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Chairman: Mr. George J. TOMEH (Syria).

AGENDA ITEM 23

Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: Southern Rhodesia (continued) (A/6700/Rev.1, chap. III)

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. PELLETIER (Canada) recalled that the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs had reaffirmed, in his statement during the general debate, at the 1569th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, that his Government would oppose the granting of independence to Southern Rhodesia before majority rule was attained in that country. Even before the Security Council had asked for mandatory sanctions, Canada had imposed a total ban on trade with Southern Rhodesia. It was now glad that a large number of countries had ceased all trade with Southern Rhodesia in the products designated by the Security Council on 16 December 1966 (resolution 232 (1966)), but it was sorry to see that there were loop-holes and that some countries were not yet fully complying with the Council's decision.

2. The Canadian delegation looked forward to receiving the report which the Secretary-General was to submit to the Security Council on the effect of the mandatory sanctions. Although some sectors of the Southern Rhodesian economy, in particular tobacco cultivation, had been affected, the sanctions had apparently not had the rapid and decisive effect that had been hoped of them. More effective sanctions had been asked for in the Committee, and the Security Council would give its opinion on that subject when it received the Secretary-General's report. Canada, which was a member of the Security Council, was giving the question serious study and would state its opinion in greater detail on that occasion.

3. On the other hand, the Canadian Government could not support the recommendations that had been made to the General Assembly in favour of the use of force: not only would the cost in human lives and in material be too great, but such action would have serious political, social and economic repercussions both within and outside Southern Rhodesia. The Charter suggested ways and means of ensuring respect for the decisions of the United Nations without recourse to force and the Security Council had already taken an important step in agreeing, for the first time, to impose mandatory economic sanctions. Canada felt that such measures would be sufficient to put an end to the situation in Southern Rhodesia and to bring a multiracial society into being in that country, governed by majority rule.

4. Mr. MALECELA (United Republic of Tanzania) said it was now almost two years since Ian Smith and his gang had made the illegal declaration of independence in Rhodesia. It would, therefore, follow that it was now nearly two years since the United Kingdom Government had called such a move a treasonable offence and an act of rebellion which would surely be brought down in a matter of weeks if not days. Yet the anticipated days or weeks had become not only months but now they were turning into years. He had specifically left out the historical background of the colony for the simple reason that the Fourth Committee was full of records on such matters. That was why he wanted to confine himself to the current situation.

5. Now that the question of Rhodesia seemed to centre around the much publicized sanctions, it would be very necessary for the Committee to examine the role of those sanctions and the extent to which they were capable of bringing down the rebellion and thus ensuring majority rule. He would ask the members of the Committee to dismiss the statement of the United Kingdom representative that to say that sanctions had failed was to encourage the unilateral declaration of independence. That statement would be regarded as a coercive attempt on the part of the United Kingdom delegate to persuade the Committee to believe the torrent of British propaganda that sanctions were working. Such a move was even more cynical as it would attempt to cover up the efforts of the United Nations to find out how the United Kingdom Government had only paid lip-service to the problem of Rhodesia even before the unilateral declaration of independence. The United Kingdom representative had tried to confuse the Committee by trying to bring up irrelevant arguments about Article 12 of the United Nations Charter.

6. As he had said before, although the United Kingdom Government had issued very strong statements several times on Rhodesia, those strong statements had not been matched by equally strong actions against the unilateral declaration of independence. Therefore such statements must be dismissed as mere propaganda aimed at deceiving world public opinion.

7. Mr. Makame, the Chairman of the Tanzanian delegation to the twenty-second session of the Assembly, speaking at the 1583rd plenary meeting on 6 October 1967, had said that it was now nearly two years since the illegal declaration of independence but Ian Smith and his rebel followers were still in power. And to make matters worse, Ian Smith had consolidated his power: he had strengthened the oppressive measures directed against the African people of that colony, had legislated for more apartheid, and had now begun to threaten the neighbouring independent country of Zambia. What went wrong with those British forecasts? The answer was not far to seek. For the simple truth about the whole Rhodesian problem was that the 4 million African people in that colony had been deceived; Africa had been deceived; the Commonwealth had been deceived; and the United Nations and the world as a whole had been fooled. It was not Ian Smith who had done all that cheating and fooling. He had made his position crystal clear long before 11 November 1965.

8. Mr. Makame had continued by stating that it was the United Kingdom Government which had been guilty of that deceit before the world and before the Organization. It had been consistent in only one thing—the dishonesty and trickery with which it had treated the whole Rhodesian question. The United Kingdom called Smith a rebel, but it had treated Smith like a member of Her Majesty's loyal Opposition in Parliament. The United Kingdom said it would not deal with treasonable people. But Her Majesty's Government had proceeded to negotiate with the rebels in Rhodesia. The United Kingdom said it was in favour of majority rule in Rhodesia; but no evidence was provided to support that statement. Indeed, one of the most cynical statements yet made was that given by the United Kingdom Prime Minister on 20 December 1966. Mr. Wilson stated that because Smith had rejected the Tiger Constitution, which was designed to give independence to Rhodesia on the basis of minority rule, then paragraph 10 of the Commonwealth communiqué on Rhodesia would apply. In other words, all past offers of a settlement had been withdrawn and no legal independence would be given to Rhodesia before majority rule. Yet a few months ago the British Prime Minister sent Lord Alport to Ian Smith to find out what amendments to the Tiger Constitution were necessary before the rebel régime could accept it. Mr. Makame had finally stated that Mr. Wilson and Ian Smith were now in secret negotiations on that matter.

