

# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/956  
Appendix II/Volume I  
4 September 1989

Original: ENGLISH

---

## REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

### APPENDIX II

#### VOLUME I

- Index by country and subject of the Verbatim Records
- Verbatim Records of the 1989 session

INDEX OF THE VERBATIM RECORDS OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN 1989

List of Subject Headings

- 0. Organizational matters
  - 1. Organization of Work and Procedures
  - 2. Participation of Non-Member States
  - 3. Membership of CD
- I. Nuclear Test Ban
- II. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament
- III. Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters
- IV. Chemical Weapons
- V. Prevention of an arms race in outer space
- VI. Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons
- VII. New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons
- VIII. Comprehensive programme of disarmament
- IX. Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures
  - 1. Special Sessions of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament
  - 2. Verification
  - 3. Nuclear-weapon-free-zones
  - 4. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons
  - 5. Bacteriological (biological) Weapons
  - 6. Conventional Arms and Armed Forces (Disarmament)
  - 7. Regional Disarmament
  - 8. Zones of Peace
  - 9. Reduction of military budgets
  - 10. Confidence-building measures
  - 11. Disarmament and international security
  - 12. General and complete disarmament
  - 13. Naval arms race
  - 14. Scientific and technological developments
  - 15. Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof
  - 16. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques
  - 17. Unilateral Disarmament Measures
  - 18. International Arms Trade
  - 19. Radioactive waste
  - 20. The Role of the United Nations in the field of Disarmament
  - 21. Role of Non-Governmental Organizations
  - 22. Disarmament and Development

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
0. <u>Organizational Matters</u>			
1. <u>Organization of Work and Procedures</u>			
484	Italy (the President) The Secretary-General of the Conference	Algeria	525
		Australia	497
487	Germany, Federal Republic of	Bulgaria	512
488	Myanmar		529
490	Italy (the President)	China	525
494	Japan (the President)		530
497	Australia	German Democratic Republic (on behalf of the Group) of Socialist Countries)	500
500	Kenya (the President) Germany, Federal Republic of German Democratic Republic (on behalf of the Group of) Socialist Countries)	Germany, Federal Republic of	487
			500
		Islamic Republic of Iran	518
501	Kenya (the President)		531
		Italy (the President)	484
506	Kenya (the President)		490
		Japan (the President)	494
508	Mexico (the President)	Kenya (the President)	500
512	Bulgaria		501
			506
513	Mexico (the President)	Mexico (the President)	508
514	Mongolia (the President)		513
517	Nigeria	Mongolia (the President)	514
			521
518	Islamic Republic of Iran	Morocco (the President)	528
520	Poland		531
521	Mongolia (the President)	Myanmar	488
523	Pakistan (on behalf of Group of 21)	Netherlands	525
			531
525	Netherlands Algeria China	Nigeria	517

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	0. <u>Organizational Matters</u>		
	1. <u>Organization of Work and Procedures</u>		
528	Morocco (the President)	Pakistan (on behalf of Group of 21)	523
529	Bulgaria	Poland	520
530	China	USSR (on behalf of the Group of Socialist Countries)	531
531	Netherlands Morocco (the President) USSR (on behalf of the Group of Socialist Countries Islamic Republic of Iran	<u>The Secretary General of the Conference</u>	484



Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
0. <u>Organizational Matters</u>			
2. <u>Participation of Non-Member States</u>			
484	Italy (the President)	Italy (the President)	484
487	Romania		487
	Italy (the President)		488
			490
488	Italy (the President)	Kenya (the President)	504
489	Yugoslavia		505
		Mexico (the President)	508
490	USSR		511
	Italy (the President)		513
500	United States	Mongolia (the President)	518
504	Kenya (the President)	Romania	487
505	Kenya (the President)	USSR	490
508	Mexico (the President)	United States	500
511	Mexico (the President)	Yugoslavia	489
513	Mexico (the President)		
518	Mongolia (the President)		

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	0. <u>Organizational Matters</u>		
	3. <u>Membership of the CD</u>		
503	Norway (non-member State)	Kenya (the President)	506
506	Kenya (the President)	<u>Non-member State</u>	
		Norway	503

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
I. <u>Nuclear Test Ban</u>			
484	Italy (the President) The Secretary-General of the Conference on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations Mexico Sweden	Algeria Argentina Australia Belgium Brazil Bulgaria Canada China Czechoslovakia Egypt Ethiopia France German Democratic Republic Hungary	525 485 497 508 506 508 489 499 512 529 492 510 525 488 507 527 503 527 487 518 485 497 504 500 503 507 526 498 489 500 515
485	Argentina Morocco German Democratic Republic		
486	India USSR		
487	Romania Ethiopia		
488	Czechoslovakia Myanmar		
489	Hungary Yugoslavia Bulgaria Nigeria		
490	Japan		
491	Italy		
492	Canada Peru		
493	Mongolia		
494	Japan (the President) Indonesia		
495	Finland (non-member State) Sri Lanka Romania		
496	Sweden		

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
I. <u>Nuclear Test Ban</u>			
497	Australia	India	486
	Sweden (Chairman, <u>Ad Hoc</u> Group of Scientific Experts)		529
	German Democratic Republic	Indonesia	494
			506
			513
498	Netherlands	Italy	491
	Germany, Federal Republic of		519
499	Kenya	Italy (the President)	484
	Bulgaria		
	Japan (the President)	Japan	490
500	Kenya (the President)		530
	Austria (non-member State)	Japan (the President)	494
	United States		499
	Hungary	Japan (on behalf of Group of Western Countries)	503
	German Democratic Republic (on behalf of the Group of Socialist Countries)		
501	Peru	Kenya	499
503	Norway (non-member State)	Kenya (the President)	500
	Poland		503
	Egypt		506
	Japan (on behalf of Group of Western Countries)	Mexico	484
	German Democratic Republic (on behalf of the Group of Socialist Countries)	Mexico (the President)	508
	Kenya (the President)	Mongolia	493
504	German Democratic Republic	Mongolia (the President)	514
	Iraq (non-member State)		521
506	Peru	Morocco	485
	Belgium	Morocco (the President)	522
	Pakistan		
	Indonesia	Morocco (the President)	522
	Kenya (the President)		527
			531

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
I. <u>Nuclear Test Ban</u>			
507	Czechoslovakia German Democratic Republic (on behalf of the Group of Socialist Countries) USSR	Myanmar	488
		Netherlands	498
			525
		Nigeria	489
508	Mexico (the President) Sweden Brazil Australia		517
		Pakistan	506
		Peru	492
509	United Kingdom		501
			506
510	Yugoslavia Canada	Poland	503
511	USSR Sri Lanka	Romania	487
			495
			519
512	Bulgaria		520
513	Indonesia Sweden United States United Kingdom	Sri Lanka	495
			511
		Sweden	484
			496
514	Mongolia (the President)		508
			513
515	Hungary	Sweden (Chairman, <u>Ad Hoc</u> Group of Scientific Experts)	497
517	Nigeria		526
518	France	USSR	486
519	Italy Romania		507
			511
520	Romania	USSR (on behalf of the Group of Socialist Countries)	531
521	Norway (non-member State) Mongolia (the President)	United Kingdom	509
			513
522	Morocco (the President) Morocco (the President)	United States	500
			513

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
I. <u>Nuclear Test Ban</u>			
525	Netherlands Algeria China	Yugoslavia	489 510
526	Sweden (Chairman, <u>Ad Hoc</u> Group of Scientific Experts) German Democratic Republic (on behalf of the Group of Socialist Countries)	<u>Non-member States</u>  Austria  Finland  Iraq  Norway	  500  495  504  503 521
527	Czechoslovakia Egypt Morocco (the President)	<u>The Secretary-General of the Conference on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations</u>	484
529	India Bulgaria		
530	Japan		
531	USSR (on behalf of the Group of Socialist Countries) Morocco (the President)		

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
II. <u>Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament</u>			
484	Italy (the President) The Secretary-General of the Conference on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations Mexico Sweden	Algeria Argentina Australia	525 485 510 497 508
485	Argentina Morocco German Democratic Republic	Belgium Belgium (on behalf of Group of Western Countries)	506 519 523
486	India USSR	Brazil	508
487	Romania Ethiopia Islamic Republic of Iran	Bulgaria	489 499 512 529
488	Holy See (non-member State) Czechoslovakia Myanmar China	Canada	510
489	Hungary Yugoslavia Bulgaria Nigeria	China	488 523 525 530
490	Japan	Czechoslovakia	488 527
491	Japan (the President) Germany, Federal Republic of Italy	Egypt Ethiopia	503 487
492	Peru	France	518
493	Mongolia	German Democratic Republic	485 497
494	Japan (the President)		504 510
495	Finland (non-member State) Sri Lanka Romania	German Democratic Republic (on behalf of the Group of Socialist Countries)	507 523

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
<p>II. <u>Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament</u></p>			
497	Australia	Germany, Federal	491
	German Democratic Republic	Republic of	500
498	Viet Nam (non-member State)	Hungary	489
			500
499	Kenya	India	529
	Bulgaria		
500	Kenya (the President)	India (on behalf of	523
	Austria (non-member State)	Group of 21)	
	Germany, Federal Republic of	Indonesia	513
	Hungary		
503	Norway (non-member State)	Islamic Republic of Iran	487
	Poland		514
	Egypt	Italy	491
	Romania		519
504	German Democratic Republic	Italy (the President)	484
	Iraq (non-member State)		
505	Morocco	Japan	490
			530
506	Peru	Japan (the President)	491
	Belgium		494
	Pakistan	Kenya	499
	Kenya (the President)		
507	German Democratic Republic	Kenya (the President)	500
	(on behalf of the Group of		506
	Socialist Countries)		
	USSR	Mexico	484
508	Mexico (the President)	Mexico (the President)	508
	Sweden		
	Brazil	Mongolia	493
	Australia		
509	United Kingdom	Mongolia (the President)	514
			521
510	Yugoslavia	Morocco	485
	Canada		505
	German Democratic Republic	Morocco (the President)	522
	Argentina		



Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
II. <u>Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament</u>			
511	USSR Sri Lanka	Myanmar	488
512	Netherlands (on behalf of Group of Western Countries) Bulgaria	Netherlands (on behalf of Group of Western Countries)	512
513	Indonesia Sweden	Nigeria	489 517
514	Mongolia (the President) Islamic Republic of Iran	Pakistan	506
517	Nigeria Iraq (non-member State)	Peru	492 506
518	France	Poland	503
519	Italy Belgium (on behalf of Group of Western Countries) Romania	Romania	487 503 519 520
520	Romania Poland	Sri Lanka	495 511
521	Chile (non-member State) Mongolia (the President)	Sweden	484 508
522	Morocco (the President) Morocco (the President)	USSR	486 507 511 523 525
523	Switzerland (non-member State) USSR United States China Belgium (on behalf of Group of Western Countries) India (on behalf of Group of 21) German Democratic Republic (on behalf of the Group of Socialist Countries)	USSR (on behalf of the Group of Socialist Countries)  United Kingdom  United States  Yugoslavia	531  509 523 489 510

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	II. <u>Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament</u>		
525	Algeria USSR China	<u>Non-member States</u>	
		Austria	500
527	Czechoslovakia	Chile	521
529	Democratic People's Republic of Korea (non-member State) India Bulgaria	Democratic People's Republic of Korea	529
		Finland	495
530	Japan China Republic of Korea (non-member State)	Holy See	488
		Iraq	504 517
531	USSR (on behalf of the Group of Socialist Countries)	Norway	503
		Republic of Korea	530
		Switzerland	523
		Viet Nam	498
		<u>The Secretary-General of the Conference on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations</u>	484

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	<p>III. <u>Prevention of nuclear war,</u>  <u>including all related matters</u></p>		
484	Italy (the President)	Algeria	525
486	India	Australia	508
487	Germany, Federal Republic of Islamic Republic of Iran	Belgium	506
488	Holy See (non-member State) Myanmar China	Belgium (on behalf of Group of Western Countries)	519
490	Japan	Brazil	508
494	Japan (the President)	Bulgaria	529
495	Romania	Bulgaria (on behalf of the Group of Socialist Countries)	524
500	Germany, Federal Republic of	China	488
503	Egypt		524
505	Morocco		525
506	Peru Belgium Kenya (the President)	Czechoslovakia	527
507	German Democratic Republic (on behalf of the Group of Socialist Countries)	Egypt	503
508	Mexico (the President) Sweden Brazil Australia	German Democratic Republic (on behalf of the Group of Socialist Countries)	507
511	USSR	Germany, Federal Republic of	487
514	Mongolia (the President)		500
517	Nigeria	India	486
519	Belgium (on behalf of Group of Western Countries)		529
520	Romania	India (on behalf of Group of 21)	523
			524
		Islamic Republic of Iran	487
		Italy (the President)	484
		Japan	490
			530

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
<p>III. <u>Prevention of nuclear war.</u>  <u>including all related matters</u></p>			
521	Mongolia (the President)	Japan (on behalf of Group of Western Countries)	524
522	Morocco (the President) Morocco (the President)	Japan (the President)	494
523	India (on behalf of Group of 21)	Kenya (the President)	506
524	Japan (on behalf of Group of Western Countries) China India (on behalf of Group of 21) Bulgaria (on behalf of the Group of Socialist Countries)	Mexico (the President) Mongolia (the President)	508 514 521
525	Algeria China	Morocco Morocco (the President)	505 522
527	Czechoslovakia	Morocco (the President)	522
529	Democratic People's Republic of Korea (non-member State) India Bulgaria	Myanmar Nigeria	488 517
530	Japan	Peru	506
531	USSR (on behalf of the Group of Socialist Countries)	Romania	495 520
		Sweden	508
		USSR	511
		USSR (on behalf of the Group of Socialist Countries)	531
		<u>Non-member State</u>	
		Holy See	488

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
IV. <u>Chemical Weapons</u>			
484	Italy (the President) The Secretary-General of the Conference on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations Mexico Sweden United States Kenya (on behalf of Group of 21) Belgium (on behalf of Group of Western Countries) China Bulgaria (on behalf of the Group of Socialist Countries) France	Algeria  Argentina  Australia     Belgium  Belgium (on behalf of Group of Western Countries)  Brazil   Bulgaria   Bulgaria (on behalf of the Group of Socialist Countries)  Canada  China   Czechoslovakia   Egypt  Ethiopia	525  485  492 497 501 508 527  501 506  484  486 499 508  489 512 529  484 487  492 510  484 487 488 501 525 530  488 495 507 527  503 527  487 495
485	Argentina Morocco German Democratic Republic Poland (Chairman, <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on Chemical Weapons)		
486	India Brazil USSR		
487	Germany, Federal Republic of Romania Ethiopia Italy (the President) Sweden (on behalf of Group of 21) Bulgaria (on behalf of the Group of Socialist Countries) United Kingdom (on behalf of Group of Western Countries) China Islamic Republic of Iran France		
488	Czechoslovakia Myanmar China		

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
IV. <u>Chemical Weapons</u>			
489	Hungary Yugoslavia Bulgaria Nigeria Indonesia	France	484 487 518
490	Japan Peru USSR Italy (the President)	France (Chairman, <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on Chemical Weapons)	507 530
491	Japan (the President) Germany, Federal Republic of Italy	German Democratic Republic	485 495 504 510 517
492	Canada Australia	German Democratic Republic (on behalf of the Group of Socialist Countries)	500 507
493	Mongolia	Germany, Federal Republic of	487 491
494	Japan (the President)		500 503 512
495	Finland (non-member State) German Democratic Republic Czechoslovakia Sri Lanka	Hungary	489 515
497	Australia Islamic Republic of Iran	India	486 529
498	Netherlands Viet Nam (non-member State)	Indonesia	489 506 513
499	Morocco Kenya Brazil	Islamic Republic of Iran	487 497 514
500	Kenya (the President) Austria (non-member State) Germany, Federal Republic of United States United Kingdom German Democratic Republic (on behalf of the Group of Socialist Countries)	Italy  Italy (the President)  Japan	491 519 484 487 490 490 530

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
IV. <u>Chemical Weapons</u>			
501	Belgium China Australia	Japan (the President)	494
		Kenya	499
503	Norway (non-member State) Poland Germany, Federal Republic of Egypt Romania Finland (non-member State)	Kenya (on behalf of Group of 21)	484
		Kenya (the President)	506
		Mexico	484
504	German Democratic Republic United States Iraq (non-member State)	Mexico (the President)	508
		Mongolia	493
506	Peru Belgium Sweden Pakistan Indonesia Kenya (the President)	Morocco	485 499
		Morocco (the President)	522 531
		Myanmar	488
507	Czechoslovakia France (Chairman, <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on Chemical Weapons) German Democratic Republic (on behalf of the Group of Socialist Countries) USSR	Netherlands	498 525
		Netherlands (on behalf of Group of Western Countries)	512
508	Mexico (the President) Sweden Brazil Australia	Nigeria	489 517
		Pakistan	506
509	United Kingdom	Peru	490 506 515
510	Yugoslavia Canada German Democratic Republic Argentina	Peru (on behalf of Group of 21)	527
		Poland	503 520
511	USSR Sri Lanka	Poland (Chairman, <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on Chemical Weapons)	485

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
IV. <u>Chemical Weapons</u>			
512	United States Germany, Federal Republic of Netherlands (on behalf of Group of Western Countries) Bulgaria	Romania	487 503 519 520
513	Indonesia	Sri Lanka	495 511
514	Islamic Republic of Iran	Sweden	484 506 508
515	Hungary Peru	Sweden (on behalf of Group of 21)	487
516	Finland (non-member State) USSR	USSR	486 490 507 511 516 523 525
517	German Democratic Republic Nigeria Iraq (non-member State) Finland (non-member State)		
518	France		
519	Italy Romania	USSR (on behalf of the Group of Socialist Countries)	531
520	Romania Poland	United Kingdom	500 509 531
521	Norway (non-member State) Chile (non-member State)		
522	Morocco (the President)	United Kingdom (on behalf of Group of Western Countries)	487
523	Switzerland (non-member State) USSR	United States	484 500 504 512 530
525	Austria (non-member State) Netherlands Algeria USSR China		



Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
IV. <u>Chemical Weapons</u>			
527	Czechoslovakia Egypt Peru (on behalf of Group of 21)	Yugoslavia	489 510
		<u>Non-member States</u>	
527	Australia	Austria	500 525
529	Democratic People's Republic of Korea (non-member State) India Bulgaria	Chile	521
		Democratic People's Republic of Korea	529
530	Japan France (Chairman, <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on Chemical Weapons) China Republic of Korea (non-member State) United States	Finland	495 503 516 517
		Iraq	504 517
		Norway	503 521
531	Morocco (the President) United Kingdom USSR (on behalf of the Group of Socialist Countries)	Republic of Korea	530
		Switzerland	523
		Viet Nam	498
		<u>The Secretary-General of the Conference on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations</u>	484

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
<u>V. Prevention of an arms race in outer space</u>			
484	The Secretary-General of the Conference on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations	Argentina	485
	Sweden	Australia	497
	Bulgaria (on behalf of the Group of Socialist Countries)		508
		Belgium	506
		Brazil	508
485	Argentina	Bulgaria	489
	German Democratic Republic		512
			529
486	India	Bulgaria (on behalf of the Group of Socialist Countries)	484
	USSR		
487	Romania		
	Ethiopia	Canada	492
			510
488	Czechoslovakia	Canada (on behalf of Group of Western Countries)	493
	Myanmar		
	China		
489	Hungary	China	488
	Yugoslavia		493
	Bulgaria		525
			530
490	Italy (the President)		
		Czechoslovakia	488
491	Italy		507
			527
492	Canada		
		Egypt (on behalf of Group of 21)	493
493	Mongolia		
	Egypt (on behalf of Group of 21)	Ethiopia	487
	Japan (the President)		
	Hungary (on behalf of the Group of Socialist Countries)	France	518
	Canada (on behalf of Group of Western Countries)		
	China	German Democratic Republic	485
	United States		504
			510
			514
			519
494	Japan (the President)		

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
V. <u>Prevention of an arms race in outer space</u>			
495	Sri Lanka	German Democratic Republic (on behalf of the Group of Socialist Countries)	500 507
497	Australia Mongolia		
498	Netherlands	Germany, Federal Republic of	502 516
499	Kenya Japan (the President)	Hungary	489
500	Austria (non-member State) German Democratic Republic (on behalf of the Group of Socialist Countries)	Hungary (on behalf of the Group of Socialist Countries)	493
502	Germany, Federal Republic of	India	486 529
503	Norway (non-member State) Poland	Indonesia	506
504	German Democratic Republic	Italy	491 519
506	Belgium Indonesia Kenya (the President)	Italy (the President)	490
507	Czechoslovakia German Democratic Republic (on behalf of the Group of Socialist Countries)	Japan	530
508	Brazil Morocco Australia	Japan (the President)	493 494 499
510	Yugoslavia Canada German Democratic Republic	Kenya	499
511	USSR Sri Lanka	Kenya (the President)	506
512	Bulgaria	Mongolia	493 497
514	German Democratic Republic	Mongolia (Chairman, <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space)	530
		Morocco	508
		Morocco (the President)	522 531

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
V. <u>Prevention of an arms race in outer space</u>			
516	Germany, Federal Republic of Sweden	Netherlands	498
518	France	Poland	503 520
519	Italy German Democratic Republic Romania	Romania	487 519 520
520	Romania Poland	Sri Lanka	495 511
521	Chile (non-member State)	Sweden	484 516
522	Morocco (the President)	USSR	486 511 523
523	USSR United States		
525	Austria (non-member State) China	USSR (on behalf of the Group of Socialist Countries)	531
527	Czechoslovakia	United States	493 523
529	India Bulgaria	Yugoslavia	489 510
530	Japan China Mongolia (Chairman, <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space)	<u>Non-member States</u> Austria	500 525
531	Morocco (the President) USSR (on behalf of the Group of Socialist Countries)	Chile Norway	521 503
		<u>The Secretary-General of the Conference on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations</u>	484

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
<p>VI. <u>Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons</u></p>			
484	Italy (the President)	Brazil	508
485	Italy (the President)	Bulgaria	489 529
487	Germany, Federal Republic of	China	525
488	Myanmar	Czechoslovakia	527
489	Hungary Bulgaria Nigeria	Egypt	503 527
490	Italy (the President)	France	518
495	Romania	German Democratic Republic	510
503	Egypt	German Democratic Republic (on behalf of the Group of Socialist Countries)	507
506	Pakistan Kenya (the President)	Germany, Federal Republic of	487
507	German Democratic Republic (on behalf of the Group of Socialist Countries)	Hungary	489
508	Brazil	India	529
510	German Democratic Republic	Islamic Republic of Iran	514
513	Sweden	Islamic Republic of Iran (Chairman, <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on Negative Security Assurances)	524
514	Islamic Republic of Iran	Italy (the President)	484 485 490
517	Nigeria Iraq (non-member State)	Kenya (the President)	506
518	France	Morocco (the President)	522 525
522	Morocco (the President)	Myanmar	488
524	Islamic Republic of Iran Chairman, <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on Negative Security Assurances)		

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	<b>VI. <u>Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons</u></b>		
525	China	Nigeria	489
	Morocco (the President)		517
527	Czechoslovakia	Pakistan	506
	Egypt	Romania	495
529	India	Sweden	513
	Bulgaria		
531	USSR (on behalf of the Group of Socialist Countries)	USSR (on behalf of the Group of Socialist Countries)	531
		<u>Non-member State</u>	
		Iraq	517

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	VII. <u>New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons: radiological weapons</u>		
484	Italy (the President)	Canada	510
485	Italy (the President)	Czechoslovakia	527
487	Romania	Egypt	503
489	Hungary Nigeria	France	518
501	Peru	Hungary	489 515
503	Egypt	Indonesia	506
506	Peru Indonesia Kenya (the President)	Italy (the President)	484 485
510	Canada	Kenya (the President)	506
513	Sweden	Mongolia (the President)	514 521
514	Mongolia (the President)	Morocco (the President)	522 527
515	Hungary Peru	Netherlands	525
517	Iraq (non-member State)	Nigeria	489
518	France	Peru	506 515
521	Mongolia (the President)	Peru (Chairman, <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on Radiological Weapons)	526
522	Morocco (the President)		
525	Netherlands	Romania	487
526	Peru (Chairman, <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on Radiological Weapons)	Sweden	513
		USSR (on behalf of the Group of Socialist Countries)	531

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	VII. <u>New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons</u>		
527	Czechoslovakia Morocco (the President)	<u>Non-member State</u>	517
531	USSR (on behalf of the Group of Socialist Countries)	Iraq	



Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
VIII. <u>Comprehensive programme of disarmament</u>			
484	Mexico Italy (the President)	Czechoslovakia	527
487	Germany, Federal Republic of Romania	Egypt	503
486	Myanmar	France	518
489	Hungary	German Democratic Republic (on behalf of the Group of Socialist Countries)	507
490	Italy (the President)	Germany, Federal Republic of	487
495	Japan (the President)	Hungary	489
503	Norway (non-member State) Egypt Romania	Indonesia	506
506	Indonesia Kenya (the President)	Italy (the President)	484 490
507	German Democratic Republic (on behalf of the Group of Socialist Countries)	Japan (the President)	495
508	Mexico (the President)	Kenya (the President)	506
518	France	Mexico	484
519	Romania	Mexico (the President)	508
522	Morocco (the President)	Mexico (Chairman, <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament)	530
527	Czechoslovakia	Morocco (the President)	522 531
530	Republic of Korea (non-member State) Mexico (Chairman, <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament)	Myanmar	486
531	Morocco (the President) USSR (on behalf of the Group of Socialist Countries)	Romania	503 519
		USSR (on behalf of the Group of Socialist Countries)	531

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	VIII. <u>Comprehensive programme of disarmament</u>		
		<u>Non-member States</u>	
		Norway	503
		Republic of Korea	530

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	<p>IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant matters</u></p> <p>1. <u>Special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament</u></p>		
484	Italy (the President)	Algeria	525
485	Morocco	Argentina	510
486	India	Bulgaria	489
487	Germany, Federal Republic of	Canada	492 510
489	Yugoslavia Bulgaria Nigeria	Egypt	503
		France	518
490	Japan	German Democratic Republic	504
492	Canada	German Democratic Republic (on behalf of the Group of Socialist Countries)	523
500	Germany, Federal Republic of		
503	Egypt Romania	Germany, Federal Republic of	487 500
504	German Democratic Republic	India	486
505	Morocco	India (on behalf of Group of 21)	523 524
506	Indonesia		
		Indonesia	506 513
508	Sweden Morocco		
		Italy (the President)	484
510	Canada Argentina	Japan	490
513	Indonesia	Morocco	485 505 508
517	Nigeria		
518	France		

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	<p>IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant matters</u></p> <p>1. <u>Special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament</u></p>		
523	India (on behalf of Group of 21)	Nigeria	489
	German Democratic Republic (on behalf of the Group of Socialist countries)		517
		Romania	503
		Sweden	508
524	India (on behalf of Group of 21)	Yugoslavia	489
525	Algeria		

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant matters</u>			
2. <u>Verification</u>			
484	Sweden	Argentina	485
485	Argentina	Australia	497
488	Holy See (non-member State)	Canada	492
491	Germany, Federal Republic of		510
492	Canada	Germany, Federal Republic of	491
494	Japan (the President)	Japan (the President)	500
497	Australia		494
500	Austria (non-member State)	Morocco	522
	Germany, Federal Republic of	Netherlands	531
508	Sweden	Poland	520
509	United Kingdom	Sweden	484
510	Canada		508
520	Poland	United Kingdom	509
522	Morocco (the President on behalf of His Majesty King Hassan II)	<u>Non-member States</u>	
		Austria	500
523	Switzerland (non-member State)	Holy See	488
		Switzerland	523
531	Netherlands		

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant matters</u>			
3. <u>Nuclear-weapon-free zones</u>			
484	Mexico	Egypt	503
485	German Democratic Republic	Ethiopia	487
487	Ethiopia	German Democratic Republic	485
489	Nigeria		504
498	Viet Nam (non-member State)		510
499	Kenya	Islamic Republic of Iran	514
503	Egypt	Kenya	499
	Romania	Mexico	484
504	German Democratic Republic	Nigeria	489
506	Pakistan	Pakistan	506
510	German Democratic Republic	Romania	503
513	Sweden	Sweden	513
514	Islamic Republic of Iran	<u>Non-member States</u>	
529	Democratic People's Republic of Korea (non-member State)	Democratic People's Republic of Korea	529
530	Republic of Korea (non-member State)	Republic of Korea	530
		Viet Nam	498

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant matters</u>			
4. <u>Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons</u>			
484	Mexico Sweden	Australia	497 508
489	Hungary Nigeria	Bulgaria	499 529
490	Japan	Canada	492
491	Germany, Federal Republic of Italy	Czechoslovakia	507
492	Canada	Egypt	503 527
494	Japan (the President) Indonesia	German Democratic Republic	497 510
495	Finland (non-member State) Sri Lanka Romania	German Democratic Republic (on behalf of the Group of Socialist Countries)	526
496	Romania	Germany, Federal Republic of	491
497	Australia German Democratic Republic	Hungary	489 500 515
498	Netherlands		
499	Bulgaria	India	529
500	Hungary	Indonesia	494 513
503	Norway (non-member State) Egypt	Islamic Republic of Iran	514
504	Iraq (non-member State)	Italy	491
505	Morocco		
506	Peru Pakistan		

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant matters</u>			
4. <u>Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons</u>			
507	Czechoslovakia	Japan	490
508	Mexico (the President)		530
	Sweden	Japan (the President)	494
	Australia	Mexico	484
509	United Kingdom	Mexico (the President)	508
510	Yugoslavia	Morocco	505
	German Democratic Republic	Netherlands	498
513	Indonesia		525
	Sweden	Nigeria	489
514	Islamic Republic of Iran		517
515	Hungary	Pakistan	506
517	Nigeria	Peru	506
525	Netherlands	Romania	495
526	German Democratic Republic (on behalf of the Group of Socialist Countries)		496
		Sri Lanka	495
527	Egypt	Sweden	484
			508
529	India		513
	Bulgaria	United Kingdom	509
530	Japan	Yugoslavia	510
	Republic of Korea (non-member State)	<u>Non-member States</u>	
		Finland	495
		Iraq	504
		Norway	503
		Republic of Korea	530



Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant matters</u>		
	5. <u>Bacteriological (Biological) weapons</u>		
491	Germany, Federal Republic of	China	525
494	Japan (the President)	Egypt	503
500	Austria (non-member State)	Germany, Federal Republic of	491
503	Poland Egypt	Japan (the President)	494
525	Austria (non-member State) China	Poland	503
		<u>Non-member States</u>	
		Austria	500 525

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant matters</u>			
6. <u>Conventional Arms and Armed Forces (Disarmament)</u>			
484	Italy (the President) Mexico Sweden	Argentina	485
485	Argentina German Democratic Republic	Australia	497 508
486	India	Belgium (on behalf of Group of Western Countries)	519
488	Myanmar China	Bulgaria	489 512
489	Hungary Yugoslavia Bulgaria Nigeria	Canada	510
490	Japan	China	488 525
491	Germany, Federal Republic of	Czechoslovakia	527
493	Mongolia	France	518
494	Japan (the President)	German Democratic Republic	485 504 510
495	Sri Lanka	Germany, Federal Republic of	491
497	Australia	Hungary	489 515
499	Kenya	India	486
500	Kenya (the President) Austria (non-member State)	Islamic Republic of Iran	514
503	Norway (non-member State) Poland	Italy	519
504	German Democratic Republic	Italy (the President)	484
		Japan	490

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
<p>IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant matters</u></p> <p>6. <u>Conventional Arms and Armed Forces (Disarmament)</u></p>			
506	Peru Pakistan	Japan (the President)	494
508	Sweden Australia	Kenya	499
509	United Kingdom	Kenya (the President)	500
510	Yugoslavia Canada German Democratic Republic	Mexico	484
511	USSR Sri Lanka	Mongolia	493
512	Bulgaria	Morocco (the President)	522
514	Islamic Republic of Iran	Myanmar	488
515	Hungary	Nigeria	489
518	France	Pakistan	506
519	Italy Belgium (on behalf of Group of Western Countries) Romania	Peru	506
520	Romania	Poland	503
521	Chile (non-member State)	Romania	519 520
522	Morocco (the President)	Sri Lanka	495
523	Switzerland (non-member State) USSR United States	Sweden	484 508
		USSR	511 523 525
		United Kingdom	509
		United States	523
		Yugoslavia	489 510

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	<p>IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant matters</u></p> <p>6. <u>Conventional Arms and Armed Forces (Disarmament)</u></p>		
525	Austria (non-member State)	<u>Non-member States</u>	
	USSR		
	China	Austria	500
			525
527	Czechoslovakia	Chile	521
		Norway	503
		Switzerland	523

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	<p>IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant matters</u></p> <p>7. <u>Regional disarmament</u></p>		
484	Sweden	Algeria	525
489	Nigeria	Belgium	506
490	Japan	Japan	490
506	Belgium Pakistan	Nigeria	489
525	Algeria	Pakistan	506
		Sweden	484
529	Democratic People's Republic of Korea (non-member State)	<u>Non-member States</u>	
		Democratic People's Republic of Korea	529

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
<p>IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant matters</u></p> <p>8. <u>Zones of peace</u></p>			
487	Romania	Pakistan	506
503	Romania	Romania	487 503
506	Pakistan	<u>Non-member State</u>	
529	Democratic People's Republic of Korea (non-member State)	Democratic People's Republic of Korea	529

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant matters</u>			
9. <u>Reduction of military budgets</u>			
484	Mexico	Bulgaria	489
487	Romania	Mexico	484
489	Bulgaria	Peru	506
506	Peru	Romania	487
511	USSR	USSR	511

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant matters</u>			
10. <u>Confidence-building measures</u>			
484	Italy (the President) Sweden	Argentina	485
485	Argentina German Democratic Republic	Australia	497 508
487	Islamic Republic of Iran	Belgium	506
488	Holy See (non-member State)	Belgium (on behalf of Group of Western Countries)	519
489	Nigeria	Bulgaria	512
490	Japan	Canada	510
491	Germany, Federal Republic of Italy	Czechoslovakia	527
495	Sri Lanka	German Democratic Republic	485 504 510
497	Australia	Germany, Federal Republic of	491
499	Kenya	Hungary	514
500	Kenya (the President) Austria (non-member State)	Islamic Republic of Iran	487
503	Norway (non-member State) Poland	Italy	491
504	German Democratic Republic	Italy (the President)	484
506	Belgium	Japan	490
508	Sweden Australia	Kenya	499
510	Canada German Democratic Republic	Kenya (the President)	500
511	USSR	Nigeria	489
527	Czechoslovakia	Poland	503 520
		Romania	520



Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	<p>IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant matters</u></p> <p>10. <u>Confidence-building measures</u></p>		
512	Bulgaria	Sri Lanka	495
514	Hungary	Sweden	484 508
519	Belgium (on behalf of Group of Western Countries)	USSR	511
520	Romania Poland	<u>Non-member States</u>	
		Austria	500 525
521	Chile (non-member State)		
525	Austria (non-member State)	Chile	521
		Holy See	488
		Norway	503

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant matters</u>			
11. <u>Disarmament and international security</u>			
484	Italy (the President) Mexico	Argentina	485
485	Argentina	Australia	497
487	Ethiopia	Bulgaria	512
490	Japan	Ethiopia	487
497	Australia	German Democratic Republic	504
500	Kenya (the President) Austria (non-member State)	India (on behalf of Group of 21)	523
503	Norway (non-member State) Poland Romania	Italy (the President)	484
504	German Democratic Republic	Japan	490
506	Pakistan	Kenya (the President)	500
512	Bulgaria	Mexico	484
523	USSR India (on behalf of Group of 21)	Pakistan	506
		Poland	503
		Romania	503
		USSR	523
		<u>Non-member States</u>	
		Austria	500
		Norway	503

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
<p>IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant matters</u></p> <p>12. <u>General and complete disarmament</u></p>			
484	Mexico	Argentina	510
485	Morocco	India	529
488	Holy See (non-member State)	Indonesia	513
489	Nigeria	Mexico	484
503	Romania	Morocco	485
510	Argentina	Morocco (the President)	522
513	Indonesia	Morocco (the President)	531
519	Romania	Nigeria	489
522	Morocco (the President)	Romania	503 519
529	India	<u>Non-member States</u>	
530	Republic of Korea (non-member State)	Holy See	488
531	Morocco (the President)	Republic of Korea	530

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant matters</u>		
	13. <u>Naval arms race</u>		
484	Sweden	Romania	520
508	Sweden	Sweden	484
520	Romania		508

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	<p>IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant matters</u></p> <p>14. <u>Scientific and Technological Developments</u></p>		
487	Romania	China	488
488	China	German Democratic Republic	504
489	Yugoslavia	Romania	487
504	German Democratic Republic	United Kingdom	509
509	United Kingdom	Yugoslavia	489

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	<p>IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant matters</u></p> <p>15. <u>Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof</u></p>		
484	Mexico	Argentina	485
485	Argentina	Japan (the President)	494
494	Japan (the President)	Mexico	484
508	Mexico (the President)	Mexico (the President)	508
513	Mexico (the President)		513
514	Mongolia (the President)	Mongolia (the President)	514
			521
521	Chile (non-member State) Mongolia (the President)	<u>Non-member States</u>	
		Chile	521
530	Republic of Korea (non-member State)	Republic of Korea	530

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant matters</u>		
	16. <u>Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques</u>		
484	Mexico	Mexico	484

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
<p>IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant matters</u></p> <p>17. <u>Unilateral Disarmament Measures</u></p>			
484	Sweden	Australia	508
485	German Democratic Republic	Bulgaria	489
486	USSR	China	488
487	Romania Islamic Republic of Iran	Czechoslovakia	527
488	Myanmar China	German Democratic Republic	485 504 510
489	Hungary Bulgaria	German Democratic Republic (on behalf of the Group of Socialist Countries)	507
490	Japan	Germany, Federal Republic of	491
491	Germany, Federal Republic of Italy	Hungary	489
495	Sri Lanka	Islamic Republic of Iran	487
503	Poland	Italy	491
504	German Democratic Republic	Japan	490
507	German Democratic Republic (on behalf of the Group of Socialist Countries)	Myanmar	488
508	Sweden Australia	Poland	503
510	German Democratic Republic	Romania	487
		Sri Lanka	495 511
		Sweden	484 508



Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
<p>IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant matters</u></p> <p>17. <u>Unilateral Disarmament Measures</u></p>			
511	USSR Sri Lanka	USSR	486 511
527	Czechoslovakia	<u>Non-member State</u>	
529	Democratic People's Republic of Korea (non-member State)	Democratic People's Republic of Korea	529

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	<p>IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant matters</u></p> <p>18. <u>International Arms Trade</u></p>		
484	Sweden	Sweden	484
500	Austria (non-member State)	<u>Non-member State</u>	
		Austria	500

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	<p>IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant matters</u></p> <p>19. <u>Radioactive Waste</u></p>		
487	Ethiopia	Egypt	503
489	Nigeria	Ethiopia	487
503	Egypt	Islamic Republic of Iran	514
514	Islamic Republic of Iran	Nigeria	489

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	<p>IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant matters</u></p> <p>20. <u>The Role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament</u></p>		
489	Yugoslavia	Kenya (the President)	500
500	Kenya (the President)	Yugoslavia	489
521	Chile (non-member State)	<u>Non-member State</u>	
		Chile	521

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	<p>IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant matters</u></p> <p>21. <u>Role of Non-Governmental Organizations</u></p>		
484	Italy (the President)	Australia	492
492	Japan (the President)	Canada	492
	The Secretary-General of the Conference	Islamic Republic of Iran	531
	Canada	Italy (the President)	484
	Peru	Japan (the President)	492
	Australia	Netherlands	492
	Netherlands	Peru	492
531	Islamic Republic of Iran	<u>The Secretary-General of the Conference</u>	492

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
527	<p>IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant matters</u></p> <p>22. <u>Disarmament and development</u></p>		527
	Czechoslovakia	Czechoslovakia	

# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.484  
7 February 1989

ENGLISH

---

## FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-FOURTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 7 February 1989, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Aldo Pugliese (Italy)

The PRESIDENT: Distinguished representatives, ladies and gentlemen, I declare open the 1989 session of the Conference on Disarmament and its 484th Plenary Meeting.

It is an honour and a privilege for the delegation of Italy, and for me personally, to assume the presidency of this Conference during the month of February, and I pledge my best efforts to get our work under way promptly.

I am sure that all members of the Conference learned with sadness the news of the passing away, in New York, last October, of Miss Aida Levin. Aida Levin was a sharp-witted, intelligent and skilful worker. She had worked closely with all members of the Conference on Disarmament, in particular as Secretary of the Ad hoc Committees on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament and the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. We will never forget her exceptional sense of humour, which often smoothed the way over some very rough situations. Miss Levin was also a good friend to all members of the Conference on Disarmament. She had uncommon personal and professional qualities, a deep sensibility and a warm and sincere approach. In our view, she represented the best of personnel working for the secretariat, and I can say with the utmost sincerity that she will be missed. I invite you to join me in a minute of silence as a tribute to the memory of Miss Aida Levin.

\* \* \*

We shall now continue with our proceedings. I should like to extend our appreciation and our thanks to Ambassador Ali Shams Ardakani of the Islamic Republic of Iran for the effective and professional manner in which he presided over the Conference during the month of September and the inter-sessional period. His diplomatic experience, tact and dedication to the work of the Conference were brought to bear in resolving a number of delicate questions facing the Conference at that time.

As President of the Conference I would like, on behalf of you all, to extend a warm welcome to the new representatives who are joining us for the 1989 session: Ambassadors Marcel Houllez of Belgium, Peter Dietze of the German Democratic Republic, Carl-Magnus Hyltenius of Sweden, Ahmad Kamal of Pakistan and David Reese of Australia. We are looking forward to co-operating with them, and I am sure that the Conference can count on their valuable support in discharging its important responsibilities.

I would like also to bid farewell to our colleagues who have left the Conference during the inter-sessional period to follow other pursuits: Ambassadors Constant Clerckx of Belgium, Rolf Ekéus of Sweden, Milos Vejvoda of Czechoslovakia and Kemal Hacene of Algeria. We all extend to them our best wishes for their future activities.

It is in the tradition for a new president to make an introductory statement at the beginning of his term of office. Allow me, therefore, to say a few words on this occasion.

Our Conference is resuming its activity at a time when favourable developments in the international situation seem to justify new hopes and expectations by Governments and public opinion of decisive progress towards



(The President)

strengthening peace and stability at a drastically reduced level of armaments. After the Moscow summit in spring 1988, the Soviet-American meeting of 7 December confirmed the positive trend in the relations between the United States and the USSR, marking a further stabilization in the bilateral dialogue and another significant advance towards the solution of important arms control problems.

At the multilateral level, two very significant events have taken place. One is represented by the positive conclusion of the Vienna CSCE review conference, which among other things laid down conditions for the launching of promising new negotiations on conventional armed forces and on security-building and confidence-building measures in Europe. A second, very important event was the successful conclusion of the Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

We are thus living through a very special phase of international relations, whose opportunities should not be missed. Perhaps never before has disarmament raised so many hopes, convincing even the most sceptical and justifying the tenacious and patient years-long negotiating efforts of the past.

Following the progressive implementation of the INF Treaty and the growing convergences lately reached in Moscow, the intensified talks between the United States and the Soviet Union will hopefully soon give rise to further significant understandings. I refer in particular to the wide expectations of a decisive move towards an agreement on the drastic reduction of strategic nuclear arsenals, the most offensive and threatening category of armaments, in a framework of increased strategic stability.

We may not be entirely satisfied with the results reached so far in multilateral forums or in the multilateral negotiations on disarmament issues but we also have good reasons for an encouraging assessment of future prospects. First of all, we should take stock of the progress achieved in past months on certain important issues, in particular in the field of negotiations on a chemical weapons ban.

Furthermore, even if many voices of disappointment were raised at the outcome of the recent SSOD-III, and at the failure to adopt a final document, the third special session was an important opportunity for common reflection, and contributed to a more precise identification of existing difficulties and of potential technical and political options for solving them.

Thirdly, we should take note that the 1988 session of the CD, among other things, showed some encouraging signs of development, although not of a conclusive nature, in dealing with the delicate item of an NTB.

Fourthly, more than ever before we have recently seen some significant and encouraging aspects in the work of the First Committee of the General Assembly at its forty-third session in New York. Perhaps it did not yield any outstanding historical result, but it bore witness to a constructive atmosphere and to a common desire to enlarge the area of consensus on many important items.

(The President)

Finally, as I have already pointed out, the recent Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons was a most successful and significant event, particularly in the way it underlined the commitment to conclude, at the earliest date, the negotiations on a global, comprehensive and effectively verifiable ban on chemical weapons.

All of us recognize that the major Powers have special responsibilities for the prevention of war, for preventing international tensions and for the reduction of nuclear and conventional arsenals, yet every country has its own share of responsibility in contributing what it can to such noble goals. The preservation of world peace and security as well as the realization of genuine disarmament are the common aspiration of the peoples of all countries, besides constituting the main task of the Conference on Disarmament. I therefore believe that it falls to all of us to provide the opportunity for imparting new momentum to the process of disarmament, by pursuing its objectives with determination and preventing any risk of a stalemate in multilateral negotiations, which would mark a sharp contrast with the dynamism in bilateral negotiations.

The more favourable conditions which have emerged should be an encouragement to the Conference on Disarmament to produce more concrete results. In this respect allow me to make a particular reference to the negotiations on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons. I have already mentioned the significant progress achieved by the Ad hoc Committee during the last session - for which our appreciation goes to Ambassador Sujka for the competent guidance of our deliberations - and the importance of the results of the Paris Conference. We should now be able to speed up the negotiating process and make every possible effort to reach a final agreement at the earliest date.

If the negotiations on chemical weapons are of special relevance at the present stage, I also believe that it is most appropriate that this Conference should address the whole spectrum of issues on its agenda, ranging from nuclear weapons to outer space issues and a comprehensive programme of disarmament, with equal good will and constructive spirit. As President I will seek to explore all possible avenues towards the solution of the various problems we have to tackle, to permit a start on substantive work without delay. While not underestimating the many difficulties involved, I shall make every effort to discharge my responsibilities as President of the Conference during this month to the best of my abilities. In so doing I obviously intend to operate in the closest possible contact with each delegation, counting of course on the spirit of co-operation and flexibility of all.

I am also aware that the invaluable assistance of Ambassador Komatina, Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ambassador Berasategui, Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference, and their staff, will as usual make an important contribution to my endeavours.

That concludes my opening statement. I now give the floor to the Secretary-General of the Conference, Ambassador Miljan Komatina, who, in his capacity as Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, will read out a message addressed to us from Mr. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar.

Mr. KOMATINA (Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations):  
Mr. President, since you have kindly given me the floor, I should like first of all to express to you and the members of the Conference the sincere thanks of all the colleagues of Miss Aida Levin in the secretariat for the tribute paid to her this morning. We mourn this loss which is deeply felt by us because of her warm, human qualities. We will also miss her competence and outstanding knowledge of disarmament, as well as her devotion to work which made of her one of the most precious members of the secretariat of this Conference.

I will now read the message of the Secretary-General addressed to the Conference.

"We are witnessing the beginnings of an historic and formative change in international relations. Confrontation is giving way to dialogue in many spheres. The provisions of the first ever nuclear disarmament agreement, the INF Treaty, are being implemented under verification arrangements which did not seem achievable only a few years ago. Relations between the two militarily most powerful States have taken a more positive turn. Exchanges on a number of disarmament issues, ranging from the bilateral talks on nuclear and space issues held in Geneva to the recent agreement in Vienna to begin negotiations on conventional armed forces in Europe, furnish signs of a constructive trend not seen before.

"The improvement in the international climate has been brought about by the working of vast and diverse forces in international life. But it is given focus and expression by the United Nations. The involvement of the United Nations in the search for solutions to various regional conflicts is an essential element in the movement towards peace, justice and stability. This has led to renewed recognition of its irreplaceable role in world affairs and of the essentiality of the multilateral approach to matters bearing on international peace and security. While issues of arms limitation and disarmament can and should be addressed also at the bilateral, regional and subregional levels, there is no substitute for global measures of disarmament. A number of critical disarmament issues can find durable solutions only in a global framework. This, and the fact that no such solutions have been achieved during the past decade, continue to lend further stress to the necessity of making full use of the machinery to negotiate multilateral disarmament measures.

"In this context, 1989 has begun with an auspicious development. The recent Paris Conference on chemical weapons - and here I wish once again to express my gratitude to the Government of France for hosting that Conference - produced a Final Declaration which clearly affirmed the commitment not to use chemical weapons and unequivocally condemned their use. It addressed a number of subjects relating to the role of the United Nations with respect to the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons. In that connection, I have noted the wish of the participant States for early completion of the work undertaken to strengthen the

(Mr. Komatina, Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations)

efficiency of existing procedures for investigation of alleged violations. Let me assure you that the Secretariat will do its utmost to implement the relevant parts of the Final Declaration.

"At the opening of the Paris Conference, I appealed to the members of the Conference on Disarmament to quicken the pace of the Geneva negotiations and to conclude as promptly as possible a global convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons which can receive universal support. The Final Declaration of the Paris Conference, together with the resolutions adopted by consensus at the forty-third session of the General Assembly on the subject of chemical weapons, reflect the consensus of the international community on the need to conclude, at the earliest date, a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons, and on their destruction. Such an agreement, to be effective, must be of world-wide scope, and consequently it is the responsibility of your Conference to proceed, in the words of the Paris Final Declaration, 'to resolve expeditiously the remaining issues' requiring agreement. I very much hope that this commitment, undertaken at such a high political level, will accelerate the pace of your negotiations.

"The Conference on Disarmament remains entrusted with the consideration of a number of other important questions of a global character which also require urgent multilateral action. Among these are issues of nuclear disarmament, in particular those relating to a nuclear test ban, and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Progress in those areas can decisively bring near the achievement of acknowledged goals in the field of disarmament. As the international situation improves, so must the Conference, as the single multilateral negotiating forum for disarmament, meet the challenges before it.

"I wish you every success in your negotiations."

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for reading out the message of Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar. I should like to ask him to transmit to the Secretary-General our thanks for his message which, I am sure, has been duly noted by the members of the Conference.

The Secretary-General of the United Nations has also addressed to us a letter transmitting the resolutions and decisions on disarmament which were adopted at the forty-third session of the General Assembly. That letter and its attachments have been circulated today as document CD/879.

I should like to welcome the presence today in the gallery of the members of the Special NGO Committee for Disarmament, which is holding its spring session at the Palais des Nations. The Special NGO Committee has also addressed a communication to me, wishing the Conference every success in meeting the challenges before it and stressing the importance and urgency for the Conference on Disarmament to conclude as soon as possible a convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and providing for their destruction.

(The President)

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Mexico, Sweden, the United States of America, Kenya, Belgium and, depending on weather conditions at Geneva Airport, the Minister of State and Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, His Excellency Roland Dumas. I now give the floor to the first speaker of this annual session, the representative of Mexico, Ambassador García Robles.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): On beginning our work for the eleventh session of the Conference on Disarmament, I am certain that its members will find it natural that we place on record our deep regret at the absence of Miss Aïda Luisa Levin, who was the right hand of the secretariat in various of its subsidiary bodies, among them the one for which I am responsible, the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, which I have had the honour of chairing since 1981.

It is my pleasant duty now to extend our congratulations to our President for the month of February, the head of the Italian delegation, Ambassador Aldo Pugliese. It has fallen to him to lead our deliberations at a propitious time following the holding of a conference in Paris which doubtless will facilitate our work on one of the most important items on our agenda, the elimination of chemical weapons. I think this is an appropriate moment to welcome the Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, Mr. Roland Dumas who guided the work of that Conference in a masterful manner, and I join with you, Mr. President, in hoping that the weather will enable us to have the good fortune to hear Mr. Dumas at this meeting. Our congratulations are also addressed to the President of the Conference during a period which is always the longest in its calendar, Ambassador Ali Shams Ardakani, the Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General, Ambassador Miljan Komatina, and the Deputy-Secretary-General, Ambassador Vicente Berasategui. I should also like to associate myself with our President's statement in welcoming the representatives, of member States of the Conference who will be taking their seats in our midst for the first time: the distinguished representatives of Australia, Belgium, Sweden, the German Democratic Republic and Pakistan.

Among the many items on the agenda of our Conference I shall confine myself to considering only three, whose importance and urgency fully warrant their selection: the nuclear test ban, the elimination of chemical weapons and the adoption of a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.

On the first of these three items it is obvious that almost all Member States of the United Nations are convinced that the full cessation of nuclear weapon tests, which has been under consideration for over 30 years, is a fundamental goal of our Organization in the field of disarmament, and one which the Assembly has repeatedly urged should be given maximum priority. The preamble to the resolution adopted last year on item 52 (a) of the agenda of the First Committee stressed that on eight different occasions the Assembly has condemned such tests in the strongest terms and stated its conviction that their continuance will intensify the arms race, increasing the danger of nuclear war. It also recalls the words of the Secretary-General, who for over 10 years has been emphasizing that no single multilateral agreement could have a greater effect on limiting the further refinement of nuclear weapons, and that a comprehensive test-ban treaty is the litmus test of the real willingness to pursue nuclear disarmament. The preamble to the resolution

(Mr. García Robles, Mexico)

adopted by the Assembly also warns that the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in its Final Declaration of 1985, called upon the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to resume trilateral negotiations and upon all the nuclear-weapon States to participate in the urgent negotiation and conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty, as a matter of the highest priority, in the Conference on Disarmament. The preamble also recalls that the leaders of the six States associated with the five-continent peace and disarmament initiative affirmed in the Stockholm Declaration, adopted on 21 January 1988, that "Any agreement that leaves room for continued testing would not be acceptable".

The operative part of the same resolution, which bears the number 43/53 A and was adopted by the Assembly on 7 December last, is even more categorical. In it the Assembly reiterates once again its grave concern that nuclear weapon testing continues unabated, against the wishes of the overwhelming majority of Member States; it reaffirms its conviction that a treaty to achieve the prohibition of all nuclear test explosions by all States for all time is a matter of the highest priority, and its conviction that such a treaty would constitute a contribution of the utmost importance to the cessation of the nuclear arms race.

The Assembly goes on to urge once more all nuclear-weapon States, in particular the three depositary Powers of the Moscow Treaty, to seek to achieve the early discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to expedite negotiations to this end; appeals to all States members of the Conference on Disarmament to promote the establishment by the Conference at the beginning of its 1989 session of an ad hoc committee with the objective of carrying out the multilateral negotiation of a treaty on the complete cessation of all nuclear test explosions; recommends to the Conference that such an ad hoc committee should comprise two working groups dealing, respectively, with the following interrelated questions: contents and scope of the treaty, and compliance and verification; and concludes its resolution by deciding to include in the agenda of its forty-fourth session the item entitled "Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions".

In addition to that resolution, which, as I have already said, corresponded to subitem (a) within agenda item 52, there was a second resolution which bears the letter B. Its purpose is to express the satisfaction with which the Assembly welcomed the submission to the depositary Governments of the partial test-ban Treaty of an amendment proposal - reproduced in document CD/852 dated 5 August 1988 - which is to be considered at a conference of the parties in accordance with article II. The amendment suggested therein is very simple, because basically it involves the addition of an article, which would be article VI, stipulating that the protocols annexed to the Treaty constitute an integral part of it, and also the addition of two protocols, the main protocol being protocol I, the full text of which reads as follows:

"States Parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, in order to achieve the permanent banning of all nuclear explosions, including all such explosions underground, have agreed that in addition to their undertakings in Article I of such Treaty:

(Mr. García Robles, Mexico)

"1. Each of the Parties of this Protocol undertakes to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, at any place under its jurisdiction and control;

"(a) underground; or

"(b) in any other environment not described in Article I, paragraph I, subparagraph (a) of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water.

"2. Each of the Parties to this Protocol undertakes furthermore to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in, the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, anywhere which would take place in any of the environments described in paragraph I of this Protocol."

By way of information I might add that the amendment proposed by the six States parties, five - Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Sri Lanka and Yugoslavia - jointly, and the sixth, Venezuela, separately, is to be considered shortly as soon as the request is supported by a third or more of the parties, which seems to be quite imminent, because only nine more requests are needed which, taken together with the 30 already received, will make the convening of the review conference in question mandatory.

The certainty that proper verification of the comprehensive nuclear test ban is possible, and its importance as a priority measure to put an end to the nuclear arms race, were highlighted on 27 June 1985 by the then Prime Minister of Sweden, Olof Palme, in his opening statement at a colloquium organized by the Bellerive Group which was held in Geneva and at which the illustrious statesman, who was assassinated a few months afterwards said, inter alia:

"A treaty banning all nuclear weapon tests would be the single most important step to slow down the qualitative arms race. It would be a good complement to the bilateral negotiations by reducing the risk that cuts in the arsenals eventually agreed upon in the strategic talks would be nullified by the development of new nuclear systems. The work done by experts in my country in this field for a long time has convinced me that existing scientific and technical capabilities make it possible adequately to verify a comprehensive nuclear test ban."

The second issue, which, as I have already said, I shall briefly consider in this statement, is that of a convention for the elimination of chemical weapons or, to put it in the official terms, a convention "on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction", a task which the Conference on Disarmament has pursued with determination and in which my delegation has actively participated. On this matter emphasis should be placed on the importance of the Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and Other Interested States, which met in Paris from 7 to 11 January last under the chairmanship of Mr. Roland Dumas, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic. At the opening session of that conference the President of France, Mr. François Mitterrand, said, inter alia:

(Mr. García Robles, Mexico)

"The Geneva Protocol constitutes the only rule applying to chemical weapons, and this will continue to be so until the treaty which is currently being negotiated takes its place in international law. But if it might be dangerous to try and amend the Protocol, it is essential to reaffirm it and to declare that the commitment contained therein will not be betrayed. Because that, it seems to me, is what is expected from those meeting here: a formal declaration that States refuse to have recourse to chemical weapons and consider it imperative to eliminate them from the face of the Earth. The reaffirmation of a legal, political and moral prohibition, the expression of a clear resolve to achieve not only the prohibition of use but also of development, stockpiling and transfer: these are the two objectives of our Conference. They are interrelated. We will not achieve a complete ban unless we reaffirm today the prohibition of use. This prohibition will in turn be all the better underpinned when production, stockpiling and transfer have become impossible."

Mexico has been a party to the Geneva Protocol since 1932 and, I am proud to say, without any reservations. During the almost 60 years which have elapsed since that date, not only has it scrupulously respected the obligations it entered into then, but it has also demonstrated in practical terms its resolve never to resort to the use of chemical weapons. We welcomed the provisions of the Final Declaration of the Paris Conference, which by consensus adopted provisions such as the following:

"The participating States are determined to promote international peace and security throughout the world in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and to pursue effective disarmament measures. In this context, they are determined to prevent any recourse to chemical weapons by completely eliminating them. They solemnly affirm their commitments not to use chemical weapons and condemn such use. They recall their serious concern at recent violations as established and condemned by the competent organs of the United Nations. They support the humanitarian assistance given to the victims affected by chemical weapons ...

"The participating States stress the necessity of concluding, at an early date, a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons, and on their destruction. This convention shall be global and comprehensive and effectively verifiable. It should be of unlimited duration. To this end they call on the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to redouble its efforts, as a matter of urgency, to resolve expeditiously the remaining issues and to conclude the convention at the earliest date. All States are requested to make, in an appropriate way, a significant contribution to the negotiations in Geneva by undertaking efforts in the relevant fields."

It should also be borne in mind in this respect that, as the Secretary-General of the United Nations emphasized in his statement to the same Paris Conference:



(Mr. García Robles, Mexico)

"Not only would it be a resounding success for multilateral negotiations if the chemical threat was eliminated, but such a victory would also constitute a remarkable achievement in the cause of multilateral disarmament and of international peace and security, in full conformity with the objectives of the Charter of the United Nations."

The necessary conclusion is that chemical weapons must disappear. The inhuman suffering they cause, both among troops and among the innocent civilian population, no longer have a place in the civilized world of today. Consequently, we must redouble our efforts in the Conference on Disarmament to conclude the convention on the elimination of chemical weapons at an early date. This is a fundamental premise which we should not lose sight of in our work: the convention will not represent any threat to the security of any State: on the contrary, it will strengthen the security of one and all.

I come now to the third and last issue which, as I indicated at the outset, I wish to address in the present statement. It is the item entitled "Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament", with which the Conference on Disarmament has been dealing since 1980 through an Ad hoc Committee which I have had the honour to chair since 1981.

The last report which the Ad hoc Committee presented to the Conference on Disarmament, and which is reproduced in full in the report that the Conference submitted to the General Assembly, contains a detailed description of all the work accomplished in 1988. It starts with a brief summary of the work of the Committee and the documentation before it. It goes on to refer to some progress made towards harmonizing positions and narrowing areas of disagreement, highlighting, however, the fact that in the short time available it was not possible to reach agreement on all items outstanding, for which reason the Committee agreed that it should resume work at the outset of the 1989 session with the firm intention of completing the elaboration of the Programme for its submission to the General Assembly, at the latest, "at its forty-fourth session". The brief introduction to which I have just referred is immediately followed by a lengthy annex of a little over 30 pages setting forth the provisions that the Programme might contain. These provisions are grouped together in six chapters with the following titles: Introduction, Objectives, Principles, Priorities, Disarmament measures, Machinery and procedures.

With regard to three of the first four chapters as well as the sixth and last, the Ad hoc Committee has succeeded in making very considerable progress. There are very few points outstanding in the Introduction, Objectives, Priorities and Machinery and procedures. It may be said that it would suffice to abide by the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament to settle any problem concerning these chapters. The same applies to the chapter on Principles, even though the number of brackets in this chapter is considerably higher than in those I have previously mentioned.

Turning to the fifth chapter, dealing with disarmament measures, it should be borne in mind that the United States and the Soviet Union have been able to adopt positive agreements, among which the "Joint Statement at the Moscow Summit", dated 1 July 1988, provides an eloquent example of the efforts that can be made jointly to halt and reverse the arms race and prevent the

(Mr. García Robles, Mexico)

proliferation of nuclear weapons. Concerning the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, it has been possible to reach consensus on most of the basic elements for that objective. It has also been possible to indicate the obligations and responsibilities of both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States with regard to preventing an increase in the numbers of the former and reducing and eventually eliminating nuclear weapons. With regard to other weapons of mass destruction, it has been agreed that all States should accede to the Geneva Protocol. There is agreement that it is necessary to make all possible efforts to secure the positive conclusion of the negotiations that are being carried out in the Conference on Disarmament on an international convention that will bring about the elimination of all chemical weapons; there is also agreement that a treaty should be concluded on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons, bearing in mind the negotiations under way in the Conference on Disarmament and all proposals made in connection therewith.

It was possible to reach a common position on the need to pursue resolutely, together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, the limitation and gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament. In this connection there is also agreement that the States with the largest military arsenals have a special responsibility in pursuing the process of reducing these arsenals.

It has also been possible to adopt the conclusion that the gradual reduction of military budgets on a mutually agreed basis, particularly by nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, would be a measure that would contribute to the curbing of the arms race and would increase the possibilities of reallocation of resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly in developing countries. There is consensus with regard to the need for further steps to prohibit military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques, as well as further steps to prevent an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the sub-soil thereof, and to prevent an arms race in outer space.

In order to facilitate the process of disarmament it has been agreed that it is necessary to take measures and pursue policies to strengthen international peace and security and to build confidence among States. There was also agreement on strict adherence and full commitment by all States Members of the United Nations to the purposes of the Charter of the Organization, and their obligation strictly to observe its principles. Likewise, there is general acceptance of the need for Member States to make all efforts to ensure a better flow of information with regard to the various aspects of disarmament, to avoid dissemination of false and tendentious information concerning armaments, and to concentrate on the widest possible dissemination to all sectors of the public of reliable information on the danger of the escalation of the armaments race and on the need for general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Consensus has also been reached on the fact that disarmament and arms limitation agreements should provide for adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned in order to create the necessary confidence and ensure that they are being observed by all, without this implying any undue intrusion in the internal affairs of other States.

(Mr. García Robles, Mexico)

The sixth and final chapter of the Comprehensive Programme, entitled "Machinery and procedures", with the exception of five words related to the Charter of the United Nations, is totally free of square brackets. In it, reference is made to the three stages - the first stage, the intermediate stage and the final stage - that will comprise the Programme; it is envisaged that the implementation of the measures included in the various stages thereof will be periodically reviewed - including at special sessions of the General Assembly; it is stipulated that, in addition to the periodic reviews to be carried out at special sessions, there should be an annual review of the implementation of the Programme, and to facilitate this the Secretary-General would annually submit a report to the Assembly on progress in the implementation of the Programme. The chapter and the draft Comprehensive Programme end with the statement that "at the earliest appropriate time, a world disarmament conference should be convened with universal participation and with adequate preparation". The undoubted importance of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament - and there is conclusive proof of this in the sections already adopted by consensus, of which I have given only an illustrative example in those I have outlined in this statement - highlights the good grounds for the "firm intention" of the Ad hoc Committee that I referred to today, quoting from the conclusion appearing in the last paragraph of its report for 1988, in which it emphasized its decision "to resume work at the outset of the 1989 session", in order to complete the elaboration of the Programme for submission to the General Assembly at the latest at its next session.

The Conference on Disarmament, which at the outset was called the Committee on Disarmament when it was set up by the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to that lofty goal, has just completed its first decade without having found it possible to transmit to the Assembly a single one of the many draft treaties or conventions that it has been dealing with. Let us hope that this will be a spur so that in the session we are beginning today we might carry to a successful conclusion at least one of the three items to which I have devoted the present statement.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Mexico for his statement, and for the kind words that he addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Theorin, whom I should like to welcome again in our midst.

Mrs. THEORIN (Sweden): Allow me first of all to congratulate you, Ambassador Pugliese, on assuming the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. I am confident that our work will progress under your skilful leadership and I pledge the full co-operation of the Swedish delegation. I would also like to thank your predecessor as President, Ambassador Ardakani of the Islamic Republic of Iran, for the effective way in which he conducted the work of the Conference. At the same time I extend a warm welcome to the newly arrived representatives - Ambassador Sharma of India, Ambassador Houlliez of Belgium, Ambassador Dietze of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Reese of Australia and Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan. My delegation looks forward to co-operating with our new distinguished colleagues.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

1988 was the year when the tide turned. 1988 was the year when nuclear disarmament began. 1988 was the year of hope. As the poem reads:

"Hope is the bird which senses the dawn and sings while it is dark."

It is still dark. The world is loaded with weapons - conventional weapons, chemical weapons, nuclear weapons. But the mistrust is receding like mist on an early spring morning, as the late Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme said in his last interview three years ago.

There has been a remarkable improvement in the international climate. And it has come about rapidly. Just a little over a year ago the Soviet Union and the United States agreed to eliminate all land-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles. A whole category of fully operational nuclear weapons was to be scrapped. The practical implementation of this historic accord began last summer. I vividly recall being told that refrigerators and baby carriages were to be produced instead of nuclear missiles. Despite the fact that the military consequences of the agreement are rather limited - since it only concerns a few per cent of the super-Powers' tens of thousands of nuclear weapons - it has acquired decisive political importance. The super-Powers are also agreed in principle on 50-per-cent cuts in their strategic nuclear arsenals. They have themselves declared that it should be possible to finalize a treaty during 1989.

Next month parallel negotiations on further confidence- and security-building measures and on conventional disarmament in Europe, the most heavily armed continent, will commence in Vienna. In December, General Secretary Gorbachev declared unilateral cuts in the armed forces of the Soviet Union by half a million in the next two years, the withdrawal of certain Soviet forces from Eastern Europe and the reorganization of remaining Soviet units so as to render these clearly defensive. Subsequently, East European States have also announced unilateral armed force reductions. Last month, the Soviet Union added that the withdrawal of its forces would include tactical nuclear systems. Already back in 1983, NATO took a decision on the unilateral withdrawal of a number of tactical nuclear weapons in Central Europe.

These initiatives demonstrate that there is considerable room for unilateral disarmament measures by the major Powers. My Government welcomes these initiatives, and strongly hopes the recent unilateral moves will be met by constructive responses without delay. Instead of an ongoing arms race, let there be a race between unilateral disarmament initiatives.

To this positive picture may be added the Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons a month ago. With some 150 nations participating, at political or high governmental level, the Conference became a powerful manifestation of the world community's repudiation of chemical arms. The unanimously adopted Final Document is an equally important and welcome success for international disarmament work.

