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NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/. . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements* of the *Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

2335th MEETING

Held in New York on Thursday, 25 March 1982, at 10.30 a.m.

President: Mrs. Jeane J. KIRKPATRICK
(United States of America).

Present: The representatives of the following States: China, France, Guyana, Ireland, Japan, Jordan, Panama, Poland, Spain, Togo, Uganda, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zaire.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2335)

1. Adoption of the agenda
2. Letter dated 19 March 1982 from the Permanent Representative of Nicaragua to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/14913)

The meeting was called to order at 11.35 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Letter dated 19 March 1982 from the Permanent Representative of Nicaragua to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/14913)

1. The PRESIDENT: I should like to inform members of the Council that I have received a letter from the representative of Nicaragua, in which he requests that his delegation be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite the delegation of Nicaragua to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

2. I request the Chief of Protocol to escort Mr. Daniel Ortega Saavedra, Co-ordinator of the Governing Junta of National Reconstruction of Nicaragua, into the Council Chamber and to a place at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Daniel Ortega Saavedra (Nicaragua) took a place at the Council table.

3. The PRESIDENT: I should like to inform members of the Council that I have also received letters

from the representatives of Angola, Cuba, Honduras and Mexico in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. de Figueiredo (Angola), Mr. Roa Kouri (Cuba), Mr. Carius (Honduras) and Mr. Muñoz Ledo (Mexico) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

4. The PRESIDENT: The Security Council is meeting today in response to the request contained in the letter dated 19 March from the representative of Nicaragua addressed to the Secretary-General [S/14913]. Members of the Council have before them also documents S/14908 and S/14909, which contain the texts of two letters dated 16 March from the representative of Nicaragua addressed to the Secretary-General, and S/14919, containing the text of a letter dated 23 March from the representative of Honduras addressed to the Secretary-General.

5. The first speaker is the Co-ordinator of the Governing Junta of National Reconstruction of Nicaragua, Mr. Daniel Ortega Saavedra. I invite him to make his statement.

6. Mr. ORTEGA SAAVEDRA (Nicaragua) (*interpretation from Spanish*): Madam President, and members of the Council, I extend to you my most sincere greetings and those of the Nicaraguan people and Government.

7. Throughout history, humanity has engaged in a constant struggle to achieve better and more just ways of life. As part of this historical process, the Central American region in recent times has been in upheaval because of the constant action of its peoples, who have so long been oppressed and who are determined to free themselves, in the face of the resistance of privileged minorities who are at pains to halt the changes which, sooner or later, must come to these unjust societies.

8. Through sacrifice and great efforts, the Nicaraguan people were able to break the chains of a brutal and inhuman system on 19 July 1979. And also through sacrifice and great effort, the people of El Salvador

are giving continuity and increased value to a struggle begun many decades ago—a struggle which has been repressed and suppressed on different occasions but which has always been just.

9. It is to a certain extent understandable that corrupt and bloody régimes such as that of Maximiliano Hernández in El Salvador would slaughter more than 30,000 Salvadorans on 22 January 1932 and that the Somozist dictatorship would massacre more than 100,000 Nicaraguans during 40 years of terror in order to maintain themselves in power, but something that defies logic and is therefore difficult to understand is that behind Maximiliano Hernández and the Somozas there stood various governments of the United States of America, giving them unconditional support.

10. We Nicaraguans have had hard and bitter experience of the policies of different United States Administrations which have supplied continuous backing to anti-popular governments, have harassed and overthrown good governments, and have carried out armed intervention against our people. A review of these unjust actions would find them repeated time and again throughout our history.

11. In the final weeks of our people's struggle, when Somoza was bombing, strafing and burning our cities, at the Seventeenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Organization of American States (OAS) the United States attempted once more, through an inter-American force, to win approval for its intervention in Nicaragua. Today, with differences only of detail, history is repeating itself, with the present United States Administration doing everything imaginable to effect an intervention in Central America.

12. When our revolution triumphed, notwithstanding the historical inconsistency of United States policy, we felt—and indeed proposed—that it was necessary to normalize relations with the United States within a new framework of respect and co-operation. It was in this spirit that I met in Washington in September 1980 with President Carter, and we must acknowledge that an effective dialogue then became possible. This mutual disposition to readjust and improve relations between Nicaragua and the United States underwent a sharp change when, in January 1981, the new Administration assumed the presidency of the United States.

13. The new United States Administration at this point had to face the reality of a triumphant revolution in Nicaragua and the determination of oppressed peoples in El Salvador and Guatemala fighting for far-reaching changes that were needed in all sectors. It was a grave responsibility for the new Administration, which, in its electoral platform throughout its campaign, had proclaimed, among other things, courses of action aimed at destroying the revolutionary process in Nicaragua and halting, at all costs, the process of change in the Central American region—a policy that

conflicted even with that of the allies of the United States because it was based on arrogance rather than reason.

14. Such programmes put forward during the electoral campaign would not have been so important and would have remained mere elements of electoral propaganda if the policy applied by the new Government had manifested itself in realistic terms and, above all, in keeping with the responsibility its great power demanded.

15. But the reality was hard and even dramatic, when the planks of the electoral campaign rapidly began to be translated into facts: economic aggression, verbal threats, destabilization plans, tolerance and encouragement of armed counterrevolutionary activities by the United States itself are among the most noteworthy events encouraged by the current United States Administration in its year and two months in office, against a country of ordinary men and women dedicated to rebuilding their country, which represents no threat to the national interests of the American people.

16. At the same time, a resumption of military aid in weapons, training and advisers to the Salvadoran army and security forces was the Administration's only response to the crisis in El Salvador, thus once again compromising the United States Government in a lost and unjust cause and thereby compromising the very values and moral strength which gave rise to the United States itself.

17. Protests against this mistaken and dangerous policy were not long in coming. Responsible peoples and serious Governments rejected the pretexts put forward to justify United States support for the immoral cause of the murderers of humble peasants, workers, students, professionals, intellectuals, children, women, old people, journalists, priests and clergy. For it has always been clear that the often-cited East-West confrontation is not the cause of the revolutionary change in Nicaragua and of the struggles of the peoples of El Salvador and Guatemala, as has so often been claimed.

18. As I pointed out in my address at the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly,¹ no one can cast doubt on the fact that the true causes of the struggle in Central America were present there even before the Bolsheviks seized power in Tsarist Russia. Nor can there be any doubt that even before, as far back as 1912, the United States was pursuing the erroneous policy that was manifested in Nicaragua by the armed intervention of its Marines, which met with the heroic resistance of our people.

19. The cause of the crisis in the region is so clear and the response on the part of the United States so weak and misguided that Governments such as those of Mexico, Venezuela and Canada have proposed a

global and non-discriminatory programme to permit a joint response in the economic field that would help alleviate the social and political conflicts stemming from economic injustices. This initiative has not been taken up as it should have been by the United States, which has in fact pursued a unilateral, limited and exclusionary policy that has excluded Grenada, Cuba and Nicaragua, thus weakening the efforts promoted by the Governments I have mentioned and making it impossible to respond to the urgent request of the Central American countries for a minimum of \$20 billion in financing and credits in order to be able to survive over the next five years.

