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Chairman: Mrs. Vijaya Lakshmi PANDIT (India).

Request for the inclusion of an additional item in the agenda of the eighth regular session: item proposed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (A/2484)

1. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) explained why his delegation had submitted a proposal for the inclusion of an additional item on the agenda, entitled, "Note by the Secretary-General concerning the implementation of General Assembly resolution 711 C (VII), adopted on 28 August 1953".
2. The Korean question had occupied a very important place in the General Assembly's work ever since the outset of the Korean war. That showed that the General Assembly had felt the need for taking part in the settlement of all questions arising out of the war inflicted on the Korean people, particularly on the inhabitants of North Korea. During the first two parts of the seventh session, the Assembly had discussed the Korean question in very great detail, but had not succeeded in reaching a settlement on the cessation of hostilities or the exchange of prisoners of war. Later, the high-minded policy of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea, supported by the Governments of the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union, had made possible the conclusion of an Armistice Agreement at the end of July 1953. A further problem had then arisen: that of the composition of the political conference and the time and place of its meeting, having regard, of course, to the Armistice Agreement, and in particular to paragraph 60 thereof.
3. When the question had been discussed during the third part of the seventh session, a difference of opinion had arisen on the meaning of paragraph 60 of that Agreement. Some delegations, among them that of the United States, had insisted that the paragraph should be interpreted in a sense which would exclude participation in the political conference by countries other than those whose troops had taken part in the fighting; others, among them the USSR delegation, had considered that interpretation incorrect and held the view that the political conference should be of the "round-table" type. That stand had been supported by several delegations.
4. The peaceful settlement of the Korean question was manifestly one that concerned all countries and all

peoples. However, everyone could not attend the political conference; and no one had denied that there must be some limit on the number of participants. Unlike the United States delegation, which believed that the conference should be restricted to the belligerents, the USSR delegation thought it should include all countries concerned with the peaceful settlement of the Korean question and the successful conduct of the conference. The USSR was still strongly of the opinion that Korea's neighbours, such as China, and those with interests closely linked with the Korean people's interests, such as Burma, India and Pakistan, should be invited to take part. The USSR had also proposed the participation of certain European and Latin-American countries; but all its proposals had been outvoted.

5. The General Assembly had adopted resolution 711 (VII) the importance and merits of which should not be underestimated. It had been adopted almost unanimously. When there had been a question of deciding whether the Secretary-General should, under part C of the resolution, report to the General Assembly, all Members had agreed that the words "General Assembly" should not appear in the text, so as to prevent dispute over a matter of wording in a question of that importance. It was, however, perfectly clear that if the Secretary-General was to make a report, he could only make it to the United Nations. He had therefore acted correctly in addressing his brief note (A/2480) to the General Assembly.

6. Obviously, the General Assembly could not fail to consider that note. The mere fact that the Secretary-General had been requested to report proved that the intention had been that his note should enable the Assembly to determine its future position on that most important question of Korea and, more especially, on that of the political conference. That was why the USSR delegation was so anxious for the General Assembly to discuss the note, even though it did not contain any positive proposal. The view expressed by the Assembly in resolution 711 C (VII) could only be interpreted as a desire to discuss the problem in order to settle it. The Assembly could not adopt a neutral attitude, still less ignore the matter altogether, since the problem concerned the whole world and directly affected the United Nations mission of preserving peace.

7. The USSR delegation believed that if the item it was proposing were placed on the agenda, and if the General Assembly were to discuss it, together with any other cognate questions that might arise, the situation would not, as some speakers had asserted, be worsened, especially as the time-limit fixed for the opening of the political conference was 28 October 1953. He urged the General Committee to give every consideration to the request of the USSR and to make a favourable recommendation to the General Assembly.

8. Mr. LODGE (United States of America) said that his delegation opposed the inscription in the agenda of

the matters raised by communications of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China (A/2469) and the People's Democratic Republic of Korea (A/2476 and Corr.1).

