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大会

第四十届会议

暂定项目表 \* 项目 22、63、  
72、93、103、132  
和 134

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案

安全理事会

第四十年

1985年5月21日

民主柬埔寨常驻联合国代表

给秘书长的信

谨随函附上摘自民主柬埔寨国民军总司令1985年4月30日题为“柬埔寨在

85-14893

第七个旱季(1984年10月至1985年4月)的局势”公报的文件,供你参考。<sup>1</sup>

请将该文件作为大会(暂定项目表项目22、63、72、93、103、132和134)和安全理事会的文件散发。

民主柬埔寨常驻代表

大使

秀蒲拉西(签名)

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\* A/40/50/Rev. 1。

<sup>1</sup> 附件只有英文本和法文本。

THE SITUATION IN KAMPUCHEA  
DURING THE 7TH DRY-SEASON  
(OCTOBER 1984 - APRIL 1985)

CHAPTER I : FACTS AND FIGURES

The military results on all battlefields in Kampuchea during the 7th dry-season are as follows:

- I. Vietnamese enemy fighting forces put out of action : 27,000 killed or wounded
- II. Enemy positions captured or destroyed:
- A). Independent positions:
- |                           |   |     |
|---------------------------|---|-----|
| 1. Platoon-size           | : | 135 |
| 2. Company-size           | : | 84  |
| 3. Battalion-size         | : | 25  |
| 4. Regiment-size          | : | 18  |
| 5. Division-headquarters: |   | 3   |
- B). Positions belonging to battalion-held defence networks:
- |                 |   |    |
|-----------------|---|----|
| 1. Platoon-size | : | 99 |
| 2. Company-size | : | 72 |
- C). Positions belonging to regiment-held defence networks:
- |                   |   |    |
|-------------------|---|----|
| 1. Platoon-size   | : | 65 |
| 2. Company-size   | : | 53 |
| 3. Battalion-size | : | 24 |
- III. Enemy mopping-up operation forces put to rout:
- |                   |   |           |
|-------------------|---|-----------|
| 1. Platoon-size   | : | 225 times |
| 2. Company-size   | : | 195 times |
| 3. Battalion-size | : | 172 times |

- 4. Regiment-size : 58 times
- 5. Division-size : 18 times

IV. Tanks and armored vehicles destroyed : 220  
Assorted heavy artillery destroyed : 235 (mortars excluded)  
Heat-searching missiles (ground-air) destroyed: several hundreds  
Helicopters shot down : 3

V. Enemy transport units intercepted:

- 1. Platoon-size : 147 times
- 2. Company-size : 130 times
- 3. Battalion-size : 117 times
- 4. Transport trucks destroyed : 274
- 5. Transport trains destroyed : 3 engines and 54 wagons
- 6. Transport boats all size sunk : 1,790
- 7. Large Soviet built ferry boats sunk : 4

VI. Population Centres liberated or attacked:

- 1. Villages liberated : 972
- 2. Vietnamese commune administrative apparatus destroyed : 160
- 3. Communes liberated : 82
- 4. District chief-towns : 42
- 5. Province chief-towns : 6 (Siemreap, Battambang, Pursat, Kompong Chhnang, Rattanakiri and Kompong Speu)

VII. Enemy supply and transportation routes cut off or destroyed:

- 1. Highways and provincial roads cut off : 849 places (15,640 metres)
- 2. Bridges and water scuppers : 124 (670 metres)
- 3. Railroad tracks destroyed:
  - . Phnom Penh - Kompong Som : 401 sections (more than 137 Kms)
  - . Phnom Penh - Battambang : 415 sections (more than 61 Kms)

VIII. Defecting Vietnamese soldiers : 3,500

IX. Vietnamese soldiers killed or wounded in mutinies within their units : 1,500

X. Vietnamese soldiers killed or wounded by Kampuchean soldiers and self-defence guards forcibly enlisted by the Vietnamese occupying forces : 1,375