9. The failure of sanctions in Rhodesia was not too difficult to see. In fact a brief analysis would show not only why sanctions had failed but also the countries responsible for such a situation. While it was true that Portugal and South Africa bore direct responsibility, they indeed had other corroboration. For example, Rhodesian exports to the United States were said to have been 50 per cent higher in the first quarter of 1967 than in the same period in 1966. Rhodesian expoerts to Switzerland in the first quarter of 1967 were 71 per cent higher than in the same period in 1966. Switzerland's exports to Rhodesia also showed a similar increase. West German exports were 64 per cent higher than in the same period last year. Other countries which showed an increase in trade with Rhodesia included France, 100 per cent; an Asian country, 38 per cent; and the Netherlands, 50 per cent. But to crown it all was the fact that even the United Kingdom itself was a party to those manœuvres of trying to defeat sanctions. For example, it was already known that much of the Rhodesian oil was supplied from Lourenço Marques through South Africa and it was British tankers that took the oil to Lourenço Marques.

10. Analysing the effect of sanctions on some of the important products of Southern Rhodesia, he said that, if one were to read the United Kingdom representative's statement again, one would get the impression that tobacco was almost the most important item on which the United Kingdom seemed to pin its hope. It must be observed that tobacco formed about 30 per cent of the total value of 1965 domestic exports, valued at £142,455,433. In 1966 more than 50 per cent of Rhodesian tobacco found its way into the world market under so many unscrupulous methods that it would not be hard to discover them. Therefore, the loss sustained on tobacco as a result of sanctions was hardly £10 million. That, therefore, was but a small fraction of the figure of £142,455,433.

11. If, therefore, Ian Smith and his gang tried to diversify their economy they would succeed to the extent of the tobacco that did not find its way into the world market. If that diversification was relatively successful, then the tobacco sanctions would have failed ultimately. On the other hand, even if sanctions on tobacco were to succeed—but he confessed they would not—it was still unlikely that it would bring an effective political change of heart on the part of the racist farmers, who were so adamant on their course.

12. The Committee was told that the sugar industry was facing bankruptcy. The facts available to the Tanzanian delegation did not warrant that assertion. On the contrary, more than 50 per cent of Rhodesian sugar had found its way on to the world market, while the remainder was being pushed through in the expanding local markets. Furthermore, the production of sugar in Rhodesia was about £3,482,485 in 1965. Considering that over 50 per cent of the sugar was still being exported and some of it was being pushed hard in the expanding local markets, the loss on sugar trade was but a fraction of the total domestic production of £142,455,433.

13. That, in short, was the situation with regard to agricultural production, as the other items like maize and cotton constituted a percentage of less importance.

14. Most of the mining companies in Rhodesia belonged to investors in London who indeed had the control shares. That those mines were still run-

ning and getting the equipment from England was an indication of the complicity of the United Kingdom in the whole question of sanctions.

15. Copper was Rhodesia's second largest mineral export. Although the United Kingdom representative had told the Committee about the unsold tobacco, he could not say the same about copper. Copper was mined in Rhodesia by a subsidiary of Messina (Transvaal) Development Co., a company registered in South Africa but run from London, just a few paces from White's Club in St. James, by Commander H. P. F. Grenfell. Most of the copper still found its way onto world markets via a British-based sales company, MTD Copper Sales, Ltd. Reports had it that the copper, after being refined in Rhodesia, was exported to Belgium, where it was passed through another refining process and was made undetectable from any other copper.

16. It was also reported that since 1964 to date, British imports of copper and its alloys from Belgium and West Germany had trebled. In fact, one of the Belgian companies dealing in copper was substantially owned by the British Metal Corporation. The only conclusion to be drawn must be that Britain was still buying large quantitited of Rhodesian copper.

17. The same was true of asbestos. Asbestos from Rhodesia was sold to Southern Asbestos, a subsidiary of the British-owned Turner and Newall of Manchester. Thus the asbestos from Rhodesia was exported to its destination as though it was of South African origin.

18. The same story of complicity and subversion of sanctions was true of Rhodesian chrome and Rhodesian iron and steel products. That, therefore, showed how in the field of mineral products not even a token attempt had been taken by former customers of Rhodesia, let alone the United Kingdom, the initiator of sanctions.

19. There were still other ways in which the Ian Smith régime was being helped to survive. The list, in fact, was very long, and it was public property.

20. Describing how the African people of Zimbabwe felt about the betrayal, he recalled that, before the Special Committee during its sessions in Africa in 1967 (see A/6700/Rev.1, chap. III, para. 375), Mr. Silundika of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) had stated that the economy of Southern Rhodesia did not show any possibility of bringing about a political change. Mr. Silundika then observed that United Kingdom commercial banks—Barclays, National Provincial and Grindlays—and the Standard and Ottoman Banks were continuing to operate in Southern Rhodesia. The United Kingdom was permitting the entry of capital under cover of necessary items for the University of Rhodesia and other schemes. The British-Dutch combine Unilever, based in and controlled from London, had recently authorized the expenditure of £135,000 for the extension of its Southern Rhodesian subsidiary. The British Petroleum Company was supplying oil to Southern Rhodesia and continuing its business. It was clear, therefore, Mr. Silundika had concluded, that the first defaulter in the programme of sanctions was the United Kingdom itself, which, while advocating sanctions in the United Nations, was adopting measures to undermine them in Southern Rhodesia.

