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MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,
on Friday, 6 December 1974, at 3 p.m.

<u>Chairman:</u>	Mr. ORTIZ de ROZAS	(Argentina)
<u>Rapporteur:</u>	Mr. COSTA LOBO	(Portugal)

- Question of Korea: /104/ (continued)
 - (a) Withdrawal of all the foreign troops stationed in South Korea under the flag of the United Nations
 - (b) Urgent need to implement fully the consensus of the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly on the Korean question and to maintain peace and security on the Korean peninsula

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AGENDA ITEM 104 (continued)

QUESTION OF KOREA

- (a) WITHDRAWAL OF ALL THE FOREIGN TROOPS STATIONED IN SOUTH KOREA UNDER THE FLAG OF THE UNITED NATIONS
- (b) URGENT NEED TO IMPLEMENT FULLY THE CONSENSUS OF THE TWENTY-EIGHTH SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON THE KOREAN QUESTION AND TO MAINTAIN PEACE AND SECURITY ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA

(A/9703/Add.1-3, A/9741/Add.1-5 and Corr.1; A/C.1/1048, 1049/Add.1; A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1, L.677, L.705).

Sir Laurence McINTYRE (Australia): In the year 1971, after more than two decades of bitter and hostile confrontation, the first tentative signs of reconciliation between the northern and southern halves of Korea appeared with the announcement that contacts were taking place between the Red Cross organizations of the two countries. It was this development that first kindled hopes around the world, hopes, I may say, that Australia still cherishes, that the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea would find themselves drawn into continuing and constructive dialogue that could ultimately lead them to a settlement of their formidable and long-standing differences of outlook and approach to each other.

The pace of this dialogue since 1971 has not been as even or as rapid as we might have hoped. But with all its hesitations and interruptions it has represented a highly significant and welcome departure from the sterile and dangerous antagonisms of the previous 20 years. The purpose of all of us here must be to encourage it and to ensure that anything that we decide upon at this session of the Assembly will help and not hinder the Korean people in solving their own problems in their own way, in their own good time.

It was with these considerations in mind that the General Assembly in 1971 and 1972 agreed to postpone the debate on the Korean question. These decisions reflected the recognition by a majority of Member States that no action should be taken that might prejudice the tentative contacts which both sections of Korea had agreed to. The decision in 1971 was fully vindicated in 1972 by the publication of the Joint Communiqué issued in both Pyongyang and Seoul on 4 July of that year and by the establishment at government level of a committee to co-ordinate contacts between the two sides.

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Since 1972 there have been a number of meetings of the North-South co-ordinating committee as well as further contact between the two Red Cross organizations. The evident fact that progress has been slow and difficult can be said to reflect the high degree of suspicion and mistrust that has remained and festered on both sides over so many years. Yet the very fact that talks have taken place at all is to be counted as a significant gain.

So also was the participation last year, for the first time, by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the General Assembly debate. My delegation was glad to join in the welcome that was accorded the delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea at that time, and I again welcome both delegations to the debate this year. We have had a second opportunity at this session of hearing the representatives of both Governments, and while their statements in many respects reveal the continuing and wide differences between them, both have emphasized their dedication to the objective of eventual reunification of their country, and both have indicated their readiness to reach this objective peacefully through negotiations and dialogue.

I like to regard this as a hopeful augury, particularly when I recall that at last year's twenty-eighth session we reached something of a milestone in our consideration of the Korean question by adopting by consensus a decision which reaffirmed the principles enunciated in the Joint Communiqué of July 1972 and dissolved the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea. The significance of that decision, in the view of my delegation, rested not merely in the dissolution of a Commission which, through no fault of its own, had not been able to discharge its mandate in full but also in the fact that both Korean delegations, by accepting a consensus, indicated a spirit of compromise.

If I have dwelt at length on the recent history of this item and on recent developments in relations between the two Koreas, I have done so for a purpose. Too often we have tended to look back over the events of the past in the manner of a post-mortem and to apportion blame to one side or the other, often with a lot of unnecessary acrimony. My intention today has been to shift that focus, to emphasize the movement that has taken place in relations between the two halves of the peninsula and their common desire to work towards the goal of national reunification.

(Sir Laurence McIntyre, Australia)

It has accordingly been heartening this year to observe that, with some notable exceptions, the debate in this Committee has generally been more moderate in tone and more conciliatory in approach in contrast to the intransigent and uncompromising stances of the past in support of one side or the other, which can only have helped to polarize attitudes and harden positions and worsen the climate for a settlement among and between the Koreans themselves.

This brings me to the present debate and Australia's views on its substance. As we see it, our discussion concerns three interrelated issues -- the future of the United Nations Command, stability and peace in the Korean peninsula, and the maintenance of the current dialogue between the two Koreas.

The United Nations Command, through its continued presence and authority in Korea since the Armistice was signed in 1953, has contributed in full measure to the preservation of peace in Korea. Of this there can be no doubt.

(Sir Laurence McIntyre, Australia)

It is this undeniable fact that we must take into account when considering the future of the remaining elements of the United Nations presence in the Republic of Korea. It appears to my delegation that both sides are agreed that it would now be timely to begin to consider the dissolution of the United Nations Command. But the difficulties that appear to hinder rational and constructive study of the question are perhaps threefold, and I should like to comment briefly on each of them.

The first relates to the belief that all foreign forces in Korea are there under the flag of the United Nations. The Chairman of the delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has indicated that to argue otherwise is to engage in sophistry. But it is a fact, as my delegation understands it, that the majority of United States forces in Korea are there under the auspices of the mutual defence pact concluded between the Republic of Korea and the United States in 1953 and ratified and brought into effect a year later. We must surely recognize the right of a sovereign government to invite another country to establish bases and forces within its territory, and the Republic of Korea has exercised that right. The existence of these bases and forces is surely a matter between the United States and South Korea and is not, as we see it, one which it is within the competence of the United Nations to pass judgement upon.

The second difficulty relates to the need to ensure that the maintenance of the armistice machinery, or an acceptable alternative to it, is agreed upon before the United Nations Command, which was a signatory to the Armistice Agreement, is done away with. We cannot overstress the important role that that Agreement and the machinery established by it have played in the maintenance of peace and security in the peninsula for the past 20 years. I recall the statement by the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Korea on 29 November, when he said that in the absence of a successor arrangement the dissolution of the United Nations Command would result in the removal of a vital party to the Armistice Agreement, could lead to a serious disruption of the armistice, and would have a grave impact on peace and security in the area.

Thirdly, we appreciate that there are misgivings in some quarters about the prospect of the question of the United Nations Command coming before the Security Council. If there exists, as we perceive there does, a willingness on the part

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of both sides to reach agreement on the dissolution of the United Nations Command, we are confident that sensitivities on both sides could be taken fully into account and that a mutually satisfactory arrangement for the future of the United Nations Command could be obtained, given good will on all sides.

That brings me to the two draft resolutions now before the Committee.

It had been our hope that this Committee would not have been faced with the necessity of voting on two competing resolutions. We had hoped, as I think other members had, that a compromise could have been reached which would have built on the consensus reached last year and avoided a possible confrontation in this Committee. In the absence of such an agreement, my delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1, which we consider offers the best prospect of making a positive contribution to a satisfactory and peaceful solution of the Korean problem.

I should like to conclude by recalling the remarks made about the Korean situation by the Australian Foreign Minister, Senator Willesee, in the course of his statement in the general debate earlier in this session:

"There are today two governments in Korea, the Republic of Korea which exercises authority south of a border running roughly along the 38th parallel, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea which exercises authority north of that border. The Australian Government has had close and friendly relations with the Government of the Republic of Korea since its inception. Those close and friendly relations continue, and will continue. This year the Australian Government also established relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and hopes these will develop further. Australia believes that any realistic approach to the future of the whole of Korea has to proceed from a recognition that two separate entities at present exist, each being the lawful Government of that part of Korea where at present it exercises effective control. The unification of Korea should be achieved peacefully by agreement among the peoples of the whole of Korea themselves. There must be no resort to force to achieve it. Pending unification by peaceful means, the realistic course, and the just course, is for other countries to recognize and deal with each of the two governments in Korea as the Government of that part of the country which it at present administers. North and South Korea are both

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members of a number of United Nations specialized agencies. They should both be members of the United Nations itself. If they were, it may be that an atmosphere would result in which agreement on some matters related to Korean questions as a whole could be more easily and more amicably arrived at than in the present climate of mistrust and acrimony." (A/PV.2259, pp. 41-42)

Mr. FOMENCOVICHENKO (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic)
(interpretation from Russian): In submitting, along with the other socialist countries and a large number of non-aligned countries, the item entitled "Withdrawal of all foreign troops stationed in South Korea under the flag of the United Nations" for consideration by this twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic was endeavouring to ensure that at the present session of the General Assembly a decisive step would be taken towards the final elimination of foreign interference in the affairs of the Korean people and that favourable conditions would be created for the peaceful and democratic unification of Korea. Such a decision by the General Assembly has long been awaited by the Korean people and is awaited by the freedom-loving peoples of the whole world. The adoption of a principled and fair decision along those lines has been sought by the socialist countries, including the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, from the very beginning of the discussion of the question of Korea in the United Nations. Today that position, which is that of all the socialist States, is supported by a large group of non-aligned countries.

(Mr. Tchernouchtchenko, Byelorussian SSR)

My delegation notes with satisfaction that with each passing year an increasing number of States support the just struggle of the Korean people for the peaceful, democratic reunification of their country, and that the ranks of those who support the shameful policy of discrimination in the United Nations vis-à-vis the Korean people, pursued by States which started the aggressive war in Korea, are growing ever thinner. We are convinced that the just cause of the freedom-loving Korean people and of the peace-loving forces that side with it will soon triumph.