9. Those communications proposed that the General Assembly's resolution 711 (VII) should be reconsidered and that the régimes of communist China and communist Korea should be invited to participate in the consideration of the matter. In resolution 711 A (VII), the General Assembly had recommended that the United Nations side at the political conference should, in accordance with the Armistice Agreement, consist of governments which had contributed forces to the United Nations Command and that the United States should act as spokesman for that group in arranging for the conference. On behalf of that group the United States Government had on 5 September made concrete proposals to the other side about the time and place of the conference. There had been no reply to those proposals. On 18 September, the United States had repeated those proposals to the other side and had asked for a prompt reply. Without a prompt reply, it would be impossible to hold the conference within the period which the communist side itself had recommended, that was, by 28 October 1953.

10. The United States, in conformity with General Assembly resolution 711 (VII), was prepared, in consultation with the designated group, to deal with arrangements necessary to ensure the convening of the political conference, and the conference, when it met, could deal with any matters not otherwise disposed of to the satisfaction of both sides.

11. The note of the Korean communist régime stated that the question of the composition of the political conference could not be resolved unilaterally, but only by agreement between both sides. The United Nations side had been selected and was functioning; the other side was defined in the Armistice Agreement, and might include the Soviet Union if the other side desired it. Whether any neutrals should be invited, as declared in the North Korean note, was a matter for agreement between both sides. If developments during the conference warranted it, and the other side desired to raise the question of additional participants, it would of course be open to them to do so, since both sides would be present at the conference and would be able to consider the matter. That view had been communicated, through the good offices of the Swedish Government, to the Chinese and North Korean Communists.

12. The countries which were to represent the United Nations at the political conference were most anxious to facilitate its work. If it would facilitate the negotiations for the arrangements of the proposed political conference, they would be prepared to despatch at once a representative to meet communist representatives in any of the places which had already been suggested for the conference.

13. There seemed to be an impression that because there was an armistice in Korea the fighting had therefore stopped for good and that all the difficulties associated with the problem were solved. The time had not come when the United Nations could indulge itself in the luxury of political gestures and manoeuvres. Prompt action must be taken to hold the political conference as an indispensable first step towards lasting peace. Those were the reasons why the United States was opposed to the consideration by the General As-

sembly of the notes from the Chinese and Korean communist régimes.

14. Mr. LLOYD (United Kingdom) thought that the setting up of the conference urgently was a matter of greater importance than the participation of additional countries. He would state very briefly his delegation's three reasons for objecting to the Soviet Union proposal.

15. First, no useful purpose would be served by a public debate; anything that could be said in a public debate upon that item could just as well, and perhaps rather better, be said through normal diplomatic channels. Secondly, the Secretary-General's note was really an interim and incomplete report and would not be an appropriate basis for a debate. Thirdly, the agenda for the session already included an item entitled "The Korean question", which would allow of the discussion of any question concerning Korea, especially the political conference.

16. In his view, each of those three reasons was adequate for rejecting the Soviet Union proposal. But there was also an additional reason: the two new developments in the situation mentioned by the United States representative. The latter's suggestions seemed extremely wise, for the sooner practical arrangements were made for the conference, the better would be the prospects of turning the armistice into a lasting peace. Therefore, he (Mr. Lloyd) had no hesitation in saying that the Soviet Union proposal would not advance the cause which all had at heart, and in voting against it.

17. Mr. HOPPENOT (France) did not consider the moment opportune to include in the agenda the new item proposed by the Soviet Union. It was not really necessary to reopen a debate which had been closed scarcely three weeks ago; a repetition of that debate would only result in delaying still further the practical and positive arrangements by which everyone set so much store.

18. The Secretary-General's note did not involve the automatic inclusion of that item in the agenda, since it was only, so to speak, an episode in a procedure which was developing in a normal manner. Since the Korean question remained on the Assembly's agenda, there was no need to add the item proposed by the Soviet Union.

19. The United States representative had apprised the General Committee of the decisions, or, rather, the new decisions, taken in common by the sixteen countries representing the United Nations at the political conference. Needless to say, those countries would show themselves broadminded and conciliatory at the conference if certain other countries were found to have special interests in the questions examined there.