21. One cannot complete the analysis on sanctions without touching upon the goods imported into Rhodesia from the outside world. Goods from major Western countries still flowed freely into Rhodesia. He need not remind the Committee that the United Kingdom, which initiated the sanctions, was also still involved in the question of exports to Rhodesia. One had only to look at the figure of the so-called goods for humanitarian purposes to see that point.

22. Most of the important machinery in Rhodesian factories was of British origin. Surely, if such factories were still running, it was obvious that spare parts still came from the United Kindom.

23. Oil was perhaps the most important Rhodesian import. In spite of the measures imposed by the Security Council, oil was still being freely delivered to Rhodesia. Crude oil from the Middle East companies of Shell was sold to South African refineries jointly owned by Shell and British Petroleum, all of which were London-controlled. The United Kingdom Government was fully aware that that oil found its way to Rhodesia. It was no wonder that a mockery was made of the Security Council about the ship Joanna V with 18,000 gallons of oil when the oil from South Africa sent to Rhodesia by land was flowing at the rate of 850,000 gallons a week. Therefore, it would be true to say that the major routes of oil into Rhodesia were either direct from South Africa or through Lourenço Marques. He had no doubt that the United Kingdom representative was aware of that.

24. Another example of complicity by big Western monopolies was shown by the evidence given to the Special Committee by the representative of ZAPU. That petitioner further declared, for example, that such companies as the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey handed over oil to the French company, Total. That company carried the oil to Southern Rhodesia through depots in Lourenço Marques for transfer and direct sale to Southern Rhodesia by British Petroleum, Shell and Caltex. That was one side of the coin reflecting the continued circumvention of the lame sanctions. Further details were to be found in paragraphs 350, 352 and 355 of chapter III of the Special Committee's report (A/6700/Rev.1).

25. On several occasions, his delegation had accused the United Kingdom of conniving with Smith. Those accusations were even more strongly reinforced by the analysis he had made. His delegation accused the United Kingdom Government of helping the illegal régime not only to survive but also to entrench itself. The United Kingdom was not seriously trying to bring down the rebellion. Therefore, those who still believed in sanctions must now see the futility of their beliefs. Furthermore, they must see that they were being deliberately misled by the United Kingdom into believing that sanctions could work. He noted that one of the British papers, the Sun, commenting recently on sanctions, had concluded that sanctions would never squeeze Smith to surrender.

26. As the Tanzanian delegation had pointed out in 1965 in the Security Council, the unilateral declara-

tion of independence was yet another creation of an apartheid State by the United Kingdom in Africa. When Tanzania had said that in 1965 it had been accused of extremism. Yet the events in Rhodesia today completely justified its forecast that in Southern Rhodesia another apartheid State was being created.

27. Ian Smith and his gang had made no secret of their plan for separate development, the very system now in full operation in South Africa. Today in Rhodesia laws were being enacted at all levels to put apartheid in full operation. It was indeed regrettable that the United Kingdom Government should be guilty of the creation of those inhuman monstrous systems in the southern part of Africa. It was even more cynical that that creation should be with the connivance of a Labour Government in the United Kingdom. He wanted to assure the United Kingdom delegation that its claim, so often repeated in the General Assembly, that it had given independence to over 750 million people could not make the Assembly acquiescent in the evil that it was now helping to create in Rhodesia.

28. He was sure that representatives would agree with him that the United Kingdom should never say it had given independence—it was compelled to do so. The oppression in Rhodesia on the African people was not unsurpassed in the history of that country. Hundreds of people were now in gaol or detention without trial. Scores of others were either awaiting death sentences or had been secretly eliminated. A number of promising young men were now being liquidated under the guise of being terrorists.

29. The Tanzanian delegation was shocked at the harsh tone used against the freedom fighters by the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom Foreign Minister in his statement stressed so much the question of the wishes of the people, yet in Rhodesia the wishes of the people seemed to be the wishes of the minority who were in rebellion. Thus it was only the Whites who were always being consulted at the expense of the majority of the people. He did not know whether one could think of an example of racism more glaring than that.

30. The United Kingdom Government was guilty of racism in Rhodesia. The very theory of kith and kin was nothing but racism. His delegation must condemn that racism on the part of the United Kingdom Government.

31. There was another most dangerous aspect of the unilateral declaration of independence. Rhodesia was now becoming a beach-head of imperialists and a racist threat in Africa. The pressure of threats to which Zambia had been subjected was a clear example of that. He took that opportunity to salute the President and people of Zambia for their heroic stand against that second apartheid state.

32. Turning to the question of what should be done, he pointed out that, first, the United Kingdom must still be held fully responsible for the situation in Rhodesia. Secondly, now that selective mandatory sanctions had failed, new ways had to be tried. As the representative of Tanzania had pointed out at the 1583rd plenary meeting of the General Assembly, Portugal and South Africa must be made to comply or else sanctions would be applied equally against them. Chapter VII, Article 42, of the Charter must now be fully applied so that it would be possible to seal all the borders of Rhodesia. As long as the borders were not closed, sanctions would be futile. The Fourth Committee must still call for the release of all political prisoners detained without trial and Smith must be held responsible for the murders of innocent people by his policy and army. In the view of the Tanzanian delegation, it was not enough for the United Kingdom to protest about the presence of South African forces in Rhodesia; it must take effective, concrete measures to eliminate them. The Committee must call on the administering Power to stop dealing with the illegal régime in secrecy. After all, the United Kingdom had assured the world that after the talks which had taken place on board the Tiger all offers had been withdrawn. His delegation would like to assert that the Commonwealth Sanctions Committee must come to realize that its efforts on sanctions as they were now were doomed to failure.

