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Chairman: Mr. João Carlos MUNIZ (Brazil).

The Korean question (A/2431, A/L.151/Rev.1, A/L.152, A/L.153, A/L.154/Rev.1, A/C.1/L.48 and A/C.1/L.49)

[Item 16]*

1. The CHAIRMAN stated that under the terms of resolution 705 (VII) the seventh session of the General Assembly was to be continued with the renewed consideration of the Korean question, now that the Armistice Agreement had been signed. Some introductory words of thanksgiving, hope and caution were appropriate. It was reasonable to believe that the pause in the bloodshed would be a lasting one and a preparation for the settlement of the Korean question in an atmosphere of co-operative understanding. The occasion was one for sober rejoicing for the General Assembly which had had an important share in bringing it about. The ideal of peace was the basis for the existence of the United Nations and it was in order to foster that ideal that the Organization had begun consideration of the problem of establishing an independent, unified and democratic Korea. Immediate attention to those ends had been diverted by the outbreak of hostilities but throughout the period of the struggle that primary objective had always been affirmed in the decisions of the General Assembly. The way to peace had always been left open to all willing nations. The United Nations had actually been criticized for a lack of firmness which was only the result of reasoned self-restraint. An honourable peace which would safeguard moral and juridical principles had always been the goal, as had been emphasized by the Secretary-General in the introduction to his report (A/2404).

2. World tensions continued to exist and many difficulties lay before the Committee. It was not a time for complacency over past accomplishments but rather an occasion for the mustering of all energies to overcome the impressive, but by no means insurmountable, problems. Good faith and conciliation should be their guide in the debate. The duty of the Committee was to reconsider the Korean question upon the conclusion of the Armistice Agreement of 27 July 1953 and in

particular article IV, paragraph 60 thereof. It was the general feeling among delegations that the recommendation of the military commanders provided the starting point and that the General Assembly would have accomplished its task when it had decided upon recommendations for the prompt convening and smooth operation of the proposed political conference. It also seemed to be the feeling that the conference itself would take the decisions regarding its agenda and procedure and that the General Assembly should concern itself mainly with the composition of the conference.

3. Four draft resolutions (A/L.151/Rev.1, A/L.152, A/L.153 and A/L.154/Rev.1) had been circulated. The first three of these dealt directly with the convening of the political conference and the Chairman suggested that the Committee should direct its attention in the first instance to those proposals. He understood that the sponsors of the fourth draft resolution would not object to its consideration afterwards in the plenary session of the General Assembly. That procedure would enable the Committee to concentrate on convening the political conference. Much depended upon their capacity to reach dispassionate decisions and to establish favourable conditions for the conference.

4. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that his delegation, on a point of order, wished to renew a proposal, which had previously been made and had received considerable support. Unless the proposal were adopted, success in the work of the Committee seemed to be impossible. The Korean question was of special significance because it had been possible to put an end to the bloodshed in Korea and to remove the threat of a new world war. The armistice had resulted from the initiative of the Governments of the Chinese People's Republic and of the Korean People's Democratic Republic with the support of the Soviet Union, which had served to break the deadlock in the negotiations. Now the United Nations was confronted with new problems concerning the peaceful settlement of the Korean question and the restoration of peace and security in the Far East. Those were questions in which the people of Korea and China were vitally interested. Consideration of the Korean

* Indicates the item number on the agenda of the General Assembly.

problem without their participation would be impossible and inadmissible. The Soviet Union delegation, therefore, wished to submit a proposal (A/C.1/L.49) to invite representatives of the Korean People's Democratic Republic and the Chinese People's Republic to participate in the meetings of the Committee.

5. When the question had been raised on previous occasions and the Soviet Union had called for an invitation to such representatives, there had been outright refusals. It had been stated that it was impossible to invite North Korean representatives because they were the attacking party. It was stated further that North Korea was waging war against the United Nations. The fallacy of those objections was clear at the time and now was even more evident after the conclusion of an armistice. Those objections had been invented to prevent the participation of the countries most concerned. The Soviet Union accordingly again pressed for an invitation to representatives of the Korean People's Democratic Republic and the Chinese People's Republic. The interest of the Government of the Chinese People's Republic in the settlement of the Korean question was shown by the fact that it had signed the Armistice Agreement which indeed proved its unchallengeable right to participate in further consideration of the question. In the absence of those representatives no success in the solution of the Korean question was likely.