The first step has already been taken in this direction. At its session last year, the General Assembly unanimously adopted a decision concerning the immediate dissolution of the so-called United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, which was used for many years by the imperialist forces to interfere in the internal affairs of the Korean people and to protect their own aggressive plans in the Korean peninsula. We regard this as a sign of the favourable influence exercised by the growing and deepening process of détente and as a result of the changing balance of power in the international arena, including in the United Nations, towards the forces of peace, socialism and progress.

As is known, in that same decision the General Assembly expressed the hope that the North and the South of Korea would endeavour to continue their dialogue and to expand their many-sided exchanges and attempt to work in the spirit of the principles contained in the North-South Joint Communiqué of 4 July 1972 to speed the independent and peaceful reunification of the country.

During the time that has elapsed since the last session of the General Assembly, the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has, in accordance with the above-mentioned General Assembly decision, taken a number of new measures to give effect to the North-South joint statement and to activate the talks between the two parts of Korea with a view to the earliest reunification of the country.

(Mr. Tchernouchchenko, Byelorussian SSR)

The numerous proposals put forward by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea would, if they had been implemented, have considerably eased the situation in the Korean peninsula, would have improved relations between the North and the South and would have paved the way for further measures towards the earliest reunification of Korea by peaceful means. And those proposals did in fact receive a lively response in the south of the country. Distinguished political figures in South Korea, members of the religious community and representatives of broad strata of the population ever more actively called for an extension of contacts with the North and the withdrawal of foreign troops, as well as an end to all foreign interference in Korea's affairs and the earliest reunification of the country.

However, despite the growing movement of the people of South Korea towards reunification, southern Korean authorities have rejected the various initiatives taken by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and have demonstrated their reluctance to act in accordance with the decisions of the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly. They have again indicated that they do not aspire to the reunification of the Korean people into a single peace-loving State. The Seoul régime has made use of the negotiations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as a cover for its policy aimed at perpetuating the division of the country, a policy that is in radical opposition to the interests of Korea and the Korean people. This can also be seen in the statement made by the South Korean representative in the First Committee. Indeed, he even declined to speak as had been agreed in an earlier meeting. Clearly the South Korean representative had no argument to refute the constructive proposals put forward by the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

What, then, is the reason for this abnormal situation? It is no secret that the roots of the present abnormal situation go back to foreign interference in the affairs of Korea and the presence in the country of foreign troops, that is to say, United States troops -- the main reason for the division of Korea and represents the main obstacle to the peaceful reunification of the Korean people. Those troops illegally style themselves

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"United Nations troops" and their Command, similarly illegally, is known as the "United Nations Command".

To justify their occupation of South Korea they take cover behind the decision of the Security Council, which was illegal because it was taken in the absence of two permanent members of that body. Under the United Nations Charter, as everyone knows, any forces established by the United Nations are subject to the Security Council and accountable to it. However, nobody can give even a single example indicating that there is any practical connexion of any kind between those troops which are occupying South Korea and the United Nations. This is more than convincingly demonstrated in the information provided to us here in the Committee by the United Nations Secretariat. It is clear from that information that to all intents and purposes the link is confined to the fact that ex post facto the United Nations was notified that the United States commanders of those troops had been changed. We have been told that since 1970 no information at all has been forthcoming.

Representatives might recall that during the 1968 session of the General Assembly, in response to a question by the representative of Hungary here in the First Committee, the Secretariat provided a similar reply: that for many years there had been no reports at all from the so-called United Nations forces. They are indeed strange "United Nations forces" in South Korea. They exist, but nothing further is known about them. What is known is that the foreign troops at present in South Korea under the United Nations flag are used to carry out plans that have nothing in common either with the tasks of preserving and strengthening peace in the Korean peninsula or with the interests of the Korean people themselves.

The presence of foreign troops in South Korea is essentially the main support of those who rule in Seoul and who stubbornly refuse a just, peaceful solution to the problem of Korea in the interests of the whole Korean people. With foreign assistance, a vast military and police apparatus has been set up in South Korea, the militarization of the economy proceeds apace, and the 700,000-strong army of South Korea is being modernized.

(Mr. Tchernouchchenko, Byelorussian SSR)

Terror and violence prevail in the country, there is corruption, and most of the inhabitants live in poverty and hunger. The most elementary democratic rights and freedoms are trampled under foot. Opponents of the existing régime are persecuted.

The serious situation in South Korea has even aroused concern in the United States. More and more United States politicians, including Congressmen, are calling for an end to the assistance and support to the Park Chun Hee régime, for an end to American interference in Korea and for the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea. As was stressed in The New York Times on 28 August, they are expressing the apprehension that:

"The United States might be involved in a war which would not be in its interests."

It might be a good idea for those who favour the maintenance of the troops to heed this pronouncement. The provocative policy of Seoul might serve as the spark which could start a fire and upset the shaky peace in the Korean peninsula.

The presence of foreign troops in the South of Korea is indeed a dangerous source of tension in the region. The withdrawal of foreign troops from South Korea is today an urgent requirement. There is neither legal nor moral justification for the continuing interference of those troops in the affairs of the Korean people. Their presence in South Korea is contrary to the Armistice Agreement in Korea which provides for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea after its conclusion. As is known, in the North of Korea, in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, there have long since been no foreign troops.

The presence of foreign troops in South Korea was deprived of foundation also in the light of the Joint Communiqué by the North and South on 4 July 1972, in which both parties agreed on the following principles concerning the reunification of the country: the principle of independence without support from external force; the principle of peaceful reunification without the use of arms; and the principle of national unity. As is known, those principles, approved by the General Assembly at its session last year, represent a basis on which talks were to be undertaken between North and South.

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However, any talks and any contacts between the two parts of Korea with a view to the country's unification will be doomed to failure until the foreign troops occupying South Korea under the United Nations flag are withdrawn, for that is the main reason for the forcible division of Korea and the principal impediment to the country's unification.

Detailed statements have already twice been made by the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs and head of the delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Comrade Li Jong Mok. His statements have drawn an impressive picture of the major efforts undertaken by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and personally by Comrade Kim Il Sung, consistent with the solution of the whole complex of problems which would lead in the final analysis to the peaceful unification of the country and satisfaction of the national aspirations of the Korean people.

Certain well-known proposals put forward by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including a five-point proposal and a whole set of other proposals, are aimed at this noble objective by peaceful means. They are all aimed at the same purpose, to bring about the peaceful solution of the problem in the interests of the whole Korean people. The Soviet people warmly support the programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which is aimed at the peaceful democratic unification of the country.

However, the opponents of this solution advance various arguments in an attempt to justify the maintenance of foreign troops in South Korea, and everything has been set in motion. Various contrived and mendacious statements are put forward that distort the nature of the foreign policy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. What are we to make of the remarks concerning the purported threat from the North although, as has been convincingly demonstrated by the head of the delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, if we are to speak of a threat at all, then it is from the southern forces and the foreign troops that this threat emanates, since they considerably outnumber the North Korean forces. Perhaps this mythical threat stems rather from the proposals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of 25 March 1974, proposals for the conclusion of a peace agreement between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States. But opponents of a troop withdrawal prefer to be silent about this.

It was even suggested that the balance of power is being upset and that peace will collapse in the peninsula if the foreign troops present there under the United Nations flag should be withdrawn. But there is no balance of power in fact, and any concern displayed to this effect is artificial. Anyone who really wants to bring this about would have immediately to accept the proposal of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for a cut in the armed forces of North and South to 1,000.

Some have even had recourse to the complex and sophistic argument that the foreign troops that are present in South Korea under the United Nations flag have now changed their nature. But everyone knows that the Western countries have for more than 20 years attempted to prove to everyone that the troops in South Korea are United Nations troops. Now the representatives of those same countries, in their attempts to justify the presence there of foreign troops, are trying to demonstrate the opposite, referring to various bilateral agreements between South Korea and the United States. It has already been rightly pointed out that the thrust of those manoeuvres is to resist the withdrawal of foreign troops present in South Korea under the United Nations flag, and this cannot mislead anyone.

Our delegation considers that the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.677, submitted by 38 delegations, including our own, is in keeping with this important and urgent task. It is brief and clear-cut. It stresses the necessity:

"... to withdraw all the foreign troops stationed in South Korea under the flag of the United Nations"

and it:

"Expresses its confidence that the parties directly concerned will take appropriate steps for the solution of the questions related to the withdrawal of all the foreign troops stationed in South Korea under the flag of the United Nations."

(Mr. Tchernouchchenko,
Byelorussian SSR)

In our opinion, the adoption and implementation of this draft resolution would be fully in keeping with the interests of the entire Korean people and with the interests of the strengthening of peace and security in the Far East. Since a decision would create the necessary conditions in which the people of Korea could themselves decide their own destiny without any interference from abroad, this is the only possible solution to a problem that has been on the agenda of the General Assembly for more than a decade, and we consider that it is the moral duty of anyone who cares about the principles of freedom and independence and the interests of peace and security to support this draft resolution.

The question of the withdrawal of all foreign troops stationed in South Korea under the flag of the United Nations is the main fundamental question under discussion in this Committee, and everyone should bear this in mind.

The First Committee has before it another draft resolution, that in document A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1. In the view of our delegation, this is nothing more nor less than an attempt to freeze the present state of affairs in South Korea, to maintain the foreign troops present there and to continue the foreign interference in the affairs of the Korean people -- all of which is contrary to the interests of the Korean people and can serve only to prevent a peaceful reunification of the country.

We are living in a new era, one in which considerable progress has been made towards the relaxation of international tensions. The ongoing processes furthering a state of détente are making it more and more irreversible in nature. But there is need for stubborn political struggle to overcome the resistance of those forces which, by their very nature, are aggressive. We are forced to note that there is still a lopsided approach to various aspects of the problem. It is the deep conviction of my delegation that, in the broad-based struggle for peace, of no less importance are the issues now under discussion, such as the question of the withdrawal of all foreign troops stationed in South Korea under the flag of the United Nations. The adoption of a decision in that regard, we are convinced, will help to remove the obstacles in the way of a peaceful reunification of Korea and to eliminate a hotbed of tension in the Far East, which, in turn, will help to strengthen world peace and security.