Furthermore, in several parts of the world, protracted regional conflicts are in the process of solution, largely as a result of patient mediation work by the United Nations. A cease-fire prevails in the cruel and long-drawn-out

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

war between Iran and Iraq. The Soviet Union is completing the withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan. The illegal South African occupation of Namibia is approaching an end. In Kampuchea a peaceful solution to the conflict and withdrawal of Vietnamese troops can be discerned. There is hope of a negotiated settlement of the conflict in Western Sahara. Even in the Arab-Israeli conflict we can begin to see some progress. The recognition by the PLO of Israel's right to peace and security opens new prospects. The United States has taken the historic step of opening a direct dialogue with the PLO. At long last we can glimpse the possibility of the Israeli and Palestinian peoples living in peace side by side.

It is at this historical juncture that we find ourselves today. At this historical juncture, multilateral disarmament forums must assert their role. Unilateral action is welcome. Bilateral initiatives as well. But multilateral disarmament work is absolutely indispensable for the momentous questions of the 1990s. While only a few States possess nuclear weapons, nuclear disarmament is the legitimate concern of all States. All countries would be the victims of a nuclear war. All countries, therefore, have a legitimate right to take part in decisions on nuclear disarmament. The world at large cannot rely merely on the good will of the super-Powers. If fact, most disarmament questions can only be solved multilaterally.

It is sufficient to ask the question: How could two States achieve a total ban on nuclear tests when six have already exploded nuclear devices and a few more have the technical capacity to do so? Or to mention the burning issue of the Paris Conference: How could two States - no matter how powerful - free the world from chemical weapons when in principle all States with a modern chemical industry are in a position to manufacture such weapons? Or how could the prevention of an arms race in outer space be ensured except through multilateral action? The international community has expressed its firm stand that the exploration and use of outer space must be for peaceful purposes and to the benefit of the whole of mankind.

The 1988 work in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly benefited from the generally constructive international atmosphere. Despite the temporary setback to multilateral disarmament efforts at the inconclusive special session on disarmament last June, a sense of prudent optimism and determination characterized the work of the First Committee. There was a feeling that the United Nations had regained its fundamental role in the field of disarmament. Consensus was reached on more resolutions than ever before. In particular, the two unanimously adopted resolutions on chemical weapons should be mentioned.

The broad support in favour of several new United Nations studies in the field of disarmament was a welcome display of multilateral resolve. The study on nuclear weapons in all their aspects will deal with the most compelling subject of our times, the persistent threat of nuclear war. More and better information about the constant threat posed by nuclear arms to our entire civilization is a necessary premise for continued nuclear disarmament. Similarly important is the decision to consider the role of the United Nations in the field of verification. In the view of my Government, this role can and should be reinforced. Two separate draft resolutions for a study on the role of the United Nations in verification were merged into one, which received

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

nearly unanimous support. The decision by the United Nations to examine the international arms trade is important too. My Government shares the conviction that international arms transfers deserve serious consideration, and will support this effort to achieve greater openness and transparency in the world-wide arms trade.

Another urgent resolution, which was adopted with overwhelming support by the General Assembly, concerns the naval arms race. Extensive activities at sea, sometimes leading to confrontation and incidents, demonstrate that the naval arms race continues unabated while forces on land are being reduced. There is widespread concern that nuclear weapons at sea present a persistent risk of an unintentional nuclear war. The deployment of highly accurate sea-launched cruise missiles designed to carry either conventional or nuclear warheads constitutes a threat to the seaboard security of all coastal States.

Initiatives to reduce military forces on land should be accompanied by simultaneous efforts to seek corresponding limitations in the maritime domain. Otherwise there is a great risk that one abolished weapon category will only be replaced by another kind deployed in a different environment. The whole effort will then be counter-productive. Naval confidence-building measures may enhance security at sea and facilitate a process of naval disarmament. I would like to take this opportunity to propose that the Conference on Disarmament add the issue of a multilateral agreement for the prevention of incidents at sea to its agenda. Such a multilateral agreement would be an important complement to already existing bilateral agreements for the same purpose. We must ensure that accidents, technical malfunctioning or misunderstanding do not determine the course of history. The international community must take full charge of these vital elements of security.

In his address in Vienna on 19 January the Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Shevardnadze, underlined that "nuclear missile modernization is a step backward, not forward", stressing that the Soviet Union is not engaged in modernization. I take note of this. The Government of Sweden has long maintained that modernization of nuclear weapons is a step backwards. Nuclear weapons should not be modernized. They should be abolished. Forever. If the nuclear Powers stopped modernizing their nuclear arsenals they would have no excuse for continuing their testing. Why is it, then, that nuclear testing continues?

The prime objective of nuclear tests is precisely to modernize and to make nuclear weapons more effective. More than a quarter of a century ago, the super-Powers with the partial test-ban Treaty gave expression to their determination to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time. Twenty years ago, in the non-proliferation Treaty, they restated their determination expressed five years earlier. Today, 25 years later, there are no negotiations on a comprehensive test ban. Instead of ending their testing for all time, the Soviet Union and the United States perform joint experiments in nuclear test verification.

It is not acceptable to the world community that the two super-Powers merely gauge the yield of each other's continuing nuclear tests. It is not acceptable that the authority of the non-proliferation Treaty is put at risk by the progressive refinement of nuclear armaments and continued nuclear

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

testing. To ensure its future viability all States parties must fulfil all their obligations under the Treaty. The world community insists that no nuclear tests, I repeat no nuclear tests whatsoever, be performed. In Sweden's view a commitment not to modernize, but instead to make deep cuts in the nuclear arsenals would gain considerable credibility from a moratorium on testing, linked to multilateral negotiations aimed at urgently concluding a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

The Conference on Disarmament is the one and only forum for such negotiations. A nuclear test ban is the first item on the agenda of the Conference. My Government repeats its call for immediate action on this matter. In this area, too, there is room for unilateral initiatives, not only by the Soviet Union and the United States, but also by France, the United Kingdom and China.

Continued multilateral action, as I have already mentioned, is required to ensure that outer space is used for peaceful purposes only. In the CD the programme of work has concentrated on three items, namely examination and identification of issues, existing agreements and proposals, and future initiatives. The existing legal régime is not sufficient to prevent an arms race in outer space. Additional measures should be identified.

The difficulty of arriving at workable definitions of ASAT weapons should not hinder us from trying to find practical solutions. One approach could be to ban the testing of ASAT weapons, which would be the same as formalizing a de facto moratorium. Such a ban could probably be reasonably well verified. A challenging goal could be to have - in a few years from now - a verifiable prohibition of ASAT weapons, through a comprehensive ban covering the development, testing, production, deployment and use of such weapons, on Earth in the atmosphere and in outer space.

A military attack on a nuclear facility in operation could have devastating consequences. And not only for the attacked country. It may also harm neighbouring and even more distant countries. This issue, therefore, should be of concern to all of us. A prohibition of military attacks on nuclear facilities would be in the interest of all countries, whether or not they have nuclear facilities. A global prohibition would be the optimal solution. For several years there has been a disappointing lack of progress in the work carried out by the Conference on Disarmament on the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities. My Government again calls upon the participating countries to show more flexibility in the negotiations aiming at the conclusion of a treaty on this urgent matter.

My delegation will listen with great interest to the statement by the Foreign Minister of France, Mr. Roland Dumas, and his report on the results of the Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons. As I mentioned earlier, the Paris Conference was an important success in terms of the task entrusted to it. The international community was able to concentrate on one priority issue - that of chemical disarmament. The Conference raised the barrier against using chemical weapons by unanimously condemning such use. It reaffirmed the commitment to the Geneva Protocol and the urgent necessity of concluding a comprehensive convention banning chemical weapons at the earliest date.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

However, the task of ensuring that the Paris Conference becomes a real and lasting success lies with the Conference on Disarmament. It is up to the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to organize its efforts in such a way that the universal commitment to a convention demonstrated in the General Assembly and at the Paris Conference is translated without delay into tangible results. The General Assembly has urged the CD to intensify its negotiations on chemical weapons with a view to the final elaboration of a comprehensive convention at the earliest possible date. In Paris the participating States unanimously called on the CD to redouble its efforts, as a matter of urgency, to resolve expeditiously the remaining issues and to conclude the convention at the earliest date. It is up to us, here and now, to draw practical conclusions from these forceful declarations.

How shall the Conference on Disarmament live up to the expectations of the international community and of the public at large? First, it seems odd, in view of the unconditional calls for the final elaboration and conclusion of a comprehensive convention, that the mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee omits reference to the key element of "use", and that it explicitly excepts final drafting. Sweden does not favour lengthy mandate discussions. We have criticized the waste of time in procedural controversies on other agenda items. It would, however, seem natural that the CD in 1989 should demonstrate that it takes the calls of the General Assembly and the Paris Conference seriously, by immediately changing the mandate for its Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons in these two respects.

Secondly, a more dynamic method of work must be adopted whereby the hard-core issues are continuously identified, pursued and resolved. Many difficult problems transcend individual articles and will have to be dealt with concretely and systematically throughout the draft convention. This might call for a greater number of working groups and a more flexible approach to the time allotted to them. My delegation notes with great satisfaction that the incoming Chairman of the Committee apparently plans to organize its work in this manner. The co-ordination of the work will put a heavy burden on the Chairman, and necessitates the continuous and active involvement of its bureau. Consequently, other committees should be prepared to concede some of their time in favour of the chemical weapons Committee.

Thirdly, the interrelationship between ongoing bilateral and multilateral efforts must become more dynamic and efficient. It has been a waste of time for the CD to discuss the order of destruction at the very same time as it was being discussed bilaterally by the two major possessors. If bilateral efforts could be scheduled so as to produce results for the multilateral negotiation, our work would significantly gain in speed and efficiency. However, this might necessitate greater flexibility on the part of the CD also. Provisions enabling the Ad hoc Committee to meet continuously throughout the year, but with intermittent recesses for consultations and preparation, must be considered.

My delegation gave its detailed views on most aspects of the "rolling text", article by article, in its statement to the plenary on 13 September 1988. Our views have not changed. Since then, however, some encouraging developments have taken place. My Government has noted with appreciation that President Bush has identified a ban on chemical weapons as



(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

one of his highest priorities. Sweden welcomes the fact that there now exists a consensus regarding an effective ban on production under international control as of the entry into force of the convention, and regarding effective international control of all chemical weapons stocks as of the same date. The announcement by France on this latter issue opens the door to the rapid conclusion of the negotiations regarding articles IV and V. The Soviet Union and the United States should now present to the CD their detailed proposals for the destruction of chemical weapons stocks and chemical weapons production facilities.

Sweden is encouraged by the fact that 16 countries have so far engaged in trial inspections of the chemical industry. We would, however, prefer that even more countries, in all groups, performed such inspections. The lessons to be drawn from the common evaluation of the trial inspections, which we have to undertake this year, will directly influence our final agreement on the verification of non-production in article VI. Sweden also welcomes the recent proposals made by the Soviet Union on article VI and by the United Kingdom on article X. Both proposals demonstrate a constructive and flexible approach to the negotiations and could serve as a basis for agreement on the two issues at hand. It is our hope that initiatives like these will be forthcoming at a rapid pace, and that such efforts to find compromise language will be recognized by other delegations. Our work must become more results-oriented. Opportunities for agreement must be seized.

The importance of the successful conclusion of a chemical weapons convention cannot be overstated. It would radically improve the security of all States. It would once and for all eliminate a whole class of existing weapons of mass destruction. It would be the first multilateral disarmament treaty embodying the principle of international challenge inspections without the right of refusal. It would constitute a major break-through for the very principle of multilateral disarmament.

However, in our work to reach agreement, we are racing against time. The further refinement, development and spread of chemical weapons seriously undermine our efforts. But the solution is within reach. If there is political will - if we are all prepared to translate our declarations into political action - the comprehensive chemical weapons ban can be ready in 1990 or maybe even earlier.

1988 was a year of hope. 1989 started by raising our expectations. We have seen the blush of a new day, the light of a new era. Let us exert ourselves that little bit extra, Let us grasp this historic opportunity. Let us fulfil what the whole of humanity expects of us.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Sweden for her statement, as well as for the kind words that she addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Friedersdorf.

Mr. FRIEDERSDORF (United States of America): Mr. President, the United States delegation congratulates you on your assumption of the Chair for the important first month of our work in the 1989 session of the Conference on Disarmament. Italy is a friend of our country. As its representative, you

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

have rendered distinguished service to this Conference during your tenure here. We look forward to working with you as you guide us in beginning our work this year.

A number of changes have taken place in the composition of the Conference since last year, and our delegation welcomes Ambassador Reese of Australia, Ambassador Houlliez of Belgium, Ambassador Dietze of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan and Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden. To all of them and their delegations we pledge our friendship and co-operation. We also appreciate the presence today of Ambassador Maj Britt Theorin of Sweden, who has presented an important and timely message to the Conference on Disarmament.

Our delegation also welcomes hopefully the appearance before the Conference of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, Mr. Roland Dumas. I am certain he will have an expert analysis and present us with sensitive perceptions of the Conference on chemical weapons which he so ably chaired in Paris last month. I would be remiss today if I did not mention the warm hospitality extended by the French Government during the Paris Conference to all delegations, and the outstanding preparatory work performed by our friend and esteemed colleague, Ambassador Pierre Morel. It has been less than four weeks now since representatives of 149 nations concluded on 11 January their work at the Paris Conference on chemical weapons. In the Declaration issued by that Conference, those 149 nations stated their determination "to prevent any recourse to chemical weapons by completely eliminating them". Consequently, the Declaration addresses prominently the ongoing negotiations here in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons.

The Paris Conference has provided a real impetus - the force of the consensus view of 149 nations - for our negotiations. It is our challenge now to seize this moment and to search for practical solutions to the problems that remain. As anyone who has followed our work over the past years can attest, there is ample room for the contributions of all members of this body, as well as those of non-member participants, to this search. Such broadened participation would constitute a real redoubling of our efforts in the chemical weapons negotiations.

The problems that remain are not insignificant. Verification is clearly the major difficulty. There are other problems as well, including ensuring undiminished security during the transition period, the possible development of new agents, assistance, and globality. Our delegation is prepared to do its part to resolve all of these issues. We are ready to get down to work as soon as possible in the chemical weapons Committee.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the United States of America for his statement, and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I should now like to give the floor to the representative of Kenya, Mr. Daniel Koikai, who will speak as Co-ordinator of the Group of 21.

Mr. KOICAI (Kenya): On behalf of the members of the Group of 21, I would like to convey the condolences of the members of the Group upon learning of the death of Miss Aida Levin. As a member of the secretariat of this Conference, Miss Levin was very hard-working and was always very ready to

(Mr. Koicai, Kenya)

co-operate and work with all delegations in the work of the Conference. She will be missed by members of the Group, all of whom were very close to her. May the Almighty rest her soul in peace and give comfort to those who are dear to her.

Mr. President, on behalf of the Kenya delegation to the Conference on Disarmament I would like to congratulate you and your delegation most warmly on your assumption of the duties of President of this Conference in the very important month of February. You represent a country that has exerted great efforts towards achieving disarmament objectives. We rest assured that with your qualifications and vast experience in diplomacy, you will guide the Conference along the desired course in the first month of its 1989 session. We would also like to congratulate Ambassador Ali Shams Ardakani of Iran for the very successful manner in which he guided the work of the Conference during the month of September 1988 and during the inter-sessional period. We look forward to having the Foreign Minister of France with us this morning, and we will be ready to listen to his statement with great interest and attention.

The Kenya delegation would like to welcome the heads of delegations who are participating in the work of the Conference on Disarmament for the first time, namely Ambassador Houlliez of Belgium, Ambassador Dietze of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden, Ambassador Reese of Australia and Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan, and to assure them of the co-operation of the Kenya delegation in the work of this Conference. We are happy to have in our midst today members of the NGO Committee on Disarmament.

I have requested the floor today to read a statement on behalf of the Group of Neutral and Non-aligned States that are members of this Conference, regarding the mandate of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. The statement reads as follows:

"The Group of 21 would like to make the following statement on the establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons.

"The forty-third session of the General Assembly adopted without a vote two resolutions on chemical weapons that referred to the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. The first, resolution 43/74 A on 'Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and to support the conclusion of a chemical weapons convention', specifically 'urges the Conference on Disarmament to pursue as a matter of continuing urgency its negotiations on a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their destruction'.

"The second, resolution 43/74 C on 'Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons', after expressing the regret and the concern of the General Assembly that a convention with the scope mentioned above has not yet been elaborated, 'urges again the Conference on Disarmament, as a matter of high priority, to intensify, during its 1989 session, the negotiations on such a convention and to reinforce further its efforts by, inter alia, increasing the time during the year that it devotes to such negotiations, taking into account all existing proposals and future

(Mr. Koicai, Kenya)

initiatives, with a view to the final elaboration of a convention at the earliest possible date, and to re-establish its Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons for this purpose with the mandate to be agreed upon by the Conference at the beginning of its 1989 session'. The Group of 21 would like to recall that both these resolutions were adopted by consensus exactly two months ago.

"The Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons, which took place in Paris from 7 to 11 January 1989, in its Final Declaration, adopted unanimously by all participating States, went still further in stressing the urgency and the priority of the task entrusted to the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, when it stated: 'to this end, they call on the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to redouble its efforts, as a matter of urgency, to resolve expeditiously the remaining issues and to conclude the convention at the earliest date'.

"The Group of 21, taking into account all these facts, considers that the Conference on Disarmament should address the question of the mandate for the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons afresh. Never before has the international community, through all its different means of expression - Governments, parliaments, press - been so engaged in the issue of banning chemical weapons. Never before has political will been so clearly manifested from all quarters. This commitment, this expression of political will needs to be reflected in our work for 1989. The Group of 21 therefore believes that the mandate to be adopted by this forum should, first, include reference to the prohibition of use of chemical weapons, to be consistent with General Assembly resolutions 43/74 A and C and with the language enshrined in the Final Declaration of the Paris Conference, and second, that the phrase 'except for its final drafting' should be deleted from the text of the mandate in order to convey to the international community our full acceptance of the responsibility entrusted to the Ad hoc Committee, as contained in the three texts referred to above, which the States represented here adhered to without exception."

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Kenya for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair, and now I give the floor to the representative of Belgium, Ambassador Houlliez, who will speak on behalf of the Group of Western Countries.

Ambassador HOULLEZ (Belgium): I should first of all like to associate myself with the condolences expressed on the decease of Miss Levin.

As co-ordinator of the Western Group, and in taking the floor for the first time in the plenary of the Conference on Disarmament, I should like to express my satisfaction at seeing you, Mr. President, presiding over our meetings. Aware of your qualities as a diplomat, your patience and understanding, I feel reassured in addressing the Conference after such eminent and competent speakers as Ambassador García Robles, Ambassadors Theorin and Friedersdorf and the distinguished representative of Kenya in his capacity as spokesman of the Neutral and Non-aligned Group. We also hope today to hear Mr. Dumas, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, who was President of the recent Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical

(Ambassador Houlliez, Belgium)

weapons, an event which will have a profound influence on our future activities in the area of chemical weapons, an influence already stressed by the Co-ordinator of the Group of 21.

I should like to indicate first and foremost that the Group I represent here fully shares the views just expressed on the importance to be given to work to be accomplished in 1989 by the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, and principally on the priority and urgency of this task. For years the delegations which are members of the Western Group have constantly and unequivocally proclaimed their desire to see the very early drawing up of a convention on the total, universal and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons. They have made significant contributions to the drawing up of the "rolling text", from which we hope a convention will emerge as soon as possible, a convention meeting the hopes, the goals and the requirements that the international community has set itself. Need I mention the contribution that the Western Group made, with many others of course, to the drawing up and adoption by consensus of the recent resolutions of the forty-third United Nations General Assembly on chemical weapons, very properly cited by the Co-ordinator of the neutral and non-aligned States?

It was President Reagan who in New York launched the idea of a special conference on chemical weapons. This proposal, positively welcomed by all United Nations Member countries, ultimately crystallized in the invitations issued by the President of the French Republic, Mr. Mitterrand, to a conference in Paris whose audience and importance need not be stressed in this forum, and one in which all the participants made a distinguished contribution to the success of this initiative.

In Paris the countries belonging to the Western Group confirmed, through their very active participation in the deliberations and in the production of the Final Declaration, the vital interest they attach not only to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 but also, and especially, to the earliest possible conclusion of a convention on the complete, universal and verifiable elimination of chemical weapons. Today, we solemnly reiterate here that, as in the past, and with a keen awareness of what is at stake, we shall continue to do our very utmost to reach the goal set in Paris for the search for solutions to still outstanding problems with key elements of our work, which will continue to be manifest throughout our debate.

Within the context of the direction laid down and the political impetus given at the Paris Conference, we have the desire and the political will to resume our work as rapidly as possible, and with that enthusiasm without which no objective can be reached. This impetus is to be found in the Final Declaration of Paris when it calls on us to redouble our efforts, "as a matter of urgency, to resolve expeditiously the remaining issues and to conclude the convention at the earliest date". We fully support these objectives, whose adoption by consensus was the result of an enormous effort at conciliation and a rapprochement which, happily, is now manifest in many aspects of international relations. The achievement of these objectives will be facilitated by an attitude enabling us to tackle the real problems as soon as possible without pointless procrastination, without wasting any time on procedural debate.

(Ambassador Houlliez, Belgium)

First and foremost it is necessary to tackle our work with a well-structured plan which, while taking into account the urgency of our role, enables us to achieve a logical and effective distribution of the various categories of problems. What we need, first of all, is a sincere political will to create conditions to ensure the progress and the success that we set ourselves as a goal in Paris. In this forum marked by important statements by figures who have left their profound imprint on the process of disarmament, and whose words have been inspired by very lofty considerations, I would not wish to go into the detail of the means to achieve our goal. For that purpose there are more appropriate means, places and circumstances. What I can assure you of is that the Western Group, together with all the other delegations, will seek the most realistic, the most effective and the most expeditious way to arrive at the conclusion of a convention which will free mankind from the fear of chemical weapons. This cause is universal; it calls for the support of all States and requires us to rise above partisan interests. This too is one of the messages left by the Paris Conference.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Belgium, Ambassador Houlliez, for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. That concludes my list of speakers for this morning. Does any other member wish to take the floor? I give the floor to the representative of China, Ambassador Fan.

Mr. FAN (China) (translated from Chinese): First of all I would like to associate myself with other speakers in extending my deep condolences on the untimely death of Miss Aida Levin. Miss Levin contributed in many ways to the work of the CD. I would particularly like to point out that, during my tenure as the Chairman of the Group of Seven, she displayed much talent and was of much help to me.

I would also like, in my capacity as head of the Chinese delegation, to extend my warmest welcome and congratulations to you on your assumption of the presidency for the first month of the CD's 1989 session. Relations between China and Italy have long been characterized by friendly co-operation. In recent years, the friendship and co-operation between our two countries has further developed. As President of the Conference on Disarmament for the first month of this year, your workload is no doubt heavy, but I am convinced that with your distinguished skills and rich diplomatic experience you will surely enable our current session to get off to a good start. I would also like to take this opportunity to extend a welcome to our new distinguished colleagues, the Ambassador of Australia, the Ambassador of Pakistan, the Ambassador of the German Democratic Republic, the Ambassador of Sweden, the Ambassador of India and the Ambassador of Belgium. I welcome all of them and I promise them close co-operation.

After listening carefully to the statement made by the distinguished representative of Kenya on behalf of the Group of 21, and the statement made by the distinguished Ambassador of Belgium on behalf of the Western Group, I would like to briefly state the views of the Chinese delegation. China has all along attached great importance to the negotiations on the prohibition of CW, and stands for the conclusion at an early date of a convention to

(Mr. Fan, China)

comprehensively prohibit and completely destroy this type of weapon, so that mankind can be rid of this scourge for ever. The Chinese delegation will continue to exert its efforts in this regard.

The present international situation has turned from confrontation to dialogue. This is very favourable to the negotiations on the CW convention. The Paris Conference on the prohibition of CW last month was held at a high political level. The Final Declaration adopted unanimously by 150 States reflects the common will of the international community. The participating States unanimously call upon the CD to redouble its efforts and to conclude a convention banning chemical weapons at the earliest date. The Conference on Disarmament should respond with concrete actions. Our country therefore shares the view of the Group of 21 that the CD should, in the light of the new developments, entrust the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons with a more appropriate mandate. Our delegation is of the view that the inclusion of the prohibition of use in the mandate is in order. In the first half of the 1980s, the CD repeatedly considered this issue. The views of various parties have gradually converged. It is generally believed that the future convention should include elements on the prohibition of use. In fact, article 1 of the present draft already contains this element. For this reason, its reflection in the mandate should not pose any problems. As to the proposal to delete the phrase "except for its final drafting" in the original mandate, the Chinese delegation has no difficulty with it. Furthermore, in order to take due account of the outcome of the Paris Conference, the adoption of the relevant phrase from the Final Declaration, "at the earliest date", in place of the words "as soon as possible" used in the original mandate of the Ad hoc Committee, is also a possibility worth considering.

The Chinese delegation is in favour of modifying the mandate of the Ad hoc Committee, but we are also willing to adopt a flexible attitude and consider in earnest the views of other delegations. At the same time, we hope that the mandate will not take up too much time. We should start the substantive negotiations as soon as possible and, through concrete actions, strive for the conclusion of the convention on CW at the earliest date.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of China, Ambassador Fan, for his statement and also for the kind words addressed to the Chair and to my country. Is there any other member wishing to take the floor? I give the floor to the representative of Bulgaria, Ambassador Kostov.

Mr. KOSTOV (Bulgaria): First of all, Mr. President, I would like to associate myself with the congratulations expressed to you on the occasion of your assumption of the presidency of the Conference for the month of February. Secondly, on behalf of the Group of Socialist Countries, I would like to express our condolences on the untimely passing away of Miss Aida Levin of the secretariat.

As has been stated on many occasions, the Group of Socialist Countries is in favour of speeding up the efforts of the Conference on all items on the agenda. We attach special importance to the item on a chemical weapons convention, as was stressed by our country's representative at the Paris Conference. Of course we applaud the results of the Paris Conference, which we think was a clear success for the whole international community. We

(Mr. Kostov, Bulgaria)

consider that the declaration of the Paris Conference concerning the redoubling of the efforts of the Conference on Disarmament should find adequate expression in the mandate of the Committee on Chemical Weapons. On the other hand, we wish to express our opinion that your efforts, Mr. President, should make it possible to resolve the question of procedure speedily in order not to take up much time on this point and to begin substantive work in the Conference. In that sense we support the statement of the Group of 21 and we hope that speedy consultations will be taken up in order to find a solution to this problem. We also think that the mandate of the Committee on outer space should be improved, and we are looking forward to discussing this question with you, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Bulgaria, Ambassador Kostov, for his statement on behalf of the Group of Socialist Countries and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. Does any other member wish to take the floor? I see none.

I am informed that the Minister of State and Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, his Excellency Roland Dumas, is now scheduled to arrive soon in Geneva as a result of an improvement in the weather situation which prevented him from being with us this morning. I therefore suggest that we resume this plenary meeting this afternoon at 3.30 p.m. after the luncheon being offered by His Excellency the Minister at 1 p.m. today. I see no objection, so we shall proceed accordingly.

As agreed during the informal consultations held last week, I shall now suspend the plenary meeting and convene immediately afterwards an informal meeting of the Conference to consider the agenda and programme of work, the re-establishment of two subsidiary bodies and requests for participation received from States not members of the Conference.

The meeting was suspended at 12.15 p.m. and resumed at 12.30 p.m.

The PRESIDENT: The 484th Plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed.

As a result of the agreements reached at the informal meeting on a number of organizational questions, I shall now formalize them at this plenary meeting.

I put before the Conference for decision working paper CD/WP.354, containing the draft provisional agenda for the 1989 session and the programme of work for its first part. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts this draft decision.

It was so decided.



The PRESIDENT: The next draft decision before the Conference is working paper CD/WP.355, concerning the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons. If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I now turn to working paper CD/WP.356, containing a draft decision on the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: We shall now proceed to the requests from non-member States to participate in our work. The secretariat has circulated the relevant draft decisions in document CD/WP.357 and addenda 1 to 17, which concern the following non-members: Norway, Spain, Finland, Switzerland, Austria, Ireland, Malaysia, New Zealand, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Portugal, Denmark, Turkey, Republic of Korea, Senegal, Bangladesh, Greece, Tunisia and Holy See. Since no objections were raised when the communications from these non-members were circulated, and since I noted agreement at the informal meeting, I suggest that we adopt all these draft decisions together. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the draft decisions.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: As you know, the mandate of the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament extends up to the forty-fourth session of the General Assembly, and accordingly there is no need to re-establish it. The Ad hoc Committee may therefore start its work under the able chairmanship of Ambassador García Robles of Mexico whenever it is considered appropriate.

I should now like to give the floor to the Secretary-General of the Conference and personal representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ambassador Komatina, who will make a brief statement regarding the services being made available to the Conference.

Mr. KOMATINA (Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations): As the members of the Conference know, the United Nations continues to face a financial emergency. As was the case during the 1987 and 1988 sessions, the Conference needs to consider how to implement the target reduction of 30 per cent in services allocated to it. That reduction would apply, as in previous years, to the number of weekly meetings. As was also the case for 1988, those savings would mean, in practice, the allocation to the Conference of 10 meetings per week with full servicing and 15 meetings per week with full services during the sessions of the Seismic Group.

Therefore, the Conference would be afforded two daily meetings with full servicing throughout the whole of the 1989 session, plus one additional daily meeting when the Seismic Group is in session.

(Mr. Komatina, Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations)

As the work of the Conference proceeds, it may be necessary to hold meetings of subsidiary bodies consecutively with other committees or working groups. This practice was put into effect in the past and prevented the wastage of allocated resources in the event that the full three hours allocated for each meeting had not been fully utilized. In this respect, punctuality is also important. May I recall that predecessors of the CD developed a system whereby all meetings would start no later than five minutes after their scheduled time of commencement? May I also note that we are not using all the services allocated to us? For your information, in 1988 the Conference and its subsidiary bodies lost 83 hours and 55 minutes as a result of late starting of its meetings, and 174 hours and 50 minutes as a result of early ending.

It is also understood that meetings with full services cannot be held in the evening or during weekends.

May I note that, since the financial emergency persists, measures accepted by the Conference at the informal meeting held on 22 April 1986, concerning documentation, continue to be valid, and in order to implement these decisions and bring about savings in the cost of documentation, all papers need to be presented in good time.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for his statement. During the consultations held last week, I noted that the members agreed to the arrangements described by Ambassador Komatina. We shall proceed accordingly.

I have no other business to consider this morning. I intend therefore to suspend the plenary meeting, as announced previously, until 3.30 p.m.

The meeting was suspended at 12.35 p.m. and resumed at 4 p.m.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): The 484th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed.

Allow me to welcome to the Conference the Minister of State and Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, His Excellency, Mr. Roland Dumas, who is to address us today. His presence at the Conference demonstrates once again the importance that France attaches to our work and to all issues relating to disarmament in general.

I should like to underline the effort made by France in organizing and contributing to the success of the Paris Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and Other Interested States, and in particular the role played by His Excellency, Mr. Roland Dumas as President of the Conference. With his prestige and learning, he committed himself to ensuring the final outcome of the Conference, which will undoubtedly be a very positive factor in our negotiations. The consensus achieved in Paris at the conclusion of the Conference was among the most extensive ever achieved by the international community on a disarmament issue. On behalf of the Conference, I wish to thank His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of France warmly for his interest in the Conference, and especially in chemical weapons. I now give the floor to His Excellency, Mr. Roland Dumas.

Mr. DUMAS (France) (translated from French): First of all I would like to apologize to you because weather conditions obliged me to reach Geneva somewhat belatedly, and, I understand, necessitated some changes in your programme.

Mr. President, my first words will be to express the satisfaction that we feel at seeing you preside over the work of our Conference for the month of February. We wish to extend to you every wish for success in your important task, and assure you of the fullest co-operation of the French delegation in this endeavour. We are convinced that during this period, which has been marked by the impetus provided by the outcome of the Paris Conference, to which you were kind enough to refer, you will guide our work with the competence and skill familiar to us. I would also like to take this opportunity to express the thanks and gratitude of the French delegation to the representative of Iran, Mr. Ardakani, for the very positive results that he obtained during his period of office as President in the past few months.

Allow me to say at the outset how happy I am to take the floor today before the Conference on Disarmament. I had of course intended to do so as the representative of the host country of the recent Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons. But I am also in the position of doing so - thanks to the confidence that you have placed in France, and for which I thank you all very warmly - as Minister for Foreign Affairs of the country that this year will provide the Chairman of your Ad hoc Committee on chemical disarmament. Please be assured that we appreciate the honour and responsibility that has been conferred on us in this way.

I asked to take the floor today, at the opening of this new session of the Conference on Disarmament, in order to present to it officially the Final Act of the Paris Conference. You are all already familiar with this document - most of you because you personally took part in drafting it, in Paris. In passing, I wish to thank you very warmly for your support and your contribution, which helped to ensure the success of the international conference. But to bring it here, myself, I felt had a symbolic value: the purpose of my initiative is to encourage you to "convert the try", as sports enthusiasts would say, and to gather within your Ad hoc Committee that is drawing up the convention on the complete banning of chemical weapons, the fruits of the political impetus given to the work in Geneva by 149 countries that met in Paris.

With a month's hindsight, what sort of reading can one give to this document? I would say that it provides a point of reference, as well as a stimulus for your work. First of all, a point of reference. It really establishes firmly the indispensable foundations for your deliberations, by confirming the will of the entire international community to bring the endeavour of chemical disarmament to a successful conclusion. Some people doubted that this collective will still existed. Some said that the use of chemical weapons was commonplace now; others asserted that certain regional circumstances could justify their acquisition. The wager that we made in convening the January Conference was that no country, faced with the shared feelings of all the others, could deny that chemical disarmament was a just cause that it deserved to be pursued for itself to a prompt and successful conclusion. We won this wager, all of us together. The hope that I have

(Mr. Dumas, France)

drawn from this is that the consensus obtained in Paris will allow us to anticipate universal accession to the convention as produced by the member States of the Conference on Disarmament.

On what does this consensus rest? How does this "reference" I was speaking about translate into practical terms? I will do my best to answer these two questions.

Briefly running through the articles of the Declaration, I would say that first of all there is now a confirmed link between the present prohibition on use and the future convention, a convention which will prohibit not only the use, but also the production, stockpiling and transfer of chemical weapons. 149 States have declared that they are "determined to prevent any recourse to chemical weapons by completely eliminating them". This wording from the Paris Declaration sums up perfectly, I think, the argument expounded by the President of the French Republic when he said: "We will not achieve a complete ban unless we reaffirm today the prohibition of use. This prohibition will in turn be all the better underpinned when production, transfer and stockpiling have become impossible." Beyond the differences in legal commitments that exist at present between States, according to whether or not they are parties to the 1925 Protocol, or whether they have tabled reservations to it, we now know - you now know - that there is a collective conviction on the part 149 States, a conviction that makes it possible to move from the Protocol of 1925 to a global convention: the universal condemnation of the use of chemical weapons.

The second element of reference, in the Paris Declaration is the political endorsement given there for the first time to the philosophy of the 1925 Protocol by more States than the signatories alone. The 149 States recognized the "importance" of the Protocol and its "continuing validity". They called upon those that have not yet done so to become parties to the protocol, and 12 of them have already responded positively to the appeal. Furthermore, despite the fears of those who predicted that the use of chemical arms would become widespread, dooming the negotiation of a new convention here in this very room, to failure, we have provided a new reason for persevering, new grounds for confidence in the wisdom of peoples.

There is a third encouragement, which is essential for the 40 of you who are negotiating here, as well as for those who are not members of the Conference on Disarmament but are now clearly invited to contribute to this work: the Paris Conference reaffirmed the need to step up the pace in Geneva, without overlooking the remaining difficulties but on the contrary to solve them as soon as possible. The Paris Declaration will serve as a point of reference: we will be accountable in the coming weeks for the way in which we translate this political impetus into action. If you will allow me, I will come back shortly to the way I view the resumption of your work here.

The fourth area in which I believe the Paris Declaration provides a point of reference is prevention of the proliferation of chemical weapons. It is clear to all now, I think, that we must refrain from applying to chemical weapons a logic which would bring the haves and the have-nots into confrontation. Let us therefore refuse to place one side in opposition to the other, and let us work together, industrial countries and developing

(Mr. Dumas, France)

countries, military Powers with chemical weapons and Powers without them, to curb a worrying trend, the only treatment for which is a complete and verified ban. In the mean time, until the future convention formalizes this ban, let us all exercise restraint and act responsibly, as the Paris Declaration invites us to do, to avoid any developments that we would all regret later.

Another area where the Paris Declaration is of obvious value relates to the confirmed support of the 149 States for the role of the United Nations. This concerns in particular the investigatory powers entrusted to the Secretary-General by virtue of procedures that, I might venture to recall, France had the honour of originating, with resolution 37/98D. I welcome the presence of experts here today who are meeting for the second time, and whose task it is - as the Paris Declaration states - to "strengthen the efficiency of existing procedures". These procedures, as we know, give some latitude to the Secretary-General. It is important that, when he decides to implement them, they should be promptly applied. Here again, the Paris Declaration, which "calls for the co-operation of all States in order to facilitate the action of the Secretary-General", indicates the path we must follow.

A second aspect of the role of the United Nations which is underlined by the Paris Declaration pertains to initiatives that could enable the international community to exercise its vigilance with regard to the ban on the use of chemical weapons: some have deemed that the Declaration is not sufficiently precise on this point. It is clear, however, that such an expression concerns the penalties that could be applied to a State that ignored the ban.

A renewed condemnation of CW use, definition of the link between the old Protocol and the future convention, the need to redouble efforts in Geneva and to settle outstanding issues, detailed analysis of the phenomenon of proliferation, precise mention of the essential role of the United Nations: on all these points the Paris Declaration is a point of reference for your work. But at the same time it gives new impetus, on behalf of the international community it expresses a fervent obligation: to conclude at an early date a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their destruction. This feeling of urgency cannot be modified by anything except for the conviction that problems still remain to be solved. It is the existence of these problems which deterred us from setting a precise deadline. What we want is not a convention on the cheap but one that is effective and effectively verifiable. These problems must be solved rapidly.

What are these difficulties that have yet to be solved? They may be grouped under five headings, corresponding to the five working groups which I would like to be the immediate and visible reflection of our determination.

Verification, first of all: this is much more difficult in the chemical domain than in the nuclear domain. It must enable us to ensure not only that no one keeps a secret stock of chemical weapons, or militarily significant precursors, but also that no party can use its chemical industry to produce such stocks in conditions that would escape the notice of even random inspection. It will therefore be necessary for you to elaborate a complete range of procedures combining routine inspection and challenge inspection.

(Mr. Dumas, France)

What is essential here is to be assured that the necessarily intrusive character of these procedures does not jeopardize the protection of industrial and trade secrets. In this connection, I should like to say that I attach a great deal of hope to the results of the trial inspections that several countries, including France, are carrying out at present, or have just completed, in their domestic chemical industry.

Second area still to be worked on: legal aspects. I will not dwell on this here. I would just like to recall the need to provide for the best possible articulation between the 1925 Protocol and the future convention.

The third area on which we should focus our attention concerns the institutional aspects: the jurisdiction of the organs to be set up under the future convention, their role in inspection, detecting violations and imposing sanctions, the articulation with existing machinery linked to the organs of the United Nations; the possibility that, through the Scientific Council that France is proposing, the convention may be continuously adapted to technological progress. The French delegation plans to table a document on the Scientific Council shortly, and we hope that you will give it a favourable reception.

The fourth area of difficulty is the definition of the field of negotiation itself, where progress should be possible now that the Soviet Union has announced that it no longer wishes to introduce a fourth category of products to be subject to control. But we have yet to come to an understanding on the exact definitions of the weapons and products that are to be covered, the thresholds considered significant, and especially the way of dealing with new agents which may emerge and cause serious concern. Here I am thinking of the increasingly blurred boundary between chemical weapons and biological weapons, especially in the very difficult area of toxins.

I have kept for the end the fifth area for consideration which, after verification, seems to me the most delicate, not to say the most difficult: it pertains to the transition period during which stocks will be destroyed. It concerns more particularly two problems: maintaining the security of all during the transition, and upgrading the status of the convention. First, upgrading the status of the convention. During the Paris Conference the public will have become aware of one of the political dilemmas that we have yet to solve here: how to make the convention a universal instrument straight away, and not just a bilateral agreement between the two main chemical-weapon Powers. To reduce it to those dimensions, as you well know, would be to fail to achieve our goal.

The Paris Declaration recognizes this clearly, emphasizing the "indispensable universal character" of the convention and calling upon "all States to become parties thereto as soon as it is concluded" - and I emphasize these last six words, which form a key phrase. But we have to devise the necessary inducements for this to be done, so that those who hesitate - either because of fears arising from a specific regional context or because of a concern that the development of their civilian chemical industry will be hampered - will be convinced that the agreement which will be put before them presents no risk to them and is solidly based. And it is there that a comprehensive approach to undiminished security during the transition period

(Mr. Dumas, France)

seems to me to be crucial; it must address simultaneously the order of destruction of stocks, non-use as long as stocks continue to exist, assistance and protection, and penalties which could be applied to those holding back the process or evading their obligations.

It goes without saying, obviously, that this question of undiminished security is very closely connected to the nature of the verification régime that I referred to earlier on. Our task - your task - on all these points is immense: drawing the logical conclusions from France's decision to give up all possibilities of producing chemical weapons from the very entry into force of the future convention, we have just withdrawn from the "rolling text" the details of our proposal concerning security stocks. The negotiating text now contains only skeleton provisions which simply remind us of the need to devise a régime that will ensure the security of all when some still have stocks while others no longer have any. We see clearly what should be the essential elements of this future régime: the solution lies in particular in the rejection of any monopoly, even a temporary one; in the asymmetrical destruction of stocks by those who have the most and the others; and in the placing of production and stockpiling facilities under control. If we can reach a rapid understanding on such a régime, if we can supplement it with satisfactory provisions on assistance, if arrangements are made for the application of penalties to any party failing to observe the timetable for destruction, I think that we would have sound arguments to convince anyone who might still be hesitant about becoming party to the convention. It is in this spirit that France adopted the important shift in position you learned of when the President announced at the United Nations that France possesses no chemical weapons and will not produce any once the convention enters into effect.

If disarmament is pursued, there is no reason why France should not draw the consequences. We are resolved that it should be pursued and attain the sought-after result as quickly as possible: this is the purpose of my coming here today, and the meaning of my message to you; it is also the purpose of the effort that we made in convening the Paris Conference; and it is the message I would like to leave with you; it can be concluded, it must be concluded, and this presupposes - as was recognized by the 149 States in Paris - redoubled efforts in order to bring about a satisfactory solution on the five major issues that I have outlined to you.

The considerable work that the Conference on Disarmament has already accomplished, for which I wish to pay you a very special tribute, convinces me that success is within your reach.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank His Excellency the Minister of State and Minister for Foreign Affairs of France for the important address he has just delivered and for the kind words he extended to the Chair. Are there any other delegations wishing to take the floor?

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will take place on Thursday, 9 February at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 4.25 p.m.

# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.485  
9 February 1989

ENGLISH

---

## FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-FIFTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Thursday, 9 February 1989, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Aldo Pugliese (Italy)



The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 485th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference will continue with statements in plenary meetings as well as consideration of the establishment of subsidiary bodies on agenda items and other organizational questions. In accordance with rule 30 of its rules of procedure, however, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

You will recall that, at our last plenary meeting, I announced that the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament might start its work immediately. I am now informed that the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador García Robles of Mexico, has convened the first meeting of the Ad hoc Committee today at 3.30 p.m. in this Council Chamber.

I should also like to inform you that the secretariat has received new requests from non-members to participate in the work of the Conference. Those requests come from Zimbabwe and Iraq. They were circulated yesterday morning in delegations' pigeon-holes for the information of members of the Conference.

I am happy to report to you that informal consultations on the appointment of chairmen for the Ad hoc Committees on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, and on Radiological Weapons, have been successful. I intend to put before the Conference the appointment of those chairmen once our list of speakers is completed.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Argentina, Morocco and the German Democratic Republic and the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the representative of Argentina, Ambassador Cámpora.

Mr. CÁMPORA (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): For a representative of the Argentine Republic it will always be a source of great satisfaction to congratulate the representative of the Italian Republic on taking up the office of President of the Conference on Disarmament, but on this occasion we should like to express our satisfaction in a very special way. Our close personal acquaintance with you, Mr. President, enables us to be sure that your diplomatic talent and your special negotiating skills will be successfully placed at the service of the Conference. Latinism, a concept which is an essential component of the Argentine Republic, is a profound cultural link between your country and mine which in a special way predisposes us to close co-operation on the part of our delegation for the greater success of your work.

We should also like to express our gratitude to the Ambassador of Iran, Ali Shams Ardakani, for his work as President in the month of September and in representing us in that capacity before the United Nations General Assembly. Finally, we welcome the new representatives who are joining the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament this year: Ambassador Sharma of India,

(Mr. Cámpora, Argentina)

Ambassador Reese of Australia, Ambassador Houlliez of Belgium, Ambassador Dietze of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan and Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden.

The year 1988 will be remembered as a particularly successful period in view of the efforts towards peace accomplished in various regional conflicts that had been dragging on with no prospect for a solution in sight. The clear political will to move towards dialogue has presented the international community with a positively encouraging schedule of negotiations. This favourable trend has been underscored by the Argentine delegation on various occasions. Our message has emphasized most especially the fact that growing détente should create the appropriate conditions so that resources at present devoted to the military effort can be reallocated to solving problems related to the economic and social welfare of developing countries.

In our statement of 1 September 1988 before the plenary of the Conference on Disarmament, we also said that the political settlement of regional conflicts, coupled with continuing dialogue on global issues between the heads of State of the two major military Powers on Earth, should remove the deadlock in the multilateral handling of substantive aspects of the disarmament agenda. We warned, however, that the improvement in the international climate is not duly reflected in the multilateral forums dealing with disarmament and international security issues. At the forty-third General Assembly we saw once again the introduction of resolutions which insist on the search for solutions and approaches that fail to bring positions closer. We do not share the views of those who think that the lack of progress in the multilateral framework of the United Nations is due to the fact that it embraces countries which do not possess the nuclear and conventional arsenals that will be subject to reduction or elimination, as if only the major military Powers had the legitimacy to negotiate on disarmament.

In the opposite direction we have followed the positive evolution in the multilateral negotiating process on conventional disarmament and confidence-building measures in Europe. The rationale behind the supposed dichotomy between the bilateral and multilateral dimensions gives way when confronted with positive signs like the recent Vienna agreement in the framework of the "Helsinki process". The third review session of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe has just concluded with the adoption of a document of major significance to peace and security not only in Europe but world wide. Thirty-three European States, some of them members of the two military alliances, others neutral and non-aligned, plus the United States and Canada, adopted a series of undertakings of the greatest importance. These commitments set up two negotiating forums. The first, which is limited to members of the two alliances, has a mandate to negotiate on conventional armaments and forces in Europe. The second negotiating forum comprises the members of the two alliances as well as the neutral and non-aligned, with a mandate dealing with confidence-building measures and security. We consider the two sets of negotiations to be parallel processes linked by a formal agreement to exchange views and information. This example clearly indicates that the handling of security and disarmament issues does not hinge exclusively on the number or weight of the participants, but rather on the existence of a real effort to find appropriate machinery for the negotiations in question. Large, medium-sized and small Powers are equally

(Mr. Cámpora, Argentina)

well qualified to participate in disarmament matters. The Vienna experience should be emulated in Geneva, where the Conference on Disarmament runs the risk of turning progressively into what it is not, namely a deliberative non-negotiating forum.

The Conference on Disarmament has on its agenda a series of items which, as is the case with the negotiations on European disarmament in Vienna, involve armaments and forces which are not necessarily in the possession of all the States members of the Conference. However, the existence of nuclear and conventional arsenals undeniably influences stability and security at the global and regional levels. Specifically, and as far as the Conference on Disarmament is concerned, it is evident that the almost complete standstill that prevails with regard to the issues on its agenda dealing with nuclear weapons contrasts with what is happening in other negotiating forums, like Vienna, where the will to bring different positions closer together and seek valid alternatives has prevailed after more than a decade of frustrations.

With regard to nuclear disarmament, my delegation, whilst noting with regret the inactivity in the multilateral sphere, ventures to urge the continuation of the bilateral dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union. We hope that the negotiations on 50-per-cent reductions in strategic arsenals (START) will be resumed soon. An issue that will need to be tackled with a renewed spirit of compromise is that of nuclear weapon tests. We have noticed with some unease that the pace and intensity of the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union have slowed down noticeably. Under the timetable agreed by the parties, these negotiations should lead to the conclusion of verification protocols to the 1974 and 1976 treaties on nuclear weapon explosions and peaceful nuclear explosions respectively, leading to the subsequent ratification of the treaties. We believe that the next session of the Group of Scientific Experts of the Conference on Disarmament, in March, could constitute an appropriate occasion for the delegations of the United States and the Soviet Union to provide information about the results of the joint verification experiments of August and September 1988. We feel, moreover, that this would provide a positive practical input to the future setting up of an international seismological network.

Whilst nuclear disarmament has the highest priority, we must recognize that the time has come to conclude without delay a convention for the complete prohibition of chemical weapons. Since the end of the 1988 session of the Conference on Disarmament, decisions have been taken which highlight the existing consensus on this issue in the international community, namely, resolutions 43/74 A and C of the United Nations General Assembly and the Final Declaration of the Paris Conference. Resolutions 43/74 A and C contain references to the work of the Conference on Disarmament on its agenda item 4. In particular, resolution 43/74 C expresses the hope that the Conference will give a strong impetus to the continuation and successful conclusion of negotiations on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction, intensifying its efforts during the 1989 session with a view to the final elaboration of the convention.

The chemical weapons issue was also addressed at a high political level at the Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons that took place in

(Mr. Cámpora, Argentina)

Paris from 7 to 11 January last. I consider that this is an appropriate occasion to express our gratitude to the Government of France for the efficient organization of the Conference as well as the hospitality offered to delegations. The Paris Conference was an international event of great significance in the long history of multilateral efforts aimed at limiting and eliminating chemical weapons. A hundred years have elapsed since the signature of the Hague Declaration in 1899, a pioneering document in this field, inasmuch as it banned the use of projectiles to spread asphyxiating and poisonous gases. Moreover, 63 years have passed since the Geneva Protocol was signed.

Seen in a historical perspective, the Paris Conference marks the start of the final stage in the process towards chemical disarmament. The participation of delegations from 149 States, in other words practically the entire international community, as well as the presence of numerous Ministers for Foreign Affairs, demonstrated the importance of a meeting that had a great impact on world public opinion. The adoption of the Final Declaration by consensus proved that it is possible to reach agreement at a multilateral level on a global scale, thus strengthening this dimension of disarmament. The Declaration also includes a unanimous condemnation of the use of chemical weapons and emphasizes the need to finalize the text of the convention at an early date. The Conference on Disarmament must respond to this appeal in an effective way, both at the procedural level and as regards the substantive issues in the negotiations, because it could not continue its work in a routine manner, impervious to the influence of such a singular political development. The Paris Conference not only focused the attention of world public opinion on the problem of the existence of chemical weapons, but also raised growing expectations in respect of negotiations on the convention. In this regard, we deem it important to draw the attention of the Conference to the terms of the statement made by the Group of 21 on 7 February, expressing the views of the neutral and non-aligned countries on the need to bring the terms of the mandate of the ad hoc committee on this subject into line with the political commitment entered into by our Governments, and by almost the entire international community, through the above-mentioned pronouncements. The message of the Paris Conference must be put into practice now, and to this end the designation of the representative of France, Ambassador Pierre Morel, to preside over the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons this year seems to us to be a very timely decision.

The prevention of an arms race in outer space remains a matter of the highest importance in the view of the Argentine delegation. It is clear that the climate of international détente should also exert a positive influence on the work of the Conference in this field. There are no reasons to prevent the Ad hoc Committee - which we hope will soon be re-established - from moving forward in the consideration of concrete measures aimed at the prevention of an arms race in space. The year now beginning has an additional interest as it will witness the third conference to review the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof. This international instrument, which has already undergone two reviews in the past, is of particular significance in that it keeps a part of our planet free from nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass

(Mr. Cámpora, Argentina)

destruction. The review process will enable us to establish the degree of compliance by States parties as well as to analyse in depth recent and future developments that might be relevant to the denuclearization of the sea-bed.

Finally, and to sum up, the Argentine delegation considers that during 1989 the Conference on Disarmament should be in a position to make considerable progress in negotiations on item 1, relating to the nuclear test ban, item 4, the convention on chemical weapons, and item 5, measures designed to prevent the beginning of an arms race in outer space.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Argentina for his statement, for the kind words addressed to the Chair and for the warm expressions about my country. I now give the floor to the representative of Morocco, Ambassador Benhima.

Mr. BENHIMA (Morocco) (translated from French): First of all, Mr. President, allow me to convey to you my delegation's warm congratulations as you take up the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for this first month of the spring session. Your distinguished personal qualities and your long diplomatic experience will without any doubt enable our Conference to start its work well. For our part my delegation and myself can assure you of our co-operation. I would also like to take this opportunity to congratulate your predecessor, Ambassador Ardakani, on the way in which he assumed his responsibilities as President of the Conference at the end of the last session. I would also like to extend a warm welcome to our new colleagues: Ambassadors Kamallesh Sharma of India, Marcel Houlliez of Belgium, Peter Dietze of the German Democratic Republic, Mutuale Kikanke of Zaire, Carl-Magnus Hyltenius of Sweden, Ahmad Kamal of Pakistan and David Reese of Australia.

As we stand on the threshold of Year Nine of this decade, a look backwards over the past year will enable us to see clearly, and hence better tackle, the task that lies ahead of us throughout this new session of our Conference. The year 1988 brought with it great hopes for the international community. It was the year of sustained dialogue and consolidated détente between the two major Powers and their respective allies. It saw the implementation of the Treaty on intermediate-range nuclear missiles and the signature of the two American-Soviet agreements concerning the creation of nuclear risk reduction centres and notifications of launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. It was also marked by the intensification of negotiations between the two super-Powers on START. Furthermore, 1988 saw a beginning to the settlement of several regional conflicts, which is incontestably a further important step in the consolidation of this new era of détente and the promise of peace.

While it may be said that last year was a rich one as far as bilateral disarmament was concerned, we are nevertheless obliged to recognize that it did not live up to our expectations at the multilateral level. The deep disappointment at the outcome of the third session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, accentuated by the lack of progress in the Conference, particularly with regard to the priority issues, that is to say the items on nuclear disarmament, has not yet subsided. Hence there is an urgent need to

(Mr. Benhima, Morocco)

show real political will so that multilateral negotiation may rise to the level of the dynamics that characterize the bilateral negotiations. To that end every effort must be made to ensure that 1989 is a year of progress on all fronts.

At a time when international relations are experiencing great changes owing to the East-West rapprochement and the replacement of confrontation and distrust by dialogue, the Conference must ensure that large-scale mobilization goes hand in hand with this evolution. The cosmogony of rigid positions that has always presided over our debates and our negotiations is in the process of becoming obsolete, thereby aggravating the risk that our Conference will be sidelined by standing aside from this great epic of disarmament. The Conference, which already has 10 years of work behind it, unfortunately has few achievements to its credit - except for the chemical weapons convention - bearing in mind the effort and energy invested up till now in discharging its mandate. That is why at the beginning of this new period we must strive to find other paths in order not to commit the error of revelling in lethargy and resignation.

We have always proclaimed our belief in the complementarity of bilateral and multilateral negotiations, just as we have also hoped that the progress made in the bilateral area will create a dynamic in the multilateral area. But we can only regret that our wait for this synergy between these two levels still continues. Is it because we have not been able to benefit from new factors in the international situation by remaining deaf to all the changes that have taken place at the global level? Our reply is in the affirmative. If substantial achievements in bilateral disarmament have occurred in the past year, it is because they stem from a realization and a conclusion. The realization concerns the antagonism and distrust generated by the escalating arms race. Hence the conclusion that we must change the perception of security and base it on the rapprochement of positions through dialogue in order to attain a common objective, that of a world at peace.

The Conference could have drawn on this progression by emphasizing the necessary flexibility which would make it possible, without denying or renouncing principles, to reach agreement on the greatest number of common denominators that can overcome the deadlock in the negotiations. The wind of change is blowing throughout the world. And it is time for the Conference on Disarmament to move into its slipstream. In fact, this session could not begin under better auspices. The success of the Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons and the announcement by the Soviet Union that it is to begin destroying its chemical weapons stocks without waiting for the conclusion of the convention, the recent agreement in Vienna concerning the negotiating mandate on conventional weapons in Europe, testify - if proof were still needed - to the new trends in international relations. Indeed, these recent developments, which are a source of great satisfaction for us all, must inspire our Conference. It must find in them the political impetus, as well as the example to be followed, so that its work may evolve in the direction of the hopes it carries with it.

The international Conference on chemical weapons that was held in Paris last month is indisputably an event of great historical significance. Besides the new lease of life that it gave to the Geneva Protocol of 1925, it was the

(Mr. Benhima, Morocco)

illustration of universal mobilization to promote the banishment of these inhuman weapons forever, and it showed the consensus reached with regard to the importance and urgency of concluding the international convention on chemical weapons which is being negotiated by our Ad hoc Committee. In our view, this consensus does not reflect only a harmony of views among the 150 participating countries. It is the expression of a universal commitment to eliminate chemical weapons totally from the surface of the Earth. Just as it also bears witness to unanimous tribute and unfaltering support by the international community for the work that has been going on in the Conference on Disarmament for a decade in this particular area. Finally, this consensus carries in it the political impetus so much sought by our Conference. I hope that our Conference will be able to make maximum use of it in order to progress rapidly in its negotiations so that the chemical weapons convention becomes a reality soon. My delegation will return to the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons at greater length in a future statement.

I would not like to close this chapter without carrying out an agreeable duty, by expressing our immense gratitude to the French people and Government for the hospitality and perfect organization of the Conference, to the success of which Ambassador Morel contributed a readiness to co-operate, dynamism and talent.

Since the beginning of the nuclear era, and more particularly since the appearance of thermonuclear weapons at the end of the 1940s, the comprehensive nuclear test ban is one of the most burning questions on the disarmament agenda. The high priority given to this problem by the international community was the reflection of a universal aspiration by way of reaction to the horrors caused by the use of nuclear weapons at the end of the Second World War. With a view to avoiding such catastrophes in the future, intense and long negotiations were started in order to ban nuclear testing. The first results that were achieved were limited, but nevertheless a source of encouragement. The first international treaty on nuclear weapons of 1963 banned nuclear testing only in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. Its scope was, moreover, curtailed by the non-accession of two of the five nuclear-weapon States. The American-Soviet bilateral agreements of 1974 and 1976 concerning the limitation of underground nuclear weapon testing did not further the cause of a nuclear test ban. The objective pursued and their bilateral dimension only legitimized tests that the world wanted to halt.

The tripartite negotiations between the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union started in 1977 to work towards a treaty completely banning nuclear testing and a protocol concerning nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes gave new hopes to the international community. Unfortunately, these negotiations proved unsuccessful. Nevertheless, their suspension in 1980 had less of an impact because of the channelling of the main efforts in the direction of a complete ban on nuclear testing within the framework of this multilateral negotiating forum, which arose out of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1978. That session, and I think it should be recalled here, in its unanimously adopted Final Document, gave absolute priority to nuclear disarmament, and considered that the cessation of nuclear testing by all States would make a significant contribution to ending the quantitative improvement of such weapons. We all know the ups and downs suffered by the

(Mr. Benhima, Morocco)

first item on our agenda since then, except for the brief two-year interlude in the subsidiary body which was dealing with it, and the still insoluble problem of the terms of its mandate since 1984.

More than a decade after the historic consensus on this point in the 1978 Final Document, we cannot but regret that the Conference on Disarmament's record in this area is negative. The dozens of resolutions adopted by the General Assembly urging the Conference to establish an ad hoc committee to negotiate an international treaty banning nuclear testing have not produced the hoped-for reaction in this body. We are distressed at its powerlessness to respond to the preoccupations and aspirations of the international community in this area. This situation - the lack not only of negotiations, but above all of any institutional negotiating framework - regrettably condemns us to a role that is not in keeping with the raison d'être of the Conference. We think in this connection that we should give real content to the reassertions of the importance that a nuclear test-ban treaty has for us. Just as we are called upon to go beyond the stage of demonstrating that the end of the nuclear arms race and the prevention of proliferation depend on the halting of nuclear testing.

After so many years of long discussions there is no need to seek to validate a reality that is recognized by all the experts, in the East as well as in the West. This reality, which stands by the force of its own logic, imposes one single approach: the prohibition of nuclear tests for ever. These are truths that need not be recalled or reaffirmed because they have been examined and re-examined in great detail. Moreover, these are realities that all lead to the same single objective - the cessation of nuclear testing in the context of broad consensus. The very fact that all delegations meet in this objective is a major contribution to the negotiating process which is to be initiated and pursued. It is also the expression of a political will constituting a credo which recurs in all statements. Consequently, why should we not seek the reasons to go beyond the differences of methodology that have always blocked the path towards this international instrument so long striven for?

The time of conflict is over. The same is true for rigid and set positions. Common sense obliges us to be courageous enough to recognize that the path followed in the consideration of this first agenda item has led us to, and placed us in, a deadlock for almost five years now. Faced with such a situation, and bearing in mind the very special international context in which our present session is taking place, we must recognize the urgent need to adapt, to change our approach, by seeking what can unite us rather than dwelling on what divides us. In this connection, my delegation, while remaining true to the Group of 21's position of principle in this area, is of the view that the quest for a compromise on the subject of the mandate of the ad hoc committee on this item is an urgent task. Agreement in principle has already been reached on the creation of the organic structure within which the work will proceed. The terms of the mandate to be entrusted to it are still a subject of discord which, far from being resolved, has only increased antagonism over the years.

That is why my delegation would like to invite all the members of the Conference to face firmly up to the challenge offered by this contentious



(Mr. Benhima, Morocco)

mandate. Two alternatives are open to us to meet this challenge. They demand a dose of political flexibility accompanied by a minimum of realism and far-sightedness. The first alternative involves, in our view, drawing from resolutions 43/63 and 43/64, just adopted by the United Nations General Assembly with a large majority, everything that would help us forge an area of convergence and serve as a framework for the mandate in question. These two resolutions have the merit of moving towards the same target, but along different paths. Let us show political courage and pick out all those elements they contain which could help us, if only to move out of the present deadlock. Perhaps - and my delegation does not doubt this at all - the very fact of starting on the Committee's mandate will generate a dynamic which will necessarily remove all the other obstacles.

The other alternative lies in the benefit that we could derive from what has been called the President's non-document, which has become more official under the symbol CD/863. We think that this draft could serve as a basis for our work in elaborating the future mandate of the ad hoc committee. It is true that two years ago this document did not meet with a unanimous reception, but nevertheless it does in its substance respond, to a very great extent, to the concerns of all sides. In this context we are counting on possible progress with regard, for example, to the detailed elaboration of verification procedures in the future treaty. Moreover, since the INF agreement this sensitive question of verification has lost some of its mythical complexity. The INF agreement established that while verification may be complex, it is not impossible. The sole key is of a political nature. And that is what we have been saying continuously for 10 years. Together with the lessons to be drawn from the system of verification established in the context of the INF agreements, mention should be made of the progress made in the arduous and very important work accomplished to date by the Group of Seismological Experts. We are encouraged by the work done to date in clearing the ground in the scientific and technical areas in connection with the question of banning nuclear testing. Despite the deadlock at the political level, this Group of Experts, under the outstanding chairmanship of Dr. Dahlman, has persevered in its mission without ever losing hope in an agreement that must be inevitable on the banning of nuclear tests.

In its first statement of this year, my delegation has chosen the language of compromise. This approach does not at all mean that in the past our attitude was not inspired by the same concern. Our position has always been marked by flexibility and has always responded to the desire to seek whatever could reconcile points of view. We remain true to these principles in the field of disarmament. These are the very same that we subscribed to in the Final Document, and with which my country remains associated in the non-aligned movement. Our will to realize and implement them is still as ardent as it ever was. Likewise, our efforts and contribution to achieve general and complete disarmament under international control remain as keen as ever. Because what is achieved in other spheres of negotiation is not a miracle. It is solely the result of a new form of thinking and analysis based on the changes that are under way in the world. Let us show open-mindedness and conjugate all our efforts and resolve so that what has been made possible elsewhere becomes a possibility for us too. We make this wish particularly for the question of the nuclear test ban.

(Mr. Benhima, Morocco)

The unprecedented number of eminent personalities who honoured the Conference on Disarmament last year by coming to address it demonstrates that our forum enjoys substantial prestige and benefits from continued credibility. All of them were unanimous in reaffirming the importance they attach to our work and the confidence that they place in it. Let us live up to all the hopes that are placed in our task, and let us act together to make progress for the common cause of general and complete disarmament. We are convinced that it is up to us alone for the Conference on Disarmament to discharge as it should the mission that has been entrusted to it by the international community.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Morocco for his statement and for the kind words he has addressed to me. I should like now to give the floor to the representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Dietze.

Mr. DIETZE (German Democratic Republic): First, Mr. President, let me say a word in tribute to your balanced and encouraging statement at the opening of the 1989 spring session of the Conference on Disarmament. I should like to congratulate you warmly and wish you success in your work. I am doing this with particular pleasure since the German Democratic Republic enjoys fruitful relations with your country. At the same time, I am confident that under your able and efficient stewardship the Conference will be heading for a good start which will lead us to concrete results in the negotiating process. In this endeavour, you may rest assured of my delegation's full support. The outgoing President, Ambassador Ardakani, deserves our appreciation and gratitude for his commitment during the past period of work. With your kind permission, Mr. President, I should also like to take this opportunity to thank you and other heads of delegation for the friendly welcome extended to me.

This year's session of the Conference on Disarmament is starting its work under favourable circumstances. Important changes have taken place in international relations. The world has witnessed the scrapping of highly sophisticated nuclear weapons in the wake of the INF Treaty, which constitutes the first genuine measure of nuclear disarmament. At the same time, negotiations are under way on halving the strategic nuclear potentials of the USSR and the United States in the context of strict adherence to the ABM Treaty. We hope that they will produce concrete results soon. The Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons and the successful conclusion of the Vienna CSCE follow-up meeting added to these encouraging developments. Moreover, socialist States have made important contributions to give further dynamism to these positive developments.

Following the initiative announced by General Secretary Gorbachev at the forty-third General Assembly session, considerable unilateral reductions of Soviet troops and armaments are to be carried out on the territories of four allied countries, including the German Democratic Republic, and a timetable has been laid down for the withdrawal of the Soviet troops covered by the reductions from the German Democratic Republic. What is more, our Head of State, Erich Honecker, announced a few days ago that the German Democratic Republic will cut back its armed forces by 10,000 troops by 1990, unilaterally and independently of negotiations in Vienna. This will be coupled with

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

reductions in weapons systems, such as tanks and aircraft; arms spending will be reduced by 10 per cent and the armed forces will be given an even more pronounced defensive character. Detailed information is contained in document CD/883, which has been circulated in the Conference.

In its fortieth year of existence, the socialist German State is a reliable partner for all who are sincere in their pursuit of peace, disarmament and security, and this new disarmament initiative of the German Democratic Republic attests to that. It proves that there is no discrepancy between words and deeds, and that we are persistently and resolutely working towards a weapon-free world. We hope that these unilateral steps, and similar steps taken by other socialist countries, will have a mobilizing effect, and that the process of disarmament now under way will also receive a distinct impulse from the other side.

It should be added here that the Warsaw Treaty Organization has just recently issued a statement on the relative strength of the armed forces and armaments of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Europe and adjacent sea areas. It gives a comprehensive and, we think, objective overall picture of the disparities which have to be eliminated in accordance with the principle that the side which has an edge makes the requisite reductions. This is a remarkable contribution to confidence-building and to preparations for the negotiations on conventional disarmament in Europe which are to start in Vienna in March this year.