6. At the same time, the Soviet Union delegation desired to draw the attention of the General Assembly to the unjustifiable and abnormal situation created by the absence of a legitimate representative of China in the Organization. That situation undermined the authority of the Organization and diminished its ability to foster international peace and security. The restoration of the rights of the Chinese and North Korean peoples was of the greatest importance and would be in the interest of all peace-loving peoples. Particularly in the new circumstances the seat of China should be occupied only by the representatives of the Central People's Government of the Chinese People's Republic who alone were the true representatives of the Chinese people. The Soviet Union would press for a solution of that matter at the eighth session and it was confident that overwhelming support would be given to the restoration of the right of the Chinese people. The Soviet Union delegation accordingly submitted its draft resolution (A/C.1/L.49) providing for an invitation to representatives of the Korean People's Democratic Republic and of the Chinese People's Republic to participate in the meetings of the Committee.

7. The CHAIRMAN stated that a distinction had to be made between the proposed invitation to the Korean People's Democratic Republic and that to the Chinese People's Republic. In the case of North Korea, a similar proposal (A/C.1/L.19) during the first part of the session had been rejected (557th meeting) by 35 votes to 16, with 6 abstentions. Rule 122 of the rules of procedure relating to the reconsideration of a proposal at the same session therefore applied. The proposal could only be reconsidered if a two-thirds majority so decided and permission to speak would be accorded to only two speakers opposing the motion.

8. Mr LODGE (United States of America) said his delegation opposed the proposal to invite repre-

sentatives of the North Korean and Chinese Communists. In the case of North Korea the proposal meant the reconsideration of a decision taken by a decisive majority. At that time the United States felt that the aggressors had no place in the General Assembly, and it still felt that there was no reason for the Committee to hear them. The Committee had met to arrange the participation of one side in a political conference in which the two régimes in question would be represented. There was no reason why the other side should have a voice in such arrangements. It was provided in the fifteen-Power draft resolution (A/L.151/Rev.1) that at the appropriate time, the date and place of the conference would be worked out with those authorities. The United States delegation would vote against the Soviet Union proposal.

9. Sir Percy SPENDER (Australia) stated that the function of the Committee was not a general discussion, but the implementation of paragraphs 60 of the Armistice Agreement (A/2431) according to which the governments concerned on both sides should appoint their representatives. The Committee was concerned with the domestic arrangements for the recommendation of representatives on the United Nations side. That could not prejudice the other two parties to the Agreement nor could the Committee do anything which was inconsistent with the terms of the Agreement without the consent of the North Korean and Chinese Communists. In the circumstances, there was no point in the Soviet Union proposal, and the Australian delegation would vote against it.

10. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) observed that the United States representative had stated that there was no reason to reconsider previous decisions. However, there were no decisions which were not subject to reconsideration, particularly when there were new circumstances and conditions as compared with the situation during the earlier consideration of the question. That argument was, therefore, fallacious. The motives which had been professed on the earlier occasion had not been valid at the time and were even less valid in the altered circumstances. The United States representative had also remarked that the Chinese and North Korean representatives would be admitted to the political conference. There could, therefore, be even less reason for rejecting their participation in the discussion of the organization of that conference. It could only be concluded that the United States representative simply did not wish the Chinese and North Korean representatives to be present despite their vital interest.

11. The representative of Australia had said that the arrangements for the conference were an internal matter. But the political conference was not some sort of Far Eastern subdivision of the United Nations attended by two formerly hostile parties. It should be a political conference in the broadest sense. To consider the organization of the conference in the absence of States which for some reason were not yet members of the United Nations would be incorrect and unjust.

12. Mr. Vyshinsky recalled the introductory remarks of the Chairman concerning the need for a spirit of conciliation to overcome the obstacles to agreement. It was in that spirit that the Soviet Union delegation had put forward its proposal with a view to mobilizing

all resources in order to overcome obstacles in the path of the success of the conference. That success should be ensured from the outset, then and there in the First Committee.

