



C O N T E N T S

	<i>Page</i>
The Korean question (A/2431, A/L.151/Rev.1, A/L.152/Rev.1, A/L.153, A/L.154/Rev.1, A/C.1/L.48) (<i>continued</i>)	725

Chairman: Mr. João Carlos MUNIZ (Brazil).

The Korean question (A/2431, A/L.151/Rev.1, A/L.152/Rev.1, A/L.153, A/L.154/Rev.1, A/C.1/L.48) (*continued*)

[Item 16]*

1. Mr. SANDLER (Sweden) said that in one of the draft resolutions before the Committee (A/C.1/L.48), Sweden had been proposed as a member of the political conference, the composition of which had proved to be a matter of controversy. As the Committee was aware, Sweden had already agreed to serve on two of the commissions set up in compliance with the terms of the Armistice Agreement, namely, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. That fact proved that Sweden was aware of its responsibilities as a Member of the United Nations. The membership of the political conference, however, would be of a quite different nature. With all due respect to the idea underlying the Soviet Union draft resolution, the Swedish Government saw no specific reason for it to become a negotiating member of that conference and it had no desire to do so.

2. Mr. Sandler believed that both India and the Soviet Union should be among the participants in the conference. The membership of India would be very useful to the conference and it was sincerely to be hoped that India would be willing to accept such an invitation. Moreover, the participation of the Soviet Union was a necessary condition for achieving lasting results. His delegation's vote for the participation of the Soviet Union was not dependent upon the final phrase of the draft resolution that read "provided the other side desires it" (A/L.152/Rev.1).

3. The Swedish delegation considered it self-evident that both parts of Korea, as well as the Peking Government, should be represented. In that connexion, it wished to stress that none of the prospective participants should have a right of veto against the participation of another State. Moreover, the conference should not be based on a strict "both sides" theory. It was quite understandable that the military commanders used

those terms in the Armistice Agreement, but that fact could not restrict the authority of the Assembly to make any recommendation it deemed useful regarding membership in a political conference.

4. The Swedish delegation had not changed its view in regard to the composition of the conference even after having carefully studied the arguments of the United States representative. It might be added that an application of the same "both sides" concept could be seen in the concluding and very essential terms of the USSR draft resolution. Also, his delegation agreed with the views expressed by the United Kingdom representative to the effect that another Panmunjom would further no good purpose. In that respect, the United Kingdom representative's explanation of the fifteen-Power draft resolution (A/L.151/Rev.1) was exceedingly important. Indeed, such a middle-of-the-road concept was likely to win a very wide support, including that of Sweden.

5. Mr. ENGEN (Norway) said that his Government and people shared fully the feelings of gratitude and relief which had been so eloquently expressed, occasioned by the armistice in Korea. They hoped that the end of the fighting would augur a new and happier phase in United Nations efforts to bring peace, security, unification and independence to the unhappy Korean people.

6. The Committee was not and should not be concerned with the substance of the problem, but should set itself to the task of making practical arrangements for the convening of the political conference provided for in the Armistice Agreement. It should not debate the substance of the problem, nor the solutions which the proposed conference should seek. The task of the Assembly was to decide upon the membership of the conference. Certainly, it should not be beyond the capacity of the Committee to find an agreed solution to that question. The Norwegian delegation believed that the conference should be composed in a way which would be most conducive to its success. Moreover, it also believed that the participants in the conference had the right to expect that the Assembly should act in a manner that should facilitate, and not complicate, the very difficult and delicate negotiations

*Indicates the item number on the agenda of the General Assembly.

which the political conference must undertake. It was his delegation's view that the composition of the conference might not only influence the outcome but also the fate of its decisions.

