

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

SEVENTH SESSION

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FIRST COMMITTEE, 624th

MEETING

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Chairman: Mr. João Carlos MUNIZ (Brazil).

The Korean question (A/2431, A/L.151/Rev.1, A/L.152/Rev.2, A/L.153, A/L.154/Rev.1, A/C.1/L.48/Rev.1, A/C.1/L.50) (*continued*)

[Item 16]*

1. The CHAIRMAN recalled that the Committee had decided to hear observations on the texts of the draft resolutions, after which it would pass to the vote. Explanations of vote would be in order after a vote had been taken on all the draft resolutions.

2. Mr. COOPER (Liberia) felt it proper to pay tribute to the armed forces of nations which had directly participated in resisting aggression in Korea and would therefore vote in favour of the relevant draft resolution (A/L.154/Rev.1). His delegation would also vote in favour of the fifteen-Power draft resolution (A/L.151/Rev.1), as well as the draft resolution (A/L.153) recommending that India be invited to participate in the political conference. That conference should not be limited to countries which had contributed armed forces in the Korean conflict, but should also include any Member which could contribute to the success of the political conference. India's record in helping achieve the Armistice Agreement and its position in Asia entitled it to a place in the conference. He would also vote in favour of the draft resolution (A/L.152/Rev.2) calling for participation by the USSR. He opposed the revised USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/L.48/Rev.1), since the wording of that proposal would exclude South Korea, which had contributed more than half of the forces to the United Nations Command in Korea, as not being one of the signatories to the Armistice Agreement.

3. Mr. Cooper regretted that ulterior motives had been ascribed to the four-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.50), co-sponsored by his delegation, requesting the Secretary-General to forward the recommendation or proposal on the Korean question to the Governments of the People's Republic of China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. It was a straightforward proposal and did not mean that a special session should be convened to consider information from the other side whenever the Secretary-General

received it. The information would be conveyed to any session or any part of any session of the General Assembly which happened to be convened at the time the Secretary-General received the information. By adopting that proposal, the General Assembly would merely apprise those two Governments of the results of its proceedings.

4. Sir Gladwyn JEBB (United Kingdom) observed that the action of the USSR representative in proposing (A/C.1/L.48/Rev.1) at that late stage in the proceedings a conference of fifteen States in which Mr. Vyshinsky's side would have the majority over the United Nations side, in which those Members of the United Nations who had fought in Korea would be limited to three, and in which Turkey would not be allowed because it was so far from Korea, but Czechoslovakia would be present, could only be described as diversionary. The draft resolution submitted by Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom (A/L.153) unfortunately seemed to have been played up in certain interested quarters, which were again doomed to disappointment, as the cause of a rift between the British Commonwealth and the United States. His delegation thought that India should participate in the political conference since it was not only a great Asian State, but was also in good position to play a constructive role. His delegation's view was also in accordance with the concept that the conference should be a round-table rather than an "across-the-table" one. In any case, the object should be to start it off with the best possible prospects of success, and once the position of individual participants had been safeguarded, as it was in the fifteen-Power draft resolution (A/L.151/Rev.1), it did not seem desirable that the conference should consist entirely of actual belligerents. However, he recognized that other States might have different views. His delegation would certainly not want the question of the composition of the conference to become the cause of some major dissension among friendly Powers who had successfully fought side by side to resist aggression, who would continue united in that resistance, and whose objectives were undoubtedly the same. His delegation would await the judgment of the Assembly and accept it with good grace.

* Indicates the item number on the agenda of the General Assembly.

5. Although any recommendation by the General Assembly could not legally bind any Member of the United Nations, he had no doubt that the great majority of Members would continue to have great respect for General Assembly recommendations. No nation, and least of all a nation which had admittedly been saved from destruction by United Nations action, ought to say in advance that it would not agree to some particular proposal which the Assembly might recommend. The United Nations should not allow itself to be deflected from the supreme objective of seeking a just and honourable peace.

6. Mr. SARPÉR (Turkey), referring to the revised USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/L.48/Rev.1), noted that Mr. Vyshinsky, in adducing arguments for the exclusion of Turkey from the conference, had stressed the distance between Korea and Turkey. It might be asked how far Poland and Czechoslovakia were from Korea. Noting that the USSR draft resolution, which included the names of countries with which Turkey had most friendly relations, included Mexico while excluding Colombia, he concluded that the purpose was to exclude as many as possible of the countries that had contributed armed forces in Korea. For those and other reasons, the delegation of Turkey could not support the revised USSR draft resolution.

