



## CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
The Korean question (A/2431, A/L.151/Rev.1, A/L.152, A/L.153, A/L.154/Rev.1, A/C.1/L.48) ( <i>continued</i> ) . . . . .	709

**Chairman: Mr. João Carlos MUNIZ (Brazil).**

**The Korean question (A/2431, A/L.151/Rev.1, A/L.152, A/L.153, A/L.154/Rev.1, and A/C.1/L.48) (*continued*)**

[Item 16]\*

1. Mr. MARTIN (Canada) said that, with the end of the fighting in Korea, it was generally agreed that questions of substance were not the present concern of the resumed session of the General Assembly and should be left to the political conference. The present task was to effect the most practical arrangements for the conference, as well as to create the most favourable atmosphere for the forthcoming negotiations.

2. He wished to pay tribute to the dead of many lands who had fought for freedom. In particular, the Korean people and the United Nations owed a special debt to the United States whose armed forces along with the South Koreans had borne the brunt of the fighting.

3. The aggression had been repelled and all that the United Nations undertook to do by armed force had been accomplished. But the success of the United Nations would remain partial until an independent, unified and democratic Korea was achieved by peaceful means. While that was so, Mr. Martin pointed out that the Armistice Agreement was not a conditional one. The present period was not a respite from war, but the necessary interval between the signing of the armistice and the commencement of the political conference.

4. As to the composition of the political conference, the Canadian representative agreed with the views expressed by Mr. Schumann (613th meeting) to the effect that the interpretation of paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement (A/2431) should not be too literal. His delegation also agreed with the position taken by Admiral Joy, in the course of the armistice negotiations, that in regard to paragraph 60 the recommendation would be made by the Unified Command to the United Nations as well as to the Republic of Korea. The United Nations itself, therefore, represented one side to the conflict. As to the countries that were to

participate in the conference, the draft resolution which Canada had co-sponsored (A/L.151/Rev.1) made it clear that each Member of the United Nations which had contributed forces to the Unified Command had earned its right to a place at the conference table, should its government wish to exercise that right.

5. The objective of his delegation was to make sure that those countries which should participate in the conference, if the conference was to have its best chance of achieving successful results, were represented there. The Canadian delegation did not attach much importance to whether the conference was a round table or an "across-the-table" one; the important thing was to have those who should be there seated around a table. The composition of the conference was all the more important in view of the unique opportunity that existed now not only for settling an issue which for the past three years had threatened to touch off a general conflagration, but as a result of that settlement, for reducing the dangerous tensions in Asia and other parts of the world. It was evident, therefore, that the USSR should participate in the conference, because it would be quite unrealistic to hold such a conference without the Soviet Union, a country which should take its full share of responsibility for making and maintaining the peace.

6. The Canadian Government believed that the great and growing importance of India in Asian affairs and the leading role which she had played in and out of the United Nations in efforts at conciliation entitled her to participate in the political conference. India's position, as expressed by Mr. Nehru, was that she would be willing to serve only if the major parties concerned desired her assistance and if it was clear that she could perform some useful function in the interests of peace. In the circumstance, Mr. Martin fervently hoped that the participation of any State whose presence was essential for the holding of an effective conference would not be blocked. His delegation, therefore, would vote for the participation of India.

7. The terms of the draft resolution contained in document A/L.151/Rev.1 sufficiently protected the rights and position of every participating government since

\* Indicates the item number on the agenda of the General Assembly.

each was to be bound only by decisions or agreements to which it adhered. That clause was an unequivocal guarantee to any of the participants that there was no question of their rights and interests being disregarded, nor, for that matter, any question of the conference becoming involved in procedural difficulties over voting; there would either be agreement or there would be no agreement at all. Thus, full protection was given not only to the Government of the Republic of Korea, but also to the other side. One could understand the misgivings of the Chinese Communists and the North Koreans at the prospect of entering a conference in which their side might be numerically inferior to the United Nations side. But if such fears were entertained, the language of paragraph 5 (a) of the Fifteen-Power draft resolution should certainly dispel them.

8. As to the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/L.48), Mr. Martin observed that there was agreement on at least seven of the participants of the political conference—the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the USSR, Communist China, North and South Korea. That was already a modest step in the right direction. Mr. Martin hoped it might be possible to secure general agreement among all States principally concerned regarding the participation of India, in addition to those other members of the sixteen countries that had contributed armed forces to the Unified Command, not mentioned in the USSR draft resolution, who might wish to come.