20. We can affirm at this time that the policy of the present United States Administration is still out of step with the realities in the region and that, despite what some had predicted, the threats made against the region in the Government's platform were not mere campaign rhetoric but are increasingly becoming a dreadful fact.

21. The waging of covert aggression against our revolution has now intensified the crisis to the point at which the imminence of intervention in Central America has compelled us to request a meeting of the Council.

22. I can only affirm that since my appearance before the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session, in the course of which we transmitted concrete peace proposals from the Salvadoran revolutionaries, the crisis situation in Central America has assumed greater dimensions, and numerous efforts to bring peace and political stability to the region have been thwarted.

23. It is because of the dynamic of these developments that I have found myself obliged to appear before you to warn the nations of the earth that the Central American crisis has now reached the point of a tragic explosion.

24. I find myself obliged to appear before you because of the growing concern of world public opinion over the uncertain course of events in Central America.

25. I have come before this body because Nicaragua has military pacts with no one, because we cannot conceive that the insensitivity of the United States Administration towards the region's need for change should spark off a crisis of global proportions, and because we do not want the just struggle of our peoples incorporated, by unilateral action, into the geopolitical calculations of grand world strategies.

26. I come to appeal to this United Nations body because we cannot accept our being left with no alternative but to die defending our country, as we would never allow ourselves to be subjugated by force.

27. I find myself obliged to appear before you because I share the legitimate concern of the responsible

men and women who in the United States Congress are making great efforts to prevent the intervention: because I share the legitimate concern of the most important and high-minded mass media of the United States, and that of the United States people: those ordinary citizens, their religious leaders and those of their civic organizations, their intellectuals and their trade unions, who reject another Viet Nam in their history and share the desire of the Nicaraguan people for peace, for both are peoples whose deep-seated historical memories contain images of intervention and of the agonies of war.

28. We have requested this meeting for serious and extremely urgent reasons, and not to make use of this forum to hurl insults at the United States Government. We wish to make every effort that we are morally obliged to make to avoid a conflagration with untold consequences for the Central American region and which could endanger world peace.

29. I want to say to you with the utmost sincerity and simplicity, and with the moral support of our entire people, that if our fervent efforts for peace should fail, neither imperial will, nor threats, nor blockades, nor invasions will be able to put an end to the historic struggle we are prepared to wage to safeguard our legitimate right to self-determination, fighting to the last man and shedding the last drop of our blood. But it is not confrontation that we desire, but peace and tranquility; that is why we have come here before you.

30. We are not here to enumerate or to set out a chronological list of all the aggressive and destabilizing actions promoted by the Government of the United States from the very moment the present Administration took office. We shall confine ourselves to a brief review of the main events that have taken place in the last few months, events which paint a picture enabling us to assert that the intervention in Central America is already under way.

31. Therefore, we want you to know of the existence in the state of Florida, on the territory of the United States itself, of training camps for Somozist counter-revolutionaries, and of the feeble, legalistic excuses offered by the United States authorities when we have demanded the dismantling of those camps, which violate the Neutrality Act that is part of United States law.

32. We want you to know of the existence of Somozist counterrevolutionary camps on the territory of the Republic of Honduras in the vicinity of the border with Nicaragua, where some 2,000 counter-revolutionaries have been brought together, and trained, supplied and armed by officials of the operations section of the Division of Hemisphere Affairs of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). In this regard, despite the public statements made by the Honduran Government concerning its position of neu-

trality, actions by the CIA to compromise that neutrality have become increasingly forceful.

33. We want you to know that in the last five months alone, these armed bands of Somozist counterrevolutionaries operating from Honduras have penetrated our territory, devastating the communities of Raiti, Alamicamba, Tuskrutara Siki-Yari in the northern zone of the Department of Zelaya; they have also penetrated El Espino, El Cuadro and Las Brisas in the Departments of Chinandega and Nueva Segovia, leaving a tragic toll of 67 dead and 20 wounded among civilian and military personnel.

34. Today, at 1.30 a.m., an attack was launched from Honduran territory on the Nicaraguan frontier post of El Espino. That aggression resulted in the burning of the Nicaraguan customs warehouses. Then, at 4.30 a.m. today, counterrevolutionary bands coming from Honduran territory attacked the Nicaraguan frontier post at El Sacatón, eight kilometres north-east of Cinco Pinos in the Department of Chinandega.

35. Therefore, we want you to know that in the Honduran Department of El Paraiso, on the border with Nicaragua, about 700 Somozist ex-guardsmen have been concentrated in several camps; that in the zone of Cacamuya there are another 60 counterrevolutionaries; and that in the Department of Lempira on the Honduran Atlantic coast and on the Nicaraguan border there are located several camps of Somozist counterrevolutionaries numbering more than 1,000 men. Since 15 March this year, these camps have been receiving an increasing supply of arms and war equipment, including hundreds of FAL and M-16 rifles, demolition and fragmentation grenades, grenade-launchers and explosives.

36. We want you to know that several days ago a documentary was shown on a United States television newscast in which United States and Argentine officials were shown—many of the Argentines recently having been discharged by their country's army—training Somozist counterrevolutionaries and Latin American mercenaries in Honduras.

37. We want you to know that on Friday, 19 March, Mr. Noel Ernesto Vásquez Gutiérrez asked for asylum in the Nicaraguan Embassy in Honduras and was subsequently seized and forcibly removed from the protection of our Embassy and abducted by Honduran authorities. Mr. Vásquez was able to announce through that country's mass media that he had been recruited in California to enter the service of the Somozist counterrevolutionary groups that were operating freely in Honduras, and that in the places he had visited he was able to count as many as 22 Argentine military men, led by Colonel Santiago Villegas, engaged in conspiratorial activities against Nicaragua. Now, in a crude and discredited manoeuvre, the same person has been presented on an official television programme of the Honduran armed forces saying just

the opposite—that is, he was forced to invent a story in an attempt to implicate Nicaragua.

38. We want you to know that in recent days there has been an increase in aggressive acts on the part of naval units of Honduras and El Salvador against Nicaraguan fishing vessels, leaving a toll of two Nicaraguans dead and one wounded.

39. These actions have taken place mainly in the Gulf of Fonseca, as a result of the campaign of false accusations about purported traffic in weapons from Nicaragua to El Salvador along this route—a campaign which has contributed to an increase of border tensions in these waters.

40. We must also mention the provocation which occurred on 21 March, when four Super-Mistère aircraft of the Honduran Air Force attacked a Nicaraguan vessel that was carrying out marine resources monitoring and protection activities in Nicaragua's territorial waters. It seems inconceivable that official spokesmen of the Department of State would hasten to take the side in this incident of the Honduran Army, instead of adopting a prudent stance of non-interference in order to contribute to a lessening of tension between Honduras and Nicaragua.