7. Mr. ORTEGA MASSON (Chile) would vote in favour of the fifteen-Power draft resolution in document A/L.151/Rev.1, but wished to reserve his right to submit a slight amendment to paragraph 5 (a) in a plenary meeting to the effect that the nations contributing armed forces in Korea had done so in reply to the appeal made by the United Nations for armed forces to set up the system of collective security.

8. Mrs. SEKANINOVA-ČAKRTOVÁ (Czechoslovakia) said that her delegation judged the draft resolutions before the Committee by the criterion of whether they were positive or whether they would lead to the failure of the political conference and by the manner in which they conceived the role and function of the United Nations in the fulfilment of the task before the Organization. The fifteen-Power draft resolution (A/L.151/Rev.1) was based on the concept of a conference of two sides, proposed that the General Assembly should decide merely the composition of one of the sides and recommended the participation of those countries whose armed forces had taken part in the intervention in Korea, to the exclusion of all other nations. Many delegations had emphasized that the conference should be a round-table one and that the "right" countries should participate. The fifteen-Power draft resolution, however, would reduce the significant contribution that the United Nations should make to but a fraction of the task which it was incumbent upon the Organization to solve in its entirety. The fifteen-Power draft resolution was based not only on a false interpretation of paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement (A/2431) but also on an arbitrary and restricted interpretation of the Charter itself. The objectives pursued in that draft resolution were also illustrated by the argument that its sponsors would not object to the presence of other States provided that those would not be participants on the so-called United Nations side. That draft not only endeavoured to reproduce in the conference the situation at Panmunjom but was

also an expression of the United States attempt to maintain its monopolistic position among its partners in the Korean intervention. Paragraph 5 (b) of the fifteen-Power draft resolution was but one of the many proofs of that fact. It was not possible at one and the same time to claim, as the United States was doing, that one desired the success of the conference, and to attempt to impose one's will on the other countries concerned. It was only natural that the delegation of Czechoslovakia should reject a draft resolution based on a clear lack of the goodwill necessary to create conditions for mutual understanding and which revealed an effort to place obstacles in the path of agreement.

9. The Czechoslovak delegation supported the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/L.48/Rev.1), which even in its original wording, contained all the elements conducive to a lasting peace in Korea. The USSR draft resolution was based on the sole criterion of how a reasonable number of countries—belligerents and non-belligerents, great and small, neighbours of Korea and representatives of other areas—might serve the cause of peace in Korea. The USSR draft resolution was likewise based on the consistent USSR position that both sides must be heard in these negotiations for a peaceful solution of the Korean question and that the Koreans themselves must settle their internal affairs. The proposed extension of the membership of the conference offered an even greater guarantee of success, and constituted yet another proof of the goodwill of the USSR in seeking understanding, in harmony with its traditional peace policy. The draft resolution of the Soviet Union was supported by the Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China, a country which was a powerful factor for peace in the Far East and which would be an important participant in the conference. That draft resolution thus met the necessary conditions to enable the conference to arrive at concrete results. The United Nations which deviated most seriously from its mission in connexion with the question of Korea had a unique opportunity and duty to regain the authority which the international Organization of sovereign States should command. The adoption of the USSR proposal would meet the need for creating a constructive atmosphere and would be a significant step towards the strengthening of world peace.

10. Mr. MATES (Yugoslavia) said that his delegation agreed with the statement of the objectives of the United Nations as set forth in the preamble to the fifteen-Power draft resolution. Regarding the implementation of the political conference, however, his delegation considered it important that the conference should be an instrument for the peaceful settlement of a particular situation by the United Nations. Its form and composition as envisaged in paragraph 5 (a) did not correspond with the approach regarded by his delegation as the correct one and was not acceptable. There were many points in that draft resolution, however, with which his delegation did agree.

11. The revised USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/L.48/Rev.1) was not acceptable for similar reasons. It listed countries which must obviously be represented as well as others concerning whose participation his delegation had serious doubts. The last phrase in that proposal, moreover, tended to perpetuate the Panmunjom situation.