13. The CHAIRMAN reminded the Soviet Union representative that rule 122 permitted only two speakers opposing the motion.

14. The Chairman put to the vote the USSR proposal to reconsider an invitation to representatives of the Korean People's Democratic Republic.

The proposal was rejected by 34 votes to 18, with 7 abstentions.

15. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the USSR proposal to invite representatives of the Chinese People's Republic.

The proposal was rejected by 34 votes to 14, with 9 abstentions.

16. Mr. LODGE (United States of America) said that the United Nations faced a new challenge. Instead of the duty of devising methods to repel aggression, it faced the more cheering fact of an actual armistice with the aggression repelled, and the aggressors thrown back. It was its task to do what it could to make the armistice stick and to show statesmanship worthy of the bravery of the troops. Specifically, their task was to make recommendations for the political conference on the basis of paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement.

17. The United States had adhered to paragraph 60 with its concept of two sides because it was one of the few things that seemed definite in the whole picture. A high price in suffering and death had been paid for the Armistice Agreement. Paragraph 60 was the only matter in regard to a political conference, to which both sides had agreed, and that matter could not be ignored without peril. If there was a desire for agreement, a conference of both sides could do as well as any other type of conference. The fifteen-Power draft resolution (A/L.151/Rev.1) provided that each government would be bound only by its own vote. That meant that if two nations agreed, their agreement would apply as far as they were concerned. That seemed to be the best way to get results. No results would be reached in a large conference where unanimity on all decisions was required. The fifteen-Power draft resolution further recommended for its side that in addition to the Republic of Korea any nation which had contributed forces to the United Nations in Korea might attend the conference if it desired since those nations had earned that right. The draft resolution did not deal with participants on the other side; paragraph 60 itself contemplated representation of that side. If the other side wished to have another country, such as the Soviet Union, participate on its side, the United States would have no objection. Mr. Lodge reserved the right to speak on that point subsequently.

18. The fifteen-Power draft resolution made no provision for participation by other Members of the United Nations which did not properly belong on either side under paragraph 60. There were several States which had a general interest in the area, and all Members of the United Nations had an interest in peace. None of them, however, had any greater interest in Korea than several others. If any other nations were to be invited, there was no logical reason for not

inviting neighbours of Korea with direct interest in the area, and the question would be where the process would end and how the conference would get anywhere.

19. Regarding the scope of the conference, paragraph 60 again should be followed, and the details should be worked out at the conference itself. The United States favoured concentrating on Korea and believed that the objective should be a unified, independent and democratic Korea as provided in the draft resolution. If the discussion developed in such a way as to suggest that consideration of other subjects in the Far East or elsewhere would be useful, the United States would be pleased, but it believed that such developments would call for another conference with different participants. If they could deal with Korea they would be doing well. If, on the other hand, all the problems of the world or of the Far East came before the conference it might well lead to little.

20. The fifteen-Power draft resolution provided for immediate contact with the other side leading to agreement on the time and place of the conference. It offered whatever assistance the United Nations Secretariat would find it possible to give. And it recommended aid to Korea in the way of relief and rehabilitation. Fifteen governments which had contributed forces to the Korean action urged the adoption of that draft resolution concerning the arrangements for their side at the political conference. At the conference the specific questions mentioned in paragraph 60 would be dealt with in order to advance the cause of peace. Those who attended the conference would do their best to achieve a unified, independent and democratic Korea. If the conference succeeded, the way would be open for further discussions and another conference as appropriate in which those countries concerned with the issues would be expected to participate.

21. In another draft resolution (A/L.154/Rev.1) which the United States hoped would be adopted, as a fitting climax to the resumed session, tribute was paid to the bravery of the troops who fought for the United Nations. Those who had died were honoured, and satisfaction was expressed in the success of the first attempt to repel aggression by collective action under a world-wide international organization. Recent events had shown that the United Nations was a real force in the world. It was for the Committee to set an example of wisdom, energy and efficiency and to show that the representatives in their sphere could act with as much distinction as had the troops in the field. The tragedy of Korea had also been an American tragedy. Young men had been drafted and reserves ordered out. It had been a major effort involving nearly 150,000 casualties including 25,000 dead. The United States had in mind those who had served and returned, many of them shattered in health, those who still stood watch in Korea and those homes from which men were missing. The United States would devote its efforts to be worthy of that sacrifice.