41. You should also know that the United States has made the decision to construct on Honduran territory both air and naval bases, the first of them on Amapala Island; and a treaty has been proposed to be signed in the next few days legalizing the United States military presence on Honduran territory. This development, so unfortunate for peace and security in the Central American region, is a premeditated result of the continuous campaign which has been launched against our country about an alleged Nicaraguan military buildup.

42. You should also know that the United States Embassy in Tegucigalpa officially acknowledged on the 19th of this month that a minimum of 72 United States military personnel are currently stationed in Honduras. This is an unprecedented number in that country.

43. The United States Navy destroyer *Caron*, equipped with sophisticated electronic espionage technology, has been stationed off Nicaragua's Pacific coast facing the Gulf of Fonseca, carrying out surveillance tasks, as the United States Government has publicly acknowledged.

44. We also want you to know about the visits to Latin America at the end of February and the beginning of March by Mr. Thomas O. Enders, aimed at organizing what is supposed to be an inter-American peace force ready to intervene in the area.

45. We want you to know that when United States newspapers, magazines and other media publish

reports that the United States National Security Council has approved a budget of \$19 million to promote destabilizing and covert actions that entail, among other things, economic sabotage, attacks, training and arms shipments to Somozist counterrevolutionary groups, not a single spokesman or authority of the United States Government has denied such reports. Indeed, on the contrary, those who have referred to them have wrapped them in doubt or given them an affirmative character. Furthermore, after these disclosures were made we began to feel the actual carrying out of terrorist actions: bombs aboard our passenger aircraft and in civilian airports, with a tragic toll of death and injury; destruction of bridges; and the resurgence of actions by counterrevolutionary gangs, such as the so-called "Red Christmas" operation along the Rio Coco River, which took the lives of 60 of our compatriots, who were murdered.

46. We want you to know that since 14 March, exercises have been going on in the Southern Command in the Panama Canal Zone in which forces from United States territory and the 193rd Infantry Brigade of that same Command are taking part, and that within the framework of the OAS, pressures are being exerted to obtain a resolution that would legalize intervention against El Salvador and Nicaragua.

47. We want you to know that from June 1981 until 11 March of this year, we were the victims of 40 violations of our airspace by RC-135 aircraft of the United States Air Force. The violations of our airspace which have been detected are: one on 28 July 1981; two on 3 and 25 August 1981; four on 4, 11, 17 and 25 September 1981; 10 on 2, 9, 13, 17, 20, 22, 24, 25, 28 and 30 October 1981; 10 on 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 10, 12, 14 and 16 November 1981—on the 7th of that month two flights were detected; two on 2 and 30 December 1981; one on 3 January 1982; six on 2, 4, 10, 16, 24 and 27 February 1982; and four up to 11 March 1982, the flights occurring on the 4th, 8th, 10th and 11th of this month.

48. All those flights were carried out over the Pacific coast of Nicaragua and along our borders with Honduras and Costa Rica, and it seems highly significant that 10 of them took place in October and 10 others in November 1981, precisely when both President Reagan and Mr. Haig were voicing the possibility of decisive and immediate military actions against Nicaragua.

49. On the basis of what norms of international law does the United States Government claim the right to conduct espionage against our country and violate our airspace?

50. We want you to know that when the Deputy Director of the CIA, Admiral Bobby Inmann, and the Deputy Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency of the Pentagon, Mr. John Hughes, presented to the media and public opinion of the United States alleged

evidence of a Nicaraguan arms buildup, they were officially acknowledging espionage against Nicaraguan territory. This so-called arms buildup by Nicaragua has been disproved in the light of the military realities of the region.

51. Our military resources are the most modest in the region. We have no air force. Nevertheless, it is Nicaragua which is being encircled with military bases and it is against Nicaragua that a permanent hostile and bellicose attitude is being aimed, with spy aircraft and vessels and naval manoeuvres. We are the only State in Central America over which hangs the constant threat of the world military might of the United States.

52. The only true military superiority for the defence of our homeland lies in the formidable combative and organizational readiness of our entire people, since we are the only Government in Central America that can, in all confidence, distribute weapons to the people.

53. We want you to know that the Department of State of the United States, in a puerile gesture aimed at accumulating any sort of evidence which could justify interventionist action against Nicaragua, presented to the United States press at the State Department on 12 March a Nicaraguan, Orlando José Tardencillas, who had been held prisoner by the Salvadoran Army for more than a year and who had been transferred from the dungeons of San Salvador to the offices of the State Department in an act without precedent in terms of violation of international juridical norms relating to the minimum respect due to the sovereignty and independence of the Salvadoran nation.

54. United States citizens should ask themselves whether these events do not contain serious violations of their own laws: participation and complicity in the kidnapping of a person; pressure and threats to force someone to lie and make statements against his own will; threats to a person's life and physical integrity; concealment and complicity in coercion and physical and mental torture.

55. We want you to know that, on 14 March, at 2244 hours, two bridges strategic for the defence and communications of the country were blown up in acts of sabotage: the bridge over the Rio Negro, which was totally destroyed, and the bridge over the Rio Coco, which suffered considerable structural damage making the passage of vehicles impossible.

56. Both bridges are in Departments bordering on Honduras, and these criminal actions demonstrate once again the implementation of the covert actions of the CIA, approved by the State Department. These assertions of ours were amply confirmed by Presidential Adviser Mr. Edwin Meese, who, when asked on 16 March by United States journalists if the destruction of the bridges meant that the covert plan had been put into operation, replied: "This is the kind of event which we can neither confirm nor deny under

any circumstances, because in either case we cannot rule out what we could be doing in any other situation." And the picture becomes even more serious if we recall that on 15 February President Reagan, when asked by *The Washington Post* about approval of plans for foreign covert political and paramilitary operations in Nicaragua, instead of categorically denying the existence of such actions, refused any comment on the subject.

57. Furthermore, a veteran of the United States Army's "Green Berets" who fought in the Viet Nam war told the CBS network that his former Special Forces Chief had tried to recruit him to participate in mercenary operations in Nicaragua on a \$50,000, six-month contract and that many ex-"Green Berets" were already at their point of destination.

58. We want you to know that, already in the month of November 1981, the Southern Command of the United States with headquarters in the Panama Canal Zone had completed an electronic encirclement of our country to monitor and control, and even distort or cut off, all communications in our national territory. In this operation without precedent in Central America, Phantom A-4C reconnaissance aircraft were employed, as well as AWACS and RC-135s.

59. We also want you to know that since October 1981, in camps situated in the eastern sector of the Panama Canal Zone, three companies made up of Somozist ex-guardsmen began receiving training in paratroop landings and the use of explosives from "Green Beret" instructors of the United States Army. General Wallace Nutting, Chief of the Southern Command, has visited these camps.

