, and when Burma had applied for membership in the United Nations, China had sponsored the draft resolution in the Security Council proposing its admission. The Chinese Government therefore regretted that the Burmese Government should have brought charges of aggression against it; it had not committed aggression and did not intend to do so.

8. The Burmese complaint related to the activities of armed forces described as Kuomintang troops, the explanatory note (A/2375) stating that some 1,000 of such troops had crossed the Burmese border early in 1950. The Chinese Government did not know whether that figure was correct, nor did it know how many casualties had occurred since that date. It had sent no reinforcements and was not therefore responsible for the additional troops said to have been recruited from among the local population of the border area; the Burmese Government did not in fact hold it responsible for that increase.

9. The army to which the complaint related, which described itself as the Yunnan Anti-Communist and National Salvation Army, was not part of the Army of the Republic of China nor was it under the control of the Chinese Government. On eight separate occasions during the past two or three years, the Minister of Defence of the Chinese Government had ordered it not to enter Burmese territory, and had warned it that in some areas the Burmese-Chinese border had not been delimited, and that in others the precise demarcation line was difficult to determine. Those orders and warnings had evidently remained unheeded. The simple fact was that the Chinese Government did not have the physical means to control the army, which was but one of many such organizations on the mainland of China at the current time.

10. It did however have some influence, the extent of which varied from time to time, over General Li Mi and some of his immediate subordinates, and had consistently used it in the direction desired by the Government of Burma. If that Government wished that situation to continue, a debate in the United Nations would not be useful, and might in fact have the opposite effect from that anticipated by the Government of Burma.

11. As regards the good offices which the United States had sought to render through its embassies at Taipei and at Rangoon, the Chinese Government had accepted any suggestions transmitted to it by the United States Embassy at Taipei, where its influence could make itself felt. It had for example informed the Government of Burma through the United States Embassy in Taipei that it would try to stop the collection of funds at Taipei for the support of the Yunnan Anti-Communist and National Salvation Army, and that it would refuse clearance to planes chartered for the delivery of supplies to the border region.

12. He would not vote against the inclusion of the proposed new item, but would abstain from voting. In his opinion, the inclusion of the proposed new item was not calculated to bring about an early settlement of the problem.

13. Mr. ABDELRAZEK (Egypt) stated that he would vote for the inclusion of the item proposed by the Burmese delegation.

14. He trusted that the Chinese representative would appreciate his position, as it had always been the policy of Egypt to show its faith in the United Nations by supporting proposals for the consideration of questions the study of which by the General Assembly might contribute to the maintenance of peace and to friendly international relations.

15. He recalled that the National Government of China was lawfully represented in the United Nations and asked whether the Burmese representative would be prepared to delete the references to the "Kuomintang Government of Formosa" in his proposal in favour of the proper designation.

16. Mr. KYROU (Greece) strongly supported the Egyptian representative and was glad to note that, in his statement, the Burmese representative had refrained from using the word "Kuomintang".

17. The CHAIRMAN asked the Burmese representative whether he would accept the proposed amendment.

18. U KYIN (Burma) replied that he had received no instructions from his Government authorizing him to change the wording of the text which had been transmitted directly to the Secretary-General by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Burma. Burma had recognized the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and he must therefore object to any other government being described as the Chinese Government. The meaning of the word "Kuomintang" was sufficiently well known. The name of the group to which his text referred was immaterial. If the representative of the Formosan Government objected to any point of substance in his draft resolution, he was free to submit an appropriate amendment at a plenary meeting of the General Assembly. He therefore requested the Committee to accept the text as it stood.

19. The CHAIRMAN put the Chinese amendment to the vote.

The amendment was adopted by 9 votes to 2, with 1 abstention.

20. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) considered the Committee's decision to be illegal and unwarranted. The Chairman had indicated that the substance of the matter was not to be discussed at the current meeting, and had therefore been guilty of irregular procedure in agreeing to a vote on the proposed amendment. The Kuomintang group could in no sense be regarded as a government, and the amendment involved the substantive question of the Government of China. He had refrained from speaking on the substance of the matter and had intervened only to explain his vote.

21. The CHAIRMAN replied that there were many precedents for rewording items proposed for inclusion in the agenda at the General Committee stage.

The Committee decided to recommend to the General Assembly the inclusion of the item in the agenda in the following form:

"Complaint by the Union of Burma regarding aggression against it by the Government of the Republic of China".

It was further decided to recommend that the item should be referred to the First Committee for consideration and report.

Organization of the work of the General Assembly

22. General ROMULO (Philippines) proposed that, if the item currently under discussion in the General Assembly were completed that afternoon, the General Assembly should have an Easter recess from the evening of Wednesday, 1 April, until the morning of Tuesday, 7 April 1953.

23. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) pointed out that the General Assembly still had certain urgent items, such as the item proposed by Poland (A/2229), on its agenda and therefore questioned the advisability of such a long recess.

24. General ROMULO (Philippines) explained that, as Easter began on Thursday, 2 April, many representatives might wish to leave New York for the occasion and would have difficulty in attending meetings again before Tuesday morning. His proposal would cover only five days.

25. Mr. ABDELRAZEK (Egypt) and Mr. MUNIZ (Brazil) supported the Philippine proposal.

26. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) suggested that the General Assembly should suspend its work on Wednesday evening and resume on Monday morning.

27. Sir Gladwyn JEBB (United Kingdom) agreed with the USSR representative but thought that the Assembly could resume either on Monday morning or Monday afternoon.

28. Mr. ORDONNEAU (France) suggested that, as a compromise, the General Assembly should convene on Monday afternoon.

29. The CHAIRMAN suggested that the recess should begin on Wednesday evening and that the time of its resumption on Monday should be determined later.

It was so decided.

Korea. Reports of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea: cablegram dated 31 March 1953 from the Premier of the Government Administration Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China to the President of the General Assembly

[Agenda item 16 (a)]

30. The CHAIRMAN announced that he had received that morning a telegram dated 31 March 1953 from the Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China addressed to him as President of the General Assembly, which included suggestions regarding a possible solution of the prisoner-of-war question in Korea and which might in turn lead to peace negotiations. The document was in process of distribution. In his capacity as President of the General Assembly he would transmit the contents of the telegram to the Unified Command.

The meeting rose at 3.30 p.m.