All this goes to show that the year 1989 has made a promising start. Now it is up to us, the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, to seize the chance offered. Let us contribute our share to ensure that disarmament, which has just made its first steps, continues without any pause and that this process is made irreversible. This is all the more urgent in view of the fact that the security situation is not yet a stable one, that tremendous arsenals with a great diversity of weapons continue to exist, and that one may discern a desire to compensate for disarmament in one field through weapons modernization in others. Modernization of nuclear weapons is indeed a step backward, as stated by Ambassador Theorin on behalf of the Swedish Government on Tuesday, and we understand this concern in the light of the latest developments.

All the more important is the responsibility of the Conference on Disarmament to make use of the increased possibilities in the disarmament field. The German Democratic Republic expects this session to make decisive strides towards finalizing the convention on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons. We also expect ways and means to be found to proceed to concrete work on a comprehensive nuclear test ban and nuclear disarmament. Finally, we expect thorough consideration to be given to practical measures to prevent the arms race from spilling over into outer space.

The day before yesterday the distinguished French Foreign Minister quite impressively summed up the results of the Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons, and submitted proposals on future action. In fact, the Paris Conference has entrusted us with a mandate to conclude the negotiations

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

and deliver mankind from the burden of this dangerous category of weapons of mass destruction. In this endeavour, the Paris Declaration is a programme of action, from all points of view.

In Paris, 149 States came out in favour of redoubled efforts for the prohibition of chemical weapons, to be undertaken by the Conference on Disarmament. One hundred and forty-nine States demanded that the convention should be concluded at the earliest date, and they called upon all States to make an appropriate contribution towards achieving that end. My country is fully committed to what was agreed upon in Paris. It is among the States which have declared that they do not possess chemical weapons. The German Democratic Republic advocates an international moratorium on the production of chemical weapons before the entry into force of the convention, and we have introduced strict export controls for dual-purpose chemicals. We continue our efforts towards the creation of a chemical-weapon-free zone in Central Europe - an area of ultra-high weapons density - because this, we feel, will facilitate a global solution. We are prepared to sign the chemical weapons convention immediately after its completion.

The USSR's cessation of its chemical weapons production, and its announcement that it will unilaterally start the destruction of its chemical weapons stockpiles this year, is a significant advance to foster the speedy continuation of our negotiations. In that light, we are all the more concerned, frankly speaking, over decisions on the production of binary weapons. None the less, we have to step up our efforts so that 1989 will become a crucial year for the negotiations on a chemical weapons convention.

For the achievement of a real breakthrough, it is imperative now to focus the work of the Conference even more on solving the still pending essential issues. As we see it, these issues include:

Firstly, harmonization of the verification régimes as set forth in the text of the draft convention. Verification must be adequate, effective and feasible - which means it must give sufficient assurance of compliance with the convention; the methods of inspection and monitoring must be highly reliable, and their costs affordable and appropriate to their objectives. It must be clarified whether the types of inspections so far provided for in the draft convention, namely routine and challenge inspections, are sufficient or whether they ought to be complemented by others, for example ad hoc inspections. Experience gathered in the context of trial inspections, including those carried out in my country, may be used for taking a decision of principle in that regard.

Secondly, completion of the provisions concerning challenge inspection. They are indeed an essential element for the verification system.

Thirdly, the order of destruction for chemical weapons stocks and chemical weapons production facilities. This is a crucial aspect of ensuring the principle of undiminished security during the period of destruction.

Fourthly, agreement in principle on the composition of the Executive Council. This organ will have to take important political decisions in future daily work in the implementation of the convention being negotiated.

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

We support dynamic methods to be applied in the Ad hoc Committee and in its working groups, concentrating on the identification and solution of such essential problems. We are prepared to chair one of the working groups.

Such an approach would help to make headway in matters of substance, as is rightly demanded. It would also be a concrete follow-up to the Paris Declaration. The German Democratic Republic is ready to make its own contribution towards this end by submitting substantive proposals and carrying out an international trial inspection.

When considering the nuclear items on our agenda we have to take into account that more than 700 Soviet and American intermediate-range missiles have been scrapped. Tentative agreement has been reached on quite a few of the key provisions in the Soviet-American draft treaty on the reduction and limitation of the strategic offensive weapons of the USSR and the United States. Progress in the first phase of the nuclear test negotiations between these two States, which are aimed at the eventual cessation of nuclear testing, is settling into shape.

Is it not time, then, to get down to business - notwithstanding all the obstacles - with regard to the nuclear items on our agenda too? Not that we underestimate the difficulties involved. Yet should this be allowed to hinder us from fully harnessing the potential for agreement and to meet each other halfway? What counts is that a beginning is made. This goes particularly for the prohibition of nuclear weapon testing.

In our view, 44 years after the first nuclear weapon test was carried out, it is appropriate to open the discussion of basic elements of a test-ban treaty. We hold that the development of national technical means of verification, the results achieved in the Group of Seismic Experts, the Soviet-American verification experiment, as well as the proposals of the Six-State Initiative are encouraging enough for us to start as a first step with the elaboration of a verification system. The German Democratic Republic would be prepared to submit a relevant document to the Conference. In this context, may I also recall the proposal advanced by the Foreign Minister of the USSR that a special group of experts should be entrusted with devising recommendations for the structure and function of a verification system? It is also laudable that the activities of seismic experts on the exchange of level II data are to be continued; the German Democratic Republic will keep participating in these efforts.

On balance, it seems to be most imperative to reach agreement on a framework for further steps. We hold that the Czechoslovak proposal, supported by the German Democratic Republic and other socialist countries, on the mandate for a subsidiary organ could be a practical solution provided all sides display their good will. Like any attempt at compromise it does not of course correspond to what we consider the optimum, but it could help make a fresh start.

For the German Democratic Republic, situated as it is on the dividing line between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO, the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament is a matter of vital interest. We support any measure which is designed to facilitate in-depth discussion of these issues in

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

terms of substance at the Conference. And substance there is - to mention only the proposals submitted by the Soviet Union in 1986 and by India in 1988 on the phased elimination of nuclear weapons. Another point of interest in this context, is what experience generally applicable to multilateral nuclear disarmament can be gathered from the INF Treaty. Last but not least, I would like to refer to the material provided and experience gained at the International Meeting on Nuclear-weapon-free zones in Berlin. Documentation on this subject has been made available to all delegations in response to requests received.

We would suggest that informal deliberations in the plenary should be started without delay, and that a serious dialogue on questions of multilateral nuclear disarmament should be taken up. We are prepared to co-operate with interested delegations to map out a well-prepared and co-ordinated course for such discussions.

Last year, quite a few initiatives were undertaken in terms of more concrete work on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. A considerable number of proposals are on the table. What matters now, as we see it, is to explore all avenues in the course of structured discussions in order to proceed to negotiations. My country is prepared, together with the Mongolian People's Republic, to further elaborate on the proposal advanced in the previous year on basic provisions of a treaty prohibiting ASAT weapons and guaranteeing the immunity of objects in outer space, and I think that, together with the Swedish proposals on ASAT problems referred to by Ambassador Theorin, there will be sufficient substance for a serious approach to these questions. We also endorse the Soviet proposal for the establishment of an outer space organization and the setting up of an inspectorate to verify outer space activities. Given the complexity of this subject, we suggest that a meeting of experts should be organized on scientific and technological aspects of the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

This statement is meant to air a few observations and ideas concerning the Conference's work at the beginning of this session. My delegation is ready to play its part so that the current session will yield good results.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the German Democratic Republic for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I should like now to give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Sujka of Poland, who will introduce the report of the Ad hoc Committee, contained in document CD/881, which the secretariat has circulated today.

Mr. SUJKA (Poland): Mr. President, allow me first of all to express my satisfaction at the fact that the Conference on Disarmament has started its work under your experienced leadership, which I believe will ensure a good start for this important working year.

I am taking the floor today as outgoing Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to present the report which was adopted by the Committee on 3 February and which is now before you as document CD/881. This report

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

covers the work carried out during the inter-sessional period on the basis of the recommendations contained in the Committee's last report of 12 September 1988 (CD/874), and approved by the Conference on 20 September.

As requested by the Conference, the Committee resumed its work under my chairmanship. Firstly, in preparation for the resumed session, open-ended consultations of the Ad hoc Committee were held between 29 November and 15 December 1988. Secondly, the Ad hoc Committee held a session of limited duration during the period between 17 January and 3 February 1989. The results of the Committee's work have been registered in the report in an updated version of the "rolling text". In general, it maintains the structure and follows the pattern of previous sessions. In particular, it reflects the results of consideration of the following issues in the framework of the three working groups.

Group A, under the chairmanship of Mr. Andrej Cima of Czechoslovakia, considered the issue of confidentiality with regard to verification of non-production of chemical weapons in the chemical industry. Agreements reached enabled us to include in appendix II two new texts: a set of guidelines to be used in the elaboration of a régime for the handling and protection of confidential information, and a classification system for confidential information. Appropriate references to the issue of confidentiality were also placed in articles IV, V, and IX of the draft convention in appendix I. More work is needed on this issue, but a broad exchange of views on this delicate and very important problem will be very useful in the further search for common ground in this area.

Issues pertaining to schedule [1] chemicals outside the single small-scale production facility were also discussed in this group, and some progress was achieved, especially concerning facilities producing schedule [1] chemicals in quantities exceeding 100 g per year. The present state of affairs is reflected in appendix II.

Group B, under the chairmanship of Mr. Pablo Macedo of Mexico, concentrated its work on two issues, namely undiminished security during the period of destruction of chemical weapons, and article X on assistance. Although it was not possible to transform the results of the intensive discussions on the first issue into concrete language, and further work on this subject is needed, nevertheless we now have a clearer picture of possible approaches to this outstanding issue and, I believe, a good foundation to resolve this problem. On the other hand, we have an indirect result of these discussions: following the statements made in the Committee on 31 January by Ambassador Morel of France, Ambassador Nazarkin of the USSR and the representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mongolia and China, appendix III as contained in CD/874 has been removed in its entirety from our report. In addition, several footnotes relating to the concept of undiminished security were either deleted or redrafted. I would like to underline that this is an important step forward on this politically, militarily and technically intricate question.

As concerns article X, the title of which now reads "Assistance and protection against chemical weapons", the new text as developed and agreed to in Group B is reflected in appendix II as a basis for future work.

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

Group C, under the chairmanship of Mr. Sadaaki Numata of Japan, invested a good deal of practical work in elaborating how challenge inspections may be conducted in practice in the context of the guidelines on the international inspectorate. The result of very active and intense discussions is the addition of section IV to the guidelines in the addendum to appendix I. However, to the extent that the work has been carried out using as a basis the principles governing on-site inspection on challenge contained in appendix II of the "rolling text", which require further consideration and elaboration, there are still important issues to be resolved.

There has been valuable progress in this Group in clarifying the interrelationship between the highest organ of the Organization, which we will now call the Conference of the States Parties, the Executive Council and the technical secretariat under article VIII. As a consequence the numerous references in the earlier "rolling text" to the International Authority, Consultative Committee or General Conference have been clarified and made more precise.

The results of the work during the resumed session are embodied in the report I am submitting today. I should like to take this opportunity to add a few personal comments.

In 1982 as well as in 1988, I was privileged to preside over the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, and in both of these cases I was faced with the exceptional requirement of three reports. I do hope that this report will bring us nearer to our common goal of completing the negotiations on a global ban on chemical weapons. Valuable progress has been made in many important areas. I would also like to underline that this text does not fully reflect what was done during the entire 1988 session. I have in mind very useful and important events like the preparations for multilateral trial inspections in the chemical industry, and a meeting of experts from chemical industry in many countries which took place last July.

I wish to stress, however, that despite hard and intensive work by all of us during the whole session, the results achieved, though important, are, at least in my opinion, not fully satisfactory. We must all ask ourselves whether we have done everything possible to achieve results matching our expectations. This is particularly important bearing in mind that we are now entering into a new phase in our negotiations. The world community expects us to conclude our work urgently and responsibly. This request was made explicitly during the last session of the General Assembly of the United Nations in its consensus resolutions on chemical weapons, as well as in the Final Act of the Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons. We must not lose our impetus and the strong political will demonstrated by some 150 countries. We have a special opportunity for a real redoubling of our efforts to resolve expeditiously the remaining issues and to conclude the convention at the earliest date, as stated in the Final Declaration of the Paris Conference.

I believe that the present report constitutes a good starting-point on this path. This being said, I wish to pay a warm and special tribute to my immediate collaborators in this endeavour - the chairmen of the three working groups. I am sure that all delegations will join me in extending to them our



(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

sincere appreciation and thanks for their competence, dedication and hard work. I also wish to thank all delegations for the co-operation they have never failed to extend to me, especially at difficult times, and for their contributions to our work.

I would like to express my special gratitude to the Secretary of the Committee, Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail. His competence and highest professional skill, which I already had the opportunity to appreciate during my first chairmanship of the Committee in 1982, greatly contributed to our negotiations. My thanks go also to Ms. Darby and other members of the secretariat for their indispensable and effective support. I also wish to express my thanks to the interpreters, translators and all technical staff who have helped to make our work smooth and effective.

My last words will be addressed to my successor. We are all familiar with Ambassador Pierre Morel's qualities. I am sure that besides his competence, dedication and charm, he will bring to this Committee all the enthusiasm that is needed to take us a long stride along the road to success. In handing over the task of carrying the work further, I wish to pledge to him my full support and that of my delegation.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons for introducing the report of the Ad hoc Committee, and also for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I should like to convey to Ambassador Sujka the appreciation of the Conference for the effective manner in which he conducted the work of the Ad hoc Committee. I also wish to congratulate him on the successful conclusion of the work of the Ad hoc Committee. In this connection, I should like to inform members that I intend to put before the Conference for adoption the report of the Ad hoc Committee at our next plenary meeting on Tuesday 14 February. I do hope that, on that occasion, we shall be able to re-establish the Ad hoc Committee and appoint its Chairman, so that we may resume work immediately on this important agenda item. If so, we shall also take up for decision all requests by non-members to participate in the work of the Conference on Chemical Weapons.

I have no other speakers on my list for today. Does any other member wish to take the floor at this stage? I see none.

I now wish to turn to the appointment of the chairmen of the Ad hoc Committees on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, and on Radiological Weapons.

I first put before the Conference the appointment of Ambassador Ali Shams Ardakani of the Islamic Republic of Iran as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons. May I take it that the Conference agrees to the appointment?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I now turn to the appointment of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, a position for which Ambassador Oswaldo de Rivero of Peru has been nominated. May I take it that the Conference so agrees?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I should like to extend to Ambassadors Ardakani and de Rivero our congratulations on the important assignments given to them. I also wish them success in discharging their responsibilities as presiding officers of the two ad hoc committees.

I am happy to inform you that the informal consultations concerning the mandate and chairmanship of the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space have concluded successfully, and that I intend to take up the relevant decisions at our next plenary meeting on Tuesday. We shall then also invite those non-members wishing to participate in the work of the Ad hoc Committee to do so.

As you know, we normally adopt at plenary meetings on Thursdays the timetable for meetings during the following week. However, since we have just taken some decisions concerning ad hoc committees and shall also do so next Tuesday, I have preferred not to circulate a timetable until I can consult with the incoming chairmen on the requirements of their subsidiary bodies. Once we agree on a programme of work, I shall request the secretariat to circulate the weekly timetable.

I should like also to inform you that many delegations have already transmitted to the secretariat communications indicating their composition. May I appeal to those who have not yet done so to send such communications to the secretariat, so that the list of participants may be issued as soon as possible?

I have no other business for today. I now intend to adjourn this plenary meeting. Before doing so, may I recall that the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament will meet this afternoon at 3.30 p.m. in this conference room?

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 14 February at 10 a.m. sharp.

The meeting rose at 11.35 a.m.

# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.486  
14 February 1989

ENGLISH

---

## FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-SIXTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 14 February 1989, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Aldo Pugliese (Italy)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 486th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the outset, I should like to extend a warm welcome among us to the Minister of State for External Affairs of India, His Excellency Mr. K. Natwar-Singh, who is addressing the Conference today as first speaker. The Minister of State has been very active in the field of disarmament, and in that connection I should like to recall his outstanding role as President of the Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development. He has also addressed this Conference on previous occasions, presenting very ably the views of his Government on a number of critical issues of disarmament. I am sure that the members of the Conference will listen to his statement with particular interest.

May I also extend a warm welcome to our new colleague, the representative of Czechoslovakia, Ambassador Vratislav Vajnar, who used to work in the predecessor of the CD? I am looking forward to co-operating with him in his new functions.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference will listen to statements in plenary meetings and consider the establishment of subsidiary bodies on agenda items and other organizational questions. In accordance with rule 30 of its rules of procedure, nevertheless, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

In addition to previous requests from non-members to participate in the work of the Conference, I wish to inform you that new requests have been received from Chile and Viet Nam. They have been circulated in the delegations' pigeon-holes for the information of the members of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of India, Brazil and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. I now give the floor to the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of India, His Excellency Mr. K. Natwar-Singh.

Mr. NATWAR-SINGH (India): I thank you for your warm words of welcome, Mr. President, and would like to take this opportunity to convey my felicitations to you on assuming the presidency for the opening month of the 1989 session of the Conference on Disarmament. I am confident that under your guidance the Conference will be able to make some progress in discharging its mandate. May I also express my best wishes to the Secretary-General, Ambassador Komatina, and the Deputy Secretary-General, Ambassador Berasategui?

Almost a year has gone by since I last had the privilege of addressing this Conference. The past year has been a significant one in the field of disarmament as we all know. The ongoing bilateral negotiations between the United States of America and the USSR on strategic arms reductions are progressing, even if it has not been possible to resolve all outstanding issues and finalize the treaty. The Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons was noteworthy and useful in that it recorded the unequivocal commitment of States to rid the world of the scourge of chemical weapons and called upon this forum to redouble its efforts to conclude the negotiations on the chemical weapons convention at the earliest date. Shortly thereafter came

(Mr. Natwar-Singh, India)

positive signals from Vienna, where one of the most significant accords in the history of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe was signed. Although the CSCE process is limited to the European States, it is an encouraging development for the rest of the world community. An important breakthrough in the new agreement relates to the mandate for negotiations on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe. It is to be hoped that this momentum will not dissipate and that these negotiations will be more successful than the ill-fated negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions, which had produced no results since 1973.

The third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament took place in June 1988. Although a consensus text did not emerge at the session, SSOD-III helped in focusing world attention on the major disarmament issues of our time and proved to be an important vehicle for giving expression to the universal concern at the nuclear arms race. The Conference also succeeded in mobilizing public opinion in favour of disarmament. A series of proposals and new ideas on disarmament were presented to the special session. India tabled an "Action plan for ushering in a nuclear-weapon-free and non-violent world order" which was later introduced in the CD as document CD/859.

The action plan contains a package of measures that structurally link the entire range of issues at present on the world disarmament agenda. The action plan, in essence, represents a continuation of India's position and initiatives on nuclear disarmament. The most essential feature of the action plan is achievement of the objective of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2010. The nuclear arms race has threatened the very survival of mankind for a considerable period of time. This race, therefore, must be halted and reversed. The INF Treaty has provided a good opening. This must be seized upon and the process taken to its logical conclusion. These are the considerations which prompted us to present the action plan. We considered that the time was opportune for the international community to initiate measures for achieving the objectives laid down in our action plan: to completely eliminate nuclear weapons; to discard the doctrine of deterrence and simultaneously to put in place an international security system that can sustain a nuclear-weapon-free world.

India's action plan is predicated on the hypothesis that genuine nuclear disarmament cannot be achieved without the nuclear-weapon States undertaking a commitment to give up both the doctrine of deterrence and the nuclear weapons that go with it. So long as nuclear-weapon States have nuclear weapons in their arsenals, and so long as their security policies remain contingent upon the possible use of such weapons, a gradual process of reduction of nuclear arms will hardly make the world any safer than it is today.

Our action plan is based on the premise that the process of disarmament cannot be confined to the United States of America and the USSR. There should be a binding commitment by all nations to eliminate nuclear weapons. All nuclear-weapon States must join the process without delay. Those States which are capable of crossing the nuclear threshold should also assume corresponding obligations. The plan calls for negotiation of a new treaty to give legal effect to binding commitments by the entire international community to eliminate all nuclear weapons by the year 2010.

(Mr. Natwar-Singh, India)

The action plan provides for a series of collateral measures during its three stages which will have the effect of building confidence, facilitating the implementation of agreed measures and negotiations on new measures, and reducing the fear of nuclear war. During the first stage, the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty and a convention to outlaw the use of nuclear weapons, pending their elimination, is proposed. The plan also provides for the elimination of other weapons of mass destruction and drastic reductions in conventional weapons. The plan also calls for the conclusion of a comprehensive international convention banning chemical weapons.

While we regard the action plan as a comprehensive basis for multilateral negotiations, it is not based on an all-or-nothing approach. Nor is it intended that the sequence of measures included in the plan should be rigidly adhered to. What is essential is that the objective of eliminating nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework must be accepted.

My delegation is convinced that all nations, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, have a vital interest in nuclear disarmament. We have been consistently of the view that multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament are long overdue and, therefore, there should be no delay in commencing these negotiations. That is why my delegation has always attached the highest priority to the first three items on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament that cover nuclear disarmament. The role of the CD in this area therefore, needs to be strengthened. Multilateral negotiations will serve in support and accelerate the pace of bilateral efforts, thereby helping to bring us closer to the vision of a nuclear-weapon-free world briefly glimpsed at Reykjavik.

Pending the realization of the goal of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, the most practical and useful interim measure would be a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. Since 1982, we have presented a draft convention on this subject at the General Assembly, a proposal that has been consistently endorsed by an overwhelming majority every year. The resolution calls upon the CD to undertake negotiations on this item on a priority basis. It is universally acknowledged that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. The forswearing of the use of nuclear weapons will help in averting the danger of nuclear war and giving credence to the commitment of the nuclear-weapon States to nuclear disarmament. It would be a demonstration of our common desire to curb the nuclear arms race, delegitimize nuclear weapons as a currency of power and provide momentum to the disarmament process.

The history of disarmament negotiations is often said to be a history of missed opportunities. Nowhere is this more true than with the proposal to prohibit all nuclear weapon test explosions for all time. Thirty-five years ago Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru called for a cessation of nuclear testing. Following this call, a conference of seismic experts produced a report in 1958 declaring that detection of nuclear explosions was feasible; in 1962-1963, the only outstanding issue was the number of on-site inspections; in 1980, the trilateral negotiations had nearly concluded the verification provisions when negotiations were suspended.

(Mr. Natwar-Singh, India)

Since then, a number of technical arguments have been brought up by those who see a comprehensive test-ban treaty only as a long-term objective. Each of these had been proven false. In the Mexico Declaration, circulated here as CD/723 in 1986, the leaders of the Six-Nation Initiative offered to monitor a test ban in co-operation with the United States and the USSR. Further, the political difficulties related to on-site inspection today seem capable of resolution. The most recent of the so-called technical arguments relates to testing for maintaining the credibility of stockpiles. Here too, scientists working in defence laboratories have testified that stockpile reliability is not a major consideration in arguing against a test ban. It is evident that these arguments disguise the real issues at stake. A mere non-negotiating mandate can only keep the Ad hoc Committee busy with these non-issues. That is why we have been against a non-negotiating mandate. However, we should all be prepared to adopt a flexible approach in this regard too if there is a commitment to move ahead with purposive action with the objective of achieving agreement on a CTBT.

At the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, it was agreed that along with the quantitative aspect, the qualitative aspect of the arms race also deserved attention. More than a decade has passed since the 1978 consensus. During this period, most bilateral and multilateral disarmament efforts have focused primarily on the quantitative expansion of arsenals. The issue of the qualitative arms race has not received the attention it deserves. Today the world stands on the threshold of a new arms race.

The cumulative impact of developments taking place in the field of micro-electronics, computers, miniaturization, fuel technology systems, guidance systems, materials, directed energy weapons and many others will transform the future security environment. Decision-making will become increasingly dependent on artificial intelligence, and the response times will be reduced to seconds. Many of these developments can only be dimly perceived at present. Moreover, most of them would not fit into existing security doctrines. However, the incontrovertible momentum of their development will throw up new strategic doctrines to justify the expenditure incurred and create new areas for investment in military budgets. It is the technological momentum of the arms race which has made science and technology the masters of war rather than the servants of peace. Far from gaining security, nations will lose control of the instruments of warfare. Historically, this is the appropriate time to ensure that mankind does not become hostage to the monsters it creates.

At SSOD-III, we put forward a detailed proposal aimed at curbing the qualitative arms race. It is a complex task to distinguish the various aspects of scientific and technological developments and to ensure that they are used only for peaceful purposes. A prerequisite for this is greater access to information. The relationship between the major military States has often suffered because of worst-case-scenario assessments and imaginary "bomber gaps" and "missile gaps", which are perceived really as "technological gaps". Greater transparency and availability of reliable information will be an important confidence-building measure, and also help promote greater international co-operation in these areas. It was with this

(Mr. Natwar-Singh, India)

end in view that we suggested the establishment of a panel of experts for monitoring, assessing and forecasting technologies which have potential military applications. We pursued this proposal at the last session of the General Assembly, where a resolution on this subject was adopted. We believe that the creation of consultative machinery to serve as a mechanism for assessment and forecasting of military applications of future developments in science and technology is necessary today. The General Assembly resolution takes the first step towards such an objective. We hope that the deliberations of the Secretary-General's panel will lay the foundation for action on a continuing basis.

The international community has unanimously recognized outer space as the common preserve of mankind. To expand international co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space, it is essential that it be kept free of all types of weapons. During the last few years, the CD has done valuable work in examining and identifying issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. It is an encouraging sign to note that almost 20 proposals have been tabled by delegations, some relating to specific aspects such as banning ASAT weapons or providing immunity to satellites, as well as other more comprehensive proposals, such as amending the 1967 outer space Treaty or adding a protocol to it or replacing it with a more comprehensive treaty.

It is accepted that the existing legal régime relating to outer space needs to be strengthened and reinforced. In view of technological developments taking place, its limitations have become strikingly evident. New legal instruments need to be developed which would reflect both the new political reality and these technological developments. The existing corpus of international law, in the form of both bilateral and multilateral agreements, indicates the direction in which we have to move.

Verification of compliance is a difficult task, and one often made more complex by lack of pertinent data. Today, the registration Convention cannot be described as an effective source of pertinent data. It needs to be strengthened. It would be useful to have an expert group associated with the Ad hoc Committee which could, as a first task, work on the development of criteria necessary for building up a relevant data base.

Satellite technology has reached a stage where it can be used as an important aid in economic planning and development. Communications, remote sensing, navigation and meteorology are among the fields where developing countries could greatly benefit from the use of satellite technology. We therefore view with great concern the development of anti-satellite weapons systems. Priority must be accorded to a ban on the development of anti-satellite weapons, coupled with the dismantling of the existing systems. It is an encouraging sign, though, that in the two States with the most significant space capabilities, restraint with regard to anti-satellite weapon development is currently being observed. What is needed now are multilateral negotiations to convert this voluntary restraint into a universally binding commitment. The proposal for an expert group would also help in resolving the definitional problems so relevant in considering an ASAT ban. We are also concerned about the ongoing research on new types of anti-ballistic-missile weapons systems. The limits prescribed by the ABM Treaty should not be



(Mr. Natwar-Singh, India)

transgressed, and negotiations should begin on a new legal instrument to ensure that outer space is kept free from the incursion of new weapon systems operated either from ground or from space. It is a matter of regret that the Ad hoc Committee functioning since 1985 has not succeeded in coming to grips with the real issues under this item.

Let me now turn to a somewhat more positive aspect of the work of the CD, where considerable progress has been made during the last year. I refer to the negotiations relating to a chemical weapons convention. A comprehensive, universal and effective prohibition on chemical weapons would lead to an enhancement of security for all nations by removing an entire class of weapons of mass destruction.

The Final Declaration of the recently concluded Paris Conference, in which I participated, reflects clearly the urgency of concluding "at an early date, a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons, and on their destruction". We share the sense of urgency reflected in the Final Declaration, and would urge the Conference on Disarmament to set itself a time frame within which to conclude its negotiations on a chemical weapons convention. We are happily close enough to see the light at the end of the tunnel. Any slow-down at this critical stage would be a serious setback to our efforts, as has happened in other areas of disarmament negotiations in the past. At the same time we also need to refrain from actions which may complicate or frustrate the momentum of the negotiations.

The time has come for us to reflect on how the convention will enter into force with the least possible delay. In our view, an open-ended preparatory commission would need to be set up once the convention is opened for signature. In this interim period till the convention enters into force after the requisite number of instruments of ratification are received, the preparatory commission will have to prepare for the first general conference of the States parties, and also enter into procedural and technical details with the host country and States parties. At present, we observe that far too much time in the Ad hoc Committee is devoted to technical details which divert attention from the political issues that still remain to be resolved. Such details could be identified and resolved by the preparatory commission. The time has come for us to look forward and move with vigour and decisiveness. A clear approach would in itself provide a positive thrust to negotiations in the CD.

If I have been frank in expressing some disappointment with the pace of negotiations in this Conference, it is because India looks upon the CD as a unique institution with immense potentialities. What we need is a commitment to make the CD equal to the challenge of our times. Let us remember something that happened on this planet once before. There was a time when the Earth was dominated by monsters which tried to protect themselves by ever more cumbersome armour, until they were walking fortresses. They never noticed, as they blundered through the forest and swamp, the little creatures that skipped out of their way: the first mammals, our ancestors. It was intelligence, not armour, which prevailed and inherited the Earth. The accumulated arsenals which weigh us down are a self-imposed burden. From our collective wisdom, we

(Mr. Natwar-Singh, India)

need to find resources to free ourselves from this burden so that the true creative potential of humankind may be released. According to an ancient Indian aphorism, it is the mind that binds and the mind that liberates. New beginnings made in recent years give us confidence that we have taken the road of wisdom, and that the decisive turn may already have been taken. May the Conference on Disarmament take us speedily on this path.

The PRESIDENT: I thank His Excellency the Minister of State of India for his important statement, and also for the kind words he addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Brazil, Ambassador Azambuja.

Mr. AZAMBUJA (Brazil): May I say a word of profound regret over the untimely death of Miss Aida Levin? She was, in a very real sense, part of our collective memory and part of our collective conscience.

Mr. President, my very warm congratulations and best wishes go to you, Sir, on your assumption of a very arduous task. My delegation would also like to welcome some new faces to this Conference. We are delighted to have with us Ambassador Houlliez of Belgium, Ambassador Dietze of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden, Ambassador Reese of Australia, Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan and Ambassador Bullut of Kenya. I am sure that I shall have with them the same excellent relations that I was fortunate to have with their distinguished predecessors. Last, but not least, I must thank the Minister of State for External Affairs of India, His Excellency Mr. K. Natwar-Singh, for the honour he confers on our Conference by his presence here today and for the timeliness of the words he has just addressed to us.

This spring session of 1989 begins under very good auspices. On 11 January the Paris Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and other interested States adopted an important Final Declaration, which my delegation expects will give further impetus to the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons and take us nearer a universal and non-discriminatory convention banning forever those terrible means of warfare.

I cannot let pass this opportunity to thank the French Government warmly for the kind hospitality and excellent conference services they provided, which undoubtedly were instrumental in facilitating the outcome of our collective endeavour. Ambassador Pierre Morel must be specially thanked for his untiring efforts in the preparations for the Paris Conference. This augurs well for his chairmanship of the Ad hoc Committee, a nomination that has pleased my delegation not only for very personal reasons, but also for the hopes it brings of a renewed impulse to the chemical negotiations during his tenure.

The Paris Conference helped to heal some of the wounds recent experience in multilateral conferences on matters of disarmament had inflicted on the international community. Consensus was reached, and this is surely something to be hailed. My delegation, however, regrets that consensus seems now possible only in certain specific areas of the disarmament agenda, those that

(Mr. Azambuja, Brazil)

appear to have been designated jointly by the two major Powers as being ready for universal negotiations. In other equally vital areas, things proceed as if it were necessary to be heavily armed as a preliminary step to be able to have a word to say on subsequent disarmament negotiations.

The Final Declaration adopted in Paris has six paragraphs, which very clearly spell out the concerns and expectations of the 149 nations that endorsed it. The first one states unequivocally their commitment not to use chemical weapons. In this light, Brazil hopes sincerely that those States which have made reservations to the Geneva Protocol will seriously examine the possibility of withdrawing such reservations. This would be a positive step towards bringing the international regulations in force prior to the adoption of the new convention into line with the situation which will come into being after the goal of the complete and universal prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons is reached.

The second paragraph reaffirms the validity of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which was indeed one of the main objectives of the convening of the Paris Conference. Let me also welcome another development directly related to that gathering, the important number of new accessions to the Protocol.

The third paragraph - for my delegation the real hub of the entire text - is the emphatic appeal to the Conference on Disarmament "to redouble its efforts, as a matter of urgency, to resolve expeditiously the remaining issues and to conclude the convention at the earliest date". My delegation, as well as the other members of the Group of 21, considered that this very clear language, adopted by all participating States, meant the same to all of us. As we have seen in the negotiations on the question of the mandate to be adopted for the re-established Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, we were wrong, and the mandate could not be brought entirely into line with the letter and the spirit of the Final Declaration of the Paris meeting.

The fourth paragraph gives the Geneva negotiations a very well-defined framework, as it emphasizes that the only answer to the vertical and horizontal dimensions of the spread of chemical weapons is the conclusion and entry into force of a universal and non-discriminatory convention.

The fifth paragraph, regarding the role of the United Nations, reiterates language already widely accepted and gives further impetus to the work of the Group of Experts established under resolution 43/74 A, now meeting in this very building.

The sixth and last paragraph takes up the subject with which I began my appreciation of the successful outcome of the Paris Conference. The consensus around chemical disarmament and the hopes that our work here at the Conference on Disarmament arouse around the world should not let us forget the priorities enshrined in the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly. In spite of the real progress made with the Washington Treaty, the so-called INF agreement, we are still a far cry from approaching in nuclear disarmament the levels that would quiet and comfort mankind's deep and well-founded anxieties.

(Mr. Azambuja, Brazil)

In this regard, I would like to recall the words pronounced by Mr. Roberto de Abreu Sodré, Minister of External Relations of Brazil, at the Paris Conference:

"Concern regarding recourse to chemical weapons must be inscribed in the wider frame of the interdiction of use and threat of use of any weapon, be it conventional or nuclear, for the solution of conflicts - a rule of international law incorporated in the Charter of the United Nations. The engagement through which we try to realize the goal of disarmament in the field of chemical weapons must have its counterpart in other realms, specifically in the nuclear one."

As I said before, 1989 begins with good winds filling our sails. After the Paris Conference, we are all solemnly committed to conclude at the earliest date the convention on the comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons. We know there is no other way, no parallel track. The Brazilian delegation hopes to see this new engagement of the international community reflected in the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons.

The work carried out during the inter-sessional period already furnished proof that things are moving. Under the chairmanship of Ambassador Sujka of Poland, the three working group chairmen made us advance in some relevant points of our agenda. We would like to single out the work done in Group C, under the co-ordination of Mr. Numata of the Japanese delegation, especially taking into account the sensitivity of the main item tackled therein - "Guidelines for the conduct of challenge inspections". While my delegation agrees that these guidelines should be seen in the light of the principles of on-site inspection on challenge still contained in appendix II, it should be recognized that the discussions were enriching and that the different and diverging points of view expressed were very even-handedly reflected in the text finally included in appendix I.

Many important parts of our "rolling text" could not be addressed, for obvious reasons, in the short period between sessions. They should be dealt with in the coming weeks. At this juncture, I would like to underline that my delegation considers that the time has come to address more forcefully the issue of economic and technological development, which is the core of article XI of our draft, still in appendix II. Some resistance to the basic concept of the article seems to be withering away. This would be a most welcome development, for this article, as well as article X, constitutes a key to the universality of our future convention. We think that economic and technological co-operation, besides its intrinsic merits, can serve also as a significant confidence-building measure. As stated in the "Guidelines for confidence-building measures" adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission at its 1988 session, and endorsed in resolution 43/78 H, "since confidence relates to a wide spectrum of activities in the interaction among States, a comprehensive approach is indispensable and confidence-building is necessary in the political, military, economic, social, humanitarian and cultural fields" (paragraph 1.3.2.2). The document goes on to state (paragraph 2.3.1) that "confidence in international relations is based on the belief in the co-operative disposition of other States. Confidence will increase to the extent that the conduct of States, over time, indicates their willingness to practise non-aggressive and co-operative behaviour".

(Mr. Azambuja, Brazil)

What better setting and what better model for co-operation than a disarmament agreement such as the one we are in the process of negotiating? What better reason to have confidence and engage in a free flow of scientific knowledge in chemistry than the formal and verifiable obligation of other States parties not to develop, produce, stockpile or use chemical weapons? And in return, what better way to be confident that the activities of other parties are really geared to purposes not forbidden by the convention than to share with them information, knowledge and a general co-operative approach?

By the same token, we hold in great esteem the idea and the implementation of national trial inspections. I can announce today to this Conference that Brazil conducted such an inspection on 6 December 1988, at a facility in Camaçari, Bahia. My delegation will circulate the report of this inspection later in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons and present its conclusions in the presence of one of the experts that participated in it. This trial inspection is one more proof of the readiness of my Government to successfully complete our negotiations on a chemical weapons ban. We hope more delegations will conclude trial inspections and report their findings to the Conference.

I have concentrated my attention today on the Paris Conference, on the future work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, under the able and stimulating new chairmanship of Ambassador Morel, and finally on the national trial inspection conducted by Brazilian experts. I reserve for another occasion my observations on other relevant points of our agenda.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Brazil for his statement, and also for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Nazarkin.

Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Permit me first of all to congratulate you as President of the Conference for this month and express my best wishes for successful work in this responsible post. For my part I should like to assure you that the Soviet delegation will lend you its full support in carrying out your tasks, which are far from simple. I should also like to express my gratitude to your predecessor, the Ambassador of Iran, Mr. Ardekani, for his effective and skilful guidance of the work of the Conference in the previous period.

I should like most warmly to welcome to this meeting of the Conference His Excellency the Minister of State for External Affairs of the friendly nation of India, Mr. Natwar Singh, whose important statement we heard with great interest. We welcome our new colleagues as representatives of the member States of the Conference on Disarmament, Ambassador Sharma of India, Ambassador Houlliez of Belgium, Ambassador Dietze of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden, Ambassador Reece of Australia, Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan and Ambassador Bullutt of Kenya. I should also like to welcome Ambassador Vajnar, the new representative of Czechoslovakia who has just arrived in Geneva and is participating in today's meeting; I had the pleasure to co-operate closely with him in the 1960s and 1970s when he was a member of the Czechoslovak delegation to the Committee on Disarmament and when he worked in the United Nations Secretariat on disarmament matters. To

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

their predecessors who have left Geneva we wish further success in their future posts. The Soviet delegation would like to express deepest condolences on the untimely death of Aida Levin of the Conference secretariat.

At the beginning of this session it is quite natural to take a look at the problems to be discussed in the broad context of the present state of international affairs as a whole. Both you, Mr. President, in your statement, at the opening of the session and a number of representatives have already presented their assessment in this regard. I too would like to begin by setting out some of our ideas of a general nature.

International tension has diminished, and the world has become a quieter and safer place. The "cold war" is on the way out and real prerequisites are being created for humanity to enter a peaceful era in its history. The Soviet-American Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles is being implemented. Prospects are fair for reaching agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States on the reduction of strategic offensive arms. The agreement in Vienna on a significant Final Document, along with the mandate for negotiations on conventional armed forces in Europe, are indicators of the effectiveness of the new, realistic approaches to international affairs. There are grounds to expect a successful outcome at the negotiations on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons (I shall be referring to this issue in greater detail later on). There is a shift towards putting an end to regional conflicts. These first real steps in improving the international situation in the field of disarmament have become possible because understanding of the need for a period of peace is gaining momentum and is becoming the dominant trend. To consolidate this sound trend it is necessary to promote all the positive achievements of the past few years, to develop and intensify political dialogue, aiming at the search for solutions to problems rather than confrontation, the exchange of constructive ideas rather than recriminations.

Today's realities are such that this dialogue requires continuing and active participation by all countries and all regions of the world. The internationalization of the dialogue and the negotiating process is necessary to bring harmony to international relations and put them on a more stable basis. To us the above-mentioned ideas are not just abstract notions. The Soviet delegation to the Conference on Disarmament draws its inspiration from these ideas and will continue to do so, both at the negotiations on a chemical weapons ban and in discussing other agenda items.

The new approach to ensuring security - not through the build-up of arms, as has nearly always been the case, but rather, on the contrary, through their reduction on a basis of compromise - is no abstract notion for us either. The achievements in the field of disarmament I referred to above as evidence in our view, of a discernible shift in the present-day world from over-armament to the principle of reasonable sufficiency for defence. This principle underlies the new military doctrine adopted by the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty. This doctrine is currently being endowed with concrete content. Solid confirmation of the above is to be found in the unilateral reductions by the Soviet Union (as well as by some members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization) in armed forces and armaments. In this connection I would like to draw your attention to document CD/882, which contains excerpts

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

from the statement made by M.S. Gorbachev at the United Nations on 7 December 1988 relating to disarmament problems, and in particular quoting the principal details of our unilateral reductions.

During 1989-1990 the Soviet Union will effect a considerable reduction in its armed forces - 500,000 men, that is 12 per cent of their total strength, including 240,000 in the European part of the country, 200,000 in the eastern part and 60,000 in the southern part. Of 10,000 tanks to be cut in Europe, 5,000 will be physically destroyed while the others will be converted to tractors for civilian purposes and to training vehicles. Five thousand three hundred tanks out of the 10,000 to be reduced are the most modern ones. Eight thousand five hundred artillery systems and 800 combat aircraft will be taken out of service. By agreement with the Governments of the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, six Soviet tank divisions temporarily deployed on their territories will be withdrawn and disbanded by 1991. Let me emphasize that the formations are being withdrawn with all their standard weapons, including tactical nuclear systems. Thus this is also a measure of unilateral nuclear disarmament. In addition, assault landing formations and units and a number of others, including assault crossing support units with their armaments and combat equipment, will be withdrawn from the Soviet forces stationed in these three countries. By 1 January 1991 this entire grouping will be exclusively defensive in nature. Altogether the Soviet forces stationed in these countries will be reduced by 50,000 men and 5,300 tanks.

Taking into account the unilateral measures announced by the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People's Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the German Democratic Republic and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the total strength of the Soviet armed forces in Europe and of the armies of other Warsaw Treaty States will be reduced by 296,000 men, the number of tanks by 12,000 and the number of combat aircraft by 930. By agreement with the Mongolian Government, Soviet troops temporarily stationed in Mongolia will be reduced by 75 per cent. The Soviet military budget will be reduced by 14.2 per cent, and the production of arms and military equipment by 19.5 per cent. We believe that major unilateral steps to reduce arms and armed forces can have a considerable positive influence on disarmament talks and stimulate agreement on far-reaching multilateral measures. At the same time, of course, there is also an objective limit for unilateral measures beyond which reductions and limitations must be multilateral in nature.

Before I turn to the state of affairs at the negotiations on a chemical weapons ban, I would like to dwell upon the importance the Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons has for these negotiations. The Paris Conference occupies a prominent place in the 1989 chronicle, which has just begun to be written. This is demonstrated by the number of its participants - 149 - by the record time by world standards required for its organization, and by the preparedness of the world community manifested at the Conference to reach agreement on complex military/political issues. In fact the Conference became a world assembly on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

Without belittling the importance of the other provisions of the Paris Final Act, I would especially point out the call for the early conclusion of a comprehensive convention on the complete prohibition and destruction of

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

chemical weapons. In essence, the States participating in the Conference in Paris declared their intention of working towards the complete prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons.

We listened with keen interest to the statement made at the meeting on 7 February by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, Mr. R. Dumas, who officially introduced the Paris Final Act and set out interesting ideas about ways to step up negotiations on the convention. Whilst giving due credit to the considerable contribution made by the initiators and organizers of the Paris Conference, I would nevertheless venture to express the view that the success in Paris would have been impossible without the progress achieved in the past few years at the Geneva negotiations on chemical weapons. It was not only a refusal to accept chemical weapons, but also the understanding that the issue of their complete prohibition was ripe for a final solution, and that nearly all the basic elements of the future convention have already been worked out, which made it possible to draft the provisions on the early conclusion of the convention that appeared in the Paris Declaration. Thus, by building upon the progress already achieved and giving a power impetus to further efforts, the Paris Conference became a major event marking the entry of the negotiations into their decisive stage.

We believe that now it is extremely important, without losing momentum, to translate the Paris Declaration into the language of the Geneva negotiations, to transform the political provisions agreed therein into concrete positions. We regard this document as a direct instruction to urgently redouble our efforts to resolve expeditiously the remaining issues and to conclude the convention at the earliest date. This objective is based on a realistic assessment of the situation. In actual fact relatively few unresolved issues remain. Furthermore, work on these issues is now well advanced, with greater or lesser progress having been made on each in the form of a greater or lesser degree of agreement on political or technical problems.

The Soviet Union has done everything in its power to eliminate difficulties with the future convention. In particular, during the last inter-sessional period we developed our position as regards permitted production of schedule [1] chemicals. The Soviet side has agreed to laboratory synthesis of small amounts of such chemicals (up to 100 grams) for research and medical purposes provided the convention ensures the strict prohibition of the development of chemical weapons everywhere. We have also expressed our readiness to include provisions in the convention under which it would be possible in each individual case to give consideration to production of schedule [1] chemicals outside a small-scale facility in amounts exceeding 100 grams for pharmaceutical purposes, with a specific amount laid down for each chemical depending on its characteristics and specific uses, naturally under effective international controls. As you know, these steps of ours have already made it possible to move towards agreement on article VI. According to the assessment made by the distinguished representative of Sweden, Mrs. M.-B. Theorin, in her statement here in the Conference on 7 February 1989, they "demonstrate a constructive and flexible approach to the negotiations and could serve as a basis for agreement". Yet, the solution of the remaining problems does not depend only on us. The elaboration of the convention is a multilateral process in which forward movement can be assured



(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

only through joint efforts. Specifically, there is another State possessing a chemical weapons stockpile which is as considerable as ours, and we cannot expect a successful outcome without its positive contribution to the negotiations. We have, of course, duly noted the statements in favour of a chemical weapons ban made during the election campaign by the newly elected President of the United States, G. Bush. We hope that it will not be too long before we see these statements materialize into specific positions on the part of the United States delegation at the negotiations. We also welcome the positive changes in the French position which were announced by President Mitterrand at the United Nations and which were referred to here in Geneva by Minister Dumas.

Now a few words about our approach to the main tasks facing the negotiations. They include in the first place the issue of undiminished security of participants in the convention during the first 10-year period after entry into force. The solution to this issue should be based on a complete cessation of development and production of chemical weapons, strict verification of stockpiles of these weapons and facilities for their production, assymetric reductions leading to a levelling out at a certain point after the entry of the convention into force, and the creation of machinery for co-operation in the field of protection from chemical weapons. Another important factor that should not be ignored, in our view, is confidence-building not only during the initial period after the convention enters into force but also prior to its entry into force, as well as the need to ensure universal accession to the future convention as soon as possible. The Paris Conference provides an impetus to solving this problem as well, by calling upon all States to become parties to the convention as soon as it is concluded. In fact the preparations for the convention's entry into force have already begun. This is being facilitated in particular by the national verification experiments being conducted in a number of States. Judging from our experience, they may prove useful not only from the standpoint of elaborating inspection procedures, but also in enabling States to gain initial experience in their practical application.

Soviet specialists are getting ready for the entry into operation of the chemical weapons destruction facility in Chapaevsk, so as to proceed immediately to the destruction of the chemical weapon stockpile as soon as the facility is ready, even before the convention enters into force. In this connection, special attention is being paid to security and ecological aspects of the problem of destruction.

It is important to finalize agreement on the issue of verification. First and foremost, I am thinking of challenge inspections. Work carried out during the past two years provides a sound basis for that. Agreement also has yet to be reached on verification under article VI of the draft convention, including verification in respect of laboratory synthesis of schedule [1] chemicals and the production of super-toxic lethal chemicals which are not chemical warfare agents. We believe that in order to finalize the verification system we can use the existing potential in the form of ideas which have been advanced. What I mean is the possibility for the international inspectorate to conduct on-site inspections on its own

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

initiative if, in carrying out its verification activities of a systematic nature, the need arises to clarify any ambiguous situations. Last year, ideas to this effect were advanced by the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom and before that by Australia. We hope that the authors of the idea of ad hoc inspections will make their proposals more specific.

National trial inspections can play a significant role in the elaboration of the verification system as a whole. We concluded such an experiment last December at the chemical plant in Dzerzhinsk, at the facility producing N,N-dialkylaminoethanols, i.e., a key precursor considered in the context of schedule [2]. Both an initial visit involving the preparation of a facility attachment, and a routine inspection, were carried out. In preparing for and conducting the experiment considerable use was made of the recommendations drawn up in September 1988 at the multilateral consultations under the guidance of the Swedish delegation. In our opinion, as early as this spring session it is necessary to analyse thoroughly the results of national experiments and map out the programme for future work in this field. It is also evident that the problem of verification of non-production of chemical weapons cannot be adequately solved without parallel progress on other aspects of article VI. Therefore, we deem it important to continue efforts to secure agreement on the provisions relating to the schedules of chemicals and a procedure for including in the schedules, when necessary, new chemicals posing a risk for the convention.

In this context, it is very important to block off all possible avenues for developing new types of chemical weapons. In this connection, I think we should give more substantive consideration to the proposal to set up a scientific council within the framework of the organs of the convention. We are looking forward to receiving the document on that subject which Minister R. Dumas of France promised to submit to the Conference in the near future. Other aspects of the machinery of the future convention also remain to be finalized, including the issue of the composition of the Executive Council.

Finally, efforts should be continued to draft the final clauses of the convention and to resolve other legal issues. The new stage the negotiations have entered requires a new approach to the organizational aspect as well. It is clear that we currently face a situation in which many outstanding issues run through all our work, and that their solution requires an integrated approach to various articles of the convention, annexes and other parts of the "rolling text". We therefore lend our support to the efforts of the representative of France, Ambassador P. Morel, to change the structure of work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons in order to create additional "administrative opportunities" for redoubling our efforts at the negotiations. Naturally, in so doing our main attention should continue to be directed towards reaching agreement on the text of the convention. The results of the Paris Conference impose a great responsibility on the Conference on Disarmament. We believe that the first response should be the adoption of an improved mandate for the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons taking those results into account and guiding the participants in the negotiations towards their early successful conclusion.

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

We note with satisfaction, that responding to the call by the Paris Conference, a number of countries have for the first time submitted requests to participate in the chemical weapons negotiations as observers. Bringing new participants into the negotiations, in our opinion, proves on the one hand that the negotiations have entered a decisive phase, and on the other should contribute to the elaboration of a truly global convention. We agree with those who believe that it is necessary to concentrate the efforts of the Conference now on finalizing the elaboration of the convention on chemical weapons. This, however, should not justify marking time in other areas of the Conference's work. The fact that the Conference on Disarmament has so far been unable to begin practical work on banning nuclear tests is absolutely inadmissible. I would like to recall that the United Nations General Assembly has called upon the Conference on Disarmament to begin substantive work on all aspects of such a treaty at this year's session. In our opinion the basis for such work is contained in the "Basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests", advanced jointly by the USSR and other socialist countries in June 1987. The Soviet delegation believes that it would be possible at the present stage to focus on verification issues and put into practice the proposal made by the USSR Minister for Foreign Affairs, E.A. Shevardnadze, for the establishment of a special group of scientific experts to prepare as soon as possible practical proposals on a system of monitoring the non-conduct of nuclear tests. We favour the early drawing up of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of tests, and believe that under the present circumstances, a step-by-step approach to resolving this problem is justifiable as well. In our opinion, the Soviet-American talks on nuclear testing, which are based on such a step-by-step approach, do not replace multilateral efforts in this field. These two processes should be mutually complementary and lead to a single final result.

In conclusion, a few words about another priority disarmament problem, the prevention of an arms race in outer space. For some years now this debate has been moving around in circles, as it were. We hope that the Ad hoc Committee on outer space will be re-established in the very near future and that it will prove capable of moving forward from academic discussions to the genuine search for areas of agreement. There is quite enough material for serious work. It includes the specific proposals made by the Soviet Union, in particular to ban anti-satellite systems, to create a system of verification of the non-deployment of weapons in outer space, and to establish an international satellite monitoring agency. The Soviet delegation will, of course, be prepared to participate constructively in the search for ways and means of achieving progress on the other items of the agenda of the Conference as well. Today, we are at the beginning of the road. But only those who move forward will reach their destination.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I have no other speakers on my list for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor?

(The President)

I had hoped today to be able also to re-establish the ad hoc committees on chemical weapons and on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, but unfortunately consultations have not yet produced results. However, I know that members are consulting actively, and it is my hope that we will succeed soon, so that the Conference might adopt the relevant decision at the plenary meeting next Thursday. I shall be happy if we are able to do so, as the secretariat is processing draft decisions on the participation of non-members in both ad hoc committees, under items 4 and 5, and I am sure that you will all agree with me that invitations to them to participate in our work should be extended at the earliest possible date.

I should like to inform you that, at our next plenary meeting on Thursday, the Vice-Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, His Excellency Mr. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, His Excellency Mr. Giulio Andreotti, will be addressing the Conference. In view of arrangements relating to the arrival of the ministers, we shall start the plenary meeting at 10.30 a.m.

I have no other business for today. I now intend to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 16 February, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.25 a.m.

# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.487  
16 February 1989

ENGLISH

---

## FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-SEVENTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Thursday, 16 February 1989, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Aldo Pugliese (Italy)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 487th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference will continue to listen to statements in plenary meetings and consider the establishment of subsidiary bodies on agenda items and other organizational questions. In accordance with rule 30 of its rules of procedure, however, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

As announced at our 485th plenary meeting, when we reach the end of the list of speakers, I intend to put before the Conference, for adoption, the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons contained in document CD/881. I am also glad to inform you that agreement has been reached at informal consultations on the mandate and chairmanship of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. We shall also deal with requests from non-members to participate in the work of the Ad hoc Committee. I shall put those questions before the Conference at an informal meeting once our list of speakers is exhausted. Immediately afterwards we shall resume the plenary to formalize those decisions.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany, Romania and Ethiopia. I now give the floor to the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador von Stülpnagel.

Mr. von STULPNAGEL (Federal Republic of Germany): As I am taking the floor for the first time under your stewardship, I first wish to congratulate you and your delegation on your assumption of the presidency for the month of February. I am very happy from a professional and from a personal point of view to see you, a friend, in the Chair presiding over the debates of our Conference. I also wish to thank our previous President, Ambassador Ardekani, for the excellent manner in which he presided over our sessions in the month of January. Let me extend a warm welcome to those Ambassadors who have arrived since the summer session 1988 - I refer, in particular, to Ambassador Aung Thant of Burma, Ambassador Sharma of India, Ambassador Houlliez of Belgium, Ambassador Dietze of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden, Ambassador Reese of Australia, Ambassador Kikanke of Zaire, Ambassador Bullut of Kenya and Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan. I note with deep regret that some of us have left, or will in the near future leave Geneva, in particular Ambassador Clerckx of Belgium, Ambassador Rose of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden, Ambassador Butler of Australia, Ambassador Ruoro of Kenya, Ambassador Hacene of Algeria and Ambassador Vejvoda of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. With all of them my delegation had excellent and amiable relations.

I would like to take the floor today to address procedural and organizational issues of the Conference, a subject which may seem both obvious and simple, but also complex and difficult at the same time. I feel certain that you will agree that procedural and substantive questions are inseparably connected. While substantive issues of arms control will be the subject of Minister Genscher's address to the Conference in the near future, I wish today to call attention to some continuing problems that our Conference has in

(Mr. von Stülpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)

organizing its work. It seems to me that our Conference has reached a point where we have to make some firm decisions if we want to give the pressing problems on our agenda the proper and acceptable treatment they deserve.

Under the relevant paragraph of the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament, this Conference is to work substantively on the basis of consensus. The consensus requirement is the very essence of our work. It gives the Conference and its subsidiary bodies their special character and provides our *raison d'être*. The challenge of the CD's work is the patient establishment and further elaboration of shared perceptions. Only with these shared perceptions can we hope to achieve full and fruitful concentrated work by the CD.

A closer and thorough look at the CD's Decalogue and this year's agenda makes us aware again of many and continuing fundamental divergences about almost all items to be dealt with. Every topic certainly demands special attention. From the point of view of individual delegations, the request for unique priorities to be given to special subjects is certainly understandable. And the Conference certainly should not neglect the individual views of delegations or groups and the substantive reasoning they are based upon. But this Conference must find global solutions to the problems before it, and this requires the development of shared views and agreements which every member can subscribe to, or can at least live with.

Our work in the CD and the special sessions of the United Nations devoted to disarmament has shown that there are no feasible solutions to the problems under discussion or negotiation in this Conference without further significant investment of time and resources. All current items will continue to be in competition with each other for limited resources. Moreover, to judge by some recent proposals, further items may be added to our already overburdened agenda.

This situation is growing increasingly untenable. Consequently, my delegation suggest that the Conference may wish to reassess, in a pragmatic manner, the priorities for its deliberations in this year's session. We might ponder the possibility of developing consensus on what I would call a temporarily selected concentration on those subjects of the agenda the urgency of which is undisputed, and for which the prospect for consensus solutions is well founded.

Nobody would belittle the terrible consequences of a nuclear exchange or of an intensive conventional conflict. Nobody will deny the Conference the right to study in depth the issues which relate to such events, including possible security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon countries or the eventual insertion of efforts in this direction into a comprehensive disarmament programme. It may be, however, that such issues are not immediately amenable to constructive resolution here in the CD. Indeed, dissenting views in these areas appear to be at the forefront. Moreover, there are other urgent subjects on our agenda with a higher degree of commonality, and which seem closer to a consensus solution. One of the subjects which come immediately into mind is chemical weapons.

(Mr. von Stülpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)

I think that the recent activities which have resulted in a notable alleviation of East-West tensions could now permit the Conference to concentrate its work on the negotiations to ban chemical weapons, even if this results in somewhat lesser attentiveness to some other points of our agenda. The unexpected and unhappy spread of the idea of the possible usefulness of chemical weapons, and the recent use of those weapons, making no distinction between combatants and non-combatants, has sharpened our eagerness to secure a global chemical weapons ban. We have seen that as long as the development, production, storage and transfer of chemical weapons is not prohibited, the danger of their use continues too. The States which attended the recent Paris Conference declared that only a comprehensive and global interdiction of chemical weapons can solve this problem.

A total of 149 States have confirmed the urgency of this task and vowed to redouble their efforts at the negotiations on the subject here in Geneva. Redoubling our already solid and conscientious work can only mean more time, more manpower and more focused and success-oriented work. The new work programme and method proposed by the Chairman-designate of the Ad hoc Committee for 1989 reflects this view. I plead, therefore, that the Conference should utilize all possibilities to put at the disposal of this programme the necessary time and resources.

I would like to close my remarks with a thought that goes beyond the immediate necessities before us. A convention banning chemical weapons is an urgent task, in itself, and does not need elaborate justification. But there is an aspect of our efforts which goes beyond this immediate aim of the conclusion of a multilateral CW convention, and which will have an impact on future chances for all multilateral disarmament efforts. The importance of the subject of a CW ban, and the importance of our being able to negotiate an acceptable agreement on a multilateral basis, combine to constitute a litmus test of whether it is possible for the world community to conduct meaningful multilateral negotiations at all and to come up with consensus final products or not. Since Paris, we know that there is a fundamental consensus in this world that chemical weapons should be banned. Our Conference should not only acknowledge that consensus, but execute it in the appropriate way.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany for his statement, and also for the kind words that he addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Romania, Ambassador Dolgu.

Mr. DOLGU (Romania) (translated from French): First of all, Mr. President, please allow me to extend my warmest congratulations to you on taking up the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of February. We are all the more satisfied when we consider that you represent Italy, a country with which Romania maintains traditional relations of friendship and co-operation. We are convinced that you will be able to guide us with wisdom and skill in our efforts during this important month as we start the 1989 session of the Conference on Disarmament. I would also like to express our most sincere thanks to the representative of Iran, Ambassador Ali Shams Ardekani, who guided the work of the Conference during the last month of the 1988 session and the inter-sessional period in a dedicated and effective manner. Finally, allow me to wish a very warm welcome to the



(Mr. Dolgu, Romania)

distinguished representatives of Burma, Ambassador Thant, India, Ambassador Sharma, Belgium, Ambassador Houlliez, the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Dietze, Sweden, Ambassador Hyltenius, Australia, Ambassador Reese, Zaire, Ambassador Kikanke, Kenya, Ambassador Bullut, Pakistan, Ambassador Kamal, Algeria, Ambassador Chaalal, and Czechoslovakia, Ambassador Vajnar, and express the hope that we will establish close links of co-operation with them.

I would now like to share a few ideas of a general nature with you on the state of disarmament negotiations and the problems therein, as well as on some avenues the Conference might pursue. Present-day international life, in our view, continues to be marked by the existence throughout the world of enormous quantities of nuclear weapons. Their destructive capacity has been only slightly affected by the Soviet-American Treaty on the prohibition of intermediate-range and shorter-range nuclear missiles, and may indeed be enhanced as a result of the modernization of tactical nuclear forces being contemplated by NATO. At the same time, there are substantial stocks of chemical weapons, which are to be supplemented by the production of binary weapons. Nuclear weapons and chemical weapons are an integral part of armament plans and combat tactics in certain countries. All this, together with the maintenance of the nuclear deterrent as the basis for military doctrines, is hardly likely to ensure peace and strengthen security, and stimulates the arms race and maintains the risk of war.

Recently we have witnessed certain actions which had a positive influence on the climate for disarmament efforts. I am thinking in particular of the unilateral reductions in arms, troops and military expenditure announced by the USSR and other socialist countries. Back in 1985 Romania, which has always spoken out against the arms race and the increase in military budgets, stressed the need for unilateral measures to reduce armed forces, including nuclear forces, as well as the possibility of implementing such measures without detriment to the security interests of the countries involved. I would remind you that in November 1986 our country itself carried out a 5-10 per cent reduction in its effective arms and military expenditure, and expressed the wish that such an act might serve as an example for other countries.

We would also like to recall that a few years ago, when the idea of a new start in disarmament efforts was being mooted, Romania suggested the idea of a global integrated approach to disarmament. It spoke in favour of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, based on nuclear disarmament and also including measures to eliminate chemical weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, as well as substantial reductions in conventional weapons, troops and military expenditure. We had in mind that in the way people think, as in every day life - in doctrines, in the very conception of defence and armed forces, there was an indissoluble link between the various types of weapons. It took some time for this to be recognized. But although a step is going to be taken in that direction soon in Vienna, much remains to be done. Because the individual, separate, piecemeal approach to various types of weapons still prevails. It is high time to ask a question: is it possible to guarantee peace and independence for peoples and at the same time forge real and equal security for all if we continue to act in isolation to eliminate one or two types of weapons of mass destruction - nuclear weapons and chemical weapons?

(Mr. Dolgu, Romania)

We do not consider that it is possible. This approach, by its very nature and by the nature of the results that could be achieved does not protect us against attempts to use force or the threat of force, against the possibilities that certain States might blackmail others by threatening to use one or other of these weapons.

An effective and equitable nuclear and chemical weapon disarmament process should be so designed that it does not lead to new imbalances in international life and does not open the way to the appearance of power centres which might impose their own domination on the world. Such a process would have to be based on the principle of equal security for all States. All this leads us to consider that nuclear and chemical disarmament should be dealt with in a unitary manner and that the simultaneous elimination of these weapons, and the shift to general disarmament, constitute the major objective at the present stage. Romania, which possesses neither nuclear weapons nor chemical weapons and has no intention of producing them, believes that firm action is required to achieve the stage-by-stage elimination of these weapons as soon as possible, which would pre-suppose the cessation of production and testing as well as the destruction of all nuclear and chemical weapon stocks and the outlawing of these weapons.

On this basis it would seem necessary for this new session of the Conference on Disarmament to make its contribution to establishing the foundations for an effective negotiating process in nuclear and chemical disarmament taking place simultaneously. Specific measures must be adopted which could lead to the complete elimination of nuclear and chemical weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, the prohibition of such weapons and the destruction of existing stockpiles. These measures should be designed in a unitary way as components of a set of actions intended to contribute to international stability, to place relations between States on new foundations, on equality and respect for independence and sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs and the elimination of force and the threat of force.

Given the representative nature of the Conference as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, it is necessary for the objectives set out above to be included in the draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, which contains actions and measures to be taken by the existing negotiating bodies and States - at the regional, bilateral or multilateral level - in all the areas of disarmament. Such a programme would provide for a closer link between the bilateral, regional and universal negotiations so that the measures adopted would be complementary, while encompassing the whole range of disarmament issues. On the subject of nuclear disarmament, Romania continues to insist that negotiations between the USSR and the United States on a 50 per cent reduction in strategic arms should be stepped up in order to arrive at agreement in this field before the end of this year. At the same time we consider it necessary for negotiations to be conducted, with the involvement of all States, to totally eliminate nuclear weapons and outlaw them. In this area Romania puts forward the following proposals.

An immediate start on the elaboration of a universal treaty for the total prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons, by stages. Such an agreement

(Mr. Dolgu, Romania)

will cover the prohibition of the production, development and testing of nuclear weapons, and the destruction of existing nuclear weapon stocks and their delivery systems.

Establishment of a special body with the participation of all the nuclear Powers, as well as other States, to negotiate a universal treaty on the prohibition and liquidation of nuclear weapons.

A start on concrete negotiations to eliminate arsenals of tactical short-range nuclear weapons.

Without awaiting the total elimination of nuclear weapons, withdrawal of these weapons by the States which possess them to within their own national frontiers.

Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free and chemical-weapon-free zones so that more and more areas of the globe can be free from the danger inherent in weapons of mass destruction.

Transformation of the Balkans into a zone of peace, co-operation and good-neighbourly relations, free of nuclear and chemical weapons, without foreign troops or military bases, and the creation of such zones in other regions of the world.

On the nuclear test ban, Romania proposes:

The immediate cessation of all nuclear weapon tests and the negotiation of an agreement on a halt to the development of these weapons, with universal participation. Of importance in this regard is the initiative to amend the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, in order to have this Treaty extended to cover underground areas, where tests are conducted at present. Romania has already indicated its agreement to the convening of an international conference on this subject and its resolve to play an active part in it. Concerning the current negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States on the gradual limitation of the number and yield of nuclear tests, we consider that they should constitute only an intermediate stage, the final objective being the cessation and prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests;

The establishment of an international system to monitor compliance with the commitments undertaken by States on the cessation of nuclear tests, through the creation of a communications network amongst existing seismic stations in various countries. Romania reiterates its readiness to participate in the proposed system of verification with the technical facilities it possesses.

As regards the prevention of an arms race in outer space, Romania proposes:

The cessation of any action or arms programmes designed to extend the arms race into space;

(Mr. Dolgu, Romania)

The negotiation of a universal agreement providing for renunciation of any use of space for military purposes, and its use for exclusively peaceful purposes under appropriate international control;

The creation, under the United Nations, of a special body to monitor compliance with agreements on the non-use of outer space for military purposes and the launching of satellites and other objects into outer space.

On the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons, Romania submits the following proposals:

In the light of the interdependence between chemical weapons and nuclear weapons, the development and implementation of the convention on the elimination of chemical weapons should be carried out at the same time as the development and implementation of a universal treaty on the prohibition and the complete stage-by-stage elimination of nuclear weapons;

The future convention on the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons and the agreed verification measures should in no way affect the development of the chemical industry or the technical and scientific potential of each and every country, or their use for economic and social progress;

The guaranteeing of the broadest possible access by all countries to the achievements of modern science and technology, and the promotion of peaceful co-operation in the chemical field;

Pending the destruction of all chemical weapons, chemical-weapon States should undertake not to make any use of these arms in any circumstances.

On the prohibition of radiological weapons and the production of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, we propose:

Speeding up of negotiations to draw up an international instrument to prohibit radiological weapons. In this context we support the idea of an international agreement prohibiting attacks on peaceful nuclear facilities, an issue of special importance, in particular for regions where such facilities are highly concentrated, as is the case in Europe;

In-depth examination, in the context of the Conference, of the problem of the production of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction based on new principles, such as lasers, wave propagation, particle emission and so on, in order to identify ways and means of preventing such dangerous developments;

A commitment on the part of States to prohibit the use of new achievements of science and technology for destructive purposes, for the development and production of new weapons.