60. Similarly, the Panama Canal Zone, under the authority of the Southern Command, is being used by the Argentine Army as a stopover point in an air bridge between Buenos Aires and San Salvador to transport the Argentine Air Brigade, as well as advisers, equipment and weapons. In the last four months, more than 45 flights of this kind have been carried out. At Fort Gullick, 20 Argentine advisers are training Salvadoran special troops.

61. Those are the fundamental elements that have compelled us, beginning on 15 March, to adopt exceptional measures for the defence of the integrity and sovereignty of our homeland, decreeing a state of national emergency.

62. But, at the same time as these aggressive actions have been carried out, it is only fair to acknowledge and support the efforts made over the last few months by the Governments of Mexico and France with a view to seeking a political solution to the crisis of the Central American area.

63. In addition to these efforts, there has been a consistent proposal for global negotiations in pursuit of

peace in the Central American and Caribbean region made resolutely and in a true Latin American spirit by the President of Mexico, José López Portillo, on 21 February at Managua, the capital of Nicaragua.

64. This global proposal considers as indispensable parties to the search for a proper response to the Central American situation the United States, the warring parties in El Salvador, Cuba and Nicaragua. This has been welcomed by the Cuban Revolutionary Government, by the revolutionaries of the Farabundo Martí Front for National Liberation (FMLN) and the Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR) of El Salvador, and by the Government of National Reconstruction of Nicaragua.

65. Since that time, the United States Government has entered into a period of meetings with representatives of the Mexican Government. After a round of meetings with the Mexican Foreign Minister, Mr. Jorge Castañeda, Mr. Alexander Haig made public a five-point proposal aimed at initiating conversations with Nicaragua following the elections scheduled for 28 March in El Salvador.

66. The very fact that the United States has made public its willingness to negotiate with Nicaragua on the basis of these points could be considered an encouraging element, but it turns out to be contradictory because, as I have been trying to demonstrate throughout this exposition, the aggressive and destabilizing actions undertaken against Nicaragua by the United States Administration have been increasing dramatically.

67. It is our obligation to state before the Council that in the days immediately preceding and following 28 March, the date set for the elections in El Salvador, predictions regarding the imminence of an intervention are more than justified; and on the basis of the events that have been described, we must assert that although the United States is making public its willingness to enter into negotiations, it has already before that date begun to develop the alternative, aggression.

68. Apart from those considerations, the five points announced by Mr. Haig do not constitute a global approach to the problem, so as to search for and find realistic solutions. This proposal fails to take into account the fact that the fundamental problem of the crisis in Central America does not lie in the never-proven allegation that arms are reaching the Salvadoran revolutionaries via Nicaragua, while on the other hand the United States is indeed supplying arms, aircraft, helicopters, advisers, technical support and accelerated military training to the Salvadoran army. It is imperative, on the contrary, to accept responsibly that the causes of the phenomenon lie in the injustice that reigns in El Salvador, and that therefore it is urgent to find by means of negotiation an outcome that deals with the possibilities of the wholesale transformation demanded by Salvadoran society.

69. It is, however, inconceivable that the country that is carrying out the greatest arms buildup and spending the most money on weaponry in the history of mankind should seek to demand of us that we fail to fulfil the minimum requirements for the defence of our country. Nicaragua rejects the attempt by the United States to impose humiliating restrictions on its inescapable prerogatives with respect to national defence. We are certain that no sovereign State in the world would accept such a thing. This position is all the more unjustified since Nicaragua, as a revolutionary country, has categorically proclaimed that it will never use its arms against any brother country in Latin America or the Caribbean. We take this opportunity to reiterate this commitment, as well as our willingness to sign non-aggression treaties and agreements with all the countries of the region.

70. We feel that we are all obliged to find a solution to the problems confronting the region through negotiated political means and never to consider the possibility of negotiations being exhausted. We believe that all efforts must be focused on finding responses that are in keeping with reality and that would allow us to begin negotiations immediately, discarding preconditions of any kind.

71. We want you to know that the Government of the United States has turned the Salvadoran parliamentary elections—one more of those elections on our continent sponsored by military élites—into something that is, ridiculously enough, crucial to its own interests. But the extreme tension resulting from the confrontation of the forces in conflict in that country at the time of the elections must not lead the United States Government to impose the response of armed intervention, especially in the foreseeable event of the elections' failure. On the contrary, such circumstances must confirm the urgent need for a political solution by means of negotiations.

72. The peoples of the region demand a negotiated political solution; United States public opinion demands a negotiated political solution; the peoples of Latin America and good Governments call for a negotiated political solution; the peoples and Governments of the world are expecting a negotiated political solution.

73. We do not wish to see ourselves forced to resist and struggle to prevail over foreign intervention, with the vigour that peoples acquire when they are invaded, the same vigour that enabled the Americans to win their independence in 1776.

74. We have not come here to level accusations, but rather to demand an end, once and for all, to the policy of aggressions, threats, interventions, covert operations and invasions against our homeland and the region, and to make it clear that the unfairly distributed resources of humanity on this planet do not give the powerful the right to act against weak and small peoples.

75. Finally, I should like to sum up this intervention with concrete points that have been voiced before, both when I appeared before the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session, in October 1981,¹ and in the proposals made by the Sandinista National Liberation Front before the Permanent Conference of Latin American Political Parties, which met in Managua on 19 February 1982. Those points are as follows.

76. First, neither Nicaragua nor any of the countries of the Central American region and the Caribbean can be considered as a geopolitical preserve of the United States or as part of its so-called "strategic frontier", a concept that restricts the exercise of our sovereignty and independence.

77. Secondly, Nicaragua can therefore in no way represent a threat to the security of the United States. We are a small country, a dignified and poor country that pursues a policy of international non-alignment. The national interests of the people and nation of the United States should not be confused with the particular policy of the present Administration, which is trying to make its own points of view prevail even at the cost of the peace, security and tranquillity not only of its own citizens but of a whole complex of countries which, like our own, have a right to determine their own destiny.

78. Thirdly, we are willing to improve the climate of relations with the United States on the basis of mutual respect and unconditional recognition of our right to self-determination.

79. Fourthly, we are willing to begin immediately direct and frank conversations with the Government of the United States, even in a mutually agreed-upon third country, with the objective of reaching concrete results through such negotiations.

80. Fifthly, the Salvadoran patriots of the Farabundo Martí Liberation Front and the Revolutionary Democratic Front have authorized us to transmit their willingness to begin immediate negotiations without preconditions, once more reiterating the call they made through me when I addressed the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session.²

81. Sixthly, the Revolutionary Government of Cuba has authorized me to communicate to the Council its willingness also to begin negotiations immediately.

82. Seventhly, the Government of National Reconstruction of Nicaragua, the Government of Cuba and the Salvadoran patriots of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front and the Democratic Revolutionary Front back the initiative for negotiations proposed by the President of Mexico, José López Portillo, on 21 February in Managua.