- XI. Vietnamese soldiers killed or wounded by the Kampuchean people : 560
- XII. Kampuchean self-defence guards and soldiers deserting the ranks of the Vietnamese enemy at different phases of their forcibly enlistment:18,300
- XIII. Kampuchean people killed by the Vietnamese enemy :
1. by toxic chemicals : 1,165
  2. by conventional weapons : 2,359
  3. The Vietnamese enemy have rounded up and sent hundreds of thousands of Kampuchean people to the western border to clear forest, to build roads, military barracks, barbed wire or bamboo fences along the border. As a result:
    - a) Several thousand people have been killed during the fightings at the border;
    - b) Several other thousands have been starved to death;
    - c) Tens of thousands have been wounded or disabled and left without care in the Vietnamese hospitals;
    - d) Several thousands have died because of malaria and other diseases because of lack of medicines, care or drinking water.
- These people have been rounded up and sent from the provinces of Preah Vihear, Siemreap, Kompong Cham, Kompong Chhnang, Pursat, Battambang, Kampot, Takeo and Kompong Speu.
- During the past 7th dry-season, the Vietnamese enemy have rounded up several hundred thousands of people, young and old.

XIV. Vietnamese reinforcements

1. The Vietnamese enemy have sent surreptitiously company- or battalion-sized units from various divisions stationed in Central and North Vietnam:
  - a. 15,000 troops to Northern Kampuchea through Qui Nhon (Central Vietnam) and Highway No 19 in Kampuchea (Province of Rattanakiri).
  - b. 15,000 troops to Western Kampuchea by sea or through the Mekong river to Phnom Penh and from there through various roads to Western Kampuchea.
  - c. 5,000 troops as the core of the Special Units A5.

2. They have also enlisted by force new soldiers from South-Vietnam : 25,000 men.

*The total number of troops sent by the Vietnamese enemy to reinforce their forces in Kampuchea during the past dry-season reached 60,000. In this connection, it should be noted that:*

1. 35,000 men were sent from Central and North Vietnam to serve as the core of their occupying forces in Kampuchea and as shock-troops in their attacks along the border during the past dry-season;
2. They did not sent their troops from Vietnam in whole division so as not to arouse the suspicion of foreign observers. But they sent them in company- or battalion-sized units from Central and North Vietnam to mend their forces and to serve as the core of some divisions stationed in Kampuchea for already several years such as divisions 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 . These divisions were shaky for they have suffered great losses in the battles from 1981 to 1984.
3. They sent from Laos one division, division 325, to carry out activities in the provinces of Preah Vihear and Kompong Thom.

## CHAPTER II : REMARKS

While the NADK have carried out, during this 7th dry-season, their main activities deep inside Kampuchea, the Vietnamese enemy have tried hard to fight us at the western border regions.

### I. NADK'S ACTIVITIES IN THE INTERIOR OF THE COUNTRY

The NADK have carried out their activities covering large territory, stretching from Battambang, Siemreap, Kompong Thom, Pursat and Kompong Chhnang to the districts of Muk Kampoul, Ponhea Loeu, Oudong, Ang Snuol and Kandal Stung in the immediate vicinity of capital city Phnom Penh, and within Phnom Penh itself. They have gained mastery of the situation. They have carried out their activities on their own initiatives and with creativeness according to the prevailing conditions. The Vietnamese enemy have lost initiatives and control of the situation and have been on the defensive.

The activities of the NADK in the Battle Zone I in the previously defined areas as well as in the newly extended ones, are strangling the strategic "throat" of the enemy in all fields. These activities, in conformity with the "five target combat tactic", consist of cutting off the enemy supply lines (railroad, highways, waterways); disintegrating the forces of the Kampuchean soldiers and self-defence guards forcibly enlisted by the Vietnamese; destroying the economic networks of the Vietnamese enemy who plunder by all means, lands, crops, fish and livestock of our population; dislocating or destroying the Vietnamese administrative apparatus, especially at the levels of villages, communes and districts, in all fields, political, military, economic and cultural through which the Vietnamese have been propagating their pernicious doctrine of "Indochina Federation" of Ho Chi Minh whom they claim to be the "father" of Indochina, and the Vietnamese customs as well as ways of life, and their doctrines of Vietnam-Kampuchea "special friendship" and Vietnam-Kampuchea-Laos "special friendship".

As a result of the activities of the NADK in the Battle Zone I and in the immediate vicinity of Phnom Penh, the insecurity in the capital city is on the rise. That is why the Vietnamese have issued directives and circular notes one after another ordering their forces to chase ours out of the Battle Zone I and especially out of the areas surrounding Phnom Penh. In comparison with the 6th dry-season, the NADK's activities in these regions have been doubled during this 7th dry-season. That means:

1. This year we have attacked the enemy more actively in the Battle Zone I (Kompong Thom, Siemreap, Battambang, Pursat and Kompong Chhnang) where our activities have been going on for already more than two years.