20. The suggestion to enter immediately into direct contact with the Chinese and North Korean Communists, with a view to reaching an understanding with them on all arrangements likely to facilitate the conference's work, seemed to him a practical proposition that might have the best possible results. He greatly hoped that the USSR delegation would appreciate that proposal at its true value and would look on it as a step forward along the road which all desired to follow.

21. For all those reasons, the French delegation would vote against the inclusion in the agenda of the item proposed by the USSR.

22. Mr. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium) said that his delegation shared the opinion of speakers who op-

posed the insertion in the agenda of the item proposed by the Soviet Union. The Secretary-General's note was not a new development such as might justify the reopening of the debate which the General Assembly had held three weeks ago on the implementation of paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement.

23. Under that paragraph both sides were to be represented at the political conference; and the conference was the most suitable place for reaching agreement between the two sides on the question of additional participants. Action by the Assembly was therefore unnecessary; it could only cause needless delay in the convening of the conference.

24. For those reasons the Belgian delegation opposed the Soviet Union proposal.

25. Mr. KHALIDY (Iraq) asked whether the suggestion made by the United States representative with regard to the composition of the political conference was a new proposal or an amendment to the Soviet Union proposal. It would make a considerable difference to the attitude of many delegations if the United States delegation was proposing that the political conference should discuss the question of its composition, perhaps as the first item on its agenda. If that was so, the General Committee should first enquire into the procedural question as to whether that proposal was an amendment to the Soviet proposal or a separate proposal.

26. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) said it would be in the interests of the United Nations, as well as of the peaceful solution of the Korean problem, that the General Assembly should consider the proposals submitted by the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea.

27. The conclusion of the Armistice in Korea must undoubtedly be regarded as a great victory for the forces of peace; it was irrefutable proof that there existed no problem which could not be solved through peaceful negotiation by the parties concerned, provided a desire for understanding existed. However, the signing of the Armistice Agreement was not a final solution of the Korean question; that was why it was recommended in paragraph 60 that a political conference should be called to take the necessary steps with a view to a final solution.

28. The General Assembly had resumed its seventh session in order to determine the membership of that conference and had adopted, on 28 August 1953, a draft resolution submitted by the United States and fourteen other States which had taken part on its side in the Korean war. During the discussion most of the delegations had clearly expressed the opinion that a two-party conference between the belligerents could not possibly lead to an agreement consonant with the interests of the Korean people and the requirements of world peace; nevertheless, when the vote had been taken a majority of the delegations had been found, under pressure from the United States, to be in favour of preventing the Member States which had remained neutral in the Korean conflict from participating in the political conference. The United States delegation's attitude had been contrary not only to the letter and the spirit of the Armistice Agreement, but also to the vital interests of the Asiatic countries, which were deeply concerned with the solution of all problems affecting peace and stability in Asia and the Far East.

29. The Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the People's Democratic Republic in Korea had indicated that the composition of the conference should be determined in conformity with paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement and should be in keeping with the interests of the Korean people and of all the countries concerned, the Asiatic States in particular. The proposals they had submitted opened up new prospects of a peaceful solution of many Far-Eastern problems. To ignore the position of China would be to flout the principle of international co-operation and to act to the detriment of peace. The need to pay due attention to China's views was all the greater inasmuch as that country was one of the five great Powers whose special position was recognized by the Charter and whose influence in international relations was felt throughout the world.

30. A genuine round-table conference would without doubt be successful and would lead to a realistic decision capable of bringing a peaceful solution to the Korean problem. The question could not be regarded as having been solved by the General Assembly's resolution of 28 August 1953. The United States representative had himself stated that his Government was willing to discuss certain questions raised by that resolution, a fact which proved that the General Assembly was fully authorized to reopen the matter. Moreover, it was clear from resolution C that it had been the General Assembly's intention to revert to it after hearing the other side's views.

31. The USSR delegation's proposal was therefore entirely justified; his delegation supported it unreservedly and would, during the debate, do its best to contribute to a proper and peaceful solution of the Korean problem.

