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*Chairman:* Mr. George J. TOMEH (Syria).

AGENDA ITEM 23

Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: Southern Rhodesia (continued)\* (A/6700/Rev.1, chap. III; A/C.4/L.870)

CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTION A/C.4/L.870

1. Mr. NKAMA (Zambia), on behalf of the sponsors, introduced a draft resolution on the question of Southern Rhodesia (A/C.4/L.870). It was admittedly rather long, but the problem of Southern Rhodesia was no longer as simple as it had appeared in the initial stages and, as a result of the administering Power's failure to take decisive action, now constituted a serious threat to Africa and to the whole world. Various relevant factors and events which had occurred since 11 November 1965 had to be taken into account. The sponsors had tried to be as reasonable as possible and had only called upon the United Kingdom to do what was consistent with its obligations as administering Power.

2. With regard to operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution, it was of paramount importance to reaffirm in no uncertain terms the legitimacy of the struggle of the people of Zimbabwe, who had tried all peaceful means to make their demands known, but without success. Peaceful demonstrations were met with police dogs and guns, and had now been declared illegal. The people had no alternative but to struggle for their freedom and independence and

the freedom fighters should not be condemned by the administering Power as terrorists.

3. Operative paragraph 2 was also of the utmost importance. Racial discrimination could only be described as a crime against humanity, and oppressive policies in Southern Rhodesia and other areas under minority rule were making multi-racialism a difficult experiment, in free Africa, where merit, and not race, was what counted.

4. It was essential to reaffirm, as did operative paragraph 3, the obligation of the administering Power to transfer power to the people of Zimbabwe on the basis of elections conducted according to the principle of "one man, one vote", since the United Kingdom had already on several occasions gone back on its promises, for instance, by initiating "talks about talks" after declaring that it would no longer negotiate with the rebel régime.

5. There was no need to explain why the United Kingdom Government should be condemned, in operative paragraph 4, for its refusal to overthrow the régime in Salisbury.

6. With regard to operative paragraphs 5 and 6, it was clear that the sanctions sponsored by the United Kingdom would never succeed in overthrowing the illegal régime and that more effective measures were required. The United Kingdom was perhaps the most experienced of all the colonial Powers in the use of force to put down rebellions and knew that that was the only way to an effective and speedy solution.

7. In operative paragraph 7, the United Kingdom was called upon, not only to put an end to the minority régime, but to ensure the implementation *inter alia* of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), in other words to introduce majority rule based upon the wishes of the people.

8. It was fitting that the States which continued to have economic and other relations with Southern Rhodesia in violation of United Nations resolutions should be condemned, as in operative paragraph 9. Some claimed that they had no power over firms in their territory, yet they had been able to take action to prevent such economic activity when their own interests had been at stake.

9. With regard to operative paragraph 10, it was interesting that some States, particularly Western States, declared publicly that they would not cooperate with the illegal régime and yet privately invested large sums of money in the territory which did not benefit the indigenous people in any way but helped Ian Smith to oppress them.

10. Operative paragraph 12 was of the greatest importance since it was clear that the South African

\*Resumed from the 1697th meeting.

forces were on Southern Rhodesian soil in order to prevent the people of Zimbabwe from gaining independence. It was also the duty of the Committee to express grave concern at the serious threat those forces constituted to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of independent African States in the area (paragraph 13); the air space of some States had already been violated. Diplomatic protests at the presence of South African forces in Southern Rhodesia were obviously insufficient and the United Kingdom should take steps to expel them without delay and to prevent any further military assistance from reaching the régime (paragraph 14). There were, of course, some who believed that the South African forces were in Southern Rhodesia with the consent of the United Kingdom; if that was not true, the United Kingdom should ensure their immediate expulsion.

11. There could be no peace in Southern Rhodesia as long as the leaders of the African people were in prison and it was absolutely necessary for them to be free to organize and lead their people (paragraph 15).

12. Having recognized the legitimacy of the struggle of the people of Zimbabwe, in operative paragraph 1, it was fitting that all States should be urged to render moral and material assistance to their national liberation movements, as in operative paragraph 16.