2. Moreover, we have extended our activities up to the capital, in the previously said areas as well as in the newly extended ones. We have developed and reinforced our troop's strength and increased it in the previously said areas such as the districts of Oudong, Western Ponhea Loeu, Samrong Tong, Ang Snuol, Choeung Prey, Kompong Tralach Loeu and Krom. We have opened new fronts in the districts of Muk Kampoul, Eastern Ponhea Loeu and Kandal Stung. We have launched attacks against the Vietnamese troops stationed at the Prek Kdam ferry (on the Tonle Sap river), Koh Chen, Oudong, Peam SETHA, Kompong Os, Prek Phneou (about 6 Kms from the capital city Phnom Penh), Bat Doeung, Tuol Leap, Peam Muk Kampoul, Rokakong, Prek Dambang, Prek Russei and Prek Anchanh. We have been more active than in previous years in these districts around Phnom Penh, next to Pochentong (the international airport), Kilo Lek Pramouy, Chroy Changva and Takhmau.

For already more than 2 years, the Vietnamese enemy have mustered their forces to oppose us in this Battle Zone I. However, they have met with failure for our forces have not been engaging in a fixed-position fighting but carrying out a mobile and guerrilla warfare, attacking the enemy everywhere they can and storming the Vietnamese positions and strongholds, based on the tactic of dividing or gathering their forces according to circumstances.

Not only have the Vietnamese failed to oppose the NADK in this Battle Zone I, but our forces have extended their activities to the immediate vicinity of Phnom Penh, in 5 adjoining districts in the north, north-west, west and south-west of the capital.

3. The NADK have been carrying out activities of sabotage inside the capital itself. Since January 1985, insecurity has been increasing in Phnom Penh and the Vietnamese enemy have declared many times state of emergency, imposed curfew from 9 p.m. to 5 a.m., restricted the movement of foreigners and prevented them from going out of town.

*During the 1984-1985 dry-season the NADK have increased their guerrilla activities and have extended the guerrilla zone up to the immediate vicinity of Phnom Penh and in the adjoining districts around Phnom Penh. This shows the favourable development of the struggle of the Kampuchean people against the Vietnamese aggressors. This also reveals the strategy and tactics of the NADK against the Vietnamese enemy. This evolution testifies to the fact that the Vietnamese enemy have not enough strength and capacity to cope with the guerrilla activities of our National Army and guerrilla units who are now operating deep inside Kampuchea, even at the gate of Phnom Penh.*

Some western news agencies, radio-broadcastings, newspapers and magazines and a number of personalities and representatives of humanitarian relief organizations who used to go several times to Phnom Penh have acknowledged the truth arising from that situation in their talks, writings, broadcasts and publications in spite of the Vietnamese enemy utmost efforts to conceal it.

## II. VIETNAMESE ENEMY'S ACTIVITIES IN THEIR MOPPING UP OPERATIONS AT THE WESTERN BORDER OF KAMPUCHEA

The activities of the NADK in the Battle Zone I began in 1983. They have been carried out in a systematic and well coordinated manner in the five provinces, Siemreap, Kompong Thom, Battambang, Pursat and Kompong Chhnang. The Vietnamese enemy, as a result, have been facing with increasing difficulties year after year in all fields: their supply lines are more and more insecure; they are increasingly short of food supplies especially rice, fish and livestock for their political and military structures have been disintegrated or destroyed; furthermore, they have to cope with a growing number of population of these five populous provinces around the Tonle Sap lake who have been participating directly in the struggle against them. That is why the Vietnamese have declared state of emergency in these five provinces they consider as their strategic "throat" through which pass their supplies to their forces in western Kampuchea.



They have done their utmost to wipe our forces out of these five provinces. They have failed to chase or wipe our forces out. On the contrary, the latter have been increased and strengthened in this areas.