12. He considered that both of the two individual countries, the USSR and India, whose participation was proposed in separate draft resolutions (A/L.152/Rev. 2 and A/L.153) should be represented in the political conference. However, the proviso contained in the draft resolution concerning participation by the USSR (A/L.152/Rev.2) was out of place if the conference was regarded as an instrument for peaceful settlement of a situation by the United Nations.

13. The Yugoslav delegation supported the draft resolution submitted by Burma, India, Indonesia and Liberia (A/C.1/L.50) concerning the action to be taken by the Secretary-General, and did not accept the amendment proposed by Peru to replace the words "report to the General Assembly as appropriate" by the words "inform the Members of the United Nations of any communication received" (A/C.1/L.51).

14. Mr. FAHMY (Egypt) had already made his delegation's position clear (618th meeting) with regard to the various draft resolutions before the Committee. Since his country had been proposed as a member of the forthcoming conference, however, he was directed to express his Government's gratitude for the trust and confidence placed in Egypt. His country had not sought and did not seek participation in the conference, and it did not intend to take part therein unless it had the concurrence of all the parties involved in the Korean conflict. However, it would never hesitate to assume its full international responsibilities should the Assembly and all the parties concerned conclude that it was in a position to accomplish useful duties in the interests of a Korean settlement.

15. Mr. NASZKOWSKI (Poland) said that his delegation had no objection to paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6 of the fifteen-Power draft resolution (A/L.151/Rev.1), but would be unable to vote in favour of paragraphs 5 (a), 5 (b) and 5 (d). Paragraph 5 (a), by limiting the conference to the States which had taken direct part in the Korean war, would give it the nature of negotiations between two opposing parties, while paragraph 5 (b), by conferring on the United States a particular role in the preparatory work of the conference, would create a precedent for the assignment of that role to the United States in the conference itself. It was by no means accidental that that draft resolution did not call directly for the participation of the USSR, a great peace-loving Power, in whose absence achievement of a peaceful settlement of Far Eastern or other peace problems was inconceivable.

16. In expanding the membership of the political conference in its revised draft resolution (A/C.1/L.48/Rev.1), the USSR had again given evidence of its willingness to reach agreement on all outstanding questions. That proposal created the possibility of a round-table meeting of a number of States, some of which had and some of which had not taken part in the Korean conflict. Among the States nominated by the USSR were the five great Powers who, as permanent members of the Security Council, bore the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. It included North and South Korea, the parties most interested in the solution of the Korean question. It also included Burma, Indonesia and India, States directly interested in the Far East, against whom the United States had been actively campaign-

ing. The three-year war in Korea had shown that the maintenance of that centre of conflict constituted a threat to the peace of the world. It was therefore appropriate that at the conference there should be such States as had occupied a neutral position in the Korean question, but which were directly concerned in the issues affecting the international situation. There had been objections to the participation of such States. The representative of Turkey had spoken of the distance between Poland and Korea, but distance was not the point. The USSR draft resolution was based on the United Nations principle of the participation of States which could represent the interests and positions of various groups of countries.

17. In view of the announced Syngman Rhee threat to wreck the political conference, everything should be done to ensure its success. That purpose was served by the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/L.48/Rev.1) and by the USSR amendment (A/C.1/L.52) to paragraphs 5 (a) and 5 (b) of the fifteen-Power draft resolution (A/L.151/Rev.1). If that amendment was adopted he would vote in favour of the latter draft resolution.

18. The draft resolution submitted by Burma, India, Indonesia and Liberia (A/C.1/L.50) was in line with the legitimate and proper demands of the People's Republic of China, and he would vote for it. He opposed the Peruvian amendment (A/C.1/L.51) to that draft resolution, which would worsen and distort its sense. Adoption of that four-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.50) would make it possible for the States whose peace-loving policies had led to the conclusion of an armistice, and who had been unswerving supporters of a peaceful settlement of the conflict, to express their views on the proposal of the General Assembly.

19. Mr. KHALIDY (Iraq) said that, in view of the revision of the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/L.48/Rev.1) he was unable to adhere to his original opposition to that proposal, since he found it impossible to vote against the inclusion of States such as Syria, Egypt, India, Indonesia and Burma. For the reasons he had given, his delegation would abstain. The action envisaged under the draft resolution submitted by Burma, India, Indonesia and Liberia (A/C.1/L.50) seemed to be entirely procedural and there did not appear to be any objection to it. His delegation always favoured such communication to the parties concerned. The Peruvian amendment (A/C.1/L.51) to that proposal would have the effect of separating the United Nations as a body from its own responsibilities. Pointing out that there was already a considerable tendency in that direction, he considered that the United Nations must bear its responsibility, at least in questions of procedure. To its regret, his delegation would have to vote against that amendment.