22. Mr. SCHUMANN (France) said the French delegation welcomed the armistice not only because it had been so long-awaited, but also because the Organization had successfully met the test of collective resistance to aggression. The civilized world had long sought means

for the peaceful settlement of conflicts, but despite all efforts collective security had not been assured between the two world wars. The present occasion, therefore, marked the first success for international co-operation in an all-important domain. It was true that the resistance to aggression had encountered many difficulties and criticisms and that the results hitherto obtained were only partial. Indeed, there were some who questioned the value of a war which ended without victory. Therein, however, lay the greatest value of the experiment. The United Nations had accepted the challenge flung by the aggressor but it had not gone beyond what was required by the duty of resisting aggression. There was every chance that the settlement would be lasting because it would be freely and jointly concluded by both parties.

23. The successful outcome was, however, dearly bought. France, which so often had been ravaged by invasion, felt keenly the devastation of Korea. France understood too the feeling of the American people who had contributed most to the common effort. If the sacrifices in Korea were to be fully justified, it would not be enough just to consolidate the foundations of the United Nations. The peoples who had suffered should also learn a lesson that only peaceful methods should be used in pursuing their legitimate claims and attaining the full restoration of peace.

24. The Armistice Agreement offered prospects for a final settlement. A satisfactory solution to the prisoner-of-war problem had been found, and the principle of no forced repatriation had been recognized. The return of prisoners had not yet been completed, and it was to be hoped that the difficulties which confronted the Repatriation Commission would be successfully overcome. The Armistice Agreement opened the way for negotiations which had been sought since 1945, with a view to a solution of the political and economic questions affecting Korea, questions which have been postponed because a meeting of the parties could not be arranged. The armistice should be the first step towards unification and it should make possible the resumption of normal relations between Korea and its neighbours and so contribute to peace and security in the Far East.

25. It was necessary for the political conference provided for in paragraph 60 to be convened without delay in the most effective conditions. The site should be decided upon quickly. The territory of the former belligerents should be excluded, and it would be best to select a neutral country removed from the combat theatre. Mr. Schumann suggested that Geneva offered unrivalled advantages.

26. With regard to participants, the French delegation believed that the terms of paragraph 60 should not be interpreted too literally. The conference should attain, in the best possible conditions, the re-establishment of peace in the Far East. All those who could usefully participate should be invited. In short, it was desirable that the conference should not consist of two opposing camps confronting one another.

27. The conference itself should decide upon its own competence; but the Korean question should be considered first, for until that was settled it would be useless to go further. The question, however, was not an isolated one. It was hard to see how there could be a valid peace in the Far East when war con-

tinued elsewhere in Asia. France alone was conducting an armed struggle in Indo-China where rebellion prevented Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam from full enjoyment of the independence they had attained. For seven years France had aided those young States with the blood of its sons for the cause of the free world and the ideals of the United Nations. Mr. Schumann therefore, expressed the wish that the negotiations which were about to begin on Korea would soon create an atmosphere conducive to the pacification of South-east Asia.

28. Mr. Selwyn LLOYD (United Kingdom) said that his delegation believed that the armistice in Korea should mark a turning point not only in Korean affairs but also in the whole Far East. The world had come to one of the decisive moments in the evolution of international affairs. The Committee must concentrate on looking forward and not backward.

29. He recalled that the world had already witnessed two major conflicts during which the United Kingdom suffered over three million casualties and had certainly left them with some idea of the need to avoid a third world war. Those great conflicts achieved some results. Attempts at world domination had been defeated. But, so far as securing lasting peace was concerned, the problems after the wars had certainly been as great as before they had broken out.

30. The world had now emerged from a further three years of hostilities, but happily, instead of a world war, there had been localized a military conflict. The part played by the United States had earned the admiration and gratitude of the international community for its great sacrifices in blood and treasure. However, it must remain a matter for sober satisfaction that the conflict did not spread into the Third World War, though it might easily have done so. Now, the cessation of the fighting presented a chance to take the first steps towards a lasting peace. If a satisfactory agreement on the Korean problem could be secured, a great contribution towards general easement of world tension would have been made.