32. Mr. PADILLA NERVO (Mexico) pointed out that his delegation had made its position perfectly clear at the seventh session: the political conference should be open to all Members of the General Assembly. His delegation had, therefore, supported the proposal to include India among the participating States. The General Assembly could certainly revert to the question, if it thought it necessary to do so. At its seventh session it had deemed it proper and necessary to discuss the question of prisoners of war which at that time was still standing in the way of the signature of the Armistice Agreement. There was therefore nothing to prevent it from considering the Korean question at the eighth session, if the majority of the Members considered that necessary.

33. If that view were accepted, it was impossible to admit that the General Assembly could have no jurisdiction in the matter unless it now included an additional item in its agenda, as the USSR was proposing.

34. The Soviet Union proposal had, however, been very useful. It had given the General Committee an opportunity to hear very clear statements to the effect that the admission of other countries to the political conference was a matter for agreement between the parties. His delegation felt that those statements gave an immediate reply both to the substantive question and to the question of procedure.

35. It was important to state that the participation of other States in the political conference would be useful, without any disturbance being caused thereby in the balance or functioning of the conference to the

extent of influencing its decisions. It was therefore to be hoped that the representatives of both sides would get in touch forthwith and study both that question and other aspects of the conference, so as to enable the latter to begin work as soon as possible. If such conversations took place, it was to be hoped that it would be possible for other States to be allowed to co-operate in the work of the political conference, as his delegation had proposed.

36. For those reasons his delegation felt that there was no need to include in the agenda the item proposed by the USSR.

37. Mr. MATES (Yugoslavia) pointed out that the question before the General Assembly had both a procedural and a political aspect. From the procedural point of view, his delegation, like the majority of the members of the General Assembly, felt that a broad view should be taken on the inclusion of new items in the agenda.

38. On the political aspect of the problem, he observed that during the previous debates on the question of the composition of the political conference, his delegation had opposed the Soviet Union proposal, but had not felt able to support the draft resolution proposed by fifteen Member States.

39. It should not be forgotten that the Korean question was already on the agenda. It was the same item under which the composition of the political conference had been discussed at the seventh session of the General Assembly; it was therefore not necessary to include new items in the agenda to enable the Assembly to deal with that controversial question.

40. The Soviet Union proposal was likely to create further political and procedural difficulties. Its consideration would not in any way facilitate the solution of the problem. His delegation would, therefore, abstain when the proposal was put to the vote.

41. Mr. URQUIA (El Salvador) held that it was unnecessary to include in the agenda the item proposed by the Soviet Union, especially as the delegations of some of the countries which would participate in the political conference under the General Assembly resolution had already stated that that conference would itself be able to consider the possibility of inviting other States to take part in its proceedings.

42. His delegation felt, however, that it would be inadvisable to reopen the debate on that question, since the sole object of the Soviet proposal was to provoke a discussion on each of the points enunciated by the Governments of communist China and Korea. It should not be forgotten that those two governments had, in their communications, asked to be invited to send representatives to the General Assembly to take part in the negotiations. His delegation felt that the General Assembly was not the appropriate place for the representatives of communist China and communist Korea to enter into negotiations with the Members of the United Nations. On the other hand, it was greatly interested by the United States proposal that, when the conference met, it should itself consider the possibility of inviting other States to participate in its work. But there was no need to regard that proposal as an amendment to that of the Soviet Union.

43. To sum up, his delegation felt that it was neither necessary nor expedient to recommend the inscription on the agenda of the item proposed by the USSR delegation; it would therefore vote against that proposal.

44. Mr. DAVIDSON (Canada) stated that his delegation opposed the inscription on the agenda of the item proposed by the USSR, having regard, first, to the fact that there was already a Korean item on the agenda and secondly to the constructive and useful proposals just put forward by the United States representative in connexion with the political conference.

45. The question of the representation of the United Nations at the political conference had recently been decided after thorough consideration and lengthy and exhaustive debate. Nothing having occurred since then which would justify or necessitate the reopening of the question, his delegation felt bound to oppose the inscription of a second Korean item on the agenda.