7. His delegation had some difficulties in appreciating the importance of that aspect dealing with the concept of the political conference, namely, whether it should be a round-table or an across-the-table conference. It was true that article IV, paragraph 60, of the Armistice Agreement (A/2431) referred to the concept of "two sides", as indeed was natural in an Agreement of that kind. However, the Norwegian Government did not believe that that concept should be interpreted too literally. The guiding consideration at the present stage should be to lay a realistic foundation for the work of the conference. His delegation had no doubt that the conference itself, when it started its work, would take on its own character. That that would happen was envisaged in the stipulation of paragraph 5 (a) of the fifteen-Power draft resolution, wherein participating governments would only be bound by decisions and agreements to which they adhered. His delegation believed that principle to be a sensible and realistic one, since it did not formalize the concept of the conference consisting of two negotiating teams facing each other. Under those circumstances, his delegation was inclined to believe that the character of the political conference should not be given too much emphasis during the selection of the participants.

8. As to the question of participation, Mr. Engen believed there already existed a considerable amount of agreement. Some of the proposed candidates appeared in each of the four draft resolutions before the Committee, thus indicating a basis for agreement on those nations forming the bulk of the conference. According to the terms of the fifteen-Power draft resolution (A/L.151/Rev.1), the General Assembly is asked to recommend the participation of those among the Member nations which had contributed armed forces and which desired to participate. Moreover, the Assembly was asked to recommend the Republic of Korea as a participant. The Norwegian delegation supported those recommendations, expressing the hope and the confidence that that broad recommendation would not result in the political conference becoming a rump General Assembly of the United Nations.

9. His delegation would also support the draft resolution introduced by Australia, Denmark and New Zealand (A/L.152/Rev.1), recommending the participation of the Soviet Union in the conference. The Norwegian Government felt that the participation of the Soviet Union, which was a great Power in the Far East, not only was justified because of its immediate interests in the area, but also was necessary in order to reach realistic solutions which would take into account the interests of all parties concerned.

10. The delegation of Norway would also vote for the draft resolution submitted by Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom (A/L.153), recommending the participation of India. His Government felt that India, as a great Asian Power, was entitled to sit at the conference table when the peaceful settlement of the Korean question was discussed, because such a settlement was obviously of direct and immediate concern to India. It was also confident that

India's position and influence would be beneficial to the conference as a whole.

11. As to the Soviet Union draft resolution (A/C.1/L.48), while his delegation would certainly agree to include most of the proposed participants, it could not agree with the principle upon which the selection of those participants was based. It was the opinion of the Norwegian delegation that that principle could in no way be said to be in accordance with the concept of a political conference between countries whose participation in the conference was determined by their geographical location and the influence wielded in the area. According to the USSR draft resolution, the conference would be made up of four communist States, four non-communist belligerent States, and three non-communist non-belligerent States. A conference composed along those lines was not likely to achieve any solution to the problem. His delegation hoped that the USSR representative would reconsider his proposal with a view to having the conference meet more adequately the requirements of the situation. As to the provision laid down in the last sentence of the Soviet draft resolution, his delegation had nothing to add to the brilliant analysis presented by the representative of the United Kingdom (616th meeting).

12. Mr. NASZKOWSKI (Poland) said that his delegation wished to express its profound satisfaction at the signing and entry into force of the Armistice Agreement in Korea, thereby putting an end to the destructive war waged by foreign interventionists against the Korean people for more than three years. The boundless sufferings and heroic struggle of the Korean people for independence had always been meaningful to the Polish people, who had struggled against the fascist invaders in the Second World War.

13. The Polish delegation, guided by its desire for peace, had invariably supported in the United Nations all efforts of the Soviet Union designed to put an end to the bloody war in Korea. It had submitted at the first part of the seventh session a comprehensive proposal covering all questions bearing on a lessening of international tension, demanding as a first step the immediate cessation of hostilities in Korea (A/2229). However, it did not press for a vote on that proposal in the course of the second part of the session in order to facilitate the attainment of agreement on such an important question as that of Korea. Today, when the Korean people were confronting the problem of the restoration of their war-devastated economy, the Polish Government and people felt duty bound to extend to them assistance and had announced their determination to extend large-scale assistance.

14. As a State which had conducted a consistent peace policy, Poland had agreed to participate in the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission as well as the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, and would do its utmost to foster a rapid and effective implementation of the provisions of the Armistice Agreement.