On the activities of the Conference on Disarmament:

We are in favour of the creation within the Conference, from the very outset of the necessary ad hoc committees to deal with the main problems on the agenda, so that concrete negotiating work can be carried out; we believe

(Mr. Dolgu, Romania)

that there is a very special need for the establishment of an ad hoc committee to study the problem of nuclear disarmament in depth and adopt the necessary measures to permit effective negotiations in this area, and a committee on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests; we would like to see the re-establishment of the committees which operated during the previous session on various other items on the agenda. We agree with the view that once created, these committees should remain in operation until their mandates have been carried out.

We believe that access to the work of the Conference should be open to all interested countries, so that they may present their positions, make proposals and play an active part in the negotiations, in order that the negotiating process on disarmament should take account of the positions and interests of all countries.

Lastly, in order to increase the effectiveness of the Conference, it would seem necessary that all States which have embarked on bilateral or regional disarmament negotiations should systematically keep the Conference on Disarmament informed of progress in their negotiations and the results achieved there through direct reporting or through the United Nations Secretary-General.

That concludes my statement. I would like to assure you of the Romanian delegation's co-operation in your efforts to identify new areas of agreement, to broaden existing areas of agreement and to move the work of our Conference forward.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Romania for his statement, and also for the kind words expressed to me and to my country. Now I give the floor to the representative of Ethiopia.

Ms. SINEGIORGIS (Ethiopia): It gives me great pleasure to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference for this month. We are happy to see you guide our deliberations, and are confident that under your wise stewardship our task will be crowned with success. I would like to assure you of my delegation's full support in the discharge of your important responsibilities. I would also like to avail myself of this opportunity to express my delegation's gratitude for the able manner in which your predecessor, the distinguished Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ambassador Shams Ardekani, conducted the deliberations of the Conference from last September. It is also my pleasant duty to welcome the new Ambassadors of Australia, Belgium, Burma, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Pakistan and Sweden, who have just joined us. I extend to them my best wishes and assure them of my delegation's full co-operation. On a sad note, it is with a heavy heart that I express our sorrow and grief over the untimely demise of Miss Aida Levin, a good friend and a very able member of the secretariat.

Looking back, 1988 was an eventful year which witnessed significant improvements in the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. As a result of this, today, the prevalent view is that world peace and security is best maintained and consolidated through disarmament rather than

(Ms. Sinegiorgis, Ethiopia)

by pursuing a dangerous and insane policy of armament and a spiralling arms race. The INF Treaty signed and ratified by the two major Powers, whose implementation is already under way, and the agreement to reduce their strategic offensive arms by 50 per cent, augur well for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Moreover, the Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons which took place from 7 to 11 January 1989 was a reaffirmation of the universal political will to ban chemical weapons. The Final Declaration, which was unanimously adopted, should serve as a clarion call for the speedy conclusion of the long-awaited convention.

It is the view of the Ethiopian delegation that the present favourable atmosphere offers us a unique opportunity to consolidate the achievements attained over the last year and to work diligently to capture new commanding heights in all areas of disarmament endeavours.

As the maintenance of global peace and security concerns the vital interest of all nations, it is our conviction that all disarmament efforts should always uphold the indispensability of multilateral negotiations. In other words, bilateral avenues cannot and must not replace the multilateral framework; they should only be supplementary to it. In this respect, I would like to stress that if global peace and security are to be guaranteed, the security of all nations must be met.

Concerning the question of a nuclear test ban, which is of prime importance to the work of this Conference, it is regrettable that this body is still unable to commence substantive work. When the partial test-ban treaty was signed a quarter of a century ago, it was hoped that the risk of a nuclear catastrophe would be minimized. It was even expected that the Treaty would eventually be followed by other agreements to halt underground nuclear weapon testing. Much to our disappointment, however, nuclear weapon testing has continued unabated, and as a result the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons has reached extraordinary levels. In this connection, the Ethiopian delegation fears that the step-by-step negotiations currently under way between the United States and the Soviet Union may not lead to the achievement of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, but may permit continued nuclear testing and promote qualitative improvement. If the nuclear arms race is to be halted, it is imperative that a comprehensive test-ban treaty should be concluded - and we all agree on this, I am sure. Needless to say, urgent negotiations should commence without delay. In this regard, we are of the view that the prevailing political climate is most propitious for such an undertaking, and therefore cannot overemphasize the need for flexibility in order to establish an ad hoc committee on a CTBT with an effective mandate.

Another issue that figures prominently on the agenda of the Conference is the prevention of an arms race in outer space. As we are all aware, outer space is mankind's common heritage and should be used exclusively for the benefit of humanity. The 1967 outer space Treaty and other relevant legal instruments governing States' activities in outer space leave much to be desired. Indeed, rapid achievements in science and technology have made the legal régime ineffective. It is therefore necessary to initiate appropriate measures to reinforce the existing legal régimes. Ethiopia supports the

(Ms. Sinegiorgis, Ethiopia)

proposal for the establishment of a committee or group of experts which will look into definitions and verification techniques. This, in our view, will lay the technical groundwork to enable the ad hoc committee to pursue its task more effectively. The longer we delay in adopting a common approach to tackle the prevention of an arms race in outer space, the greater the difficulties we will face. Our concerted effort should be deployed to realize the objective of the prohibition of the use of outer space for hostile purposes. Likewise the vast potential of space technology should be used for the advancement and the well-being of mankind.

It is gratifying to note that much progress has been made in the elaboration of the convention on chemical weapons during the past year. In this regard, I hasten to add that the Paris Conference has been a resounding success. We note with satisfaction that the Conference not only made the reaffirmation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol possible, but also called upon the Conference on Disarmament "to redouble its efforts, as a matter of urgency, to resolve expeditiously the remaining issues and to conclude the convention at the earliest date".

In this connection, I would like to seize this opportunity to convey the profound appreciation of my Government to the Government of France for convening the Conference and for its generous hospitality. I would also like to proffer our sincere thanks to His Excellency Mr. Roland Dumas, Minister for Foreign Affairs, for having taken his precious time to officially introduce to us the Final Declaration of the Conference. Let me also pay a particular tribute to the distinguished representative of France, Ambassador Pierre Morel, for his indefatigable efforts in the preparations for the Conference.

It is evident from the Final Declaration of the Paris Conference that there is an expressed general will to ban chemical weapons once and for all. Moreover, the Final Declaration states, inter alia: "The participating States stress the necessity of concluding, at an early date, a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons, and on their destruction".

Ethiopia was among the first States to accede to the 1925 Geneva Protocol. It is one of the paradoxes of history that Ethiopia was also one of the first countries to fall victim to the use of chemical weapons. Ethiopia therefore considers these weapons and their complete destruction a matter of the utmost priority. Furthermore, it is my duty to inform this Conference that my country does not produce or stockpile chemical weapons.

At this juncture, we would like to note with satisfaction the considerable progress made during the inter-sessional work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. We welcome the deletion of appendix III on security stocks. My delegation also commends the work done in the areas of confidentiality, assistance and protection, as well as the conduct of challenge inspections. In this regard, I would like on behalf of my delegation to express my sincere gratitude to the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, His Excellency Ambassador Sujka of Poland, for his timeless efforts in successfully guiding the deliberations of the Ad hoc Committee. Our appreciation also goes to the chairmen of the three working groups, namely Mr. Andrej Cima of Czechoslovakia, Mr. Pablo Macedo of Mexico and Mr. Sadaaki Numata of Japan.

(Ms. Sinigiorgis, Ethiopia)

A quarter of a century ago, a summit conference of the Organization of African Unity held in Cairo declared Africa a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Despite this clearly expressed wish, however, the denuclearization of Africa has not yet materialized. It is common knowledge that the racist South African régime has now achieved the capability to produce nuclear weapons. My Foreign Minister stated in his address to the forty-third session of the General Assembly of the United Nations that "the implications of this ominous development for international peace and security cannot be overemphasized. Such capability, acquired by a régime that would have no scruples in using them, should be viewed with alarm by all who have genuine concern for the maintenance of international peace and security". I would like to stress that this situation is of grave concern to Africa.

Of equal concern to Africa is the issue of dumping of nuclear and industrial wastes in and around the continent. The forty-eighth ordinary session of the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity, held in Addis Ababa in May 1988, declared the dumping of nuclear and industrial wastes in Africa to be a crime against Africa and its people. The forty-third session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, which also had this matter before it, adopted two resolutions in which, inter alia, it expressed "profound concern regarding practices of dumping nuclear and industrial wastes in Africa, which have grave implications on the national security of African countries", and called upon all States "to ensure that no radioactive waste is dumped in the territory of other States in infringement of their sovereignty". In this connection my delegation condemns the dumping of nuclear waste and calls on all those involved in this heinous operation to cease their infamous activities.

Finally, I wish to reaffirm once again my Government's firm support for multilateral disarmament efforts, for the cause of international peace and security and for the success of the work of the Conference on Disarmament.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Ethiopia for her statement and for the kind words she addressed to the Chair. I have no other speakers on my list for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? I see none.

I should like now to put before the Conference, for adoption, the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, contained in document CD/881. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the report of the Ad hoc Committee.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: As agreed at the outset, I shall now suspend the plenary meeting and convene an informal meeting to take up the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, the appointment of its Chairman and requests from non-member States to participate in our work.

The meeting was suspended at 11.30 a.m. and resumed at 11.45 a.m.

The PRESIDENT: The 487th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed.



(The President)

I now turn to working paper CD/WP.360, dealing with the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. In connection with the process leading to the adoption of that working paper, I would like to make the following remarks.

I had consultations in connection with some proposals advanced about the mandate of the Committee on CW at the plenary session on 7 February. From my consultations with all the groups, a consensus did not emerge, but there was a general will to start the work of the Committee without delay. In consideration of these facts and in order to start the work, I propose that we re-establish the Committee on the basis of the existing mandate. Therefore, I shall now proceed to put before the Conference for adoption working paper CD/WP.360. If I see no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I would like to add some other words after the adoption of the decision on the mandate. I hope that the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, which has just been re-established, will work in the spirit of the Final Declaration of the Paris Conference.

I now turn to the appointment of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. I understand that there is consensus on the appointment of Ambassador Pierre Morel of France as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, as recommended in the report of the Ad hoc Committee adopted today. May I take it that the Conference so agrees?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I extend our congratulations to Ambassador Morel on this important assignment. We are glad to have him in that position. I also wish him every success in discharging his important responsibilities as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee. Is there any other delegation wishing to take the floor? I give the floor to the representative of Sweden.

Mr. MOLANDER (Sweden): As item co-ordinator for chemical weapons of the Group of 21, I have been empowered to make the following statement.

The Group of 21 expresses its satisfaction that the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons has been re-established. The Group would also like to take this opportunity to extend its sincere congratulations to Ambassador Morel of France as the new Chairman of the Committee. Ambassador Morel embodies the very spirit of the Paris Conference, to which he made such decisive contributions with his dynamism, enthusiasm and intellectual discipline. The Group of 21 pledges to work with him in that very spirit.

At the opening meeting of the Conference, on 7 February, as you have just recalled, Mr. President, the Group of 21 proposed that the mandate for the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons should be improved, firstly by including a reference to the prohibition of use of chemical weapons, and secondly, by deleting the phrase "except for its final drafting". The Group of Socialist States and China supported these proposals.

(Mr. Molander, Sweden)

The proposals were not intended to be controversial. In fact, the Group could not foresee that the proposed amendments could cause difficulties to any group or any country which participated in the General Assembly and the Paris Conference, where such language was agreed to by consensus. It is therefore with a considerable degree of disappointment that the Group of 21 has taken note of the fact that the Conference as a whole is not in a position to join consensus on the two proposals.

The Group of 21, however, considers that it is of paramount interest that work in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons should be pursued immediately. It has therefore agreed not to press further its proposals for an improved mandate, thus enabling the Committee to start its substantive work as of this week. The position of the Group is clear, however, and it hopes that the Conference will wish to review the mandate at an appropriate time during the 1989 session.

Whatever the mandate, the Group of 21 is ready, in the words of the Paris Declaration, "to redouble its efforts, as a matter of urgency, to resolve expeditiously the remaining issues and to conclude the convention at the earliest date". It is our hope that the future work of the Committee from its very beginning will show that our resolve is shared by all.

This concludes the statement of the Group of 21.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Sweden for his statement. Is there any other delegation wishing to take the floor? I give the floor to the representative of Bulgaria, Ambassador Kostov.

Mr. KOSTOV (Bulgaria): It is a pleasure for me to congratulate Ambassador Morel on behalf of my Group on his election as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. I would like to assure him of my Group's readiness to co-operate in the course of the negotiations which lie ahead during this year.

We have just adopted the mandate for the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. I would like to make the following statement for the record on behalf of the Group of Socialist States.

First, the Group of Socialist States believes that the final elaboration at the earliest date of a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons, and on their destruction, is a matter of highest priority for the Conference on Disarmament.

Second, the world community expects us to conclude our work urgently and responsibly. This request was explicitly made in resolutions 43/74 A and C of the General Assembly of the United Nations and in the Final Declaration of the Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons. We consider these documents as manifestations of the strong political will of all participating countries to do everything possible to rid the world of chemical weapons.

Thirdly, the year 1989 will be crucial on our way to a chemical-weapon-free world. We are obliged by the world community to mark

(Mr. Kostov, Bulgaria)

that we are entering a new phase in our negotiations. From this point of view last year's mandate is outdated and does not duly reflect the present situation and the tasks before us. We have in mind, first of all, the need to delete the restrictive provision "except for its final drafting", as well as to indicate that we have a clear mandate from the Paris Conference to achieve a convention not "at the earliest possible date" or "as soon as possible", but simply "at the earliest date". It was also suggested that we should reproduce the full title of the convention, which includes the prohibition of use, as in the General Assembly resolution and as in the Final Declaration of the Paris Conference. Changing the mandate would be a clear signal that we are seriously addressing our commitments expressed in the Paris Declaration.

Fourthly, our group made specific proposals to this effect during the consultations on the mandate. We also supported the amendments to the old mandate proposed by the Group of 21 at the plenary meeting on 7 February.

Fifthly, we are disappointed that it has not been possible so far to improve the mandate of the Ad hoc Committee. We still do not understand the rationale of the Western Group, which opposed any change in the mandate. However, bearing in mind that lengthy discussions on the mandate would be detrimental to the substantive work of the Committee, we decided not to stand in the way of the decision just taken. But we do not consider this issue closed, and believe that it should be possible to continue the consultations on the mandate with the aim of coming to an agreement during the current session of the Conference.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Bulgaria, Ambassador Kostov, for his statement. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? I give the floor to the representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Solesby.

Miss SOLESBY (United Kingdom): I look forward to congratulating you, Mr. President, and to welcoming our new colleagues when I take the floor to speak on behalf of the United Kingdom. This morning I am speaking on behalf of the Western Group.

As Co-ordinator of the Western Group, I warmly welcome the establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. The speed with which this has been accomplished is a good augury for our future work. It has followed detailed, informal consultations held by yourself. I thank you, Mr. President, and colleagues from all groups who have helped to make this possible.

The Committee has a task of great importance before it. We look forward to resuming the substantive negotiations without delay. The important thing is that each of us here should contribute to our utmost to resolving the remaining problems in our negotiations. We will all have in mind the call of the Final Document of the Paris Conference to redouble our efforts. Indeed the report of the Ad hoc Committee in CD/881, which we have just adopted, contains the consensus recommendation that "the results of the Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons be taken into account in the future work on the convention".

(Miss Solesby, United Kingdom)

Western Group countries have made major contributions in the past, and intend to maintain their efforts intensively in the months ahead. We want a good convention as soon as possible. As the distinguished Ambassador of Belgium, speaking as the Western Co-ordinator, said on 7 February, "What I can assure you of is that the Western Group, together with all the other delegations, will seek the most realistic, the most effective and the most expeditious way to arrive at the conclusion of a convention which will free mankind from the fear of chemical weapons".

While I have the floor, I would like to refer to one particular passage in the Paris Declaration, namely that which establishes that "any State wishing to contribute to these negotiations should be able to do so". The Western Group of countries is pleased that a larger number of Governments, not members of the Conference on Disarmament, have applied to participate in the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons than ever before. We believe the work of the Ad hoc Committee will much benefit from the presence of all these countries, and look forward to co-operating with them.

Lastly, I should like to join others in expressing the pleasure of the Western Group of countries at the accession of Ambassador Pierre Morel as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee. His well-known personal qualities, and above all his eminent contribution to the successful outcome of the Paris Conference, give us every confidence in his leadership of our work during the coming months.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Solesby, for her statement and now I give the floor to the representative of China, Ambassador Fan.

Mr. FAN (China) (translated from Chinese): At the outset, I am most pleased to express my warm congratulations to Ambassador Morel of France on his assumption of this year's chairmanship of the Ad hoc Committee on CW. I am confident that, under his able guidance, the work of the Committee will be crowned with new successes. I also wish to avail myself of the opportunity to express my appreciation to Ambassador Sujka of Poland for his positive contributions.

As far as the mandate of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons is concerned, we have conducted serious discussions under your guidance, Mr. President. I have made known the position of the Chinese delegation, including its views on the statement made by the Group of 21. Today I would simply reiterate that the Chinese delegation hopes that this year's mandate for the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons will see some improvement in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the forty-third session of the General Assembly and the Final Declaration of the Paris Conference. At the same time, the Chinese delegation is also ready to adopt a flexible attitude and to go along with the existing mandate so that the Committee may start its substantive work as soon as possible.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of China, Ambassador Fan, for his statement. Is there any other delegation wishing to take the floor? I see none.

(The President)

I now turn to requests from non-members to participate in the work of the Ad hoc Committee. In that connection, I should like to note that for technical reasons relating to a process of consultations, the secretariat had to prepare the working papers relating to invitations to non-members with a reference to a subsidiary body on agenda item 5. This should be disregarded, as we have not been able yet to re-establish that Ad hoc Committee. We shall consider the references to a subsidiary body on agenda item 5 as deleted from working paper CD/WP.359 and Add.1 to 19. When we re-establish the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, we shall then take the working papers up again to deal with agenda item 5. I shall list those countries requesting participation under agenda item 4, "Chemical weapons": Norway, Spain, Finland, Switzerland, Austria, Ireland, New Zealand, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Portugal, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Denmark, Turkey, Republic of Korea, Senegal, Bangladesh, Syrian Arab Republic, Greece, Tunisia, Zimbabwe (which has also requested participation under items 6, 7 and 8 on the agenda) and Iraq.

May I ask the Conference whether there is consensus on inviting those non-members? I give the floor to the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ambassador Ardekani.

Mr. ARDEKANI (Islamic Republic of Iran): At the outset, Mr. President, allow me to join other colleagues in congratulating you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of February. I am confident that with your diplomatic skill and personal abilities, the Conference will mark notable success in discharging its duties. Also, in the light of the good relationship and co-operation between our two republics you can count on the full support of the delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran in successfully carrying out your weighty responsibility.

I would also like to welcome our colleagues who have joined us since last summer - the distinguished Ambassadors of Burma, India, Belgium, the German Democratic Republic, Sweden, Australia, Zaire, Kenya, Pakistan, Algeria and Czechoslovakia. To all of those colleagues who, at the end of their term of duty here, have departed in pursuance of other duties and functions, I wish them well. At this juncture, I would also like to congratulate Ambassador Pierre Morel of France on his assumption of the chairmanship of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. I am sure that under his able chairmanship the Committee will mark substantive success. I assure him of the full co-operation of my delegation. I would also like to thank Ambassador Sujka of Poland for his outstanding job during the 1988 session.

Since the procedural and substantive work of the Conference are closely interlinked, my statement concerns the former, while Minister Dr. Velayati in his address to the Conference in the near future will address the latter, i.e. substantive subjects.

The dynamics of disarmament indicate changes in the world; the world of unilateral, bilateral and multilateral disarmament; and the world of understanding. The world of freeing resources from armaments and allocating them to improving the living conditions of the people, eradication of ignorance, poverty and disease, and the world of freeing people from fear and insecurity.

(Mr. Ardekani, Islamic Republic of Iran)

Unfortunately, there are a few who do not discern this change. Those who do not appreciate that the world is changing or do not want to believe that. Let us hope that global negotiations on effective disarmament, with their collective nature, will be the instrument which expedites and paves the way for increasing understanding about this changing world. When we say the move toward disarmament is being expedited, it is because we observe that the draft of the convention banning chemical weapons is in the process of being finalized. This is an achievement for the Conference on Disarmament as the sole international body for disarmament negotiations. We have noted that the Paris Conference reaffirmed the role of the Conference on Disarmament in finalizing a convention on all aspects of chemical weapons.

Adherence to an absolute prohibition of chemical weapons should be globally verifiable, unconditional, and subject to no divergent interpretation. It should be unlimited in its application and duration. It should also have horizontal and vertical scope within and between countries. Under this convention, no justification should ever permit the use or threat of use of chemical weapons, nor should any one even seek to invoke Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations to justify the production, stockpiling or transfer of chemical weapons within the territory of a country or against any other nation. The verification and investigation procedures should be effective and leave no room for any violation. Any violation should be dealt with in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

As the Conference on Disarmament is reaching the final stages of its deliberations on the draft of the new convention, it is our duty to involve non-member States and seek their adherence to this convention. In this regard, in particular, the adherence of those States which have used chemical weapons, those which assisted the violators in obtaining the technology to produce and use chemical weapons, those which provided them with delivery systems, and those which violated their commitments under the Geneva Protocol of 1925, is of the paramount importance. It is also essential to secure the adherence of those States which have or can acquire the capability to produce, stockpile or use chemical weapons.

Obviously, the dynamics of change in the world dictate that if a Government considers itself free of obligations with regard to the prohibition of chemical weapons, the determination of the world community should prevent such behaviour and should not allow a fiasco to take place.

It is in this sense that we believe the presence of observers in this august body should not be utilized for old polemics and politics of chicanery. This Conference has heard declarations in recent times by members which announced unilateral and bilateral reductions of weapons of mass destruction and the adoption of confidence-building measures. The Conference therefore cannot make its podium available to those who do not move in this direction. This is not a podium for those who do not move toward peace and collective security and relaxation of tension. The Conference should allow those observers which would like to work genuinely for the cause of disarmament in general, and the complete prohibition of chemical weapons and the removal of the nuclear threat in particular, to render their sincere contribution. It is in this spirit that their performance at the Conference

(Mr. Ardekani, Islamic Republic of Iran)

will be judged - on their future co-operation and participation in the Conference on Disarmament. Their performance in other areas in easing tensions and moving toward peace will also be under advisement and evaluation.

I hope that past experience will be our torch for our march towards the future for a safer world in which common sense rules over arms.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ambassador Ardekani, for his statement, and also for the kind words he addressed to me and to my country. In the light of his statement, I take it that the Conference adopts the draft decisions.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I wish to inform you that additional requests for participation in our work have been received from Chile and Viet Nam. They have been circulated in the delegations' pigeon-holes, and we shall take them up at our next plenary meeting on Tuesday. I give the floor to the representative of France, Ambassador Morel.

Mr. MOREL (France) (translated from French): Mr. President, allow me to thank you for your very kind words and to thank all the delegations here for the trust that they have just shown, first of all in my country, in my delegation and finally in me personally. I would like to take up the very words of Mr. Roland Dumas, Minister of State and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic, who said a few days ago, in this very room, that we were very appreciative of the honour and responsibility conferred on us in this way with the chairmanship of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. For my part I would add that we will do everything within our power to live up to this honour and responsibility. Allow me also on this occasion to thank all my colleagues here for the gestures of friendship, encouragement and good wishes that have been extended to us. I can say very sincerely that they will enable us to cope together and to deal with very demanding tasks in our work. These signs of friendship, this encouragement, these wishes also show that, beyond political will, above and beyond the facilities that are made available, there is a human and personal element without which no major endeavour is possible.

Next I would like to pay tribute to my predecessor, Ambassador Sujka, who in an exceptional way represents in the Conference, and in particular with regard to chemical weapons, continuity and also, in a certain way, the history of these negotiations, because he was Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons twice. And I would like to emphasize that what he accomplished with his three group chairmen, and with contributions from all delegations, during the year 1988, was a remarkable effort on the substance, which is reflected in the "rolling text", but which goes beyond what is recorded in the "rolling text". I am stressing this because I think that without that effort, what was achieved at the Paris Conference would have remained slightly insubstantial, and that as a result of the work accomplished in 1988 that achievement, on the contrary, can now take on its true dimensions.

And this will be my last point. The impetus has been building up for a long time. We must pursue it and build on it. The best way of responding to

(Mr. Morel, France)

the confidence which has been shown in me - and for which I would like to thank all the delegations again - the best way of applying our collective determination, as manifested in the United Nations resolutions adopted by consensus, as manifested in the Paris Declaration and, of course, in the mandate itself, is quite simply to announce that the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons will meet tomorrow morning at 10 a.m., then again on Monday, at 3 p.m., and that during next week each of the five working groups will have its opening meeting with full conference services. In this way, at the end of next week the actual substantive work will have begun in all the areas where serious problems remain for us to solve.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of France, Ambassador Morel, for his statement. The secretariat has circulated at my request a timetable for meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. As usual, this timetable is merely indicative and we can proceed to change it or to adjust it depending on the circumstances. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference agrees to the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I should also like to recall that the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, which we re-established today, will hold its first meeting tomorrow, Friday 17 February, at 10 a.m. in Conference Room V.

In addition, I should like to inform you that the secretariat has received a telegram from the former representative of Peru in the Conference, Ambassador Jorge Morelli-Pando, transmitting to me, as well as to the other representatives, his appreciation for all the co-operation received when he was accredited to the Conference, which he left to take up new important functions as Ambassador of Peru in Ecuador.

I have no other business for today. I now intend to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 21 February at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.20 p.m.



# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.488  
21 February 1989

ENGLISH

---

## FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-EIGHTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 21 February 1989, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Aldo Pugliese (Italy)

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I declare open the 488th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

First of all, allow me to welcome warmly to the Conference the Secretary of State of His Holiness Pope John Paul II, His Eminence Cardinal Agostino Casaroli, who is to address us today. His Eminence Cardinal Casaroli is a diplomat with a wealth of experience well known to us all. He began his career at the Pontifical Ecclesiastical Academy, and then entered the diplomatic service of the Holy See in 1940. Appointed the Church's Under-Secretary for Public Affairs in 1961, he became an archbishop and Secretary of the Church's Council for Public Affairs in 1967. In 1979, he was created a cardinal by His Holiness Pope John Paul II, who chose him as his Secretary of State. He has evinced a special interest in United Nations affairs, especially in the field of disarmament, and last year addressed the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. It was his Eminence who strengthened the close co-operation that has always existed between the Holy See and the United Nations.

Starting in 1963, he embarked on a policy with a profound universalist spirit, one of the major aspects of which is what later came to be called the Holy See's Ostpolitik, and in 1971 he deposited the Holy See's instrument of accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in Moscow. His presence among us today, in a particularly important phase of our work, provides yet further proof of His Holiness's concern for and interest in the major problems confronting mankind. It is with pleasure that I now have the honour to give the floor to His Holiness's Secretary of State, His Eminence Cardinal Agostino Casaroli.

Cardinal CASAROLI (Holy See) (translated from French): The person who has the honour to address you today, and who thanks you for having offered him the opportunity to do so, represents before you a Power (if one can use that word) which is in no way military. Its weapons are exclusively moral and spiritual in nature, and thus very different from those that your Conference has to concern itself with. However, there are few parties in the world who are more interested than the Holy See in the problems of disarmament, and who follow work on this subject with such attention. The active presence of a permanent observer mission to the Conference is an eloquent sign of this. I can assure you that none of your initiatives, none of your efforts, pass us by unnoticed.

What is involved first and foremost is the common interest of all those who live on our planet, and for whom the weapons of all categories that have been accumulating for decades on Earth, in the atmosphere, and even in outer space, represent both a guarantee of security and a threat. But to a greater extent it is an interest based on deeper reasons, that is to say concerns of an ethical nature. It is true - and this is the first reaction of many people - that matters relating to arms and disarmament involve many technical aspects, which are rightly pursued and studied thoroughly by experts. And these matters are part of the political context of relations between States, blocs of States, regional, continental or global alliances: a complex fabric woven and rewoven by statesmen and by international political leaders, which sometimes develops in opposition to their efforts and their forecasts. It

(Cardinal Casaroli, Holy See)

would, however, be fatal to forget the specifically moral problems and repercussions related to these questions. In the final analysis they have to do with man, his survival, his integrity, the possibility for him to live a dignified life and to develop in a way which is in keeping with his rights and his vocation: man, the centre of our universe and of history. These problems, which the experts on armaments are of course aware of, and which are not forgotten by statesmen, constitute for the Holy See (but assuredly not for the Holy See alone) an absolute priority and a dominant concern.

It is this very lack of competence in the technical and political aspects which makes it possible for the Holy See to take what one might call a clearer look at the moral questions: a look that is not disturbed by considerations of any other order, however necessary they may be. And for those who like you who cannot ignore those other considerations, perhaps this will arouse a little more attention to hear what the Holy See has to say. In a world that suffers from the pressure of problems and concerns presented by a situation that seems to want to follow only the lines laid down by the opposition of military and economic forces or the interests of social classes and peoples, this voice seeks to bear witness to the supreme requirements of a moral nature, and in particular to provide a reminder of them, which reaches as far as the everyday lives of peoples.

Many years of experience teach me that in the current world situation the unarmed word of the Holy See, if it is not always followed, is generally listened to with respectful attention and often, if I am not mistaken, with gratitude, like that of a friend who is trying to express in a disinterested fashion the profound voice of the conscience of mankind. At least that is the role the Holy See gladly assumes in the great community of nations, including those who are furthest away from it from the point of view of religion or ideology. And it wishes to express its gratitude to that community for the very cordial welcome it receives.

Quite rightly, the question of disarmament is seen as being closely linked with that of peace: the more States arm themselves, the greater the dangers of conflagration, which in a way are increased by arms themselves; the more military arsenals are reduced, the less temptation there is to use them. This spontaneous feeling stands in opposition to an old and well-routed conviction that is well expressed in the old Latin adage Si vis pacem, para bellum - If you want peace, prepare for war. In other words, arm yourself: the better armed you are, the more you will ward off the danger of war. It is not difficult to recognize in this succinct expression, in what one might call its "essential" form, the philosophy of modern "deterrence". Justice, and the interests of different nations and humanity, require a careful and measured approach - from the moral viewpoint too - to a problem that is so fundamental where principles are concerned and has so many concrete consequences in terms of life or death.

I was struck by the remark of a scientist, certainly not a man lacking moral concern, who, when discussing the possibility of carrying out an ambitious "defence" project and its foreseeable or disturbing implications, concluded that all things considered he found it more practicable - still - less dangerous and more useful for peace to continue to hold to the

(Cardinal Casaroli, Holy See)

principle of "honest deterrence". Quite apart from the worth of his scientific and technical arguments, the collocation of these two terms was bound to make one think. I also remember the reply given by Pope Paul VI to a statesman from a major country who cited to him these very words of ancient Roman wisdom. Oh no, was the Pope's reaction, with the calm and sometimes only apparent candour that was characteristic of him, "Si vis pacem, para pacem". Of course, the statesman could have replied that the aim was the same, peace; the only difference was the judgement as to the most effective way of achieving the goal. Realism against idealism, one could have said. The solid ground of reality against the generous calculations and the illusion of good will.

But is it really so? For thousands of years, war was regarded as a means of conquest and glory which was more or less customary and acceptable for nations that were expanding or were forcefully asserting their will to achieve supremacy and domination over other peoples: for conquerors and strategists of genius seeking laurels and power. I do not need to retrace before you the long, hard and fitful evolution that has led humanity little by little to become aware of the morally unacceptable nature of such a concept and the behaviour that it inspires. Increasingly, princes and peoples who continued to make war - and God knows how many of them there were! - felt the need either to refuse to accept that they had taken the initiative, or to invoke powerful, almost unavoidable reasons for taking up arms. Now renunciation of the use of force, and even the threat of force, to have one's real or alleged rights accepted, is recognized as a principle of modern international law, and one may legitimately resort to the use of arms only in the case of an imposed war or if one needs to defend oneself. Even recourse to a "first strike" to prevent an attack that one expects or fears from the other party is in theory subject to such conditions that everyone prefers not to be seen as responsible for it. This attitude, inspired by legal or moral considerations, has been confirmed by the growth of the destructive potential of armaments which "progress" has put in the hands of the opposing armies and which has made the consequences of war increasingly less "tolerable" even for the winner. The appearance of the atomic bomb on the scene of history finally provoked the decisive crisis of a political philosophy which had not, and still has not, been able to deprive the very idea of war in relations between peoples and countries of its acceptability.

The terrible potential for destruction of the side which is attacked, and self-destruction of the attacker, which is characteristic of nuclear weapons, with their devastating consequences in space and time beyond the theatre of operations and the period of conflict, has given rise to the new concept of a "weapon made in order not to be used". Its very existence should be a sufficiently sure deterrent against possible attacks. Yet the dangers of such a threatening presence in the world very quickly became obvious: the boundary between the effectiveness of deterrence, even the most powerful deterrence, and the preponderance of elements that release the self-defence mechanisms linked with mutual mistrust, is still uncertain, and as long as arms are available it is a line that is too easy to cross, either in a moment of panic or because of inefficiency or error in the operation of the sophisticated electronics by means of which modern man seeks to make up for the insufficiency and slowness of his capacity to concentrate and react. In any event, if it is

(Cardinal Casaroli, Holy See)

to be "credible" deterrence cannot rule out the actual use of threatened retaliation. If this is particularly true for nuclear weapons, given the lightning speed of their use and the destruction they cause, we should not exclude the other categories of weapons of mass destruction, or even what are called conventional weapons, which, in increasingly sophisticated form, are filling the arsenals of small and large countries alike.

The conviction has thus been forged, increasingly strongly and widely, that it is now necessary to remove from men's hands the instruments they need to make war on one another - in other words, we must come to disarmament. This is a relatively modern concept in the history of mankind, but one which is becoming increasingly necessary, also because of the way things are: even though, regrettably, it still appears easier to issue grand declarations of principle and stick to general intentions rather than to go into the specificity of the problems. The horrors of the Second World War led the newly established United Nations to include among its first aims the elimination of arsenals of nuclear weapons and the principal weapons of mass destruction, and later also the problem of conventional weapons, and since 1978 there have been three special sessions devoted to the problem of disarmament. You know much better than I do the history which, starting in 1945, led to the setting up of the present Conference on Disarmament, to which I am happy to pay tribute today, not only because of its importance and its almost universal representativeness, despite its necessarily limited membership, but particularly because of the work it has done and which it still has to do. You are the United Nations body that is responsible for multilateral negotiations on arms limitation and disarmament. It is true that the most acute problem today, that of atomic weapons, is in practice in the hands of the two major nuclear Powers. But you are not uninvolved in this, and not only because of the special interest with which you have followed the development of negotiations on that subject and your satisfaction, shared throughout the world, at its positive results, with the hope that they will be built upon in accordance with the aspirations of peoples.

Your Conference has also put among the items that go to make up what has been called its "Decalogue" the question of nuclear weapons in all their aspects; it keeps on its agenda subjects such as the banning of nuclear tests, the halting of the arms race, nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war. Even if on those points your work has not produced concrete results, it does show the great interest of your Conference in those problems, and it should be pursued with tenacity.

The historic changes that have taken place in the international climate, because of and following the new Soviet-American approach to disarmament questions, could have a positive influence in allowing progress at the multilateral level, which is your purview. Your interest in it and the success wished for in the future are bound in turn to improve the climate still further, by stimulating and encouraging the good will of those who want to bring humanity relief from the nightmare caused by the mass of weapons threatening life and progress, through bilateral and multilateral approaches which can increasingly be seen to be necessarily complementary.

(Cardinal Casaroli, Holy See)

In this way there is a very wide area open for efforts by your Conference. Wide, of vital importance. And difficult. Your commitment deserves to be recognized, with your tenacity either for promoting real negotiations or for conducting exploratory discussions which must precede and prepare for the phase of negotiations per se. Of course the rule of consensus which governs your decisions is bound to slow down the work of the Conference; but that rule is dictated by understandable reasons, because you are dealing with subjects that concern the security of every State and of the international community. This difficulty and the slowness that it brings about can easily lead to a certain pessimism and discouragement; particularly because the "multilateral" nature of your field of action does not concern just a multiplicity of countries but also, in one way, the multiplicity of questions relating to disarmament, in so far as it is natural enough for a country that possesses weapons on which it bases its security to be reluctant to give them up if other countries are not ready to give up, in turn, other types of weapons that could threaten that security. But neither this difficulty nor the magnitude of the task should cause a dampening or cooling of your efforts, which are maintained by the awareness that you are working for a cause of vital importance for humanity, as I have said.

The dream of universal and complete disarmament, a world without weapons, returns from time to time to the minds of men, with the attraction of beautiful things, perhaps too beautiful to be realizable. While serving peace, disarmament itself needs peace to be able to be realized and maintained. And peace, to be possible and maintained, needs justice. Universal justice, in turn, would require an authority above the parties, universally recognized and accepted, which also had the means to enforce its decisions. In the prophecies of Isaiah of olden times, which have also found a place at the United Nations in New York, we read: "They shall beat their swords into ploughshares, and their spears into pruning-hooks: nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more." But we also read, as a premiss for such a welcome change: "He shall judge among the nations, and shall rebuke many people" (Isaiah 2, 4).

"He will judge ...": but who will judge, today? Without giving up this perspective, within which not dreams, but the requirements of political logic and particularly of morality confront what we see as the lack of logic of a reality subjected to selfish impulses as strong as, for example, exacerbated nationalism or the rivalries of races, ideologies or interests, it is necessary, at the same time, to consider this reality in order to try to improve the various elements of it, where possible, and as time allows, always taking into account the limits imposed by ethics and the ultimate ideal which humanity should never give up (I like the assertion that "you cannot achieve the possible without aiming at the impossible", and I find it to be true).

In 1979 your "Decalogue" presented you with an ambitious picture of sectors where you could work. Notable among them, because of the seriousness of the problem and the emphasis placed on it by the United Nations General Assembly and the international community, is the problem of chemical weapons. Last year the Conference on Disarmament, which has long been active in this area, and aware of "its responsibility to conduct as a priority task the negotiations on a multilateral convention on the complete and effective

(Cardinal Casaroli, Holy See)

prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction, and to ensure the preparation of the convention", re-established the Ad hoc Committee entrusted with pushing that process ahead. It is the wish of the Holy See that your work, backed up by the results of the recent Paris Conference that brought together the signatory States of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and other States, and stimulated by the request made to you to redouble your efforts as a matter of urgency, will be crowned with the success the world is awaiting as fast as possible. This result will be parallel to those that humanity also expects in the domain of nuclear weapons, remembering always the horrors for which chemical weapons have already been or can still be responsible, and the durability of their harmful effects, even decades after they have been used. On this point I think that no security argument can be reasonably put forward against the aim of complete and unreserved disarmament, while acknowledging the existence of many technical or legal problems in its execution. If cruelty and the involvement of the civilian population are characteristic to some extent of any type of modern weaponry, as far as chemical weapons are concerned, or those like them, the cruelty factor, one might say, is there in the pure state, that is without any of the corresponding advantages of a military nature - advantages which are debatable and in some cases unjustifiable - that are inherent in other types of weapon used for "deterrence".

There remains the question of an effective system of verification and control, a question which is just as important in all the other schemes for the complete elimination or the "progressive and balanced" reduction of weapons, to maintain an equal balance, particularly in the strategic area, which is still regarded as essential for safeguarding peace. On this problem your Conference is certainly able to provide a focus and a contribution that I think are particularly valuable.

The road to peace is long and difficult. There is no doubt that disarmament offers one of the most effective and most fundamental means to achieve peace; but the path to disarmament is not short or easy either. And in particular, it is still insufficient. It is still more necessary to achieve moral and political disarmament, to try to eliminate, or at least to reduce as far as possible, at the same time as arms, the motives that move men and peoples to use those arms: the desire for domination and oppression on the one hand, and on the other a well-founded fear of becoming the object of aggression in one's own existence, in one's rights and vital interests, in one's independence, in one's freedom, which is more valuable than life itself. Confidence-building measures are increasingly winning acceptance in relations between nations. We must encourage and develop them. But it is even more important to promote and improve the system of political dialogue, strengthened by the use of the various possible forms of good offices, mediation or arbitration - perhaps even made mandatory under appropriate arrangements. In the current situation the United Nations, with its own structures, is the best means that the international community has in this area. I hope you will forgive me if I also mention here in passing what the Holy See was able to do at a particularly critical moment in the southern zone of South America, as a result of Pope John Paul II's mediation between Chile and Argentina.

(Cardinal Casaroli, Holy See)

International law still has a long road to travel before it manages to effectively reconcile the supreme cause of peace with those of sovereignty and the legitimate rights and interests of all nations large and small. That is a noble task which is incumbent on statesmen and on politicians, on the leaders of international life, and the scientists of our time. The Conference is not unfamiliar with this task, and for more than one reason, particularly because disarmament is also, in a way, closely linked to expanding the resources that nations and the international community require to face the challenge of development, in which Pope Paul VI recognized "the new name of peace". And it is in the name of peace - necessary, difficult, but possible - that I have the pleasure of offering you and your Conference my most sincere wishes for fruitful work.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank His Eminence Cardinal Agostino Casaroli for the important statement he has just made as His Holiness's Secretary of State.

We shall now continue with our business for today. In conformity with its programme of work, the Conference will start its consideration of agenda items 1 and 2, entitled "Nuclear Test Ban" and "Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament". In accordance with rule 30 of its rules of procedure, however, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

As announced at our last plenary meeting, I shall put today before the Conference, for adoption, requests from non-members to participate in the work of the Conference. We shall first discuss those questions at an informal meeting once our list of speakers has been exhausted. Immediately afterwards we shall resume the Plenary to formalize any decisions which we may have reached at the informal meeting.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Czechoslovakia, Burma and China. I now give the floor to the representative of Czechoslovakia, Ambassador Vajnar.

Mr. VAJNAR (Czechoslovakia): Mr. President, allow me first of all to join you in welcoming here today His Eminence the Secretary of State of the Holy See, Cardinal Agostino Casaroli. We listened with keen interest to what Cardinal Casaroli said in his statement this morning, and we appreciate the attention paid by the Holy See to the urgent and acute problems facing humanity today. Allow me also, Mr. President, to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. I wish you, as well as the Conference under your guidance, the achievement of progress in dealing with the urgent and important problems on our agenda. My delegation would also like to thank Ambassador Ardekani of the Islamic Republic of Iran for his active work as President of the Conference last September. And I would also like to thank you, Mr. President, and my colleagues in the Conference on Disarmament who have welcomed me as the new head of the Czechoslovak delegation for their good work and wishes. I am looking forward to further fruitful, efficient co-operation in dealing with the problems entrusted to our Conference.



(Mr. Vajnar, Czechoslovakia)

It is always challenging and exciting to come back to familiar places. It is even more so when one returns to an international body at which one had witnessed and assisted in the elaboration of important international disarmament and arms control agreements. They are still in force, playing an indisputable, positive role in curbing the arms race in various categories of weapons and environments.

Of course, the Conference on Disarmament today is working in substantially different international circumstances from those of its predecessors. Moreover, the international climate has been changing rapidly in recent years. Constructive dialogue, replacing confrontation, has already brought tangible results in the negotiations on disarmament, the easing of tensions and the solution of regional conflicts, as well as co-operation in the humanitarian field. The end of last year and the first weeks of this year were particularly promising in this regard. The Vienna follow-up meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe concluded its work, adopting important decisions. A number of member States of the Warsaw Treaty Organization announced their decision to reduce their armed forces and armaments unilaterally and significantly. The Paris Conference issued an unprecedented call for the prohibition and elimination of all chemical weapons at the earliest date.

These positive developments should also have a direct bearing on the Conference on Disarmament's proceedings. In this regard we endorse what has been said at the previous meetings by the Minister of State from India, the head of the Soviet delegation and some other speakers. We are fully aware that the solution of the problems we have to address will not be easy. However, there is a feeling that the opportunity offered to the international community must not be lost.

Successful work in the Conference on Disarmament requires decisive action in a constructive spirit, with a sincere desire to achieve a balanced compromise. It should not serve as an arena for confrontation, for winning "points" in unproductive polemics. In our negotiations the legitimate interests of all participants must be respected. We are satisfied that the new atmosphere in international relations has led to increased interest in the Conference on Disarmament's work. Never before have so many countries which are not regular members - 21 now - participated in the Conference's work. We welcome them all, and in particular those who have applied to participate in our work for the first time.

The Czechoslovak delegation considers the Conference on Disarmament sufficiently representative to address successfully the priority questions related to nuclear disarmament and the finalization of the chemical weapons convention. Naturally, while specific measures are being discussed and negotiated in this direction, arms must not be moved into outer space. Czechoslovakia does not see the tasks I have just mentioned as noble but distant goals. We are ready to contribute to their achievement through specific steps, including unilateral steps when there is a hope that they will lead to positive developments.

(Mr. Vajnar, Czechoslovakia)

Two days before the Paris Conference, on 5 January, the Government of Czechoslovakia released a statement on issues concerning the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons. This statement reaffirms that Czechoslovakia does not possess, manufacture or stockpile on its territory any chemical weapons. Nor does it own facilities for their development or production. All scientific research in this field is oriented exclusively towards protection against the effects of chemical weapons and other peaceful goals.

We are in favour of prevention of the further proliferation of chemical weapons. We are ready to contribute to this goal as far as we are able. With this objective in mind the Czechoslovak Government has adopted legislative measures providing for controls on the export of dual-purpose chemicals. I would like to stress in this connection that the only purpose of this measure is to contribute to the non-proliferation of chemical weapons. It is not discriminatory against any country. We also consider that it will not hinder international co-operation in the peaceful development of the chemical industry. The full text of the said statement is contained in Conference document CD/878.

The Paris Conference and its Final Declaration have already been welcomed here by practically all speakers taking the floor since the beginning of this session. We share the view that the Conference was an important political gathering confirming the validity of the Geneva Protocol while at the same time calling for the elaboration of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their destruction at the earliest date, as the most reliable guarantee against the use of chemical weapons. Czechoslovakia regards that as a highly urgent task. It is argued by some that fixing deadlines is arbitrary, and not acceptable for disarmament negotiations. Perhaps this might be so if there is a total absence of specific negotiations on a subject covered by a suggested deadline. However, in the case of chemical weapons so much effort has already gone into the elaboration of the convention that the proposals for the time frames for its achievement advanced in Paris, as well as in this room recently, are not only quite realistic, but might also usefully remind us of the pledge we have all so solemnly subscribed to.

Paragraph 3 of the Final Declaration requests all States to make contributions to the negotiations in Geneva and to become parties to the convention as soon as it is concluded. As the Czechoslovak Government said in the statement mentioned above, we are prepared to be among the first States to accede to the chemical weapons convention. We regard the national inspection of a chemical industry facility we effected on 25 and 26 January 1989 in the town of Mnisek in central Bohemia as a contribution to the early finalization of the convention. The inspected facility is producing a schedule [3] chemical. The report on this inspection will be submitted soon.

We share the belief expressed by many representatives in our Conference, as well as at the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, that measures of a regional nature could also make a significant contribution to the negotiations on the chemical weapons convention. With this in view my country, together with the German Democratic Republic, proposed back in 1985 the creation of a chemical-weapon-free zone in Central Europe. If established, in Europe as well as in other parts of the

(Mr. Vajnar, Czechoslovakia)

world, such zones could limit the proliferation of chemical weapons and lessen the threat of their use. In so doing they would strengthen efforts aimed at the global ban on chemical weapons and would create more favourable conditions and a political atmosphere conducive to its early achievement.

Starting at the end of last November the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons met twice to continue work on the convention during the inter-sessional period. We consider the work done in the course of the six weeks useful. Under the chairmanship of Ambassador Sujka of Poland certain progress was registered on a number of issues, and some obstacles complicating the Committee's work in the past were removed. The Ad hoc Committee has just started its work for the 1989 session under the chairmanship of Ambassador Morel of France. The programme adopted is ambitious and should lead to intensive work. We welcome the fact that problems related to article VI are going to be discussed actively. My delegation also hopes that due attention will soon be accorded to the question of challenge inspections. Agreement on this issue would be a major step in the development of a general pattern of verification under a chemical weapons convention.

We of the Czechoslovak delegation maintain that the priority attention accorded by the Conference on Disarmament to the chemical weapons convention must not lead to putting aside and neglecting of other urgent topics - first of all the nuclear test ban. We would have been pleased if an ad hoc committee on the matter had been established years ago and if a "rolling text" similar to the one we have been developing for the chemical weapons convention were now in our hands for an NTB too. The comparison might seem a bit far-fetched; however, if all had displayed readiness for constructive dialogue, a long way could have been covered since 1982, when we first established an Ad hoc Working Group on an NTB. Instead, the Conference has been discussing the terms of reference for a subsidiary body for the last five years, and new events related to an NTB which have occurred outside this room have barely had any influence on this discussion. My delegation considers that the Conference on Disarmament should abandon the passive role it has confined itself to and finally start specific work geared towards a future NTB. In August last year the Czechoslovak delegation submitted a draft mandate for an ad hoc committee on the subject (CD/863) which had previously been known and discussed as an informal proposal by the President. We were motivated solely by the desire that the Conference on Disarmament should initiate, "as a first step towards achieving nuclear test-ban treaty, substantive work on specific and interrelated test ban issues, including structure and scope as well as verification and compliance". It is high time that we recognized progress achieved at the bilateral Soviet-American talks and in the Group of Scientific Experts dealing with seismic data transmission. At the same time it should be accepted that the conclusion and successful realization of the INF Treaty, and the advanced stage of the Soviet-American negotiations on 50 per cent reductions in their strategic nuclear forces, make the situation today quite different from the time when a nuclear test ban was proclaimed a long-term or ultimate objective.

The agenda of our Conference contains a number of other important items, and my delegation will address them in due course. However, before I conclude my today's statement let me draw your attention, and the attention of the Conference, to document CD/887, circulated by my delegation. It contains a

(Mr. Vajnar, Czechoslovakia)

statement entitled "On reducing the number of personnel and armaments and on organizational changes in the Czechoslovak People's Army". This statement, issued in Prague on 28 January of this year, stipulates that the Czechoslovak People's Army will be cut by 12,000 men and military expenditure in Czechoslovakia for 1989-1990 by 15 per cent. Large quantities of armaments - 850 tanks, 165 armoured personnel carriers and 51 combat aircraft - will be withdrawn and gradually destroyed.

We regard this decision as marking the start of the gradual implementation of our initiative on the establishment of a zone of confidence, co-operation and good-neighbourly relations along the dividing line between the member States of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO. At the same time it marks adherence to and active support for the proposals advanced by Mikhail Gorbachev in his statement at the United Nations General Assembly on 7 December of last year. The steps which are going to be undertaken will emphasize the defensive nature of the Czechoslovak People's Army and the creation of more favourable conditions for the upcoming Vienna negotiations. As is stressed in the statement mentioned above, Czechoslovakia is prepared to continue the process of reductions if the member States of NATO are ready to undertake adequate measures.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Czechoslovakia for his statement, and also for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. As His Eminence Cardinal Casaroli has other pressing appointments during his visit to Geneva, I should like briefly to suspend this plenary meeting in order to take leave of him as he departs from the Conference and the Palais des Nations.

The meeting was suspended at 11.10 a.m. and resumed at 11.20 a.m.

The PRESIDENT: The 488th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed. I should now like to give the floor to the representative of Burma, Ambassador Thant.

Mr. AUNG THANT (Burma): May I, first of all, extend our warm welcome and felicitations to His Eminence Cardinal Agostino Casaroli, Secretary of State of the Holy See? Despite his manifold duties, he has found it possible to come to our midst and deliver a statement in the CD. We thank His Eminence for his gracious presence and the important statement he has delivered.

I should like to extend to you, on behalf of my delegation as well as on my own behalf, our heartfelt congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of February 1989. You represent Italy, a country which has been in the forefront of many important diplomatic initiatives in the cause of international peace and security. In addition, you personally bring to the presidency a wealth of experience and expertise in the field of multilateral disarmament negotiations, and I am fully confident that it will make a positive contribution to the work of the CD. I should also like to express our appreciation to your predecessor Ambassador Ardekani of the Islamic Republic of Iran, who very skilfully guided the work of the CD during September 1988 and through the inter-sessional period.

(Mr. Aung Thant, Burma)

I came to Geneva to assume my responsibilities towards the tail-end of the 1988 session. I recall with profound thanks the warm words of welcome addressed to me by my colleagues. I thank them all once again and reciprocate their kind sentiments. I should also like to take this opportunity to welcome in our midst our new colleagues who have just joined us, Ambassador Sharma of India, Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan, Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden, Ambassador Dietze of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Houlliez of Belgium, Ambassador Reese of Australia, Ambassador Bullut of Kenya and Ambassador Vajnar of Czechoslovakia. I look forward to entering into close relations and co-operation both official and personal, with them all.

I do not wish to let this opportunity pass without placing on record the most sincere and profound thanks of my delegation to the French Government for hosting the historic Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons, and for the generous hospitality and most satisfactory services extended to the participants in the Conference, including my own delegation. This initiative of the French Government was a most timely and welcome step at the right historical moment. My tribute also goes to the French Foreign Minister, His Excellency Mr. Roland Dumas, who addressed this august body and formally presented the Final Act of the Paris Conference on 7 February. His statement was a source of inspiration and encouragement for all the delegations in the Conference on Disarmament.

As we survey the world political scene at the beginning of the 1989 session of the Conference on Disarmament, we can see many encouraging signs. The Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons has generated a political momentum that will give added impetus to the negotiations on chemical weapons in the Conference on Disarmament. The Soviet Union has made a unilateral declaration that it will start destroying its chemical weapon stockpiles (the United States also announced earlier its plan to destroy its old stocks of chemical weapons). Another unilateral measure declared by the Soviet Union and its allies was to reduce their conventional forces in Europe. The United States-Soviet START negotiations are well advanced on 50 per cent cuts in their strategic nuclear weapons. East-West negotiations on conventional arms reductions are due to start in Vienna next month with new vigour. All these developments create an atmosphere of optimism. It is incumbent on all of us to translate this optimism and hope into reality by producing maximum possible tangible results.

The tempo of negotiations on chemical weapons in the CD has somewhat slowed down in the past two years, at a time when the threat of chemical weapons is looming ever larger and the need for the early conclusion of a convention on chemical weapons is becoming much more urgent. We require a renewed political commitment by all countries, large and small, at a high political level in order to move those negotiations out of the doldrums. The Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons fulfilled this very requirement. The Final Declaration of the Paris Conference, inter alia, stressed the necessity of concluding a convention on chemical weapons at an early date and called on the Conference on Disarmament to redouble its efforts, as a matter of urgency, to resolve expeditiously the remaining issues and to conclude the convention at the earliest date. We can consider this solemn and strongly worded Final Declaration of the Paris Conference as a

(Mr. Aung Thant, Burma)

mandate for the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons this year. Inspired by this solemn and serious political commitment in the Final Declaration, it is imperative that the CD move into high gear and press ahead with new verve and vigour this year in our task of elaborating the draft convention on chemical weapons.

Some doubts have been raised as to the assurance of undiminished security during the transitional period after entry into force of the convention on chemical weapons. This is a complex question, and I do not wish to get into the substance or the detailed discussion of this question at this point. However, my way of reaffirming the fundamental position of my delegation, I wish to stress the conviction of my delegation that the security of all countries can be strengthened only by the early conclusion and entry into force of the convention on chemical weapons, but not by postponing it. It is hardly necessary nowadays either to look back far into history or to go into deep research in order to realize the terrible reality of the use of chemical weapons. The risk of proliferation of chemical weapons is already running high. We must act before the situation gets out of control. The only long-term guarantee for security against chemical weapons is undoubtedly a global and comprehensive ban on chemical weapons through early conclusion of the convention. Even pending and prior to the achievement of that goal, there will surely be viable unilateral measures that could be helpful in confidence-building. The United States and the Soviet Union - the only chemical-weapon States which have declared their possession of these weapons - will unilaterally start destroying their stockpiles of chemical weapons before entry into force of the convention. Moreover, once the convention is signed, signatory States will have an obligation to refrain from actions that will jeopardize the objective of the convention, unless of course they have subsequently explicitly declared their intention not to ratify it. Thus, even prior to entry into force of the convention, there will be certain restraints, though short of binding legal obligations, that will preclude or lessen the risks of the use of chemical weapons by signatory States, since this kind of worst-case scenario violations will obviously jeopardize the fundamental objective of the convention.

While some real and reassuring progress has been made on agenda item 4, Chemical weapons, little progress has been achieved in the CD on the priority nuclear issues, agenda items 1, 2 and 3. Agenda item 1 "Nuclear test ban", is a priority item to which my delegation attaches great importance. There is general agreement in the CD on the need for the establishment of an ad hoc committee on a nuclear test ban. Differences of opinion lie with the question of the mandate for the ad hoc committee.

At its forty-third session last December, the United Nations General Assembly adopted resolution 43/63 A, entitled "Cessation of all nuclear test explosions", with an overwhelming majority of 136 votes in favour to 4 against, with 13 abstentions. Resolution 43/63 A, inter alia, appeals to all States members of the Conference on Disarmament to promote the establishment by the Conference at the beginning of its 1989 session of an ad hoc committee with the objective of carrying out the multilateral negotiation of a treaty on the complete cessation of nuclear test explosions. It further recommends to the Conference on Disarmament that

(Mr. Aung Thant, Burma)

such an ad hoc committee should establish two subsidiary working groups, one dealing with the contents and scope of the treaty, and the other with the issues of compliance and verification.

The main thrust of resolution 43/63 A is the same as that of the Group of 21's proposal in document CD/829. My delegation believes that document CD/829 provides a sound basis for reaching consensus on the draft mandate for an ad hoc committee. Hence, the quest for an appropriate formula should be pursued on the basis of CD/829, also taking into account other relevant United Nations General Assembly resolutions and proposals such as United Nations General Assembly resolution 43/63 A and Czechoslovak paper CD/863.

In order that the impasse over the question of the draft mandate may be overcome expeditiously, I should like to suggest that you, Mr. President, undertake intensive consultations with group co-ordinators and interested delegations who are the proponents of those proposals.

Up till now, the Conference on Disarmament has not been able to deal effectively with agenda item 2, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". Under the present rules of procedure, the most effective way to deal with a subject in the CD is to address it in an ad hoc committee. It is regrettable that the Conference has not hitherto been able to establish an ad hoc committee on this important agenda item. My delegation feels that as the existence of nuclear weapons and their qualitative and quantitative development directly threaten the security of both nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States, all nations have a vital interest in negotiations on nuclear disarmament. In view of the universal character of the security risks posed by nuclear weapons, the bilateral negotiations between the two major nuclear-weapon States could never replace the genuinely multilateral search for universally applicable disarmament measures; and it is the conviction of my delegation that the Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament, has a role to play in this most important area of disarmament.

At a time when the bilateral talks between the two great Powers have already produced the INF Treaty and have now entered the crucial stage of negotiations on 50 per cent reductions in their strategic nuclear arsenals, the encouraging progress thus far made in the bilateral context should stimulate serious negotiations in the multilateral forum of the CD on the question of nuclear disarmament. In this connection, my delegation favours the establishment of an ad hoc committee on agenda item 2 with an appropriate mandate to elaborate on paragraph 50 of the Final Document of SSOD-I, with the objective of carrying out the multilateral negotiation of an agreement or agreements with adequate measures of verification and for the cessation, in appropriate stages, of the nuclear arms race and the substantial reduction of existing nuclear weapons and their ultimate elimination.

In the view of my delegation, while agenda items 1 and 2 have received a great deal of attention in the CD, agenda item 3, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters", does not receive the attention it deserves. My delegation believes that the foremost concern of the international community today is the prevention of nuclear war, and therefore attaches highest priority to this agenda item.

(Mr. Aung Thant, Burma)

It was in the year 1984 that intensive consultations were conducted on agenda item 3. Those consultations came close to reaching consensus, but never came quite through to a successful conclusion. However, the CD has not made any movement forward on this question ever since. It is quite a long time since serious and intensive consultations on agenda item 3 were conducted in the CD. Perhaps, after all those years of low profile, it might now be time again to take a fresh look at this agenda item in the light of recent developments in the bilateral relations between the two major Powers, and to make renewed efforts to move forward on this agenda item. My delegation favours the establishment of an ad hoc committee to address this question effectively, as it does on every agenda item of the CD. However, in the absence of general consensus on the establishment of an ad hoc committee in making such renewed efforts, it might not be entirely irrelevant to explore the possibility of finding an appropriate and adequate organizational arrangement to deal with the substance of agenda item 3.

The impending threat of an arms race in space makes it absolutely necessary and imperative to take urgent and timely measures for the prevention of such an arms race before it is too late. An arms race in space will add a new dimension to the prevention of nuclear war, and will certainly make it doubly difficult to reduce the risks of nuclear war. This will be the fifth year that the Conference has dealt with this agenda item in an ad hoc committee. My delegation feels that the useful work thus far carried out in the ad hoc committee in the past four years, and later developments in this field, should be adequately reflected in the mandate and the programme of work of the ad hoc committee. Previous years have seen the belated establishment of an ad hoc committee on agenda item 5. We wish to see the speedy establishment of an ad hoc committee on agenda item 5 so that it may start its substantive work at the earliest possible date.

The question of negative security assurances is a long-standing question of great concern to non-nuclear-weapon States. We all agree that the most effective and the best guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. But pending the achievement of this goal, negative security assurances are important and indispensable measures to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Up till now, if I am not mistaken, only the People's Republic of China has given unconditional security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States.

Last year's CD session witnessed lively and interesting discussions in the Ad hoc Committee on negative security assurances. The attempt to find a common formula on negative security assurances is a laudable and useful step worth pursuing. We should examine more closely the possibility of finding a "common formula" arrangement of negative security assurances that will be acceptable to all and meet the minimum requirement of the non-nuclear-weapon States. The single common formula approach and the "categorizational" approach which were subjects of much debate in the Ad hoc Committee last year deserve to be further pursued and scrutinized.

A comprehensive programme of disarmament, if truly comprehensive in scope and adopted as a genuine consensus document, could well be a valuable road map for us all in our disarmament efforts. The Ad hoc Committee on the



(Mr. Aung Thant, Burma)

Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament has been engaged in the task of elaborating a draft text of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament for the past eight years since 1981, under the able guidance of its Chairman, His Excellency Mr. García Robles, Ambassador of Mexico. Under the present mandate of the Ad hoc Committee, this year is the deadline year for submission of the finalized draft text of the CPD to the United Nations General Assembly. Consequently, an intensive work schedule lies ahead of the Ad hoc Committee if it is to complete its task within that deadline. In the view of my delegation, the priorities and principles of the CPD should be based on those enshrined in the Final Document of SSOD-I, and should reflect developments thereafter. The draft text of the CPD remains heavily bracketed. The reservations registered by some delegations on some specific paragraphs in the draft text reflect basic differences of approach.

The question of the improved and effective functioning of the CD is a subject which we keep under regular review and consideration every year. The Group of Seven (the "seven wise men") has done a good job; the Group's reports CD/WP.286 of 24 July 1987 and CD/WP.341 of 12 April 1988 are valuable inputs and form a useful basis for future discussions on this question. In the view of my delegation, the Conference should not content itself with mere discussion of the proposals and suggestions contained in those reports. The Conference should also find ways and means to implement some promising suggestions contained therein and translate them into concrete measures. In principle, my delegation supports the continuation of the work of the Group of Seven; but it will be appropriate and necessary to give them a fresh specific mandate on what aspects the Group should focus its work on next.

In talking of the work of the Conference on Disarmament, it would be a dereliction of duty on my part if I did not refer to the important role played by Ambassador Miljan Komatina, Secretary-General of the Conference, and his excellent staff. Without their exemplary devotion and dedication to their task, our work in the Conference would not have been as smooth and enjoyable as it is at present.

I recall vividly that in the past, particularly in the 1950s and 1960s when talking about disarmament, delegates in the First Committee or plenary of the General Assembly were accustomed to conclude their statements by giving the world a warning in these solemn words: "Disarm or perish". The futility of wars and the endlessly spiralling arms race, no matter whether nuclear or conventional, have been driven home to us all by history both ancient and contemporary so clearly that that dire warning of old seems no longer needed. Instead, true to the newly gained spirit of optimism and hope which I referred to at the outset, I would conclude and simply say:

"Forward to a saner world  
Where humankind knows no wars  
But peace and prosperity".

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Burma for his statement, and for the kind words he addressed to me and to my country. Now I give the floor to the representative of China, Ambassador Fan.

Mr. FAN (China) (translated from Chinese): The spring session of the Conference on Disarmament is being held in a new situation. At present the world is turning from confrontation to dialogue and from tension to relaxation. The world is in a period of change. Over the past year the United States and the Soviet Union, in accordance with the Treaty they signed, have started to dismantle and destroy their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles under strict supervision. This is the first United States-Soviet agreement on the reduction of nuclear weapons since their emergence, and it is being implemented. Addressing the forty-third session of the United Nations General Assembly, Mr. Gorbachev, President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, announced a reduction in Soviet armed forces and conventional arms over the next two years. The third SSOD, convened in the new international circumstances, was an important international conference. It gave expression to the common desire of the international community for the maintenance of world peace and opposition to the arms race. This is conducive to the promotion of the disarmament process. Over the past year hot-spots in different regions and of different types have cooled down. For some, approaches to a political settlement have already been adopted, while for others they are being worked on. The momentum for political settlement of regional conflicts is increasing. At the same time, the United Nations has played a more active part in promoting the solution of major international disputes. In short, the past year has witnessed a marked improvement in the international situation.

These positive developments are gratifying and encouraging. The tendency towards relaxation in international situations contributes to the success of efforts for disarmament. It is the hope of the international community that more progress will be made in the field of disarmament so as to further promote the relaxation of international situations. It is true that this change is the outcome of policies pursued by various States. However, fundamentally speaking it is the result of the joint efforts of the people of the world to safeguard peace and prevent war, and of the evolution of the international situation over the past 40 years or so since the Second World War; it is also what historical developments demand.

One of the characteristics of post-war history is the intensification of the national yearning for independence and the continued struggle to safeguard national independence and State sovereignty. Great numbers of small- and medium-sized countries have taken pains to safeguard their sovereignty and refused to bow to others. Hegemonism and power politics have continued to suffer setbacks. Also characteristic of this period is a greater realization that solving international disputes by military means can lead nowhere. The wars of aggression waged by large countries against small countries were defeated by strong resistance. The aggressors paid heavily and found themselves isolated internationally. The disputes between a few developing countries unfortunately developed into armed conflict, bringing huge unnecessary losses to the parties involved and hampering their efforts to accomplish the historical task of national development. The super-Powers, in spite of their ability to start a world war and their possession of enough nuclear weapons to destroy the world many times over, had to admit that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought".

(Mr. Fan, China)

The third characteristic is rapid economic development following the remarkable progress of science and technology. Some countries with small military budgets, which have escaped the flames of war, concentrated their efforts on the development of science, technology, the economy and education. Consequently their national strength grew by leaps and bounds. On the other hand, the countries involved in the arms race and military conflicts had their economic development retarded to various degrees. Their position in the world economy has continued to decline. People have come to realize that the strength of a nation depends on a number of factors, especially the development of the economy, science and technology, rather than the deliberate pursuit of military might. However, it goes without saying that the marked change for the better in the world situation does not mean an everlasting peace, nor does it exclude relapses or new setbacks in the international situation. A number of unstable factors remain in the world. The rivalry between the super-Powers has not faded away, but will be continued in new forms. No regional conflicts have been finally solved. It is possible for new clashes to break out. World economic and social development is far from balanced. The gap between North and South is widening. The results of disarmament are very preliminary and limited. Even after destroying their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, the super-Powers still possess an overkill capacity, enough to destroy the world many times over. The negotiations on 50 per cent reductions in strategic nuclear weapons are now marking time. The arms race has been continuing, and is characterized by quantitative reductions and qualitative improvement, as well as the application of the latest scientific and technological achievements to the research and development of new types of weapons. While people are concerned with the continuing modernization of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, the arms race is also extending into outer space. Consequently, efforts for the maintenance of peace and the promotion of disarmament can in no way be slackened, and disarmament still remains an arduous and long-term task.

Nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war are the top priority items in the whole area of disarmament. In the past few years the United Nations has adopted by consensus a resolution tabled by the Chinese delegation on nuclear disarmament. The resolution states that the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, and welcomes the signing and ratification of the Treaty Between the United States and the Soviet Union on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles. The resolution also urges those two countries, which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, further to discharge their special responsibility for nuclear disarmament, to take the lead in halting the nuclear arms race and to reach early agreement on the drastic reduction of their nuclear arsenals. In addition the resolution expresses the belief that the qualitative aspect of the arms race needs to be addressed along with its quantitative aspect. China has always held the view that the two major nuclear Powers possessing the largest and most sophisticated nuclear arsenals in the world should take the lead in halting the testing, production and deployment of all types of nuclear weapons and in drastically reducing and eliminating them, whether they are deployed at home or abroad. In other words, they should not only drastically reduce the quantities of all types of nuclear weapons but also halt the qualitative escalation of the nuclear arms race and the production of new types of nuclear weapons. Following that, a broadly representative international conference on nuclear disarmament, with the participation of all the nuclear States, can be

(Mr. Fan, China)

held to examine steps and measures for the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons. All countries in the world, big or small, with or without nuclear weapons, should have the right to participate in endeavours to solve nuclear disarmament problems.

It is regrettable that the Conference on Disarmament has failed to establish ad hoc committees on two agenda items, cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war. Moreover, substantive discussions on nuclear disarmament have not been able to be carried on at informal plenary meetings. As is noted in resolution 43/75 E on nuclear disarmament, adopted by consensus at the forty-third session of the General Assembly, "the Conference on Disarmament has not played its due role in the field of nuclear disarmament". We sincerely hope that appropriate ways will be found through consultations to enable the Conference to play a concrete and helpful role in this field.

At a time of preliminary progress in nuclear disarmament, more attention is being given to the importance and urgency of conventional disarmament. It was pointed out in paragraph 81 of the Final Document of SSOD-I that, together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, the limitation and gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons should be resolutely pursued within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament. It was also emphasized that States with the largest military arsenals have a special responsibility in pursuing the process of conventional armaments reductions. Consensus resolutions on conventional disarmament sponsored by China and adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in recent years explicitly reaffirm the importance of this issue. Wars and conflicts conducted with conventional weapons since the Second World War have resulted in enormous losses of life as well as property, and have endangered world peace and security. In an area where there is a high concentration of conventional and nuclear arms, a conventional war is likely to escalate into a nuclear war. With scientific and technological progress the lethality and destructiveness of conventional weapons have been greatly enhanced. In order to maintain and develop their conventional forces, some countries have consumed enormous amounts of human, material and financial resources which should have been devoted to their socio-economic development. Therefore, conventional disarmament is a matter that brooks no delay.

In recent years, encouraging signs have emerged in the negotiations on conventional disarmament in Europe. In 1986, the Stockholm meeting of CSCE reached an agreement on confidence- and security-building measures in Europe, exerting a positive impact on promoting conventional disarmament in Europe. Not long ago, at the Vienna CSCE follow-up meeting, agreement was reached on a mandate for the negotiations on conventional forces in Europe, which are to begin in March. Since December 1988 the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria have announced unilateral reductions of their armed forces, armaments and military budgets. NATO countries have also put forward proposals on conventional disarmament in Europe. Non-aligned and neutral States in Europe, too, have had an opportunity to air their views. Generally speaking, the international community welcomes these developments and earnestly expects all the parties concerned to reach early agreement on conventional disarmament in Europe so as to strengthen security and stability in Europe and the world.

(Mr. Fan, China)

In order to make practical progress in conventional disarmament, it is essential to consider a number of principles to be followed by all. For example: first, the two super-Powers, which possess the largest military arsenals, have a special responsibility for conventional disarmament; second, the military forces of all countries should not be used other than for the purpose of self-defence. While taking into account the need to protect security and maintain defensive capabilities, countries should be encouraged to intensify their efforts and take appropriate steps, either on their own or in a regional context, to promote progress in conventional disarmament and enhance peace and security. Third, all occupying forces should be withdrawn from foreign territories and all forms of foreign military occupation terminated. Fourth, armed forces and armaments reduced from one region should not be redeployed elsewhere. Fifth, resources released from conventional disarmament should be devoted to social and economic development. It should be noted, however, that different regions have their own specific conditions. Efforts to promote conventional disarmament can only be effective when specific regional conditions are taken into account. The experience of other regions is not to be copied mechanically. Different situations require different approaches.

China is committed to the promotion of world peace and disarmament, including conventional disarmament. It has not only put forward proposals actively, but has also taken action. When the international situation permitted, China voluntarily made the decision to reduce its armed forces unilaterally by 1 million men, and the reduction was completed in 1987. Many of our military airports and harbours have been converted to civilian use or joint use by the military and civilians. A considerable proportion of military industries have been turned into enterprises for producing civilian products.

At the beginning of 1989, the Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons, a high-level political meeting, was held. Through the joint efforts of the participating countries, the Conference adopted a Final Declaration, with positive results which have received wide attention and welcome from the international community. In the Final Declaration the participating countries state clearly that they are determined to prevent any recourse to chemical weapons by completely eliminating them. They solemnly affirm their commitment not to use chemical weapons and condemn such use. The Declaration stresses the necessity of concluding at an early date a global, comprehensive and effectively verifiable convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The Declaration furthermore points out the growing danger posed to international peace and security by the risk of the use of chemical weapons, as long as such weapons remain and are spread.

At the Paris Conference, the Chinese Foreign Minister clearly stated China's basic position on the prohibition of chemical weapons. He reiterated that China neither possesses nor produces chemical weapons. China has all along stood for the early conclusion of an international convention on the comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons, and will continue to participate actively in the negotiations. The Chinese delegation wishes to reiterate the following position: while we continue to attach importance to nuclear and conventional disarmament, we also consider it imperative to pursue the comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons as an urgent and important task and as an objective of our endeavour. The member States of the Conference on Disarmament should expedite negotiations to conclude at the

(Mr. Fan, China)

earliest date an international convention on the prohibition of the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, possession and use of chemical weapons. The new convention should give priority to efforts to ensure the total destruction of existing chemical weapons and of their production facilities, guarantees against the production of new chemical weapons, and prevention of the emergence of new chemical weapons. To ensure compliance with the convention it is essential to provide for necessary and effective verification measures. The countries with the largest chemical arsenals should take the lead in ensuring an immediate halt to the development, production and transfer of chemical weapons, undertaking never to use such weapons and to destroy them within the shortest time possible. All countries capable of developing chemical weapons should stop the research, development and production of chemical weapons. The negotiations within the Conference on Disarmament on the comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons have now entered a crucial stage. The CD should respond to the appeal contained in the Final Declaration of the Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons and redouble its efforts to resolve expeditiously the remaining issues and to conclude the convention at the earliest date.

The year 1988 witnessed remarkable achievements in space science and technology. In 1988, the Soviet Union successfully launched its first pilotless space shuttle and two Mars explorers. Soviet astronauts set a record by staying one year in outer space. The United States recovered from the serious setback caused by the Challenger explosion and launched Discovery. The European Space Agency sent three satellites into orbit with a single powerful Ariane 4 rocket. And for the first time China launched a meteorological satellite into heliosynchronous orbit. There is great potential for the peaceful use of outer space to promote the development of science, technology, the economy and culture, and to enhance international co-operation. Bright prospects are opening up before mankind to explore and utilize outer space. While joyous over the progress of mankind in this respect, one also notes with grave concern that there has been an increase in military-oriented space activities. The development of space weapons, in particular, has cast the cloud of an arms race over peaceful outer space. Now the development of space technology is at a crossroads: either we take immediate measures to prevent an arms race in outer space, so as to ensure that the peaceful use of outer space remains beneficial to mankind, or we leave things to take their own course, making outer space the arena for an arms race, thus placing the whole of mankind under the threat of an unprecedented calamity. Consequently, the prevention of an arms race in outer space should be a new priority in the field of disarmament.

It has been eight years since the prevention of an arms race in outer space was put on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, and the Ad hoc Committee on this item has been set up for four successive years. Though the work of this Committee has scored some achievements, it has undeniably failed to make substantive progress. We have always held that the effective way to prevent an arms race in outer space is to ban all types of space weapons. And this depends primarily on the will of the major space Powers, which bear a special responsibility for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. As the sole countries which at present possess and continue to develop space weapons, they should, if they are willing to do so, take practical measures and undertake not to develop, test, produce or deploy space weapons and to destroy all types of existing space weapons. On this basis, an international

(Mr. Fan, China)

agreement on the comprehensive prohibition of space weapons can be concluded through negotiations. It is imperative to take advantage of the current favourable international climate to start substantive negotiations on the prevention of arms race in outer space as soon as possible. China has all along held that the exploration and utilization of outer space should serve only peaceful purposes and the well-being of mankind by promoting the economic, scientific and cultural development of all countries. China's commitment to the peaceful use of outer space is further exemplified by the fact that on 8 November 1988 the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress adopted a decision to accede to the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects and the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space. Our accession to the three conventions will help increase international co-operation and exchanges in space activities.

This session of the Conference on Disarmament is convened at a time when China has just celebrated its traditional New Year festival - the spring festival. In China, we have many expressions, both in proverbs and in works of poets, greeting the spring festival, such as "Everything becomes fresh when spring comes" and "With the New Year all living things renew themselves". The spring festival marks the beginning of the first season when everything is full of vigour. Now that the spring session of the Conference on Disarmament in 1989 has already started, I would like to take this opportunity to express the wish that this Conference will demonstrate new vitality and make progress in the new international climate in 1989.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of China for his statement. I have no other speakers on my list for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? I see none.

As announced at the opening of this meeting, I shall now suspend the plenary meeting and convene an informal meeting to take up requests from non-members to participate in the work of the Conference.

The meeting was suspended at 12.08 p.m. and resumed at 12.11 p.m.

The PRESIDENT: The 488th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed.

I now turn to requests from non-members to participate in the work of the Conference. In that connection, we shall take up for decision working papers CD/WP.361 and Add.1 concerning the requests received from Chile and Viet Nam. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the draft decisions.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I have no other business for today. I shall now adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 23 February, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.12 p.m.

# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.489  
23 February 1989

ENGLISH

---

## FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-NINTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Thursday, 23 February 1989, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Aldo Pugliese (Italy)



The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 489th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference will consider today agenda items 1, "Nuclear test ban", and 2, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". However, in accordance with rule 30 of its rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Hungary, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Nigeria and Indonesia. I now give the floor to the representative of Hungary, Ambassador Varga.

Mr. VARGA (Hungary): Mr. President, as I am taking the floor for the first time during the 1989 session, I wish to offer to you the felicitations of my delegation on your presidency for the month of February, and to congratulate you on the effective fulfilling of your duties as President of the Conference on Disarmament. At the last but one plenary meeting for this month, one may say rightly that you have succeeded in giving the CD a dynamic start from the beginning of its 1989 session. My words of thanks go also to your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Ardekani of Iran, who presided over our proceedings last August in an able and efficient way.

I would also like to join those representatives who have in their statements offered a hearty welcome to our new colleagues, the distinguished heads of delegations Ambassador Thant of Burma, Ambassador Sharma of India, Ambassador Houlliez of Belgium, Ambassador Dietze of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden, Ambassador Reese of Australia, Ambassador Kikanke of Zaire, Ambassador Bullut of Kenya, Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan, Ambassador Messaoud of Algeria and Ambassador Vajnar of Czechoslovakia. I am looking forward to co-operating with our new colleagues, as my delegation did with their predecessors.

Following with attention the statements made from the beginning of the 1989 session of the Conference on Disarmament, it seems to be the unanimous view that the CD has started its 1989 session in an auspicious international atmosphere. The positive changes that have recently taken place in East-West relations, and particularly in the relations between the two leading nuclear Powers, have resulted in a considerable lessening of tension in international relations. The process of gradual elimination of military confrontation in the field of nuclear weapons has got under way with the signing, the entry into force and the beginning of the implementation of the INF agreement. We do hope that the world will see sustained momentum in, and results produced by, the continuing talks between the USSR and the United States on 50 per cent reductions in their strategic nuclear arsenals, with the continuing authority of the ABM Treaty upheld.

As a result of the CSCE follow-up negotiations in Vienna, talks will start 'in a few weeks' time on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, with the participation of the member States of the two military alliances, and likewise on new security-building measures, with the participation of all States involved in the CSCE process.

(Mr. Varga, Hungary)

My Government welcomes the fact that the question of conventional disarmament in our continent has become the focus of attention. We do hope that the forthcoming talks in Europe will eliminate the kind of security which rests on centuries-old military confrontation and a balance of fear in the continent. That must be replaced by a security based on political co-operation and the removal of the material basis of the military threat. It is necessary to abandon thinking in terms of "ally and enemy", in categories of black and white, and to start easing - step by step - the political, economic and psychological burdens placed on the peoples of the continent by the existence and maintenance of huge regular armies.

The decision by the Soviet Union concerning the unilateral decrease of its armed forces in Europe contributes to the chances of success of the forthcoming negotiations. So do the decisions by some other Warsaw Treaty member States to decrease their conventional armed forces and military budgets unilaterally.

My Government welcomes and highly appreciates the new and positive developments in the international situation. It is making every effort to sustain and strengthen that positive trend and to use it for widening political and economic co-operation among States and for the promotion of the cause of human rights and disarmament. In this spirit, and in order to contribute to the process of European détente and to the success of the forthcoming negotiations on the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe, the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic - upon the suggestion of the country's defence leadership - has decided to reduce the number of troops in the Hungarian People's Army by approximately 9 per cent and to decrease its armaments in parallel. This unilateral measure has become possible as a consequence of the favourable events in the international situation, on the one hand, and is designed to promote the further improvement of the international atmosphere on the other. It is also in accordance with the expectations of Hungarian public opinion that the military budget of the country should be further reduced.

In accordance with the decision, the armed forces will be decreased by 9,300 troops, 8.8 per cent of the total. This amount mainly comprises conscripts, but also includes 2,100 officers and warrant officers. The reduction of the armed forces and armaments will invoke the disbandment of one tank brigade and one home air defence squadron. The military hardware withdrawn from service will be deactivated, used for civilian purposes if convertible for such purposes, or else destroyed. The execution of the unilateral reduction of the armed forces will commence in the very near future, and will be accomplished by next year.

I am confident that the negotiations on conventional armed forces in Europe will not only result in arms limitations and reductions in existing arsenals, but also gradually lead to a qualitatively new form of international security in Europe. This will be instrumental in reducing military confrontation in international relations as a whole, leaving more room for co-operative forms of security, for joint efforts reaching beyond frontiers and military blocks, seeking solutions for the global problems facing mankind.

The encouraging events in the domain of disarmament are not confined to the bilateral talks between the USSR and the United States, or to Europe. The

(Mr. Varga, Hungary)

Paris Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and other Interested States testified to the success of efforts made towards disarmament on a truly global, multilateral basis. The Conference accomplished its task by accepting its final document by consensus. It is of paramount importance that States renounced "any recourse to chemical weapons by completely eliminating them". That is a timely and welcome development in the face of recent events that have caused considerable concern among world public opinion.

It is in complete accordance with the aspirations of the disarmament policy of the Hungarian Government that the Paris Conference and the 150 or so States participating expressed a unanimous position as to the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons, and the destruction of existing stocks. The Conference urged the Conference on Disarmament - thereby giving it a clear mandate - to "redouble its efforts, as a matter of urgency, to resolve expeditiously the remaining issues and to include the convention at the earliest date". The Declaration appealed to all States "to make, in an appropriate way, a significant contribution to the negotiations in Geneva by undertaking efforts in the relevant fields". The Hungarian Government is determined to contribute to the earliest successful conclusion of the negotiations and to sign the convention as soon as it is opened for signature.

My delegation is confident that the Paris Conference has created a momentum for the ongoing Geneva negotiations. This momentum is upheld in an appropriate way by the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons under the dynamic guidance of Ambassador Morel, Chairman of the Committee. It is a matter of regret, however, that because of well-known circumstances the CD has been unable to come to an agreement on improving the mandate of the Ad hoc Committee. My delegation is of the opinion that the mandate given to the Ad hoc Committee lags far behind both the actual possibilities created by the Paris Conference and the pressing political necessities of the international situation. It is not always possible to do everything that is necessary, but what is possible should always be done. The consensus reached in the First Committee of the General Assembly last fall and during the Paris Conference this year demands and makes possible more than is contained in the present mandate. I hope we will be able to rectify this during this session.

In recent years it has become habitual for delegates speaking about our negotiations on chemical weapons to state that the most promising and most ripe item on the Conference's agenda is the prohibition of chemical weapons. Statements from time to time have gone even further, predicting or demanding the immediate solution of all the outstanding problems, and the conclusion of the convention before the end of the given year. Only a few weeks after the Paris Conference, we must all realize that the fruit is far from being ripe for harvest. The problem of chemical weapons demands untiring efforts and purposeful negotiations - with that we agree most readily, and are partners in them. However, the problem also demands an objective and sober evaluation of the pending questions, a sincere will and determination to solve them, and the concerted action of all interested States in one and the same direction.

The Paris Conference has created favourable conditions; now it is for us to live with them. First, we must do everything to avoid a situation where

(Mr. Varga, Hungary)

the solution of this problem is held hostage to other problems, no matter how urgent and important they are. The convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons must not fall hostage to certain aspirations.

There are many pending questions, but we must select the ones that are vital to the solution of the problem as a whole. Verification, we all agree, is one of them, maybe the one. The satisfactory solution of all issues in this context must, therefore, figure first on the list of priorities of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons.

Our delegation has always asked for a strict and most effective verification system. As Hungary does not possess and does not intend to possess chemical weapons, and as the chemical or engineering industry in our country is in no way geared to chemical warfare, we are in favour of creating a foolproof verification system. That applies, I must add, not only to the prohibition of chemical weapons, but also to all other agreements relating to international security and disarmament.

Verification of a CW convention would require various forms and methods of international verification. For obvious reasons, Hungary is mainly interested in the verification of the non-production of chemical weapons in civilian or commercial industry, that is, in devising and negotiating the relevant provisions of the draft convention. That is why last year we welcomed the initiative of the Soviet Union aimed at testing verification procedures to that effect.

The idea, as usual, started developing only at a slow pace but then, towards the end of the session, the process gained momentum. Following open-ended consultations, a useful working paper was put on our table, containing guidelines and check-lists for trial inspections. In Hungary, as in several other countries around the world, preparations started without any further delay to organize and conduct national trial inspections. At an informal meeting of the CW Committee on 7 December, over a dozen delegations were already in a position to provide information about the status of the preparations. The Hungarian delegation was among them, and was able even to go a step further, giving a preliminary report on our first trial inspection.

Today I am glad to present an official document containing a detailed report on that experiment (CD/890), which will also be presented in due course to the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. The paper was prepared by Hungarian experts who participated in both the preparations for and the conduct of the trial inspection. I believe it speaks for itself, and I will therefore refrain from any further introduction. I only wish to add that our team of experts is already engaged in the drafting of new undertakings in the fairly unknown land of on-site inspections in the chemical industry.

The Hungarian delegation feels convinced that the initiative to conduct full-scale experiments was most proper and timely. We are looking forward to a series of meetings in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons that will have to be convened before the end of the spring session for the purpose of formal presentations of reports on the first series of national trial inspections. That series of meetings should be organized well in advance so that experts may come and participate actively in presenting, discussing and

(Mr. Varga, Hungary)

evaluating the reports. Sufficient time should be allocated to the meetings so that experience can be properly analysed, and useful, practical conclusions drawn. We are aware that a number of trial inspections will be held only later, but we still prefer to organize the first exchange of experience now, before quantity might be detrimental to quality. A similar exchange will, of course, have to be held some time during the summer session to continue the exercise.

When all the trial inspections have been conducted, reported and evaluated, a new set of guidelines, check-lists and other practical aids will have to be developed for the third stage: a series of trial inspections with multilateral participation. We can foresee that the exercise will take quite some time, but if it is spent well, it is worth spending. Only on the basis of such experience can we hope to devise the relevant provisions of the draft convention. However, if we accept that verification is the key to a disarmament agreement and we certainly have to agree on that, then there is hardly any shortcut to it. Objective and sober evaluation of the situation has obliged me to state what I have ventured to say.

Dealing with the question of chemical weapons at some length does not mean that my delegation neglects other items on the agenda of the Conference. We share the view of the majority of the delegations that the CD should address the issues of nuclear disarmament in a substantive way. A central task in this field is the comprehensive test ban. We continue to hold that the prohibition - once and for ever - of nuclear weapon tests would be the single most effective measure on the way to halting the nuclear arms race. Continuing nuclear testing and the modernization of nuclear weapons emerging as a consequence of it puts at risk the strengthening of the non-proliferation Treaty and the non-proliferation régime as a whole. Difficulties encountered in solving the deadlock around the NTB issue have been evident for years. The situation cannot be accepted, however, for sober political reasons. We believe that a realistic compromise can be built around the formal proposal by Czechoslovakia that the Committee should "initiate, as a first step towards achieving nuclear test-ban treaty, substantive work on specific and interrelated test ban issues, including structure and scope as well as verification and compliance". I am confident, Mr. President, that you and your distinguished successor will do whatever is possible for the establishment of the appropriate subsidiary body where substantive work on a CTB can eventually be started.

My delegation, while aware of the heavy workload to be placed on delegations by the accelerated pace of negotiations on CW, is of the opinion that appropriate attention should also be paid to other important items on our agenda. We have acknowledged with satisfaction that the ad hoc committees on the CPD and security assurances have started substantive work. We consider that continued multilateral action is required for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. It is vital that the mandate issue should be overcome as expeditiously as possible and that the Outer Space Committee should start substantive work on improving the existing international legal régime governing outer space. The Committee could do useful work on the issue of prohibiting ASAT weapons and providing immunity to satellites in outer space. The proposal by the Soviet Union for the establishment of an outer space

(Mr. Varga, Hungary)

organization and an international inspectorate for verifying activities in outer space are issues which can provide for a sensible and useful task for the Committee and a good option for its deliberations.

The prohibition of radiological weapons and the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities have long been the subject of negotiations. It is our position that both issues could be settled within a comparatively short time given the necessary flexibility from all participants in the negotiations. We are sure that by building on the results achieved so far the Committee on radiological weapons can make considerable headway. The complexity of these questions is far less great than that of the problems of chemical weapons or outer space. Nevertheless, the successful completion of these negotiations could be of considerable political and practical value for all countries with or without a nuclear industry. An agreement on the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities, apart from its significance for the safety of peaceful nuclear activities, could also be a positive element in strengthening the non-proliferation régime.

In concluding my statement, Mr. President, I would like to assure you that my delegation will be ready to co-operate with you as always in finding solutions to the problems I mentioned in my statement.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Hungary for his statement, and for the kind words that he addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Yugoslavia, Ambassador Kosin.

Mr. KOSIN (Yugoslavia): It gives me particular pleasure to congratulate you, the representative of neighbouring Italy, with which Yugoslavia maintains high-level friendly relations and long-standing and good co-operation, on your election as President and on your successful guidance of our Conference. Your great competence and devotion to this responsible task have once again been confirmed. I know from my personal experience, having served as Ambassador to your country, how much Italy contributes to the creation of conditions conducive to the success of disarmament efforts. Yugoslav-Italian co-operation stands out as a substantial complement to security in our part of Europe, as well as an important element of stability in the continent in general. My appreciation and thanks go to your predecessor, Ambassador Ardekani of Iran, who so competently presided over the Conference during September last year and throughout the inter-sessional period.

I am taking this opportunity to warmly welcome in our midst our new colleagues who have arrived since my last plenary address - Ambassador Aung Thant of Burma, Ambassador Sharma of India, Ambassador Varga of Hungary, Ambassador Houllez of Belgium, Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden, Ambassador Dietze of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Reese of Australia, Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan, Ambassador Bullut of Kenya, Ambassador Kikanke of Zaire, Ambassador Chaalal of Algeria and Ambassador Vajnar of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. I can assure them all of our full co-operation. To their predecessors we extend our best wishes in their new assignments.

We are at the outset of yet another period when our ability to translate into reality the potentialities created by the improved international environment is going to be thoroughly tested. The best way to pass the test

(Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia)

would be to steer the energies released by the changes towards stepping up the disarmament process and strengthening the role of our Conference as the single multilateral negotiating body in this field.

The developments in 1988 and in early 1989 have greatly enhanced the positive evolution in many crucial sectors of international life. The first real and tangible results in the bilateral and regional disarmament dialogue have been achieved. It is never superfluous to speak about such welcome developments. We do it not to create unfounded optimism, let alone spreading illusions, but to permit ourselves a rapid perception and thorough understanding of their positive traits, so as to build on experience and initiate and conduct the proper actions. This is all the more needed as the positive evolution is accompanied by contradictory signals arising from the fact that qualitative aspects of the arms race remain untouched, while economic lagging behind and instability facing the majority of mankind are shaking the already fragile security structure.

It is very encouraging that the right conclusions are beginning to be drawn from experience, confirming the vainness of the policy of overarmament and the failure of efforts to shape the world by military power. Such a policy has not only fallen short of its expected results, but has been discarded as illegitimate by the international community. Indeed, the substantial improvement in East-West relations and co-ordination in resolving regional crises, as well as an unprecedented negotiating effort in the field of disarmament, primarily at the bilateral and regional levels, also open up new prospects for multilateral endeavours, including those in our Conference. In spite of the outcome of SSOD-III, the Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons proved that a number of critical disarmament and security issues cannot be solved without common efforts. This is the reason why I would like to comment on that gathering in a wider context, as evidence of the validity and vitality of a multilateral approach to disarmament - the more so as it reaffirmed the lasting value of the Final Document of SSOD-I.

Turning for a moment to the current disarmament negotiations, allow me to underline the significance we attach to the Vienna agreement on conventional disarmament in Europe. I want to stress the global character of that regional agreement, which is due to the role of Europe as the most heavily armed and divided continent. We see in its implementation the beginning of the formation of a new security order in Europe, ensuring adequate participation for all countries, with CSCE as its central structure. In this way conventional disarmament may obtain higher priority, which it well deserves, as many wars have been waged with conventional weapons and tens of million people killed.

Turning back again to the Paris Conference, whose outcome is of relevance to us here and now, I think that its significance transcends by far the declaration of political intentions. It contains a number of basic positions that deserve to be analysed at several levels: the consolidation of the lasting validity of the Geneva Protocol, condemnation of the use of chemical weapons and a pledge that they will never be used again, an appeal to our Conference to strive for the earliest possible conclusion of a convention imposing a complete and universal ban on the development, stockpiling and use of any chemical weapon, and of course destruction of the existing arsenals, as

(Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia)

the only answer to the problems posed by chemical weapons. It is extremely important that the role of the United Nations was duly recognized. Thus, the Paris Conference provided a major stimulus to disarmament negotiations on CW, but its reach is more universal, as it reflects the widest international consensus ever attained on one concrete issue of disarmament in all its dimensions.

In the new situation we cannot behave as if there were no Paris Conference, or, of course, as if it had resolved all the issues. For if, after Paris, there are fewer dilemmas, we still cannot ignore the profound differences on a number of tangible issues. The international community has endorsed the Paris Conference as an expression of a will to proceed with chemical disarmament at a faster pace, and to start dealing with the core of the problems, with the objective of finalizing the convention - in other words, to start genuine negotiations on drafting the convention. We can do so because the Paris Declaration contains highly specific understandings on where and how fast we should move. To that end the proclamation of a moratorium on chemical weapons production would be most helpful for our negotiations.

The Paris consensus has undoubtedly deprived chemical weapons of any legitimacy by unconditionally condemning their use and recording agreement on their complete elimination. It is therefore a major step towards the universality of the future CW convention.

We are aware of the difficulties involved in negotiations - of the problems arising, for instance, from the complexity of verification, undiminished security for all States, or protection of victims of chemical attack. Co-operation in the development of civil chemical industry is also one of the key questions. These difficulties are yet another reason to redouble our efforts, as required under the Paris Declaration. We therefore see the renewed political will not only as an expression of adherence to the ultimate goals, but as a readiness to settle unresolved issues. Without any intention of disputing the achievements of the last year, it nevertheless seems to us that the rhythm of negotiations is not in conformity with often reiterated political commitments and growing coherence in the process of confidence-building. In our view the changed French position on security stocks, followed by the broad range of trial inspections and work done on assistance and protection, have strengthened the convergence of views, which transcends what is contained in the text of the report.

Irrespective of the fact that we cannot be satisfied with what we have achieved so far, and I think that we could have done better, I wish to pay tribute to the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Sujka, for his dedication and his initiatives in clarifying a number of sensitive issues and extending the negotiations to new chapters of the convention. My delegation agrees to the restructuring and reorganization of our work and the establishment of five groups to cover the main problems relevant to the entirety of the convention. I wish the incoming President, Ambassador Morel, every success. I am confident that, with his inherent dynamism, diplomatic skill and mastery of the subject, he will compel us, at least, to work harder, better and faster.

The future CW convention will be a sort of a model, not only for future disarmament agreements, but for a wider international co-operation,



(Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia)

introducing new qualitative ingredients. To play such a role the convention must be acceptable to all, in other words, it must be based on the undiminished security of all its signatories and their full equality in rights and obligations. To become global, verifiable, universal and non-discriminatory, and in particular to be effective, it should not only prevent the production of chemical weapons and ensure destruction of the existing arsenals, but provide for adequate assistance to the victims of the use or threat of use of chemical weapons. It must also ensure co-operation in technological and economic development in the utilization of chemicals for peaceful purposes, and lay the foundations for an effective but rational international mechanism for control and verification, which would rely on the United Nations to the maximum possible extent. I want to repeat once more that adequate solutions regarding economic and technological co-operation will greatly enhance the universal acceptability of the convention and the equality of all members of the international community. May I recall the Yugoslav proposal at SSOD-III for a special United-Nations-sponsored conference for the signing of the convention?

The fact that I have dwelt on the chemical weapons topic should not be taken as neglect of other priority issues, primarily those concerned with nuclear and space disarmament. I wish to remind you of our often reiterated position on the significance and urgency of our Conference's beginning substantive work on the nuclear test ban. We do not question the validity of the step-by-step approach to this issue, but we cannot see it as an end in itself or as a reason for weakening, let alone eliminating, the role of our Conference. Preventing the CD's work on the NTB is not only contrary to the obligations assumed under the NPT and the PTBT, whose multilateral character has never been disputed, but constitutes open neglect of the concern of the wide international community and even limits the value of negotiations and agreements concluded or to be concluded on nuclear disarmament.

That is why we have to establish, as soon as possible, a committee to deal with this issue, which is not by chance the first item on our agenda. Our preference, of course, goes to the mandate presented to the Conference by the Group of 21 last year. But we are ready to consider and accept any suggestion that would help us move to substantive discussions on this issue, which is crucial to overall disarmament policy. We hope that the process of negotiations on various aspects of nuclear disarmament will pave the way for more constructive positions on this issue.

Nuclear tests are bound up with the whole problem of science and technology, which if left unresolved would make disarmament an incomplete and fragile undertaking, while negotiations will keep being outpaced by technological advance. We welcomed the decision of the General Assembly to initiate a study of this problem, which will no doubt encourage closer international consideration of the subject. It is clear that the issue could not be resolved by prohibiting specific technologies, still less by any idea of halting or slowing down research. It must, however, remain present on our agenda more than it has been so far, in terms of better co-ordination, greater transparency and above all wider co-operation.

Another priority for immediate action is the item on prevention of an arms race in outer space. It is high time to start addressing these issues in

(Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia)

a more substantive way, in view of the need to take measures to institute an improved legal régime conducive to the conversion of space into an area of peaceful co-operation. The level of discussion about this issue thus far has been very beneficial, in terms of clarification of its broad aspects, submission of proposals and understanding of others' positions. However, this is the reason for us to believe that the conditions favour a move forward. Among priority measures which could contribute to both confidence-building and improvement of the security environment are guarantees of the immunity and protection of satellites. This is of universal importance because of the role of satellite technology in promoting development for all, and particularly developing countries. We expect the main space Powers to continue their restraint in developing anti-satellite weapons, which should be translated into binding international agreements.

One of the unavoidable issues in any debate about disarmament is the strengthening of the role of the United Nations in this as well as in other fields of international relations. The United Nations cannot consolidate its role in resolving hotbeds of crisis and in peace-keeping operations while remaining on the sidelines of disarmament negotiations. We therefore point to the importance of the General Assembly resolution adopted with only two abstentions about the role of the United Nations, including special sessions and multilateralism in general. Although our Conference has a special relationship with the United Nations, its role will largely depend on the strengthened role of the United Nations and the global multilateral approach, not as a substitute for any negotiating table, but as a source of initiative and creation of order acceptable to all. We have, however, to consolidate the role of our Conference by our own results.

The international community is, one might say, in a kind of permanent session. This year significant efforts and events will be forthcoming. I would like to mention the summit of the non-aligned countries to be held in September in Belgrade. As in the past, this gathering will certainly give a major contribution to disarmament and lend its support to our Conference within its confirmed global philosophy of peace, disarmament and security. I would remind you that much of what is going on today, concerning priorities, concepts, approaches to peace, disarmament and security, appeared long ago in the documents adopted by the non-aligned countries and in their perception of the system of international relations.

It is essential for our Conference to become an integral part of all these efforts and assert its ability, more than in the past, to answer the new challenges. The CD must therefore encourage and facilitate participation by non-members in its work, and first of all in negotiations on chemical weapons. In its internal functioning our Conference must become sufficiently flexible to be able, within its general mandate, to address in a substantive manner any issue on its agenda, depending on its lasting priorities but also depending on current needs. Without excluding other important items, I believe that we will have to devote most of our energies this year to the chemical weapons negotiations.

If we take as our point of departure the message of the United Nations Secretary-General, who warned us of the challenges and the road we have traversed in recent years, realism acquires a new shape. Free from the illusion that we have reached the turning-point, I still think that we may

(Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia)

look more optimistically at the possibilities generated by the positive evolution of facts and ideas. We also have to consider how we could promote our own work if we are to attain the common goals.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Yugoslavia for his statement, and for the kind words that he addressed to me and to my country. I should like now to give the floor to the representative of Bulgaria, Ambassador Kostov.

Mr. KOSTOV (Bulgaria): Mr. President, I have already had an opportunity to congratulate you on your election as President of the Conference for the month of February. Now that your mandate is coming to a close I wish only to add that during this month, in my capacity as Co-ordinator of the Group of Socialist Countries, I have been in a position to fully appreciate your high human and professional qualities. I would also like to congratulate your predecessor, Ambassador Ardekani of Iran, on his skilful guidance of the Conference's work.

I avail myself of this opportunity to congratulate and wish every success to my new colleagues, the distinguished representatives of Algeria, Australia, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, India, Kenya, Pakistan, Sweden and Zaire. I would like to assure them of my wish to maintain with them the excellent relations I enjoyed with their predecessors.

If we try to summarize the facts and phenomena in contemporary international relations, and to extract from them the most characteristic features for some time past, it could be said that the new political thinking, though slowly and not so quickly as we would wish, is making its way in international life. Ideological inertia is gradually being overcome. Confrontation is giving way to constructive dialogue and business-like negotiations. As a result the atmosphere in international relations is being improved, concrete results are being achieved, prerequisites are being created and possibilities are being opened up for the achievement of agreements on international problems which, until recently, were assigned a place in the realm of Utopia rather than in the realm of reality.

The chronology of events in the past few months is an indicative illustration of this conclusion. On 7 December 1988 M.S. Gorbachev made a remarkable statement at the forty-third session of the United Nations General Assembly. And if Winston Churchill's speech in Fulton laid the ideological foundations of the cold war, now we have every reason to say that M.S. Gorbachev's speech marks the beginning of the end of that gloomy period in international relations. In taking decisions involving considerable unilateral reductions in their armed forces and military budgets, the USSR and its allies have provided convincing proof of their political good will.

On 27 January 1989, on a proposal made by T. Zhivkov, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party and President of the State Council, a joint session of the Council of Ministers and the State Council of Bulgaria decided to reduce the country's military budget for 1989 by 12 per cent, and to reduce the military forces by 10,000 servicemen, 200 tanks, 200 artillery systems, 20 aeroplanes and 5 naval units by the end of 1990. This decision - which I have asked to be circulated as a

(Mr. Kostov, Bulgaria)

CD document - was prompted by the successful development of the pan-European process, the favourable conditions for the further lessening of military confrontation, and the consolidation of European and world security on the basis of trust and co-operation, as well as by the arrangements arrived at between the Warsaw Treaty member countries.

On 19 January this year, after 27 months of intensive work, the Vienna meeting came to an end with the adoption of a final document which marks the highest point in the development of the pan-European Helsinki process. That document is a common denominator of consent to seek ways and means of instituting qualitatively new and upgraded relations between European countries. The final document is convincing evidence of the potential which may spring from a good-will dialogue between countries - a dialogue which leads to the realization of universal values based on a balance of national interests.

In the field of disarmament, the agreement on the mandate for negotiations on the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe is an undeniable success of the Vienna meeting. The forthcoming negotiations should lead to stability and security in Europe at the lowest possible level of armed forces and conventional weapons. It was also decided at the Vienna meeting to resume the work of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe.

On 27 January 1989, a joint session of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, the State Council and the Council of Ministers pointed out that "the Vienna meeting ended with results which, being based on the Helsinki Final Act, mark steps towards greater security and the deepening of mutually beneficial co-operation in all fields of international relations", and qualified the results of the meeting as "a new phase in the development of East-West relations on the European continent".

On 31 January this year, in Sofia, the Committee of Ministers of Defence of the Warsaw Treaty member countries adopted a "Declaration on the correlation of the armed forces and armaments of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Europe and adjacent water areas". We hope that this document, which was circulated today as an official document of the CD (CD/888), will contribute to the strengthening of trust and to preparations for negotiations on the reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe, which are to begin in a few days.

An undeniable achievement of multilateral diplomacy was the Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons. One hundred and forty-nine countries reached a consensus on a problem both complex and important. After the detailed and eloquent presentation of the Final Act of the Paris Conference by Mr. Roland Dumas, Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, it would be redundant to dwell again on the merits of that document. All the elements of the Final Act have equal moral and political force. However, if we are to single out just one element of particular immediate importance for the work of the Conference on Disarmament, it should undoubtedly be the emphasis laid at the Paris Conference on "the necessity of concluding, at an early date, a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons, and on their destruction", and

(Mr. Kostov, Bulgaria)

its explicit call to the CD "to redouble its efforts, as a matter of urgency, to resolve expeditiously the remaining issues and to conclude the convention at the earliest date".

It would be fair to note that the success of the Paris Conference would hardly have been possible without the years-long work of the Conference on Disarmament and the progress made in the elaboration of the draft convention. It could be said, without exaggeration, that the core of the consensus achieved in Paris was gradually taking shape in the negotiations held in the Conference on Disarmament. In this vein the Paris Final Document stands both to the credit and to the debit of the CD.

The last report of the Ad hoc Committee clearly shows both the achievements and the blanks in the elaboration of the draft convention. The progress in the negotiations is illustrated by the removal of appendix III, and by the texts dealing with chemical weapons production facilities and economic co-operation and the final clauses of the convention. It should also be noted that agreement was reached to hold an international experiment in the civil chemical industry and that "national trial inspections" have been or will be carried out. The meeting of experts from the chemical industry also played a useful role. I would like to take this opportunity to express to the former Chairman, Ambassador Sujka (Poland), the gratitude of my delegation for his tireless efforts aimed at ensuring progress in the negotiations. I would also like to thank the three chairmen of the working groups, whose contribution also deserves high appreciation.

The common task of the Conference on agenda item 4 is a clear and indisputable one - to intensify efforts in order to conclude the elaboration of a convention on chemical weapons. This goal is within reach provided the work of the Ad hoc Committee concentrates on the solving of the complex problems still pending. Without trying to exhaust the question or to set priorities, we hold the view that the following problems are of key importance: the order of destruction of chemical weapons and their production facilities, i.e. the need to ensure the implementation of the principle of undiminished security in the first 10 years after the convention comes into effect; conclusion of the elaboration of provisions on all aspects of verification, and in particular those dealing with challenge inspections and verification of non-production of chemical weapons; and reaching an agreement at least in principle on the composition of the Executive Council. At the present stage a number of aspects of some pending problems require an integrated approach to take fully into account the existing relationship among them. For that reason we believed that it was justifiable to reorganize the work of the Ad hoc Committee with the purpose of creating as many prerequisites as possible for holding intensive and fruitful negotiations. Having supported the efforts of Ambassador Morel (France) aimed at this goal, my delegation wishes to assure him of its readiness to co-operate with him in the future as well.

While recognizing the high priority of the work on agenda item 4, "Chemical weapons", we have never deemed it warranted for the Conference to confine itself to serious and business-like negotiations on just one agenda item. Proceeding from this position of principle I would like to express my delegation's views on items 1, 5 and 6 of the agenda.

(Mr. Kostov, Bulgaria)

The nuclear test ban has for many years rightly been pointed out to be one of the most acute problems in the field of disarmament. It is therefore no mere coincidence that it has been placed at the top of our agenda. Acute problems need urgent treatment. Urgency, however, is regrettably not the word that one would use in describing the way this subject has so far been dealt with in the Conference on Disarmament. The inability of the Conference to break a procedural impasse on one of its priority items is no sign of political wisdom, especially in the new international climate that is taking shape today. Bulgaria stands ready to subscribe to any mandate for an ad hoc committee on item 1 that would enable the Conference on Disarmament to proceed with concrete work. The proposal of the Group of 21 contained in document CD/829 offers such a possibility. Other compromise solutions could also be pursued. For instance, we believe that substantive work on all aspects of a nuclear test-ban treaty could be initiated on the basis of the proposal made by Czechoslovakia in document CD/863. One of the aspects where early progress could be expected is elaboration of the elements of the verification system of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. Bulgaria fervently hopes that the ongoing Soviet-American talks on the subject will promptly yield concrete results. Any militarily significant interim measures that lead to a comprehensive test ban would be most welcome. Bilateral and multilateral efforts should complement and reinforce each other. There is enough room for both of them as long as the final objective is constantly and consistently kept in sight.

The item "Prevention of an arms race in outer space" remains high on the agenda of our Conference. Resolution 43/70 of the United Nations General Assembly reiterated once again that the Conference has the primary role in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement or agreements, as appropriate, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects, and requested the Conference to re-establish an ad hoc committee with an adequate mandate with a view to undertaking such negotiations. We earnestly hope that this year the mandate of the ad hoc committee will be agreed upon expeditiously, which will enable the Conference to proceed with substantive consideration of the subject. The content of the "adequate" mandate referred to by the General Assembly is of course subject to different interpretations. In my understanding, intensive and fruitful work is possible and needed even under the present mandate. There are a lot of proposals and initiatives that should be further pursued within the ad hoc committee. Such issues as a moratorium and ban on ASAT weapons and guarantees of the immunity of space objects, the establishment of an international space inspectorate and other verification mechanisms are well identified and, in our opinion, ripe for practical solutions, given political will on the part of all member States. We also note with interest the proposals and ideas regarding the multilateralization of the ABM Treaty and the Soviet-American agreement on the notification of long-range ballistic missile launches, the strengthening of the 1975 registration Convention, and so on. It will be very useful if the authors of these proposals elaborate on their ideas in a more detailed manner.

The Bulgarian delegation will also favour the establishment of a group of experts to consider verification issues in the context of specific aspects of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The consideration of these and other issues would not, in our view, preclude the search for comprehensive

(Mr. Kostov, Bulgaria)

solutions of the type envisaged, for example, in USSR documents CD/476 and CD/274. My country's main objective remains unchanged - outer space must remain free from weapons of any kind. It is our conviction that the Conference could make a significant contribution towards the achievement of this objective.

The question of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is one to which Bulgaria attaches great importance. It is our firm conviction that the most effective and reliable guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Pending the achievement of that objective, non-nuclear-weapon States which are not in a position to pose any nuclear threat to other countries have every right to expect reliable assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Our Conference is entering its tenth year of negotiation on this subject. The negotiations have revealed that some specific difficulties are related to different perceptions of the security interests of nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, as well as to the complex nature of the issues involved. Bulgaria is of the view that the military doctrines of military alliances, and particularly those of the nuclear-weapon States which are members of those alliances, have a most direct bearing on the subject of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. In this context I would like to recall that the Warsaw Treaty States declared in their Berlin document of 29 May 1987 (CD/755) that, firstly, they will never under any circumstances initiate military action against any State or alliance of States unless they are themselves the target of an armed attack, and, secondly, they will never be the first to employ nuclear weapons. Fresh political and military approaches to global security issues would make it possible to find innovative solutions in the field of disarmament in general, and make a breakthrough in our negotiations on "negative security assurances" in particular.

The Bulgarian delegation reaffirms its readiness to participate in the search for a solution to the problem of "negative security assurances", based on a "common formula", and pledges its readiness to co-operate with the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Ardekani of Iran.

In conclusion, I do hope that this year the Conference will do its utmost to bring to fruition the impetus it got from the Paris Conference and the forty-third session of the United Nations General Assembly. It is high time for the tail-winds which have considerably improved the climate in international relations also to fill other big sails in the Conference's ship. That requires political good will from every delegation and, as a matter of fact, from all of us.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Bulgaria for his statement, and for the kind words that he addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Nigeria, Ambassador Azikiwe.

Mr. AZIKIWE (Nigeria): Mr. President, may I, on behalf of the Nigerian delegation, add my voice to the expressions of warm sentiments which you have already received and convey my delegation's satisfaction on the successful manner in which you have presided over the affairs of the Conference on

(Mr. Azikiwe, Nigeria)

Disarmament for the month of February? May I also welcome our new colleagues, the Ambassadors of Australia, Belgium, Burma, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, India, Pakistan and Sweden, who have recently joined us? I assure the distinguished Ambassadors of the close co-operation of my delegation.

This session is taking place at a time of considerable improvement in the international political climate. There is an atmosphere approaching optimism in the history of the disarmament process that did not exist two years ago when the global situation was fraught with danger, due to the unrestrained refinement and continuous accumulation of nuclear weapons. This augurs well for the United Nations, which has proved its value as an effective and indispensable instrument in the painstaking process of negotiating the settlement of regional conflicts.

The Nigerian delegation is, however, not here to assume the pretentious posture that the issues and problems of disarmament can be subjected to simplistic prescriptions. Indeed, as my Foreign Minister observed during the United Nations third special session on disarmament, "so long as the inordinate pursuit of national interests, conflicts of ideologies, the quest for domination and for spheres of influence and glaring social and economic inequalities that characterize international relations persist, so long will the instinct for the acquisition of means for offence or defence preoccupy the conduct of States and peoples."

To achieve peace, all nations must have confidence in its efficacy. Granted that small nations must be content with their physical heritage, the big nations, especially the nuclear-weapon States, must recognize the rights of the less endowed ones to exist in a peaceful environment. In our statement last March, I emphasized that we must strive to work out a system of security in which politics, not nuclear technology, is pre-eminent - a system in which peoples affirm their identity together and not in opposition to others.

With respect to the ongoing nuclear disarmament negotiations, my delegation is not unmindful of the progress made in the implementation of the Soviet-United States Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles. Its value lies in the promise of providing the basis for a more far-reaching agreement on the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons. As the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union rightly observed during his statement on 14 February, "today's realities are such that this dialogue requires continuing and active participation by all countries and all regions of the world. The internationalization of the dialogue and the negotiating process is necessary to bring harmony to international relations and put them on a more stable basis."

The cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament have long been considered the most urgent task before the Conference on Disarmament. Were the situation in which mankind finds itself as a result of the escalating arms race not so serious, many people would question the usefulness of our ritual general debate on nuclear disarmament. For there is an element of repetitiveness which ought to have become boring were the danger which evokes these annual repetitions not so menacing. If a problem can be solved by the amount of attention it has received, then the complete prohibition of all



(Mr. Azikiwe, Nigeria)

nuclear testing ought to have been achieved long ago. An agreement on the prohibition of nuclear tests would not only check the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, but also prevent their proliferation, both vertical and horizontal. This will mark a significant beginning of the assumption by the nuclear-weapon States of their obligation under the non-proliferation Treaty to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

The Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is scheduled for 1990. Indeed, the Preparatory Committee will hold its first session in New York during the first week of next May. The NPT was conceived as an important instrument to be complemented by other collateral measures for an effective régime of non-proliferation. It was not meant to constitute the whole structure. As you are aware, failure to adopt necessary complementary measures has already created sharp divisions and reduced its effectiveness.

I need hardly emphasize how crucial it is for progress on a comprehensive test-ban treaty to be evident before the commencement of the Review Conference. Nigeria has always felt, and it bears repetition, that as a party to the NPT we find it rather difficult to press other non-nuclear-weapon States to become parties when, despite the pleas of the international community, the nuclear-weapon States proceed at an alarming rate to conduct tests. A forward-looking decision by the Conference on a comprehensive test-ban treaty is absolutely essential for the preservation of the régime of non-proliferation embodied in the NPT. Indeed, a comprehensive test-ban treaty is potentially less restrictive and might open the way for non-signatories of the NPT to become parties.

The commitment of the nuclear-weapon States in negotiating a comprehensive test-ban treaty is no doubt essential. Similarly, the role of the Conference on Disarmament in negotiating such a treaty should never be in doubt. If it is to discharge its responsibility as the single multilateral negotiating body, the Conference should commence without further delay negotiations on the achievement of nuclear disarmament in accordance with paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament. A major ingredient for success is flexibility or good will on the part of the delegations, especially those from nuclear-weapon States. But is this good will forthcoming? We also need to demonstrate the political will to accomplish the entire process in the shortest possible time, otherwise the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament will continue to elude us.

One area for disarmament efforts which is increasingly gaining attention is the regional approach, to which some delegations have made reference in the course of their statements. In particular, reference has been made to the negotiations on further confidence- and security-building measures and on conventional disarmament in Europe scheduled in Vienna next month. My delegation is aware that States in any region are the best judge of their requirements, and any initiative will have to emanate from them. Obviously, such a regional approach can facilitate global disarmament provided it is not pursued at the expense of overall multilateral efforts towards complete and general disarmament.

(Mr. Azikiwe, Nigeria)

All the same, if regional efforts are to contribute effectively to the global disarmament process, the United Nations will have to assume its responsibility in providing assistance in the painstaking process of negotiating the terms of settlement. The more events unfold in various parts of the world, the more caution is required in the approach to the concept of confidence-building measures, which should be based on trust and good will among States. In a region where there exists no trust whatsoever between States, where clearly one State is bent on destabilizing the entire region, it will be premature to think of possible ways of creating confidence.

The nuclear weapon programme of South Africa is in direct contrast to the expressed wishes and aspirations of Africa, and a threat to their collective wish for a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa bears true testimony to this honest intention. The realization of this noble objective has been frustrated by the Pretoria régime. Three years ago, it was reported that South Africa had gone on a recruitment drive to attract nuclear scientists to assist in its research. It has now been established that Pretoria has amassed sufficient uranium to produce up to 21 nuclear warheads. This will no doubt confer on the Pretoria régime the status of a nuclear Power. Notwithstanding their isolation, they cannot be trifled with. How, then, can the best of their friends be certain of the channel to which they direct their nuclear programme when South Africa is not a signatory of the NPT, the legally binding instrument forbidding nuclear weapon acquisition? Surely it would be unrealistic to expect the African States to place the safety of their region from nuclear attack in the custody of the Pretoria régime, which has repeatedly conceived such weapons as a clear military option.

My delegation is satisfied that the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons has got off to a good start this session under the able guidance of Ambassador Pierre Morel of France, whose constructive contribution towards the realization and successful outcome of the Paris Conference last January received commendations from most delegations. Nigeria's Government's appreciation to the Government of France for hosting the Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and Other Interested States was highlighted in our statement.

The prospects of concluding an effective and verifiable chemical weapons convention are now far more promising, and will eventually lead to a complete ban on the use of chemical weapons as well as their development, production and stockpiling, and the destruction of all existing chemical weapons. Much work has now been done on the draft, and its conclusion is now in sight. We note with satisfaction that the convention will have a distinct advantage over the Geneva Protocol as it will ensure the non-use of chemical weapons through total elimination.

There are still a number of outstanding issues under consideration. Apart from the exact definition and elimination of production facilities, there are still activities not covered by the convention. Even though we all agree that the convention should provide an effective mechanism for verification, how do we ensure that the chemical industry is not used in producing chemical weapons? I need not emphasize that some work still remains to be done on the question of challenge inspection or limited spot check

(Mr. Azikiwe, Nigeria)

arrangements to ensure that the equal rights of all States can be guaranteed. We hope that the Ad hoc Committee will intensify its efforts to conclude the outstanding work on the convention at the earliest possible time. A spirit of mutual concession and mature compromise is required at this stage to overcome the outstanding differences.

Just as we are worried about the extreme danger posed by the use of chemical weapons, we are also concerned about the prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes for hostile purposes. The Nigerian delegation has made its position clear on this matter, and followed this up by co-sponsoring a resolution at the forty-third session of the United Nations General Assembly requesting the Conference on Disarmament to take into account, in the ongoing negotiation for a convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons, the deliberate employment of nuclear wastes to cause destruction, damage or injury by means of radiation produced by the decay of such material. It will be recalled that the Secretary-General was requested to transmit to the Conference on Disarmament all documents relating to the consideration of this item by the General Assembly at its forty-third session.

The Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons will soon commence its work. The identification of the basic elements of a future convention, and the elaboration of a text for each element will enable the Committee to harmonize its views, leading to an agreed text. My delegation is aware of some views expressed within this body on the non-existence of radiological weapons and the narrow chances of their being used in warfare. However, the dumping of radioactive wastes for hostile purposes has been identified as an effective means of conducting radiological warfare. This underlines the importance my delegation attaches to this item. In any case, we all subscribe to paragraph 76 of the Final Document of SSOD-I which states inter alia that "a convention should be concluded prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons".

Soon, active work will commence in the Ad hoc Committee on negative security assurances. My delegation hopes that the Committee will succeed in the search for an appropriate formula this year to facilitate substantive work on the item. Either security for all States will have to be sought in ways other than the possession of nuclear weapons, or all States should be accorded the right to determine the means, including the possession of nuclear weapons, for protecting their security. All the same, Nigeria's commitment to the non-proliferation régime still remains firm.

My delegation has a long tradition in participating in the work of the Conference on Disarmament. We are here because we believe the items on the agenda are of a global nature and the issues under consideration are vitally important. Pursuing negotiations in good faith implies, as a minimum, transparency in the desire to achieve results.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Nigeria for his statement, and for the kind words that he addressed to the Chair. I should now like to give the floor to the representative of Indonesia, Ambassador Loeis.

Mr. LOEIS (Indonesia): In my statement today I wish to touch upon item 4 of our agenda, concerning chemical weapons. This is an item in which we have invested much time and effort, and it continues to be the most promising work of the Conference on Disarmament. Before I proceed with my statement, however, may I at the outset congratulate you upon your assumption of the highest office of the Conference, as well as for your exemplary stewardship in guiding the Conference on Disarmament during this usually difficult month of February? At the same time I should like to express the appreciation of my delegation to Ambassador Ardekani of Iran for the excellent manner in which he presided over our deliberations in the month of September.

I also avail myself of this opportunity to extend a warm welcome to our new colleagues Ambassador Kikanke, Ambassador Kamal, Ambassador Hyltenius, Ambassador Reese, Ambassador Dietze, Ambassador Houlliez and Ambassador Vajnar, who have joined us since the start of our spring session, and to assure them of my delegation's readiness to continue to co-operate with their delegations. Through you, Sir, may I request our new colleagues to convey my gratitude to their predecessors for the co-operation they have extended to the members of my delegation and myself, and to wish them every success in their new posts?

Despite being confronted with a serious situation and various obstacles last year, nevertheless the international community was able to pronounce again its willingness to get rid of chemical weapons once and for all from the arsenals of nations. Through resolutions 43/74 A and C, the United Nations General Assembly unanimously urged the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its negotiations with a view to finalizing at the earliest possible date a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction. The Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons also called on the Conference on Disarmament to resolve expeditiously the remaining issues in the negotiations and to conclude such a convention at the earliest possible date.

In order to capture and put into practice the spirit contained in those resolutions, the Group of 21 tabled a proposal on 7 February 1989 for a slight change in the mandate of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. Given the urgency of finalizing the draft convention and its importance to the process of multilateral disarmament, the Group of 21 is also willing to assume greater responsibility this year by chairing three out of the five working groups. As is well known, it is within these working groups that the real negotiation will take place. I hope that the disagreement on the question of the mandate at the beginning of our session was not a sign of a lack of political will to implement those resolutions, but is due to certain unavoidable temporary circumstances. In this connection we took note of the readiness of the Soviet Union to go forward with the negotiation, as stressed by Ambassador Nazarkin last week, as well as the commitment of the President of the United States of America, George Bush, to treat efforts to ban chemical weapons as one of his priorities.

Indeed, efforts have to be exerted in order to avoid the recurrence of last year's experience, where, in the words of Ambassador Ekéus on 13 September 1988, "our work in 1988 has fallen short of the repeated calls for renewed or even continuing urgency. Some important issues have hardly

(Mr. Loeis, Indonesia)

been addressed; solving others has taken unnecessary time and effort". It was only due to the untiring efforts of the chairmen of the Committee and the three working groups that the Committee managed to keep the negotiation continuing and in the end gain certain concrete results. The work of Ambassador Sujka, Mr. Numata, Mr. Macedo and Mr. Cima merits our thanks.

At this juncture, I wish to welcome the appointment of Ambassador Morel of France as the new Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. His diligence and excellent stewardship during the preparatory stage, which made the Paris Conference successful, are well known to us. His chairmanship of the Committee, as well as the presence of Foreign Minister Roland Dumas in the plenary session, raise hopes on the implementation of one of the most important aims of the Paris Conference, which is to give impetus to our negotiation here in the Conference on Disarmament. My delegation looks forward to the Committee resolving the remaining issues this year.

As stated in the programme of work of the Committee for this spring session, one area of our future work is the relation between the future convention and the 1925 Geneva Protocol. In-depth negotiations have taken place on this question, including in the open-ended consultations in 1985 chaired by a member of the Indonesian delegation. Some concrete results have already been achieved, such as the formulation of the preamble and a short paragraph 3 of article I, which simply states that each State party undertakes not to use chemical weapons.

Article IX concerning on-site inspection on challenge is one major issue which needs to be tackled straightforwardly this year. Much time has been invested in this subject, and attempts have been made to formulate the necessary paragraph, as in 1986, when Indonesia provided the Chairman of then Working Group C. In 1987, the Chairman of the Committee himself, Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden, presided over the negotiations, and concrete results were achieved, as appeared in appendix II of document CD/881. The time has come to capitalize on this paper by using it as a basis for further negotiations.

Speaking on the question of verification as a whole, we believe that the verification system envisaged in the "rolling text" is adequate to deter prohibited activities. Nevertheless, we see some good points in the efforts to close the so-called "verification gap" or in the need to search for a type of "non-confrontational inspection" short of on-site challenge inspection, and we will keep an open mind on these issues. In the meantime my delegation is now in the process of studying the papers presented by the Chairman of Working Group 1.

My delegation awaits with interest the result of our discussion in Working Group 3 concerning article VII. As is well known, this article as it appears in the "rolling text" was formulated years ago and had never been discussed until last Tuesday. Since various parts of the "rolling text" had not yet been negotiated and drafted, attempts were understandably made in the formulation of article VII to include as many important rights and obligations of States parties as could be thought of at that time. Now the situation is very different. The "rolling text" is more developed, and the negotiations on important aspects such as verification have advanced, resulting in a high

(Mr. Loeis, Indonesia)

degree of mutual understanding. Accordingly, certain adjustments are needed. One of them concerns national technical means. I believe there is already a consensus that for the purposes of the convention verification activities, be they systematic or on challenge, should be carried out by the international inspectors. I do understand that States parties may wish to, and have the right to, establish national technical means to carry out inspections within their countries; but that would be strictly an internal affair of those countries and would have no direct relevance to the convention. Therefore, we should leave this issue to those countries alone, and the convention should not interfere with their work.

In the efforts to solve the issue of jurisdiction and control and at the request of the Chairman of the Committee, a working paper was produced in 1987 by Dr. Bolewski of the Federal Republic of Germany, Dr. Szénási of Hungary and a member of my delegation. As indicated in their report, the discussion and drafting should be directed towards defining the obligations or responsibilities of the States parties, which include all the subjects relevance to the convention, to avoid difficulties in legal interpretation of attribution as well as to prevent legal "loopholes" in the convention.

These are some of the issues and, of course, there are also other more important ones which remain to be negotiated. On those issues we have also various working papers, and these papers are not only national papers, but papers produced by previous chairmen of the Committee or by the respective working groups, as well as by various "friends of the Chair". Some of them have even been negotiated and revised.

The point that I wish to raise by way of conclusion concerns continuity and consistency. We already have the "rolling text" and various working papers, and we should benefit from them or refer to them during the course of our negotiations. I do realize that the finalization of a paragraph or an article often depends upon the result of negotiation in another part of the "rolling text", and at the same time there is no denying that it would be practically impossible for the Committee to devote simultaneous attention and equal time to each of the remaining issues in our negotiation. Thus the risk of inadvertently overlooking the problem of this interdependence cannot be underestimated. However, whatever the method in approaching this problem will be, care should be taken in order to avoid as far as possible the danger of unravelling tentative agreements or the springing up of footnotes and brackets on already agreed paragraphs or articles.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Indonesia for his statement, and for the kind words that he addressed to the Chair. I have no other speakers on my list for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor?

I have requested the secretariat to circulate today a timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies next week. In this connection I wish to inform you that the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States

Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons is also convening a meeting of that subsidiary body on Friday, 3 March at 3 p.m. in this conference room. The secretariat will therefore issue a revision to the timetable, which will be circulated in the delegation's pigeon-holes.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I have no other business for today. I now intend to adjourn this plenary meeting.

The meeting rose at 12 noon.

# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.490  
28 February 1989

ENGLISH

---

## FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND NINETIETH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 28 February 1989, at 10 a.m.

President:            Mr. Aldo Pugliese            (Italy)



The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 490th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

The Conference continues today its consideration of agenda items 1, "nuclear test ban", and 2, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". However, in accordance with rule 30 of its rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Japan, Peru and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. I now give the floor to the representative of Japan, Ambassador Yamada.

Mr. YAMADA (Japan): Allow me to extend to you, Sir, my belated congratulations upon your assumption of the office of President for this important month of February. With your profound knowledge and experience and under your able leadership, we are able to embark on this year's work with renewed vigour.

May I also pay my tribute to Ambassador Ali Shams Ardekani of the Islamic Republic of Iran for presiding successfully in the closing months of last year's session?

On behalf of the delegation of Japan, I would like to express our most sincere gratitude to all the Governments represented here in this Conference for participating at such a high level in the funeral of His late Majesty Emperor Showa last Friday. Before proceeding to my present post, my wife and I were received in audience in the Imperial Palace, and His late Majesty instructed us to make friends with colleagues in the Conference and do whatever we could for the cause of peace. His late Majesty was always with us, with the people, and wrote in one of his last poems:

"Joy and sorrow  
I shared with my people  
Year by year  
I lived and learned."

The good will shown at this event, we take as your feeling toward what we are and what you expect us to be. We Japanese shall try our best, in reciprocating your good will, to work for a better world.

On 16 February last year, I referred in this plenary to a pervasive anticipation that 1988 would bring about significant developments in the multilateral disarmament process. Today, one year later, I venture to say that the events of 1988 proved this anticipation to have been well founded. Though there have been ups and downs, expectations and disappointments, we discern some underlying trends clearly in motion in the international community. Let me enumerate a few of these trends.

In the relationship between the two super-Powers, the practice of constant dialogue has firmly taken root. One can justifiably look forward to

(Mr. Yamada, Japan)

this dialogue being irreversibly continued under the new Administration in the United States. Japan, for its part, hopes that this process can act as a catalyst to open vistas for multilateral negotiations on major disarmament items. The significant progress towards the settlement of long-standing regional conflicts or hostilities in Afghanistan and the Gulf has been brought about in large measure by the mediation efforts of the United Nations. Further, the parallel negotiations on further confidence- and security-building measures and on conventional disarmament in Europe will commence next week in Vienna. Though these negotiations will necessarily call for painstaking and sustained efforts on the part of all those concerned, the agreement, after two years of intensive work, on the mandate for negotiations on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe marks a historic breakthrough. It is significant that there have also been some important unilateral initiatives whose implications on Europe and other regions of the world merit in-depth consideration.

In the multilateral arena, the third special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, though without a consensus final document, proved to be a valuable process from which emerged areas of broad convergence such as a nuclear test ban, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the importance of the early conclusion of the chemical weapons convention. The forty-third session of the General Assembly of the United Nations reflected these areas of convergence, as well as the emerging priorities on conventional disarmament and on issues which cut horizontally across various disarmament areas, such as verification. Most recently, we were greatly encouraged by the success of the Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons. I wish to pay the sincere tribute of my Government to former President Reagan of the United States for taking the initiative for such a conference, and to the Government of France, and especially to Ambassador Pierre Morel, for their untiring and constructive contributions which were crowned with success. I shall address its implications for our work a little later in this statement.

While these trends give us reason for hope, we should not be content only with what takes place outside the Conference. The attention of the international community is focused more and more on the Conference on Disarmament, the single multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament. With due respect to the sincerity and hard work by the members, to be blunt, I feel constrained to say that we have achieved very little indeed in the Conference. The world is watching how we can take advantage of these outside trends and produce tangible, concrete results. There is much that we have to do here in the Conference.

Let me, in this light, address three areas of particular importance to Japan. Though we see a trend of shifting of priorities to conventional and chemical-weapon disarmament, the issues related to nuclear weapons continue to be of high priority to the Japanese people, who solemnly pray that nuclear weapons will ultimately be eliminated so that a nuclear holocaust can never be repeated. In the view of my delegation, it is no accident that there were tentative but broad convergences in the course of SSOD-III on nuclear disarmament, a nuclear test ban and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons,

(Mr. Yamada, Japan)

at a time when we were about to enter the preparatory process towards the Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1990. Japan attaches particular importance to the maintenance and strengthening of the NPT régime, and considers that the Fourth Review Conference can be an important watershed for the Conference of the Parties in 1995 which, under article X, paragraph 2 of the Treaty, must determine "whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods".

In this review process which is to go on for the next six years, we will need to consider the issues of nuclear disarmament, a nuclear test ban and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in their interrelationship, and devise a coherent multilateral strategy which will ensure peace and security for all of us. If anyone takes it for granted that nuclear non-proliferation will continue without serious effort on real issues of nuclear disarmament, he will regret such a judgement. I wish to note in particular the commitment contained in the preamble of the NPT to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end.

It is in this overall context that I wish to appeal to all delegations to grapple seriously with the long overdue problem of initiating substantive work on item 1 of our agenda, "Nuclear test ban". Our continued failure to do so can only affect adversely the process I have just referred to, in which the attention of the international community will be focused, among others, on progress on a nuclear test ban. I do believe that we already have in our hands the necessary parameters which, taken together, should enable us to bring us out of the log-jam in the establishment of an ad hoc committee.

The bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union in accordance with their joint statement of 17 September 1987 led to the historic Joint Verification Experiments, which seem to have brought the two sides very close to the completion of the first phase of the full-scale, stage-by-stage negotiations, namely the ratification of the threshold test-ban Treaty of 1974 and the peaceful nuclear explosions Treaty of 1976. The momentum should be maintained in an irreversible manner, so that the two sides can proceed without delay to the second phase, namely, negotiating further intermediate limitations on nuclear testing.

A prolonged philosophical debate on bilateral versus multilateral negotiations is not likely to lead us very far. What we need is rather to seek parallel progress on both the bilateral and the multilateral fronts. As I have stated before, none of the draft mandates officially tabled by the groups for the establishment of an ad hoc committee has received consensus support. We must squarely face the political realities. A prolonged repetition of the established positions of each group on the mandate question does not help us start substantive work. That is why I renew my appeal to all those concerned to show one more sign of flexibility. Japan believes that the draft mandate in document CD/863 tabled by Czechoslovakia, which takes into account the various positions does indeed constitute a very useful basis for developing a consensus, and is happy to note that similar views are held by an increasing number of States across the Groups.

(Mr. Yamada, Japan)

Since the beginning of this session, quite a few delegations have addressed themselves to this question and expressed their strong desire to start substantive work in an ad hoc committee on this item, indicating possible flexibility. I noted with keen interest such statements in the plenary as those by the distinguished representatives of Morocco, India, Burma, Yugoslavia, the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria. Let us try to translate these signs of hope and flexibility into concrete action in this Conference as soon as possible in the 1989 session. I continue to believe that it would also be the best and only way to meet the concern of the international community as a whole, including those who are calling for a conference to amend the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963.