46. Mr. EBAN (Israel) stated that the General Committee would be failing in its duty if it did not recommend the discussion by the General Assembly of all serious international questions; no one wished to suggest that the General Assembly should be indifferent about the work of the political conference or the obstacles which had so far stood in the way of its establishment. That, however, was not the issue. The Korean question in all its aspects had been discussed in the General Assembly for several years; the most recent discussion had taken place only a few weeks previously, and the item had again been placed on the agenda of the present session. In his view, the inscription of a new item was not only superfluous, but open to potential disadvantage.

47. The General Assembly had recently, after a particularly thorough discussion, adopted a recommendation about the composition of the political conference. Negotiations to that end were still in progress. It was therefore premature to assume the failure of the efforts at present being made to secure the institution of the political conference.

48. It had been the General Assembly's practice when a matter was under discussion or negotiation outside to avoid general debate on it. It was not always the case that because a matter was very important that it was therefore very urgent to expose it to public discussion. It was sometimes advisable, as in the present case, not to undertake premature discussions which would preclude a favourable result. Consequently, the Israel delegation would be obliged to vote against the USSR proposal.

49. Mr. TSIANG (China) reminded the Committee that when the First Committee had debated questions relating to Korea, during the third part of the seventh session, his delegation had been sceptical about the decision to request the Secretary-General to report on communist reactions to the Assembly's resolution. Experience had shown his apprehensions to have been justified.

50. The telegrams which the Secretary-General had received from North Korea and from the Communists on the mainland of China, and the speeches made by the USSR and Polish representatives, were concerned primarily with the future of Asia. They were intended to win favour, to encourage hopes and to hold out promises to other countries in Asia which world communism hoped to enclose behind the iron curtain. As he did not think that the General Assembly should encourage that line of development, his delegation would vote against the USSR proposal.

51. Mr. KHALIDY (Iraq) stated that the General Assembly was the supreme forum of the world and

that Member States should have every opportunity to bring their problems before it. To deny them that right would be to deny the very precepts of the Charter itself. Speaking as a member of the Asian-African regional group, he had reason to look with disapproval on the denial of that right. On two occasions, fourteen Asian and African nations had been rebuffed in trying to place on the agenda of the Security Council an item which concerned them directly. That was a bitter experience that would not be easily forgotten.

52. His delegation adhered staunchly to the principle that Member States should have the right to secure the inclusion in the agenda of problems they considered to be of importance. How did that principle apply in the present case? The General Assembly had discussed the question proposed only three weeks before and there had been no substantial change in the situation. Reopening of the question would have no justification and would produce practically no change in the situation or in the attitude of the General Assembly.

53. The main purpose of the resolution adopted by the General Assembly was the calling of the political conference. Not one of the potential participants had stated specifically that it refused point blank to cooperate and thus make impossible the convocation of the conference. It was thus too soon to say that the General Assembly's recommendation was impractical or unwise. Nevertheless, if it became clear that the decision was not going to work, it would become the duty of the General Assembly to reopen the whole question. That could be easily done since the question of Korea was already on the agenda.

54. His delegation's attitude on the substance of the question was clearly defined and he would explain it when the time came. Therefore, without prejudice to his delegation's position at the plenary meeting, he did not feel justified in voting in favour of the USSR proposal.

55. Mr. PEREZ PEREZ (Venezuela) observed that the USSR proposal, based on communications to the Secretary-General from the Governments of the Central People's Republic of China and the People's Democratic Republic of Korea, rested on arguments which the General Assembly had heard quite recently in the third part of its seventh session. The Assembly had expressed its views on those arguments in adopting its resolution 711 (VII) of 28 August 1953. The USSR proposal was tantamount to asking the General Assembly to reconsider its decision. Reopening of the question could not be justified unless the position had changed in the short interval since the adoption of that resolution. Since that was not the case, his delegation considered there was no good reason for accepting the USSR proposal.