15. The conclusion of the Korean armistice constituted a great victory for the heroic Korean people and the Chinese volunteers. The Armistice Agreement also constituted a victory for the peaceful aspirations of hundreds of millions of human beings throughout the world who yearned for the elimination of all sources of war and for peaceful co-operation and who longed

for the solution of disputed questions by negotiation rather than by force.

16. In the course of the debate, many representatives had stressed the necessity for creating a favourable atmosphere for the proposed conference by avoiding questions which might make agreement more difficult. The Polish delegation wholly shared that view and found it odd and regrettable that some representatives deemed it necessary to revert to the old spurious allegations and unfounded charges against the Korean People's Democratic Republic and the Chinese People's Republic. Guided by a practical spirit of conciliation and an intention to assist in the making of constructive decisions, his delegation did not wish, at that juncture, to make an analysis of the genesis of the war and to repeat again the arguments which were now accepted by world public opinion as to the identity of the aggressor. It could not, however, fail to stress that the armistice negotiations clearly showed the resolute striving of the Governments of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea and of the Chinese People's Republic for a termination of hostilities and for the creation of conditions likely to ensure the peaceful unification of Korea. Moreover, it was useful to recall that paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement was the result of the initiative of the Korean and Chinese representatives, who had introduced it as early as 16 February 1952 (S/2619) and that had it not been for their exceptional forbearance, their readiness to make concessions and their resolute desire to put an end to the hostilities, there would have been no armistice today.

17. Mr. Lloyd had recognized that the Korean armistice was of great significance to the whole world. Nevertheless, the threat of a resumption of hostilities in Korea was by no means entirely eliminated. That was the reason why world public opinion attached such a great significance to the problem of the Assembly's deliberations, expecting the United Nations to adopt decisions that would foster the peaceful unification of Korea. The whole world remembered with what great concern it watched over the actions of the Syngman Rhee régime, which had patently sought to frustrate the armistice negotiations. The danger of such deeds in the future had been enhanced as a result of the full support extended to that régime by the United States. Mr. Dulles and Mr. Syngman Rhee had signed a treaty of mutual defence. That treaty was clearly at variance with the objectives of the political conference, which were set forth in paragraph 60 of the Agreement. Indeed, it was impossible to reconcile the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korean soil with the Dulles-Rhee treaty, since article IV of that treaty spoke of the retention and stationing of American troops in Korea. Though Mr. Lodge had endeavoured to persuade the Committee of the absence of any inconsistency (615th meeting), the Polish representative wished to remind Mr. Lodge of his own words reported in a dispatch dated 2 August 1953 to *The New York Times*, wherein he had declared that no people which maintained a large army on foreign territories could be regarded as peace-loving.

18. Mr. Naszkowski added that, faced by such a situation, one might ask what chances of success there were if the political conference was to be confronted, in advance, with the ultimatum of the Dulles-Rhee *communiqué* to the effect that the conference should

either adopt the Syngman Rhee conditions or else give up. The same misgivings had been expressed in an article in the *Manchester Guardian* on 1 August 1953.

19. Mr. Lodge had endeavoured to convince the Committee that the United States had concluded no secret agreements with Syngman Rhee. There was no need for such persuasion when the United States was guilty of having concluded an open agreement which ran directly counter to the letter and spirit of the Armistice Agreement signed only a few weeks before.

20. The conclusion of the armistice in Korea constituted a great victory for the forces of peace. One would believe that that fact would be present in the minds of those who professed concern that the political conference should succeed in its task. Its success would be of the greatest significance in securing peace in the Far East and throughout the world. However, it could not be alleged that the fifteen-Power draft resolution (A/L.151/Rev.1) as well as the statement of the United States representative, were designed to lay the ground work for a political conference of that nature. On the contrary, a new attempt was being made to legitimize the old and repeatedly exposed falsehood that the United Nations was a party to the Korean conflict. The United States intervention in Korea was again being represented as collective security action on the part of the United Nations, whereas in reality the name of the United Nations was taken in vain in Korea, thereby doing great harm to the authority of the Organization. In preparing for the political conference, the Assembly must reject attempts to continue that concept so harmful to the United Nations and the cause of international peace. The task of the United Nations was to convene a truly international conference and, in determining the membership of that conference, the interests of ensuring peace must be paramount.