9. The representative of Canada, however, found at least two major difficulties in the Soviet Union draft resolution. The first was that the last sentence of the operative paragraph would seem to exclude the Republic of Korea from those whose consent must be given to all agreements reached at the conference. Since the proposed conference was to discuss Korean affairs, it was essential that the rights of the Republic of Korea should be protected. The second objection was that Canada was not included as a participant in the USSR draft resolution. Canada's role and its military and financial contributions in Korea certainly entitled it to participate in the conference.

10. In conclusion, Mr. Martin said that the United Nations forces had done what they had been asked to do by force of arms. It had been the first major application of the principle of collective security by an international organization, and it had been successful.

11. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that various representatives had spoken of the historical importance of the Korean Armistice Agreement. Mr. Malenkoy, the President of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in a recent speech before the Presidium of the USSR had acknowledged the signature of the armistice as an event that crowned the struggle for peace.

12. The representative of the USSR declared that the history of Korea since June 1950 was an instructive one. It clearly showed that the attempt of the aggressors had been foiled and that a people fighting for their freedom and independence could not be vanquished. The Chinese People's volunteers, who had come to the rescue of their Korean brethren, had also earned great merit. However, there was no need at that moment to go back to the history of the Korean war, since the United Nations must address itself to the problems that

now confronted it and which were of great practical importance.

13. Before proceeding, however, Mr. Vyshinsky wished to recall the numerous efforts of the Soviet Union to bring about an end to the Korean conflict. He recalled the reply of Mr. Stalin to Mr. Nehru in July 1950, and mentioned the various proposals made by the Soviet Union, Poland and other peace-loving nations in the course of the fifth regular session. Later, during the month of June 1951 and at the sixth regular session, the Soviet Union made proposals toward a peaceful settlement in Korea. As recently as the seventh regular session in 1952, the Soviet Union supported the Polish proposal (A/2229) for putting an end to the hostilities and for starting negotiations between the belligerents with a view to the eventual withdrawal of foreign troops from Korean soil, including the Chinese volunteer units. The Polish proposal also called for ensuring a peaceful settlement of the Korean question on the basis of the unification of Korea, which was to be carried out by the Koreans themselves under the supervision of a commission in which the parties directly concerned would participate, as would other States, including those which had not taken part in the war in Korea. Thus, the Soviet Union had, more than once, attempted to bring to an end the war foisted upon the Korean people.

14. Such a reminder of the efforts of the USSR would have been unnecessary had it not been for the allegations of the representatives of New Zealand and of the United States of America at the 613th meeting of the Committee to the effect that the Soviet Union had helped aggression in Korea. In that connexion, Mr. Vyshinsky wished to reiterate his statement of 2 March 1953 (561st meeting) to the effect that Soviet Union help to the Chinese People's Republic had been offered in accordance with the Sino-Soviet Treaty, signed in 1945 and subsequently confirmed in 1950. As regards the alleged help extended to the Korean People's Republic, there was no such treaty of alliance between the USSR and that country; the USSR was not obligated to sell arms, nor did it sell armaments to that country. However, the Soviet Union did sell the Korean People's Republic some surplus armaments when its troops withdrew from Korea in 1948. Mr. Vyshinsky stated that he had already indicated (613th meeting) how a group of prominent American correspondents had refuted the slanderous fabrications spread about the alleged sale by the Soviet Union of armaments to Korea.

15. One could not fail to recall that the Governments of the Korean People's Democratic Republic and the Chinese People's Republic had played an important part in ending the Korean war by their efforts in settling the question of the prisoner exchange. However, despite every opportunity that existed to conclude the negotiations and sign an armistice agreement, more than two months had passed before the armistice was finally signed. The cause of that delay was the provocative attitude of the Syngman Rhee clique which not only did its best to thwart the signing of the armistice, but flagrantly violated the agreement on the prisoner-of-war exchange by forcibly abducting more than 27,000 war prisoners of the Korean-Chinese side. That clique had not given up its intention even at present to do its utmost to prevent the peaceful settlement of the ques-