Mr. KELANI (Syrian Arab Republic) (interpretation from Arabic):

My congratulations to you, Mr. Chairman, on your election as Chairman of this Committee are very late indeed, but they are all the warmer as they are strengthened by the experience and the facts. You have conducted the work of this Committee with great intelligence and sincerity, with wisdom and neutrality. Your wisdom, your patience and your firmness have been for us a source of appreciation and admiration for you, as a Chairman of whom we are proud and as the representative of a friendly country, Argentina.

I wish first of all to welcome the delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, headed by the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Li Jong Mok, and to wish him every success in the performance of his task, which aims at peace and the reunification of his divided country, and alleviation of the sufferings of his people.

When the General Assembly concluded its last session, the delegations returned to their countries filled with the hope that an era of fruitful dialogue would be initiated between the two parts of Korea, the North and the South. That hope was the result of the consensus that was adopted by the Assembly and accepted by the two Korean delegations. However, an entire year has passed and the dialogue has not yet started. Instead of the spread of détente and the indications of a peaceful era that could be enjoyed by the people of Korea after the sufferings that they have undergone for a quarter of a century, we find the tensions increasing and the Korean people further and further from peace, with the drums of war and crisis being heard throughout the Korean peninsula.

Is it not right for us to ask what the reason is for this setback, for this atmosphere filled with explosive and dangerous possibilities? If, in an attempt to find an answer to this question, we analyse the causes and results, then we must take into account certain facts and events that will light our path to the correct answer.

Perhaps the first of these truths can be found in the North-South Joint Communiqué of 4 July 1972, which enunciated the principles for the reunification of Korea: an independent reunification, without recourse to outside force or interference, achieved through peaceful means with neither of the parties resorting to the use of force against the other, and on a basis of national unity.

(Mr. Kelani, Syrian Arab Republic)

The first conclusion we can draw from the Joint Communiqué issued by the responsible authorities of the two parts of Korea, of their own free will and by virtue of the identity of the historical and geographical motives of the two peoples is that we are dealing with a single nation, a Korean nation, with a single homeland, the Korean homeland; with one history, one heritage and one fate, the history, heritage and fate of the Korean people.

The second conclusion is that the two parties have agreed to terminate all foreign presence throughout the entire Korean homeland and to reject all foreign interference, whatever its source or the reasons for it may be. These provisions apply to the responsible authorities in both parts of the Korean homeland and do not permit either of them to accept any foreign presence, military or otherwise, on its territory, or any foreign interference.

The third conclusion is represented in the means whereby the reunification would take place, namely peaceful means. This rejects and excludes any possibility that the Korean territory should serve as the base for a huge army or as the location of gigantic arsenals of modern and varied types of weapons.

The fourth conclusion is that the democratic process laid down in the Joint Communiqué for achieving its aims is one of national unity.

(Mr. Kelani, Syrian Arab Republic)

The second fact can be found in the attitude adopted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which is an attitude emanating from the Joint Communiqué to which it is committed and which sets up technical and practical solutions for its implementation. This attitude is represented in the five points that were stated by the great leader, Kim Il Sung, in June 1973, which provide for the elimination of military confrontation, the easing of tensions between North and South, the achievement of co-operation and exchange in all forms, the convening of a national congress representing national unity and the setting up of a union or federation which joins the two halves of the country. On the other hand, we find in the south a régime based on foreign support only, and particularly United States military and financial support. This régime militarizes the people and gears them for battle, mobilizing them while aiming at provocation, and artificially creates events in order to bring about an atmosphere of threat of war whereby to justify its policy of oppression used to maintain its rule. It speeds up the mobilization of its forces and increases their size and their armaments, until with their reserves they have reached 2.5 million soldiers. The United States gave them aid of \$1,500 million in order to up-date and modernize this army and equip it with the latest weapons.

In order to create an atmosphere of enmity and war, the leader of the Seoul régime stated in January of this year that his country was living in a state of semi-war. Only six months later, in July of this year, this leader escalated the state of semi-war to turn it into a state of war and ordered his army to complete its preparations for war and to enter into a state of total mobilization. The Seoul régime created this artificial atmosphere out of provocation, mobilization and preparation for war, in order to obstruct the implementation of the consensus opinion that was issued by the General Assembly at its last session and to impede the implementation of the Joint Communiqué and in order to reject the proposals made by the North.

We have a question to ask. Why does the Seoul régime do all this and from where does it derive the strength to defy the will of the United Nations and to create tension in the area, to raise the spectre of a threatening war, when we have seen this very same régime knock at the door of the United Nations asking for

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membership therein as a peace-loving State? The answer to this question will be included in what I have to say today, because I would like to speak of the truth, which is a proposal that was made by the North to sign a peace agreement to take the place of the Armistice Agreement, on the basis of non-invasion, non-aggression and non-interference, which aims at placing the Korean peninsula outside the framework of confrontation and which would create the necessary atmosphere for the start of unification of the two parts of the country. This serious, reasonable proposal could be the framework within which to have peaceful unification through peaceful means and to contribute to achieving détente and maintaining peace and security in Asia. However, the fate of this proposal was to be ignored, as happened with all other constructive attempts which the North had continued to make in an effort to unify the country and to strengthen the foundations of peace and security there.

We return now to the questions which I raised at the beginning of my address, to find the reasons behind this explosive situation which was described by the leader of Seoul as a state of war. Perhaps the most obvious reason for this is the inclusion of the southern part of Korea in the military strategy of the United States in east Asia. This sheds light on the entire question and explains to us why the United States would like to hold on to the flag of the United Nations, to hide behind it in order to use it as a cover which would prevent criticism, and whereby it could maintain its strategic interests in the area and keep in southern Korea a large military base for its forces, irrespective of the interests of the Korean people and their desire to unify the two parts of the country and to establish peace and security in their country. In order to maintain and preserve its interests, it prevents the unity of a single people and sets up in Seoul an Asian fascist régime which it equips with arms. It mobilizes the people for its own purposes and urges the Seoul régime to defiance of the United Nations and to provocation and to announcing a state of semi-war followed by a state of war. The victim of this imperialist game is the Korean people alone, who live their sufferings, who live this division, who have lived this for the past quarter of a century and continue to do so in a state of tension and war.

(Mr. Kelani, Syrian Arab Republic)

In order to put an end to this tragedy and in order to implement the principles of the Charter it is necessary that all the foreign forces under the flag of the United Nations should withdraw from southern Korea. The presence of these forces is a violation of the Charter of the United Nations, the principles of international law, the desire of the Korean people in both parts of the country, and the Armistice Agreement. Their presence represents very clearly and without doubt an outside interference and a form of pressure on the Korean people and its authorities in the South, which prevents them from practising their legitimate right to establish national unity through peaceful means and without any outside interference. It also prevents these people from practising their right to have democratic elections and from creating a democratic atmosphere in which all the groups and parties would exercise their freedom of expression and of meeting and other aspects of democracy.

(Mr. Kelani, Syrian Arab Republic)

The presence of these forces infringes upon the principle of sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of States and the stipulation of the Armistice Agreement which affirms the necessity for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea. The presence of those forces is contrary to the will of the Korean people in the two parts of the country.

If we consider the Joint Communiqué of 4 July 1972 as expressive of the will and determination of the people, we find that its three principles state that unification shall take place without recourse to external force or outside interference, that unification shall be achieved without resort to arms and that it is necessary to achieve national unity.

The presence of those forces constitutes an external force and outside interference. It is a weapon in the hands of one of the parties and aimed at the other. It is an impediment to the achievement of national unity. The presence of those foreign forces, therefore, is contrary to the will of the entire Korean people, both in the South and in the North.

The United Nations has never stood against the desire of the peoples of the world who were forced to be divided and who seek unification through peaceful and democratic means -- who seek the unification of their territory, their homeland, after it had been divided into two parts as a result of extraordinary circumstances whose causes and reasons have long since passed.

The report presented by the representative of the Secretary-General two days ago included information according to which we understand that the flag of the United Nations is being used in South Korea as a cover for the forces of one of the Member States and that those forces receive their orders from the capital of that Member State. I do not think that this needs any further comment. What we request is that that flag should not cover the forces of one country only, and that it should return to its headquarter in respect for this international Organization and its Charter and principles. We also request that the forces of that country should withdraw from Korea and permit the Korean people to implement its desire and will to determine its own internal affairs.

(Mr. Kelani, Syrian Arab Republic)

In view of these remarks, the delegation of my country has decided to sponsor the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.677, which is based on the principle of self-determination and the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of others, and on the necessity to create the circumstances and conditions needed for the peaceful and independent unification of the country as well as to preserve the reputation of the United Nations. It is a draft resolution that would open the road clearly and easily to implementing the will of the General Assembly as reflected in its consensus of the last session.

The delegation of my country hopes that this draft resolution will be adopted.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I thank the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic for his very friendly references to my country and to me.

Mr. WALDRON-RAMSEY (Barbados): Mr. Chairman, it has fallen to your responsibility this year to preside over the debate on the question of Korea. Permit me to place on record publicly the gratification of my delegation at the very efficient and masterly manner with which you are discharging your functions as Chairman of this Committee on Political and Security Affairs.

The representative of Liberia, Mr. Dosumu-Johnson, out of the abundance of his vast experience and knowledge of these matters, made such a brilliant and comprehensive statement yesterday that he would appear to have completely anticipated my delegation, almost to the point of precision. But this does not surprise the delegation of Barbados, as presently constituted. For those of us who have sat at the proverbial feet of Mr. Dosumu-Johnson for the last 15 years at the many conferences he attended on the African continent, or read his writings or attended the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conferences or the Bandung Conferences, or at the United Nations itself in the last decade and a half, cannot fail to recognize the platform of erudite authority from which he speaks. His authority in these matters is informed by the vast experience and cultivated wisdom which he has garnered over the years

(Mr. Waldron-Ramsey, Barbados)

of his vast scholarship and teaching. The Liberian position was ably put by Mr. Dosumu-Johnson. If therefore, the delegation of Barbados ventures to intervene at this stage, it does so in order to lend weight and support to some of the constitutional and political arguments so eruditely advanced by Mr. Dosumu-Johnson of Liberia.