31. Mr. Lloyd recalled that during the fighting in Korea, the United Nations Assembly had assigned responsibility for the conduct of military operations to the United Nations Command. Now that an armistice had been achieved, the duty of the Assembly was to make recommendations for the next steps. First of all, the Assembly should produce an atmosphere conducive to peace. The importance of this task could not be exaggerated since the demonstration of international opinion in the first part of the present session against the forcible repatriation of prisoners of war had its effect. Therefore, the creation of the right atmosphere was an essential prerequisite for the successful outcome of the Assembly's efforts. The atmosphere in that discussion should be one of a patient but resolute search for a business-like and workable solution for an admittedly difficult problem. Secondly, the Assembly's task was the discharge of the technical or practical function of giving effect to paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement (A/2431). Thirdly, the Assembly could make suggestions or recommendations which would contribute to the success of the political conference. There could, of course, be no question of attempting to do the work of the conference itself; the Assembly's task was the purely practical one of

making it possible for the conference to start its work. The draft resolutions before the Committee had been drawn up with that aim in view.

32. The first draft resolution (A/L.151/Rev.1) dealt with the implementation of paragraph 60 of the Korean Armistice Agreement. Paragraph 1 noted with approval the Armistice Agreement. Mr. Lloyd wished to recall that the armistice had been attained after long and difficult negotiations and he wished to pay a tribute to Admiral Joy, General Harrison and their team of negotiators, who had patiently and resolutely persevered in their task of reaching that agreement. Paragraph 2 reaffirmed the objectives of the United Nations regarding Korea. The common purpose was still the achievement by peaceful means of a unified, independent and democratic Korea under a representative form of government. Paragraph 3 was simply a quotation from the Armistice Agreement and required no comment. Paragraph 4 welcomed the holding of such a conference. Paragraph 5 (a) related directly to paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement and recommended that the governments of the countries concerned on both sides should convene a political conference of representatives of both sides. The sponsors of the draft resolution had suggested that Member States contributing armed forces to the United Nations Command should participate in the political conference if they so desired. In this connexion, the representative of the United Kingdom hoped that agreement could be reached among the countries concerned so that the proposed conference would not become too large and cumbersome.

33. His Government, however, did not wish to perpetuate that concept of two sides, to have the peace conference as a kind of political Panmunjom. The second sentence of paragraph 5 (a) was, therefore, absolutely right; it clearly ensured that the political conference would become a true conference and not a negotiation between two sides. Indeed, a conference of two sides would mean that only two voices would be heard but, as a result of the recommendation contained in paragraph 5 (a), the proposed conference would become a true one wherein many voices might be heard.

34. In dealing with the principles contained in paragraph 5 (a), it would be convenient to refer to the other two draft resolutions before the Committee, (A/L.152 and A/L.153). The first one recommended the participation of the Soviet Union. The United Kingdom welcomed that draft resolution and was glad to know that the United States would support it. Although the recommendation was subject to a proviso, the Soviet Union would certainly not come to the conference without the agreement of the other side. Indeed, unless the other side were agreeable to the addition of Members of the United Nations which were not parties to the Armistice Agreement, the United Nations could not insist on their representation at the conference. Mr. Lloyd believed that the Soviet Union should participate in the conference because it was a great Far Eastern Power, having a land frontier with Korea. Certainly, it would be necessary for the success of the conference.

35. The United Kingdom was a co-sponsor of the other draft resolution (A/L.153) recommending the participation of India. It believed that India could

make an important contribution to the success of the conference because she was a major Asian Power, had already contributed significantly towards the solution of the Korean problem and had provided the Chairman of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. There was a difference in the wording of the two draft resolutions, but they had been carefully worded with a view to obtaining the maximum support for them.