21. The Polish delegation was, therefore, in agreement with those representatives who had declared that the political conference should not be a continuation of the Panmunjom negotiations. In Panmunjom, the topic was an armistice and consequently, the negotiations had been conducted between the representatives of the belligerents. At the political conference, the question of peace would be discussed and many countries directly concerned with Far Eastern problems, such as India, would be interested in that conference. Some of the co-authors of the fifteen-Power draft resolution had tried to interpret that draft as making it possible to organize a round-table conference. However, it was sufficient to analyse paragraph 5 of that draft to realize that such an interpretation was incorrect, and that the paragraph had implicit in it a mechanical sequel to the Panmunjom conference of two opposing sides. Thus, the spirit of the conference would become one of negotiations between belligerent parties rather than between participants in a conference, wherein one side would impose its conditions on the other side and might even submit ultimata, following the example of the Dulles-Rhee pact. That would certainly not provide the atmosphere conducive to international negotiations. It was only in an atmosphere of mutual respect for the rights, views and positions of all participants, namely, the atmosphere of a round-table conference, that it would be possible to bring about the lessening of international tension, the settlement of disputed

problems, as well as the establishment of the prerequisites of lasting international co-operation.

22. If the United Kingdom representative, as well as those who had championed the concept of the round-table conference, were truly the partisans of such a concept, they should withdraw their support from the fifteen-Power draft resolution. Moreover, it should be emphasized that, despite contrary allegations, paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement (A/2431) did in no way exclude the possibility of convening a round-table conference, since that paragraph contained no limitation as regards the identity of the participating States. None of the speakers so far, with the exception of Mr. Lodge, had made the fallacious argument that a round-table conference was excluded by the terms of paragraph 60. Indeed, the Australian delegate had gone so far as to say that paragraph 60 contained no such limitation (613th meeting).

23. A correct approach to the problem of a political conference was offered by the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/L.48) because it was based on the principle of a genuine round-table conference, thereby breaking with the concept of two opposing parties. It would also make possible an impartial and comprehensive consideration of the problem. The Polish delegation was convinced that the adoption of the Soviet Union draft resolution would constitute a step forward which would ensure for the political conference the character and significance of a true peace conference and convert it into a conference which could, in good faith, consider impartially the problems facing it. As a result thereof, it would not only bring peace to the Korean people but also foster the further abatement of international tension and, consequently, the strengthening of peace throughout the world.

24. Mr. FAHMY (Egypt) said that his delegation had believed that the only task confronting the Committee was the implementation of paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement and the adoption of recommendations for the nomination of representatives to the political conference. However, there had soon appeared another no less important issue concerning the interpretation of that article. His delegation had also hoped that the United States representative would be able to convey to the Committee, on behalf of the Unified Command, the only authorized interpretation of paragraph 60, and that the representatives of the other fifteen Member States would convey the same unique and sole interpretation of that article. The situation, however, was that the Committee was confronted with two concepts—a narrow and a broad interpretation. His delegation was so confused by that ambiguous situation that it had seriously thought of abstaining on all the draft resolutions before the Committee. In that connexion, he wished to note that various newspapers had foreseen such differences in interpretation, thereby inducing his delegation to support, with no hesitation whatsoever, the Soviet Union proposal to extend an invitation to the representatives of the other side to present to the Committee their own interpretation of that paragraph.

25. It had been most heartening to hear the representative of France telling the Committee (613th meeting) so graciously and wisely that peace was indivisible and that it was hard to conceive a valid peace in the Far East when war continued elsewhere in Asia. Those

words were worthy of note by the Committee, especially when they came from as eminent a politician as Mr. Schumann. The Egyptian delegation wished to join Mr. Schumann in making an urgent appeal and in expressing an ardent hope that all might be reminded of the fact that if peace were disturbed in one corner of the world, other corners, too, would immediately feel the shock of that breach of peace and might react very bitterly, indeed.