33. The Tanzanian delegation had always insisted on the use of force as the most effective means of toppling the rebellion. It still affirmed that only force could bring down the rebellion. Evey day that passed continued to confirm what it had said. Even those who had supported the United Kingdom in not using force, though they had done so with sincere intentions, must now be asked to search their hearts. For what they had sincerely supported had now proved fruitless.

34. Force must be used against Rhodesia. As long as the borders of Rhodesia remained unsealed, it must remain wishful thinking that sanctions could work. The Committee must also find some method of punishing those Western combines which were subverting sanctions in Rhodesia. Japan, an Afro-Asian country, should have been on the side of an African country. Finally, the clear goal in Rhodesia must remain that of independence under majority rule. The bringing down of the rebellion must not overshadow the main goal of independence for the people of Rhodesia.

35. He would now like to appeal to the people of Rhodesia. They must fight on. Theirs was a noble cause. The people of Tanzania deplored the attempts being made to discredit the freedom fighters as being terrorists.

36. When those people were sacrificing their blood for the sake of human rights and for their legitimate rights, it was most unwarranted for some people to lodge a scandalous campaign against them.

37. His delegation appealed to the people of Rhodesia to redouble their efforts. Tanzania made no apologies to anyone for helping them. It was in fact the duty of Africa to help those fighters. It had now become clear that the tree of independence in Rhodesia had to be watered with blood. Tanzania's African brothers in Rhodesia had accepted the challenge.

38. The Tanzanian Government and people would always be on their side until that beach-head of colonialism and imperialism in Africa was completely eliminated.

39. The Committee must consider positively the aid to be given both to refugees and to the freedom fighters.

40. The reputation of the United Nations was fast dwindling amongst the African people. They could not imagine how such a large Organization could remain powerless in dealing with only 200,000 racist Whites. The United Nations must help those who were struggling to defeat that oppressive régime. The African people could not understand that all the resolutions adopted at the United Nations were not implemented or how 121 nations could not deal with a handful of rebels. The United Nations would be doing a great service both to Africa and to the Organization itself if it could resolve once for all that the rebellion would be ended and that freedom and independence under rule would prevail.

41. Mr. OULD CHEIKH ABDALLAHI (Mauritania), supported by Mr. SIMBULE (Zambia), Mr. WARSAMA (Somalia), Mr. CAINE (Liberia), Mr. TEVOEDJRE (Dahomey) and Mr. GATUGUTA (Kenya), stressed the importance of the statement just made by the Tanzanian representative, who was also Chairman of the Special Committee, and proposed that the statement should be published in extenso.

42. The CHAIRMAN said that if there was no objection the statement made by the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania would be published in extenso, as proposed by the representative of Mauritania.

It was so decided.

43. Mr. LUARD (United Kingdom) requested that the statement which he had made on the question of Southern Rhodesia at the 1683rd meeting on 4 October 1967 should also be published in extenso, so that the Committee could have a more complete picture of the situation in Southern Rhodesia.

44. Mr. WARSAMA (Somalia) pointed out that the United Kingdom representative's statement was not of the same importance to the Committee as was that of the Tanzanian representative, who was Chairman of the Special Committee, and he did not think that it should be published.

45. Mr. MALECELA (United Republic of Tanzania) recalled that when the United Kingdom representative had spoken, the text of his statement had been circulated to all the members of the Committee.

46. Mrs. ANDERSON (United States of America) supported the United Kingdom motion, stating that the United Kingdom representative's statement should be published, since it was the Committee's practice to accede to requests of that kind and since, moreover, it was a statement by the administering Power.

47. Mr. M'BAYE (Guinea) said that the Tanzanian representative's statement which Guinea would like to see published, had thrown light on imperialist collusion in Southern Rhodesia. Placed in a situation which was highly embarrassing for him, the United Kingdom representative should remain silent and withdraw his request.

48. Mr. MOROZOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that in his opinion the United Kingdom representative's statement made no real contribution to the Committee's work and it had been given sufficient coverage in the summary record. If the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States maintained their request, it should be put to the vote.

49. Mr. THIAM (Mali) said that, as the representative of the United States had pointed out, it was the Committee's practice to authorize the publication in extenso of statements when a request for that was made: for example, a statement by the United Kingdom on Aden had recently been issued in that way. In the present instance, however, the text in question had already been circulated to all the members of the Committee and, moreover, it introduced nothing that was really new. The Malian delegation was therefore opposed to its being published.

50. Mr. VAN DIJK (Netherlands) thought that the United Kingdom representative's statement, which provided a great deal of information on the application of the sanctions, should be published at the same time as that of the Tanzanian representative.

51. Mr. OULD CHEIKH ABDALLAHI (Mauritania) agreed with the USSR representative that the United Kingdom representative's proposal should be put to the vote.

52. The CHAIRMAN said that, as the United Kingdom representative maintained his proposal, it would be put to the vote.

53. Mr. BERRO (Uruguay), speaking in explanation of his vote, said that it was one of his country's democratic traditions to make use of every possible source of information. As he thought that the Committee should have as much information as possible at its disposal, he would vote in favour of the publication of the United Kingdom representative's statement.

54. Mr. TEVOEDJRE (Dahomey), speaking in explanation of his vote, pointed out that when the United Kingdom representative had delivered his statement no one had asked for it to be issued as a document. Moreover, the United Kingdom's request had a political meaning. That country, which was guilty of denying human rights to 4 million people, was seeking approval of its dilatory measures. That being so, Dahomey would vote against the publication of the statement.