36. Returning to the fifteen-Power draft resolution (A/L.151/Rev.1), Mr. Lloyd pointed out that paragraph 5 (b) dealt with the necessary mechanics and needed no further comment. Regarding paragraph 5 (c) it was proper that, since the political conference was welcomed and endorsed by the United Nations, the Secretary-General of the United Nations should provide the conferences with such services and facilities as might be feasible. Naturally, that was one of the matters which must be discussed with the other side when arrangements were made for the conference. Paragraph 5 (d) was an important one. Although the United Nations has not to ratify any agreement that might be reached, as a parliament would ratify a treaty entered into by its government, it was only right that the United Nations should be informed of any agreement reached. No doubt they would speedily approve it. There was, however, the possibility that the conference would occasionally run into difficulties and, in that event, the United Nations should be informed. The United Nations had authorized the original action in Korea; it had set up the Unified Command; it had remained throughout seized of the Korean question; when there had been a deadlock in Panmunjom over the question of forcible repatriation of prisoners of war, the debate in the United Nations had ultimately resolved that problem. Similarly, if there was a deadlock in the next stage, it was only just and proper that the United Nations should attempt to play a part in breaking it.

37. Paragraph 6 of the fifteen-Power draft resolution was simply a reaffirmation of intentions already announced and to some extent implemented. Now that hostilities had ceased, the United Nations should not diminish its interest in relief and rehabilitation in Korea. The Korean people had suffered sorely in that long struggle. The United Nations would want to bind up their wounds, heal the sores, and give new economic life and energy to a people so brave, so patient and so long-suffering.

38. The draft resolution did not deal with the agenda of the political conference. Some people believed that further discussion on other Far Eastern matters should be undertaken by the conference; others believed it would be preferable to set up, at the appropriate moment, a new and separate conference. The United Kingdom hoped that no one would adopt a fixed position on that matter since none could tell, at that stage, how things would develop or what might become possible in the light of progress made at the conference. It believed that successful progress on Korean questions at the political conference should lead to discussions or negotiations on wider issues affecting the Far East, including that of Indo-China.

39. In conclusion, Mr. Lloyd said that the three draft resolutions involved no great issues of principle. They dealt with practical matters and with the practical execution of the recommendation made in the

Armistice Agreement. It was the task of the United Nations to create for that conference the atmosphere that would give it the greatest chance of success.

40. Sir Percy SPENDER (Australia) said that the prime concern of the resumed session was the problem of peace, particularly peace in Korea. The first attempt by the United Nations at collective security against aggression had succeeded. The Korean people, and those who had fought on their side, looked to the United Nations for guidance and wise leadership. There was no need at the present moment to debate the rights and wrongs of past political events. But since all wisdom was based on experience, the past could not be completely obliterated. It would be Australia's purpose to seek a just and honourable settlement of the Korean question. In so doing, it would be important to adhere to principles which should not be abandoned. Much give and take on minor points had been essential to the achievement of the armistice. Thus, Australia's approach to the problem would be based on the following: firmness of principle, flexibility in subordinate questions. However, no degree of flexibility should permit the abandonment of principle.

41. The task of the United Nations was to set up the political conference proposed in the Armistice Agreement. Therefore, United Nations actions must be consistent with the terms of that Agreement. Since it was understood that all Member States had adopted the Armistice Agreement, they must turn to the terms of that Agreement for guidance both as regards the subject matter of the conference and its composition. It would not be Australia's desire to adopt any legalistic view in approaching the interpretation of paragraph 60 of the Agreement. Similarly, it would be quite improper to attempt to depart from the terms of that paragraph, to distort the language used or to seek to impose upon that language a different interpretation. That would result only in the reopening of the protracted preliminary negotiations.

42. Sir Percy then quoted the text of paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement and noted that the term "governments of the countries concerned" referred to the governments actually engaged in military action. He also noted that that paragraph referred in three separate places to the term "both sides". In the first place, it referred to the military commanders of both sides; in the second place, it referred to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides, and in the third place, it referred to a political conference of a higher level on both sides. Thus, the words "both sides" must surely have meant the same thing each time they were used.