26. That was the reason why his delegation did not see the real justification of debarring any Asian member from participation in the Korean political conference on the United Nations side, whether that State had taken part in the Korean conflict or not. His delegation felt unable to adhere to any contention denying those Asian countries the right and duty to discuss and make peace on their own borders and in their own continent. India could not be denied such an inherent right and duty when it had taken a leading part in guiding the two parties towards reaching an agreement. Nor did his delegation share the opinion that peace-making should be the privilege of the big Powers. On the contrary, small countries appreciated peace and they sometimes knew more about peace than certain other powers whose record in history was full of long and sad chapters concerning their love to conquer and their claim to dominate others. His delegation hoped that the participants in the conference would not attend it in order to safeguard their own colonial interests in the Asian continent.

27. The Egyptian delegation believed that there was a great inconsistency, as explained by the representative of Poland, between the fifteen-Power draft resolution (A/L.151/Rev.1) on the one hand, and the two draft resolutions in documents A/L.152 and A/L.153 on the other. While the first restricted the participants on the United Nations side to those Member States which had contributed armed forces under the Unified Command, the second and third draft resolutions recommended the participation of two Member States whose armed forces had not taken part in the Korean conflict. Before casting its vote on the first draft resolution, his delegation would welcome clarification in that respect.

28. The Egyptian delegation did not feel at all happy about the proviso in the operative part of the draft resolution sponsored by Australia, Denmark, and New Zealand (A/L.152/Rev.1). It believed that that proviso was unnecessary. It would be unable also to give its support to the recommendation embodied in the last sentence of the operative paragraph of the Soviet Union draft resolution (A/C.1/L.48), since it believed that that sentence was discriminatory in that it excluded South Korea and, therefore, dangerously curtailed its inherent rights in matters of deep and vital interest to that country.

29. Mr. EBAN (Israel) said that the armistice had given the world feelings of relief and rare solidarity and that that spirit should not be lost in the practical task before the Committee. The United Nations action in Korea represented a turning point in the quest for collective security. For the first time an attempt to destroy a legitimate international situation by arbitrary violence had been successfully resisted by the collective efforts of a world organization.

30. The General Assembly had authorized the operations of the United Nations Command, laid down the principles for an armistice, taken measures to prevent the extension of the conflict, defined its objectives and contributed to the solution of the prisoner question. It was appropriate therefore that the entire membership of the United Nations should feel a responsibility for launching the next step in its Korean policy by facilitating the work of the political conference.

31. The burden of the conflict had fallen with special weight on sixteen Members and tribute should be paid to them, and in particular to the American people. Some might feel that the experience of the States participating in the hostilities should inhibit the initiative and counsel of other States whose circumstances limited them to a relatively passive role. However, those sixteen had always regarded themselves as the emissaries of the sixty. Moreover, though Korea was the most recent episode in the long struggle on behalf of freedom against the rule of violence, other peoples had made their sacrifice for similar causes in other arenas. The governments involved in the Korean hostilities acknowledged some of those considerations by bringing their proposals before a collective body instead of acting alone.

32. The Armistice Agreement contained a provision for its own replacement by a negotiated peace. The delegation of Israel agreed with the view that the political conference should develop a different atmosphere from that prevailing at the truce negotiations. It should represent the spirit of a peace organization facing a common task rather than groups of belligerents in a state of suspended war.

33. The Korean conflict differed from the traditional concepts of war. There had been no declaration of war and United Nations action had not been in the particular interests of the participating States. There was no intent to destroy the opposing army and subjugate its territory. The object was to repel aggression and to restore a situation set aside by violence. That distinction was not easy to grasp. While the concepts of belligerency and neutrality were not mentioned in the Charter or in the Uniting for Peace resolution (377 (V)), it was doubtful whether a State participating in a United Nations action thereby entered into a state of war. Mr. Eban did not suggest that the Committee should consider the political and legal implications of an enforcement action. It would, however, be helpful at an appropriate time to review the problem in some United Nations organ. For the present it could be concluded that participation in the political conference need not be limited to what previously would have been called "belligerents". There was no need to decide which "side" any State represented or to disqualify any State because it could not be described as being on either "side". Those concepts might have been natural in the Armistice, but they did not fit into a United Nations peace conference. Paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement could not be interpreted as ruling out any Member of the United Nations.