20. Dealing with the fifteen-Power draft resolution (A/L.151/Rev.1), Mr. Khalidy noted that paragraphs 5 (b) and (d) would mean that only the belligerents would be included in the conference. As he had indicated previously (622nd meeting), his delegation considered that India and the USSR should participate in the conference. With the exception of those two paragraphs, on which it would abstain, his delegation would support the fifteen-Power draft resolution. The USSR amendments (A/C.1/L.52) to that draft reso-

lution were practically the same as the revised USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/L.48/Rev.1) and his delegation would abstain from voting on those amendments for the reasons he had explained earlier. He added that his delegation did not agree with the USSR proposal, since it was unprecedented to exclude from a peace conference Powers which had fought on the battlefield.

21. As for the draft resolution concerning participation by the USSR (A/L.152/Rev.2), his delegation would abstain on the proviso therein should that be put to a separate vote, but it would vote in favour of the whole proposal. It would vote in favour of the draft resolution concerning India's participation (A/L.153).

22. Mr. CASTILLO ARRIOLA (Guatemala) expressed the hope that the political conference would meet and hoped that it would be successful. To bring that about, those taking part would have to forget the past and prove that there had been no victors and no vanquished.

23. Referring to the fifteen-Power draft resolution (A/L.151/Rev.1), he found it difficult to accept the interpretation of paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement (A/2431) embodied in paragraph 5 (a). The type of forced interpretation which would limit participation in the conference to belligerents was not really useful for the purpose in hand. Moreover, the General Assembly must be consistent and must follow the lines of its previous practice in regard to the Korean conflict. Everything done during that conflict had been done under the name and on behalf of the United Nations. The Unified Command had signed the Armistice Agreement on behalf of the United Nations, and whatever peace might be achieved in the conference must consequently also be a peace on behalf of the United Nations. None of the fifteen belligerent States, he said, should regard themselves as legally belligerent, since those countries had not been at war with North Korea and had sent their armed forces to fulfil the resolution of the General Assembly on collective action. Consequently, his delegation considered that the wording of paragraph 5 (a) of the fifteen-Power draft resolution, in accordance with paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement should have indicated that the participants would take part in the conference "on behalf of the United Nations". His delegation would like to see maintained the principle that it was the United Nations which had carried out collective action and it would consequently request a separate vote on paragraph 5 (a), on which it would abstain. He would vote in favour of the rest of that draft resolution.

24. As to USSR participation his delegation felt that room should be made for all the great Powers which, because of their influence and power, could guarantee positive results from the work of the conference. The decision that the USSR should participate would have to be taken by the Organization itself, subject to the concurrence of the other side. If done otherwise, the decision would involve dictating to the other side who was to take part in the conference on the other side of the table. His delegation considered that India should participate in the conference not so much as a reward for its past work, but in order to help in the solution of the problem. The work of the conference

would be greatly assisted by the participation of India. His delegation respected the point of view expressed by the representative of South Korea, but did not share it. As for the revised USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/L.48/Rev.1), he could not agree with the criterion of equilibrium that was its basis or with the list proposed, and would vote against it. He had no objection at that stage to the proposal submitted by Burma, India, Indonesia and Liberia (A/C.1/L.50).

25. Mr. ZEINEDDINE (Syria) expressed his delegation's appreciation of the intentions which motivated the USSR to propose Syria as a participant in the political conference. His delegation had not sought, and did not seek to participate. A final decision with regard to its participation or non-participation could only come before his Government after the Assembly had invited it to take part. While the Assembly was definitely entitled to recommend the participation of any Member State, his delegation's preference was toward non-participation.

26. Mr. Zeineddine stated that an objective consideration of the situation in the Committee had indicated that Syria, as well as other non-belligerents, would not in fact have to undertake any duty, except to thank those for the trust they had that Syria could be useful to the conference.

27. Mr. MUNOZ (Argentina) expressed his profound satisfaction at the armistice that had recently been concluded and associated himself with the hope that it would put an end to the dreadful material destruction and human suffering wrought on the noble Korean people.