ion and the unification of Korea on a democratic basis. Moreover, it was an open secret that the Syngman Rhee clique had found support on the part of the reactionary circles in the United States. Mr. Dulles' statement of 7 August 1953 had made it clear that the State Department had reached an agreement with Syngman Rhee for joint and co-ordinated action, even to the point of withdrawing from the political conference at a moment which should be agreed upon under that plan. Mr. Dulles' statement also showed that the United States Government had agreed with Syngman Rhee not to undertake any unilateral action for the unification of Korea by military means during the time of the political conference. In other words, the United States of America, along with Syngman Rhee, had agreed not to start a war against North Korea, a war already begun in 1950. One must ask, of course, what would happen once that interval had elapsed? Mr. Dulles' statement clearly confirmed the intentions of the Syngman Rhee clique to conquer North Korea by force of arms.

16. In appraising the situation that had arisen in connexion with the signature of the Armistice Agreement, mention should be made of the conclusion between the United States of America and South Korea of a so-called mutual defence treaty. Even the reactionary United States Press could not refrain from observing that that treaty was a serious link in a chain of measures with a view to ensuring military bases for United States forces for possible future use in aggressive military actions in the Pacific area. The phraseology of that agreement could not delude anyone at all since it had become standard language in aggressive agreements and was designed to cover up the true nature of those agreements. Mr. Vyshinsky then quoted excerpts from articles III and IV of the Mutual Defence Treaty and stated that those articles had revealed quite clearly the nature of the expansionist policy of the United States. Indeed, it was interesting to note that the agreement which granted the United States the right to maintain its armed forces on South Korean territory had been signed immediately after the signature of the Armistice Agreement, according to which one of the questions to be disposed of by the political conference was the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korean soil. Mention should also be made of the treaty of mutual assistance known as the sixteen-Power Declaration (A/2431, part I) wherein the participants in the intervention in Korea had undertaken, in advance, to take part in a new war in the Far East if such a war were to be unleashed by amateur military adventurers. Even the British Conservative newspaper, *The Observer*, had described that agreement to be tantamount to a threat to start a third world war if a new local incident were to arise in Korea. A similar opinion had been expressed by a well-known Labour Member of Parliament, Mr. Driberg, which appeared in *Reynold's News*. Such was the nature of the atmosphere on the eve of the political conference.

17. The main problem now was to help the Korean people to restore their national economy and help heal their wounds. Accordingly, the Soviet Union Government had decided immediately to appropriate 1,000 million roubles for the restoration of the Korean economy. But the most important problem facing the As-

sembly was to spell out measures that would help foster the success of the proposed political conference to be convened in accordance with paragraph 60 of article IV of the Armistice Agreement. In that connexion, the position of the Soviet Union Government was to follow unswervingly a policy of peace, based on the notion that the Korean people themselves must negotiate and settle their differences. Moreover, particular attention must be attached to such important questions as the manner and composition of the conference.

18. The representative of the Soviet Union noted, however, that some of the ways and means proposed for the solution of the problem were erroneous, such as the contention that the conference should be composed of representatives of both sides. That was the position adopted by the United States of America along with the States who were sponsoring the fifteen-Power draft resolution (A/L.151/Rev.1). The fallacy of that contention was made clear by the fact that a proper functioning of the conference was of interest not only to the sides mentioned in paragraph 60, article IV of the Armistice Agreement (A/2431), but also to all peace-loving peoples and particularly to the peoples of the countries neighbouring Korea. Though Mr. Lodge had quoted the text of paragraph 60 of the Agreement, he had apparently failed to notice that that text did not state that the representatives of the two sides could be only the countries which had taken part in the actual hostilities; indeed, that paragraph nowhere even hinted that only those countries could be nominated by the two sides. Mr. Vyshinsky believed that the correct understanding of paragraph 60 would be the following: that the two sides would convoke, within three months after the Armistice Agreement was signed and became effective, a political conference of a higher level of both sides attended by representatives appointed respectively to settle through negotiation the question of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea etc. However, the authors of the fifteen-Power draft resolution, and Mr. Lodge in particular, construed paragraph 60 to mean that membership of the conference could comprise only countries nominated by the two sides from among such countries as had actually participated in the hostilities. That draft resolution was, therefore, based on the principle of construing the organization of the conference on the basis of two opposing sides. Thus, Mr. Lodge had explained, the draft resolution did not contain any provision for the participation of other Members of the United Nations.