55. Mr. MOROZOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that he, too, thought that the United Kingdom's request had a political meaning and that the Committee should not be misled. The Soviet Union delegation would vote against the publication of the United Kingdom's statement.

56. Mr. MALECELA (United Republic of Tanzania) said that he, too, considered that the simultaneous publication of the United Kingdom representative's statement and his own statement would have a political meaning.

57. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the United Kingdom representative's proposal that the statement he had made on the question of Southern Rhodesia at the 1683rd meeting should be published in extenso.

The United Kingdom representative's proposal was rejected by 50 votes to 20, with 28 abstensions.

58. Mr. GASCHIGNARD (France), speaking in explanation of his delegation's abstention in the vote, said that it should not be understood as an expression of any value judgement on the United Kingdom representative's statement. The French delegation considered that, for reasons of economy, it would be better to adhere to the rule which provided that only one Committee would have verbatim records. Delegations could always circulate their own statements if they deemed it desirable.

59. Mr. MELAN (Malaysia) said that, despite the condemnations of the racist régime of Southern Rhodesia and the sanctions imposed against it, it was becoming stronger and increasingly arrogant. In fact, the abhorrent practice of apartheid was being systematically introduced in that country, at the expense of the 4 million Africans living there. According to the Rhodesian Herald of 30 January 1967, Mr. Smith's "ideal" was to institute a system similar to that in South Africa. In its issue of 5 October 1967, the Manchester Guardian Weekly commented that the way to separate racial development was now clearly marked and would inevitably show itself in the "new do-it-yourself Rhodesian independence constitution". Legislation designed to ensure the political, if not physical, oblivion of the black people in Southern Rhodesia was being enforced. The African Affairs (Amendment) Bill and the Land Apportionment Act, which were almost carbon copies of the Group Areas Act and the Bantu Authorities Act in force in South Africa, boded ill for those people. That legislation was designed not only to establish discrimination between various tribal and ethnic groups on the basis of the colour of their skin, but also to sow discord among the Africans in order to enable the Whites to apply the well-known principle of divide and rule.

60. The illegal régime was expanding its armed forces and had recently increased its defence budget by about 20 per cent. Moreover, it was extremely disturbing to learn that in August 1967 members of the South African Police had gone to the help of the Southern Rhodesian armed forces in western Rhodesia. The New York Times of 5 October 1967 reported that South African forces were now patrolling beside the Southern Rhodesian armed forces.

61. A petitioner, the Reverend Bernard Zulu, had stated in the Special Committee (see A/6700/Rev.1, chap. III, para. 451) that under the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act anyone could be deprived of his liberty, without trial, for periods of up to five years which could be renewed indefinitely. It was estimated that about 10,000 Africans in Southern Rhodesia were detained or subjected to restrictive measures. The so-called Minister of Justice and Law and Order of the illegal government had introduced in the Legislative Assembly the Constitution Amendment Bill, which would modify current legislation in order to permit the application of preventive detention measures.

62. Faced with that situation, it was doubtful whether the economic sanctions adopted in various resolutions had had as much effect as the United Kingdom representative had claimed in his statement at the 1683rd meeting. The information provided in that statement was not convincing; he referred to the statement which, according to a Reuters report, had been made on 23 September 1967 by Mr. J. Wrathall, a member of the illegal régime. Mr. Wrathall had said that the only conclusions which could be drawn from the statements of the United Kingdom Government were that the latter adjusted its figures to bamboozle its Afro-Asian friends, or that it did not know what was going on in its own backyard.

63. Although under Articles 25 and 41 of the Charter all States Members of the United Nations were bound to apply the mandatory sanctions adopted by the Security Council, some Members, in particular Portugal and South Africa, publicly defied them. The role of foreign monopolies should also be denounced; in that connexion, the statistics for trade between the illegal régime and its partners, which were to be published, would be highly revealing; he would revert to that question when the time came to consider the relevant agenda item.

64. Malaysia maintained no political, economic or other relations with the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia, or with South Africa. In 1965 it had adopted the Customs (Prohibition of Imports and Exports) (Southern Rhodesia) Order, which had imposed a total embargo on trade with Southern Rhodesia more than a year before the Security Council had adopted resolution 232 (1966). Furthermore, in accordance with the recommendations of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Meeting held at Lagos in January 1966 regarding Commonwealth assistance for the training of Southern Rhodesian Africans, the Malaysian Government had decided to assist the latter in the following ways: to grant scholarships to enable them to study at the University of Malaya and at technical, agricultural and teachers' training colleges in Malaysia; to provide training for them at the Government's Staff Training Centre, the School of Customs and in youth training centres in Malaysia; to provide training for nurses and midwives at the General Hospital and at nurses and midwives training centres; and to provide in-service training in the information, broadcasting, general administration, land administration, police, social welfare and telecommunications services.

65. Malaysia appealed to all concerned, in particular the United Kingdom, which was primarily responsible for that "British colony" under the provisions of the 1961 Constitution, to take bolder and more effective action to bring down the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia. Malaysia would continue to discharge its obligations until that goal had been achieved.

66. Mr. NASKAR (India) associated himself with the congratulations addressed to the Chairman, the Vice-Chairman and the Rapporteur on that election.

67. The Indian delegation was convinced that if the United Kingdom Government had issued a timely and credible warning to the Southern Rhodesian racists, the white minority would never have dared to carry out its evil designs. The responsibility lay without any question with the administering Power.