28. Korea was an example of collective action, but the members of the Committee must not forget that it was at the same time a basic element of the existing international division. The primary responsibility, as had been proven by facts, lay with those States which were privileged by virtue of the Charter and which also had special interests. Although the Argentine delegation attributed just value to the military action in Korea, it was frightened by the possibility that it might become general to indulge in military interventions on a large scale to solve local difficulties. For those reasons, Argentina had endeavoured to help the civilian population.

29. Mr. Muñoz said that it was obvious that the sponsors of the fifteen-Power draft resolution (A/L.151/Rev.1) were not in agreement regarding the scope of the text. With the broadest possible interpretation, the role to be played by the General Assembly had been reduced to a minimum both in regard to the composition of the conference and to the scope of future meetings. Therefore, his delegation would be unable to vote in favour of that draft resolution, but it hoped, nevertheless, that the conference would be held with the sole objective of setting up and maintaining international peace.

30. Since his delegation was unable to vote in favour of the draft resolution in document A/L.151/Rev.1, he did not need to expatiate at length on draft resolutions referring to the participation of the Soviet Union (A/L.152/Rev.2) and India (A/L.153) in the conference. Those proposals did not change the tenor of the fifteen-Power draft resolution.

31. Mr. Muñoz stated that although the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/L.48/Rev.1) endeavoured to solve the conference question from a different point of view by inviting a limited number of non-belligerent States, it did not make clear the method to be utilized in arriving at decisions at the conference. Also the USSR draft resolution was not acceptable to a majority of those States without whose participation fruitful results could not be expected from the conference.

32. The Argentine delegation considered the four-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.50) and the Peruvian amendment (A/C.1/L.51) referred to a procedural nature to which it had no objection and reserved its position on the Chilean amendment until such time as it had been officially submitted.

33. Mr. TJONDRONEGORO (Indonesia) stated that draft resolutions in documents A/L.153 and A/L.152/Rev.2 recommending the participation of India and the Soviet Union at the conference would receive his delegation's support.

34. Turning to the fifteen-Power draft resolution (A/L.151/Rev.1) and the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/L.48/Rev.1), he stated that his delegation believed that non-belligerent United Nations Members, as well as the belligerents of both sides, should participate in the conference. The belligerents should have the right to participate, but some limitation should be observed in order to attain a conference with a political balance. Following logically from those two conditions, his delegation believed that the Panmunjom negotiations, which were of a strictly military nature, had been concluded with the signing of the Armistice Agreement and should be followed by a post-armistice political conference of a broader nature.

35. He regretted that the concept of a conference as outlined in paragraph 5 (a) of the fifteen-Power draft resolution was contrary to what his and many other delegations thought to be the best for a post-armistice conference. For that reason, his delegation would find it difficult to support paragraph 5 (a) although other paragraphs in that resolution were acceptable. However, his delegation's difficulties in that respect could be mitigated if the three draft resolutions recommended by all or some of the fifteen Powers were combined into a single draft resolution.

36. The Indonesian delegation had found in the USSR draft resolution, prior to its latest revision, the conception of a politically balanced conference of a multilateral composition. The revised draft in which four additional non-belligerent countries had been recommended as participants, including Indonesia, had been submitted. While his delegation was grateful that the Soviet Union would appreciate the presence of Indonesia at the conference, it had not sought participation in it. In enlarging the composition of the conference he said Indonesia would have liked to see the Soviet Union include some other United Nations Members who had expressed a wish to be included as participants, such as Canada, Australia or the Philippines. Although the liberal and multilateral conception of a conference, as outlined in the USSR draft resolution could be supported by the Indonesian delegation, Mr. Tjondronegoro did believe that such an adjustment might be helpful in warranting the support of both sides.

37. Speaking on the procedure for adopting decisions recommended under the fifteen-Power draft resolution (A/L.151/Rev.1) and the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/L.48/Rev.1), the representative of Indonesia felt that both procedures had merits. The procedure suggested in the Soviet Union draft resolution seemed most suitable for decisions regarding the withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea. Decisions on that matter would be deemed to have been adopted if they had the unanimous consent of the parties on both sides who had foreign forces in Korea. On the other hand, the representative of Indonesia felt that decisions on the question of the unification of Korea should be deemed adopted if they had the approval of the representatives of South Korea and North Korea. Finally, decisions to be taken in reaching a peaceful settlement of the Korean question might require another procedure, and he was inclined to favour the liberal method as mentioned in paragraph 5 (a) of the fifteen-Power draft resolution in that case. Therefore, both procedures might be suitable, depending on the nature of the problems arising at the conference.