56. On the other hand, it felt that the United States representative's statement that the conference itself could decide whether or not to co-opt other members was a most important proposal which would obviate reopening the debate on a question already fully discussed.

57. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) considered that the discussion to which the USSR proposal had given rise had served to elucidate and establish certain positions in the matter. The first position was that of the USSR and the delegations which supported its proposal or which, though not supporting it, recognized that in certain circumstances, which in their opinion had not yet come about,

the Assembly was entirely justified in including the question in its agenda. The only arguments advanced against the USSR proposal were those of the United States representative, which amounted to saying that the political conference should itself decide on its composition. That argument created a somewhat bizarre and illogical situation fraught with danger to the conference's success.

58. The General Assembly's recommendations had a constitutional character; once adopted, they were binding on the States which had approved them. The recommendation which the General Assembly had adopted on 28 August stated quite specifically how the political conference was to be organized. Delegations of many countries, a number of which had sent armed forces to Korea and would thus attend the conference, had voted for that resolution. It was now suggested that the countries represented by those delegations might decide whether or not to invite other countries to attend. As long as the Assembly's recommendation of 28 August remained in force, that proposal could only be regarded as a subterfuge or stratagem. It was claimed that it strictly complied with the Assembly's recommendation which envisaged not a round-table conference but a conference to be attended by belligerents to the exclusion of all neutral countries. But the proposal that the conference should itself decide on its composition was incompatible with that recommendation. It was also proposed that representatives of the two parties should meet and try to reach agreement on the organization of the conference and the arrangements to be made for it. If those arrangements were to include the question of composition, all the USSR delegation's arguments remained valid. If, on the other hand, the discussion was to cover merely the technical aspects of the conference, it seemed naive to attempt to decide the place and date of the conference and to settle technical details before the fundamental question of who would participate had been decided.

59. The least that could be said was that the two propositions did not stand up to criticism, that they were illogical and irrational. Politically, they could lead only to procrastination and delay, which were likely to jeopardize the conference.

60. If it were considered that the conference could itself decide on its composition, why had the General Assembly studied the question at its seventh session? The United States wanted the belligerents to appear in that guise at the conference table, whereas the Soviet Union wished them to participate not as belligerents but as parties striving for peace.

61. It had been stated that there was no need to place the item on the agenda since the Korean question was already on the agenda of the First Committee and the question proposed by the Soviet Union could appropriately be considered under that heading. Obviously, the First Committee could examine the proposal but, there was reason to ask, when? He had been given to understand that a proposal was to be put before the First Committee to remove the Korean question from its position of priority and to place it at the end of the Committee's agenda. His delegation would oppose that proposal. Regardless of any decision of the General Committee, he would insist that the Korean question be placed at the head of the First Committee's agenda because it was the most serious and important question in international relations at the present time. It was, to a certain extent, the key not only to a peaceful settlement in Korea, but also to

many other outstanding problems. The Assembly's present session was due to end on 8 December, while the time-limit for convening the conference expired on 28 October. That fact, naturally, caused great anxiety for the prospects of a peaceful settlement of the Korean question.

62. Another point had to be borne in mind. If, as an amendment to the General Assembly's recommendation, a proposal were adopted authorizing the political conference to examine the question and invite some additional countries to attend, what would be the position? On the one hand, the conference would be attended by parties whose presence had been recommended by the General Assembly, and, on the other, there would be members with whom the General Assembly had no relationship. The latter would consequently introduce into the conference a new element, an alien body, concerning which the General Assembly had been unwilling to take a decision. It was questionable whether such a situation would enhance the conference's authority and advance its work. The prestige of the General Assembly was equally unlikely to benefit. It was remarkable that the delegations of the countries which had voted in favour of the Assembly's recommendation were the very ones which now wished to disregard them. If those delegations did not support the proposals, which the other side might make, to invite certain additional members to the conference, no agreement could be reached on the participation of those States without the consent of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, Australia, and other delegations aligned with them, even though such proposals were supported by countries like India, Burma, Indonesia and Pakistan. The only way out of the dilemma was for each party to appoint whom it pleased, regardless of the wishes of the other side. But such a solution was dangerous and would probably prevent the conference from achieving any positive results.