68. The Indian delegation viewed the situation in Southern Rhodesia with the gravest concern. The voluntary sanctions called for by the General Assembly and the Security Council following the unilateral declaration of independence had naturally had no

effect. Even the Government of the United Kingdom took several weeks before announcing an embargo on the supply of oil to Southern Rhodesia. In April 1966 the United Kingdom Government, in a gesture which was more dramatic than meaningful, had asked the Security Council for permission to use force against an oil tanker at the port of Beira. As a result of pressure by the Afro-Asian countries, the United Kingdom delegation had once again gone to the Security Council in December 1966 to ask for selective mandatory sanctions to be imposed against Southern Rhodesia. It was quite obvious that those sanctions had failed.

69. On 8 December 1966, at the 1331st meeting of the Security Council, the United Kingdom Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had stated that the sanctions would result in cumulative economic atrophy and paralysis of Southern Rhodesia. The truth of the matter was, however, that they had actually served to strengthen the economic structure of the Territory. Small industrial enterprises, protected from foreign competition by an import quota system, had prospered. The Minister of Trade and Industry of the illegal régime had announced that since "independence" more than 250 new industrial projects, involving an investment of £4.75 million, had been approved. In its April 1967 issue, the Swiss Review of World Affairs had indicated that the sale of some items affected by the embargo, which had been carried out under the cover of forged certificates of origin, had been further facilitated by the establishment of a number of new Rhodesian enterprises in the Portuguese colonies in Africa. The industrial share index had risen by about 10 per cent compared with the previous year. On 8 June 1967, the Manchester Guardian Weekly had reported that import substitution had absorbed unemployment and that Rhodesian manufactures had never known such favourable conditions. Even the ban on the sale of tobacco, which had been expected to bring about the collapse of the Southern Rhodesian economy, had failed, since, with the help of subsidies, the tobacco planters had turned to the production of more profitable crops such as cotton, wheat and maize. In no sector, however, had the sanctions failed so completely as in the oil embargo. Several economic journals had recognized that the supply of oil had in no way been disrupted. Everyone knew the reasons for the continued availability of oil in Southern Rhodesia. His delegation did not suggest that sanctions were not hurting the white minority in Southern Rhodesia. It maintained however that sanctions had not and would not produce the desired results. Some people tended to see sanctions as an end in themselves, forgetting that they were merely the means to an end. The Indian delegation, while disapproving of the failure of certain States to fulfil their obligations, thought that the concentration of the question of the effectiveness of sanctions tended to divert attention from the principal objective and from the refusal of the United Kingdom Government to take the necessary steps without delay.

70. Everyone was aware of the collusion between the South African and Portuguese racists and the Southern Rhodesian régime. According to some estimates, Southern Rhodesia received by rail between 150,000 and 250,000 gallons of refined petroleum products daily, and it had already accumulated enough reserves for two years. The Portuguese company SONAREP had supplied Rhodesia with at least 70 million gallons of petrol in the past twelve months. On 12 March 1967, the Johannesburg Sunday Express had reported that South Africa was supplying Southern Rhodesia with large quantities of aviation fuel and that a new depot had been built by the Rhodesians on South African soil. Each day an average of eighteen road tankers crossed the frontier river, the Limpopo.

71. The conspiracy between South Africa and Southern Rhodesia was not confined to the economic sphere. Recently, the Smith régime had begun to apply the infamous policy of apartheid in Southern Rhodesia by passing the Land Apportionment Act, which reserved residential areas on the basis of race. The United Kingdom had failed to prevent the imposition of that detestable system in a territory for which it still retained responsibility.

72. The long-suspected military collusion between South Africa and Southern Rhodesia had now been confirmed. Press reports indicated that South Africa was supplying reinforcements for the Rhodesian troops and that South African helicopters were engaged in fighting the nationalists. Pretoria no longer denied those facts. The Washington Post of 27 August 1967 attributed the following sentence to Mr. Vorster: "South Africa is a good friend of Rhodesia and good friends know what their duty is if a neighbour's house is on fire—whatever becomes necessary will be done". It was therefore to be regretted that Mr. George Brown should have told the General Assembly that his Government did not contemplate an "economic war" with South Africa. That attitude could only encourage Pretoria to violate Security Council resolutions.

73. India welcomed the statements of the representatives of the administering Power that the United Kingdom had no intention of going back on its commitment not to grant independence to Southern Rhodesia before majority rule. His country was nevertheless concerned at the reports that the United Kingdom Government was trying to initiate talks with the illegal régime, even though, on 8 December 1966, at the 1331st meeting of the Security Council, the United Kingdom Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had said that the talks which had taken place on board the Tiger were the final round of talks. And yet a year later, the United Kingdom was still trying to negotiate with the Smith régime. And it was Mr. Smith who was reported to have told a rally on 29 July: "The Rhodesians don't have to worry about bogies—things like NIBMAR—... I repeat, our independence is something we have and we have no intention of relinquishing it." What then was left for the United Kingdom to negotiate about with Mr. Smith?

74. To be effective, economic sanctions must be comprehensive, mandatory and backed up by the forces of the administering Power. Since the United Kingdom had declared that the Smith régime was illegal and that a legally constituted government must be installed in Southern Rhodesia, it might be asked why it shrank from police action when it had not been afraid of using such measures in the past

against genuine national liberation movements. The only explanation was that the rebels of today were white and of British origin.

75. In conclusion, he recalled the communiqué issued during the visit of the President of Zambia to India in June 1967, in which the Presidents of the two States had expressed concern at the deteriorating situation in Zimbabwe and, agreeing that the measures so far taken had proved ineffective, had called for stronger measures in the form of comprehensive mandatory sanctions under Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter and had reaffirmed their view that the only effective and speedy way of putting an end to the illegal régime was through the use of force by the United Kingdom.