43. As far back as February 1952, when those words had found their way into the draft Armistice Agreement, General Nam Il had stated during the course of the negotiations that it was inappropriate to make recommendations to the United Nations, since not all Members of that Organization had been involved in Korea. But, it was to be observed that while paragraph 60 spoke of both sides being represented, it did not exclude a round table discussion which, after all, involved a concept that each nation spoke for itself and was bound only by its own decisions. Indeed, it did not preclude other nations, which might recommend themselves to the United Nations as appropriate par-

ticipating Members, from taking part. Certainly, the United Nations could not determine unilaterally which those other nations should be. Nor was it open to the Communists unilaterally to say that nations other than those referred to in paragraph 60 would participate, any more than it was open to the United Nations unilaterally to do so. If the General Assembly desired, as proposed in the draft resolution which Australia had co-sponsored (A/L.152 and A/L.153), that the Soviet Union and India should participate or that any other nation should participate, it had the power to make such a recommendation. Such a recommendation, once carried, might be concurred in by the Chinese Communists and the North Korean Government as well as by the governments of the United Nations Members directly concerned. Thus, an agreement between the parties would be superimposed on that of paragraph 60. It was in the light of those considerations that the draft resolutions before the Committee had been formulated.

44. In paragraph 5 (a) of the first draft resolution (A/L.151/Rev.1) it was recommended that the side contributing armed forces should have as participants in the conference those among the Member States contributing armed forces which desired to be represented, together with the Republic of Korea. Sir Percy was grateful to the representatives of the many countries who had expressed, outside the Committee, their support of Australia's membership in the conference, on whatever basis that conference might be determined. Australia had an unassailable claim to membership. In the circumstances, he wished to indicate officially the firm desire of his Government to participate. Australia was a pacific nation and a country whose destiny was inextricably bound up with the future of the western Pacific. That fact was in itself sufficient to demand Australia's presence at the conference. Australia had also developed in recent years an industrial potential which was becoming an important factor in the future of East and Southeast Asia. Its economic future was to a great degree bound up with that region and its future security was involved in any important decisions concerning that area. Moreover, by its actions in relation to the Korean conflict, it had demonstrated not only its interest and concern, but also its willingness to take responsibility and to make material contributions. In the circumstances, Sir Percy wished to take note of the fact that the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/L.48) made no mention of Australia as a participating member of the conference.

45. As for the participation of the Soviet Union, the United Nations had no right to force it to participate either against its will or against the will of the two communist governments concerned. If they were both willing that the Soviet Union should participate, then there was no practical difficulty in its doing so. It was the view of the Australian Government that the Soviet Union should participate in that conference if it were to prove successful. Any peace in Korea would be of a merely transitory character unless the Soviet Union not only participated in the settlement of such peace, but also undertook obligations, together with other countries, in its preservation. It was for that reason that Australia had been a co-sponsor of the draft resolution (A/L.152) permitting Soviet Union participation.

46. It was also the Australian view that India should participate. Not only had that country made an honourable and great contribution to bringing about the cease-fire and the armistice, but it was also a great Asian nation whose participation would considerably strengthen the reality of any agreement which the negotiations might produce. Accordingly, Australia had been a co-sponsor of the draft resolution (A/L.153) which had been submitted by the representative of the United Kingdom.

47. The Australian Government would do its utmost at the conference to reach a humane, just and honourable settlement of the Korean question. It had manifested its sympathy for the Korean people in their long struggle for freedom, and could not fail to admire Mr. Syngman Rhee's devotion to the cause of his country. However, there had been a tendency in recent days to criticize those who had fought in Korea, while at the same time refraining from any worthwhile criticism of those who had not only been the enemies of the United Nations, but the enemies of international peace; to use harsh words against those who had fought on the side of the United Nations, while reserving soft words for those who had fought against it. Indeed, some statements by the President of South Korea made in recent weeks had greatly disturbed the Government and people of Australia, and probably the governments of other countries. The Government of Australia hoped that Mr. Rhee and his Government would display flexibility towards its friends as well as resolution in the face of its enemies.

48. In conclusion, Sir Percy wished to pay tribute to those who had sacrificed so much for the principles which the United Nations had defended in Korea, and also to salute the tenacity and courage of the South Korean civilians in the face of the tremendous hardships they had endured.

49. Mr. MUNRO (New Zealand) said that New Zealand had a particular interest in the settlement of the Korean question. In the first place, its geographical position in the Pacific made the maintenance of stability in that vast area a matter of infinite and vital concern to it. In the second place, New Zealand's contribution to the forces serving under the Unified Command in Korea was of special significance. Its contribution of armed forces, in proportion to its population, had been second only to that of the United States and of the Republic of Korea. New Zealand had also contributed generously to the relief and rehabilitation of the Korean people. Accordingly, the New Zealand delegation had readily joined in the sponsorship of each of the four draft resolutions before the Committee.