*It was in such an inextricable difficult situation that the Vietnamese politbureau in Hanoi and the high military commander of the Vietnamese occupying forces in Kampuchea, Le Duc Anh, drew up a strategic and decisive plan to wipe out the forces of Democratic Kampuchea at their bases along the western border. They thought that in order to cope with the NADK and to extricate themselves from their difficult situation around the Tonle Sap lake, they have to mobilize their forces to the maximum in order to fight the NADK at the Kampuchean western border. In so doing, they hoped they could prevent the NADK from sending reinforcements and ammunition supplies to the interior of Kampuchea.*

*In brief, the Vietnamese enemy thought that "in order to prevent the NADK from fighting against them deep inside Kampuchea, they have to mobilize their forces to fight the NADK at their root."*

For this reason, in the 6th dry-season and especially during this 7th dry-season 1984-1985, the Vietnamese have mobilized up to 11 to 12 divisions of their occupying forces in Kampuchea with the additional 60,000 reinforcements sent from North, Central and South Vietnam to fight our National Army at the Kampuchean western border. In these large scale operations they have deployed their crack troops and their shock troops surreptitiously sent in from North and Central Vietnam in order to destroy and take over the NADK's bases and strongholds according to their slogan, "to seize the NADK's strongholds at all costs" with a view to disrupting the supply routes of the NADK in troop reinforcements as well as in military material so as to bar the NADK from fighting them deep inside Kampuchea.

But the result of their strategic plan has been very small:

1. They have resorted to using large scale crack troops and have been able to capture a number of our strongholds because these bases and strongholds were their well-defined targets. They have deployed large scale forces and paid a very high price to seize these bases and strongholds.

2. However, the Vietnamese enemy have failed to destroy our forces, fighting as well as commanding forces, military depots, and disrupt our supply lines to inside Kampuchea. We have fundamentally succeeded in preserving our fighting and commanding forces, military depots and supply lines. The Vietnamese enemy have failed in their strategic plan to wipe out our forces at the western border albeit the use of large scale forces. On the contrary, they have lost a large number of their crack troops.

Out of the 27,000 Vietnamese forces killed or wounded during this 7th dry-season, nearly 20,000 have been killed or wounded on the western border. The Vietnamese enemy have paid a very high price for their operations along the border.

Quite a number of western observers have concurred with this assessment over the poor result of the Vietnamese enemy big plan at the western border during the last dry-season.

*In short, during this 7th dry-season 1984-1985, our National Army concentrated their efforts to fight deep inside Kampuchea especially in the Battle Zone I and in the five districts around Phnom Penh, while the Vietnamese enemy have been fighting in western Kampuchea and along the western border which they consider as their vital front in order to prevent our National Army from penetrating to the interior of Kampuchea. They have failed. The regular units of the NADK regiments or divisions have kept on carrying out their guerrilla attacks deep inside Kampuchea and have even extended them to the immediate vicinity of Phnom Penh.*

*We must continue to carry out more actively our guerrilla activities in the five districts around Phnom Penh as in the case of our fight around the provincial cities of Battambang, Siemreap, Kompong Thom and Pursat. At the western border, we must continue to eliminate a great number of the Vietnamese fighting forces, their well-trained troops sent surreptitiously from North and Central Vietnam.*

### III. VIETNAMESE PLANS IN THE FUTURE

What would be the Vietnamese objectives in the future especially during the 8th dry-season 1985-1986?

The Vietnamese aggressors have mustered hundreds of thousands of their troops to invade and annex Kampuchea for already almost 7 years. In retrospect, we can see clearly that year after year during the past 7 years, the Vietnamese enemy have been increasingly bogged down in all fields, especially since 1983 when our NADK began to extend their activities to the interior of Kampuchea. NADK regiments and divisions have been carrying out their attacks deeper and deeper inside Kampuchea and have stretched their activities to the vicinity of Phnom Penh particularly in the five districts in the north, north-west, west and south-west. It appears that the Vietnamese enemy have been at their wit's end. They do not know how to strike at the NADK who have been operating deep inside Kampuchea without fixed or established positions but rather in small mobile units who have been attacking them and destroying their political and economic structures according to the "five-target combat tactic".

*In such a situation, we can expect that during the 8th dry-season 1985-1986, the Vietnamese enemy would strive to increase their forces and step up attacks at the western border according to their slogan, "to wipe out the NADK at their root". We must be clearly aware of these Vietnamese objective and plan so that we can take in advance all appropriate measures in order to be in a more favourable position over the enemy. We must realize that in the next dry-season the Vietnamese enemy will bring more forces and military equipment than those they had used during the past 7th dry-season.*

#### IV. ABOUT OUR ORGANIZATIONAL MEASURES

1. First and foremost, we must have a clear perception of the military situation in the battlefield of Kampuchea on our side as well as on the Vietnamese side during the last 7th dry-season so as to have a correct assessment of the actual situation. In so doing, we can keep the situation under control and take initiatives and appropriate measures in advance.