83. Eighthly, Nicaragua is willing immediately to sign non-aggression pacts with all neighbouring coun-

tries of the Central American region, in order to ensure the peace and internal stability of the zone.

84. Ninthly, Nicaragua is obliged to reject the attempt by the United States to impose humiliating restrictions on its inviolable and sovereign prerogatives regarding national defence.

85. We demand, on the other hand, that the Government of the United States immediately put a halt to every measure and covert plan among the many which have been announced and denounced but which have never been denied officially: to secret destabilization plans and the organization and financing of paramilitary forces advised and trained by United States military personnel stationed in Honduras and by active and retired military personnel from Argentina and other South American countries.

86. We demand that it put a stop to the use of Honduran territory as a base for armed aggression and terrorist operations against our homeland; put a stop to the traffic in arms and counterrevolutionaries between the territory of the United States and Honduras; put a stop to the existence of counterrevolutionary military training camps on United States territory, mainly in Florida; put a stop to the participation of the United States intelligence community in the financing, training and organizing of forces and clandestine plans against our homeland; put a stop to the presence of United States warships in the waters of Central America and off the coasts of Nicaragua; put a stop to overflights by spy-planes violating the airspace of Nicaragua; and that the United States Government officially and explicitly voice its commitment not to attack Nicaragua, nor to initiate or promote any direct, indirect or covert intervention in Central America.

87. Nicaragua calls on the Security Council to issue an explicit pronouncement, in line with the Charter of the United Nations, regarding the obligation to seek by peaceful means a solution to the problems of the Central American region and the Caribbean, and calls on the Council to reject all acts of force or threats and to repudiate any direct, indirect or covert intervention in Central America.

88. In memory of the millions of people killed in wars throughout history; in memory of the millions tortured and murdered in the Nazi concentration camps in the Second World War; in memory of the thousands of patriots who fell in the struggles for liberation and against colonialism, racism and all kinds of oppression; in memory of the Central American patriots who have fallen in the fight for independence, justice and peace, for the right of peoples to be free, sovereign and independent, for the right of humanity to desire peace and to demand peace—let there be peace in Central America.

89. The PRESIDENT: I should like to inform members of the Council that I have just received a letter

from the representative of Argentina in which he requests to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite that representative to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Roca (Argentina) took the place reserved for him at the side of the Council chamber.

90. The PRESIDENT: I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of the UNITED STATES.

91. In his letter requesting the convening of this meeting [S/14913], the Co-ordinator of the Nicaraguan Government, Mr. Daniel Ortega Saavedra, made some extraordinary charges against the Government of the United States. We naturally desire to respond to the grave charges that Mr. Ortega has levelled against our policies and our intentions and to comment on the state of relations between our two countries.

92. The essence of Mr. Ortega's complaint is that the United States is about to launch a large-scale military intervention against his country. Thus he wrote, in the letter in which he requested this meeting, of an

“ever-increasing danger of a large-scale military intervention by the armed forces of the United States of America [which] constitutes a grave threat to the independence and sovereignty of the Central American countries and to international peace and security.”

93. He spoke of the “interventionist strategy” of the Government of the United States and of statements and “concrete actions that clearly evidence an intention to attack Nicaragua and to intervene directly in El Salvador.”

94. To support his charges, Mr. Ortega charges us with the “systematic repetition of . . . aggressive statements [which] seriously affects the normal conduct of international relations . . .”, and with “bellicose statements” as well. The United States actions, Mr. Ortega asserts, violate the Charter, the principles and goals of the United Nations and constitute a “grave threat to the independence and sovereignty of the Central American countries and to international peace and security”.

95. The attack made by Nicaragua on the United States is not haphazard; the charges made by the Government of Nicaragua are not random. The Government of Nicaragua has accused the United States of the kinds of political behaviour of which it is itself guilty—large-scale interventions in the internal affairs of its neighbours, persistent efforts to subvert and

overthrow by force and violence the Governments of neighbouring States, aggressive actions which disrupt the normal conduct of international relations in the region—acts and intentions inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.

96. These charges, as extravagant as they are baseless, are an interesting example of projection, a psychological operation in which one's own feelings and intentions are simultaneously denied and attributed to—that is, projected on to—someone else.

97. Hostility is the dominant emotion and projection the key mechanism of the paranoid style of politics, a style which, much to our regret, has characterized the political behaviour of the Sandinista leadership since its arrival in power. The principal object of Sandinista hostility, I further regret, is the Government and people of the United States.

98. Nicaragua's new political élite—which calls itself Sandinista—has constructed a historical myth to justify its demand for full power. According to this myth, the United States is responsible for all problems and disasters—natural and social—that Nicaragua has ever suffered. The Sandinista anthem describes us as the enemy of mankind and Sandinista ideology defines us as implacably opposed to the national independence and economic development of everyone and to peace in the world. Since the moment of their arrival in power, the Sandinistas have predicted that the United States was about to overrun them. The Yankees are coming, they have reiterated; the counterrevolutionaries will get us if we do not silence criticism, mobilize the population into armies, destroy freedom.

99. The familiar totalitarian assertion that one is surrounded by enemies both internal and external has been heard again and again to justify the elimination of opponents and the concentration of power in a tiny, one-party élite.

100. In the past two and one-half years, Nicaragua's hopes for greater freedom, democracy and security from government tyranny have very nearly died as the new rulers have moved expertly, first to establish and then, progressively, to exercise control over the various sectors and institutions in Nicaraguan society. The extension and consolidation of power have followed the pattern of "*coup d'état* by instalments", to use Konrad Heiden's apt description of the Nazi seizure of near-total power in German society.

101. One step at a time, the Sandinista directorate has moved against the faint-hearted "bourgeois" democrats in their ranks. One sector at a time, they have moved against Nicaraguan society—now seizing radio and television stations and newspapers, now nationalizing new industries, now tightening control of the economy, now moving against independent trade unions, now banning a bishop from access to television, now organizing and reinforcing the Sandi-

nista defence committees that bring the revolution, with its demand, rewards and surveillance, into every neighbourhood of Nicaragua.

102. Alongside it all came a dramatic, extraordinary expansion of Nicaragua's army and of its international role. Today the militia of Nicaragua is many times the size and strength of the one that reinforced Somoza's régime, and it reinforces a political machine many times more sophisticated than Somoza's.

103. A political scientist describing the Nazis' consolidation of power in a single German town, Thalburg, noted, concerning that process of destruction of society and politicization of human relations:

"Hardly anyone in Thalburg in those days grasped what was happening. There was no real comprehension of what the town would experience if Hitler came to power, no real understanding of what nazism was."

It is no easier to understand what is happening today in Nicaragua. But it is clear that at each stage, the Government's demands for increased power have been accompanied by new charges concerning enemies without and within.