19. Nevertheless, Mr. Lodge had recognized at the same time that there were several States which were interested in that area. That admission notwithstanding, the joint draft resolution entirely failed to call for the participation of those countries. Such a stand was entirely inadmissible and was not likely to ensure the success of the proposed conference. Mr. Lodge had also stated (615th meeting) that were the General Assembly to recommend the invitation of any country to participate in the conference, then there was no logical reason why any other country neighbouring Korea and having direct interests in that area should not likewise be invited to participate. That assertion was correct. However, Mr. Lodge had subsequently denied to the General Assembly the power of recommending an invitation to countries other than those

which participated in the fighting in Korea. Such a stand was illogical and showed that Mr. Lodge's interpretation of paragraph 60 was entirely fallacious.

20. The incorrectness of that interpretation and the unsatisfactory nature of the fifteen-Power draft resolution was also indicated by the presentation of two additional draft resolutions (A/L.152 and A/L.153) concerning the composition of the conference. Since the fifteen countries had already agreed on the basic draft resolution and on their basic position, one could not understand why those two draft resolutions had to be presented separately. Evidently, they had been submitted to create some semblance of unity concerning the main draft resolution (A/L.151/Rev.1), whereas the truth was that unity among the fifteen delegations had been conspicuous by its absence. The sponsors of the other two draft resolutions (A/L.152 and A/L.53) had already announced their adherence to a different point of view from that set forth in the main draft resolution. The statements made by the representatives of the United Kingdom, France and Canada showed that the fifteen-Power draft resolution could not serve even as a basis for the solution of the problem of membership of the political conference.

21. Mr. Vyshinsky was of the opinion that the French representative had made a good point when he had declared that the recommendations contained in paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement should not be construed too narrowly and that the conference should not consist of two sides confronting each other. That was also the position adopted by the representative of the United Kingdom. However, it should be noted that both representatives were among the co-sponsors of the joint draft resolution which was based on a completely opposite principle. In the opinion of the USSR delegation the political conference was likely to succeed only if it was based on the principle of the round table at which not only the representatives of both sides would participate, but also representatives of other countries which were truly interested in the peaceful settlement of the Korean question.

22. According to Article 10 of the United Nations Charter, the General Assembly was entitled to make recommendations on any question within the framework and the limits of the Charter, particularly on questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security. It was natural that, in submitting its recommendations, the General Assembly was bound to be guided by the maximum political propriety and expediency of its recommendations and their conformity with the principles of the Charter. Those principles would be adhered to if the political conference was composed, not of opposing sides, but of representatives at a round table.

23. Mr. Vyshinsky wished to note that the Soviet Union draft resolution (A/C.1/L.48) proposed that the conference adopt its decisions without having recourse to voting and that those decisions would be adopted if they secured the consent of the parties signatory to the Armistice Agreement. That draft resolution was in line with the generally accepted international principle of the round-table conference and in conformity with the interests of all peace-loving peoples and of international security.

24. Mr. LODGE (United States of America) wished to draw the attention of Mr. Vyshinsky to the fact

that it was General Nam Il of North Korea who had insisted quite specifically that the conference should consist of North Korea and the Chinese Communist volunteers on the one hand and the Governments having armed forces under the United Nations Command in Korea on the other.

25. If the General Assembly were to invite the neighbours of Korea to participate in the conference just because they were neighbours, such an invitation should not perhaps overlook the Chinese Nationalist Government as well as Japan. However, paragraph 60 of the Agreement did not contemplate the participation of such neighbours. Apparently, the USSR representative defined the words "governments concerned" as including everybody. Perhaps if Mr. Vyshinsky believed that the forthcoming political conference should be another political committee consisting of sixty nations he should say so, but Mr. Lodge did not think that such a conference would constitute a proper forum in which the specific problem of Korea could be solved.

26. The representative of the Soviet Union had referred to the statements made by the representatives of New Zealand and of the United States. Mr. Lodge wished to remind the Committee that during the month of June 1953 United Nations airmen had shot down seventy-five MIG airplanes in Korea. There had been little doubt that those airplanes had been supplied by the Soviet Union. Moreover, the excellent heavy guns which had been used by the aggressors in Korea, and which had been so highly praised by the Unified Command's military experts, had also been supplied by the Soviet Union. Those facts should be remembered in the light of Mr. Vyshinsky's assertion that the Soviet Union's influence in the Korean war had been nothing but peaceful.