2. Taking into consideration our concrete situation and that of the Vietnamese enemy, we have to set up our objectives and take detailed and appropriate measures aimed at increasing our activities inside and especially in the Battle Zone I and around Phnom Penh by providing more troop reinforcements and military equipment, and assuring transportation and food supplies.

As for the western border front, we must also have a clear perception, draw up in advance well-defined objectives and take appropriate measures in all fields to safeguard and organize our forces in order to fight the Vietnamese enemy in new conditions that is without fixed or established positions or strongholds as we have been fighting them inside Kampuchea where our units have constantly moved instead of staying in fixed positions. The only difference between the Battle Zone I and the western border front is that at the border we can move only within a limited territory. Yet, we have quite a number of favourable conditions in terms of food, medicine, ammunition and weapon supplies. As for the Vietnamese enemy, they have to face a lot of difficulties: transportation of new reinforcements, food, medicines and ammunitions, the care of the wounded, etc. And the more they sent new reinforcements, the more difficult their supply becomes. From the strategic point of view, if we compare the favourable and unfavourable conditions between us and the Vietnamese enemy, we can see that we have a number of favourable conditions. Provided that we implement correctly the guerrilla warfare according to the new conditions prevailing at the border, we will certainly be in a position to eliminate more Vietnamese crack troops than during this present dry-season.

V. SITUATION IN OTHER FIELDS RELATED TO THE MILITARY SITUATION

We have seen clearly the military situation on our side as well as on the Vietnamese enemy side. If we look at the situation in other fields we can also see that the Vietnamese aggressors have been facing increasing difficulties year after year especially during the past 7th dry-season. In the diplomatic field, they have met with failure after failure, and have been more and more isolated. The economy and finance of Vietnam are on the brink of collapse. A few years ago, the exchange rate of the Vietnamese currency was 2 to 4 Dongs against \$1 US; now the official rate is 100 Dongs for \$1 US but at the black-market, the rate is more than 200 Dongs for \$1 US. Vietnam's foreign debt is 3 to 4 billion US dollars. Vietnam is unable to pay not only this debt but also its interests. The forces of production of all fields, agriculture, handicraft, industry, communications have been declining every year for they have been used to serve the war of aggression in Kampuchea. That is the situation of the Vietnamese aggressors. They are actually almost out of breath. They can only pursue their war of aggression through the aid provided by the Soviet Union, their master. However, the Soviet Union itself has to shoulder a heavy burden on the international arena because of its policy of global expansionism such as the strategic nuclear arm race, the 2 to 3 billion US dollars yearly aid to Vietnam, the 5 to 6 billion US dollars yearly aid to Cuba and several more billion US dollars yearly aid to its other client States. Besides, there is the war in Afghanistan where the Soviet Union, almost the biggest military power in the world, has been increasingly bogged down since 1980 in all fields, by the guerrilla warfare of the heroic Afghan people.

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The Vietnamese enemy have already swallowed up our rich territory of Kampuchea Krom (the present South Vietnam). They have swallowed up the land of Kampuchea Krom as well as its people and its wealth. Our Kampuchea Krom land has become a Vietnamese land. On the map, it is a part of Vietnam's territory.

At present, the Vietnamese enemy have been carrying out their war of aggression and occupation in Kampuchea with a view to annex Kampuchea as they did in Kampuchea Krom, that is to swallow up the land, the people

and the wealth of Kampuchea and to eliminate her national identity. However, the heroic people and NADK have always held aloft the banner of patriotism in the framework of the great national unity and resolutely fought against the Vietnamese expansionists and aggressors, preventing them from swallowing up our territory, nation and people and from eliminating our national identity. The development of the struggle of the Kampuchean people during the past 7 years against the Vietnamese aggressors shows clearly that our people and the NADK have all capability to defend the survival of our nation, our people and our national identity.

Besides, we have an overwhelming number of friends throughout the world who assist and support our just struggle.

*The struggle of our people and the NADK combined with the assistance and support of the overwhelming number of friends throughout the world will bring about the victory of the people and nation of Kampuchea over the Vietnamese expansionists and aggressors. We will surely succeed in defending and preserving our nation, people and national identity.*

(Excerpts from the Communiqué of the High Command of  
the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea - 30 April 1985)

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