In this debate on the question of Korea, it must be remembered that there are two aspects both to the title of the item and to its substance: 1. the withdrawal of all foreign troops stationed in South Korea under the flag of the United Nations; 2. the urgent need to implement fully the consensus of the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly on the Korean question, and to maintain peace and security on the Korean peninsula. It is important that this Committee remember that there are two formal elements in this item. For both the representative of North Korea, who has spoken in this debate, and some of our colleagues in the Committee, have addressed themselves to only one element of the issue -- that is, the removal of United Nations troops from the Republic of Korea.

In this debate, in the submission of Barbados, we must pay at least equal weight to the consensus agreement of last year and to the maintenance of peace and security on the Korean peninsula. Indeed we go further and argue that greater weight should be paid to the maintenance of peace and security in Korea, and the methodology of peaceful dialogue between the two Governments on the Korean peninsula. We shall proceed to defend this postulation.

(Mr. Waldron-Ramsey, Barbados)

There are two Governments in the Korean peninsula. There is the Government of the Republic of Korea in South Korea. There is the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in North Korea. There are two separate States, as Germany is divided today into two separate States, with two separate Governments. Because of the history of their relations over the last 27 years, an almost unbridgeable gulf of distrust has grown up between the two Governments and the two peoples. We have tested the verity of this assertion not only by what we learn of the actions between the two nations in situ in the peninsula; but also by the opportunity we have had to observe them in microcosm here at the United Nations. Since the two observer delegations are composed of Koreans -- and we presume that they are brothers -- we have been careful to observe very keenly to see if they would, at any time in the lounges or elsewhere at Headquarters, make physical contact and talk to each other. We have been looking for a sign, a public demonstration, of genuine effort to bring about peaceful unification. We must confess that we see none. It seems to me that if they refuse to greet each other here because of the deep-seated mistrust between them, surely it must be even more difficult for them to embrace each other at home, in their separate national entities. My delegation must recognize, of course, that there have been efforts to bridge this chasm and so, presumably, an effort has been made to build underground tunnels of love from North Korea to South Korea. But we must confess that we would prefer to see, in these days of open love-making and liberation, such Korean amorous embraces performed in public view, on bridges over troubled waters.

My delegation, the delegation of Barbados, submits that this Assembly must principally concern itself with the development of the consensus agreement it unanimously agreed upon last year. What has happened since it was passed? Have the parties, North and South Korea, been meeting and pursuing the dialogue? Have they expanded the possibilities for many-sided exchanges and co-operation, in an effort to solve the Korean question? Has any progress been made in the Red Cross talks in an effort to reunite Korean families? What really is the state of play?

(Mr. Waldron-Ramsey, Barbados)

My delegation respectfully submits that this is the only area of clear constitutional competence for the General Assembly. Quite a few of our colleagues have been addressing themselves only to the question of the removal of all foreign troops from South Korea under the United Nations flag. I shall return to this constitutional point later. But permit me to state here, even now, that this General Assembly has no constitutional power whatsoever to remove any troops from South Korea, from Argentina, from the United Kingdom, from the Maldiv Islands, from China, from Gambia or from the Middle East. The General Assembly has no such competence. As far as United Nations troops are concerned, the General Assembly may recommend to the Security Council that United Nations troops should be removed from a particular place or places. But the General Assembly cannot, and I repeat cannot, by a resolution remove troops from anywhere. Just as the General Assembly cannot, by a resolution, admit or expel a State from the United Nations. The Charter states very clearly the role which must be played by the Security Council in these matters. And until and unless we review and revise the Charter, there is no way we can circumvent this constitutional impediment. As Mr. Dosumu-Johnson of Liberia was careful to point out yesterday, the United Nations is founded on laws and works by clearly defined and promulgated laws. And as the quotation made by Mr. Dosumu-Johnson has it, "... law floats in a sea of ethics" (A/C.1/PV.2036, p. 56). Nor can the General Assembly, by a resolution, tell a State that it must remove troops of another State which are legally on the territory by virtue of a bilateral mutual defence treaty. The General Assembly has its numbers, of course, but it also has its limitations. We cannot by a resolution make a black man white nor a white man black because we decide to do so by our votes in this chamber. The founding fathers at San Francisco were conscious of their responsibilities when they defined the provinces of constitutional competence of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

But what of the consensus we reached last year in this self-same room, on this self-same Korean question? Was the dialogue continued by the two States, North and South Korea? Were the many-sided exchanges and co-operation for peaceful settlement extended? This is the proper jurisdictional line of inquiry, as we understand it, for this Committee, the main Committee of the General Assembly. As we understand it, a South-North co-ordinating committee was established as the formal channel of dialogue under the aegis of the South-North Joint Communiqué

(Mr. Waldron-Ramsey, Barbados)

of 4 July 1972. By August 1973, the Co-ordinating Committee had met three times in Seoul and in Pyongyang on an alternative basis. As for the South-North Red Cross Conference, seven full-fledged meetings were held between August 1972 and August 1973.

The international community breathed a sigh of relief when it heard that these talks were taking place. For we felt then, as we do now, that some progress could have been made, at least in the humanitarian domain, in tracing dispersed families, in arranging for reverse visits and the eventual reunion of families. This, with careful nurture, could lead eventually to the peaceful reunification and rehabilitation of the entire Korean people. It would be reasonable to expect that, in time, greater many-sided contacts in the cultural, economic, social and even the sports fields would have been arranged between the two sides; that they would have postponed for a more felicitous season the more complicated political and military questions.

(Mr. Waldron-Ramsey, Barbados)

My delegation was somewhat disappointed and distressed to learn from the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Korea, Mr. Dong-Jo Kim, when he addressed our Committee last Friday and recounted the history of the dialogue which the Assembly encouraged in its consensus last year, that rather than follow this easy, practical way, as a first step, the North Koreans demanded that they settle military and political questions before all other issues. We found this very disappointing indeed. The Foreign Minister, Mr. Kim, went on to say in his statement:

"They demand that we abrogate our national security laws. They even demand the withdrawal of the United Nations forces from the Republic of Korea, as a precondition for continuation of the dialogue". (2031st meeting, p. 11)

If one may say so, this would not seem to be the attitude of a Government that has a genuine desire to reunite families and bring about the peaceful reunification of a people which is at present divided and living in two distinct sovereign States. It would seem to us that before a State proceeds to dismantle the fabric of its national security it should look carefully to see what it is getting in return and what is going to be put in the place of its existing national security guarantee. The Foreign Minister of the Republic of Korea went on to tell us in dismay that after only one year the North Koreans unilaterally suspended the dialogue on 28 August 1973. No meetings of the Co-ordinating Committee have been held since. Since November 1973, Red Cross societies of both sides have held a number of meetings at the working level in the hope of reopening full-dress talks. Unfortunately, the dialogue has not been resumed because, apparently, the North Koreans no longer want it.

It seems to me that in these circumstances the Assembly can only urge a peaceful method for resolving disputes between States. And what is a more pacific method than talking together? My delegation strongly calls upon both North and South Korea to sit down and reason together, to continue the dialogue for peace.

Some have argued in this debate that before the unification of Korea can be brought about all foreign troops must be removed from South Korea; but my delegation considers that we must mainly be concerned in this debate about the maintenance of peace and security on the Korean peninsula. Indeed, we submit

(Mr. Waldron-Ramsey, Barbados)

that peace and security in Korea is even more important at this stage than the unification of the Korean people, for there is little point in having a unified people which is daily at each other's throats and is rent asunder by constant fratricidal war and torment. We must advocate the establishment and maintenance of peace and security in the area first. We must maintain the fabric of the Armistice Agreement. We must guard jealously the methodology which has kept the Armistice Agreement in existence for all these years. This is not to say that we should not invite the Security Council, the competent body, to review and reappraise the Armistice Agreement itself, as well as the methodology which keeps it alive, from time to time. But we could not with any degree of seriousness recommend to the Security Council that it dismantle the United Nations Command in Korea before it is sure that the Armistice Agreement will survive, or before creating a viable alternative to the United Nations Command.

Then what about the argument that the unification of the Korean people cannot take place because the United Nations forces are in South Korea? Are we to understand that, if we were to remove the United Nations forces, or any other forces, tomorrow from the Republic of Korea, the two peoples would immediately rush to embrace and love each other? Or is it that the United Nations Command in the South is linked in a hand-barrier, holding back the South Koreans who are straining at the bit to rush over the Bridge of No Return to greet their brothers in the North? Are we to understand that the United Nations soldiers are suppressing the South Koreans? Or is it that the United Nations Command is keeping the friendly, peace-loving North Koreans from bringing olive branches and ginseng tea to their lost brothers in the South?

It seems to me that we must examine the role of the United Nations Command before we make judgements about it. We must see if it is fulfilling the mandate it legitimately was marshalled to perform.

In the submission of the delegation of Barbados, the onus of proof lies on those who assert that the United Nations Command and its troops must be liquidated before the Korean people can be united. It is for them to show that the United Nations forces stand in the way of reunification, and how they do so. In the submission of my delegation, it has not been demonstrated in this debate that, first, if we remove the United Nations forces from South Korea, unification will come about immediately, or at all; nor, secondly, that the two Governments

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on the Korean peninsula trust each other so much that they would abandon the attributes of separate national sovereignties for one unified nation; nor, thirdly, has it been established that the Armistice Agreement would survive if the United Nations Command were liquidated.