50. The fifteen-Power draft resolution (A/L.151/Rev.1) providing for the implementation of paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement called for little explanation. It was designed to set up in the most efficient manner, and within a framework sufficiently flexible to give it every opportunity of achieving its objectives, a political conference which would endeavour to bring about a just and enduring settlement in Korea as well as the unification of Korea by peaceful means under a representative form of government as an independent and democratic country. That draft resolution was concerned only with the essential procedure for the convening of the political conference. It determined the

participation on the United Nations side, a participation which his delegation desired to be in the nature of a round table conference. Accordingly, Mr. Munro wished to associate himself with the views expressed by the representative of the United Kingdom. New Zealand, as one of the countries contributing to the forces of the United Nations in defending aggression might, if it so desired, participate in the conference. The draft resolution provided also the formula for determining the location of the conference as well as its servicing by the United Nations. Finally, it provided that the Member States participating in the conference should inform the United Nations when agreement was reached or at other appropriate times. Thus, the procedure of the conference was kept within the framework of the General Assembly. It was hoped that the Assembly would not endeavour to go beyond the scope of the resolution; it must leave it to the participants in the conference to endeavour to solve the substantive issues involved in a permanent Korean settlement.

51. New Zealand had also joined in sponsoring the draft resolution (A/L.152) recommending the participation of the Soviet Union, provided the other side desired it. The basis of that sponsorship was a realistic assessment of how the conference might and should reach a settlement that had some prospects of enduring. The hard facts of geography and the history of the past three years had made the Soviet Union undoubtedly one of the powers concerned in the Korean conflict and in the Korean settlement. Moreover, the Soviet Union had not sought to disguise the fact that it had supported the Chinese and North Korean Communists. Indeed, Mr. Vyshinsky had himself acknowledged that fact to the Committee (561st meeting). But Mr. Vyshinsky's own words should reinforce the belief that the Soviet Union should be a participant in the settlement of that problem. The rulers of the Soviet Union should be given the opportunity to prove their peaceful intentions by translating their words into actions. Accordingly, the New Zealand delegation had felt it wise and necessary to join in sponsoring the draft resolution asking for the participation of the Soviet Union in the political conference. It had done so in the knowledge that the United States, the United Kingdom, France and other countries that had contributed forces to the United Nations Command would support that draft resolution.

52. As for the participation of the Government of communist China, the representative of New Zealand believed that the people of China had shed enough blood in a cause of no profit or good to them. The United Nations extended to them the hand of goodwill and trusted that their leaders might see the wisdom of a just peace along their borders.

53. The third draft resolution (A/L.153) recommended the participation of India in the conference. India was the largest country in free Asia. By reason of its geographical position and its historic interest in the cause of Asian freedom, it was vitally concerned in the attainment of a just and lasting solution of the Korean problem. Moreover, it had been directly concerned with the question, first, by its dispatch of an ambulance unit which had served under military discipline as an integral part of the British Commonwealth Division on the Korean front and secondly, by its sponsorship of the resolution that had provided the

basis for the present Armistice Agreement. Thirdly, it had provided a considerable number of troops for the purpose of taking charge of prisoners of war who did not wish to return to their own countries. The New Zealand Government strongly believed that, because of its great interest in the area and the special knowledge that it would have gained of the problem of non-repatriate prisoners, the presence of India at the political conference might do much to assist the other participants in arriving at an agreed solution.

54. Mr. LODGE (United States of America) said that the United States was perfectly prepared to accept the participation of the Soviet Union in the political conference. The Soviet Union could not, of course,

participate on the side of those nations which had contributed forces to the United Nations; neither could it take part as a neutral since article IV, paragraph 60, of the Armistice Agreement did not contemplate the inclusion of any neutral. Moreover, the Soviet Union could certainly not qualify as a neutral nation in the conflict. The matter of who would participate on the other side was basically one for the other side to determine. However, the United States was willing to have the Soviet Union participate in the conference if for no other reason than to bear its share of the responsibility and accountability for peace.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.