104. We are confronted in Nicaragua with the familiar patterns of doublespeak with which totalitarian and would-be totalitarian rulers of our times assault reality in the attempt to persuade us, and doubtless themselves as well, that making war is seeking peace, that repression is liberation, that a free press is a very carefully controlled one. Thus, on 19 February, Commander Ortega, whom we have just heard, solemnly assured the opening session of an international conference—the Standing Conference of Latin American Political Parties—that the forced, violent transfer of Mesquito Indians was naturally carried out only to protect their human rights.

105. In their statement of 18 February, Nicaragua's bishops described those forced relocations as involving "grave violations of the human rights of individuals, families and entire populations of peoples." These include, said Nicaragua's bishops,

"relocations of individuals by military operations without warning and without conscientious dialogue; forced marches, carried out without sufficient consideration for the weak, aged, women and children; charges or accusations of collaboration with the counterrevolution against all residents of certain towns; the destruction of houses, belongings and domestic animals; the deaths of individuals in circumstances that, to our great sorrow, remind us of the drama of other peoples of our region."

106. Given this pattern of repression, obfuscation and charges, it should, I suppose, have come as no surprise when, last week, Commander Ortega levelled

new charges against the United States Government at precisely the same time that Nicaragua suspended its Constitution and promulgated a new Law of National Emergency which threatens to eliminate the limited liberty and pluralism that remain in that country. That new Law of National Emergency provides that all discussions in the Sandinista-controlled Council of State of the proposed media and political parties laws be suspended. It provides that the Minister of Interior may make an unspecified number of preventive arrests of people who are suspected of having ties with counterrevolutionaries. Under that decree, Radio Católica has been closed down indefinitely and all radio news programmes, except official news statements, are prohibited. The one remaining independent newspaper in Nicaragua—*La Prensa*—and all other media have been required to submit their news stories for prior censorship. Yesterday it proved impossible for *La Prensa* to publish, since more than 50 per cent of the paper was found objectionable.

107. Under the new Law of Emergency, opposition political leaders have been informed that they may not leave the country. The passport of one was seized when he attempted to make a routine trip abroad. Under the new law, a "patriotic tax" is to be imposed on businesses to help finance its latest mobilization campaign.

108. Thus the dialectic of revolution unfolds in Nicaragua: liberation has already produced its antithesis in Sandinista Nicaragua. Old, familiar arguments are invoked to justify new, more effective repression.

109. Nicaragua's new Government could have satisfied the longings of its people for peace instead of making war on them; it could also have accepted the United States' offer of friendship. It did not need to be thus. The United States Government did not, in fact, oppose the Sandinista rise to power and it has not attempted to prevent their consolidation of power.

110. Quite the contrary: with our help, the Government of Nicaragua received more loans in two years from the International Development Bank than the Somoza Government received in any decade. During the first 18 months of the existence of the Government of Nicaragua, the Government of the United States provided more economic assistance to Nicaragua than any other Government did. The fact that the United States Government gave the Sandinistas moral and political support in crucial phases of the civil war, cut off their opponents' supply of arms, ammunition and gasoline, and negotiated the resignations of Somoza and Urcuyo did not affect the Sandinista leadership's view of the United States' attitudes. Neither did the \$75-million supplemental aid bill rushed through the Congress to assist in the job of reconstruction, or our continued active support for Nicaragua's credit applications in multilateral lending institutions.

111. We might have hoped—in fact, we did hope—that support from the United States would alter the Sandinista leadership's hostility to our Government. Alas, it had no such effect. By its words and deeds, the United States Government—the Congress and the executive branch alike—demonstrated not only its respect for the sovereignty of the Nicaraguan political process and the right of Nicaraguans to determine their own Government, but also our concrete, effective desire to give a boost to Nicaragua's new Government, to help it overcome the devastation of civil war. Unfortunately, Sandinista ideology overcame the reality of United States assistance. The fact of United States support for economic reconstruction and national independence proved less powerful in the minds of Nicaragua's leadership than the stereotype: we remained the Yankee enemy of mankind.

112. Like others in this century who have seized power by force, the Sandinista leaders are haunted by the expectation that they will fall victim to the violent intrigues by which they won power and exercise it. They are haunted by the fear that their neighbours will in fact treat them in the manner in which they systematically treat their neighbours.

113. It is, of course, they, the Government of Nicaragua, who systematically seek to subvert and overthrow neighbouring Governments. El Salvador has had the misfortune to be the principal target.

114. A clandestine support system established in 1978 at the time of the Nicaraguan civil war continued to operate after the fall of Somoza in July 1979 with a new final destination: El Salvador. The existence of this support system has been repeatedly and vigorously denied by Nicaraguan and Cuban spokesmen. Yet it is perfectly clear that those denials are false.

115. Nicaragua offers a support system with three major components: external arms supplies, training, and command and control. Within weeks after the fall of the Somoza Government in July 1979, the Sandinistas began to co-operate in the support of the Salvadoran insurgents by establishing training camps and the beginning of an arms supply network. This clandestine assistance initially involved local black markets and relatively limited resources. In 1980, after meetings in Havana had unified Salvadoran Marxists into a single military command structure, the Sandinista leadership agreed to serve as a conduit for an arms trafficking system of unprecedented proportions, originating outside of this hemisphere. That structure remains in place today.

116. Arms and ammunition for the Salvadoran insurgents reach Nicaragua by ship, and occasionally by direct flights from Havana to Nicaragua. Three Nicaraguan ships, the *Monimbo*, the *Aracely* and the *Nicarao*, frequently transport arms and ammunition to Nicaragua from Cuba in their cargo. Salvadoran guerrilla headquarters near Managua arranges for their

shipment into El Salvador. The timing of the resupply operations is co-ordinated with the planned level of fighting, since before each surge in the fighting it is possible to detect new large arms deliveries.

117. When a clandestine shipment of arms is captured or a safe house is found containing arms and terrorist supplies, it is often impossible to know with certainty whether the ultimate recipients are destined to be Guatemalan, Honduran, Costa Rican or Salvadoran, since the arms supply networks established by Cuba and Nicaragua are funnelling lethal military supplies to guerrillas and terrorists in all four countries.

118. A few examples chosen from among dozens will illustrate these clandestine smuggling techniques and routes.

119. Look first at the air flow. The Papalonal airfield provides a clear case of the direct airlift of weapons from Nicaragua to guerrillas in El Salvador. Papalonal is a commercially undeveloped area 23 nautical miles north-west of Managua, accessible only by dirt roads. In late July 1980, the airfield was an agricultural dirt-strip approximately 800 metres long, but by early 1981 the strip was lengthened by 50 per cent to approximately 1,200 metres. A turnaround was added to each end. A dispersal parking area with three hardstands—a feature typical of a military airfield—was constructed at the west end of the runway. Three parking aprons were cleared and six hangar and storage buildings were constructed on the aprons. The hangars were used to stockpile arms for the Salvadoran guerrillas. Flights of C-47s from the air base corresponded with sightings in El Salvador, and several pilots were identified in Nicaragua who regularly flew the route into El Salvador. This particular route was closed by March 1981, but some air infiltration continues to this day despite the increasing difficulties that Nicaragua has experienced in recruiting pilots for this very hazardous work.