(Mr. Waldron-Ramsey, Barbados)

I have argued earlier that only the Security Council can create a United Nations command and force and that only the Security Council can disband a United Nations command and force. That, in my respectful submission, is the unambiguous law of the Charter. The Security Council, by its resolution of 7 July 1950 created a unified command to assist the Republic of Korea. Paragraph 4 of that resolution reads:

"Requests the United States to designate the commander of such forces." (Security Council resolution 84 (1950))

Paragraph 5 of the resolution

"Authorizes the unified command at its discretion to use the United Nations flag in the course of operations against North Korean forces concurrently with the flags of the various nations participating." (Ibid.)
In its final paragraph, paragraph 6, the Security Council

"Requests the United States to provide the Security Council with reports as appropriate on the course of action taken under the unified command." (Ibid.)

With hindsight, in December 1974, we may have all kinds of reservations about the morality of that resolution which was passed in 1950; but that is what the Security Council did in 1950, and that is the existing and extant law on the matter, until the Security Council itself and alone, in its wisdom or otherwise, amends, varies or abrogates that law. That is the law on the matter. The General Assembly cannot amend or vary or abrogate a decision of the Security Council. It has no such legal competence. The delegation of Barbados submits that, as a collectivity of sovereign States, the only way we could smoothly operate in this system of parliamentary diplomacy is by a body of law determining and defining our method of conduct. The Charter of the United Nations provides that body of law. We are all prisoners of the Charter. We are each diminished by the strictures of its provisions.

That is why I say it is bad law, and an even worse argument, to say that because two permanent members of the Security Council -- two States friendly to us -- were not present in the Security Council on 7 July 1950 the resolution passed by the Council on that date was illegal. That is a bad argument. It

(Mr. Waldron-Ramsey, Barbados)

is as untenable as it is tendentious. We know why the Soviet Union was not in the Security Council on 7 July 1950. This is now almost ancient history, and I certainly have no intention of even slightly irritating my respected and distinguished friend, Ambassador Malik, by recounting any part of that incident. The People's Republic of China did not then occupy the seat of China in the Security Council. That was in 1950 -- which chronologically is one year after 1949. I suspect that an appreciation of the historical sense of these matters will put my meaning into correct constitutional perspective. There was a quorum in the Security Council at the time of the vote on that resolution. All the normal procedures were followed. The constitutional forms were observed. It cannot therefore be maintained or argued that Security Council resolution 84 (1950) was illegal.

I have demonstrated that the various elements in the unified command -- and there are elements, in the plural -- were placed under a designated commander of the United States by the Security Council resolution of 7 July 1950. The United States supplied the majority of the forces, but not all the forces. Today the United States has its own forces in the Republic of Korea, and indeed has had since 1954, pursuant to a mutual defence treaty of that self-same year with the Republic of Korea. The General Assembly cannot, in my submission, remove those forces by a resolution. We may suggest to the Republic of Korea and the United States that they behave in a certain manner with respect to those forces. But both the Republic of Korea and the United States are sovereign States. We may suggest to them that they rearrange their positions in a manner that others might find less irritating, but they alone must decide how they want to deal with treaties they have jointly and freely entered into. In any case, the doctrine of pacta servanda sunt is certainly applicable in international law with respect to this particular matter.

I do not know if we can say that their mutual defence treaty is a threat to the peace and security of the two States on the Korean peninsula. There are foreign troops stationed in other States, but we do not hear that any such circumstance is a threat to international peace and security.

(Mr. Waldron-Ramsey, Barbados)

Again, of course, we may ask the Security Council to liquidate the United Nations Command. Suppose for the sake of argument that the Security Council did liquidate the United Nations Command in South Korea. But suppose, too, that the mutual defence treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea continued in active force and United States troops remained in the Republic of Korea. There would still be foreign troops in the Republic of Korea, though not under the United Nations flag. Well, what then?

(Mr. Waldron-Ramsey, Barbados)

It seems to me that we must recommend a return to the dialogue and the peaceful avenues to ever-widening contacts between the two peoples. Our concentration on the removal of the United Nations forces will lead us down a fruitless path, I suspect. The United Nations forces cannot be said to be obstructing peace on the Korean peninsula; but it can certainly be said that the United Nations Command prevents the outbreak of a major war between the two States, North and South. The Armistice Agreement has been holding, in our view, principally because of the presence of the United Nations Command set up by the Security Council in July 1950. Before we dismantle the United Nations Command -- and the Security Council can, if it wants to -- we must be sure that we have something equally dependable to put in its place.

That is why the delegation of Barbados cannot support the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.677.

In its third preambular paragraph, that draft resolution notes that the desire of the States Members of the United Nations expressed in last year's consensus for the continuation of dialogue and the expansion of contacts has failed to be realized. But it does not say why the dialogue was discontinued -- it is silent on that question -- nor by whom. Why are the Red Cross talks not proceeding?

In its fourth preambular paragraph, it recognizes that the continued presence of foreign troops in South Korea and the interference of outside forces in the internal affairs of Korea constitute a serious obstacle to promoting dialogue between North and South Korea relating to peaceful reunification.

The sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.677 have not demonstrated how troops in the Republic of Korea have prevented or can prevent military or civilian envoys from discussing. The self-same troops have not over the years, prevented the two sides from talking in the meetings of the Armistice Commission at Panmunjon. They did not prevent the Red Cross Society in South Korea from initiating talks between the South and the North in August 1971.

(Mr. Waldron-Ramsey, Barbados)

Representatives will recall that, as a result of that valiant initiative which started in the South, a special emissary was sent in May 1972 from the South to Pyongyang, the capital of the North, to negotiate the opening of the famous dialogue.

As a result of all that peaceful activity -- with the United Nations troops still in Korea -- the historic South-North Joint Communiqué was issued on 4 July 1972, in both capitals, enunciating the principles of peaceful unification. Both sides agreed to that Joint Communiqué. The United Nations troops were in Korea then, as they are now. Those who oppose the presence of the United Nations troops in South Korea must, in the view of my delegation, show beyond a reasonable doubt how their presence prevents peaceful dialogue between the two Governments. It is not enough to say "remove the foreign troops; they are preventing talks and hindering a durable peace". One must show that the troops cause this obstruction.

The main operative operative in the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.677 considers it necessary to withdraw all foreign troops stationed in South Korea under the flag of the United Nations. As I have said earlier, it is for the Security Council, not the General Assembly, to consider it necessary to withdraw troops. The General Assembly may consider it necessary, but then it must so recommend its consideration to the attention of the Security Council for possible action. The Security Council has power to withdraw United Nations troops from the Republic of Korea, or from Barbados, or from Ghana, or from any other place. But the Security Council can withdraw troops under the United Nations flag only. Obviously, the Security Council has no power, no competence, to deal with troops under any other flag. Needless to say, the Republic of Korea is a sovereign, independent State and is free to exercise its sovereignty as it sees fit.

The draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1, on the other hand, desires that the goal of peaceful reunification of Korea be brought about by the "freely expressed" will of the Korean people. It pays a tribute to the promise and hope engendered by the Joint Communiqué of 4 July 1972. But it recognizes that tension still exists in Korea and that the Armistice Agreement of 27 July 1953 remains indispensable to the maintenance of peace and security in the area.

(Mr. Waldron-Ramsey, Barbados)

That draft resolution further recognizes the continuing responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace and security on the Korean peninsula. It would properly urge both North and South Korea to return to the table of dialogue in order to bring about the peaceful reunification of Korea. The Security Council is asked in that draft resolution to keep those aspects of the question concerning it under review, bearing in mind the necessity to maintain the Armistice Agreement and peace and security on the Korean peninsula. It would invite the Security Council further to review the future of the United Nations Command

The draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1 is a realistic, fair and reasonable text. It seeks to respect the proper constitutional rectitude in dealing with the United Nations Command. It properly addresses itself to the real business of the General Assembly on the question of Korea, that is, concern with the peaceful dialogue which is the corner-stone of the consensus of the last session of the General Assembly. Peace on the Korean peninsula and getting the two Governments talking again should be our main preoccupation in this house.

(Mr. Waldron-Ramsey, Barbados)

The peoples of Korea will not be reunited by any magical dispensation: remove the troops, then presto, reunification. No, Sir, the two Governments of North and South Korea must provide the framework for the rejoining of their peoples. That is why my delegation exhorts members of this Committee to vote for the resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.676 and to restore the dispensation of dialogue in the affairs of the Korean people. By our vote for the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.676, we would also be placing a legal responsibility on the Security Council, where it properly belongs, to review its mandate in Korea to see how the peaceful process might be speeded up.

Having voted and passed resolution A/C.1/L.676, the business of this Committee would be finished on the matter, in the submission of the delegation of Barbados. For there would be no need to pronounce ourselves on any other proposal touching and concerning the question of Korea at this session of the Assembly.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I thank the representative of Barbados for the kind remarks he addressed to me.

Mr. RAMPHUL (Mauritius): At the outset I wish to say that last year we took a step in the right direction by adopting a consensus aimed at encouraging the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to settle their differences and achieve reconciliation and peaceful reunification through dialogue.

We regret that the dialogue which we have all hoped for, following the adoption of the Joint Communiqué of 4 July 1972, has been suspended and that there is renewed tension between the two countries.

It is of great concern to Mauritius that the United Nations should, at this session, see to it that the action we shall take at the end of this debate contributes to reducing the prevailing tension and encourages the two parties to resume their dialogue.

We have been fortunate to have had for a second year the benefit of the views of the delegations of South and North Korea during our deliberations. We have noted that both countries still favour the reunification of their fatherland. However, the approaches they have advocated seem irreconcilable.

(Mr. Ramphul, Mauritius)

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea feels that we could contribute to accelerating the independent and peaceful reunification of Korea by adopting:

"... a just decision for the withdrawal of all the foreign troops stationed in South Korea under the banner of the 'United Nations forces'" (2029th meeting, p. 43).