38. Mr. Tjondronegoro expressed his delegation's support of the second fifteen-Power draft resolution (A/L.154/Rev.1) and the four-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.50), as amended by the delegation of Peru (A/C.1/L.51).

39. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) observed that his delegation had submitted an amendment (A/C.1/L.51) to the draft resolution submitted by Burma, India, Indonesia and Liberia (A/C.1/L.50). He believed that that draft resolution was timely and had filled a gap in the fifteen-Power draft resolution (A/L.151/Rev.1). Some representatives had interpreted the last part of the four-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.50) as meaning that General Assembly action would have to be delayed until the Assembly had been notified of the reaction of the Governments of the Central People's Republic of China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. He did not believe that the Assembly's jurisdiction should be subordinated to the observations of those two governments. The reopening of the debate also might place serious obstacles in the path of the immediate convening of the conference. He believed that the Committee could contribute to the success of the operative part of the four-Power draft resolution by adopting the Peruvian amendment.

40. Mr. LODGE (United States of America) stated that at first reading there appeared to be no reason for the draft resolution submitted by the delegations of Burma, India, Indonesia and Liberia (A/C.1/L.50) or any other draft resolution informing the Communists of what the United Nations was doing. But in deference to the views of the four governments sponsoring the draft resolution, the United States delegation was prepared to go along with its general purposes. The Communists would thus be informed that the General Assembly had approved the armistice, that it welcomed the political conference recommended by paragraph 60 and that it had made a number of recommendations concerning the conference directed particularly to the side consisting of those governments which had contributed forces to the United Nations action.

41. Mr. Lodge said that his delegation did not concede, for example, that the Communists had legitimate-

ly anything to say on the draft resolutions which were to be adopted. It did not agree, in particular, with the implication of the proposal that the Communists' reactions might properly be the basis for further consideration by the General Assembly. Such a position would lead to lengthy wrangles which might prevent the conference from being held within the period contemplated by paragraph 60 and would reduce the likelihood of its success. Mr. Lodge stated that his delegation would vote for the four-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.50) as modified by the Peruvian amendment.

42. Although his delegation's fundamental disagreement with the spirit and purpose of the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/L.48/Rev.1) had been made clear in previous statements, Mr. Lodge said that several things in it stood out. First, the Soviet Union would exclude from the conference the Governments of Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, Turkey, Thailand and the Union of South Africa, whose sons had fought for the cause of the United Nations in Korea. Secondly, the representative of the Soviet Union had talked at length about the importance of including Korea's neighbours. Mr. Lodge observed that one did not have to be an expert on geography to know that Poland and Czechoslovakia were not exactly geographically contiguous to Korea, nor were such countries as India, Indonesia, Burma, Syria and Egypt exactly next-door neighbours. On the other hand, there had been no mention of Japan, the National Government of China, the Philippines nor Thailand. The claims of the Philippines and Thailand rested not only on the fact that they had placed troops under the Unified Command but on their proximity as well. Thirdly, several representatives had noted previously that the original text of the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/L.48) would give a veto to the Chinese Communists and the North Koreans but not to the Republic of Korea. Although the USSR representative had said previously that that was a falsification of his position, the revised USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/L.48/Rev.1) provided that the decisions of the conference would be deemed to have been adopted if they had the unanimous consent of both parties which had signed the Armistice Agreement. As the only signatories to the Agreement were the United Nations Command and the Commanders of the North Korean and Chinese communist forces, the draft resolution would seem still to provide that a solution for Korea could be imposed against its will on the Republic of Korea.

43. In conclusion, Mr. Lodge stated that the USSR draft resolution was unacceptable in its intention, in its letter and in its spirit. The United States would vote against it and for the same reasons against the USSR amendment to the fifteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.52).

44. Mr. MENON (India) observed that an amendment (A/C.1/L.51) to the four-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.50) had been submitted by the representative of Peru and his delegation, as well as the others who had sponsored the draft resolution, deeply regretted and deplored the amendment.