120. Weapons delivery by overland routes from Nicaragua passes through Honduras. Several examples of this arms traffic can be and have been identified. Honduran authorities have intercepted various shipments of arms *en route* from Nicaragua and concealed in caches in Honduras. In early January 1981, for example, Honduran police caught six individuals unloading weapons from a truck *en route* from Nicaragua. The six identified themselves as Salvadorans and as members of the International Support Commission of the Salvadoran Popular Liberation Forces. They had in their possession a large number of altered and forged Honduran, Costa Rican and Salvadoran passports and other identity documents. That one truck contained over 100 M-16 and AR-15 automatic rifles, 50 81-millimetre mortar rounds, approximately 100,000 rounds of 5.56-millimetre ammunition, machine-gun belts, field packs and so forth.

121. In April 1981, Honduran authorities intercepted a tractor-trailer truck which had entered Honduras at

the El Guasaule crossing from Nicaragua. This truck was apparently heading for Guatemala. Ammunition and propaganda materials were hidden in the side walls of the trailer. The same arms traffickers operated a storehouse in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, with a false floor and a special basement for storing weapons.

122. A special legislative commission established in June 1980 by the Costa Rican legislature confirmed in its May 1981 report that a clandestine arms supply link between Costa Rica and Nicaragua was established during the Nicaraguan civil war and that the link continued to function between Costa Rica and El Salvador once the Sandinistas had come to power in Nicaragua.

123. In April and July 1981, Guatemalan security forces captured large caches of guerrilla weapons in safe houses in Guatemala City. Several of the vehicles captured at Guatemala City safe houses bore recent customs markings from Nicaragua, thus suggesting that the operation was part of the well-established pattern.

124. Within the past three months, shipments of arms into El Salvador reached unprecedented peaks, averaging out to the highest overall volume since the so-called final offensive of last year. The recent Nicaraguan-Cuban arms flow into El Salvador has emphasized both sea and, once again, overland routes through Honduras.

125. Last month, a Salvadoran guerrilla group picked up a large shipment of arms on the Usulután Coast after the shipment arrived by sea from Nicaragua.

126. On 15 March 1982, the Costa Rican judicial police announced the discovery of a house in San José with a sizeable cache of arms, explosives, uniforms, passports, documents, false immigration stamps from more than 30 countries, and vehicles with hidden compartments—all connected with an ongoing arms traffic through Costa Rican territory to Salvadoran guerrillas. Nine people were arrested: Salvadorans, Nicaraguans, an Argentine, a Chilean and a Costa Rican. Costa Rican police so far have seized 13 vehicles designed for arms smuggling. Police confiscated some 150 to 175 weapons, from Mausers to machine-guns, TNT, fragmentation grenades, a grenade-launcher, ammunition and 500 combat uniforms. One of the captured terrorists told police that the arms and other goods were to have been delivered to the Salvadoran guerrillas before 20 March, "for the elections".

127. Nicaragua's fraternal assistance to its neighbours is not limited to arms. Training is also provided. This co-ordinated Nicaraguan and Cuban political and military training creates the basic framework for the use of arms by guerrillas operating within El Salvador and elsewhere in Central America.

128. Since at least mid-1980, Salvadoran guerrillas have been trained in Nicaragua in military tactics.

weapons, communications and explosives at temporary training schools scattered around the country and on Sandinista military bases—of which there are many. At several military sites in Nicaragua, Salvadorans receive training under guidance from Cuban and other foreign advisers. For more specialized training, guerrillas transit Nicaragua for Cuba. They are provided false identity documents to help them transit third countries. Guerrillas trained in Cuba are reinfiltrated through Nicaragua and back into El Salvador. The attacks on Ilopango Airport in January 1982 and on the El Oro Bridge, in El Salvador, in October 1981 showed the clear effects of this training. Both acts were performed by saboteurs who had enjoyed the benefits of very sophisticated help.

129. Honduran police raided a safe house for the Morazanist Front for the Liberation of Honduras (MFLH) on 27 November 1981, in Tegucigalpa; while the Honduran police were there, a fire-fight broke out, but the police none the less captured several members of that group. Remember that this is the Front for the Liberation of Honduras now. Nicaragua's generosity to its neighbours knows no end. The police ultimately captured several members of that group. The cell of the MFLH included a Honduran, a Uruguayan and several Nicaraguans. The captured told Honduran authorities that the Nicaraguan Government had provided them with funds for travel expenses, as well as explosives. Captured documents and statements by others detailed further that the group was formed in Nicaragua at the instigation of high-level Sandinista leaders: that the group's chief of operations resided in Managua; that members of the group received military training in Nicaragua and Cuba; and that guerrillas at one safe house were responsible for transporting arms and munitions into Honduras from Esteli, Nicaragua. Other command and control services are provided by Nicaragua to its neighbours.

130. Nicaraguan Social Welfare Minister Antonio Befred, by the way, told reporters in Lima last week that some Nicaraguan "volunteers" had gone to El Salvador to fight with the guerrillas. Perhaps they would like us to believe that the presence of the Salvadoran guerrillas' military command headquarters near Managua is also a "volunteer" effort. In fact, planning and operations in El Salvador are guided from that headquarters, where Nicaraguan officers are involved actively in the command and control. The headquarters co-ordinates logistical support for the insurgents, including food, medicines, clothing, money and, most importantly of course, weapons and ammunition. The headquarters in Nicaragua decides on locations to be attacked and co-ordinates supply deliveries. The guidance flows to guerrilla units widely spread throughout El Salvador. The pattern is painfully clear; it functions until this day.

131. We very much wish that the Government of Nicaragua would cease its efforts to repress its own people and to overthrow its neighbouring Govern-

ments. Frankly, we thought that some progress to that end might be in sight. We were somewhat surprised when the Nicaraguan Government decided to attempt to expand and embitter regional conflict at this time. One explanation for Nicaragua's decision to expand the conflict at this time is that it fears that the United States Government is about to invade. But, of course, that is a ridiculous charge. The United States Government is not about to invade anyone, and we have stated as much at all levels of our Government, at all times and on many occasions.

132. It is true that once we became aware of Nicaragua's intentions and actions, the United States Government undertook overflights to safeguard our own security and that of other States which are threatened by the Sandinista Government. These overflights, conducted by unarmed, high-flying planes, for the express and sole purpose of verifying reports of Nicaraguan intervention, are no threat to regional peace and stability; quite the contrary. The threat to regional and world peace lies in the activities that these photographs expose. One can well understand that the Government of Nicaragua would prefer that no such photographs existed. The United States Government is frankly surprised and puzzled by Nicaragua's appeal to the Security Council at this time.