In this connexion, my delegation would like to recall, without sounding too legalistic, and unlike the previous speaker, that the United Nations Command was established in accordance with a resolution of the Security Council. Since everybody seems to agree on the dissolution of that Command, it would seem advisable to give the Security Council a chance to review the situation. There is no denying that the Armistice Agreement was a valid and useful instrument and that the United Nations Command was created to enforce it. We appreciate the feeling of the Republic of Korea that the dissolution of the United Nations Command, in the absence of a successor arrangement, will result in the removal of a vital party to the Armistice Agreement and could lead to a serious disruption of the Armistice, and that this would have a grave impact on peace and security in the area.

In his statement, the representative of the Republic of Korea referred to a number of alleged provocations from the North. In so far as those allegations correspond to real acts against the security of the South, it is understandable that the South Koreans should feel that it is essential for them to continue to have the United Nations Command and United States troops to protect them. It is also in this context that we view the proposal of the delegation of the Republic of Korea for a non-aggression agreement and its appeal to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to join the South in pledging a renunciation of the use of force as a means of settling their national difference. This proposal, we feel, should not be rejected by North Korea, particularly since it believes that what contributes the actual danger in Korea today is the threat of northward aggression from the South and not the threat of southward aggression from the North.

My delegation believes that the idea of a non-aggression pact is worth exploring because it might facilitate the solution of the question of the withdrawal of foreign troops from the South.

(Mr. Ramphul, Mauritius)

It follows, from what I have just said, that my delegation has been impressed by the line of argument that North Korea should not insist on the withdrawal of the United Nations Forces as a precondition for resuming the dialogue between the North and the South. There are some facts which are the result of the territorial division of Korea and which we are bound to take into account if we want to help to solve the Korean problem. There are ideological political and economic differences which are the underlying causes of the mutual distrust and tension between the two countries. These differences would have to be dealt with if the tension is to be reduced and trust restored.

My delegation believes that it is ultimately up to the Korean people, both in the North and in the South, to solve their own problems. If need be, they should be allowed to pronounce themselves on all issues, particularly the question of the withdrawal of foreign troops. We believe that the United Nations should encourage the resumption of the dialogue between the leaders of both countries, in the hope that this dialogue will result in fraternal contacts between the people of the North and the people of the South.

Those are the views which will guide the Mauritius delegation in its vote on the draft resolutions before us.

In this connexion, I should like to add that my delegation is favourably impressed by the compromise proposals advanced yesterday by the delegation of Tunisia. I understand that those proposals are the subject of current informal consultations. I hope that, perhaps after some gentle persuasion, careful exploration and deep penetration by my beloved elder brother, Ambassador Baroody -- I see that he has left his seat; he may be at it already -- and after some pleasant relaxation over the weekend, we might be in a position to consider them on Monday, should they be deposited in the form of a draft, after the necessary cosmetic and surgical operations.

In conclusion, may I inform the Committee that Mauritius enjoys equally friendly and diplomatic relations with both Governments existing on the same artificially divided territory of Korea.

Mr. TRAORE (Ivory Coast) (interpretation from French): The delegation of the Ivory Coast wishes to avail itself of this opportunity at the present stage of our debate on Korea to define its position on this problem.

The question of Korea has always been a subject of concern for the United Nations, which has been debating it now for more than 20 years. It is true that, although no solution has thus far been found to resolve this grievous problem, that fact should in no way be imputed to the shortcomings or ineffectiveness of our Organization; rather it is to be attributed to the power politics of the great Powers, which, concerning the interests of the Korean people, have directed their efforts above all to encouraging the division of that people in the sole concern of safeguarding their strategic interests.

Thus it is not surprising that, session after session, the Assembly, divided by the manoeuvres of those same great Powers, has not succeeded in adopting any positive resolution that would promote the peaceful settlement of this problem in the interests of the Korean people.

However, I do not believe it necessary to go back to the origins of the conflict nor to dwell on the reasons that have thus far prevented the achievement of such a settlement. In fact, our past debates, governed as they were by partisan positions, have sufficiently demonstrated the ineffectiveness of such a position that has contributed only to exacerbating the debates without thereby resolving the problem; the parties concerned and their allies hold to their respective positions, showing no spirit of concession or of compromise. My delegation could only deplore this attitude, which is not likely to bring about any meeting of minds between the two parties.

It was for these reasons that we welcomed with great hope and optimism the issuance of the Joint Communiqué dated 4 July 1972, which had a great influence in the debates during the last session, thus making possible the adoption of a consensus based on three fundamental principles which the leaders of North Korea and South Korea themselves considered as a prerequisite for the reunification of their country, namely:

(Mr. Traore, Ivory Coast)

- (a) the reunification of the country should be achieved independently, without reliance upon outside force or its interference;
- (b) the reunification of the country should be achieved by peaceful means, without recourse to the use of arms against the other side;
- (c) great national unity should be promoted."

Furthermore, in that same consensus, the parties were urged to continue their dialogue and increase the number of their exchanges. Finally, the United Nations, taking account of the goodwill manifested by the Koreans themselves and in order to assist this further progress towards peace, decided on the immediate dissolution of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea.

My country, consistent with its policy of dialogue and peaceful settlement of disputes, could only rejoice at the adoption of that decision, and hoped that the parties concerned would this year be able to report to us that they had achieved progress within the framework of the reunification of their country in accordance with the three principles contained in the consensus of last year.

Unfortunately, however, the statements we have had occasion to hear in the course of the present session, far from setting forth positive measures of co-operation and unity between the two parties, serve only to perpetuate the division. My delegation can only regret this state of affairs, which is contrary to the spirit of both the Joint Communiqué of 1972 and the consensus of 1973 adopted by the Assembly.

In view of this situation, my delegation, in its desire to promote a peaceful settlement of the Korean problem, ventures to make an urgent appeal to the two parties to show a spirit of concession and tolerance so that they may reach a peaceful settlement in the well-understood interest of the Korean people.

Accordingly, our Committee should rather assist the two parties to resume their fraternal dialogue in accordance with the spirit of the Joint Communiqué of 1972, and not widen the division by initiatives that can result only in a perpetuation of the so often denounced status quo.

(Mr. Traore, Ivory Coast)

In view of these considerations, my delegation would have wished to see before our Committee a single draft resolution aimed at promoting a resumption of the dialogue so as to lead to peace and the peaceful reunification of Korea.

In that spirit, the sponsors of the two draft resolutions in documents A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1 and A/C.1/L.677 respectively should show a spirit of compromise so as to facilitate our task and further the adoption of a single text in the form of a consensus.

In this connexion, it appears that a majority of our Committee is in favour of a United Nations disengagement to be brought about by dissolution of the United Nations Command in Korea. My delegation would have no objection to the adoption of such a measure, on condition that adequate provision was made for preserving the Armistice Agreement and for maintaining peace and security in the region.

We are very much gratified that the co-sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.676 accepted the inclusion of the French amendment in their text, an amendment seeking to achieve that same objective. We hope that they will also take into consideration the amendment of Saudi Arabia in document A/C.1/L.705, which substantially improves the text in that it insists on the preservation of peace and security in the region and calls for continuance of the negotiations between the two Korean Governments.

Further, the sponsors of the draft in document A/C.1/L.677, in a desire to encourage the adoption of a consensus and the resumption of the dialogue between the two parties concerned, should demonstrate a spirit of concession by accepting the Saudi Arabian amendment and not insisting on the withdrawal of foreign troops from South Korea. In fact, that requirement is all the more unwarranted as it constitutes flagrant interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign State, in this case the Republic of Korea, contrary to the provisions of Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter.

(Mr. Traore, Ivory Coast)

The conclusion of international agreements has always been one of the essential prerogatives of States and they by no means intend to abandon such a prerogative. Even those who today insist on the withdrawal of the troops no doubt have foreign troops stationed on their own territory, under bilateral or regional agreements. My delegation does not believe that they would agree to our Assembly's taking a decision inviting them to put an end to such agreements. In the meantime the problem of the withdrawal of foreign troops can be negotiated by the Koreans themselves within the framework of a general settlement and in terms of the progress achieved along the road to peace and reunification of their country.

Taking all these considerations into account, and in the absence of a single text, my delegation will vote in favour of the amendments of Saudi Arabia and the text of document A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1 as amended and we shall vote against the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.677.

Mr. MOLAP (Lesotho): Mr. Chairman, this being the first time my delegation has spoken in this Committee, I wish to take this opportunity to congratulate you and the other officers of the Committee on your election and to express the satisfaction of my delegation at the excellent manner in which you are conducting the business of this Committee. Allow me to assure you of the fullest co-operation of my delegation at all times.

Once more the General Assembly is seized of the question of Korea. This is a question which is now almost as old as the United Nations itself. Since 1948 the General Assembly has been adopting resolutions the object of which has been to bring peace and stability to the Korean peninsula. Last year the General Assembly adopted a consensus under the item "question of Korea". My delegation was gratified at that outcome, as it had been a party to the efforts to arrive at that compromise solution. It remains our belief that the identical positions expressed in that consensus might prove realistic and that new elements can be found to facilitate the peaceful negotiations regarding the reunification of Korea.

(Mr. Molapo, Lesotho)

It is the understanding of my delegation that both Koreas are still parties to the famous joint Korean Communiqué of 4 July 1972. The General Assembly during the two previous sessions decided to shelve the debate on this question in order to give reasonable time for talks between the representatives of the two rival parties. My delegation sees no reason why we should not adopt the same approach this year. There would be no harm in once more reaffirming and strengthening the objectives thus far agreed upon between the two sides as we did last year.

This year we have had the benefit of hearing statements in this Committee by representatives of the two Korean Governments. These statements have brought us up to date concerning the actual state of affairs in the peninsula. From their remarks we have come to learn that this question is both delicate and explosive.

We now have two draft resolutions before our Committee. North Korea supports one, and South Korea the other. There are similarities and dissimilarities between these draft resolutions. Therefore we have been placed in a position where we can identify the areas of agreement and those of disagreement. In our view, the identification of a problem is the beginning of its solution.