Once we engage in substantive work on a nuclear test ban, as I hope indeed we do, verification will be a main aspect which will merit in-depth, thorough examination from the scientific, security, political and other angles. I highly appreciate the groundwork for this being laid by the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts, and look forward to further valuable contributions in this regard. At the same time we may be coming to a point where we should start thinking seriously about the multiple facets of verification from a broader and more purpose-oriented perspective, and give proper guidance to the work of the GSE. The forthcoming United Nations Conference on Disarmament Issues to be held in Kyoto from 19 to 22 April, originally proposed by Prime Minister Takeshita, will provide a useful opportunity for policy-makers and scientific experts to brain-storm on a nuclear test ban and other important disarmament issues. It is hoped that the discussions there, though not directly linked to the work of the Conference on Disarmament, may stimulate further thinking for our work in the future.

The prohibition of chemical weapons is one of the most urgent and achievable tasks before us. Japan participated in the Paris Conference with the basic recognition, as Foreign Minister Uno said in his statement, that "so long as chemical weapons are allowed to exist, mankind can never be freed from the danger of the use of these weapons, and conversely, so long as the possibility of their use is left open, we can never rid the world of chemical weapons". We succeeded in mobilizing world opinion to check the undesirable trend of erosion of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and chemical weapons proliferation. It remains for us in the Conference on Disarmament to translate the determination expressed in the Final Declaration of the Paris Conference into reality by concluding a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their destruction at the earliest date.

The positive impact of the Paris Conference is also demonstrated by the fact that we now have 22 non-members participating in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, a significant step forward toward ensuring the universality of the convention. I particularly welcome the countries in Asia and the Pacific - the Republic of Korea, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Viet Nam, participating in the chemical weapons negotiations for the first time.

(Mr. Yamada, Japan)

Even with the best of efforts and intentions, the convention cannot be finalized and brought into effect overnight. We will have to work very intensively to resolve a number of hard-core issues. As we engage in these efforts in the negotiations here in the Conference on Disarmament, it is also vitally important that we foster further the international climate conducive to the early conclusion and entry into force of the convention. As paragraph 4 of the Paris Declaration states, each of us is called upon to exercise restraint and to act responsibly, in meeting the concern of the international community caused by the growing danger posed to international peace and security by the risk of the use of chemical weapons as long as such weapons remain and are spread.

As for the negotiations before us in the coming months, I believe that we are now into the final crucial phase where some fundamental hard-core issues have to be faced and resolved. Some issues do not lend themselves to easy solutions if we just look at them piecemeal in isolation. That is why I welcome the approach taken by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Pierre Morel, and the chairmen of the five working groups in their working programmes to address the remaining issues in their interrelationship in a structured manner. As we proceed further, it will probably become increasingly necessary for us to consider some issues which cut across different working groups.

With this in mind, let me comment on what I consider to be the priority issues. In Group 1, we have the opportunity to bring together the various loose ends on the subject of verification. With respect to on-site inspection on challenge, the experience of my delegation, which had the honour of chairing Group C in the 1988 session, indicates that we now have in the "rolling text" a fuller picture than before of what a challenge inspection régime based on the assumption of "any time, anywhere, without the right of refusal" may look like. At the same time, basic issues remain, such as the specificity of the request, the alternative arrangements, the involvement of the Executive Council and the Conference of the States Parties after the submission of the report and possible further actions. Underlying these issues seem to be different perceptions among States as to the nature of challenge inspections, including their usability, and how their security, industrial and other interests may be affected when challenge inspection is invoked against them. If there are such differences, they need to be thrashed out further in search of common ground.

It is also time for each of us to take a considered look at the whole range of verification measures contained in the convention, with a view to ensuring that these measures give reasonable confidence that the objectives of the convention will be fulfilled. For this reasonable confidence to be felt by all States parties, it is important that the burden resulting from the application of verification measures should fall equitably among States parties in a manner commensurate with the risks they pose to the objectives of the convention. My delegation is open to examining closely whether there are gaps in the verification measures that need to be filled. In doing so, we consider it important that the whole balance of rights and obligations throughout the spectrum of various verification measures should be considered. For example, when we consider the risks to the convention which

(Mr. Yamada, Japan)

may be posed by particular chemical agents or facilities, we should ask ourselves whether the risks to the convention increase in simple proportion to the toxicity of the agent or the number of relevant facilities, or whether other factors should also be taken into account. Care should be exercised to ensure that no particular State or group of States is unduly penalized, and that the technical secretariat is not politicized, either wittingly or unwittingly.

In addition to the above, my delegation is looking forward to the pooling of experience from our national trial inspections, which should give us practical guidance in bringing the current verification provisions closer into line with reality. Japan has conducted its national trial inspections on several schedule [2]-related facilities since last autumn, and is now preparing the report. This practical experience, together with the accumulation of data provided voluntarily by States, should give us a more realistic idea of the staffing requirements and costs of the organization, which will be addressed in Group 3. It is hoped that the work in Group 1 on verification, in Group 3 on staffing requirements and costs, and in Group 5 on data exchange and the Preparatory Commission, will bring us closer to a truly balanced and cost-effective verification régime.

The new additions to the "rolling text", in appendices I and II, of the elements on confidentiality provide useful general parameters for the consideration of this issue, which merits careful consideration in ensuring that the convention gains full public acceptance, and is lived up to by our civil chemical industries. We look forward to further elaboration of the related provisions, in constructive dialogue with our industries.

My delegation notes with appreciation the focus in the work programme on several underlying political and legal problems. They represent the hard nuts that we have to crack to achieve a meaningful and effective convention. Among these issues, the question of how non-compliance or violations should be dealt with is a major unresolved problem which runs throughout the convention and merits in-depth examination. Though my delegation does not necessarily feel that "sanctions" in the normal sense of the term provide the best answer to the problem, it will be necessary to address this problem through the whole spectrum from the question of ambiguities or anomalies arising in the course of inspection to the possibility of sanctions.

At this early stage of the 1989 session, I have limited myself to presenting my views on these few items. I do sense that there is again in this Conference a considerable degree of anticipation on what we may be able to achieve this year. It is up to us to make this come true. I pledge the full co-operation of my delegation to that end.

Before concluding, may I extend my warm welcome to the distinguished representatives who have joined the Conference since my last intervention in the plenary of 18 August 1988? I look forward to working closely with Ambassador Aung Thant of Burma, Ambassador Sharma of India, Ambassador Houlliez of Belgium, Ambassador Dietze of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden, Ambassador Reese of Australia, Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan, Ambassador Vajnar of Czechoslovakia and Ambassador Bullut of Kenya.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Japan for his statement, and for the kind words addressed to me. At the opening of his statement Ambassador Yamada recalled the passing away of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan and the mandate entrusted to him by the Emperor. We and our countries had occasion to pay our respects to the Emperor, and I wish now to reiterate to Ambassador Yamada our deep condolences for such a loss suffered by the people of Japan. I now give the floor to the representative of Peru, Ambassador de Rivero.

Mr. de RIVERO (Peru) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, first of all I would like to convey to you the satisfaction of my delegation at your accession to such an important post for the month of February. The fact that the Conference has taken significant steps forward in the organization of its work bears witness to your acknowledged experience and great diplomatic talent. Allow me also to extend a warm welcome to the new colleagues who have joined this negotiating forum since October of last year. I am referring to the Ambassadors of Australia, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, India, Pakistan, the German Democratic Republic and Sweden. My delegation wishes them every success in discharging their functions, and assures them of all necessary co-operation.

This year in the Conference on Disarmament, we have all chosen and given priority to chemical disarmament. All the Conference's topics have given up some time and made room for the negotiations on chemical disarmament. The Peruvian delegation thinks that this is right and logical, because since the Paris Conference it would appear that there are greater political possibilities for chemical disarmament. We might say that at present chemical disarmament is less difficult than making progress in other areas, for instance nuclear disarmament. That is all very well, but this also involves a risk because if, on this subject that we have chosen and to which we have given priority because of its political possibilities, we do not come up with a draft convention by the end of this year or the beginning of next year, then, if we cannot manage to do this, if we cannot manage to make maximum possible headway in disarmament now, this could cause irreparable damage for the work of the Conference on Disarmament and could have a depressing effect on all the work in general. For this reason, we should be resolutely determined to make progress in the negotiations on chemical disarmament. It is absolutely vital to do so because all the confidence that we may place in the Conference on Disarmament in the future is at stake. For these reasons, my delegation would like to focus this statement on agenda item 4, on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

Mr. President, my delegation was particularly pleased to see the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, for the reasons that I have just described, as well as the election of Ambassador Pierre Morel to chair its work. Nevertheless, it cannot hide a degree of disappointment at the unexpected difficulty encountered by the Conference in adopting an updated mandate in the light of the important results of the Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Even if we proceed from the assumption of transparency which underlay the consensus on the Final Declaration that was adopted in Paris by 149 countries on 11 January this year, it remains

(Mr. de Rivero, Peru)

paradoxical that the reaffirmation of political will and commitment to ban chemical weapons as soon as possible has not been reflected in a new mandate that would enable the Ad hoc Committee to agree on a draft convention (without needing to refer to a final version) during this session of the Conference, or by the very latest in 1990. And what is most paradoxical is that the reasons for which a group of countries has not been in a position to go along with the consensus promoted by the Group of 21, with the support of the socialist countries and China, are not at all clear, at least officially. It is to be hoped that this state of mind, which is at variance with the spirit of Paris, will change in the coming months for the benefit of all of us and all peoples throughout the world, who are waiting for the conclusion of negotiations which, once and for all, will lead to the final elimination of all chemical weapons, as well as facilities and equipment designed to produce them.

For all these reasons my delegation welcomes the restructuring of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to facilitate the thematic treatment of the present "rolling text". The proliferation of footnotes, square brackets, appendices and annexes has turned this document into gibberish for the uninitiated. There is an urgent need to streamline it, rationalize its content and possibly structure it in such a way that at the end of this session we will be able to have a cleaner, more coherent text without any interruptions, which is closer to the format and language of a convention and not what we have now, which looks rather like a hybrid, because it tends to mix the setting of standards with the regulatory aspects. If there is a conviction that this is inevitable, then it will be necessary to see how far we have to go with regulatory clarifications or aspects.

Despite what I have said, the establishment of five working groups at first sight deserves a somewhat cautious welcome, because of the risk of overlapping of subjects, or watering down of subjects which are differentiated but complementary. Another additional problem with this distribution of work is that which will face delegations with a small number of members that have to follow all the activities of the Conference on Disarmament with the same zeal. My delegation greatly appreciates the steps taken by Ambassador Morel of France to minimize the difficulties that might stem from the functioning of these five working groups, as well as this commendable initiative of favouring the Group of 21 with the chairmanships of three of these working groups, which is an important precedent. It is to be hoped that the good will that inspires Ambassador Morel and his remarkable skill and diplomatic tact will enable the Committee to overcome its own mandate, politically speaking, and place the Conference on the home straight of the negotiations in 1990.

The Final Declaration of the Paris Conference had the merit of casting light on some of the basic issues which are still awaiting a solution in the Ad hoc Committee. First, we have the problem of "second use" by way of recourse to retaliation or self-defence. In paragraph 1 of the Paris Final Declaration there was evidence of the unwillingness of some States that are parties to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 to withdraw the reservations that they have made in this regard. Obviously, every State has sovereign power to indicate the conditions within which it expresses its consent to be bound to a treaty. Nevertheless, the problem arises when that position is in conflict



(Mr. de Rivero, Peru)

with its decision to negotiate a convention designed to prohibit and destroy chemical weapons. The fact that the Conference on Disarmament has not managed to add the prohibition of use to its mandate this year only reconfirms this uncertainty and gives rise to doubts about the intrinsic value of the entire negotiating exercise that has been under way now for some years.

Secondly, we have the problem of the proliferation of chemical weapons. Paragraph 4 of the Final Declaration did not accurately reflect the state of thinking and feeling at the Paris Conference about this. On the one hand, there was the concrete and urgent problem of halting the production and refinement of chemical weapons. And on the other, nothing was done to avoid the risk of an increase in the number of States with the capability to produce chemical weapons, a risk which could be smaller if certain supplier States were less complacent in their trade policies. Discussions are being held on whether the two aspects of chemical weapons proliferation can be dealt with on an equal footing, but what there can be no doubt about is the indissoluble link between them, as well as the frame of reference established by the priorities in the negotiations on disarmament which are set forth in the Final Document of 1978.

This question of proliferation leads me to make a few remarks on the principle of undiminished security. As understood by my delegation, this principle cannot come to an end with the agreed 10-year destruction period. It is obvious that during that time there will be greater interest in avoiding any deterioration in the existing levels of security for each State. But, in addition to the bilateral, regional and global dimensions in which this principle should be seen, it cannot in any way serve as a pretext for discriminating qualitatively or quantitatively among stocks in the order of destruction, nor for justifying a delay for certain chemical-weapon States parties as compared to other States parties in the process of destruction of their respective chemical stockpiles. In the view of my delegation, the mere fact of becoming a party to the convention should offer States parties sufficient proof of the good will and necessary mutual trust of all concerned with a view to the full achievement of the objectives set out in the convention. In other words, the principle of undiminished security cannot be based on the implicit presumption of suspicion, but on the conviction that the confidence and political will of the States parties for the full application of the convention must be strengthened. Consequently, we must not await the entry into force of the convention to ensure that this principle is applied. There is a need for prior work, basic and preventive work from the moment the convention is adopted and opened for signature, in order to avoid any change in regional or subregional security levels as far as chemical weapons are concerned, or any vertical multiplication of the existing chemical arsenals. It would be illogical and of dubious morality if, during the negotiation of the convention and the time necessary for its entry into force, the world were made to witness an ill-timed chemical arms race, however discreet, cloaked in the precept of undiminished security which should subsequently govern the destruction of larger and more deadly arsenals.

(Mr. de Rivero, Peru)

Another dimension concerning this issue of undiminished security is that which will arise on the day after the end of the 10-year period for the destruction of chemical weapons. Proceeding from the logical assumption that all States parties will faithfully comply with the obligations entered into, one may suppose that the chemical industry, including the pharmaceutical industry, will continue its development, handling chemicals which may be more sophisticated and dangerous. This possible or probable risk brings us out of the political dimension to the human dimension of undiminished security. Once chemical weapons, for example, have been destroyed and eliminated forever from the face of the Earth, the most urgent problem in the next century will undoubtedly be chemical pollution of the environment, with its negative and indiscriminate effects. For these reasons, we consider that the drafters of the convention must not overlook this potential threat, and one may suppose that the future international organization will not remain indifferent or defenceless in the face of this problem which homo sapiens is inflicting on himself. Therefore, Peru believes that article X on assistance and protection could far-sightedly provide for assistance and support to those States parties that are victims of chemical disasters which cause great harm to their people or go beyond national borders with the ensuing implications for the integrity of ecosystems. This is an issue that demands consideration in future negotiations.

Another question arising out of the Final Declaration of the Paris Conference relates to the role that the United Nations should play in bringing about the total prohibition of chemical weapons. My delegation believes that the convention cannot institutionalize a parallel system; the arrangements must fall within the broader system of the United Nations. Therefore, besides drawing on the purposes and principles of the Charter, the convention could bring about a correlation between the two international instruments in order to resolve situations in which a State party was, for instance, confronted by a State that is not a party, or in those cases involving two or more States that are not contracting parties to the convention. The interest here lies not only in the production and maintenance of stockpiles, but also in possible allegations of use. It is to be hoped that improved machinery to carry out investigation missions can be supplemented by another system entailing the application of sanctions so that there will be some sort of disincentive to States that might wish to stand aloof from the convention.

There is no doubt that the verification system to be established under the convention cannot be absolute nor can it decipher the private intentions of States parties. This is very difficult. In other words, it should be based on good faith, mutual trust and the willingness of all to abide faithfully by commitments that have been entered into. From this angle it is necessary to have ad hoc inspections as a way of dispelling any doubts that might arise out of a routine inspection but that are insufficient to give rise to a formal allegation. However, care will have to be taken that this procedure does not lead to a sort of hysteria causing an unnecessary increase in the costs of verification. Without achieving absolute verification we can ensure a reasonable and financially feasible level of verification if we proceed from the presumption of the good faith of all.

(Mr. de Rivero, Peru)

Finally, the institution of the competent national authority should be elaborated upon further. For the present my delegation considers that the convention should contain an article devoted specifically to the national authority, with provisions drafted in a generic way, endeavouring not to be exhaustive, because of the wide variety of possible forms that the national authority might take, depending on the capacity of the chemical industry of each State party. But it would be desirable to give the national authority the status of the State party's sole representative vis-à-vis the international organization, and also to declare it competent in matters of co-ordination with regard to all the sectors covered by the convention for each State party. Finally, it is also desirable that a State should designate its national authority at the same time as it deposits its instrument of ratification or accession to the convention.

The question of amendments is of special importance if we take account of the special nature of the convention which we are negotiating. We are legislating on something new, and so the fundamental precept underlying the convention must be its privileged nature. Obviously, like any human endeavour, the convention may be subject to improvement; nevertheless, the commitment should be to safeguard its integrity to the greatest extent possible. Proceeding from the assumption that amendments will be the last resort available, once attempts to reform this multilateral instrument from within have failed, it would be of great value, in the view of my delegation, to establish a special régime during the 10-year period of transition. A kind of pause or truce could be provided for during the destruction stage as far as the presentation of amendments is concerned. We do not envisage the triggering of the amendment procedure during a critical period of implementation of the convention, since that might jeopardize the principle of undiminished security. If, after the 10-year period, the contracting parties agree that it is necessary to amend the convention, a distinction should be made between the convention as such, or main treaty, and the additional annexes or protocols. In the former case, a stricter procedure could apply, especially if the amendments involve fundamental obligations set forth in the convention, both as regards acceptance of the amendments and as regards their entry into force. We cannot set aside the rule of unanimity, which would be accompanied by a waiver clause to avoid deliberate or involuntary vetoes. In the second case, it would be advisable to adopt a simpler procedure, in keeping with the nature of the amendments, which would not entail any fundamental changes in the convention.

My delegation will play an active part in the deliberations of the Ad hoc Committee and the five working groups, with the aim of contributing to the speedy conclusion of the ongoing negotiations, which, as I said at the beginning of this disquisition, constitute a very important responsibility for us all.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Peru for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I should now like to give the floor to the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Nazarkin.

Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): As 28 February is the last day of your presidency, allow me to express my satisfaction at the manner in which you have guided the work of the Conference in the month that is now ending. Today the Soviet delegation has taken the floor in order to communicate the results of a trial inspection held in the Soviet Union, which was organized at a chemical facility near the town of Dzerzhinsk in the Gorky region. At this facility, among other chemicals, certain dialkylaminoethanols are produced. These chemicals, as you know, are included in the "rolling text" for further consideration from the standpoint of their possible inclusion in schedule [2]. The national experiment, including the necessary preparatory work, was conducted during the period September-December 1988. It was based on the recommendations contained in document CD/CW/WP.213. The results of the experiment are set out in the report which we have passed to the secretariat for publication as a document of the Conference and the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons under the symbols CD/894 and CD/CW/WP.225.

In the course of the experiment two types of inspection were tried out. First of all there was the initial visit provided for in the annex to article VI of the draft convention. It included a detailed inspection of the areas of the facility, including production areas, storage facilities for raw materials and finished production, the control centre, administrative areas and laboratories. When the flow chart was examined the specific characteristics of the equipment were studied and the key points at which the production process could be monitored were identified. As a result an agreement was prepared on the facility, on the basis of which a routine inspection was subsequently conducted. The initial visit took five days, of which two days were required for the preparation of the draft agreement on the organization of the systematic inspection of this facility. Next, monitoring equipment was set up at points on the process path which had been identified in the course of the initial visit. These operations were carried out over a period of 24 hours during a scheduled shutdown of the production process, and therefore did not affect the operation of the facility as a whole. Between that moment and the holding of the routine inspection samples were taken automatically, hermetically sealed and placed in a sealed container.

The routine inspection was conducted in the course of one day. A further day was required for the preparation of the report of the inspection team. The inspectors examined the production equipment, checked the condition of the seals on the monitoring and measurement apparatus and samplers, checked the instrument readings and compared them with the facility records. A number of staff of the facility were questioned. When the inspectors arrived at the facility, the sample container was opened in their presence and two samples were extracted. The analysis of these samples, as well as the samples taken on the initial visit, was conducted on the spot (in the facility laboratory) by representatives of the facility in the presence of one of the inspectors. Both on the initial visit and on the routine inspection the inspection team was made up of four persons. It included a specialist in monitoring (team leader), a specialist in chemical technology, a specialist in monitoring and measuring instruments and automation, and a specialist in physical and chemical methods of analysis. They were all representatives of the Ministry of Chemical Industry of the USSR. In addition, the routine on-site inspection

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

was attended by representatives of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and the Ministry of Defence of the USSR.

In the course of the inspection, issues relating to the maintenance of confidential information were addressed. In actual fact, no real problems arose in this area, as all those participating in the experiment, including the observers, have specific obligations under Soviet legislation. Nevertheless, in the course of the inspection the management of the facility drew the attention of these persons to the degree of confidentiality of each type of information. The participants studied the question of what information can be conveyed to the technical secretariat and what should be retained at the facility. As a result of the holding of the national experiment, it was recognized that, in cases where the inspection team detected no violations at the facility, it might perhaps compile a short report, in the form of replies to questions based on the inspectors' mandate. Where breaches of the provisions of the convention were detected, a more detailed report would have to be drawn up. It should include information confirming the violations detected.

Generally speaking, the national experiment confirmed the practical applicability of the monitoring procedures agreed upon during the negotiations, and supplied answers to a number of concrete questions which have yet to be considered in detail in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons (duration of inspections, specific composition of the inspection team, etc.). The experiment also demonstrated that it is possible to conduct inspections without disrupting the operations of chemical plants.

The results of the experiment, the specific procedures followed, and actual data on production and consumption of chemicals are set out in greater detail in the report. Official documents used during the experiment are annexed to the basic report. These are: the initial declaration concerning the facility; a notification regarding the proposed production of dialkylaminoethanols in 1989; a facility agreement, prepared on the basis of the results of the initial visit, containing a detailed description of areas and buildings, the technology and production processes, measuring points and sampling points, etc. Annexed to the agreement are a layout diagram of the facility indicating its position in relation to Dzerzhinsk and the railway line, a diagram of the dialkylaminoethanol production plant, a diagram of the principal material flows in the facility, a plan of the facility, a schematic of arrangements for monitoring output of chemicals, and a schematic of the dialkylaminoethanol production monitoring system. We have also attached the mandates for the initial visit and for routine inspections, which were followed by the inspection team, as well as the inspection team's reports on the initial visit and the routine inspection. Although the inspection team did not observe any violations or divergences from standard procedure, the outline for the conduct of the national experiment included various violation scenarios which were "acted out" in theoretical terms and reflected in the report, and also in a special document entitled "Possible instances of discrepancy between the actual situation and earlier declarations concerning a facility". I should like to draw attention to the fact that in the context of actual application of the convention, part of the information contained in the report should not, in our opinion, be forwarded to the technical secretariat

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

but should remain at the facility. However, guided by a desire to do our utmost to promote the analysis of the results of national experiments, we put this information in the report.

In submitting this report, the Soviet delegation considers that it will contribute towards "fine tuning" of the system for monitoring the production of key precursors. Naturally, our experts will be prepared to provide any clarifications required and answer any questions you may have.

We note with satisfaction that three reports have already been submitted - from Sweden, Hungary and Italy - and that 13 other States have either conducted or intend to conduct national trial inspections and to submit reports on them. A positive factor is the fact that the trial inspections are being conducted not only by members of the Conference on Disarmament but also by States participating in the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons as non-members of the Conference.

We consider that the holding of national trial inspections testifies to the fact that the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons have entered a decisive stage, where work on the drafting of the future convention is going hand in hand with practical preparation for its entry into force.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement, and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I have no other speakers on my list for today. Does any other member wish to take the floor at this stage?

I should now like to make my concluding statement.

Since this plenary meeting is the last one for the month of February, allow me, as President of the Conference for this month, to make a few remarks regarding the work done by the Conference until now.

First of all, I would like to express to all of you my sincere gratitude for the spirit of co-operation you have shown, for the effective support you have so kindly granted to my presidency, and also for the many expressions of friendship addressed to me. The Conference on Disarmament opened this year's activities in a promising world climate, which was not only characterized by the satisfactory trend in East-West relations, but also by the significant progress towards solution of many local conflicts and by the general decrease in international contention. In the multilateral arena the successful outcome of the Paris Conference on the prohibition of use of chemical weapons was undoubtedly an event of primary importance, which raised growing expectations for the specific work of this Conference and the disarmament process in general.

Right at the outset of my term of Office, the Conference was able to adopt its agenda for the 1989 session, including the programme of work for the first part of the session. To our great satisfaction, we have witnessed this year an interesting and encouraging increase in the number of applications to participate in our work put forward by a number of non-member States, which

(The President)

were all admitted. At the same time significant progress was made which enabled various problems relating to the internal organization of the Conference to be rapidly solved.

We were also able to re-establish the ad hoc committees on item 6, entitled "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons", and item 7 "Radiological weapons", including the appointment of their respective chairmen, Ambassador Ardekani of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Ambassador de Rivero of Peru. Furthermore, the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament resumed its work under the chairmanship of Ambassador García Robles.

Owing to the assistance and good will of all, it has also been possible to reach agreement on the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, under agenda item 4, appointing moreover an able Chairman, Ambassador Morel of France, to that subsidiary body. As you are all well aware, many hopes and expectations are bestowed on the work of this important Committee, especially after the Paris Conference: International public opinion is looking at this subject with particular attention and sensitivity. Therefore I cannot abstain from renewing the appeal for all political groups and delegations to redouble their utmost efforts for the decisive progress of this negotiation. The success brought about by an agreement on a convention on the total prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons could only increase the prestige and renown of the Conference. To this effect, I would like, on behalf of you all, to renew the most sincere wishes of success to Ambassador Morel, who has been assigned the responsibility of leading the work of this important Committee for the 1989 session.

I would have been pleased to welcome, as early as in February, the establishment of another important subsidiary body, the one in charge of the delicate and important problem of "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". Despite great good will, my efforts have not yet led to a conclusive result on this matter. I am sure that, where I did not succeed, my successor will be able to reach more concrete results in the pursuit of a reasonable compromise solution to enable the Ad hoc Committee on outer space to resume its work as soon as possible.

Nor has the Conference been successful in establishing working arrangements for the so-called "nuclear items" on our agenda. This seems to indicate that additional intensive efforts are required if we want to see some signs of movement on these issues.

Informal consultations on other pending subjects are also worthy of attention. For instance on the expansion of the membership of the Conference. It will be up to my successor to continue ongoing consultations and hopefully succeed in consolidating agreement on those questions.

I believe it to be a legitimate aspiration of any President of the Conference on Disarmament to obtain from the Conference positive progress in its work. Not merely for reasons of personal prestige, which are, after all, of secondary relevance, but from a belief in the importance our multilateral exercise assumes with regard to the problems of the contemporary world, among

(The President)

which the issue of disarmament certainly plays a role of primary importance. I therefore beg the indulgence of those who expected from me more than was achieved.

In conclusion, it is my wish to thank all delegations again, for the assistance they have lent me in many ways during my presidency. First and foremost comes to my mind the significant contributions of group and item co-ordinators for the solution of outstanding problems. I also want to thank sincerely the Secretary-General of the Conference, Ambassador Komatina, whose great competence and qualities I have been able to appreciate fully. I would like to express all my gratitude to the Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference, Ambassador Berasategui, whose advice and assistance have also been extremely valuable to me during this month. My gratitude goes also to all the staff of the secretariat, as well as to the interpreters and translators, whose competence and dictation I myself have been able to appreciate.

Lastly, I would like to present to my successor, Ambassador Yamada of Japan, my very warm good wishes for success in the exercise of his mandate. I am sure that under his competent guidance the Conference will be able to carry on its work in the most efficient possible manner. I would like to assure him of my delegation's constructive support.

I now proceed to other business. I should like to inform you that Vice-Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, His Excellency Hans-Dietrich Genscher, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, His Excellency Giulio Andreotti, have expressed the wish to address the Conference on Thursday, 2 March. In view of the very tight schedule and previous commitments of the Ministers, they will only be able to stay in Geneva during the afternoon of that day. This being the case, I should like to propose - after consulting with the incoming Chairman, Ambassador Yamada of Japan, and the presiding officers of other meetings to be held on that date - that we hold our regular plenary meeting on that day at 3.30 p.m. This will make possible the visit of the Ministers. If there is no objection, we shall so proceed.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT as a result of this change in our timetable of meetings, the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament will meet in this Council chamber at 10.a.m., and Working Group 2 of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons will hold its meeting, also at 10 a.m., in room V, on 2 March. I should like to thank the incoming President of the Conference, Ambassador Yamada of Japan, as well as the presiding officers of those meetings, for their understanding and co-operation.

I now intend to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held as I said, on Thursday, 2 March at 3.30 p.m.

The meeting rose at 11.25 a.m.



# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV. 491  
2 March 1989

ENGLISH

---

## FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND NINETY-FIRST PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Thursday, 2 March 1989, at 3.30 p.m.

President: Mr. Chusei Yamada (Japan)

The PRESIDENT: The 491st plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is now called to order.

As Japan assumes the presidency for the month of March, my Prime Minister has asked me to convey a message to the Conference which I would like to read. I quote:

"Japan has the honour to assume the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament during this month, nearly seven years after it last held the post of the then Committee on Disarmament in April 1982.

"Recent years have witnessed marked improvements in the international climate surrounding bilateral relations as well as regional and multilateral issues. These trends give us a sustained hope that the priority objectives of the Conference on Disarmament, to which the Government and people of Japan continue to attach high importance, will become a reality.

"Such attainment requires, no doubt, patient and continuing efforts on the part of all member States to bridge the differences and to widen the areas of convergence. The very success of the recent Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons has demonstrated that it is indeed possible to obtain concrete results, when such efforts are made. Our mission is to make steady progress, building upon those successes as in chemical weapons and other important areas of disarmament.

"Japan is firmly committed to this worthy endeavour, and pledges to fulfil in all sincerity its heavy responsibility of the stewardship of the Conference at this important juncture.

"I extend my very best wishes to all delegates and earnestly hope for success in your undertakings."

This concludes the message.

I wish to pay a tribute of praise to my predecessor, Ambassador Pugliese of Italy. The month of February is an important month to set the course for our work during the whole year. Ambassador Pugliese, who presided during this crucial period, performed a marvellous task. Under his able leadership we can embark in our assignments with new determination. I would like to thank him also for the kind words and good wishes he addressed to me at the last plenary session. My task is to follow in his footsteps. May I ask for your kind co-operation so that I can fulfil my duty during the month of March.

This afternoon the Conference is honoured with the presence of two dignitaries. They are His Excellency Mr. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Vice-Chancellor and Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, and His Excellency Mr. Giulio Andreotti, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy. The Vice-Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Foreign Minister of Italy have been playing key roles in multilateral disarmament. We had the privilege of listening to their

(The President)

addresses in our session last year as well as at the special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the forty-third session of the United Nations General Assembly, and, as recently as in January, the Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The importance of their visit is enhanced in particular because it takes place at a time when the conference is engaged in an intensive negotiating effort to achieve a comprehensive chemical weapons ban. The two statesmen represent countries which have always played a significant role in the Conference through the well-known contributions of their delegations to our daily work. We are indeed grateful to them for their personal interest in the work of the Conference, and I wish to extend a most cordial welcome.

I now call upon his Excellency Mr. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Vice-Chancellor and Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, to address the Conference.

Mr. GENSCHER (Federal Republic of Germany) (translated from German): At this time of dynamic developments in the field of disarmament and arms control, the Geneva Conference on Disarmament has also acquired increased tasks and responsibility for ensuring the maintenance and safeguarding of peace world-wide. My friend Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti of Italy and I have decided to appear here jointly again in order to underscore the great importance attaching to this Conference as the global negotiating forum for arms control and disarmament. Above all, this Conference has the task of freeing mankind as quickly as possible from the threat of chemical weapons by concluding a convention that completely bans chemical weapons world-wide.

You, Mr. President, are known as an experienced and circumspect diplomat versed in multilateral disarmament negotiations. I wish you every success in your responsible post, and assure you of my delegation's support. May your presidency bring about a successful and decisive session.

The conditions for this are good. In many parts of the world, conflicts are now being defused, tensions eliminated, and confrontation replaced by agreed settlements. This dynamic peace process is made possible by no longer thinking in terms of confrontation and rivalry. Instead new thinking predicated on responsibility and co-operation is gaining the upper hand. This gives cause for optimism and confidence. But it should not prompt us to be complacent. We are all faced with global challenges. The effects of the North-South conflict and the consequences of the debt burden are problems confronting the whole of mankind. The destruction of the environment, of rain forests and of the ozone layer poses a threat to us all. Only jointly can we safeguard our future; everyone must participate in this undertaking. We are united in the quest for survival. Mankind has come to realize this.

These new recognitions also extend to the sphere of disarmament and arms control. New, co-operative thinking in West and East is beginning to prevail in this field, too. The reduction of military arsenals has at last become a real possibility. In the case of American and Soviet land-based intermediate-range systems people throughout the world are witnessing the elimination of an entire class of weapons. This is accompanied by unprecedented and exemplary rules of verification.

(Mr. Genscher, Federal Republic of Germany)

The Stockholm Document and the INF Treaty mark a historic turning point. The breakthrough in the INF sector must now be followed by progress in the other areas of disarmament and arms control. Never before have the conditions been as favourable for disarmament and arms control. The completion of the Vienna CSCE Follow-up Meeting opens up new avenues to a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe. Europe has the chance to create an exemplary order marked by a new political quality, collaboration and co-operative security. We must set standards of coexistence that have effects reaching beyond our continent.

In Vienna, the way has now been paved for two new sets of arms control negotiations. The aim of the negotiations on conventional forces is to achieve stability at a significantly lower level of armaments. It must be ensured that neither side is able to launch surprise attacks or large-scale offensives, which we for our part are already unable to do. In view of the existing disparities, equilibrium at a significantly lower level can only be achieved through asymmetrical disarmament. This means that the Eastern side must make larger disarmament steps than us. The unilateral reductions announced by the Soviet Union and subsequently by other members of the Warsaw Pact are important steps in the right direction, which we welcome. They do not eliminate the existing imbalances, but they show that the East is seriously seeking to move in the direction of Western ideas on conventional disarmament.

Confidence is a precondition of disarmament. Confidence is the product of openness and predictability. For this reason, the other forum established in Vienna for negotiations on new confidence-building measures in Europe is important. Neither weapons nor weapons reductions can on their own guarantee peace and stability. Lasting security presupposes that the two sides agree on the philosophies underlying their defence. In the forthcoming negotiations we therefore intend to achieve a common understanding to the effect that military forces should only exist to prevent war and ensure self-defence, not for the purpose of military aggression and not for the purposes of political or military intimidation.

In this nuclear age, a responsible security policy must be guided by the recognition that mankind can survive only through joint efforts. As realists, we are aware that today's security must not be based on visions and expectations for tomorrow. But as men of action as policy makers living up to their responsibility for the future, we must today develop perspectives for future security and lay foundations that are broader, firmer and stronger than those on which peace has rested until now. Over the net of deterrence by nuclear and conventional means as the final resort, we must spread an additional net which reduces the risks resulting from exclusive reliance on military deterrence. This requires the creation of reliable and co-operative security structures not only in Europe, but world-wide. Wherever disarmament and arms control are at issue in the world, it must be borne in mind that confidence-building paves the way to more disarmament. And disarmament in turn generates confidence. Let us set in motion this spiral of reason world-wide.

(Mr. Genscher, Federal Republic of Germany)

The INF Treaty has initiated a process which must become irreversible. Other steps must soon follow. The countries not possessing nuclear weapons will not allow the nuclear-weapon States to evade their commitment to nuclear disarmament, which they assumed before the rest of the world in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The constructive continuation and early successful completion of the United States-Soviet START negotiations are urgently needed for ensuring strategic stability at a lower level. The remaining gaps in the field of nuclear arms control must be closed. For this reason, we consider negotiations on short-range nuclear systems, as decided in the Western Alliance at Reykjavik in 1987, to be a top priority. We call for negotiations on these systems to be started without delay in accordance with the Reykjavik decisions; there are no reasonable grounds for not initiating such negotiations. We welcome the Soviet Union's readiness for negotiations of this kind. What we need are not firebreaks against new disarmament negotiations, but firebreaks to prevent an unbridled arms race. The Soviet Union, which has a great superiority in the field of short-range nuclear systems, could facilitate promising disarmament negotiations by offers of unilateral disarmament.

A Convention wholly banning biological weapons has existed since 1972. A shortcoming of this Convention is the lack of verification rules. I would therefore like to announce at this stage that at the third review conference in 1991 my Government will advocate adequate verification measures to supplement the Convention. I call upon all countries that have not yet done so to sign the Convention prohibiting biological weapons.

Mr. President, the most urgent contribution to disarmament expected of this Conference by the world is the elimination of a particularly cruel and insidious category of weapons of mass destruction: chemical weapons. In this respect, the multilateral disarmament process on a global scale is facing a crucial test. A year ago, I emphasized here, together with my colleague Mr. Andreotti from Italy, that the global, comprehensive and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons is a matter of the greatest urgency. Above all, we warned of the risk of proliferation of chemical weapons. Meanwhile it has become painfully clear how right that assessment was. The shock caused by the use of chemical weapons in the Gulf war led to the international community, on the suggestion of the American President and at the invitation of President Mitterrand, holding a conference in Paris on the prohibition of chemical weapons. At the Paris Conference high-level representatives from 149 countries jointly sought ways and means of putting an end to the use and spread of chemical weapons. The international community was at one in condemning chemical weapons. This permitted consensus on the Final Declaration of Paris, which demanded the early conclusion of a convention banning chemical weapons. We must now do justice to that call here in Geneva. Everyone's words must be followed by deeds.

In Paris, the recognition that only a comprehensive and global ban can solve the problem of chemical weapons gained considerable ground. As long as there are no peremptory rules of international law prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and transfer of chemical weapons, the risk of their unlawful use will persist. As long as national export controls

(Mr. Genscher, Federal Republic of Germany)

remain the only legal instrument for preventing the proliferation of chemical weapons, it will not be possible to rule out reliably any misuse of chemical substances and equipment allegedly supplied for peaceful purposes. As long as there is no international monitoring system that permits systematic on-site inspections at short notice, it will be hard to dispel any suspicion of the clandestine development and production of chemical weapons. And as long as the arsenals of chemical weapons are not eliminated world-wide, it will be almost impossible to obtain a voluntary renunciation of the capacity for chemical warfare, especially in areas of crisis.

More and more countries are trying to acquire with foreign assistance the capability for producing chemical weapons. Foreign companies, and unfortunately German ones as well, supply components and chemical precursors or provide the requisite know-how. The alarming proliferation of chemical weapons confronts all countries with a grave responsibility that no government can shirk. Particularly for our country this is a deeply moral matter, which directly affects the identity and credibility of our State.

The Federal Republic of Germany has renounced the production and use of chemical weapons through an internationally binding pledge. It is the only country thus far to subject its chemical industry to regular on-site inspections by an international agency. We consider it our duty to do everything humanly possible to prevent the participation of German companies and individuals in the production of these terrible weapons in other countries. Such participation is a crime and must be treated and punished as such. The laws and controls will be tightened. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has therefore responded to the recent occurrences with a series of measures, of which I would like to mention the main ones:

Firstly, we shall extend the authorization requirements for the export of technical documents and know-how. In future, the export of production and other technological documents, as well as the transfer of not generally accessible technical know-how to other countries in the world, will require authorization in all instances. Secondly, the authorization requirements for the export of precursors of chemical weapons will be extended from 8 to 17 substances. This will apply to exports to all countries without exception. Thirdly, it will be made obligatory, even before any export, to notify the production of equipment capable of being used for the purposes of chemical weapons. Fourthly, the criminal provisions governing violations of foreign trade and payments legislation are being tightened. Penalties of up to five years' imprisonment may be imposed. Fifthly, new provisions are being introduced which make it punishable for Germans to assist - in whatever manner, be it at home or abroad - in the production of chemical weapons facilities or the development and manufacture of chemical or biological weapons. This offence will be subject to not less than 2 and up to 15 years' imprisonment.

On 20 February of this year, the Council of Ministers of the European Community adopted on my initiative a regulation under article 113 of the EC Treaty which subjects to authorization the export of eight chemical substances suitable as precursors of chemical weapons. Our aim is to achieve

(Mr. Genscher, Federal Republic of Germany)

consensus within the European Community on considerably expanding this list so as to achieve the most comprehensive instrument possible for preventing the spread of precursors of chemical weapons. We are also striving together with our partners in European political co-operation to introduce mandatory authorization with regard to the export of facilities and equipment suited to the production of chemical weapons. It is our aim that such an agreement should as soon as possible be made binding on all 19 countries united in the "Australia Group". I appeal to the bodies that I have just mentioned to accord the highest priority to these measures. Every effort must be made to ensure that the chemical weapons production facilities now under construction are not completed.

However, on no account must we succumb to the illusion that national and international measures can effectively prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons, though such measures are at present greatly needed because this Conference has not yet concluded a convention fully banning chemical weapons world-wide. There is no alternative to a comprehensive, global and effectively verifiable convention which prohibits without restriction the development, production, possession, acquisition, transfer and use of chemical weapons and brings about the complete destruction of existing chemical weapons stocks under international supervision. The risk of proliferation will grow as long as this legal vacuum persists. It arouses the desire of those who do not possess chemical weapons. I strongly warn against confining the fight against chemical weapons to measures designed to prevent their spread. Such an approach would undermine the determination of the international community to effectively ban chemical weapons through a global, comprehensive convention.

On 18 April 1984 President Bush, then still Vice-President of the United States, rightly stated at this very Conference: "The essence of verification is deterrence of violations through the risk of detection." A global ban will only be effective if it is verifiable. In the matter of verifiability, especially in challenge inspections, the security interests of mankind must take precedence over the economic interests of companies that are worried about their business secrets. This must not be the hour of the pusillanimous who encumber the substance of the negotiations with more and more technical and legal problems and describe the verification issues as unsolvable. Time is pressing! The negotiations of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament on a convention that prohibits chemical weapons world-wide must therefore be brought to a successful conclusion at last.

In the Final Declaration of the Paris Conference, the countries participating in this Conference here were called on "to redouble their efforts, as a matter of urgency, to resolve expeditiously the remaining issues and to conclude the convention at the earliest date". This signal from Paris must be translated into practice here in Geneva. This imposes a duty on all negotiating delegations in this forum and on the Governments they represent. I wish Ambassador Morel as the new Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons every success in his new responsible post. I would also like to thank his predecessor, Ambassador Sujka, for his dedicated and purposeful conduct of the negotiations in 1988.

(Mr. Genscher, Federal Republic of Germany)

I share the expectation of the United Nations Secretary-General that the commitment expressed at such a high level in Paris will expedite the negotiations here. It is possible to solve the problems still obstructing the conclusion of a convention by the end of this year. This also applies to the subject of verification. The Final Document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, as well as the United States-Soviet INF Treaty, opened the door to a world in which systematic checks and mandatory challenge inspections play a natural confidence-building function. In the efforts towards chemical disarmament, too, the technical complexities of the verification issue must not become a pretext for deferring the solution of what is essentially a political problem.

As the outcome of many years of work by this Conference, an advanced draft convention is available, which also contains the fundamentals of a comprehensive verification régime. However, over the years this text has become more and more complicated. Some points are unclear or ambiguous, as inevitably results from different views at a particular time. It is now essential to consolidate the draft where consensus has already been achieved on substantive issues and, at the same time, to find suitable solutions to those questions still in abeyance.

During this year's round of negotiations, we must succeed in solving the main problems involved in the envisaged verification régime. While chairing the new Working Group on verification, my delegation will make special efforts to bring about consensual solutions to the outstanding verification issues. Above all, two important questions concerning the verification of a chemical weapons convention, namely the monitoring of non-production of chemical weapons and challenge inspections, have yet to be resolved. One of the most difficult tasks is that of reliably monitoring the chemical industry. It must be ensured that the permitted production of substances which are also suitable as precursors of chemical weapons exclusively serves peaceful purposes. This Conference has developed a graduated monitoring system to that end.

To supplement the measures already discussed for monitoring non-production, my delegation introduced during the last round of negotiations a concept for additional inspections at short notice in the form of ad hoc checks applicable to the entire chemical industry. With the aid of a simple analytical procedure, it is to be established whether any prohibited or undeclared substances are being manufactured at the time of the inspection. Such ad hoc checks are intended to supplement routine inspections and can be carried out without time-consuming, excessive interference with production processes. This new flexible instrument offers clear-cut advantages for the verification of a chemical weapons convention: even if there is no suspicion, the entire chemical industry is accessible to the inspectorate. With the aid of simple, scarcely intrusive checks, a high degree of transparency is achieved in what is at present a grey area. Therefore, these ad hoc checks ought to be acceptable to everyone.



(Mr. Genscher, Federal Republic of Germany)

However, mandatory challenge inspections remain indispensable as the main means of obtaining certainty in a specific case as to whether the convention is being complied with. They permit swift clarification in any case involving serious concern about security. This problem should be tackled as a matter of priority. The associated political and technical difficulties are well known but confidence-building, protection against violations of the convention and the protection of human life and dignity must take precedence. Absolutely nothing can justify the rejection of mandatory challenge inspections, and certainly not the business interests of individual companies.

Even before the convention is concluded, practical experience should be gathered so that its verification provisions can be made as realistic and effective as possible. We have therefore unreservedly welcomed the suggestion of trial inspections and have, like various other countries, declared our readiness to undergo such inspections. A few weeks ago, the Federal Republic of Germany carried out its first trial inspection in the form of a routine inspection at a facility of the civilian chemical industry. The results were encouraging. Our experience has convinced us that it is possible with the aid of routine inspections to ensure adequate monitoring of the non-production of prohibited substances.

As with routine inspections, we expect practical trials of ad hoc checks to yield important information. We are, therefore, at present preparing a trial inspection in the form of an ad hoc check at a major chemical plant. The chemical industry is receptive to this new verification instrument and its testing. We shall report in detail on the experience we gain. The exchange of experience here in Geneva on all national trial inspections will provide important information on how to improve the verification rules. It will also lay the basis for international trial inspections, which we shall gladly participate in. The German chemical industry will also make a plant available for that purpose.

The national or international trial inspections carried out or envisaged in many countries also reflect the growing openness and co-operation of countries in the field of chemical disarmament. This creates a new dimension of confidence, which is beneficial for the negotiations on a verifiable chemical weapons convention. The aim must be to achieve such a degree of monitoring that it is not possible for anyone to manufacture and stockpile militarily significant quantities of chemical weapons without being discovered.

We must reach agreement soon if we are to live up to our common responsibility for putting an end once and for all to the atrocities of chemical warfare. Given good will on the part of everyone concerned, this ought to be possible by the end of this year. I appeal to the world's scientists to refuse to participate in the development and production of these terrible weapons of mass destruction. I therefore address this urgent appeal to the Governments of the countries represented here: for the purpose of definitively eliminating these weapons, let us demonstrate maximum commitment, creativity and readiness for compromise. Let us make every effort to arrive as soon as possible at a convention that is ready for signature. We must not shatter the hopes of our nations. We must not cause the process of

(Mr. Genscher, Federal Republic of Germany)

disarmament, which is now under way on a broad basis, to founder on this decisive threshold. We all know that there are still difficult problems to be solved. But at this advanced stage, invoking those problems can no longer serve as a pretext for relaxing our efforts.

We must do everything possible to ensure at an early stage that countries which are not members of this Conference are suitably informed and become involved where appropriate. We must avoid a situation where, after this Conference has completed its work, individual countries refuse to accede to the convention on the grounds that they had insufficient opportunities to participate in drafting it. The requisite globality of the convention presupposes that the opportunities for participation open to all countries are actually used. We should therefore encourage all interested countries to take part as observers in the meetings of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. I expressly welcome the representatives of those countries who already perform this important task, and especially this session's newcomers.

Mr. President, we are in a position where we can make the vision of a world without chemical weapons become reality. You may rest assured that my delegation will continue to contribute actively to this endeavour. The obstacles on the path to a convention banning chemical weapons can now be surmounted. This lofty goal merits our full commitment. It is my most fervent wish that this Conference will prove an unqualified success.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Vice-Chancellor and Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany for his important contribution to the work of the Conference. In my capacity as the representative of Japan I would like to express our sincere gratitude to His Excellency for personally participating in representing your Government at the funeral of His late Majesty last week. I would also like to thank His Excellency for the very kind words you addressed to me.

I now call upon His Excellency Mr. Giulio Andreotti, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, to address the Conference.

Mr. ANDREOTTI (Italy) (translated from Italian): I am particularly pleased to address this gathering again, one year on, together with my friend, Mr. Genscher. The year has not passed in vain: in fact, the prospects for hope and peace have been reinforced.

Some of the most serious crises bequeathed to us by the previous decade seem to be gradually coming to an end, or at least their gravity seems to be decreasing. In the most bloody conflict of all, in the Gulf, a truce, although precarious, has been agreed upon. It is up to the two parties to bridge the gap still separating them from a veritable and durable peace. In Afghanistan the withdrawal of Soviet troops has removed one of the main obstacles to the solution of the crisis, but has also opened a phase of extreme uncertainty. Our commitment, the commitment of the European Community countries, is that of following the events carefully and providing our own political and material support for a peaceful transition.

(Mr. Andreotti, Italy)

Dialogue is continuing between the United States and the Soviet Union, substantially uninterrupted by the change of Administration in Washington. Following the entry into force of their agreement of 8 December 1987, we witnessed the elimination of a first contingent of highly sophisticated instruments of death, and this underlines even more clearly the innovative, I would even say revolutionary, nature of the agreement.

The CSCE Conference in Vienna has set new, historic and demanding goals in terms of security, human rights and freedom of expression and communication. In a very few days, negotiations will begin on conventional armed forces in Europe and confidence-building measures, which will be extremely important for the prospects of enhanced stability at decreasing levels of forces and for a gradual restructuring of all military deployments in accordance with defensive criteria.

Finally, the results of the Paris Conference of 7-11 January have vindicated the initiative taken by Mr. Genscher and myself in February 1988, when we pressed for a general commitment to intensified negotiations on a total ban on this kind of weapon. In Paris, we realized that the concerns we had expressed on that occasion were broadly shared by the international community. From that Conference, which was attended by practically every country in the world, there emerged a generalized rejection of chemical weapons and a firm commitment on the part of everyone to give a further boost to negotiations on a convention which would not only ban their use, but at last prohibit their development, production, possession and very existence.

Let us seize on this favourable opportunity that the political situation is offering us, which we may never be offered again, to stave off for ever the scourge of war in its most devastating forms. The Paris Conference reaffirmed the role of the United Nations and gave it renewed vigour, strengthening its monitoring powers and its political and moral authority which no one will wish to evade. It is now necessary to set up the procedures that will allow the Secretary-General to promptly and effectively act in the face of future allegations on the use of chemical weapons. The outcome of the Paris Conference will be measured above all in terms of your work. Hence the additional responsibility of this institution, which has to pursue concrete objectives in relation to peace and stability by proceeding towards the elimination of a whole class of weapons, as has already been done in the case of intermediate-range missiles.

Over-estimation of the requirements of one's own security hinders disarmament, while an imperfect knowledge of the capabilities and intentions of the other side fuels suspicion and mistrust. This is the main reason why it is so difficult to solve intricate problems in an area where the risk of violating commitments is increased by the many connections that exist between civilian production and potential military uses. Italy is endeavouring to enhance the role of the international scientific community, precisely to help solve the problems relating to verification and transparency.

(Mr. Andreotti, Italy)

We are firmly persuaded that only a global solution can root out the growing risk of proliferation of weapons which are not only deadly, but also hideous, in a context of rigorous verifiability that will deter violations. Italy neither possesses nor intends to develop chemical weapons, and does not host them on her soil. Our commitment to the rapid establishment of conditions which will persuade all countries to resolutely and effectively reject them, in line with the conclusions of the Paris Conference, is therefore all the more credible.

One of the main objectives, in our opinion, is the rapid neutralization of all existing stockpiles and production facilities. Their destruction should begin as soon as the future convention comes into force, at a faster pace in the case of the largest arsenals. I also believe that the storage depots and production plants should be immediately made subject to rigorous international monitoring, pending their total elimination.

All of us have appreciated the willingness of the Soviet Union to unilaterally begin the destruction of its large quantities of chemical weapons; our only regret is that this decision had not been taken earlier - for example, before the United States resumed production of such weapons after an interval of 17 years. We view the Soviet initiative, which in due course will have to be channelled into the verification procedures provided under the future convention, as a step in the right direction, to which the other great Power will certainly not remain insensitive.

We have already supplied information on Italy's production of substances relevant to the convention, and we are ready to participate in a wider and even more detailed and exhaustive exchange of data. Until a total ban is imposed, we are also willing to adopt further measures to check the export of chemicals that could be used for military purposes, as well as appropriate sanctions. Italian legislation is in fact one of the strictest in this regard. The more advanced industrial countries are duty-bound to act rigorously and consistently and co-ordinate their actions. We have stressed this need in multilateral forums, such as the Western European Union and the European Community.

We have also promoted a trial inspection in some Italian chemical plants by an international group of scientists, whose findings have just been made available to this institution. For this reason too, it is satisfying to note that the experimental method was recommended at the end of the most recent session of the Conference on Disarmament.

The countries most concerned, which certainly include Italy, could also promote and co-ordinate scientific initiatives that will help to settle the still unresolved issues in the negotiation; gather and disseminate useful information for effective implementation of the ban; and co-ordinate possible initiatives taken by the industrial associations of different countries in this particular field in order to increase public awareness of the risks proliferation entails.

(Mr. Andreotti, Italy)

Supported by an increasingly attentive public opinion, negotiations have now reached the point of no return, and this is likely to be a decisive year in overcoming the greatest obstacles. Hence the need to deal resolutely and in an open spirit with those aspects of the convention that still require further political and juridical development. I am referring specifically to non-production, the institutional aspects, challenge inspections, and the destruction of chemical weapons and their production facilities. Through serious debate, we have to resolve our existing differences and make a quantum leap forward without ignoring legitimate national concerns. For years now, the working group system has worked to everyone's satisfaction, and I am convinced that it will continue to do so in the light of the constructive changes recently adopted. However, we must also think in terms of restructuring some negotiating methods, so that we can more rapidly bridge the distance that still separates us from our goal.

A year ago, when I addressed this gathering, I suggested that a select working group should be given the task of identifying proposals to intensify the work of the Ad hoc Committee. I believe that this proposal is still worthy of careful consideration, and I wish to advance it once again today. In this context, it is first of all our view that the long intervals in the negotiating activity of the Committee should be reduced, so as to give the negotiations the necessary lasting impulse and an increased incisiveness. I consider very appropriate the creation of an ad hoc working group - as we had advocated - responsible for all verification aspects. To my mind, it is evident that, however complex this essential problem might be, it has to be dealt with comprehensively, not leaving the various aspects of it to be handled by different groups with little functional linkage between them.

While chemical weapons represent a priority issue, we are aware that the remit of the Conference on Disarmament comprises numerous other issues. On the subject of nuclear weapons, we cannot but welcome the progress recently made in the dialogue between the two leading Powers. The INF agreement is only a first step, but it also marks a historic new departure, and its implications for future agreements are already before our eyes. In this context, and also taking into consideration the approaching fourth review conference of the non-proliferation Treaty, the Italian Government hopes that negotiations will resume as soon as possible and will proceed rapidly towards their conclusion, with a view to achieving drastic reductions in strategic arsenals, in a framework of enhanced general stability.

The negotiations on nuclear tests which the United States and Soviet Union began in November 1987 also seem to be taking advantage of the favourable moment in the relations between these two countries. A process has been set in motion whose final outcome, though still far in the future, should be the total cessation of all nuclear tests, as an element of effective disarmament. In Geneva, much could be done to this effect. We regret that it has once again proven impossible to reach agreement on the procedures to be followed in order to open a substantive debate. A preliminary discussion is indispensable, designed to ascertain which of the various existing proposals or future initiatives could be conducive to substantive negotiations. In our view, such a debate would permit all countries to clarify their positions and identify the points of agreement and disagreement on the role that the Conference on Disarmament can play.

(Mr. Andreotti, Italy)

One of the final issues on which we are focusing our attention is the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Space is destined for peaceful activities, and its use or exploration must be for the benefit of all countries, whatever their level of economic and scientific development. Primary responsibility for seeking effective and verifiable agreements undoubtedly lies with the two leading Powers. I believe that both of them, like all of us, are fully aware that unrestrained competition in this field would eventually prove to be a costly and unproductive enterprise. The bilateral negotiations being conducted in Geneva, although complex and sensitive, suggest that a constructive approach will be pursued. We would wish to encourage the United States of America and the Soviet Union to reach an agreement which will safeguard strategic stability and foster co-operation, in the context of rigorous respect for existing agreements.

The current debate on this subject at the Conference on Disarmament is still in a preliminary phase: recently, however, it has been possible to make a detailed examination of issues of quite considerable importance: for example, the applicable legal régimes, terminology, and identifying activities conducted in space. This gathering can play a role of prime importance with regard to this problem, while making due allowances for the fact that many and diverse political, strategic and technological requirements converge, sometimes contradictorily. However, it is a sector of activity of enormous relevance to the peaceful future of mankind, and will require increased commitment on the part of us all.

We may wonder whether that disturbing state of international relations, hovering between impossible peace and improbable war, which has dominated the post-war period, is now drawing to an end. Some of the constraints, including psychological ones, which have been weighing heavily on our destinies and creating a world in which vast political and economic resources have been squandered by rivalry and mutual suspicion, are beginning to fade. The United Nations is the workshop where a new form of coexistence is being fashioned.

Andrei Sakharov, who was a guest in Italy a few weeks ago, had this to tell us:

"Progress has provided surprising answers to social problems. But we must tread carefully, because the enormous growth in technology is creating new threats to mankind: ecological disaster and nuclear conflict. There can be no solution to these problems unless there is ever broader international agreement."

Your commitment is vital to removing some of the barriers that still separate us from this better world. I will therefore conclude by wishing you every success in your work during the year which has just begun, and which already holds out great expectations.

Before leaving this gathering I would like to express my most heartfelt congratulations to Ambassador Yamada, who has assumed the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of March, and wish him every success in the fulfilment of his task.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy for his important contribution to the work of the Conference. I would also like to thank Your Excellency for the very kind words you addressed to me.

I have no other speakers on my list for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage?

I will now proceed with our regular business. The secretariat has agreed today, at my request, to circulate an informal paper containing the timetable of meetings of the Conference and its subsidiary bodies for the week 6-10 March. As usual, the timetable is merely indicative and subject to change, if need be. If I see no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: As I have no other business for today, I now intend to adjourn this plenary meeting, but before doing so I would like to thank all the delegations, and in particular Ambassador García Robles, Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, and Mr. Gomaa, Chairman of Working Group 2 of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, for their co-operation in accommodating the change of plenary schedule to this afternoon.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 7 March, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 4.40 p.m.

# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.492  
7 March 1989

ENGLISH

---

## FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND NINETY-SECOND PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 7 March 1989, at 10 a.m.

President:        Mr. Chusei Yamada        (Japan)



The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 492nd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

First of all, I should like to inform the members of the Conference that at today's plenary meeting we have among us the participants in the Conference on "The United Nations Role in Disarmament and the Peaceful Settlement of Conflicts - From a Women's Perspective" who are following our discussions in the public gallery. The representatives of women from all over the world are gathering here in the Palais. Their conference is being held on the occasion of International Women's Day, which is to be celebrated tomorrow. On behalf of the Conference, I thank them for their interest in the work of our Conference and extend to them our cordial welcome. They have addressed a message to the Conference. As we have done previously, I should like to invite the Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to read out the message for the information of the members and for the Conference's record.

Mr. KOMATINA (Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations): The message addressed to the Conference on Disarmament read as follows:

"We have gathered once again in Geneva to mark International Women's Day, and take the opportunity to wish the Conference members all success in their work during the 1989 session.

"As organizations, we work to promote women's involvement in disarmament and to ensure that women have a meaningful role in determining the future of humanity. Through the efforts of all peoples and Governments world-wide, we hope to see rapid advancement toward achieving disarmament.

"We believe that the current international climate provides historic opportunities for the resolution of international problems, and we also welcome the developments that have taken place during the past months. Amongst them are the conclusion of the INF agreement, the Final Declaration of the Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons and the concluding document of the Vienna follow-up meeting in the framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.

"The participants in the Paris Conference stressed the urgency of concluding a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. Although some obstacles still remain, we urge all the participating States to do their utmost to expedite the negotiations. We would like to see a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and their destruction before the end of this year.

"The Brundtland Commission Report on environment and development highlights the imperative need to reallocate global resources for the preservation of the environment and to fulfil the basic human needs of peoples throughout the world. While 30 children die of hunger every

(Mr. Komatina, Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations)

minute, \$1.8 million is spent on global military expenditures. We believe that global priorities must be altered and resources must be applied for the betterment of humankind.

"The lasting significance of arms control and disarmament agreements depends upon our ability to bring an end to the arms race. New quantitative and qualitative enhancements to current weapons arsenals can render the achievements of existing agreements obsolete.

"It is for this reason that we continue to place the highest priority upon the negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty as an important step towards significant and enduring disarmament measures. We urge the Conference on Disarmament to pursue a CTBT as a matter of the highest priority, and to establish an ad hoc committee to this end at the earliest possible date.

"We will continue to follow the work of the Conference on Disarmament with deep interest, and assure you of our support for all genuine disarmament efforts."

This ends the message.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Secretary-General of the Conference for reading out the message addressed to us by the non-governmental representatives taking part in the Conference on "The United Nations Role in Disarmament and the Peaceful Settlement of Conflicts - From a Women's Perspective". On behalf of the Conference, I thank the participants in that conference for transmitting to us their valuable views on the important matters of disarmament, and extend to them our very best wishes for the success of their conference.

In conformity with its programme of work, the Conference starts today its consideration of agenda item 5, entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". However, in accordance with rule 30 of its rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference. I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Canada, Peru and Australia. I now call upon the representative of Canada, Ambassador Marchand.

Mr. MARCHAND (Canada) (translated from French): It is an honour for me and for my country to take the floor this morning in the presence of the women whom you greeted at the beginning of the meeting. If you will allow me, I should like to associate myself with your words in wishing these women all the success they deserve during their conference here, and I wish also to pay tribute to this presence, renewed from one year to the next, the dynamism of the action of these women and also their serious-mindedness. Allow me also to adopt the approach of brevity urged on us by our former colleague Ambassador Butler of Australia in welcoming all our newly arrived colleagues in this Conference.

(Mr. Marchand, Canada)

In my initial plenary statement of the current session, I would like to begin by stressing that Canada shares the generally hopeful assessment, already expressed by most preceding speakers, that our session is being held at a particularly propitious time, when new, encouraging prospects appear to be opening up in international relations, including in the disarmament field. I would begin by recalling the generally positive atmosphere that attached to SSOD-III, even though it ended without agreement on a substantive document. This positive atmosphere was even more perceptible during the forty-third United Nations General Assembly, in the First Committee, which Canada had the honour to chair. When the representative of the USSR addressed the final meeting of the First Committee on 30 November on behalf of the Group of Socialist States, I suspect he spoke for us all when he noted that, as never in the past, the Committee's work had been promoted by a positive international political climate. The number of resolutions and decisions adopted increased over the forty-second General Assembly, and so also did the number of consensus resolutions. The other major development was, of course, the January Paris Conference on the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the Final Declaration of which was officially presented to us on 7 February by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, His Excellency Roland Dumas. Most importantly, there was the successful conclusion last month of the Vienna Follow-up Meeting of the CSCE. This included the major decision to open two new negotiations relating to conventional armed forces in Europe. Little wonder that we should therefore be beginning our work for this session with heightened expectations of further progress.

That being noted, however, we should not allow too great a sense of euphoria to blind us to the very difficult outstanding issues that still confront us in relation to each of the eight substantive items on our agenda. When I first spoke in plenary, last year, on 10 March, I emphasized the fundamental importance attached by Canada to an element that must characterize both the bilateral process and our multilateral work, namely effective verification achieved through efficient, agreed implementation mechanisms. I further suggested that, to maintain confidence in compliance, precise and often intrusive verification provisions are a necessary and central element of politically viable arms control and disarmament agreements. The Canadian Government is still of that view, a view which I hope all of us share. If this is so, then all of us must also agree that, particularly in the context of our ongoing work on a chemical weapons convention, we must give intensified effort to resolving outstanding issues to formulate verification measures which will be both practical and effective.

In a few moments' time I shall speak in greater detail about some of our specific concerns relating to chemical weapons, outer space and a nuclear test-ban treaty; but before doing so I would like to support our colleagues Ambassador von Stülpnagel of the Federal Republic of Germany and Ambassador de Rivero of Peru, who on 16 and 28 February last invited us to consider focusing our work somewhat more on those aspects of it where lie the best chances of making genuine progress. I realize, of course, that each of the items on our programme of work has its own intrinsic value. Moreover, there is none among those items that does not find particular support among at least some of the countries which participate in our work. Nevertheless,

(Mr. Marchand, Canada)

because of their subject-matter, in some cases, or because of the views about them held by some countries in other cases, not all are equally amenable to productive negotiation at this stage. Perhaps we should therefore spend more of our collective time and efforts, both of which are clearly finite and are already stretched almost to breaking-point, on areas such as a chemical weapons convention, where we are slowly but surely progressing and where virtually all sovereign States have specifically requested us to redouble our efforts. For these same reasons, I also share Ambassador von Stülpnagel's reservations about any possible expansion in the number of items with which we are seized. No doubt there are other subjects of importance to which the Conference on Disarmament could give attention: but not, I would suggest, until we have been successful in disposing of at least some of those already on our plates.

(continued in English)

Now I would like to address in more detail three among our agenda items which are of particular concern to Canada: items 1, 4 and 5. I shall speak only briefly about item 1, a nuclear test ban. It is a subject where the views of all among us have already been clearly stated; moreover it is one where responsibility for real movement forward lies ultimately with the nuclear-weapon States. It is they who must be persuaded that a régime providing for a comprehensive ban on testing can be in their own national security interest. They also must have a key role in determining the possibilities for devising verification measures in which we all can have real confidence. To this end, it is important that the bilateral dialogue and joint experimentation on nuclear test verification between the United States and the USSR continue and that it make progress toward further agreed test limitations. In the meantime, other States which strongly favour a comprehensive test ban, such as Canada, must do what they can to advance this process.

One area in which we have considered for many years that we could make a national contribution of genuine worth has been the area of verification. This commitment was re-emphasized by the Government of Canada in December of 1986 when, in response to one of the recommendations in an earlier joint Canadian House of Commons and Senate committee report supporting the need for adequate means of verification as a way of pursuing arms control, the Government confirmed that "through the work of the Verification Research Unit" of the Department of External Affairs it would be "advancing practical suggestions for verification procedures". Many of you will already have seen some of the numerous papers and research documents in various fields that we have already produced and circulated to you.

Of particular relevance to our work in relation to agenda item 1 was our participation in the international seismic data exchange experiment that was conducted late in 1984. We followed that up with a workshop on the exchange of seismic wave-form data held in Ottawa in October 1986. Since then we have been devoting part of our resources, along with other Canadian governmental agencies, to upgrading and modernizing the Yellowknife Seismic Array, an internationally recognized facility which, when that modernization programme

(Mr. Marchand, Canada)

is completed later this year, will constitute a world-class facility which we hope will serve as a prototype for other international stations to be developed to participate in an international seismic data network.

In one of my plenary statements last year, in which I also referred to the Yellowknife Seismic Array, I mentioned that in the autumn of this year Canada would be hosting a technical workshop in Yellowknife. Members of the Group of Scientific Experts will be invited to the official opening of the Array at that time. The occasion will include reporting on and discussion of Canadian research on nuclear test ban verification, as well as informal discussions of preparations for the forthcoming large-scale data exchange experiment which is being co-ordinated by the Canadian representative to the Group of Scientific Experts. In fact the Canadian representative will be extending the invitation to participants at its present meeting, which started yesterday and runs until 17 March.