133. As most members of this Council understand, Commander Ortega's contentious charges come at a time when we and others are actively looking for a basis on which to settle peacefully the differences of the parties involved. Only last week the Government of Nicaragua stated a desire to negotiate. But then, after two high government officials visited Cuba, they called for this meeting to air baseless charges in this most public, important forum.

134. The United States seeks peace in Central America. We have repeatedly attempted to explore ways with Nicaraguans in which our Governments could co-operate in alleviating the tensions in the area. We have submitted proposals to the Nicaraguan Government, and we have received no response. Instead, the Government replied last year, after it came to power, by sending Daniel Ortega to the United Nations—as it has done today—to deliver an attack on the United States.

135. As soon as the present United States Administration came to power, Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Enders went to Managua to try to communicate with the leaders of the Government of Nicaragua to offer a way out of confrontation, to ask them to restrain their military buildup and cease their interventions in neighbouring countries. At that time we offered a specific agenda for discussions. We offered to consider their concerns and asked them to consider ours. We also agreed to restrain all public rhetoric while the proposal was being considered.

136. The response was not long in coming. On 15 September, one month later, Humberto Ortega made a

speech in Managua during which he vilified the United States. On 7 October, Nicaraguan Junta Co-ordinator Daniel Ortega addressed the General Assembly¹ here, attacking the United States for past intervention in Central America and accusing us of causing all the world's problems, virtually throughout history.

137. In recent weeks, our Secretary of State has met with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mexico in yet another attempt to engage the Nicaraguans in a meaningful dialogue. And how has the Nicaraguan Government again responded? By sending Mr. Ortega to the United Nations, apparently in search of a propaganda victory, apparently in search of an exacerbation of conflict.

138. The Nicaraguan Government has said that it wants peace; it has stated that it wishes better relations with the United States. But, unfortunately, its actions do not match its pretensions. If the Nicaraguan Government was genuinely interested in alleviating tensions, would it continue to act as an active conduit for war *matériel* aimed at subverting the Government of El Salvador? Would it have undertaken a campaign of systematic violence against its own Indian communities, displacing some 25,000 Indians from their ancestral homes on the pretext of security from a peaceful, democratic neighbour, Honduras? Would it have doubled the number of Cuban military and security advisers in the past year? Would it have continued seeking to augment its military forces and arsenal? Would it have declared a state of siege on its own people, effectively eliminating the opposition? Most importantly, would it continue incessantly to pour arms into El Salvador, even increasing that flow of arms, bullets and propaganda just when the people of El Salvador are given an unprecedented opportunity to express their views?

139. Given the history of United States relations with the current Government of Nicaragua, we are understandably somewhat sceptical when the Government of Nicaragua declares that it wants peace or asserts that it wishes better relations with our country. How, we ask, is this professed interest in peace reconciled with the statement of Comandante Humberto Ortega when he says that the opposition will be hanged from lamp-posts, or with the statement of Comandante Baillardo Arce when he tells us that the Nicaraguan Government will continue to pour arms into El Salvador no matter what we or anyone does or says?

140. None the less, in spite of these harsh responses on the part of the Government of Nicaragua, the United States offer to engage in a dialogue has been repeated many times. It was repeated by Secretary of State Haig at the General Assembly of OAS, held at St. Lucia from 2 to 11 December 1981, when he said:

"The United States has made proposals to Nicaragua to normalize relations. If Nicaragua ad-

resses our concerns about intervention and militarization, we are prepared to address their concerns. We do not close the door on the search for proper relations."³

The Nicaraguan Government has not responded to our offer.

141. On 24 February, President Reagan, in his speech concerning the establishment of the Caribbean Basin Initiative, asserted:

"We seek to exclude no one [from the benefits of that Initiative]. Some, however, have turned from their American neighbours and their heritage. Let them return to the traditions and common values of this hemisphere, and we all will welcome them. The choice is theirs."⁴

142. Finally, just a few weeks ago the President of Mexico offered his good offices in the effort to reduce tensions between Nicaragua and the United States. We welcomed that initiative. In a press conference on 15 March in New York, Secretary Haig reiterated the five points which, we believe, can serve as the basis for a substantial improvement of relations between the Governments of the United States and Nicaragua. These points had been conveyed earlier to the Government of Nicaragua: a commitment, through mutual high-level reassertion of our Rio Treaty engagements,⁵ to non-intervention and non-aggression; a United States political commitment concerning the activities of Nicaraguan exiles in this country and the enforcement of the Neutrality Act in this country; a regional undertaking not to import heavy offensive weapons and to reduce the number of foreign military and security advisers to a reasonably low level; a proposal to the United States Congress for renewed United States aid to Nicaragua; and actions by the Nicaraguans to get out of El Salvador—to wind up their command and control operations, their logistics operations, including weapons, ammunition deliveries and training camps.

143. And now, even as the representatives of the Mexican and United States Governments are consulting on this initiative, the Government of Nicaragua, fully informed of what is going on, has once again made a move that can only increase tensions and not reduce them.

144. Although the United States Government finds the actions of Nicaragua puzzling—and we regret them—we have not interposed any objections to the Nicaraguan Government's desire to be heard in this arena, even though the Government of Nicaragua, for whatever reasons, chose to ignore procedures well established in both the Charter of the United Nations and the Charter of the Organization of American States. As members of the Council know, Article 52 of the Charter of the United Nations encourages efforts to achieve the peaceful settlement of disputes through

regional arrangements and gives priority to them. Article 23 of the OAS Charter specifically singles out the role of the OAS in settling regional disputes before such disputes are referred to this body.

145. The Government of Nicaragua should be among the very first to recall the existence, under the OAS, of the Seventeenth Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers, which in 1978 and 1979 dealt with events in Central America threatening to the peace of the region. Indeed, in 1979 the Nicaraguan Government termed the resolution of the Seventeenth Meeting of Consultation as "historic in every respect". That meeting was never terminated. The question of Central America remains before the OAS. Just yesterday, in the Permanent Council of the OAS, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Honduras made serious proposals for efforts to bring peace to Central America.

146. The OAS thus not only has jurisdiction over this matter, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the OAS Charter; it is also formally seized of the matter. It is clear that the OAS is the appropriate and primary forum

for the consideration of the matters addressed by Nicaragua.

147. We appeal once again, in this public forum, to the Government of Nicaragua to join with us and other neighbouring Governments in resolving differences, ending interventions, living in peace in this hemisphere.

The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.

NOTES

¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-sixth Session, Plenary Meetings, 29th meeting.*

² *Ibid.*, para. 55.

³ United States of America, *Department of State Bulletin*, vol. 82, No. 2058 (Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1982), p. 6.

⁴ *Ibid.*, No. 2061 (Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1982), p. 5.

⁵ Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 21, No. 324), p. 3.