45. Mr. Menon observed that the representative of Peru had said that some representatives were suspicious that the amendment would have the effect of super-

seding the jurisdiction of the Assembly. The representative of India said he had endeavoured previously to remove any suspicion that it had been introduced as a block or that it had been intended to drag on the discussions interminably. India had a vested interest in the early convening of the conference. India had troops in Korea who had taken charge of the prisoners to be repatriated.

46. The purpose of the draft resolution submitted by Burma, India, Indonesia and Liberia (A/C.1/L.50) was procedural. It meant that the proposals were to be communicated to the other side. The United Nations would wait for some communications to be received and would deal with them afterwards. The draft resolution did not say anything about reporting all communications, but the Peruvian amendment thereto did say "inform the Members of the United Nations of any communication received". The draft resolution had not introduced that idea, but the amendment had.

47. Mr. Menon observed that the four-Power draft resolution included the words "report to the General Assembly as appropriate". He was confident the Assembly had sufficient confidence in the Secretary-General to permit him to use his discretion in a matter of reporting. The draft resolution did not state what to report; it simply said to report. It did not say to report to any particular session.

48. The Indian delegation felt it would be harmful if the Peruvian delegation were to press for the adoption of its amendment, for the following reasons: first, the draft resolution did not include all the purposes accredited to it; secondly, the amendment proposed to circumvent the Assembly, would create unnecessary suspicion and difficulty and suggested lack of confidence in the Secretary-General; thirdly, some of the representatives must feel that they also had a say in the United Nations which would be heard.

49. In order to obtain a unanimous decision on the four-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.50) the sponsors were prepared to delete the words "to the General Assembly" from the phrase "and to report to the General Assembly as appropriate", if the representative of Peru were to withdraw his amendment.

50. In conclusion, Mr. Menon observed that the words "to the third part of the seventh session" should be changed to read "to the resumed meeting of the seventh session". The sponsors had no objection to that technical change.

51. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) said in order to prove his good faith and admiration for India and his feeling that the vote on the draft resolution should be nearly unanimous as possible, he would be happy to withdraw the Peruvian amendment and accept the amendment Mr. Menon had suggested.

52. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) recalled that the representative of the United Kingdom had described the revised Soviet Union draft resolution (A/C.1/L.48/Rev.1) as diversionary. However, the USSR delegation, in that revision, had followed the principles first defended by the United Kingdom delegation and had tried by adding a number of countries to make the membership of the round-table conference comprehensive. The British position was peculiar in that it gave support to a draft

resolution calling for a two-sided conference while admitting that there should not be an "across-the-table" conference and proposing invitations to the Soviet Union and India. The United Kingdom representative had asserted that the Soviet Union proposal provided for the presence of only three of the belligerents. However, it proposed as participants the United States, the United Kingdom, France and South Korea and had done so in accordance with the principle of comprehensive representation to eliminate the danger of unilaterality. In the revision of the draft resolution, a further step forward had been taken. The four belligerents proposed had been suggested to represent the side described as that of the United Nations. The other side would be represented by North Korea and the Chinese People's Volunteers; that was to say, two representatives. Therefore, there would be four countries on one side and two countries on the other along with nine neutrals of which six were Arab or Asian countries. That composition was based on the principle of multilaterality and the elimination of the notion of having only two sides opposing each other.

53. The revised draft resolution, however, was apparently not popular. Some delegations had objected previously to the original draft because it did not include all the countries they would have liked to see. Now there would be some abstention, at least, rather than opposition as a result of the addition of some countries. The question was still being asked, however, why Canada, Australia and some other States were not included. The Soviet Union view was that those various States were all members of the same group which had intervened in Korea and it did not greatly matter exactly how they were represented. The conference should avoid having too many delegations and there should be between fifteen and twenty at the most. It should not consist entirely of members of the same political bloc, with the Koreans and Chinese on the other side. Such a conference would not in reality be an international conference. The two-sided concept was suitable in signing an Armistice Agreement but the peaceful settlement of the Korean question was a much larger question in which many countries, particularly Korea itself and Korea's neighbours, were directly interested. Also interested were peace-loving nations like France and Poland. No question had been raised in connexion with France although there had been some remarks about Poland and Czechoslovakia. The point to be satisfied was the fundamental principle which should underlie the composition of the conference.