63. In view of the categorical attitude adopted by one side on the General Assembly recommendation, and the firm support given to the Assembly's decisions by the other, which rejected any possibility of a review of the question with a view to rectifying those decisions, little benefit could be derived from a meeting of the two sides. That was where the United Nations Organization should intervene, not as a belligerent represented by the "sixteen countries" but as an effective instrument for the settlement of disputes and as the organ of an international policy of peace. If the political conference were to determine its own composition, the result would be like some sort of book-keeping by double entry. The very fact of allowing amendments to the General Assembly's recommendation to be made at the conference table instead of leaving the process to the Assembly itself, showed that the authority of the United Nations would be undermined even more than it was at present. If, on the other hand, the representatives of the sixteen nations, who regarded themselves as the representatives of the United Nations as a whole, sought to defend the authority of the Organization, which would necessarily imply the unequivocal defence of the recommendations of 28 August, that would mean the collapse of the conference.

64. That was why the Soviet Union, anxious to secure a peaceful settlement of the Korean question, was seeking to eliminate the obstacle that had arisen in connexion with the composition of the conference.

65. He wished to avoid encroaching on questions of substance, though the Yugoslav representative had been right in saying that in political problems it was difficult to separate questions of procedure and substance. Nevertheless, the very formulation of the question was evidence of the existence of a profound political conflict; either the General Assembly recommendation remained binding to the letter, or the conference collapsed. Another approach had, therefore, to be found. The immediate question was not whether the recommendations of the Governments of the People's Republic of China and of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea were acceptable or not; the issue was merely whether or not the question submitted by the Soviet Union should be placed on the agenda. In that connexion, there was a tradition established from the very first days of the United Nations, that even those questions which were regarded as inconvenient, misconceived, or inappropriate, should be placed on the Assembly's agenda and discussed. The substance of the matter could be discussed by the First Committee. Two of the delegations present at the present discussions considered it indispensable for the Secretary-General's note to be examined. The Secretary-General's function was not confined to receiving and circulating documents. The Secretary-General was a political agent who occupied a post regarded as very important by the USSR delegation. His proposal to include the Secretary-General's note in the agenda was therefore justified for two reasons: first, the question itself was of exceptional political importance, and, secondly, the political standing of the Secretary-General had to be safeguarded.

66. Mr. LLOYD (United Kingdom) considered that the USSR representative had removed any logical basis for putting the item on the agenda, when he had said that his delegation proposed to press for an early debate on the item, "The Korean question".

67. Furthermore, the USSR representative's reception of the United States representative's suggestions had been most regrettable. All delegations were at one in trying to get the political conference going. He hoped, therefore, that second thoughts would prevail, and that the new suggestions would be given the consideration they merited. Nothing the USSR representative had said gave any reason for the United Kingdom delegation to depart from the attitude it had already adopted.

68. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) considered that the problem of the composition of the political conference should be discussed first, and not taken together with the items dealt with in the reports of the various bodies concerned with Korea. The matter had been raised in communications submitted by the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and by the Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea. That was why his delegation supported the USSR proposal.

69. His delegation had not as yet taken any position regarding the United States representative's suggestions, because they were not clear. If the United States representative had any proposals to make and was prepared to modify the attitude he had adopted during the third part of the seventh session, he would be better advised to present his views during the consideration of the question submitted by the USSR. As long as no formal proposal had been made, the Polish delegation would continue to hold the view that the

General Assembly should discuss and finally decide on the composition of the political conference in a manner likely to assist an early and just solution of the Korean problem.

70. The CHAIRMAN put the Soviet Union proposal to the vote.

The Committee decided, by 10 votes to 2 with one abstention, not to recommend the inclusion in the agenda of the item "Note by the Secretary-General concerning the implementation of General Assembly resolution 711 C (VII) adopted on 28 August 1953".

The meeting rose at 1.5 p.m.