27. Mr. Vyshinsky had also sought to refute Mr. Lodge's remarks of February 1953 (557th meeting) by the report of a committee of newspapermen in 1950, but the capacity of such a committee to pass final judgment on whether or not certain types of military equipment had been used in the Korean war was questionable. Moreover, they could not in 1950 have disproved the assertions he made in 1953 relating to facts in 1952 and 1953.

28. Mr. Lodge declared that Mr. Dulles had concluded no secret agreement with the President of the Republic of Korea. There was utterly no inconsistency between the withdrawal of all troops from Korea and the United States determination to protect the small Republic of Korea from future aggression.

29. In conclusion, Mr. Lodge said that the Soviet Union draft resolution (A/C.1/L.48) was not a very democratic one, since it established two classes of nations. According to that resolution, the Chinese People's volunteers would have the final say as to whether agreements went into effect, whereas the Government of the Republic of Korea would be bound by the decisions of the conference without having had any voice in that conference and without its consent being required. That was a callous injustice to the gallant people of the Republic of Korea. Moreover, the USSR draft resolution would exclude thirteen countries whose young men gave their lives to repel aggression in Korea. Furthermore, that draft discriminated not only between members of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, but even between the Soviet satellites. Some were

chosen, while others were dropped. The USSR draft resolution was calculated to lead to further disorder, not to a settlement of the Korean problem.

30. Mr. SARASIN (Thailand) said that the Armistice had brought to the people and Government of Thailand feelings of relief that the conflict was over and of gratitude to those who had ended it. Their thoughts were with those who were bereaved in South Korea, the United States and other countries as well as in Thailand. It was to be hoped that those sacrifices would inspire the Committee to approach its task wisely and courageously.

31. The Armistice Agreement was significant because, as a result of the efforts of the Unified Command in the negotiations, the other side had been convinced that it could not achieve results through force, but had to give consideration to other nations. Further, the United Nations Command had achieved not merely an end to the hostilities but it had also created harmony among the nations that contributed forces to repel the aggression. The United Nations had also shown what collective efforts could do in the face of an assault. For the first time, the United Nations had been put to a test and although it had not been victorious in the nationally conceived sense of the word, it had repelled aggression and saved the victim. The men of many nations had rallied under the banner of the United Nations in support of its ideals of peace and security. For this, much credit was due to the two Presidents of the United States who had done so much to make the security system workable. Now that the fighting had been ended, the peace had to be consolidated, and for that object harmony was still required or it would be difficult to reach the goal.

32. The fifteen-Power draft resolution (A/L.151/Rev.1), of which Thailand was a co-sponsor, was concerned with the task of implementing a section of the Armistice Agreement: the settlement of the Korean

question in a political conference in accordance with paragraph 60. The provisions of that paragraph were clear. There was general agreement that the conference should be composed of representatives nominated by the two sides, and that on the United Nations side those who had contributed forces and wished to participate might do so. That was the only possible interpretation. There were, however, different views based on political consideration, but when those arose, the basis of the agreement was altered. Political considerations could not be barred from the Committee, but if the basis of the armistice were altered, it might be invalidated. The Thailand delegation did not adopt that position because it was an interested party. Their position with regard to the Korean question and their concern had been clearly demonstrated by their military and economic contributions to the efforts of the United Nations.

33. With regard to the scope of the conference, despite the presence of the word "etc.", the contents of paragraph 60 showed that the subject was Korea. Being situated in Asia, Thailand would welcome discussions on Indo-China because of its concern for the stability of that whole neighbouring area. The Korean peace was a tenuous one, however, and first things should be dealt with first; their search for peace should be gradual. The achievements of the conference could not be predicted, but as soon as the Korean question was settled the United Nations could either present new problems to the conference or convene a new conference.

34. The views of Thailand were not coloured by its national interests. It did not believe that the peace and security of an entire region of the world should be affected by the question of participation in the conference. The great objective was to consolidate the peace in Korea and extend it more widely.

The meeting rose at 4.30 p.m.