Before leaving the subject of a comprehensive test ban I would be remiss not to say something, also, about the proposal to convene an amending conference of the partial test-ban Treaty, with the objective of somehow finding agreement to convert it into a comprehensive test ban. Clearly such a conference could be convened (I understand that at least 34 among the required 38 requests have already been received by the depositaries). But to what avail? It is evident that amendment of the partial test-ban Treaty as proposed will not obtain the assent of all three of the nuclear States who are original parties to the Treaty, as required for any amendment to come to effect. Moreover, not all among the present nuclear Powers are parties to the Treaty. For this and other reasons, including difficult issues such as comprehensive test ban verification which remain to be resolved, we in Canada therefore see little benefit in such an exercise. Further, we remain convinced that direct negotiations constitute the only practical means of achieving a comprehensive, genuinely verifiable test ban. We at the Conference on Disarmament might make our best contribution by reaching agreement on a mandate for establishing an ad hoc committee. There are practical things we could be doing, and Canada would welcome our beginning to work in this area on the basis of the suggested mandate in CD/863 of 23 August 1988, as proposed by our former colleague, Czechoslovak Ambassador Vejvoda.

Now let me turn to our agenda item 5, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. It seems to us that in our consideration of item 5 we are perhaps too often overly selective in our focus. Given the importance of the use of space for the present and future development of mankind, it is clearly of particular importance for us to give serious thought to one very broad and somewhat imprecise issue - namely, the relationship between international security, on the one hand, and the uses of space, on the other. Both of the two elements that comprise this relationship deserve greater conceptual thought, as does the relationship itself.

International security in this context relates not only to the absence of weapons as such in outer space. The responsibility of the two major space Powers, both to themselves and to the rest of us, is to maintain a stable

(Mr. Marchand, Canada)

controlled relationship between themselves. We, in the multilateral area, must not forget this point. That is why this delegation has emphasized both that we must take great care to ensure that the results of our work will enhance stability, rather than detract from it, and that our negotiations complement the bilateral negotiations that are taking place between the two major space powers.

We must also consider the actual use being made of outer space. Until recently, space activities have been effectively dominated by the two major space Powers. They have allocated huge resources and developed revolutionary technologies with the goal of managing their strategic relationship to which I have just referred. That situation is, however, now changing every day. One of the specific challenges for the multilateral disarmament world will be not only to put technological developments in space to good use but, even more important, to come to a common understanding as to what such "good use" is.

The point of the foregoing is to underline our contention that the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space should give much more attention to the basic framework involved in the use of space: to strengthen the current régime, to agree on the definition of key terms, to clarify the issue of stability and, in general, thereby to set up a solid foundation to guide our work in the coming years. I would further contend that this is one area where multilateral efforts would be particularly appropriate.

This exhortation, that we seek better to set out the essential parameters of our work in this field, is not to say that the Ad hoc Committee (once it is established) should not also focus on particular questions. In that regard, we in Canada continue to believe, with respect to the registration Convention, that it would be a helpful confidence-building measure were the parties to provide more timely and specific information concerning the functions of the satellites they launch, including whether specific satellites are intended to fulfil civilian, military or combined functions.

As a member of the Conference on Disarmament with a special interest in progress in this field, and as, moreover, this year's co-ordinator for the Western Group, we in the Canadian delegation had hoped that the ad hoc committee on item 5 could have been established this time with a minimum of procedural wrangling. This has not proved to be so, but my delegation regards the attention being given to this item as a hopeful indication of our shared desire to look seriously at what is involved in the prevention of an arms race in outer space and, through our collective work, make some gains in pursuit of that objective.

Before I leave this item, I would like to inform the Conference that our Verification Research Unit has already completed the preparation of a single-volume outer space compendium covering all the statements made during the course of our 1988 sessions and including all the working papers that were issued. This document, which we hope will prove a useful working tool and point of reference for our future use, was distributed by the secretariat on 28 February under cover of CD/891 dated 22 February.

(Mr. Marchand, Canada)

Finally, let me turn to the fourth subject on our agenda, chemical weapons. Here too we have papers to distribute, which we hope will also prove useful to you. One is the first issue in a new series which we will be preparing of arms control verification occasional papers. It is entitled "International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards: Observations on lessons for verifying a chemical weapons convention". Others among these occasional papers will be issued periodically. They are primarily intended for a specialist audience, and they represent the results of selected independent research undertaken by our Verification Research Programme. For this reason the views expressed in them are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Canadian Government. The second set of papers we have to distribute is a three-volume compendium on chemical weapons covering our 1988 session. The volumes cover plenary statements (PVs), plenary working papers (WPs) and Ad hoc Committee papers (CD/CW/WPs). I would draw to your attention that several Ad hoc Committee papers which were tabled after the close of the 1988 formal session in September 1988 are not included in the third volume. We hope to receive these volumes from Canada any day now and will distribute them to you soon afterwards.

This leads me to the more substantive remarks on our work on chemical weapons with which I would like to conclude this statement. Essentially they comprise a reiteration of some of our long-standing concerns about difficult aspects of our work that nevertheless must be resolved if ever we are to succeed. As I have already stated, probably the single most important task before us, without which we can never hope to find broad support for any convention, is to establish an agreed and effective verification framework. In the words of the Paris Conference Final Declaration, the convention must be "global and comprehensive and effectively verifiable". In our view, to be effective, the verification régime must be practical. It must use resources efficiently and at a tolerable cost. In this context you may recall that on 31 March last year Canada circulated CD/823, a working paper which examined factors involved in determining verification inspectorate personnel and resource requirements. We are at present working on a follow-up paper, examining the cost implications of establishing inspectorate, which we hope to be able to provide to you later this year. Again, our purpose is to advance the process of discussing this crucial aspect of our work on verification in the chemical weapons convention context.

If we are to make further progress, it will be important for us to come to grips with those important problems which still lie ahead that have a political as well as technical dimension. One is challenge inspections: here, notwithstanding what appears to be a general acceptance, at least in principle, of this concept, a number of States still seem to have difficulties in accepting the degree of intrusion which will be needed to make challenge inspection an effective verification measure. Another thorny issue is that of the composition of and the powers to be assigned to the proposed Executive Council. Here we will have to reach agreement among a number of hard choices about the degree of authority this organ will require in order to supervise implementation of the convention and how to hold it accountable for its action. How to select its members has also still to be settled. There remain still other problems. Articles X and XI are particularly sensitive: but

(Mr. Marchand, Canada)

solutions that fully respect the concerns of the various participants in the negotiations on them ought to be available: it will be a matter of making the necessary choices, keeping in mind that our overall objective is an effective convention. On undiminished security during the transition period, the problem is different: we do not yet have sufficiently clear ideas of what the concerns of some among us about this matter really are. But, if we can resolve related outstanding issues respecting the principles and order of destruction, surely some of those concerns will be alleviated. Another, different but still difficult, issue is that of confidentiality. It is of especial interest for countries with highly developed chemical industries operating in a highly competitive international environment, and whose legitimate commercial concerns must be taken into account.

There are other aspects of our work on a chemical weapons convention which can best be dealt with by experts. Perhaps the most important issues in this sense relate to definitions and criteria under article II and to the content and number of the schedules to be required under article VI. Among those inputs required from legal experts there are two of particular concern to Canada. One is the need for us to consider the meaning of the phrase "jurisdiction and control", a phrase that gives rise to issues of extra-territoriality. Canada would prefer that this phrase be deleted from the text and that more specific wording could be found to describe a signatory's obligations. Another relates to article XII, where for now I will merely recall the Canadian suggestion, made last August, that this separate article may not in fact be required.

Another important point I wish to register relates to suggestions which have been made, here and at the Paris Conference, to the effect that conclusion of a convention on chemical weapons should be conditional on progress in nuclear arms control. The Canadian Government emphatically disagrees. A complete ban on chemical weapons is desirable in itself. It is, in the Canadian view, in the interest of countries of all regions. It should not be conditional on progress in other areas.

My list of outstanding "difficult" issues is by no means exhaustive. Nor is it intended in any way to downplay the importance of others which I have not cited. My purpose has been, rather, to remind us that more than mere good will and the intention to work harder will be required from us if we are to make the sort of progress at this session which both the General Assembly and the Paris Conference have called for.

In concluding, I am pleased to be able to tell this Conference that Canada will be joining those member States that have already carried out or plan to carry out trial inspections. We will provide the results as soon as they become available.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Marchand of Canada for his statement. The next speaker is the representative of Peru, Ambassador de Rivero.



Mr. de RIVERO (Peru) (translated from Spanish): May I say, Mr. President, how pleased my delegation feels to see you presiding over the Conference on Disarmament this month? You are a distinguished representative of a great nation that has historical links with my country. I have no doubt you will make a valuable contribution to guiding our work, and I should also like to take this opportunity to express my delegation's appreciation to the distinguished Ambassador of Italy, Mr. Aldo Pugliese, for the excellent work he did in the same post last month.

As representatives of various women's non-governmental organizations in favour of the role of women for peace in this present-day world are present in this room, I should also like to greet them and congratulate them on their work. I should also like to take advantage of the fact that I have the floor and that tomorrow is International Women's Day, which should not be interpreted to mean that my wife will not let me speak tomorrow, but that tomorrow there is no plenary, to congratulate all the ladies members of our delegations, the ladies members of the secretariat, of the services, the ladies present here.

I should like this time to refer to agenda item 1, relating to the total cessation of nuclear tests. As I said on another occasion, the paralysis of the Conference in this respect is, regrettably, striking proof of its limitations in providing an appropriate response to the imperative that stems from the world-wide clamour to ban all nuclear tests once and for all. For over 25 years this sole multilateral negotiating forum has shown a certain inability to arrive at a consensus formula which will allow discussion with a view to the holding of multilateral negotiations on a treaty prohibiting this. I am not going to recapitulate the most important episodes in this unconsummated tale. However, it is proper to recall that the bilateral negotiations that have been conducted since 1977 by the States depositaries of the partial test-ban Treaty have certainly opened up an unprecedented possibility to chart the correct course, which has regrettably not been realized as a result of disagreements concerning the priority to be given to this issue within the process of nuclear disarmament.

It was this realization of the lack of political will and the paralysis of the Conference on Disarmament that in 1985 prompted Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Sri Lanka and Yugoslavia to place before the United Nations General Assembly a draft resolution which recommended that the contracting parties to the 1963 Treaty should carry out urgent consultations as to the advisability of convening a conference to amend this multilateral instrument by extending the test ban to underground areas, thus making it absolute and total. Three years later and in view of the continued stagnation in the Conference on Disarmament, despite the favourable reaction of the majority of its members to the draft mandate submitted by the Group of 21 (CD/829), these same five States, in the welcome company of Venezuela, were compelled on 5 August last year to submit to the States depositaries of the 1963 Treaty a request for the convening of such a conference, together with a specific proposal which appears in document CD/852.

(Mr. de Rivero, Peru)

As the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico pointed out in his statement on 8 February last, the amendment proposal originally formulated by these six States has been widely welcomed, to the point where it now has around 33 co-sponsors, which shows how much a measure of this type is desired. In other words, we are very close to the threshold of 39 contracting parties required to set in motion the procedure described in article II of that international instrument, which permits the initiation of negotiations proper.

A new avenue has been opened since 1985 and is being consolidated in 1988. It would be impossible to understand or explain if the Conference on Disarmament had already shouldered its responsibilities with regard to item 1 of its agenda, the first item. Unfortunately it has not done so, and now we see this sole multilateral negotiating forum facing the imminent risk of letting the urgent question of the total cessation of nuclear tests elude its grasp. But what is important is not the means but the end.

Last year we celebrated the twentieth anniversary of the opening for signature of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This is far and away the international instrument that has the greatest number of parties. There are about 140 States parties, Peru being one of the 58 countries that signed it at the very moment it was opened for signature, on 1 July, and the 28th to become a contracting party, even before two of the three depositary States. With these credentials in hand, in addition to the status as a contracting party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco from 4 March 1969, I think it is proper for me to make some comments on this today. Firstly, my delegation reaffirms my country's support for that international instrument, and stresses its importance for the maintenance of international peace and security. Like any human endeavour the NPT is not a perfect multilateral instrument. However, it is an important landmark in collective multilateral efforts to curb horizontal nuclear proliferation and reverse vertical proliferation. From the standpoint of history as it might have been, the treaty might perhaps have been better, especially as regards the provisions of article VI, concerning the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. But this was not the case, and what we need to do now is to strengthen it, seeking full compliance with all the obligations entered into by the parties.

Secondly, while the NPT has to date not achieved the universality initially sought, it is none the less true that it has provided a bulwark against the temptation of covert horizontal proliferation, which has undeniable repercussions in the regional context. Of course, an additional effort is still required. It is also clear that a very important role is being played here by the trade policies of the supplying countries - this is very important - whose indulgence at a certain point rendered a disservice to the cause of nuclear non-proliferation.

One last comment relates to the limited results that have been obtained both in nuclear co-operation between States parties and in the realization of a fundamental aspiration shared by all - the cessation of nuclear testing once and for all. In respect of article IV, there is a need to give a new impetus to technical and scientific assistance to developing countries which are

(Mr. de Rivero, Peru)

contracting parties to the NPT so that they can reduce their budgets for training of technical personnel, and also make better use of the many benefits of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

As for the question of a nuclear test ban, it might be a happy coincidence for the convening of the conference to amend the 1963 Moscow Treaty to precede the holding of the fourth NPT review conference, which is scheduled for mid-1990. If so, if that happens, my delegation deems it perfectly legitimate to hope that the two ad hoc forums might crystallize converging processes aimed at providing a definitive reply to the universal aspiration for the prohibition of all nuclear testing. Another development of great significance might be the happy conclusion next year of an agreement between the two big Powers providing for substantial reductions in their strategic arsenals in accordance with a timetable and in association with restrictions on the modernization of the remaining nuclear weapons. We are not unaware of the technical and political implications that both objectives involve. However, the possibility of success is inherent in the logic that made feasible the signature and entry into force of the Washington Treaty for the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range nuclear missiles.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador de Rivero of Peru for his statement and for the very kind words he addressed to me and to my country. The next speaker is the representative of Australia. I give the floor to Ambassador Reese.

Mr. REESE (Australia): As this is the first time I have taken the floor at this Conference, I would like to thank colleagues who have welcomed me in their statements and assure them that Australia will continue to play the active role in this Conference which Australia played under my predecessor.

I am also pleased, Mr. President, that I make my first statement while you are in the chair, and in the presence of participants in the Conference entitled "The United Nations Role in Disarmament and the Peaceful Settlement of Conflicts - From a Women's Perspective", which is being held on the occasion of International Women's Day to be celebrated tomorrow.

While it is my intention to address particular items on our agenda as the session progresses, I have asked for the floor today to bring to the attention of the Conference on Disarmament an important arms control initiative of the Australian Government.

The Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Senator Gareth Evans, announced today, 7 March, that Australia will host a major international chemical weapons conference later this year. The conference will bring together Governments and representatives of the international chemical industry to discuss the growing problem of the international trade in feedstocks, plant and equipment which are to be used for chemical weapons purposes. The initiative follows discussions between Australian and United States officials, and between Senator Evans and the United States Secretary of State, Mr. James Baker, about how best to build on

(Mr. Reese, Australia)

the momentum generated by the Paris Conference on chemical weapons in January. The date of the conference, and details relating to participation in it, are still to be finalized.

In his announcement Senator Evans said that for some time Australia had been actively developing measures to address the problem of the spread of chemical weapons. Since 1985, Australia had brought together representatives of industrial nations which export certain relevant chemicals, to ensure that their industries were not associated, even inadvertently, with the production of chemical weapons. This group, which met regularly in Paris, has now become known as the Australia Group.

Australia has had a productive dialogue with other Governments and the chemical industry for some time, including as leader of the Australia Group, on how best to advance the objective of preventing the spread of chemical weapons while not impeding the legitimate activities of the civil chemical industry. One clear lesson from these discussions has been the need to work closely with the chemical industry. Senator Evans said that the proposed conference - designed to bring together Governments and chemical industry representatives in a joint problem-solving dialogue - would benefit from the background of close relations which have developed between the Australian chemical industry and the Australian Government. Australia sees the purposes of the Conference as being supportive of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament for a comprehensive and universal ban on chemical weapons. The chemical weapons convention remains Australia's priority objective.

I will ask the secretariat that the full text of Senator Evans' statement be circulated as a document of the Conference.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Reese of Australia for his statement and for the very kind words he addressed to me. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other member wish to take the floor at this stage? I recognize the representative of the Netherlands, Ambassador van Schaik.

Mr. van SCHAIK (Netherlands): The reason that I wish to say a few words is that today we are honoured with the presence of special guests. Many of them have come a long way. You yourself have mentioned in particular the presence of representatives to the Conference on "The United Nations Role in Disarmament and the Peaceful Settlement of Conflicts - From a Women's Perspective."

Let me say how much my delegation appreciates the fact that non-governmental delegations, as well as private citizens - women and men - pay attention to our work. The interest they express today will one day transform itself into opinions and advice. Without the people's advice, we run the risk of becoming mandarins, whose wisdom may have too little to do with the outside world. And, speaking for a moment only of our female

(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

visitors, I recall the words of one of the first suffragettes, Emmeline Pankhurst, who in 1908, speaking from a dock in London, said: "We are here not because we are law-breakers; we are here in our efforts to become lawmakers". Mr. President, let it be so.

We here in this august hall are sitting far away from those who observe us from above. That is quite a difference with the setting a few hundred yards from here, where, in the human rights Commission, it is difficult for delegates not to stumble over the body of a representative of a non-governmental organization or a journalist of some sort. Styles differ, and each has its merits. But wherever they may be, on the upper gallery, in the lobby or on the floor, my delegation wishes to assure those who follow our debate that, outside of this room, my delegation is always ready for substantive discussion of themes that bring us here together.

Forgive me for this brief excursion into an area that is not normally the subject of our discussions. Our relations with the outside world are perhaps an under-exposed subject that requires a more serious debate, but today I wanted to limit myself to these words of welcome to the audience above us. I hope soon to make a somewhat more substantive contribution to our debate. Since this is the first time I have taken the floor this month, I wish to say how much my delegation appreciates seeing you in the Chair. Japan is a country whose deep interest in, and involvement with, matters of disarmament we admire. Your own dedication and personal interest, supported by a lucid mind, give us great confidence in your leadership. I also wish to thank the President for the month of February, Aldo Pugliese, for the excellent way in which he has tacked over the wild waves of the always difficult first month of a year's session.

To conclude, I also wish to welcome colleagues who have arrived since I spoke last. I wish them success in their endeavours, here and elsewhere, and I hope they will enjoy their participation in this Conference as much as I have done and still do.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador van Schaik of the Netherlands for his statement, and for the very kind words he addressed to me and to my country. Does any other member wish to take the floor?

If no other member wishes to take the floor, I should like to inform you that my consultations on the establishment of an ad hoc committee under agenda item 5, entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space", are proceeding. I will again take up this matter with the co-ordinators at our regular meeting tomorrow, in order to establish whether we have consensus on this matter. If this is so, then I intend to put before the Conference, for decision, a draft mandate for the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee and, at the same time, we shall take up requests from non-members to participate in the work of the Ad hoc Committee.

Distinguished delegates, you are aware that our meetings schedule is quite congested. In order to accommodate the increased requirements for meetings, in particular those of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, we

(The President)

must make the best use of the conference services made available to us. Short plenaries should be followed by meetings of the subsidiary bodies. In order to programme those meetings in an organized manner, we need to know the length of the plenary meetings in advance. I would therefore like to request you to register your names not later than midday Wednesday when you plan to address the plenary in the following week - that is to say, please register by noon tomorrow if you wish to speak in the plenary either on Tuesday or Thursday next week. This is by no means intended to set a deadline; each delegation has the right to request the floor at the last minute - I simply ask for your understanding and co-operation so that we can better organize our meetings.

I have no other business for today, and I now intend to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 9 March 1989, at 10.a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.10 a.m.

# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.493  
9 March 1989

ENGLISH

---

FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND NINETY-THIRD PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Thursday, 9 March 1989, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Chusei Yamada (Japan)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 493rd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference will continue today its consideration of agenda item 5, entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". However, in accordance with rule 30 of its rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

In connection with the agenda item under consideration today, I am happy to inform you that agreement has been reached at informal consultations on the mandate and the Chairman for the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. Accordingly, I shall put before the Conference for adoption today a draft decision on the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee, the appointment of the Chairman and also draft decisions on requests from non-members to participate in the work of the Conference.

At the meeting of co-ordinators yesterday we agreed, for practical reasons, to dispense with the procedure of first holding an informal meeting to discuss these questions. Therefore, we shall take up these matters at this plenary meeting once the list of speakers has been exhausted.

I have on my list of speakers today the representative of Mongolia. You have the floor, Sir.

Mr. BAYART (Mongolia): Mr. President, I would like to say how pleased I am to see you in the Chair. I am confident that your calm candour and oriental wisdom, along with your great diplomatic skills, will enable you to steer successfully the work of the Conference on Disarmament for this month. I would like to thank Ambassador Pugliese of Italy, who as your predecessor in this high post has given a good start to our 1989 session. I also take this opportunity to extend my delegation's warm welcome to the new representatives of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Burma, India, Belgium, the German Democratic Republic, Sweden, Australia, Kenya, Pakistan, Algeria and Czechoslovakia. I assure them the co-operation of the Mongolian delegation.

The 1989 session of the Conference on Disarmament is being held in an atmosphere of growing expectations that tangible and practical results will be achieved in its work. These hopes are generated by the significant positive changes that have occurred in the domain of international relations, as well as the important understandings that have been reached in the field of arms limitation and disarmament. The process set in motion for cutting nuclear arsenals is now being supplemented by negotiations between 23 States on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Europe.

The Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons met the world's expectations and served as an important landmark in the struggle to rid our planet of chemical weapons. This being so, as we see it, the quest for disarmament is gaining qualitatively new parameters in all its basic directions. There is growing awareness and determination to renounce the



(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

principle of over-arming and to turn to the principle of defensive sufficiency. Not only are old stereotypes being overcome and certain values reassessed, but a new realistic approach to greater confidence and security is taking shape.

Mongolia welcomes the continued successful implementation of the INF Treaty, and expects that the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons will resume soon so as to bring about the declared objective of a 50 per cent reduction in their strategic offensive arms, while preserving the ABM Treaty as signed in 1972.

In our opinion, the relaxation of military confrontation in Europe would have a most favourable impact on strengthening stability and security not only on this continent but throughout the world. The decision of the Soviet Union unilaterally to reduce its armed forces and armaments in Europe and Asia, as declared by General Secretary Gorbachev at the United Nations General Assembly session last December, as well as the corresponding decisions taken by the other Warsaw Treaty member States, have made a valuable practical contribution to the whole process of disarmament, and enhanced confidence among nations, and they clearly demonstrate the determination of these States to see a breakthrough in the field of conventional disarmament as well.

As was announced earlier by the leaders of my country and the USSR, most of the Soviet troops temporarily stationed on the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic will return home during 1989-1990. I am happy to inform the Conference on Disarmament that my Government recently decided to reduce the numerical strength of our country's armed forces by 13,000 in 1989-1990, and to convert 1,000 transport vehicles and 90 tracked and armoured vehicles for use in the civilian economy. I have asked the secretariat to distribute the text of this decision as an official document of the CD, and the secretariat is now circulating it. It should be emphasized that my Government's decision is fully in line with the objective of furthering the development of the national economy and increasing financial and human resources to enhance the well-being of our people.

All these decisions have been prompted by our genuine desire to promote by deeds confidence and co-operation in relations among States, and also the positive developments taking place in the world as a whole, and in Asia in particular.

Like many others, we think that conditions for disarmament are now as favourable as they are ever likely to be. Therefore, it would be an unforgivable mistake if the Conference were not to take advantage of the day, and did not offer its worthy contribution to furthering the positive changes taking place the world over. Here, in our opinion, the current year, 1989, should be a crucial turning-point as we move towards completion of work on the chemical weapons convention.

As was rightly pointed out by His Excellency Mr. Genscher, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, in his statement on 2 March 1989, given good will on the part of everyone concerned, the finalization of the convention ought to be possible by the end of this year.

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

It is extremely important that the negotiations on chemical weapons should not lose momentum. During the negotiations, all efforts should be directed towards finding solutions to pending problems, rather than revising compromises achieved through a great amount of painstaking work.

The current state of affairs of the negotiations allows us to conclude that today there is no problem that cannot be resolved or that could long hamper the ongoing negotiations. Yes, there are problems, for the moment, which are mainly of a technical nature. Given the desire on everyone's part to search for common understanding, they could be agreed upon without much difficulty.

Speaking on the question of chemical weapons, I will limit my remarks mainly to its verification aspects. As for the other problems related to the chemical weapons negotiations, I will address them in a future statement. The Ad hoc Committee is now focusing attention, inter alia, on the question of verification, which occupies a prominent place among the outstanding problems. Hence, we welcome the creation of a working group to deal with the subject. The "rolling text" of our future convention contains the main mechanisms of verification which have been elaborated to varying degrees. Some of them have almost been completed, whereas others are being worked out.

Like many others, my delegation considers that whenever one raises the question of verification of the convention, one has to proceed from the premise that the security interests of States should prevail over commercial and other interests. Naturally, we could think about the specific interests of given companies and take them into consideration wherever possible. In the course of negotiations, a number of delegations have come up with valuable ideas and proposals on the question of verification, including the idea of making good use of relevant verification provisions contained in the INF Treaty and the document of the Stockholm Conference, as well as the day-to-day practice of the International Atomic Energy Agency wherever feasible. Though we understand that they cover different subjects, nothing will prevent us from studying the good experience gained there. This could be done, in our opinion, in Working Group 1 on verification.

There are other priority questions on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. Negotiations on the chemical weapons convention, while of central importance, should not be allowed to overshadow other agenda items. What I have in mind, first and foremost, is item 1, "Nuclear test ban", which has always been and remains a key topic because of what it would mean for stopping the nuclear arms race and for nuclear disarmament. Further inaction on the part of the Conference on this vital issue will find no justification whatsoever. A large number of proposals aimed at creating a subsidiary body which would seriously grapple with the problem of a nuclear test ban are currently on the table in the Conference. While not excluding other possibilities, we still see in document CD/863 a way out of the deadlock on the issue of a mandate. The Conference has definitely not exhausted all possible ways of establishing a working body. For example, in the search for a common approach, the "mandate question" might be discussed at the informal

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

open-ended consultations under your guidance, Mr. President, in order to facilitate the creation of an ad hoc committee. My delegation pledges its full support and co-operation in your endeavour to overcome this stalemate.

At the same time, it is essential to pursue the work on the elaboration of a seismic verification system for the CTB. This system should be based on the international exchange of wave-form (level II) data. In our opinion, besides seismic verification of the non-conduct of nuclear explosions, on-site inspection and radiation safety monitoring, other measures of verification could possibly be applied in this field. We share the assessment you made in your statement of 28 February 1989, Mr. President, that "we may be coming to a point where we should start thinking seriously about the multiple facets of verification from a broader and more purpose-oriented perspective, and give proper guidance to the work of the GSE".

In this respect, we feel that there are good prospects for creating a group of scientific experts to be assigned the urgent task of preparing practical proposals on the system of verification of the non-conduct of nuclear explosions. Providing it did not duplicate the work of the Group of Seismic Experts, this mechanism could also be entrusted with the task of conducting an exchange of opinions on the place and role of seismic components in an overall verification system.

The prevention of an arms race in outer space is one of the priorities of disarmament negotiations. As was eloquently pointed out by His Excellency Mr. Andreotti, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, "it is a sector of activity of enormous relevance to the peaceful future of mankind, and will require increased commitment on the part of us all". We have just heard the good news of the agreement on the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on outer space.

During 1985-1988, in the Ad hoc Committee, representatives of the member States of the CD drew attention to a number of issues such as: the status of outer space as the common heritage of mankind; the need to prevent an arms race in outer space; the non-deployment of weapons in outer space; the interrelationship between the prevention of an arms race in outer space and arms limitation and disarmament measures in other fields; the relationship between bilateral and multilateral efforts aimed at the prevention of an arms race in outer space; the definition of space weapons; the improvement of the working procedures of the Ad hoc Committee; the necessity of strengthening the existing legal régime; and the problems related to verification and compliance.

Many delegations favoured a mandate for the Ad hoc Committee that would provide for negotiations, considering that the stage of identifying and examining the problems pertaining to the prevention of an arms race in outer space is over, and they stressed that it was indispensable to embark upon more substantial work. Almost all the members of the Conference on Disarmament have expressed their attitude vis-à-vis the idea of starting multilateral negotiations. Proposals of a comprehensive nature, and those partially covering certain aspects of the problem, have been tabled before the Ad hoc Committee.

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

If we are not all prepared to enter negotiations on the substance of these proposals, we could first take up the partial or "supplementary" measures, including measures to strengthen confidence and openness in this field. Here the idea put forward by the Federal Republic of Germany for the devising of "rules of the road" in space merits our interest. The Argentine proposal that every member State of the Conference on Disarmament should declare that weapons have not been deployed in outer space on a permanent basis is very important, in our opinion.

Thus we can see that during its work in 1985-1988 the Ad hoc Committee has accumulated a great number of useful ideas and proposals. Most of them contain constructive elements which are acceptable to the majority and constitute a good basis for concrete and purposeful negotiations. What is more, ideas and suggestions for negotiations have been put forward by all countries, including those which are at present not prepared for the commencement of concrete negotiations.

These are a few remarks that my delegation has to offer at this stage of our work.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Bayart for his statement and for the very kind words he addressed to me. I have no other speakers on my list for today. Before we proceed to the decision on agenda item 5, may I ask whether any other delegation wishes to take the floor? I recognize the representative of Egypt.

Mr. ELARABY (Egypt): I would like to make the following statement on behalf of the Group of 21 with respect to the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, but before doing so - and since this is the first time that I have taken the floor this month - I would like, on behalf of my delegation, to extend to you, Sir, our best wishes and to express our gratitude to Ambassador Pugliese.

The Group continues to underline the importance of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes and the urgency of preventing an arms race from occurring in outer space.

The General Assembly on 7 December 1988 adopted resolution 43/70 on the prevention of an arms race in outer space with an overwhelming majority and only one dissenting vote. The resolution requested the Conference on Disarmament to consider as a matter of priority the question of preventing an arms race in outer space and to intensify its consideration of that question, in all its aspects, taking into account all relevant proposals and initiatives. The resolution further requested the Conference on Disarmament to "re-establish an ad hoc committee with an adequate mandate at the beginning of its 1989 session, with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects".

(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

The Group of 21 remains fully committed to the provisions of this resolution. It considers its adoption as an endorsement of a desire to entrust the Ad hoc Committee with the task of improving the mandate in a manner commensurate with the responsibilities of the Conference on Disarmament as the single multilateral forum for disarmament negotiations.

Faced once again with a rigid position taken by the Western Group, and in particular by one delegation belonging to that group, the Group of 21 regrets that it was not found possible to improve the mandate in accordance with the above-mentioned General Assembly resolution, nor to reiterate the proceedings involving a statement by the President of the Conference as was done in previous years.

In view of the pressing need to address, without delay, the important question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space, which necessitates the prompt re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee, the Group of 21 decided, once again, to demonstrate further good will and flexibility in agreeing to work on the basis of the mandate of the previous years. Nevertheless, the Group of 21 recalls that the mandate covers the consideration of proposals for measures aimed at the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Group of 21 believes that the Ad hoc Committee should therefore start work immediately in order to achieve progress and attain positive results.

This is the statement that my delegation was charged with delivering on behalf of the Group of 21.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Elaraby for his statement on behalf of the Group of 21, and for the very kind words he addressed to me. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor before we proceed to take a decision on the mandate?

I now intend to put before the Conference the draft mandate for the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space contained in working paper CD/WP.358. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I should now like to propose the appointment of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee. I understand that there is consensus in the Conference on appointing Ambassador Luvsandorjiin Bayart of Mongolia as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee. May I take it that there is agreement in the Conference?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: Ambassador Bayart, on behalf of the Conference, I would like to extend to you our most sincere congratulations upon your appointment as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, and our very best wishes for success. You were the Chairman of the same Committee in 1986, and I am convinced that under your able leadership the Committee will have fruitful consideration of agenda item 5.

(The President)

I shall now take up requests from non-members to participate in the work of the Ad hoc Committee. You will recall that the relevant draft decisions concerning agenda item 5 were circulated at the plenary meeting held on 16 February, and another circulation is being made today. At that plenary meeting, my predecessor noted that for technical reasons relating to the consultations being held then, the secretariat had prepared the working papers relating to invitations to non-members with reference to the subsidiary bodies on agenda items 4 and 5. Of course, the references to agenda item 4 should now be disregarded, as action has already been taken on them. We shall then only consider working paper CD/WP.359 and its addenda 1 to 19 with respect to agenda item 5. To facilitate the process of decision-making, I shall list those countries cited in that working paper as requesting participation under agenda item 5, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space": Norway, Spain, Finland, Switzerland, Austria, Ireland, New Zealand, Portugal, Denmark, Turkey, Senegal, Greece and Zimbabwe. We shall also take a decision on the request received from Chile, the relevant draft decision also having been circulated today as working paper CD/WP.362. As no objection has been raised to inviting the non-members concerned to participate in our work under agenda item 5, I suggest that we take up all the requests together. If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference adopts the draft decisions.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I understand that the representative of Hungary requests the floor.

Mr. VARGA (Hungary): First of all, Mr. President, I would like to congratulate you on your accession to the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of March. I am confident that the Conference on Disarmament will make further progress on its priority agenda items as it has done under your able guidance up till now.

I have asked for the floor to make a short comment - on behalf of the Group of Socialist Countries - on the establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. I would like to thank you - on behalf of our Group - for your untiring and eventually successful efforts to abolish the difficulties standing in the way of the establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. The Group on behalf of which I am speaking has taken note of the flexible position of the Group of 21 - as we heard a couple of minutes ago - contributing thereby a great deal to solving the problem of the setting up of the Ad hoc Committee. I express our congratulations to Ambassador Bayart of Mongolia, Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, and wish him success in his responsible task. We are sure that his experience will contribute to achieving further progress in this important field.

Resolution 43/70 of the General Assembly of the United Nations recommended that the Conference on Disarmament should activate the consideration of the issue of the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects, taking into consideration the relevant suggestions and initiatives. It also recommended the setting up of an ad hoc committee at

(Mr. Varga, Hungary)

its 1989 session with a view to starting negotiations on the conclusion of a convention or conventions on the issue. The Group of Socialist Countries is of the opinion that it is more timely than ever to make serious efforts for the prevention of an arms race in outer space, to speed up multilateral efforts in this respect - first of all those of the Conference on Disarmament.

We have just adopted a decision on the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space and on its mandate. The agreement on the mandate, reached in spite of the well-known difficulties, as well as the start of the substantive work of the Committee, is a matter of satisfaction for us, although we are somewhat unhappy with the delay. The Group of Socialist Countries cannot help, however, expressing its disappointment over the fact that in recent years the Ad hoc Committee has been prevented from entering into real negotiating work on key issues on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Nevertheless, we consider that the Ad hoc Committee will be in a position to accomplish purpose-oriented work through an appropriately structured discussion, conducted with a view to preparing the basis for future negotiations on the subject. Item 3 of its programme of work provides for that. We think that the main thrust of the work should be directed to substantive discussion and evaluation of the existing proposals and initiatives, concentrating on the convergence of views concerning particular issues. Substantive consideration could, in our view, be given to the working out of agreements aimed at the effective prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The ideas and initiatives put forward during recent years provide a reliable basis for fruitful work in the Ad hoc Committee. We do hope that those involved in the discussion will make good use of them.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Varga for his statement on behalf of the Socialist Group, and for the very kind words he addressed to me. I recognize the representative of Canada.

Mr. MARCHAND (Canada): Speaking on behalf of my Group, I wish to express primarily pleasure but also disappointment at what I have heard this morning at the Group of 21's acceptance of consensus as was communicated to us in this Conference. First, pleasure, because obviously our Group, like all the others, welcomes the establishment of the Ad hoc Committee. Pleasure also because we note with satisfaction the comprehensive nature of the mandate that we have adopted today to define the work of the Committee, and the fact that that mandate allows all delegations to address the subjects they consider important and urgent. Pleasure finally, because I take pride in indicating the desire of the Western Group to contribute fully to the work of the Committee.

Disappointment also I have to register. We at the CD are dealing with the fundamental national security concerns of all countries represented here. We are not engaged in an academic exercise, but we are engaged with real work, of real importance. To single out a particular delegation and its position on important issues is not conducive to the proper advancement of our work.

(Mr. Marchand, Canada)

Having said this, Mr. President, I wish to thank you, and indeed your predecessor Ambassador Pugliese, for the active interest you have taken in the matter which this morning comes to its dénouement.

Finally, I wish to congratulate Ambassador Bayart, who has just received the confidence of this Conference, and I wish to assure him of my Group's full co-operation.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Marchand for his statement on behalf of the Western Group. I now give the floor to Ambassador Fan of China.

Mr. FAN (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. President, I am very pleased to see the presidency of the CD for the month of March in your hands. China and Japan are close neighbours, and at present are co-operating in many areas. China commits itself to the development of long-term stable neighbourly and friendly relations with Japan. You are a seasoned diplomat rich in experience, and you have a penetrating knowledge of disarmament matters. I am convinced that under your skilful guidance work at the CD will register new progress. During your term, the Chinese delegation is willing to enter into close co-operation with you. I would also like to avail myself of this opportunity to express my appreciation to your predecessor, Ambassador Pugliese, for his outstanding work during the month of February.

In my statement in February I pointed out that the prevention of an arms race in outer space should be a new priority in disarmament. China has all along insisted that the exploration and exploitation of outer space should serve peaceful purposes, and is opposed to an arms race in outer space. China supported resolution 43/70 on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, adopted by the General Assembly, at its forty-third session, and we favour the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee with an adequate mandate at the beginning of the 1989 session with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects.

We are of the view that the mandate of the Ad hoc Committee should always adapt itself to changing circumstances. In the past three years, the statement made by the President of the CD at the time of the establishment of the Ad hoc Committee concerning its mandate has been useful. This year the effort made by the Group of 21 to improve upon the mandate and to reaffirm the statement of the President was justified. At the same time, the Chinese delegation has taken note of the fact that different parties still hold divergent views on this matter. We appreciate the good will and flexibility displayed by the Group of 21 to enable the Ad hoc Committee to be re-established and embark on its work as soon as possible.

In order to enable the Ad hoc Committee to enter into substantive work as soon as possible, the Chinese delegation will go along with the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on the basis of the present mandate. I would also like to congratulate Ambassador Bayart warmly on assuming the chairmanship of this Committee. I am convinced that his able guidance will lead the Ad hoc Committee to positive progress.



The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Fan for his statement and for the very kind words he addressed to me and to my country. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this moment? I recognize the representative of the United States of America.

Mr. FRIEDERSDORF (United States of America): I have asked for the floor today to explain our delegation's position on the issue of a negotiated presidential statement in conjunction with the adoption of a mandate for an ad hoc committee on prevention of an arms race in outer space. Our delegation opposed such a statement. It has always been the position of our delegation that a committee's charter is embodied in the mandate adopted by the Conference. Clearly, that is what is contemplated by the Conference on Disarmament's rules of procedure. When it was suggested two years ago that the President make a statement following adoption of the outer space mandate, our delegation reluctantly agreed. We agreed because we consider that a President is entitled to state his personal views, and such views in no way affect the mandate or the work of any committee. We agreed reluctantly because we were concerned that others might make more of such a statement than was warranted.

Unfortunately, that is what happened in 1987. Several delegations treated the President's statement as a substantive addition to, and extension of, the mandate, and much committee time was wasted debating the relevance of the statement. The presidential statement was later misused in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. When the issue of a presidential statement again was raised at the beginning of the 1988 Conference on Disarmament session, our delegation at that time pointed out these abuses and, hoping that our protestations had registered, we again reluctantly agreed, stressing that the presidential statement should not be elevated to greater stature than it deserved, that is, that it should be treated as an expression of the views of one delegate only. The Committee was formed and the presidential statement was delivered, and the sound of the gavel was still echoing through the chamber when other delegations began citing the presidential statement as authority for emphasizing some parts of the Committee's work programme at the expense of other parts.

This past experience convinces us that a negotiated presidential statement in conjunction with the outer space mandate leads to unacceptable perversion of the Conference on Disarmament's rules of procedure. It leads to misunderstandings. It leads to the waste of time, so for these reasons our delegation was opposed to a negotiated presidential statement this year. Of course, we continue to support the President's prerogative to express his own views, just as other Conference on Disarmament members and groups of delegations have the right to express their positions at all times.

Our delegation has joined consensus on the establishment of an ad hoc committee on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, with a mandate which will permit wide-ranging inquiry and valuable, interesting work, and we look forward to beginning that work at an early date under the able chairmanship of a distinguished Ambassador and our colleague, Ambassador Bayart.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Friedersdorf for his statement. May I ask if there is any other representative who wishes to take the floor? There seems to be none.

I thank you all for your understanding and co-operation in dispensing with the informal plenary before we proceeded to take decisions related to agenda item 5. I wish to say that this does not constitute a precedent for such decisions in the future. Before taking similar decisions in the future, I will consult with you through your co-ordinators to establish whether we can dispense with informal meetings.

I shall now invite the Conference to consider the timetable for meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. As usual, this timetable is merely indicative and we can proceed to adjust it, depending on the requirements of our work. You will notice that provision is made in the timetable for the opening meeting of the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, on Tuesday, 14 March at 3 p.m. in this conference room. If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference accepts the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I have no other business for today, and I now intend to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 14 March at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 10.55 a.m.

# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.494  
14 March 1989

ENGLISH

---

## FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOURTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 14 March 1989, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Chusei Yamada (Japan)

The PRESIDENT: The 494th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is called to order.

Twenty-seven years ago today, on 14 March, the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum which has been meeting without interruption since then held its first plenary meeting at the Foreign Minister level. Known at the beginning as the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, it was later renamed Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. Its procedural and organizational arrangements were certainly different from those which guide our work at present. Yet it was, at that time, a welcome development after almost two years without multilateral negotiations on disarmament.

During those 27 years, several important multilateral disarmament agreements have been negotiated here in Geneva - the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Sea-bed Treaty, the Convention banning biological and toxin weapons and the Convention on environmental modification for hostile purposes. The ENDC also contributed significantly to the conclusion, in 1963, of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water. These agreements, together with others also negotiated in multilateral forums, such as the Antarctic Treaty, the outer space Treaty, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies and the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons, represent a substantial body of international law in the field of disarmament. Together with bilateral agreements reached by the two big Powers and other nations, they perform the essential function of excluding certain areas, arms or activities from the arms race. However, it is clear that we are far from having succeeded in either stopping or reversing it.

Much remains to be done at all levels, and we, the members of the Conference on Disarmament and the non-members participating in it, have a heavy responsibility in advancing our negotiations to achieve new effective and verifiable disarmament measures. That responsibility assumes particular relevance at present, when the international situation shows considerable improvement and multilateral forums are proving once more that they are indispensable instruments in the search for disarmament. Clear indications in that respect appeared at the last regular session of the General Assembly. The success of the Paris Conference in recognizing the importance and continuing validity of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, as well as in providing further impetus to our negotiations on a comprehensive chemical weapons ban, is a timely example of the irreplaceable role of the multilateral approach to disarmament. Last but not least, this year we have welcomed in our midst an unprecedented number of non-member States wishing to participate in the work of the Conference. Twenty-four States have been invited to join us in dealing with the issues facing this multilateral body.

The 1989 session of the Conference has begun on a positive note. A number of organizational questions have been settled quickly. Five subsidiary bodies are working under their competent chairmen and, as requested by the Paris Conference, the Conference is redoubling its efforts in the field of chemical weapons. However, we should not forget that several agenda items and other subjects still need to find an appropriate organizational framework for

(The President)

their consideration. This applies in particular to the nuclear issues on our agenda, agenda items 1 to 3. Among those, I would like to single out agenda item 1, "Nuclear test ban", on which we have not been able, unfortunately, to find an acceptable arrangement since the end of 1983. I have initiated with our co-ordinators the process of exploring possible progress on the item, and I am very encouraged by the positive response. I assure you that I will continue to intensify my consultations and to co-operate with you in the search for a solution to those pending matters.

In conformity with its programme of work, the Conference starts today its consideration of agenda item 3, entitled "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". However, in accordance with rule 30 of its rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference. I have on my list of speakers for today the representative of Indonesia. I now call upon Ambassador Loeis.

Mr. LOEIS (Indonesia): It is indeed a pleasure for me and my delegation to see you, Sir, a personal friend and a representative of Japan, with which my country enjoys an excellent relationship, presiding over the deliberations of the Conference for the month of March. You may rest assured that the Indonesian delegation will extend its fullest co-operation to you in the discharge of your duties. My delegation also wishes to reiterate its appreciation to your predecessor, Ambassador Pugliese, for the commendable stewardship that he gave to our Conference last month.

Ideally, every year the Conference should end its deliberation on organizational matters in the month of February, and intensive negotiations should have begun in the month of March on substantive issues pertaining to all items on its agenda. The fact that the Conference is still not able to begin negotiation on its priority agenda items, such as the nuclear test ban, should be a source of deep concern, especially at a time when enthusiasm for disarmament and co-operation is on the rise. Now that the Conference is already in the midst of its spring session, I wish to join others in making some brief remarks on the subject.

Seven years ago, under the chairmanship of your delegation and with the help of Ambassador Jaipal, the then Secretary of the Committee on Disarmament, the Committee was successful in establishing a subsidiary body on the nuclear test ban with a mandate acceptable to all delegations. That success was achieved at a time quite different from now, marked by the intensified arms race and confrontation. Logically, the present political climate should have made it easier for the Conference to achieve a consensus. Unfortunately, such was not the case, and it would perhaps be too much to hope that the Conference could repeat that success during this spring session, as we are now almost in the second half of the month of March. Nevertheless, even at the risk that it may perhaps sound pointless, but given the highest importance attached by my delegation, as well as by your own, to the need to end nuclear testing once and for all, I would like to reiterate the appeal for the demonstration of "political will" from all sides so that the Conference can fully discharge its responsibility to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty as soon as possible. I am fully convinced that until such a treaty is concluded, this appeal, which has been made by many in the past, will be repeated again in the future.

(Mr. Loeis, Indonesia)

Much has been said concerning the importance of having a comprehensive test-ban treaty. It is the litmus test of nations' willingness to stop and reverse the nuclear arms race and move towards general and complete disarmament, which, according to paragraph 111 of the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament, will permit States to have at their disposal only non-nuclear forces. We are told that there is no such thing as peaceful nuclear explosions, and thus article V of the 1968 non-proliferation Treaty, which provides the basis for international co-operation in sharing the benefits stemming from peaceful applications of nuclear explosions, has become a dead letter. From this premise a conclusion can accordingly be drawn that the continuation of nuclear testing is tantamount to permitting the continuation of the proliferation of nuclear weapons either quantitatively or qualitatively, or even perhaps for the purpose of inventing a new generation of weapons. If such is the case, the continuation of nuclear testing, and the refusal to continue negotiations to ban such testing, run counter, if not to the letter, at least to the spirit of the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty as well as the 1968 non-proliferation Treaty. As we can see, the nuclear test-ban treaty is not only important to end testing itself, but also has wider implications for the disarmament process as a whole. It is for these reasons that Indonesia, together with Mexico, Peru, Sri Lanka, Yugoslavia and Venezuela, has proposed amending the partial test-ban Treaty to make it a comprehensive one.

As far as Indonesia is concerned, we gave up our nuclear options 19 years ago by signing the NPT. Indonesia has agreed since the very beginning of the existence of the Conference to make a nuclear test ban a priority and the first item on the agenda of the Conference. Consequently, my delegation is ready to establish the necessary subsidiary body with the responsibility of concluding a comprehensive test-ban treaty as a matter of urgency. The Indonesian delegation has also approached the "mandate problem" with a sufficient degree of flexibility. Although we are ready to embark on a full-fledged negotiation to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty, we none the less supported the mandate contained in document CD/291 in 1982, which accommodated the wishes of those who were not ready to negotiate. As we all know, it was with this mandate that the subsidiary body was established and discussed specific issues - verification and compliance - with a view to making further progress toward a nuclear test ban.

Today, it is very clear that the problem of verification is not the insurmountable obstacle it was pictured to be. To put it more succinctly, verification of compliance is possible, and the so-called problem of on-site inspection has become a matter of the past. With these developments and within the prevailing international political environment, the Conference should have been able to negotiate a comprehensive test-ban treaty or at least work on the basis of the mandate contained in document CD/829, which my delegation believes is sufficient to accommodate those who are still not able to carry out a full-fledged negotiation.

My delegation is ready to co-operate and find a way out of the current impasse, and search for a mandate which provides a sound basis for well-structured deliberations where the result will be recorded in a formal document ensuring continuity and consistency of efforts towards the conclusion

(Mr. Loeis, Indonesia)

of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Any mandate which is less than that, I am afraid, may inadvertently compromise the prestige of this Conference as a negotiating body, converting it into just another round-table seminar. I am convinced that none of us would wish that to happen.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Loeis of Indonesia for his statement, and for the very kind words he addressed to me and to my country. I have no other speakers on my list for today. May I ask whether any other delegation wishes to take the floor at this stage? There seems to be none.

Today, on behalf of the Conference, I would like to bid farewell to an esteemed and competent colleague - present at this plenary meeting - who is leaving us this week after seven years of hard and effective work in the Conference, although his country is not yet one of its members. I refer to Mr. Sten Lundbo, who will shortly take up the important post of Deputy Director-General in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Oslo. His dedication and diplomatic skills are an example of how influential and full of opportunities the activities of a non-member can be. On behalf of the Conference, I wish him and his wife every success. In my capacity as Japanese delegate, I hope that the day will come soon when his country will join this Conference as a full member.

As I have no other business for today, I now intend to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 16 March, at 10.a.m.

The meeting rose at 10.30 a.m.

# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.495  
16 March 1989

ENGLISH

---

## FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND NINETY-FIFTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva  
on Thursday, 16 March 1989, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Chusei Yamada (Japan)



The PRESIDENT: The 495th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is now called to order.

At the outset, I should like to extend a cordial welcome to His Excellency Ambassador Aarno Karhilo, the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs of Finland, who is addressing this plenary meeting. In doing so, I should like to recall that he made a significant contribution to the success of the Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons as an Acting Chairman of the Committee of the Whole. I should also like to note the long-time active participation and valuable contribution of Finland, a non-member, in the work of the Conference. I am sure that the members will follow the statement of His Excellency the Under-Secretary of State with particular interest.

The Conference continues today its consideration of agenda item 3, entitled "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". In conformity with rule 30 of its rules of procedure, however, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference. I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Finland, the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Sri Lanka and Romania. The first speaker on my list is the representative of Finland. I invite His Excellency Ambassador Aarno Karhilo, the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs, to address the Conference.

Mr. KARHILO (Finland): Mr. President, permit me to thank you for the warm words of welcome you have just extended to me. I am very pleased and honoured to have this opportunity to address the Conference on Disarmament. Let me also express my pleasure at seeing you occupy the Chair of the Conference. I know that under your competent guidance, the Conference will work effectively.

Chemical disarmament has gained new urgency on the agenda of the world community. Alarm at the proliferation and use of chemical weapons is global. The 149 participating States at the Paris Conference in January aired their common awareness of this danger. It marked a unique expression of political resolve by virtually all States of the world. The Declaration of the Paris Conference called upon the Conference on Disarmament to conclude the convention on the total prohibition of chemical weapons by redoubling its efforts on this issue. The present global alarm now provides a momentum which this negotiating body should not fail to seize. If this Conference succeeds in these efforts, it will give a new impetus for multilateral disarmament as a whole.

There is now an increasing understanding of the scope of the chemical weapons problem. Many countries are taking measures to strengthen export controls on chemicals, equipment and facilities which may be used in the production of chemical weapons. International trade in this kind of merchandise has to be put under scrutiny. But this alone is not enough to stop the spread of chemical weapons. Finland welcomes the Soviet Union's announcement at the Paris Conference that she will unilaterally start the elimination of her chemical weapon stockpiles. We also welcome the recent

(Mr. Karhilo, Finland)

statement by the United States that she plans to explore ways of ensuring the accelerated withdrawal of her chemical weapon stockpile from the Federal Republic of Germany.

These kinds of unilateral measures are encouraging signs. They help to strengthen the momentum which is further highlighted by developments in other areas of disarmament efforts. The Soviet Union and the United States are expected soon to resume their nuclear and space talks. Deep reductions in their strategic nuclear arsenals will be a vital element in making the world safer. In Europe, two parallel sets of negotiations on military security within the framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe started only a week ago. In addition to the continued work on confidence- and security-building measures, conventional armed forces in Europe have finally become an object of negotiation.

Disarmament at the bilateral level and in the regional context is advancing. The Conference on Disarmament is responsible for advancement at the multilateral level. Among the first priorities is the completion of the chemical weapons convention. The Paris Conference demonstrated the globality of the chemical weapons question. The effectiveness of the future convention requires universal adherence to the convention from the very beginning. Every country is expected to abide by the provisions of the convention and, therefore, every country that is willing to contribute to the negotiations should have an opportunity to do so. Finland welcomes the decision of the Conference to open its Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to new observer States. The restructuring of the work of the Committee is a positive sign that the redoubling of efforts is taking place. We wish the Ad hoc Committee and its Chairman, Ambassador Pierre Morel of France, every success in turning the unanimous message of the Paris Conference into reality.

Verification of the future convention is undoubtedly one of the most difficult issues facing the CW negotiations. The Finnish research project on the verification of chemical disarmament - Finland's contribution to the CW negotiations - has for 15 years developed sensitive and selective analytical methods to meet verification requirements of the convention. The results have been published annually here at the Conference on Disarmament in the form of "Finnish Blue Books" totalling about 2,500 pages of research data in 13 volumes. These reports contain analytical data on chemical warfare agents, their precursors and degradation products studied using seven instrumental methods. Some of the methods require sophisticated stationary instrumentation, but some are also usable in mobile laboratories. Application of the methods for air monitoring was found feasible in on-site, near-site and remote verification tasks.

To make the results more readily available for other laboratories, a computerized verification data base is being prepared. A prototype of this data base was introduced at this Conference last year, and delegations were encouraged to test it by allowing them access to our computer. The ultimate goal is a comprehensive chemical weapons verification data base for the Technical Secretariat. In the first phase, an analytical data base will help the future Preparatory Commission in developing verification methods. We hope to be able to demonstrate its use to the delegations in Geneva during the coming summer session.

(Mr. Karhilo, Finland)

To allow reliable use of the identification data collected into the data base, work within the project has proceeded to describe the numerous methods of sample preparation and analysis required in a way which meets the criteria of standard operating procedures. Concrete international co-operation is vital to the success of the pioneering work towards the standardization of methods. We are pleased to announce to this Conference that we have recently signed an agreement with Switzerland on co-operation in methods development. We are confident that our project will benefit from Swiss scientific expertise.

In order to facilitate international validation of the procedures the Finnish project is planning an inter-laboratory "round robin" exercise. The project will also test the suitability of the methods during the first trial inspection in Finland, which incidentally is taking place today.

Finland has put her capability to verify alleged uses of chemical weapons at the disposal of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Once the convention has been signed, Finland is also prepared to offer the facilities of her research project to the Technical Secretariat for analytical work. Continuous methods development and updating of chemicals lists will remain important after the convention has entered into force.

In addressing the Paris Conference, Foreign Minister Kalevi Sorsa announced that, as of next year, Finland is prepared to train each year, free of charge, chemists from the developing world in the use of technical methods and instruments relevant to the verification tasks of the convention. Details of this offer will be worked out before the summer, and invitations will be extended directly to the Governments concerned. Close acquaintance with the technical methods is necessary for every party to the convention that has a chemical industry of its own. National organizations should be able to ensure compliance with the obligations set out in the convention. Acquaintance with the methods would also facilitate the recruitment of staff to the Technical Secretariat on a broad geographical basis.

Let me now turn to another major item on the agenda of this Conference, that is nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament. The role of nuclear weapons is being reappraised. The complete prohibition of nuclear tests would be necessary to constrain the qualitative development of nuclear weapons. A cessation of nuclear testing would also strengthen the non-proliferation Treaty, addressing the danger of the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons. Finland looks forward to the fourth review conference of the NPT next year. We hope that it will allow further steps to strengthen the status of the Treaty as one of the corner-stones of international security. Progress in nuclear test-ban negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States as well as in this body would facilitate the success of the NPT review conference.

Again, progress towards reliable and effective verification is a prerequisite for the success of the negotiations on a comprehensive test ban. The Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events (GSE), working under the auspices of the Conference since 1976, has a key role in this respect. In order to make a contribution to the study and development of effective seismic verification methods for a test ban, Finland is actively participating in the

(Mr. Karhilo, Finland)

work of the GSE and maintains for the purpose a seismic verification research programme run by the University of Helsinki and sponsored by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Finnish participation is made possible by a sophisticated national network of seismic stations and the requisite expertise. Moreover, the bedrock in Finland offers optimal conditions for seismic detection. With a view to the improved global seismic data exchange system to be presented in the fifth report of the GSE, Finland is completing her own facilities in the framework of her seismic verification research programme.

A new three-component station (VAF) equipped with modern instrumentation designed specially for detection purposes will start operations this spring in western Finland. This station, together with the array station FINSA, with continuous seismic data transmission to the national data centre in Helsinki, are the main elements offered to the global seismic data exchange system to be established for monitoring of a comprehensive prohibition of nuclear tests.

In addition to this system Finland is participating in co-operation with Norway in a small-aperture seismic array experiment with the FINESA station in southern Finland. A new central computer unit and a continuous on-line data transmission system are to be brought into operation this spring, after which we will be ready to continue experimenting with other small-aperture arrays.

Finland welcomes the plans for large-scale experimental testing of the global seismic data exchange system (GSETT-2) in 1990. Finland is participating actively in the programme for this experiment and its start-up tests. As our contribution to GSETT-2, the computing facilities at the Finnish National Seismic Data Centre in Helsinki have been increased by adding new Sun computers and work stations for receiving, processing and transmitting seismic wave-form and parameter data. At the same time research is going on at the Helsinki NDC on procedures for automatic detection of seismic events. Some preliminary achievements of these studies have been presented at the ongoing GSE meeting.

Particular attention has been given to developing facilities for data transmission so that the seismic data recorded and processed within the Finnish station network can be made available to all interested parties. From the Helsinki NDC the seismic data can easily be transmitted through public networks to other data centres.

Seismic verification facilities are not equally distributed round the globe; in the southern hemisphere the density of seismograph stations is much lower than in the northern hemisphere. In order to improve seismic recording facilities in Africa, Finland has co-operated with Zambia in establishing a seismic network. The main station in Lusaka has the capacity to record, analyse and transmit seismic data, especially from the southern hemisphere, as is indicated by Zambian participation in GSETT-1 in 1984.

In order to strengthen the seismic observation capacity in Africa, Finland, in co-operation with UNESCO and various scientific organizations, conducted a training course for African seismological observers in Lusaka last September. Altogether 32 participants from 15 African countries took part in

(Mr. Karhilo, Finland)

this course. To encourage African countries to participate in the work of GSE, including GSETT-2, the Finnish Government is prepared to increase assistance to the Lusaka seismograph station.

The easing of international tensions, co-operation between major Powers and prospects for the peaceful settlement of many regional conflicts may encourage this body to discuss, beside its substantive work, questions relating to its agenda, procedures and membership. As a non-member State Finland has repeatedly emphasized its continuing active interest in the work of the Conference on Disarmament. Our contributions to multilateral disarmament efforts, some of which I have just presented to you, are a record of our commitment. As a neutral country Finland has a permanent interest in disarmament. It is our conviction that countries which are able and willing to participate should have the opportunity to do so fully.

The PRESIDENT: I thank His Excellency Ambassador Karhilo, the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs of Finland, for his statement. It was indeed a pleasure for me as a delegate of Japan to welcome you, Sir, who served in Tokyo as Ambassador of Finland and who are such a good friend of Japan. I would also like to thank Your Excellency for the very kind words you addressed to me.

Before I give the floor to the next speaker, I would like to welcome a group of students from Yugoslavia who are observing our session in the public gallery. I thank them for their interest in the work of disarmament, and wish them a very successful and fruitful visit. The next speaker is the representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Dietze.

Mr. DIETZE (German Democratic Republic): First of all, Mr. President, allow me to convey to you my warm congratulations as you take up the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of March. I should like to express my appreciation to you, as the representative of a country with which the German Democratic Republic shares fruitful relations. I wish you success in the discharge of your responsible duties, and I can assure you of my delegation's fullest support in this endeavour. I am confident that under your able and efficient stewardship the Conference will yield concrete results in the negotiating process. Your predecessor, Ambassador Pugliese, deserves our appreciation and gratitude for his competence and special negotiating skills which helped create the necessary conditions for resuming our Conference's work.

I should like to introduce at today's plenary session document CD/899, i.e. the report on the national trial inspection of the German Democratic Republic.

In February 1988, the Soviet Union submitted a proposal for the holding of trial inspections in chemical industry facilities in order to expedite work on the draft convention on chemical weapons. This initiative was taken up and developed further by the Ad hoc Committee, resulting in document CD/CW/WP.213. On this basis, the German Democratic Republic carried out a trial inspection in an industrial plant in the autumn of 1988. It was conducted in a multi-purpose pharmaceutical facility, a production unit of the "Dresden" pharmaceutical enterprise, which processes a substance listed

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

in schedule [2] as "To be discussed further" - dimethylaminoethanol. The substance is converted into meclophenoxate hydrochloride, a chemical which is used as a medicine.

In preparation for the trial inspection an initial visit - actually a sequence of several visits - was carried out. During the "initial visit period" a facility agreement was negotiated and a document outlining the detailed verification approach was drawn up. The initial visit included four one-day visits to the facility and several weeks for the analysis and study of basic documents to prepare the verification concept and negotiate the facility agreement. The routine verification lasted for two days, while the elaboration of the inspection report took one day.

The following inspection methods were applied: inventory controls by direct measurement, enumeration of standard tanks, verification of records and sampling and analyses for confirmation of data in the material balance declaration and of non-production of schedule [1] chemicals. At the same time, the operating condition and the production régime were checked on the basis of the facility agreement. Moreover, interviews were held with plant workers.

During the inspection two technical principles were investigated, namely material balance verification and anomaly detection. In the case of material balance verification, a narrow inspection mandate was drawn up and successfully implemented, based on the facility agreement and the verification approach. For anomaly detection, it was difficult to formulate a tight inspection mandate.

The facility was notified in advance of the inspection date, mainly because material balance verification, and inventory verification in particular, can only be performed at specific points in the production cycle. Therefore, the time of the inventory verification must be agreed with the operator of the facility, while interim inspections can be conducted at short notice in accordance with the "rolling text". The inspection did not have a major impact on facility operations. But with a view to making facility operations suitable for verification under the convention, some adjustments became necessary, both in facility accounting practice and in the operating régime at the facility. We are looking forward to expert discussions on the experience gathered during trial inspections, to be held in the coming weeks here in Geneva.

Since I have been given the floor, I should like to air some further observations on topical issues concerning current negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

The verification problem has attracted great attention in recent consultations. Our delegation welcomes the efforts made in Working Group 1 with respect to the pattern of verification. A conclusion to be drawn from this debate is that the existing elements of verification included in the "rolling text" constitute a solid foundation for a functioning and reliable verification system. Chemicals which are chemical weapons and have little or no use except for CW purposes, as well as key components for binary or multicomponent chemical weapons, are covered under the most stringent régime.

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

The second category, key precursors, will also fall under systematic verification by on-site inspection. In both cases, the inspections will have to prove not only that the chemical is not used for other than the declared purposes, but also the absence of any production prohibited by the convention in the facility under inspection. A third category of chemicals will be subject to verification by data monitoring.

At present the question of whether there is a need to supplement these verification system elements is being discussed. We feel that an answer to this question may be found in trying to identify the aim of additional verification measures. It will be easier to make a choice concerning the verification methods to be applied on the basis of this identification. One target for verification is chemicals which are not included in any of the three schedules and which, because of their toxicity or other characteristics, can be diverted to chemical weapons purposes. In addition, the facilities producing these chemicals might be converted into or readily used as CW production facilities. In our view, a solution could perhaps be brought about by including such chemicals in schedule [2]. In so doing, sufficient assurance could be obtained that the chemical in question is not produced for prohibited purposes and the facility not used for CW production. This relates to problems which have been the subject of discussion for some time under the heading "schedule [4]" or "super-toxic lethal chemicals" (STLCs). To arrive at the aforementioned solution, the guidelines for schedule [2] would have to be drafted to allow for the inclusion of such chemicals. The ambivalent characteristics of some chemicals, however, might create difficulties in reaching agreement on whether a specific chemical requires systematic verification or not. For these cases, another pragmatic approach seems to be advisable.

In our opinion it would be sensible for a list to be drawn up comprising those dubious chemicals which cause concern. Requests from States parties should form the basis of such a list, which should be compiled by the Technical Secretariat and communicated to the States parties. The idea of maintaining an open list of this kind was advanced by the delegation of Italy last year. The production of chemicals set forth in this list, probably above a certain threshold, as well as the facilities in which they are produced, would have to be declared by the States parties. Following such declarations, checks could be carried out on an ad hoc basis. The creation of weighting factors, as suggested by the Federal Republic of Germany, could serve as a means of choosing the proper frequency of ad hoc checks. The scientific council whose establishment was proposed by France could assume an advisory role in the overall process. By applying this method, only one point of possible concern would be left unaffected, namely facilities which do not produce chemicals contained in the schedules and are consequently not declared, but which have the capability of being used as or easily converted into a CW production facility. The discussions on this subject did not reveal any possibility of defining sufficiently clear characteristics so that they can be included in a list or a special register. We are ready to discuss further ideas to provide assurances regarding the absence of prohibited activities in such facilities. There is, of course, always the alternative of requesting a challenge inspection.

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

Another problem I should like to touch upon concerns the Executive Council. We attach great importance to reaching agreement on the composition of the Executive Council of the future Organization. The work to be accomplished on this subject would, to our mind, also help make headway in other subjects which are linked with the functions of this organ. In working paper CD/812 of 4 March 1988, the delegation of the German Democratic Republic set forth its views on the composition, size and decision-making of the Executive Council. In this approach we proceeded from the fact that the proper implementation of the convention would have a strong bearing on the security interests of the States parties. For this reason, the stability of the convention and its global character will largely depend on the political body acting as the executive organ. The composition of the Executive Council will have to correspond to the character of the convention as a disarmament agreement. That is why its composition should be in accordance with the political balance established in the Conference on Disarmament, as the appropriate multilateral organ to negotiate this kind of agreement. Therefore, the conclusion has been drawn that the principles of political balance and equitable geographical distribution should play a crucial role. In addition, the groups should be made up of an appropriate number of countries with a developed chemical industry as well as those not having a major industry of this kind. We are still of the opinion that this organ, to be effective, should be composed of a limited membership. We deem the figure of 21 adequate.

Since we are now to continue the debate on these issues in the various working groups, I would like to offer some observations on the outcome of discussions held in the meantime. In our view they revealed that the relationship between political balance and equitable geographical distribution, being the governing principles for the composition of the Executive Council, was widely supported. A limited size for this body was also considered essential. Different views have been expressed only concerning whether the stage of development of a chemical industry should be taken into account. We arrived at these conclusions during the consultations held last year in the working group under the chairmanship of Mr. Numata of Japan. The same goes for observations offered on this subject in the plenary. I am referring especially, in this context, to statements made by the delegations of Brazil, France, Pakistan, the United States, Sweden and China last year. The quotations contained in the circulated text of my statement delivered today speak for themselves. 1/

---

1/ The relevant section of the text circulated by the delegation of the German Democratic Republic read as follows:

"The delegation of Brazil stated on 26 April 1988: 'Three criteria, in our view, could be merged in the definition of eligibility for the



(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

I believe that this justifies the conviction that there already exists a foundation for elaborating an agreement in principle on the composition of the Executive Council. Following this agreement, the details of a text to be included in article VIII could then be worked out. We value the intention expressed by the Chairman of Working Group 3 to start consultations on this item, and we welcome the fact that this endeavour was also supported by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Morel of France.

---

Executive Council: geographical, political and industrial capacity.' The CD was proposed as a model for a 'strong, efficient and representative Executive Council, with a membership in the range between 20 and 30 ...' (CD/PV.460).