As the parties to this conflict have some views in common, we believe, therefore, that the best course of action to take in accordance with the over-all goal of a peaceful settlement would be to identify all these points and to have an agreed decision giving the fullest possible account of them. My delegation is of the opinion that our Committee must address itself primarily to those points where there is agreement and, by so doing, leave it to time to resolve the disagreements -- or we might entrust the Secretary-General of our Organization with the responsibility of serving as a bridge between these two rival parties.

Last year it was resolved that the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea be dissolved. All parties agreed and complied accordingly. Part of the same decision called for a dialogue designed to pave the way for the reunification of Korea. Both sides needed

(Mr. Molapo, Lesotho)

time to prepare for these delicate and intricate negotiations. The General Assembly cannot by its own resolution afford to be a party to any new manoeuvre seeking to make such talks as have been envisaged impossible. Therefore we must reject the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.677 and vote for the amended version of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.676. The draft resolution in A/C.1/L.677 lays down an unacceptable precondition calculated to undermine the very idea of dialogue, which can only take place in an atmosphere free from the threat of war and aggression.

Both these draft resolutions before us have something to say about the desirability of dissolving the United Nations Command. It is the considered opinion of my delegation that the General Assembly should not take a decision on the fate of the United Nations Command before taking into full account the interests of all the parties concerned. We maintain that in order for the negotiations to take place in a peaceful atmosphere the Armistice Agreement must be respected by all the parties.

In counselling caution and moderation, my delegation wishes to note that some significant progress has already been made towards some form of mutual agreement. For example, both parties agree on the desirability of conducting their affairs free from external interference. Both parties agree on the goal of achieving independently the reunification of Korea. Both parties are committed to the maintenance of peace and security in the area and both parties agree on the need for a competent organ to deal with the future of the United Nations Command. Therefore it is the duty of us Members of the United Nations to assist the Korean Governments, within the framework of the Charter, to realize their goals.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I thank the representative of Lesotho for his kind remarks to me and to the other officers of the Committee. I call on the representative of the Republic of Korea.

Mr. PARK TONG JIN (Republic of Korea): My delegation has followed the debate on agenda item 104 with keen interest and concern. We have heard various arguments and suggestions. Some seem constructive, for which we are grateful, while others are unrealistic and therefore preposterous. At times we have even been vilified and accused without justification.

The basic issue before us is twofold: first, the question of continuation of the dialogue between the South and the North and, secondly, the question of maintaining peace and security in Korea.

The dialogue is the only available channel of contact, communication and negotiation. Without the dialogue, proposals or suggestions, however well-intended, could not be dealt with by the Korean people themselves. As our Foreign Minister pointed out in his address on 29 November, the future of our national reconciliation depends upon the outcome of this dialogue.

Who then broke off this dialogue? It is North Korea. As this Committee is well aware, on 28 August 1973, the North Korean authorities unilaterally announced its suspension of the dialogue with the South. I would like to make this fact crystal clear to the members of the Committee. Namely, North Korea -- and North Korea alone -- is responsible for the continued suspension of the dialogue which this Committee itself unanimously recommended last year. On our side, we have since 15 November last year repeatedly proposed to the North Korean side to resume the dialogue without conditions.

Very recently, we have proposed to set up a Mail and Information Exchange Center at Panmunjom for the benefit of dispersed families. Once again, the North Koreans rejected our humanitarian proposal.

We would like to ask them: What is the use of discussing complex problems such as mutual reduction of armed forces, and so forth, when they refuse to solve even the simplest and most elementary problem between us? Actions speak louder than words.

My delegation calls for prompt resumption of the dialogue without any pre-conditions through the South-North Co-ordinating Committee. The final resolution to be adopted here will be incomplete if it does not refer to the dialogue in a direct and constructive manner.

My delegation wishes to reiterate that the Korean Armistice must be scrupulously observed, and its enforcement by the United Nations Command must continue until a suitable successor arrangement is made. This is the minimum requirement for peace and security in Korea under the prevailing conditions.

The North Koreans and their supporters allege that the presence of the United Nations Command and the United States troops in Korea constitutes an interference in the internal affairs of my country. Then, have they produced

(Mr. Park Tong Jin, Republic of Korea)

any evidence to that effect? So far, none at all. This allegation is a serious insult to the Korean people.

Allow me to ask before this Committee: who is interfering in whose affairs? It is those countries that make such allegations. Are they not interfering in the sovereign right of the Republic of Korea to provide for its own defence and security? Who is to question such sovereign right of my country? The Government of the Republic of Korea wishes to declare solemnly that it will not tolerate any form of interference from any source in the exercise of its own sovereign right.

The allegation that the involvement of the United Nations in Korea was not in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations is equally unjustifiable. Is it not one of the most important mandates of this world Organization to act in time of crisis to maintain international peace and security? Is it not the just aspiration of all the States, particularly the small States, to make the United Nations effective in resisting forces of aggression?

My delegation maintains that the questions relating to the United Nations Command, including its possible dissolution, should be referred to the Security Council for consideration. This position is fully in accord with the present Charter of the United Nations and pays due respect to the constitutional authority of the Security Council on the maintenance of international peace and security.

The current United Nations peace-keeping operations in a few critical areas of the world as well as the recent debate in the Special Political Committee on this question demonstrate that the special responsibility and authority of the Security Council should be fully safeguarded and even strengthened in the future.

Since last year, my country has expressed its readiness to approach the subject of the United Nations Command in a flexible manner and continues to emphasize the necessity of making an alternative arrangement first. In this regard, we have already indicated our readiness to negotiate. This is a significant factor which I hope will not escape the attention of this Committee. Is not our attitude reasonable and our approach realistic?

(Mr. Park Tong Jin, Republic of Korea)

In this turbulent world, goodwill alone cannot provide a firm guarantee that peace will be maintained. And it is much too premature for us to trust North Korea's so-called "peace-loving policy", so long as the same North Korea openly advocates the overthrow of the legitimate Government of the Republic of Korea. Such flagrant violations of the Armistice Agreement as constructing a large-scale southward underground tunnel in the southern sector of the demilitarized zone, which we have recently discovered, represents one example of North Korea's policy of duplicity. It is recalled that the North Korean representative at this Committee repeatedly, but unsuccessfully, denied their irrevocable guilt in provoking the Korean war in 1950.

In view of the lateness of the hour, I do not wish to elaborate any further on our position on the question of maintaining peace and security in Korea. In order to set the proper perspective in international politics where the interaction of various factors is especially complex, it is always necessary to assess events in their entirety and not in an isolated manner. Neither an academic approach nor the shouting of tired slogans can lead us to the real solution of a problem such as the one with which this Committee is concerned.

(Mr. Park Tong Jin, Republic of Korea)

My delegation therefore profoundly deplores uses of such intemperate and abusive words as "puppets", "clique", etc., by the North Koreans and their supporters in this august forum. Slanderous words do not change the truth. By using such demeaning words, they only demean themselves and prove their insincerity. Let us be sincere in discussing such a serious question as the unification of Korea.

My delegation is convinced that it is high time that the Korean question be dealt with on its own merits and free from any irrelevant political motivations. One must not be misled or confused by fabrication and distortion of facts on Korea and the innocent Korean people.

Our position on the two fundamental issues, which I have pointed out at the outset, has been fully expressed in our memorandum and also in the statement made by our Foreign Minister on 29 November. Based on what we have already explained before this Committee, my delegation strongly recommends to the members of this Committee to vote in favour of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1, co-sponsored by 28 countries. These 28 countries represent the peace-loving world. This resolution will make a true contribution to the resumption of the South-North dialogue and to the maintenance of peace and security in the Korean peninsula. It is a simple, clear and reasonable resolution. For this reason, this draft resolution deserves the overwhelming support of all peace-loving countries in this august body.

Mr. CLARK (Nigeria): Yesterday the representative of Tunisia appealed to the good sense of the representatives who cared for the peace and unity of the Korean people not to press their point of view. He challenged us to unite our strength to assist in the maintenance of peace and security in Korea and, in this connexion, to fulfil the role of the United Nations as a force for compromise and a force of moderation. He also wanted us to demonstrate that the United Nations takes seriously a problem such as that of Korea and tries to find a solution which will express not the opinion of a group, not the opinion of a faction, but the opinion of the United Nations. Thereupon the Ambassador of Tunisia, in a spirit of compromise and conciliation, read out

(Mr. Clark, Nigeria)

the text of a draft, now published in document A/C.1/PV.2036, aimed at advancing the purpose of the consensus on the peaceful reunification of Korea which we adopted last year.

My delegation has been moved to heed the Tunisian appeal and will not fail to view the Tunisian draft resolution in a sympathetic light. If I am now speaking at this very late stage of our debate, it is only to affirm the view that, in our opinion, the Tunisian proposal does not seek to undermine the position of either the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1 or the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.677. According to our understanding, both resolutions will still stand, but they would not be voted upon at this session.

For too long, the purposes of the United Nations, upon which we all agree, have been thwarted through the exploitation of legalisms. If an action is worth taking, we should exert our energies to do so. In the case before us it is clear that the United Nations Command in South Korea needs to be dissolved and that, at the same time, the peace-keeping provisions of the Armistice Agreement should not be jettisoned.

(Mr. Clark, Nigeria)

How then do we proceed from this conclusion? It seems to my delegation that the Tunisian draft resolution attempts to find a way acceptable to the majority -- if not all of us. We therefore commend it for general acceptance.

However, in order to meet both sides half way, and to advance further the cause championed by Tunisia, I should like to propose a minor modification, which I have already discussed with the Tunisian delegation and some others. Without prejudice to the positions that they have taken, I am encouraged to propose it because it does not seek in any way to contest the positions of these two earlier draft resolutions now before us, nor does it call into question any sovereign or legal rights which the North or the South Korean Governments enjoy at the moment, nor does it prejudice the construction either side puts on the legality of the United Nations Command in South Korea.