76. Mr. GATUGUTA (Kenya) congratulated the Chairman, the Vice-Chairman and the Rapporteur on their election. He also expressed the conviction that Mr. Djermakoye's first-hand experience, as an African, of the workings of colonialism and his profound knowledge of world affairs would be great assets to the Committee. The delegation of Kenya, for its part, would do its utmost to contribute constructively to the Committee's deliberations.

77. After two years of discussions on Southern Rhodesia and the adoption of numerous resolutions, it was disheartening to note that the régime seemed to be consolidating its position more and more. The time had come to move from words to deeds. It must be realized by now that time was not on the side of the people of Zimbabwe and that a determined attack must be made on the problem.

78. There was no longer any doubt as to the sinister intentions of the rebels. The African Affairs (Amendment) Bill introduced by Mr. Harper, Minister of Internal Affairs of the rebel government, while allegedly meant to give more dignity and power to the African chiefs, was in fact merely aimed at promoting the interests of the white racists. On 27 July 1967, Ian Smith had informed the Legislative Assembly that an independent commission would be established to advise on a new constitution based on recognition of the existence of different communities in Southern Rhodesia. In a broadcast statement, Smith was reported to have said also that it would take time for Africa to adjust itself to the democratic system, that as long as separate development continued it would be all the more necessary to educate the African, and that otherwise the African might live under the wing of the European. It was undeniable, in the light of those statements, that Smith and his rebels intended to introduce apartheid in Zimbabwe.

79. The report of the Special Committee was full of examples of atrocities being committed by the rebel régime against the people of Zimbabwe, of steps being taken by the régime to consolidate white minority rule, and of incidents revealing the worst type of dictatorship. In such circumstances, it was to be asked whether the United Nations could allow the people to be deprived of their basic political and social rights and confine itself to suggesting measures which it well knew would be ineffective. His delegation felt that the Committee must recommend the adoption of specific measures to put an end to a form of oppression which was incompatible with the ideals of the Charter.

80. Contrary to what the United Kingdom representative had said in his statement at the 1683rd meeting, sanctions were not hurting the Southern Rhodesian economy appreciably. Indeed, they had hardened the stand of the rebels, driven the moderate elements to extremism and given Smith more support than he had had at the time of the unilateral declaration of independence.

81. The oil embargo had produced no effect other than mild rationing. While the price of petrol had risen, the new price did not compare unfavourably with the price prevailing in many parts of the world. It could not therefore be claimed that the embargo was capable of bringing about the régime's downfall.

82. The United Kingdom representative had himself recognized that the success of sanctions depended on the loyal support of all Members of the United Nations. It was to be wondered whether the United Kingdom Government, at the time when the sanctions had been decided upon, had been unaware of the attitude of the South African and Portuguese Governments towards sanctions. Those Governments had, of course, stated their opposition to sanctions and had immediately proceeded to sabotage them, providing Rhodesia with many essential supplies and allowing oil to be transported through their territory.

83. In fact, the only way of making sanctions effective was to extend them to the two parties responsible, South Africa and Portugal, if they refused to comply with the Security Council's resolutions.

84. The United Kingdom delegation had stated that its Government was giving close attention to the problem of closing loop-holes. As the policies of Portugal and South Africa constituted the main loophole, it was to be hoped that the United Kingdom Government would make it its duty to remedy that situation.

85. At the present time, Southern Rhodesia was still a United Kingdom colony and a United Kingdom responsibility, but Kenya would never be indifferent to the problems of the Territory, which were African problems. The situation prevailing was a result of inaction by the United Kingdom Government. The United Kingdom must acknowledge that, as long as South Africa and Portugal continued to flout the decisions of the United Nations, sanctions would have no effect and the rebel régime would continue to oppress the people of Zimbabwe.

86. Everyone knew that, in the past, the United Kingdom as a colonial Power had used force to crush genuine nationalist movements advocating independence. If the United Kingdom had regarded the use of force as justified on those occasions, there should certainly be infinitely more justification today for using force to crush the illegal régime in Rhodesia.

87. It was not enough, at the present stage, to condemn verbally what was happening in Rhodesia. The time had come for action for giving full effect to the resolutions adopted by the Security Council

and the General Assembly. It was therefore imperative that all Governments which were directly or indirectly supporting the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia should cease to do so. Kenya, for its part, had not only complied with the Security Council resolution on sanctions but had also taken steps to make them more comprehensive.

88. Despite the reluctance of the United Kingdom to use force, it was clear that recourse to violence was inevitable. Wherever a people was politically, socially and economically oppressed, and wherever it had failed to achieve its rights through constitutional means, it had always resorted to violence in order to regain those rights. Rhodesia would certainly not be an exception to the rule, even if the violence was to result in prolonging suffering and bloodshed and creating racial animosity.

89. It would be disastrous if the United Kingdom and the United Nations left the Zimbabwe nationalists with no other choice except to rise in arms against the rebel régime. The only practical solution to the problem in Rhodesia was for the United Nations to impose comprehensive mandatory economic sanctions and to compel South Africa and Portugal to comply with them. If it proved impossible to implement those sanctions, there would be no other course but for the United Kingdom—which could certainly not say that it did not believe in the use of force—to take military action.

90. It would be a grave mistake to think that the African countries would sit by and watch inhumanity becoming the order of the day in Rhodesia. Kenya, together with its African brothers, would do everything possible to support the heroic struggle by the freedom fighters of Zimbabwe.