34. The criterion for the selection of participants should be practical rather than dogmatic. The question was whether the participation of a State would be useful, whether its inclusion would contribute to success and whether it would give greater validity to any agreements reached. Israel would support any

resolution which could answer those questions affirmatively. Subject to more detailed consideration, Israel would support the first fifteen-Power draft resolution (A/L.151/Rev.1) welcoming the holding of a political conference and also the second fifteen-Power draft resolution (A/L.154/Rev.1) paying tribute to those who had fallen. Israel also endorsed the proposal of Australia, New Zealand and Denmark (A/L.152/Rev.1) for the participation of the Soviet Union. Every circumstance of history, geography and political reality argued in favor of that draft resolution. It was their interpretation that, by adopting that resolution, the General Assembly as a whole, and not only China and North Korea would be assuming responsibility and initiative for the recommendation. References had been made to the constructive interest of India as a leading Asian power in all phases of the consideration of the Korean question. In that connexion, the delegation of Israel would vote in obedience to the criterion of utility and the prospect of success in convening the conference and bringing it to agreement, which Prime Minister Nehru's statement had also upheld.

35. Mr. Eban felt that the results of the Committee's discussions and vote probably would not conform precisely with the ideas of all interested parties. But it should be remembered that the importance of the conference would transcend the significance of this or that detail of composition. If most legitimate claims were satisfied and there could be no charge of inequitable balance, then attention would be directed beyond procedure to the substantive task of conciliation. Peace in Korea might generate the momentum for a fruitful discussion of all Far Eastern issues. In turn, a Far Eastern settlement might lead to an abatement of tensions in other areas. By its action on the issues before it, the Committee could open broad perspectives for world peace.

36. Mr. NUNEZ PORTUONDO (Cuba) said his delegation regarded the discussion on basic aspects of the issue as largely ended. The time had come for attitudes to be clarified. The Cuban delegation had studied the various considerations with two facts in mind. First, South Korea had been unjustly attacked by North Korea; the Chinese Communists had contributed to the aggression, while moral and material backing to that aggression had been given by the Soviet Union. The General Assembly's decisions had been built upon those facts and there had arisen no reason to change the decisions. Indeed, the Soviet Union had admitted supplying armaments and equipment to the Chinese Communists, and equipment captured from the North Koreans, including jet aircraft of Soviet Union manufacture, and left no doubt as to the intervention of Moscow in support of the aggressors. Secondly, the Armistice Agreement contained both in paragraph 60 and in the preamble clear references to two sides or two contending parties. It was a basic legal principle that when a contract was clear it should be interpreted literally. The Armistice Agreement would have to be revised if it were to be interpreted other than literally, and that could not be done without the agreement of communist China and North Korea.

37. If there were any doubts about the South Korean Government having subscribed to the armistice, the terms of the preamble to the Armistice Agreement, with its reference to the great toll of suffering and

bloodshed on both sides, would clearly indicate that that Government was a principal party. Indeed, even the Soviet Union draft resolution (A/C.1/L.48) recognized this by including South Korea.

38. Mr. Núñez Portuondo said the Cuban delegation would vote for the fifteen-Power draft resolution in document A/L.154/Rev.1. It paid homage to those who fell in the cause of freedom. It was satisfactory that the first collective effort of the United Nations against aggression had been successful, for it offered convincing proof of the effectiveness of collective action under the Charter.

39. His delegation would vote also for the fifteen-Power draft resolution (A/L.151/Rev.1) concerning the political conference. That draft resolution recommended to the General Assembly that those Member States that had contributed armed forces and which desired to participate in the political conference should participate together with the Republic of Korea. The question was what should the recommendation of the United Nations be. To recommend the participation of other States would amount to saying to North Korea and communist China that anyone might participate.