Moreover, my proposal does not infringe upon the competence of the Security Council to determine the status of the Command or what should be covered by the Armistice Agreement.

It only seeks to convey the sense of our debate. It is only an opinion which, I feel convinced, it is the duty of this Committee to express. It is an attempt to defuse the combustible elements of the situation.

With your permission, Sir, I now propose a new operative paragraph 1 to the Tunisian draft resolution, which appears in document A/C.1/PV.2036. The new paragraph would read as follows:

"1. Agrees that the United Nations Command in South Korea, involving the presence of foreign troops thereat under the flag of the United Nations be dissolved forthwith;"

The four operative paragraphs of the Tunisian draft resolution would then follow. In other words, there would now be five operative paragraphs, with the original four operative paragraphs renumbered accordingly.

I am aware that the Tunisian draft resolution has not yet been formally introduced. It is on the same understanding, and because we await the outcome of the consultations on it with pleasurable anticipation, that I put forward the slight amendment that I have just read out.

Mr. DRISS (Tunisia) (interpretation from French): I should like to thank the representative of Nigeria for his comments on the informal Tunisian proposal. We put forward our draft resolution in a spirit of conciliation. We appealed to all delegations to participate in this effort of conciliation. This morning we believed that the atmosphere was propitious. The statement that we have just heard from the representative of the Republic of Korea should not discourage us. I believe that the two parties are now seeking to compare their views and to evaluate their respective friendships, which is perfectly natural. Of course, when it comes to the vote, everyone will follow the instructions of his Government.

However, we have three days before us -- that is to say, the weekend and Monday morning -- and it seems to me that throughout that period we should continue to exert every possible effort so that we can come to Monday afternoon's meeting with a new draft consensus. Otherwise, the vote will be taken; but we should not allow ourselves for that reason to be discouraged; having seen the result of the vote, we should still try to reconcile the two positions in the General Assembly. I think we have a duty to Korea and a duty to the United Nations, and that duty is to see to it that this debate does not result in a division and in a confrontation that we can well do without.

I am sure that I shall express the feelings of all delegations when I say that all of us here would rather not vote on the draft resolutions but that we would rather reach a consensus. It is therefore up to all of us and to the two Koreas to assist in this process.

That was the meaning of the appeal that I made yesterday. It is the meaning of the appeal which I make again.

I would point out that the Tunisian delegation has not formally introduced a draft resolution and that, since this is such a complicated, serious and difficult problem, it is not for us so much a matter of voting but one of common efforts to reach a common objective, which is peace, the peace that is threatened.

Mr. ALARCON (Cuba) (interpretation from Spanish): My delegation had not intended to speak again at this stage, but the statements just made by the last speakers have led me to do so.

First of all, we wish to express our appreciation to the Ambassador of Tunisia, who, although he did not introduce a formal proposal to the Committee, has at all times been prepared to offer explanations to other delegations and to clarify what the Tunisian delegation is suggesting as a course of action for the Committee.

However, we have concluded the debate on this item and we are close to the time when we shall have to vote. As you have indicated to us a few moments ago, Mr. Chairman, on Monday delegations will be called upon to explain their votes and then to vote. Nevertheless, there has been no clarification of some fundamental questions raised repeatedly throughout the debate as to what we are to vote on and how we are going to vote. Other delegations which have sponsored a draft resolution -- I refer, in this case, to that contained in document A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1 -- have not taken the trouble to explain to us exactly what they are inviting us to do.

I should like to draw the Committee's attention to the fact mentioned by my delegation and others, that while they are submitting a text to us calling on the Security Council to examine, inter alia, the possibility of dissolving the United Nations Command, the Secretariat of our Organization has informed us that it is not in a position to explain just what the United Nations Command is.

Several delegations, including my own, have raised some very important and serious questions in connexion with this Command. We have asked specifically what relationship there is between that Command and the United States Eighth Army; we have asked specifically, on the basis of official United States sources, what the United States Second Division is doing in the Demilitarized Zone. And the persons who could have clarified those questions before the Committee have not taken the trouble to do so, in spite of the fact that, as I indicated this morning, apparently some of these questions were answered through the press.

My delegation wishes to place on record that it considers that the Committee will not be in a position to vote seriously on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1 on next Monday unless it is informed in advance what exactly the United Nations Command is, which we are asked to dissolve through the Security Council without first knowing exactly what are its links with the other military bodies that I have just mentioned.

(Mr. Alarcon, Cuba)

If as we all have said, we consider this to be an important and a serious question which affects peace and security and the destiny of a people, the least we can expect is that next Monday we know what the sponsors intend to say in the draft resolution they have submitted to us in document A/C.1/L.676.

Mr. WALDRON-FAMSEY (Barbados): Like the delegation of Cuba, the delegation of Barbados, having delivered itself of its main statement on the subject, did not propose or intend to return to this debate this evening, but we must confess that our colleague and friend, Ambassador Clark of Nigeria, in attempting to tamper with the very informal suggestions of the Ambassador of Tunisia has submitted what he, Ambassador Clark, considers to be a small amendment. Certainly, with all due respect to my distinguished and friendly colleague, the amendment he suggested could not, by any stretch of the imagination, be considered to be a small amendment.

When one reads the amendment submitted by Ambassador Clark of Nigeria in connexion with the text as submitted in the relevant provisional verbatim record of our meeting, one sees clearly that were we to accept Nigeria's amendment in conjunction with the text submitted by Tunisia we would have an extremely one-sided text. It is not really a bridge between the two contending positions at all. Let us examine it.

Ambassador Clark would have us agree that the United Nations Command in Korea should be disbanded. The Ambassador of Tunisia's operative paragraph 1 saying:

"Requests the Security Council to examine the question of Korea in order to dissolve the United Nations Command ..." (2036th meeting, p. 67) would then follow as the second operative paragraph, still dealing with the dissolution of the Command. The Ambassador of Tunisia in his operative paragraph 2 now re-numbered 3 would have us invite

"the parties directly concerned to take appropriate measures to promote the withdrawal of the foreign troops ..."

Three paragraphs dealing with the liquidation of the troops in South Korea. That is clearly a one-sided position. The new operative paragraph 4 would say:

"Urges North and South Korea to pursue their dialogue in order to accelerate the peaceful reunification of Korea in the spirit of the Joint Communiqué of 4 July 1972".

(Mr. Waldron-Ramsey, Barbados)

I do not want to return to this debate, but representatives will recall in my long statement this afternoon that I argued that the General Assembly has competence only to deal with the question of enjoining the parties concerned to return to a peaceful dialogue. If we are going to recommend that the Security Council should review the status of the unified Command, that is a different question altogether, but let us use the correct language that attempts to be neutral in intent and postulates a position that comes between the two contending positions. Do not let us pretend that we are submitting a neutral position in the interests of the United Nations, when in fact we are taking a position that is heavily weighted on one side. That is the considered view of my delegation.

I do not know that we should be interested in protecting the United Nations. The important elements in this question are not the United Nations but the Korean people and the two States in Korea. Those are the people we have to be solicitous for, not the United Nations. It is for the Security Council, pursuant to the clear, unambiguous, unequivocal provisions of the Charter, to deal with the question of peace and security. Only the Security Council can send out troops to pacify a situation where there is an infraction of international peace and security. Therefore, only the Security Council can withdraw those troops. That is the law of the Charter. If, therefore, we want to invite the Security Council to address itself to this review, then let us do so, but do not let us, in the language we use, request the Security Council to "dissolve" the Command and then say that this is a neutral position.

I agree with the Ambassador of Cuba only to disagree with him in that the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1 is very clear. We can vote on the draft resolution as it is. So can we vote on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.677, as it is. Both draft resolutions are very clear. What is not clear is the suggested text which puts itself forward as interposing itself in neutrality between the two contending positions. In fact, it does no such thing.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I should now like to point out to the Committee that the text proposed by the representative of Tunisia, as was quite clearly stated by the Permanent Representative, Ambassador Driss, is not a formal draft resolution but is simply a document, the purpose of which is to try to bring criteria together in order to arrive at one single document rather than the two we now have. Consequently, I do not think it is in order to continue a debate on a draft that is not formal and the exchange of views that has been held, even though positive, I suggest had be better carried out in the corridors so that through the efforts of all delegations we could arrive at a common text, as has been suggested.

Mr. DRISS (Tunisia) (interpretation from French): I only want to give my support to the interpretation you, Mr. Chairman, have just given. I have already explained that the proposal we made is a totally informal proposal to serve only as a starting point in order to arrive at a consensus. We believed in our proposal and we continue to believe in it and I deeply regret the remarks made by the representative of Barbados. I believe he is crediting my delegation with intentions which it does not have. I am truly sorry. What is more, the Tunisian delegation can, quite simply, withdraw its proposal. It is not the Tunisian delegation that will lose by that. Our intention is quite clear. We explained it thoroughly and we are simply at the service of the United Nations.

Mr. ALARCON (Cuba) (interpretation from Spanish): I want to comment on what has been said by our colleague and friend the Ambassador from Barbados. I did not say that the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1 was clear. I would rather say the contrary. The draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.677 on the other hand does seem a clear draft; but on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.676 I precisely said that it could not seriously be put to a vote if its sponsors did not give us an explanation of what they understand by the United Nations Command and what link it has with the United States. Also, we would like to have explained to us how, more than 20 years after, in this same Conference Room 4 of this same building of the General Assembly, we approved resolutions concerning troops in South Korea without

(Mr. Alarcon, Cuba)

ever having thought of the Security Council, we now find delegations which feel that we cannot speak of troops here.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): With the statement we have just heard, we have concluded the general debate on agenda item 10⁴, "The question of Korea". I would like to announce now that the delegation of Dahomey has joined the sponsors of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.677.

The meeting rose at 6.30 p.m.