91. He concluded by appealing to the United Nations to bring its full authority to bear in order to obtain the release of the African leaders who were being illegally held in detention in Southern Rhodesia.

92. Mr. CALINGASAN (Philippines) congratulated the Chairman, the Vice-Chairman and the Rapporteur on their election and paid a tribute to Mr. Fakhreddine for the way in which he had conducted the Committee's proceedings at the twenty-first session. His delegation was pleased by the appointment to the post of Under-Secretary for Trusteeship and Non-Self-Governing Territories of Mr. Djermakoye, an eminent citizen of a recently liberated African country. It also wished to express its appreciation to the Special Committee for its excellent report.

93. As the United Kingdom had admitted, the question of Southern Rhodesia was the most important of all those that were before the Committee. That question was indeed both vital and urgent. It was vital because it constituted a test of whether or not an illegal and racist government of a handful of minority settlers could continue to defy not only the authority of the United Kingdom but also that of the United Nations itself. It was urgent because that situation constituted a threat to international peace and security, as had been pointed out by the Security Council, and because action was imperative in order to liberate the African majority from the oppression of the illegal régime, which was rapidly consolidating its position and was on its way to the adoption of the ignominious practice of apartheid. Unless the United Nations, and in particular the Security Council, acted fast and effectively, the world community would have another South Africa on its hands.

94. The representative of the United Kingdom had said (1683rd meeting) that confusion and inconsistency could only give encouragement to the rebels. Although the United Kingdom representative had meant well, that statement could easily lead to the mistaken implication that in the past there had been confusion and inconsistency on the part of the United Nations or the majority of its Members and that such confusion and inconsistency had encouraged the illegal régime to adopt its present defiant attitude. That, however, was not the case in so far as the vast majority of the membership of the United Nations was concerned. The pertinent resolutions, which had been adopted with overwhelming majorities and which demanded the re-establishment of majority rule, the attainment of freedom and independence by the country and the overthrow of the illegal régime, if necessary by force, had never given rise to the slightest doubt.

95. The responsibility for what was happening was clear. In spite of the affirmation by the General Assembly that Southern Rhodesia was a Non-Self-Governing Territory under the terms of the Charter, the United Kingdom had consistently refused to transmit to the Secretary-General the information required under Article 73 e, insisting that Southern Rhodesia had been a self-governing Territory since 1923 and contesting the right of the United Nations to discuss the question. In spite of the repeated resolutions of the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Special Committee for the release of African political prisoners, the suspension of the 1961 Constitution and the calling of a constitutional conference, the United Kingdom had persisted in its position that it could not interfere in the internal affairs of Southern Rhodesia. Moreover, even after having declared that the unilateral declaration of independence had been an open act of rebellion and treason, the United Kingdom had made it known that it would not use force against the Southern Rhodesian régime, considering that it would last only a matter of weeks. Two years had nevertheless passed, and the Salisbury régime had more and more strongly consolidated its position. Shortly after having declared that they would not negotiate with the illegal régime, the United Kingdom authorities had entered into so-called "talks" with Mr. Smith.

96. The position of the Philippine delegation with regard to the struggle of the African people of Zimbabwe for the attainment of independence under majority rule was clear and unequivocal. His country had invariably supported, and in some cases co-sponsored, all the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and the Security Council on that question since 1962. His Government, while complying with the mandatory economic sanctions imposed by the Security Council in its resolution 232 (1966), held to the view that the use of force by the United Kingdom against the illegal régime was more than justified under the circumstances and would con-

stitute the most effective way of bringing it to an end. It also fully supported the resolution by which the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African unity had invited the African members of the Security Council to continue to call for further measures, including those provided for by Article 42 of the Charter, in order to strengthen the implementation of Council resolution 232 (1966). It was imperative for the permanent members of the Council to hearken to that call, for without their support no measures could bring down the illegal government. His Government shared the conviction expressed by the Special Committee in its resolution of 9 June 1967 (A/6700/Rev.1, chap. III, para. 609) with regard to the adoption of comprehensive mandatory sanctions and the use of force by the administering Power.

97. It was apparent from the report of the Special Committee and other information that the sanctions had thus far failed principally because of the continued trade between the illegal régime and South Africa, the lack of the necessary co-operation from Portugal and the existence of loop-holes in the sanctions which had been taken advantage of by some private traders.

98. He was convinced that the Security Council had the power to take the necessary enforcement action and to ensure that the sanctions and other measures were applied by all States, especially those which had so far failed or refused to take action.

99. His delegation would like, in conclusion, to pay a tribute to the fortitude of the African people of Zimbabwe and their nationalist leaders, who could rest assured that the Philippine delegation would support all United Nations efforts to bring about the downfall of the illegal racist minority régime and the establishment of majority rule in their land.

Requests for hearings (continued)

100. The CHAIRMAN informed the Committee that he had received three requests for hearings concerning South West Africa, the first from Mr. Jacob Kuhangua, Secretary-General of the South West Africa, People's Organization (SWAPO), the second from Mr. Nathaniel Mbaeva and Mr. Mburumba Kerina, representing the South West Africa National United Front (SWANUF), and the third from the Reverend Michael Scott, of the International League for the Rights of Man. Another request for a hearing, concerning Territories under Portuguese administration, had been received from Mr. Albert Bonaparte Nank. If there were no objections, those communications would be circulated as Committee documents and considered at a later meeting.

It was so decided. [1]

The meeting rose at 6.15 p.m.

[1] The requests concerning South West Africa were subsequently circulated as documents A/C.4/692 and Add.1 and 2 and that concerning Territories under Portuguese administration as document A/C.4/693.

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