13. Since the limited measures now in force would not succeed in bringing down the illegal régime, it was the duty of the Committee to draw the attention of the Security Council to the need for measures envisaged under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter (paragraph 17).

14. It was appropriate to appeal for assistance for those suffering from oppression in Southern Rhodesia and for those who had fled the territory (paragraph 18), and most important that the sufferings of the people in Southern Rhodesia should be given the widest possible publicity (paragraph 19).

15. Since the policies pursued by some Governments were inconsistent with their declarations, it was important to keep the situation under review and to establish which States were complying with the United Nations resolutions and which were not; hence the request to the Special Committee in operative paragraph 20. The remaining operative paragraphs required no explanation.

16. When, on previous occasions, African and Asian delegations had recommended strong measures to put down the rebellion of the minority régime in Southern Rhodesia, they had been accused of being hasty, emotional and irresponsible. Almost two years had elapsed since the unilateral declaration of independence, however, and the limited measures adopted had failed. Some claimed that the use of force was inconsistent with their convictions, yet the United Kingdom was only being asked to use force to prevent part of its territory from seceding, to remove the racists from power and to establish democracy and true freedom and independence. He pleaded with those who had opposed strong measures on previous occasions to vote with the Afro-Asian delegations.

17. Mr. NASKAR (India) seconded the draft resolution which was only the logical corollary of the sequence of events concerning Southern Rhodesia since 11 November 1965. The draft resolution sought to reflect the sentiments expressed by the various representatives during the debate, without compromising the interests of the 4 million Africans of Zimbabwe. It was also based on the resolution adopted by the Special Committee of Twenty-Four on 9 June 1967 (A/6700/Rev.1, chap. III, para. 609).

18. It had been found necessary to recall, in the fifth preambular paragraph, the solemn pledge given by the United Kingdom that it would not grant independence to Southern Rhodesia before majority rule was established because of the persistent rumours in the Press that the United Kingdom Government might enter into some arrangement with the rebel régime. That was the crux of the whole crisis. Operative paragraph 3 needed no explanations since it reaffirmed an obligation long recognized by the United Nations. Operative paragraph 4 condemned the failure and refusal of the United Kingdom Government to take effective measures which were fully within its competence as administering Power. Operative paragraph 5 expressed the opinion of the overwhelming majority of members that, while the sanctions so far enforced might have hurt the Southern Rhodesian economy to some extent, they would never lead to the ultimate objective of bringing about the downfall of the Smith régime. Operative paragraphs 6 and 7 reaffirmed the view held by the majority of delegations that the use of force by the administering Power would be the most effective and speedy way of ending the rebellion. Unlike economic sanctions, moreover, that method would not demand difficult and futile sacrifices from many nations which bore no responsibility for the present crisis. Operative paragraph 8 followed logically from the principle upheld both by the United Nations and by the administering Power, namely, no independence before majority rule. Negotiations with the régime which had rejected that principle would therefore serve no useful purpose. Operative paragraphs 12 and 13 dealt with a new element in the situation, namely, the South African military presence in Southern Rhodesia, an act of aggression which constituted a threat to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of independent African States. He hoped that the open admission by the South African representative of the presence of South African armed personnel in Southern Rhodesia would convince all members of the futility of expecting any co-operation from the Pretoria régime. In operative paragraph 14 the United Kingdom was called upon to take immediate action to deal with that aggression. The remaining provisions of the draft resolution were similar to those of previous resolutions or were of a procedural nature.

19. The Security Council had already declared that the present situation in Southern Rhodesia constituted a threat to international peace and security and he was sure that no Member of the United Nations, with the usual exceptions of South Africa and Portugal, would question the Organization's fundamental obligation to restore the rights of the people of Zimbabwe and establish peace in the area. Its failure to do so would have far-reaching repercussions involving

the whole African continent and, perhaps, the world. The sponsors considered that the draft resolution, if adopted and implemented, would be the best means of fulfilling the obligations voluntarily undertaken

by Members under the Charter. He commended it for unanimous adoption.

*The meeting rose at 12 noon*