54. The tendency of those supporting the United States was reflected in the Peruvian amendment, the concept of which was identical with that of the fifteen-Power draft resolution, namely that there should be no discussion with the other side. The Peruvian representative had objected that reporting the views of those two Governments to the Assembly would delay the convening of the conference and would lead to a resumption of consideration of the question in the General Assembly. The United States representative had expressed his opposition to a resumption of negotiations and had taken the unrealistic position that the General Assembly's proposals should be presented like an ultimatum. The Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China had stated (A/2446) the conditions

under which proposals would be acceptable. If the conditions in that statement were regarded as unacceptable by the Assembly or if the Assembly's proposals concerning membership were unacceptable on the Korean-Chinese side, there would be a need for negotiation.

55. Apparently the intention was to push through the fifteen-Power draft resolution (A/L.151/Rev.1) by a majority vote and present it to the Chinese and Korean Governments as an ultimatum. That course would wreck the forthcoming conference before it opened by avoiding negotiation and the idea of a settlement through agreement on the question of membership. That course was useless in connexion with a conference with governments which could not be regarded as vanquished. There had been no unconditional surrender and the will of the heroic Korean people had not been broken. When the military machine of one of the greatest imperialistic Powers had failed to impose its will upon the peoples of Korea, the proposal which it was proposed to adopt would also fail to do so. The approach which consisted of presenting demands in the name of the United Nations and on behalf of the sixteen belligerent States was not appropriate and would not yield results.

56. Under the terms of the draft resolution submitted by Burma, India, Indonesia and Liberia (A/C.1/L.50), the Secretary-General would report the replies from the Korean People's Democratic Republic and the People's Republic of China to the General Assembly. There should be no fear over the necessity of reverting to the question on the basis of those reports. The Assembly had already reverted to the Korean question on a number of occasions over difficulties which had appeared insuperable and ways had been found to reconcile the positions. The door should not be closed to further negotiation because of a fear of delay, for surely the best way of avoiding delay would be to enter into direct negotiation in an effort to find common language. Indeed, it would be best to invite the North Koreans and Chinese in order to hear from them. The Chinese Foreign Minister, in his statement, had pointed to the error of refusing to invite Chinese and North Korean representatives and that error ought not to be enshrined as a precedent.

57. On the one hand there was a request for a report to the General Assembly and on the other hand there was the idea of circulating the replies to the various Member States individually, leaving the initiative to the Secretary-General. But all the Secretary-General could do was to convene a special session if the majority was in favour, but the majority did not wish to talk about that. They relied on their ultimatum. That was an incorrect approach and the Soviet Union would fight for its draft resolution (A/C.1/L.48/Rev.1) which opened the door to the beginnings of a political conference.

58. The United States representative and some others had asserted that the Soviet Union would exclude South Korea, but the Soviet Union policy was based upon the notion that the participation of North and South Korea in the conference was mandatory. The Soviet Union draft resolution provided for the inclusion of South Korea and Mr. Vyshinsky, in a previous statement (623rd meeting) had said that North and South Korea should be the basic members participating

in the conference and accordingly that the agreement of South Korea should be required for the adoption of decisions. It would be incorrect to construe the Soviet Union position as meaning that the conference should adopt decisions without the agreement of South Korea. That would be pointless both politically and practically. The Soviet Union view was that the Koreans themselves should resolve their internal affairs.

59. The Soviet Union draft resolution stated that unanimous agreement of the parties which had signed the Armistice Agreement was necessary for any decision. Clearly the United States Government represented essentially not only the United States but also all those countries which had fought under its command including South Korea. Apparently, the authors of the fifteen-Power draft resolution (A/L.151/Rev.1) did not want the conference to discuss matters freely or even to allow the delegations in the Committee to act freely. The voting machine was to come into play and anything which failed to fit into the proposals was to be rejected. Matters could not work out that way at all.

60. While there might be some who were not satisfied with the Soviet Union draft resolution (A/C.1/L.48/Rev.1), its meaning ought not to be distorted. It should be clear that South Korea would be a participant in the conference. Moreover, no matter how many draft resolutions might be introduced for the purpose of avoiding negotiations on the composition of the conference, such negotiations would occur by one method or another. All mankind wished an end to be put to the war which had been suspended in order to remove the danger of a new world war. Accordingly, the Soviet Union had championed the cause of a correct composition for the conference in which all sides concerned would be represented and which would not be unilateral. The various questions could be settled only by negotiation and through efforts to eliminate contradictions and differences and to ensure proper conditions for the peaceful coexistence of the two systems prevailing in the world.

The meeting rose at 1.35 p.m.