40. It would be inconsistent for the Cuban delegation to vote in favour of the draft resolution in document A/L.152/Rev.1. Cuba had frequently maintained that the Soviet Union should be considered a belligerent and still took the position that North Korea would not have undertaken the aggression without the approval of Moscow and could not have continued it for more than a week without the equipment and technical staff furnished by the Soviet Union. As the Soviet Union had been on the other side and was not a neutral, it had the right and the duty to attend the conference. Indeed, the Soviet Union would have to give its approval to the North Korean and Chinese communist Governments in regard to the peace terms.

41. With regard to an invitation to India, Mr. Núñez Portuondo wished to recall that at all times during the discussions on Korea Cuba had paid tribute to the Indian contribution. The objective, however, was the success of the conference. India had not been on either side, and indeed paragraph 37 of the Agreement (A/2431) defined as neutral those nations whose combatant forces had not participated in the hostilities. Further, India was specifically referred to in an annex of the Agreement as a neutral nation. Thus, although it had contributed an ambulance unit to the Commonwealth forces, it had been regarded as neutral by the parties. It was therefore difficult to see on which side India would sit. With regard to the references to the contribution of India towards a settlement and in particular on the question of the prisoners of war, it should be recalled, without belittling the part of India, that a number of ideas had been taken from the proposals of Mexico and Peru. Furthermore, the President of the Republic of Korea had said he would not agree to the presence of India at the conference table and it would be wrong to impose an unwanted representative. The statement of Prime Minister Nehru had made it clear that India was not soliciting a seat at the conference, and, unless it was evident to India that its presence would be useful and that the principal parties desired its assistance, India herself might not care to participate. Certainly, South Korea had to be regarded as a principal party, and others among those partici-

pating in the fighting were also opposed to India. There could be no conference without the Republic of Korea, but it would be possible to get along without India. Cuba could not face the responsibility of contributing by her action to the failure of the conference. It would therefore vote against the proposal for the participation of India.

42. The Soviet Union draft resolution (A/C.1/L.48) omitted any reference to the two sides. In proposing the membership of the conference it included allies for North Korea and communist China while omitting all but three on the South Korean side. It included Burma but no other Asian neighbour. It included Sweden as a neutral but omitted Switzerland. Moreover, it left South Korea, the victim of aggression, without a vote. The delegation of Cuba would vote against that draft resolution.

43. Mr. JORDAAN (Union of South Africa) expressed the relief of the South African Government at the news of the armistice and the end of the bloodshed and destruction. It was satisfying that concerted efforts had successfully repelled aggression. Great sacrifices had been made by the sixteen nations responding to the call of the Security Council, and in particular by the Government and people of the United States. South Africa too had suffered casualties and incurred heavy costs. He wished to pay tribute to all who had responded to the appeal. South Africa had had no direct interest in Korea; it had acted out of devotion to the principle of collective security. Now that aggression had been repelled, the United Nations had achieved its military objective with the conclusion of the armistice.

44. The Government of South Africa believed that the nations directly concerned should take the lead in the establishment of peace. Its own security interests lay closer to home and, for its part, South Africa would abide by any agreements reached by those who had a direct and vital interest in Korea. Moreover, it took the view that the conference would have a better chance of success if its membership was small. Accordingly, although South Africa was entitled under paragraph 5 (a) of the fifteen-Power draft resolution (A/L.151/Rev.1) to participate, it would not seek a seat at the political conference. In voting for that draft resolution, however, South Africa did not undertake to contribute to Korean reconstruction but reserved its position on that subject.

45. With regard to the Soviet Union draft resolution (A/C.1/L.48), South Africa shared the views expressed by the representatives of the United States, United Kingdom and Canada and could not vote in its favour.

46. According to paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement, the two sides were to nominate participants and there was no mention of the attendance of States which did not participate in the hostilities. South Africa would not express a view on that question, but would leave the matter to the States concerned and accordingly abstain on the questions of the participation of the Soviet Union and India. It was to be hoped that any difficulties would rapidly be removed so that the conference could begin its work without delay.

47. The CHAIRMAN stated that the list of speakers would be closed at 3 p.m. on Monday.

The meeting rose at 12.30 p.m.