"The French delegation stressed in its statement of 17 March 1988 that the composition of the Executive Council should not be 'simply a copy of the usual rules in general political bodies'. The view was expressed that it is 'on the contrary, directly linked to the convention itself and so combines the geographical, the political and the industrial criteria' (CD/PV.449).

"In the statement of the delegation of Pakistan of 28 April 1988, it was stressed that the precise composition of the Executive Council 'should be based on the principles of equitable geographical distribution and of political balance' (CD/PV.461).

"We appreciate the positive comment made by the United States delegation in its statement of 14 April 1988 concerning our working paper CD/812. In this context, it was stated that 'the Executive Council must be small enough for effective work and yet represent the different interests involved in the convention'. The statement recognized that care must be taken to achieve political balance, and recommended that it should be brought about indirectly. The interrelationship between political balance and decision-making procedures was also stressed (CD/PV.457).

"In its statement of 13 September 1988, the delegation of Sweden expressed the following view: 'The composition of the Executive Council should reflect political balance and equitable geographical distribution.' It was further stated that the wish for special representation of countries carrying a higher burden of routine inspections was understandable (CD/PV.481).

"In its statement of 31 March 1988, the delegation of China recognized 'a convergence of views' on 'the three elements of geographical distribution, chemical industry capacity and political groupings'. We fully share the conviction expressed by China that 'so long as we give full consideration to the above three elements and show mutual compromise and understanding, a composition of the organization compatible with the requirements of the convention will be found' (CD/PV.453)."

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

Winding up my statement, I have grounds to reiterate on this occasion what has already been said at SSOD-III, during the Paris Conference, and here in this very room. The German Democratic Republic possesses no chemical weapons and has no such weapons from other States stationed on its territory. It is neither engaged in the development of chemical weapons, nor has it facilities to produce them. The German Democratic Republic advocates an international moratorium on the production of chemical weapons before the entry into force of the convention, and has introduced strict export controls for dual-purpose chemicals. My country continues its efforts towards the creation of a chemical-weapon-free zone in Central Europe, because this, we feel, will facilitate a global solution.

These measures are truly building confidence. They add, we think, to the successful work of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. These steps, in fact, promote the early conclusion of the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The German Democratic Republic is keeping its word given at the Paris Conference that it will advance these negotiations by displaying a constructive and action-oriented approach and submitting substantive proposals. Our delegation is in favour of focusing these negotiations on the essential issues of the CW convention and achieving a real breakthrough. We do this because the implementation of the Declaration of the Paris Conference will not come about on its own. We do this since concrete action is called for when we are about to seize the chance offered at the Paris Conference, namely to conclude the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons at the earliest date.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Dietze of the German Democratic Republic for his statement, and for the very kind words he addressed to me and to my country. The next speaker is the representative of Czechoslovakia, Ambassador Vajnar.

Mr. VAJNAR (Czechoslovakia): Mr. President, let me first of all cordially welcome you to the presidency of our Conference for the month of March. Your diplomatic skill and kind, flexible, personal approach has already influenced our proceedings positively. We wish you full success in your further work, and I assure you that you may rely on the full support and co-operation of our delegation. I would also like to thank your predecessor, Ambassador Pugliese, for his useful work as the President of the Conference in February. Let me also join you in welcoming the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs of Finland, Ambassador Aarno Karhilo, who addressed the Conference this morning. We listened to his statement with great interest.

As I informed the Conference last month, Czechoslovakia carried out a national trial inspection of a chemical industry facility on 25 and 26 January this year. In my short intervention today I would like to introduce the report on this inspection, contained in what will be document CD/900.

The facility selected for the inspection is a medium-sized plant situated close to the town of Mnísek, producing an agent commercially designated as Spolapret OS which is used mainly for non-flammable treatment of cotton. This substance is produced from phosphorus trichloride, which is converted into

(Mr. Vajnar, Czechoslovakia)

dimethyl phosphite, these being substances which would under CD/881, be declared schedule [3] chemicals. For the purposes of the inspection these compounds were hypothetically considered as schedule [2] chemicals.

The inspection team was composed mainly of officials with a technical background. However, representatives from the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs also participated, either as members of the inspection team or as observers. The main sponsor of the trial inspection, the Ministry of Industry of the Czech Socialist Republic, paid thorough attention to the preparations for the experiment and to the establishment of all necessary conditions for its effective and instructive implementation. Special emphasis was placed on the thorough preparation of the facility attachment, since it soon became evident that the provisions included in the attachment would play an important "regulatory" role for the designation of areas or places to be inspected, as well as access by the inspectors and the conduct of the inspection itself.

The plant was visited six times between November 1988 and January 1989 before the facility attachment was finalized and concluded on 25 January. In its preparation maximum use was made of the provisions contained in the "Model for an agreement relating to facilities producing, processing, or consuming chemicals listed in schedule [2]" (CD/881, pp. 124-127). The inspection proper took two days. Its technical proceedings are described in detail in the report. The conclusions drawn from the inspection, which are specified in the report, might be summarized in the following way.

Firstly, the provisions relating to the verification of chemical industry facilities which have been developed so far in CD/881 can be considered as accurately reflecting the requirements for such verification. The national trial inspection convinces us that reliable verification of civilian chemical industry is feasible. At the same time, under normal conditions, the inspection is not exceedingly intrusive for the facility, or too demanding for the inspecting personnel, either in terms of participants or in terms of time. We hope that our experiment, together with the evaluation of other national trial inspections, will contribute to the completion of the verification provisions and procedures of the future chemical weapons convention.

Secondly, the participants in the inspection repeatedly realized the importance of the facility attachment. Attention paid to this kind of document in the previous work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons has proved fully justified, since the facility attachment indeed plays the role of a "guide" to a facility, while at the same time protecting it from unnecessary intrusiveness and disclosures of confidential information. Two footnotes attached to the text of the Model on which facility attachments will be based indicate that some work on the material is still needed. We favour the initiation of such work as soon as possible.

Thirdly, the size of inspection teams will, in the course of real inspections, vary quite considerably, depending on the type of facility. It seems useful to envisage, in the case of larger inspection teams, specialization of its members. In view of the need to protect confidential information, the participants in the inspection came to the conclusion that access to all information should be limited to the head of the inspection team.

(Mr. Vajnar, Czechoslovakia)

Fourthly, certain conclusions, albeit only approximate ones, might be drawn with regard to time periods required for various operations. For instance, the elaboration and conclusion of a facility attachment will require about one week. The routine inspection itself could be carried out effectively within one or two days, depending on the type of facility inspected. The preparation of a final report on an inspection might take about five to seven days.

The first stage of the trial inspection of chemical industry, which I am speaking about, confirmed the timeliness and usefulness of the initiative on this matter advanced in February last year by the delegation of the USSR. As was said in the statement of the Government of Czechoslovakia issued on 5 January this year, we are prepared to participate in the second stage of the experiment, namely, inspections with the participation of international inspectors.

Allow me to add one short remark concerning our present proceedings. One of the valuable conclusions to be drawn from the experiment, as well as from the work of the spring session of the Conference on Disarmament to date, as far as the future work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons is concerned, is that it should be as specific and as goal-oriented as possible. What we need is not the redrafting of essentially agreed provisions, while some important issues are still unsolved in the "rolling text". In our view a pragmatic approach would now require concentration of our effort on the solution of these outstanding problems. In this spirit of practical work Czechoslovakia is prepared to provide information on facilities, laboratories and other scientific institutions producing or handling chemicals of relevance to the convention. We could start releasing such information soon.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Vajnar of Czechoslovakia for his statement and for the very kind words he addressed to me. The next speaker is the representative of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Rodrigo.

Mr. RODRIGO (Sri Lanka): Mr. President, it is a great pleasure to see you presiding over the Conference this month. Sri Lanka has centuries-old ties with Japan and has an excellent relationship with your Government and people. That you are a personal friend and an able and wise diplomat well suited to preside over the Conference on Disarmament in this important month, makes it all the more a pleasure. I would also like to express my delegation's appreciation for the commendable leadership of Ambassador Aldo Pugliese over the Conference on Disarmament last month. Let me also welcome our guests, the student group from Yugoslavia who are with us today.

Dramatic developments have taken place in the recent past which logically should augur well for the work of the Conference on Disarmament. The INF agreement is well into the process of implementation under a verification régime that is unprecedented. The fear of negotiation has been overcome and has led to a bold new co-operative relationship between the super-Powers. This has gone a long way to calm the empty rancour of confrontation. In turn, this has rippled out to new agreed approaches by the super-Powers to certain regional issues, which has helped towards their solution or at least their

(Mr. Rodrigo, Sri Lanka)

amelioration. A flow of exchanges has commenced, including on nuclear and outer space issues. Unilateral reductions by the Soviet Union and socialist countries in their armed forces have been mooted.

On the broader multilateral canvas, we have seen the culmination of the CSCE review and the commencement of negotiations on conventional forces in Europe, as well as the continuation of negotiations on confidence - and security-building measures, the latter with the participation of non-aligned and neutral States as well. There are also strong expectations of drastic reductions in strategic nuclear arsenals. Finally, in Paris in January this year 149 countries, by a remarkable act of consensus, together forged an unequivocal political commitment against chemical weapons and called on the Conference on Disarmament to redouble its efforts, as a matter of urgency, to resolve expeditiously remaining issues and to conclude the chemical weapons convention at the earliest date.

The Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons was in many ways a product of the times, and the Government of France needs to be congratulated for articulating and vigorously pursuing an idea whose time had clearly come.

Some aspects about the Paris Conference require particular emphasis. Firstly, it was an endeavour in which 149 nations participated despite proclaimed differences in approach. In short, it was a genuine multilateral effort. Secondly, it was a multilateral exercise that ran simultaneously with ongoing efforts in the Conference on Disarmament to complete an effective ban on chemical weapons. It did not undermine, obstruct or complicate the work of the Conference on Disarmament. Indeed, Paris showed that a broad-based, multilateral and - this is significant - clearly political approach need not upset the highly specialized negotiating process continuing in the Conference on Disarmament. Finally, the consensus reached at the Paris Conference was hailed throughout the world as a manifestation of political determination and will to prevent any recourse to chemical weapons by completely eliminating them.

The strong political message thus emerging from Paris should have found a corresponding echo in the Conference on Disarmament's work. In fact, a task of the Paris Conference was to positively influence the Conference on Disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament's task in turn was to respond to the challenge offered by the Paris document. The Co-ordinator of the Group of 21, the representative of Kenya, has already expressed our concern that the Conference on Disarmament's mandate was not adjusted and strengthened in such a way as to reflect more fully the international will clearly articulated at the Paris Conference.

Much of the success of the Paris Conference was due to the patient preparatory work undertaken by the French delegation, particularly our colleague Ambassador Pierre Morel, who now deservedly steers the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. His thematic or conceptual approach to negotiations takes us beyond the specific individual provisions of the "rolling text" and helps to give a clear perspective of the inter-relationship of different articles and provisions. In this way the convention can be envisaged as a balanced and integrated package which meets the concerns

(Mr. Rodrigo, Sri Lanka)

of all countries. At the same time we should be cautious about any over-conceptualization that might lead to a loss of focus and shift emphasis away from treaty-oriented negotiation.

Discussions in the Working Group on Verification should not lead to a point where the convention is called upon to legislate for every single eventuality. Such an approach could pose restrictive burdens on small chemical industries, particularly in developing countries. We have requested the relevant authorities in Sri Lanka to study how our small chemical industry could respond to a non-production verification régime.

We would like to commend the Chairman of Group 5 for his suggestions with regard to the question of assistance and protection. The provisions in the convention on the question of assistance, together with those for technological co-operation, will help ensure wider adherence. We would like the envisaged Organization to be more actively involved in the provision of assistance and protection. Availability of assistance to a victim State through the envisaged Organization would be a practical and indeed effective manifestation of collective political will that should serve to deter attacks with chemical weapons. Timely protective assistance is essential. Chemical weapons have been used mainly against those who do not have the requisite protective capability. Affected countries should have the confidence to seek security through the convention's protective régime rather than through dubious attempts to develop their own chemical weapons capability. It is in this context that we understand the emerging agreement on the relationship between protection, assistance and the concept of undiminished security. A dependence exclusively on voluntary assistance would not afford the same degree of security as would the availability and provision of assistance through de-politicized mechanisms under the Organization.

I would now like to make some brief remarks on item 1 of our agenda - Nuclear test ban. A quarter-century has passed since the signing of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (the partial test-ban Treaty - PTBT). The distinguished representative of Mexico, Ambassador García Robles, in a statement made at the opening meeting of this spring session, surveyed international efforts spread over three decades in pursuit of multilateral negotiations to achieve a total ban on nuclear testing. It is a matter of regret that negotiations have not taken place since 1980 on this vital question, and that the intermittent work of the Conference on Disarmament within the framework of a subsidiary body during 1982-1983 was inconclusive.

The 1963 partial test-ban Treaty was conceived essentially as an interim measure in the process leading to a comprehensive test ban. The test ban itself, in turn, was placed in the overall context of "the principal aim of general and complete disarmament". Five years later, in a related move, the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty was signed. Its preamble recalls the determination expressed by the parties to the 1963 PTBT "to seek ... discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end".

(Mr. Rodrigo, Sri Lanka)

Sri Lanka became a party to the NPT in the expectation that the Treaty would enhance the security of all States and contribute to international peace and security. A commitment to negotiate a total ban on nuclear testing was an integral part of the NPT consensus. Continued testing has been rationalized on various grounds. Test explosions are said to be necessary, inter alia, to refine and sophisticate weapon designs, to ensure the enduring reliability of stockpiled weapons and to guarantee their safety. Technical studies have, however, indicated that all these functions can be as effectively fulfilled without recourse to actual test explosions. However, the most important argument advanced by those advocating continued testing is of course that it is required to modernize and improve the lethality and accuracy of nuclear missiles and weapons systems so as to maintain that illusory "edge" over those of rivals.

The Foreign Minister of the USSR, Mr. Shevardnadze, stated in Vienna this year that "nuclear missile modernization is a step backward, not forward". The refinement of weapons increases the threat to the security of all nations and is a major obstacle to the pursuit of disarmament measures. The United States-Soviet bilateral talks on nuclear testing, though welcome per se as confidence-building measures, concentrate on regulating rather than eliminating testing. Moreover, bilateral talks of this nature, despite their undoubted scope, do not fully encompass the question of continued testing by other nuclear-weapon States. The imperative for a comprehensive test-ban treaty has been acknowledged and, as stated before, is embodied at least in spirit in the PTBT and the NPT, as well as in the Final Document of SSOD-I.

An unfortunate impasse has prevented the Conference on Disarmament from negotiating on item 1 of its agenda. There are indeed a number of proposals on the table to help finalize an adequate mandate for an ad hoc committee to commence substantive work on this item. While my own delegation has no rigid attitude, we would of course prefer the proposal of the Group of 21 in document CD/829, which does have some flexibility to facilitate a consensus that would meet the concerns of those who are wary about negotiating a treaty in the Conference on Disarmament. The desire to get over this impasse in the Conference on Disarmament has led to the consideration of other measures as well. Such measures have been pursued without in any way seeking to duplicate the mandate and functions of the Conference on Disarmament or to question its central role in multilateral negotiations on a comprehensive test ban. Attention has been given to utilizing the provisions of article II of the PTBT, which contains provision for the consideration and possible adoption of amendments to the Treaty through a conference of parties.

Following an initiative by the delegations of Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and my own delegation, action has been set in motion for the convening of a conference of treaty parties to consider an amendment proposal that would convert the PTBT into a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The requisite number of signatures requesting a conference has I believe been obtained. The supporters of the amendment proposal see it more as a possible spur to the stalled work on the test ban in the Conference on Disarmament than an attempt to usurp its central function in multilateral negotiations. To illustrate this approach, one needs only to consider the acknowledged impact of the Paris Conference of January this year on the work of the Conference on Disarmament relating to the chemical weapons convention.

(Mr. Rodrigo, Sri Lanka)

An amendment conference would provide for a cross-pollination of differing approaches towards the fulfilment of the original promise held out in the preamble of the PTBT, which was to seek the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time. An eventual comprehensive test ban would also have a major impact on every aspect of nuclear disarmament and impose restrictions on the qualitative arms race and the development of new weapons systems, which would in turn contribute to creating a climate of greater confidence and security. Furthermore, the significance of an amendment conference in which would participate a number of States which are not parties to the NPT régime would be that a more favourable atmosphere would be created for its review Conference next year, and thereafter possibly for the renewal and the continuance of the NPT beyond 1995.

Finally, my delegation is glad that the Ad hoc Committee on outer space has been established. We regret that a bout of procedural wrangling is holding up substantive work. We are hopeful that the Chairman of the Committee will be successful in his negotiations. My delegation will revert to the subject of outer space in a later intervention.

In closing, I would like on behalf of my delegation to extend a warm welcome to Ambassador Reese of Australia, Ambassador Houlliez of Belgium, Ambassador Dietze of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Sharma of India, Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan and Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Rodrigo of Sri Lanka for his statement and for the very kind words he addressed to me and to my country. The next speaker is the representative of Romania, Ambassador Dolgu.

Mr. DOLGU (Romania) (translated from French): Mr. President, since I am taking the floor in plenary for the first time since the beginning of this month of March, permit me to extend to you our warmest congratulations on the occasion of your taking up the presidency of the Conference. Our wishes go to the distinguished representative of Japan, your great country, to the patient and skilled diplomat with whom we are familiar as well as to a colleague and friend of outstanding intellectual and human qualities. Through you, Sir, I would also like to extend our thanks to your predecessor, Ambassador Pugliese of Italy, and thank him very much indeed for his substantial and able efforts during the month of February to start up the work of the session. I too would like to welcome among us His Excellency, Ambassador Aamo Karhilo, the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs of Finland, and tell him how interested we were in his statement.

In my statement in plenary on 16 February 1989 I presented some views of a general nature on the status of the disarmament negotiations and major problems therein, as well as possible areas for action in the context of the Conference on Disarmament. On that occasion I stressed the importance of an integrated approach to disarmament, a comprehensive disarmament programme focused on nuclear disarmament and also including measures for the elimination of chemical weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, as well as measures to bring about a substantial reduction in conventional weapons, military personnel and military budgets.



(Mr. Dolgu, Romania)

Today, with your permission, I would like to make a few brief comments on problems covered by the first three agenda items on the Conference's agenda. In our view, nuclear disarmament remains an issue of the highest priority. The debates at the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the resolutions adopted by the last session of the United Nations General Assembly, the realities and indeed the imperatives of international life oblige the Conference and all member States to act responsibly to discharge this urgent priority task. With respect to item 1 on our agenda, we reiterate our appeal for the immediate cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests and for the initiation of negotiations on an agreement for a halt to the refinement of such weapons, with universal participation. As has already been stressed here, the international community should not allow the progressive development of nuclear weapons and the continuance of tests of such weapons to undermine the credibility of the non-proliferation Treaty. If nuclear-weapon testing continues, there is every reason to fear that the qualitative nuclear arms race will prevail over agreements concluded or currently being negotiated on the reduction of such weapons. Nor can it be forgotten that nuclear tests lead straight to a new generation of weapons. And one should not forget, in the euphoria of the various advances in the field of verification, which are most certainly to be welcomed, that the deadly threat which continues to hang over the very existence of mankind stems first and foremost from nuclear weapons.

We would like to take the opportunity once again to stress the importance of the initiative for the amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water in order to extend it to the underground environment, where tests are currently carried out. We have never accepted the legitimacy of nuclear weapons, nor the justifications - of whatever kind - on which they may rest. And we do not think that in recent developments there have been any changes that would lead us to modify our attitude. On the contrary, in view of what has occurred, we find the monopoly of a few countries over nuclear weapons and the efforts some of them are making to hang on to this monopoly and strengthen it even less acceptable. How can one continue to claim that a serious disarmament effort is underway when the sole United Nations multilateral negotiating forum is denied even the opportunity to discuss problems relating to nuclear weapons. The USSR and the United States of America have a special responsibility in the field of disarmament, and they should be encouraged to pursue their bilateral nuclear arms reduction efforts. These efforts and the results therefrom are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for a real, sustained and global disarmament process. They should not and cannot replace multilateral efforts by member States of the Conference on Disarmament and the international community as a whole. For the existence of nuclear weapons, their effects and also the impact of agreements for their reduction concern all countries. In this context I would like to remind you of our proposal of a universal treaty on the prohibition and complete step-by-step elimination of nuclear weapons and the creation of a special body with the participation of all the nuclear Powers, as well as other States, to negotiate such a treaty. The least that can be hoped is that the search will go on for an adequate framework for substantive consideration of item 2 of our agenda, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", as well as item 3, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters".

(Mr. Dolgu, Romania)

Lastly, we would like to take this opportunity to underscore the importance of the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, and the need to make substantial progress in this area, in particular bearing in mind the fourth conference to review the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Dolgu of Romania for his statement and for the very kind words he addressed to me and to my country. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this moment? There seems to be none.

May I now turn to another subject? The secretariat has circulated today the timetable for meetings of the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. In this connection, I should like to recall that Friday 24 and Monday 27 March are official holidays for the United Nations Office at Geneva and, accordingly, there will be no conference services available at that time. Therefore, our timetable for the coming week covers up to Thursday 23 March, the date on which we shall hold our regular plenary meeting. The plenary meeting will be followed immediately by a meeting of the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. This arrangement means that there will be no meeting of the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament on Thursday afternoon next week. In accordance with our practice, the timetable is merely indicative and subject to change, if needed. If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference agrees to the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I now intend to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 21 March 1989, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.30 a.m.

# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.496  
21 March 1989

ENGLISH

---

## FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND NINETY-SIXTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 21 March 1989, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Chusei Yamada (Japan)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 496th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the beginning, may I welcome, on behalf of the Conference, the new head of the delegation of Kenya, His Excellency Ambassador Simon Bullut, who is attending this plenary meeting. Ambassador Bullut has been appointed by his Government to that important position and entrusted with the responsibility of presiding over the Conference during the month of April. In welcoming him, I should also like to pledge to our new colleague the co-operation of the Japanese delegation, in particular when he assumes the responsibilities of the presidency next month.

The Conference begins today its consideration of agenda item 4, entitled "Chemical weapons". Nevertheless, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference. I have on my list of speakers the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Hyltenius.

Mr. HYLTENIUS (Sweden): I have asked for the floor today to speak on the item which in the view of my Government is the most important on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, that is the question of a nuclear test ban. However, before doing so, Mr. President, I should like to express the pleasure of my delegation at seeing you presiding over the Conference. With your personal skill, experience and commitment, the Conference is in very competent hands. It is a crucial month, not least when it comes to the question of the nuclear test ban, and I know that you are making great and constructive efforts to deal with this important matter. I also wish to thank your predecessor, Ambassador Pugliese for the excellent manner in which he conducted his task in the month of February. As I am speaking for the first time before the CD in my new capacity, I should like to thank all those colleagues who have welcomed me and assure them that I look forward to co-operating with them in the future.

For many years now the General Assembly of the United Nations has adopted, with overwhelming majorities, resolutions regarding the urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty, reaffirming the particular responsibility of this Conference in the negotiation of such a treaty. It is a source of grave concern to my Government that the Conference has not been able to move forward on this momentous question. On the political level a comprehensive test-ban treaty would have a tremendous impact. Already the commencement of multilateral negotiations on such a treaty after so many years of stalemate on the item in the Conference would constitute a considerable step forward in the field of disarmament.

The importance of bringing an end to nuclear testing was acknowledged by three of the nuclear-weapon States in the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963. More than a quarter of a century ago they undertook to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and expressed their determination to continue negotiations to that end. Further, in the non-proliferation Treaty of 1968 they undertook to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date. It is hard to conceive of any measure more conducive

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

to the cessation of the nuclear arms race than a comprehensive test-ban treaty. It is appropriate to recall this in view of the forthcoming NPT review conference in 1990.

The Swedish Government considers that the non-proliferation Treaty is of pivotal importance, and that every effort must be made to sustain and strengthen that Treaty. The non-nuclear-weapon parties have done their share, but the nuclear-weapon Powers must do more to live up to the spirit of the Treaty, and especially its article VI. My delegation is convinced that a nuclear test ban would not only hamper vertical nuclear proliferation, but also strongly promote efforts to prevent the horizontal spread of these weapons. Continued vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons may endanger the future of the non-proliferation régime.

It is a positive development that the two leading nuclear-weapon Powers have engaged in bilateral talks on nuclear testing, but it is not enough. This is a matter that concerns all nations, and it should therefore be dealt with in a truly multilateral body. That forum is at hand, but so far the necessary political will to let it assume its responsibility is lacking. In the meantime the nuclear testing continues. Last year 38 nuclear explosions were conducted, 12 by the United States, 17 by the Soviet Union, 8 by France and 1 by China. Since nuclear testing significantly contributes to sustaining the nuclear arms race, partial or gradual approaches implying continued testing cannot be accepted by the great majority of States. In the view of my delegation, such approaches are acceptable only when directly linked to the achievement of a comprehensive test-ban treaty at an early and specified date.

It has been stated that a nuclear test ban should be considered a long-term goal only, and that it is more urgent to reduce nuclear-weapon arsenals. However, a treaty banning all nuclear-weapon tests would not only be the single most important step to slow down the qualitative arms race in this field and prevent the emergence of new nuclear-weapon Powers. It would also be a valuable complement to reductions in nuclear arsenals, as agreed quantitative cuts stand the risk of becoming offset by qualitative improvements. In fact, a comprehensive nuclear test ban would be instrumental in avoiding such a development. Thus, bilateral and multilateral action on arms reductions and disarmament can complement and mutually reinforce each other.

It goes without saying that in order to be effective, a nuclear test-ban treaty must be of global scope. It must also be adequately verifiable. It is a political question to define what capacities should be considered necessary for adequate verification of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. For several years it was argued that the absence of appropriate verification methods constituted the main obstacle in the realization of a nuclear test ban. However, technical developments have now made it possible to meet far-reaching verification requirements. Verification has therefore become a political rather than a technical issue.

The Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events has just concluded

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

its twenty-seventh session. The new global seismic verification system emerging as a result of the work of the expert Group is based on the exchange of wave-form and parameter data and the processing of such data at international data centres. This system will provide participating States with a compilation of globally collected high-quality data that will greatly facilitate the verification of a test ban. The ongoing large-scale technical test, approved by the Conference on Disarmament, will allow evaluation of the system's performance. For a successful test and for the final design of the system, the co-operation and support of a large number of countries around the globe are essential.

It has been proposed that a global seismic monitoring system should be put into routine operation to gain experience from the operation of an international monitoring system and to demonstrate achievable capabilities. Once the ongoing redesign and testing of the new system is concluded, this could be an interesting possibility. In addition to the establishment of a global seismic monitoring system, complementary verification measures will be needed. It is essential to improve the verification capability in selected critical areas, such as test sites or areas containing cavities or low-coupling ground material, where the seismic signals from explosions will be substantially reduced.

By establishing seismic stations around test sites, weak explosions, even below one ton, can be detected. On-site inspections by international teams of observers would enhance confidence further. The monitoring of earthquakes within the nuclear-weapon States can be improved through the use of networks of internal seismic stations. Measures and procedures to ascertain the authenticity of data from these stations are essential. On-site inspection, conducted upon invitation, should be used to confirm that large chemical explosions, for instance in mining operations, are non-nuclear.

In its draft CTB treaty submitted in 1983, Sweden proposed that a global system for monitoring atmospheric radioactivity should be established in order to provide an assurance that clandestine explosions are not conducted in the atmosphere. We must not design a verification system which provides an assurance against clandestine underground tests but is less capable of detecting atmospheric explosions. Satellite images of the surface of the Earth can give valuable contributions to the verification of a nuclear test ban by monitoring the infrastructure and other evidence of nuclear testing in selected areas, for instance existing test sites and areas where peaceful nuclear explosions have been conducted. Satellite data could also assist in the interpretation of seismic events which have not been positively identified as earthquakes through seismic data alone. If satellite data show that an event is located in an area which lacks the infrastructure - roads, for instance - necessary to conduct a nuclear explosion, the possibility of a clandestine test might be excluded.

Many verification arrangements will be critically dependent on the global and secure exchange of information. This political need cannot be met by

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

commercial telecommunication services controlled by a limited number of countries. In this context, a recent Swedish study of a special telecommunications satellite system may be of particular interest. I am referring to an independent data exchange satellite system which could be established for the sole purpose of exchanging data related to arms limitation and disarmament treaties. It would not only provide a tool for the global exchange of verification data but also secure the authenticity of reported data. For the verification of a nuclear test-ban treaty, such a satellite system could facilitate special verification arrangements. It might be used for the direct and secure transfer of data from in-country monitoring stations and inspectors to international data centres, as well as to participating countries.

The Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts provides an excellent forum for the establishment of a high-quality international seismic verification system. It may also be suitable for some additional tasks related to the verification of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Expert deliberations are needed to pave the way for the implementation of such verification arrangements as on-site inspection and observation, the monitoring of airborne radioactivity and the use of satellite images for test ban verification. They give rise to technical and scientific questions similar to those presently addressed in connection with a global seismic system. My delegation, therefore, believes that it might be appropriate to ask the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to address these matters too.

The many efforts over the years to advance the nuclear test-ban issue in this Conference have hitherto been fruitless. Not even a mandate for an ad hoc committee has been agreed upon. My delegation finds the continued postponement of concrete work towards a nuclear test-ban treaty unacceptable. The efforts to elaborate different mandates in great detail have in fact created a stalemate in the Conference. Experience proves that a broad and far-reaching mandate sometimes yields only very modest results, while a comparatively weak mandate may be adequate to allow for considerable progress on substance.

During this session of the Conference several delegations from different groups have expressed flexibility as to the formulation of the mandate for an ad hoc committee. Whereas my delegation favours the mandate as recommended by the Group of 21 in CD/829, it also regards the compromise proposal in CD/863 as a viable approach, containing as it does a full commitment to a nuclear test-ban treaty. Given the impasse in the CD on the nuclear test-ban issue over the years, some States have requested that the matter should be dealt with through the convening of a conference to consider the amendment of the partial test-ban treaty. It is understandable that the frustration over the lack of progress in the CD has produced efforts to advance the issue elsewhere. My delegation, however, is of the opinion that it is in the Conference on Disarmament that the question should be dealt with. The CD is designated as the single multilateral body for disarmament negotiations. Action on the nuclear test ban must, therefore, be taken here, and now.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden for his statement and for the very kind words he addressed to me. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this moment? There seems to be none.

As there is no other business for today, I shall now adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 23 March, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 10.30 a.m.



# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.497  
23 March 1989

ENGLISH

---

## FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND NINETY-SEVENTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Thursday, 23 March 1989, at 10 a.m.

President:

Mr. Chusei Yamada

(Japan)

The PRESIDENT: The 497th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is now called to order.

At the outset, I should like to extend a warm welcome, on behalf of the Conference, to Mr. Yasushi Akashi, Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs of the United Nations, who is participating in this plenary meeting. I should like to take this opportunity to express our deep appreciation to the Under-Secretary-General for the valuable support that he is providing to the Conference by making available to us all the substantive services needed for the work of the Conference and its subsidiary bodies, without which we cannot fulfil our assigned duties. We also appreciate his vigorous effort in reinforcing the activities of the Department of Disarmament Affairs. The Under-Secretary-General will be here with us until the end of next week, when he proceeds to Lagos to take part in the Disarmament Training Programme hosted by the United Nations in co-operation with the Government of Nigeria. I wish him a successful mission in Geneva, and I am sure that his consultations with the members of the Conference will prove very useful for our activities.

The Conference continues today its consideration of agenda item 4, entitled "Chemical weapons". However, in conformity with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference. In that connection, I should like to inform the members that today the Chairman of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events will introduce the Ad hoc Group's fifth report to the Conference, contained in document CD/903, and in addition its progress report to the Conference on Disarmament on its twenty-seventh session, which appears in document CD/904.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representative of Australia, the Chairman of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events and the representatives of the German Democratic Republic and Mongolia.

Mr. REESE (Australia): In making my first major statement to the Conference on Disarmament today, I wish to address the issue we are considering this month, chemical weapons, but also to say something about two other important issues, nuclear testing and outer space.

International co-operation to ensure a more stable and secure world has decidedly passed the stage of being a vision. Increasingly we are seeing engagement at the bilateral, regional and multilateral level to conclude significant and durable arms control agreements. Indeed, the growing list of concrete achievements and processes in train demonstrates that nations are translating this commonly shared knowledge into a working reality. The arms control and disarmament treaty network is expanding, as are our common efforts to establish a régime of greater predictability and hence stability through a mutually supportive network of confidence-building measures in military, human, social, economic and environmental fields.

(Mr. Reese, Australia)

If we take 1985 as a watershed year, the list of achievements in arms control and disarmament at the bilateral, multilateral and regional level since that time are indeed considerable. They include the INF Treaty; the successful conclusion of the third NPT review conference; the successful outcome of the CSCE process; the launching of the negotiations on conventional armed forces in Europe; the signature of the India/Pakistan agreement not to attack one another's nuclear installations and facilities; the conclusion and coming into force of the Treaty of Rarotonga and the ratification by China and the Soviet Union of the protocols to that Treaty relevant to them; the conclusion by the Soviet Union and China of voluntary safeguards under the IAEA; the successful conclusion of the Paris Conference which gave renewed political impetus to the chemical weapons negotiations here in the Conference on Disarmament; as well as the ongoing negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on nuclear and space matters and on issues related to nuclear testing.

We are all aware none the less that the tasks that remain before us are formidable. The 40 nations gathered here, as well as those who participate in our work as observers, are united by a common commitment to making a tangible contribution to the achievement of international security and stability through the negotiation, as appropriate, of effectively verifiable disarmament agreements. They recognize that this is not only desirable, but also necessary. We in the CD do not work, however, in a vacuum. Our work is often shaped by processes and events which take place outside this forum. For example, members of the NPT are about to embark on preparations for the fourth NPT review conference, to take place in Geneva next year. Regional developments, such as the Treaty of Rarotonga, can also have an impact on the way we look at particular issues. Bilateral arrangements can impact even more directly on our work. Whether we like it or not, much of what we deal with here will be determined and strengthened by basic understandings which must be reached between those of us who bear the heaviest responsibility for ensuring that the fragile strategic balance is put on a more stable footing. Nowhere is this more true than in the nuclear and space field. The benefits that accrue to all of us from a successful outcome of the bilateral nuclear and space talks cannot be denied. We do, however, rely on the full co-operation of the two major Powers in helping us in our joint exercise of laying the groundwork for basic understandings which must be reached in the CD.

In my statement today, I wish to identify, in a concrete way, some of the contributions the Conference on Disarmament can make to multilateral arms control and disarmament efforts on the three agenda items: nuclear test ban, the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and chemical weapons. All three of these items represent disarmament objectives which can be pursued in their own right. They are ideally suited, indeed require, global and hence multilateral solutions. The CD is engaged in fully-fledged negotiations on only one of these three agenda items - chemical weapons. While consensus does not yet exist to launch negotiations on the other two items, there is a pressing need to begin work on the basic technical and legal groundwork of these issues. Failing to do so would understandably be interpreted as a dereliction of duty on the part of the CD.

(Mr. Reese, Australia)

Rule 23 of our rules of procedure acknowledges that not all items on the CD's agenda will be immediately suited to negotiations, and that the CD can effectively perform its functions through the establishment of subsidiary bodies with mandates which are not necessarily negotiating mandates. It is in this spirit that I wish to suggest a number of steps that we in the CD might take to advance our work on a nuclear test ban and the question of preventing an arms race in outer space.

The fact that agreement to commence negotiations on a nuclear test ban still eludes us - a fact which my Government very much regrets - does not obviate the need for substantial technical groundwork on the parameters and verification requirements for a global nuclear test ban. It is noteworthy that members of this Conference have not refused in principle to engage in such work. Disagreement has tended to focus on the mandate under which such work should be conducted. This in turn revolves around a failure to reach an agreement on whether a nuclear test ban is an urgent, pressing or long-term objective, whether it is a disarmament measure which should be concluded in its own right, or whether it should be realized in the context of corresponding reductions in, and the ultimate elimination of, nuclear weapons.

Practical work on nuclear testing issues has in fact already commenced at the bilateral level. The United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to commence negotiations on nuclear testing issues on the basis of full-scale, stage-by-stage negotiations, placing the complete cessation of nuclear testing within the context of an effective disarmament process which would pursue, among other things, the goal of the reduction of nuclear weapons and, ultimately, their elimination. In implementing the first objective of these testing negotiations, the two sides agreed to commence practical work to identify and agree on effective verification measures to enable them to ratify the United States-USSR threshold test-ban Treaty of 1974 and the peaceful nuclear explosions Treaty of 1976. They also agreed to use, to the extent appropriate, the verification measures for the TTBT in further nuclear test limitation agreements which may subsequently be reached. The Joint Verification Experiment relevant to the TTBT was duly conducted, and we look forward to the fulfilment of the subsequent steps envisaged in this important bilateral agreement.

Irrespective of the negotiating premise on which these talks are based, they do attest to the fact that the technical and organizational elements for the CTBT form the basis of an interdiction to test, and that they will require substantial and painstaking elaboration. In this regard the experience of the JVE and the current work of the Group of Scientific Experts to examine seismic events speak for themselves. Australia firmly believes that the most appropriate forum for practical multilateral work on a CTBT is within the forum of the CD, a view which seems to be shared by all members of the Conference.

The CD is, at the same time, large enough and small enough to make the conduct of such work manageable while drawing on an already considerable and representative fund of technical and practical knowledge and know-how, of

(Mr. Reese, Australia)

which the work of the GSE is an integral component. We take note of, and share, the renewed sense of urgency underlining the appeals issued by those who have addressed this issue during our plenary sessions this year. We share their call for flexibility on all sides to resolve the procedural argumentation over the mandate in order to enable the Conference to commence substantive work on a nuclear test ban. We also welcome signals of greater flexibility from a number of delegations on the mandate question, and hope that the Conference will be able to profit from these signals in the very near future.

Whatever the argument about the context within which a nuclear test ban should be negotiated, the CD's purpose must remain the complete cessation of nuclear testing by all States in all environments for all time. Australia has been active in its support for an effectively verifiable CTBT as soon as possible. Practical work on a CTB should therefore be conducted on the understanding that we are identifying and analysing technologies which would be applied globally and equitably. While the fine print on scope could realistically be left pending for a while, the Committee would need to agree that a future CTBT must include not only underground testing but also atmospheric testing, testing in outer space and underwater testing.

On verification issues alone, which could constitute the core of a CTBT, an NTB Ad hoc Committee could identify, as a first step, and then go on to elaborate, methods for monitoring a nuclear test ban, including both their capabilities and shortcomings. Consideration should be given to seismological methods, radioactive methods, optical methods, radiometric methods, on-site inspections and the operational requirements of a global monitoring system. The Committee would need to make an assessment of the cost of a nuclear test ban verification system and devise a system of determining the authenticity of data. Evasion scenarios would also have to be addressed.

Australia views the creation of an international seismic network to be established, tested, and then further refined to assure maximum confidence in its capability, to be the principal means of verifying compliance with the CTBT. This should form an essential part of the CD's practical work in the quest for a CTBT through the work of the GSE, although delegations would have to give some thought to the relationship between the work of the GSE and that of a committee, in the event that one is established.

We note that the availability of comprehensive empirical data on past nuclear tests would be of great assistance in creating an effective international seismic network, which Australia has sought to bring into the public domain through our notification-of-nuclear-tests resolution. Australia is also continuing in its efforts to expand bilateral seismic co-operation, which we see as part of a large effort to lay the basis for an effective functioning seismic network. We would encourage other members of the CD to explore the ways and means of engaging in similar co-operative arrangements.

The elements that I have identified are not intended to be exclusive, but serve to illustrate the considerable range of issues which are essential to an effective and reliable comprehensive test-ban treaty régime, and on which an ad hoc committee in the CD could commence useful work tomorrow.

(Mr. Reese, Australia)

While the essential elements of a nuclear test ban are already well known, and have achieved a large measure of consensus, the same cannot be said of the broader and far more complex issue of preventing an arms race in outer space. The prevention of an arms race in outer space remains a priority Australian objective in view of its strong implications for global stability and the prospects for new bilateral United States/Soviet Union agreements to reduce their nuclear arsenals. We firmly believe that the anti-ballistic missile Treaty, in its traditional interpretation, is critical for a stable strategic nuclear relationship and the achievement of reductions in strategic arsenals. We therefore attach major significance to the fact that the prevention of an arms race in outer space is one of the agreed objectives of the NST negotiations.

We recognize that the super-Power negotiations on space/defence issues will continue for the foreseeable future to set limits on what we can do here in the CD. We also recognize that progress in these negotiations, and understandings reached at the bilateral level, will have a significant impact on the work of the CD. However, the acceptability of a non-negotiating mandate in the CD is a direct function of the realism and thoroughness with which the CD is allowed to examine the relevant issues. The need for multilateral involvement in the prevention of an arms race in outer space becomes increasingly pressing as more States become engaged in space activities. Existing and future uses of outer space have and will continue to have a profound impact on the security of all States.

The programme of work for 1988 continues to provide us with an appropriate framework for undertaking work on item 5 of our agenda, but the potential offered by that programme of work continues to be under-utilized. The Committee has hitherto failed to reach the consensus essential for determining the need to broaden or complement the existing legal régime. In a subject area as legally and technically complex as that pertaining to outer space matters, this remains one of the fundamental and yet unfulfilled tasks of our Committee. What can we in the Committee do to bring us closer to reaching such common understandings?

As a first step, the Committee should broaden its collective understanding of individual legal instruments relevant to outer space and the extent of their coverage, both as single instruments and in their interrelationship. This would require reaching agreement on the meaning of basic terms such as "peaceful uses", "militarization" and "stabilizing". This could assist us in determining what constitute permitted or prohibited uses of space, following which we could examine the scope for identifying relevant thresholds of tolerance in satellite functions.

We should be able to identify and reach agreement on the range of measures that can be taken to ensure better compliance with the existing legal régime, and compile a list of confidence-building measures relevant to outer space. Such measures could include the broadening of membership of existing legal instruments and stricter interpretation of the letter of instruments

(Mr. Reese, Australia)

such as the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space - as outlined in the Canadian/Australian paper tabled in 1988 as working paper CD/OS/WP.25. In this regard identifying measures for greater transparency in military and military-related uses of space would make a valuable contribution to our collective search for creating better conditions for collective stability. A related question would be to examine the possibilities for a durable régime to protect those space assets which have been identified as contributing to international stability and peace.

Technology is now sufficiently advanced to provide reasonable assurances that bilateral arms control agreements can be effectively verified. The availability to multinational bodies of strategically significant technologies such as space-based remote sensing of spacecraft or of the Earth has also become a reality. The examination of evolving verification technologies and how they could be put to good use in issues related to arms control in outer space is therefore another area which warrants serious examination by our Ad hoc Committee.

Verification is also of central importance to the chemical weapons convention, and it is this particular aspect of the current negotiations of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons that I wish to address today. The Ad hoc Committee has made encouraging progress in the verification of the destruction of stockpiles, and to a considerable extent in the area of destruction of chemical weapons production facilities. But verification of non-production of both chemical weapons and of their specific precursors is an area which my delegation considers requires further elaboration.

The proposed monitoring régime for both schedule [1] and schedule [2] chemicals is now well developed. There is general agreement that monitoring of schedule [2] chemicals would involve data reporting which will be the foundation for on-site inspections by an international inspectorate with monitoring by tamper-resistant instruments as an adjunct to the on-site visits. The frequency of such visits will then be determined both by the confidence which can be placed in such instruments and the requirement to service them. There are of course other details which remain to be resolved, but these do not appear insurmountable.

Schedule [3] chemicals, by contrast, are made in large amounts and have a multitude of uses, so to monitor these with the same stringency as is envisaged for schedule [2] chemicals would clearly be impractical. None the less the importance of these chemicals and their relevance to the chemical weapons convention is almost as great as that of schedule [2] chemicals. Schedule [3] chemicals have been used recently as chemical weapons, and could conceivably be so used again. Others are precursors of schedule [2] chemicals and/or schedule [1] chemicals.

Australia's concern about schedule [3] chemicals can be illustrated graphically by looking at two such chemicals: phosgene, which caused massive numbers of casualties in the First World War, and which is a commonly used precursor for plastics, pesticides and pharmaceuticals; and trimethyl phosphite, which is a commonly used precursor for pesticides, flame retardants

(Mr. Reese, Australia)

and oil additives. The over-production of phosgene is quite common in the chemical industry, although this is normally not a particular problem. During a production "run" what phosgene is not required is simply burnt off. But it would be technically easy to separate off and contain a chemical which can provide a hideous form of death. Hence our concern to see facilities which either produce, or use, phosgene come under more rigorous monitoring than is currently envisaged.

Trimethyl phosphite can be converted to a phosphorite by using an appropriate catalyst, and the resulting substance can then be converted, in the same reaction vessel, to form compound No. 2 of schedule [2]. The further addition of chemicals not in schedule [2] or [3] to this same reaction vessel would result in the production of Sarin, and the neat agent could then be tapped directly into munitions. Safety measures would be needed to protect personnel, but these would not be unusual in a modern facility.

By making this brief foray into the world of chemistry, I am drawing attention to an essentially simple chemical process in order to underscore Australia's concern that schedule [3] chemicals must come under an appropriate inspection régime if the chemical weapons convention is to be perceived as one which provides the necessary assurances to ensure full compliance. Australia, together with a number of other countries, has conducted national trial inspections, and we are hopeful that when the results of all of these are fully analysed and evaluated, we will have a clearer picture of the problems before us and, hopefully, a better idea of how to resolve these.

Although we are still evaluating the results of our own trial inspection, certain preliminary conclusions are already clear. Monitoring of the civil chemical industry will necessarily involve a significant element of intrusion. Adequate verification will necessarily require the disclosure of confidential and possibly commercially sensitive information, the extent of this depending in part on the nature of the facility being inspected. From the industry perspective at least, confidentiality safeguards will need to be built into the inspection processes, to ensure that such information is afforded the maximum possible amount of protection.

We are conscious that the monitoring of schedule [3], or dual-purpose, chemicals raises particular problems for the chemical industry, but are confident that these concerns can be accommodated through the inclusion of a confidentiality annex within the chemical weapons convention. In this regard, I would confirm my delegation's strong support for the approach currently being taken by the Chairman of Working Group 1 on such an annex. I should add that we are far less attracted to the notion of adding confidentiality "markers" throughout the convention, as we believe that these will only overburden the text and, possibly, give a distorted picture of what we are trying to achieve.

Australia's clear position is that an unequal balance has to be struck between verification and confidentiality. Verification must be the overriding objective, and the protection of confidential information must be secondary to this objective. Australia also believes that some information should not be



(Mr. Reese, Australia)

subject to any confidentiality safeguards, and in this regard we welcome the move to greater openness by States about their chemical production and facilities, as a contribution to greater confidence which will help move the chemical weapons negotiations forward. For its part, Australia has prepared a response to the questions set out in the Federal Republic of Germany's working paper CD/828, and I have asked the Secretary-General of the Conference to distribute this to delegations in the usual way.

At the beginning of my statement I noted that the work of the CD can always benefit from complementary exercises which are conducted outside this forum. The Paris Conference on chemical weapons exemplifies this. Certainly the exchange of views in Paris helped broaden the international community's understanding of the work we are doing here in Geneva and, clearly, helped enrich our own thinking on a number of issues. As many before me have said, the Paris Conference also helped give a political impetus to our work here.

My Government has recently taken the initiative to propose the convening in Australia of a conference between representatives of government and industry later this year. Australia considers that dialogue between government and industry must be developed to ensure that there is no inadvertent association between the chemical industry and chemical weapons programmes. We are also hopeful that a practical exchange of views between government and industry will lead not only to a shared understanding of the problems facing industry, but to greater support for the aims and requirements of the chemical weapons convention. I would also recall that Australia is currently pursuing an initiative in our own region to promote the shared perception with our neighbours that chemical weapons are inimical to regional security. A concurrent objective is to enhance the universal acceptance of and adherence to the chemical weapons convention. However, the Conference on Disarmament must remain the focus of our efforts. This applies especially to the ongoing negotiations on a chemical weapons convention, but also to a range of nuclear testing and space issues where the participation of experts at the delegation level continues at this stage to be the most productive use of the resources available to us, and the most effective organizational format for making substantive progress on the full range of items on our agenda.

Mr. DAHLMAN (Chairman of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events): It is a pleasure to introduce today the Group's fifth report on technical concepts for a global system for international seismic data exchange, contained in document CD/903. I will also report on the Group's recent meeting, held from 6 to 17 March, and introduce its progress report, contained in document CD/904. This was the twenty-seventh session of the Group, and experts and representatives from 26 countries attended.

The fifth report now presented is a consensus report and the result of the joint efforts of the experts in the Group. Seven appendices containing detailed and technical material will be finalized at the Group's next session. These appendices are to be considered as an integral part of the fifth report. The Group's scientific secretary, Dr. Frode Ringdal of Norway,

(Mr. Dahlman, Chairman of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events)

played a most important role in drafting the report. The support of the secretariat in preparing and translating the document is also greatly appreciated.

The fifth report of the Group describes the design of a modern, international seismic data exchange system aimed at assisting States in their national monitoring of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. The Group has been working on such an international system since 1976, and you may ask in which way the concept and the technologies have been developed. The basic concept is unchanged. The system remains a service facility with the aim of providing globally collected and compiled data to assist States parties to a comprehensive test-ban treaty in their national monitoring. The principal design of the system remains the same too. A network of more than 50 globally distributed stations will provide information through agreed communication channels to international data centres. At these centres data are to be processed in a standardized way and submitted for the use by participating States.

If the basic concept and the principal design remain, technology has changed most significantly. The system presented in the Group's fifth report is based on today's modern technology and the latest scientific achievements. This will create a far more efficient system which will provide not only more data but, most important, data of considerably higher quality. The aim is to significantly improve the confidence with which a future comprehensive test-ban treaty could be monitored. Seismic stations operated by individual States form the basic element of the system. A high-quality network must contain stations based on modern technology and digital data recording which are located in areas where the background disturbances are low. The use of "array stations", where a number of sensors are placed in a suitable pattern to form an antenna, will further enhance the detection capability. The Ad hoc Group has agreed on a "CD station" concept as a standard for stations in the new system. Preliminary technical specifications of such stations, including arrays, have been worked out and will be tested during the forthcoming large-scale technical test. To obtain a high-performance network it is essential that high-quality stations are operated all over the globe. To achieve the necessary global coverage, new high-quality stations will have to be installed in some regions of the world, notably in Africa and South America. The receiving conditions for seismic signals are expected to be extremely good in some of these locations. National data centres will be the participating States' gateways into the international system. These centres will be responsible for collecting and reporting data to be exchanged, and for receiving information from the international system. Although the organization of these national centres may be different in different countries, it would be useful to have compatible equipment and procedures at such centres. Technically it will also be possible for participating countries to operate joint national data centre facilities should they so wish.

(Mr. Dahlman, Chairman of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events)

International data centres (IDCs) are the corner-stones of the envisaged system, where data are collected and analysed and from which processed information is transmitted to all participants. At the international data centres the introduction of new scientific methods and modern technology has been most significant. In the first system presented by the Group the processing at IDCs was based on reported parameter data only, whereas in the present system it is based on routinely provided wave-form data. The routine use of wave-form data from globally distributed stations is expected to dramatically improve the quality of the analysis, in particular by improving the precision of the source parameters of seismic events. To develop the methods and procedures needed to routinely analyse wave-form data from a global network of stations involves breaking new scientific and technical ground. Much has been accomplished, but more research remains to be done. Current plans are to establish four experimental international data centres, to be located at Canberra, Moscow, Stockholm and Washington D.C.

Rapid and reliable communication links with sufficient transmission capability constitute an integral part of the global system. The recent dramatic development of communication facilities makes it possible to transmit large volumes of data from one part of the globe to another. This important development has paved the way for the new system based on the routine exchange of wave-form data. It is agreed, in the fifth report, that efficient means of communication, including use of the improved World Meteorological Organization Global Telecommunications System channels, should be established for data exchange between national and international data centres. To handle the heavy traffic between the IDCs, dedicated high-speed computer-to-computer links are to be established. Different technical arrangements for such communication will be tested.

The Group's fifth report gives the basic design of a modern verification system, which, like all new technical designs, must be adequately tested before it is put into operation. During its session last summer the Group agreed to start such testing, under the title of the Group's Second Technical Test (GSETT-2), using a stage-by-stage approach. The first stage consists of a large number of mostly small-scale national, bilateral and multilateral experiments to test individual components of the system. Some of these tests have already been concluded and were reviewed at the Group's meeting; others are going on at present, and still others will start soon. A review of these so-called start-up tests has been compiled by the Co-ordinator of the test, Mr. Peter Basham of Canada, and annexed to the progress report. As can be seen from this document, many countries have begun the development and testing of national facilities required for later phases of GSETT-2.

The Group also noted that work is well under way to establish the four experimental IDCs. An experimental IDC represents a considerable effort not only in computer hardware but to an even greater extent in computer programs or software. To develop and implement compatible software is thus an

(Mr. Dahlman, Chairman of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events)

important co-operative effort among the four international data centres. Such joint efforts would greatly facilitate not only the establishment of these international centres but also their day-to-day operation aimed at achieving identical results.

The Group also reviewed tentative results from a wave-form collection experiment conducted from 1 to 3 December 1988. So far 13 countries have contributed more than 2,000 wave-form signals to the data base. Further contributions are expected to create a test set of data to be used in the development of the experimental IDCs.

The second stage of the experiment involves the entire global system. The intention is to gradually bring the system into operation by repeated short-time experiments, for example by operating the system one day a week. The Group tentatively decided that this second phase will start in January 1990. This will require appropriate facilities and procedures to be put in place by that time. It is important that this experiment should enjoy widespread participation to achieve its goals. This will require the co-operation of a large number of countries around the world, hopefully including also countries not presently participating in the Group's work. Preparatory work has to be initiated soon in countries intending to participate.

The third and final phase of the experiment will involve the full operation of the whole global system, and is aimed at providing experience from the continuous operation of a global seismic data exchange system. It has so far not been decided when this phase will commence and how long it will last. It is, however, reasonable to expect that it may start in the autumn of 1990 and last for three to six months.

The Ad hoc Group suggests that its next session, subject to approval by the Conference on Disarmament, should be convened from 24 July to 4 August 1989 in Geneva. Between now and this forthcoming meeting hundreds of scientists will be working at seismological stations and national and international data centres around the world. They will develop scientific and technical methods and conduct bilateral and multilateral experiments to facilitate the final design and implementation of a global seismic verification system. This work is the backbone of the efforts of the Ad hoc Group. It is a practical demonstration of how science and technology are being used today to promote arms limitation and disarmament.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Dr. Dahlman, Chairman of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts, for presenting two reports to the Conference. I would also like, through him, to thank the members of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts for their valuable contributions to the work of the Conference.

Mr. DIETZE (German Democratic Republic): At the outset, I too would like to welcome our dear colleague and friend, Under-Secretary-General Mr. Akashi. We appreciate very much his dedication to disarmament, his personal engagement and the attention he is always paying to the work of our Conference.

In my statement today I should like to deal with the complete cessation of nuclear-weapon tests. This task has assumed new dimensions against the background of enhanced confidence in international relations and growing co-operation in the preservation of peace. Multiple opportunities have been shaping up for stemming the nuclear threat hanging over mankind. Among the possibilities offered, the nuclear test ban occupies a crucial place. The two great nuclear Powers have pushed open the door for nuclear disarmament and have undertaken further steps towards this end. And we all know that the road leading there cannot be covered by the two Powers alone. The broad dialogue aimed at groping for common answers to the nuclear issues has to be continued, all the more so since rather contradictory phenomena have become apparent in this respect.

The INF Treaty is material evidence of the understanding that more nuclear weapons do not spell more but less security. Therefore, we expect that the Soviet-American negotiations on the halving of their strategic offensive weapons, while strictly adhering to the ABM Treaty, will soon be resumed and will result in the agreed objective. This prospect needs to be endorsed with all determination. Measures to offset the reductions already achieved or those envisaged by introducing qualitatively new nuclear systems are counter-productive, in terms of both the effects on stability and prospects for further headway in nuclear disarmament. Since a nuclear war cannot be won and should never be fought, it is indispensable to consistently continue the process of nuclear disarmament. Closely bound up with this question is the strengthening of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The cessation of nuclear-weapon tests is presently acquiring even greater significance for bringing about further accords, preventing counter-productive trends and strengthening the principle of non-proliferation. The basis for reaching consensus on this issue has broadened, owing to positive developments in the international climate and in nuclear disarmament. Due to these propitious trends, the potentialities of the CD have also increased. At present, the Conference is firmly committed to efforts to see to it that the mandate of the Paris Conference is fulfilled and the negotiations on the comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons come to fruition, and this is undeniable. However, this provides no justification for losing sight of the task concerning a nuclear test ban. Quite a number of statements delivered at the spring session have testified to the growing preparedness to address this issue, the issue of a nuclear test ban, in a constructive and flexible manner. We concur with this attitude. After so many years of stalemate on the item of a nuclear test ban, we have reached a point where declarations have to be followed by deeds.

I think the contribution of the Conference on Disarmament to this effect is indisputable. The comprehensive nature of such a ban, its universal character and indispensable world-wide co-operation in verifying compliance with such a treaty necessitate a multilateral framework for its elaboration,

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

for which the Conference on Disarmament offers the most favourable pre-conditions. In this organ valuable experience and material are available. No matter how the question of a nuclear test ban is approached, it is certain that the Disarmament Conference cannot be bypassed.

The setting up of a committee on a nuclear test ban would create the necessary prerequisites to start work on these issues, and our assessment indicates that conditions for agreement on a mandate for such a committee have improved. On that score, Mr. President, my delegation welcomes your endeavours to take this timely step. We fully support the plea for co-operation and flexibility. In the past, my delegation, like several others, has made contributions to matters of substance in terms of a test ban. I should like to refer in this connection, in particular, to the "Basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests", which were submitted by Bulgaria, Hungary, the German Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. I am referring to document CD/756. Furthermore, Australia suggested the establishment of a global seismic network as part of a monitoring and verification system (CD/717); and I would also like to mention working paper CD/712 on "Nuclear test ban verification" put forward by Sweden.

Today my delegation would like to introduce working paper CD/902, distributed this morning and now before you, which addresses special aspects of verification of a nuclear test ban. This paper rests on the realization that, besides seismic elements, further methods and techniques can be applied to ensure reliable verification of a comprehensive test ban. A verification system would, in our view, be made up of the following main components: seismological monitoring (we have just listened to the report presented); means of surveillance of atmospheric radioactivity; other technical means of verification (e.g. remote sensing by satellite); and on-site inspection. In this regard, in-depth consideration would be necessary to clearly indicate their interrelationship. Furthermore, options for a step-by-step approach in establishing the verification systems would have to be considered, covering all those components. It would also be essential to investigate and assess the different technical means of verification.

Administrative and organizational questions pertaining to the verification system should accordingly be taken into account. Here we have in mind, for example, the composition and functions of the organ or organs of the verification mechanism. All States parties to a future CTBT must receive information on its implementation. This includes data obtained through national technical means of verification, which requires the establishment of designated information channels. It is no less important to inform all States parties to a future CTBT on pertinent developments in science and technology, which are decisive for improving and streamlining the verification system.

Finally, it is imperative to investigate the possibilities of co-operation in the development and production of the required technical equipment. We propose the conduct of experiments which involve different components of the verification system. In this effort, use should be made of

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

the experience gained by the USSR and the United States during their Joint Verification Experiments, as well as by the Group of Scientific Experts during technical tests on the exchange of level II data. The aforementioned questions should also be considered by a special group of experts to be set up, comprising specialists from different scientific and technological fields. As we see it, this group should not be identical with the already existing Group of Seismological Experts.

We followed with interest the statement made by our distinguished colleague and representative of Sweden, Ambassador Hyltenius, at the session on Tuesday, in which he proposed that the Group of Seismological Experts could undertake additional tasks related to the verification of a nuclear test ban. We welcome the fact that this suggestion is basically geared to the same objective as our proposal now before you. There is ample ground, I think, for holding an exchange of views on how to translate common ideas into reality.

In conclusion, let me air an observation on the work of the Group of Seismological Experts. The report on its last session, just introduced by the Chairman of the Group, Dr. Ola Dahlman, deserves our special attention. At this juncture, we should like to express our keen appreciation for the diligent work carried out by the members of the Group on difficult technical matters concerning a global system of international seismic data exchange. We are convinced that its report will also be instrumental in developing a future verification mechanism.

Mr. ERENDU (Mongolia): At the outset, on behalf of the Mongolian delegation, I would like to welcome amongst us Mr. Akashi, Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs of the United Nations, and wish him every success on his mission in Geneva.

The United Nations General Assembly in its resolution 43/70 called upon the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its consideration of the question of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects, taking into account all relevant proposals and initiatives.

This February, in order to facilitate our discussion under item 5 of the agenda, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space" the delegation of Canada made available to the Conference a compendium of plenary statements and working papers tabled in plenary during the 1988 session, which is contained in document CD/891. In our view this useful document will undoubtedly promote the intensification of the Ad hoc Committee's work.

Today, in view of the importance and urgency of the task of preventing an arms race in outer space, the delegation of Mongolia, as a further step towards a more systematic and orderly discussion of the proposals and initiatives which are currently under consideration in the Ad hoc Committee on outer space, is presenting to the Conference on Disarmament a document entitled "Review of proposals and initiatives of the States members of the Conference on Disarmament under agenda item 5, 'Prevention of an arms race in outer space'". The document, contained in CD/905 - CD/OS/WP.28, is now being

(Mr. Erendo, Mongolia)

distributed by the secretariat. In submitting this review, my delegation hopes that it will make an appropriate contribution to efforts of the member States of the Conference on Disarmament directed towards the substantive elaboration of the proposals and initiatives tabled before the Ad hoc Committee. We hope that it will promote in-depth analysis of their complex political, military, scientific, technical and international legal problems, taking into account the necessity of examining avenues which could lead to future multilateral negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament aimed at the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The official documents and records of the United Nations General Assembly and the Conference on Disarmament, as well as statements made by the member States, were used in compiling this review. Naturally, we proceed from the premise that this review does not purport to be a complete and comprehensive presentation of the position of any delegation. Consequently, our delegation would be grateful if the member States of the Conference were to offer additions and comments which they might find necessary for a more complete reflection of their positions with regard to all three items on the Ad hoc Committee's programme of work.

In the course of its work the Ad hoc Committee has accumulated a wealth of useful ideas and proposals. Most of the proposals contain constructive provisions acceptable to a large number of delegations, and constitute a good basis for specific and goal-oriented work. It is a matter of satisfaction that proposals on the prevention of an arms race in outer space contained in this document came from virtually all delegations. In submitting this compilation for consideration by the Conference on Disarmament, the delegation of Mongolia invites the representatives of all member States to pursue in a constructive spirit the quest for consensus that could serve as a basis for future multilateral negotiations on the issue of preventing an arms race in outer space.

The secretariat has just informed me that the document will be available in Russian this afternoon. However, for the convenience of the distinguished members of the Conference on Disarmament, my delegation is distributing advance copies of the English translation.

The PRESIDENT: That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? I recognize the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ambassador Ardekani.

Mr. ARDEKANI (Islamic Republic of Iran): I would also like to join our colleagues in welcoming Mr. Akashi, Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, and since we are discussing chemical weapons listed on our agenda, I would like to remind all of us that today is the first anniversary of the horrible use of chemical weapons in the city of Halabja, where over 5,000 innocent lives perished, and I would like to take this opportunity to remind us of our divine task here at the Conference on Disarmament, to put an end once and for all to this abhorrent weapon demeaning all human values and, with your permission, I would like to ask the Conference to observe a minute of prayer in silence in tribute to the memory of those who perished during that incident.



The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Ardekani of the Islamic Republic of Iran for his statement. Distinguished delegates, you have heard the proposal from the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran. If the Conference agrees, I will act accordingly. There seems to be no objection. I propose, therefore, that we observe a minute of silence.

\* \* \*

The PRESIDENT: Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this moment? There seems to be none.

Since the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts has submitted this time, in addition to its usual progress report, its fifth report to the Conference on Disarmament, containing technical concepts for a global system for international seismic data exchange, I suggest that we give delegations time to study this document before we take action on it. Accordingly, we will take up, for decision the progress report as well as the fifth report of the Group at the end of our plenary meeting on Thursday, 13 April. Of course, members wishing to do so may also deal with the fifth report of the Group at a later stage, but it might be that some members may prefer to address it before we proceed to take note of it and to adopt the recommendations concerning the dates of the next session of the Ad hoc Group, as they appear in paragraph 9 of the progress report.

We now take up the timetable for meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. As I announced when we adopted the previous timetable, Monday, 27 March is an official holiday for the United Nations Office at Geneva, and therefore there will be no conference services on that day. As usual, the timetable is only indicative and we may change it later on, if needed. If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference agrees to the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: As there is no other business for today, I shall now adjourn this plenary meeting, but I would like to remind the members that the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, chaired by Ambassador García Robles, will meet immediately in this room after the adjournment of this plenary. Distinguished delegates, I wish you a very pleasant holiday, and I shall see you again at our next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament, which will be held on Tuesday, 28 March at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.25 a.m.

# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.498  
28 March 1989

ENGLISH

---

## FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND NINETY-EIGHTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 28 March 1989, at 10 a.m.

President:

Mr. Chusei Yamada

(Japan)

The PRESIDENT: The 498th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is now called to order.

The Conference continues today its consideration of agenda item 4, entitled "Chemical weapons". Nevertheless, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference. I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of the Netherlands, Viet Nam and the Federal Republic of Germany.

Mr. van SCHAIK (Netherlands): It was your Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. President, who said at the Paris Conference that "as long as chemical weapons are allowed to exist, mankind can never be freed from the danger of the use of these weapons". That is one of the reasons why chemical weapons should continue to have high priority on our agenda. That is also the reason why a ban on the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons, which also provides for their total destruction, should continue to have priority on the world's disarmament agenda. The urgency of reaching agreement on such a convention found expression in the Paris Declaration, where we participating countries in this Conference were called upon to redouble our efforts, as a matter of urgency. We should therefore direct our efforts at resolving expeditiously the remaining issues and concluding the convention at the earliest date. The language the Ministers chose could not have been clearer. This signal coming from Paris should be translated into practical action here in Geneva.

Let me first say a few words on the underlying reasons why agreement on an effectively verifiable convention banning chemical weapons is so urgent. First, of course, because there are horrendous weapons of mass destruction with a capacity to kill and wound people indiscriminately on a massive scale. But second, also, because chemical weapons have actually been used recently. They are no longer weapons of the past. The taboo that long seemed to exist on the use of chemical weapons has been lifted. That is why the reconfirmation of the condemnation of the use of chemical weapons at the Paris Conference was so important. A third reason for accelerating our pace is that agreement on a convention seems to be within reach. Also for that reason we consider any linkage with progress in other arms control and disarmament areas not a fruitful approach. The bird, almost in our hand, would escape us.

There are other reasons why the chemical weapons negotiations are urgent. And I return now to what the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan said when he added to the words I have just quoted that, apart from the risk of use arising from the existence of chemical weapons, there was another risk: the threat of the use of chemical weapons may in its turn prevent countries from actually getting rid of their chemical weapons. It is this vicious circle that we must break through, and that is a fourth reason why we have to cut some Gordian knots, why we must urgently work towards a situation in which all chemical weapons - and therewith the risk of their use - are eliminated. In a world in which countries continue to produce chemical weapons and more and more countries possess those weapons, it will become increasingly difficult to achieve our common objective of banning those

(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

weapons. The risk of proliferation cannot effectively be averted by imposing a freeze upon the further spread of chemical weapons, or by any other half-way interim measures. Only a total ban responds to our common objective. Only a total ban can effectively be verified.

There is a fifth reason: countries have been devoting their attention to the elimination of chemical weapons now for more than 18 years. I am not sure whether the world community could be proud of itself in 1991 when celebrating the twentieth anniversary of these negotiations without a final agreement. There is a limit to the duration of such negotiations, beyond which the air becomes stale. We believe that, with the advent of ever-newer technologies, time may, at some moment in the future, become our enemy. Aristide Briand once referred to time as "my most useful colleague". That is not the case here at the Conference. Ambassador Pierre Morel, as the new Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, has rightly placed our work under a certain time constraint, drafting a work programme that exerts the required degree of pressure on our delegations, as well as on those at home that have to furnish us with instructions. We thank him for that and for the impulse he has given to the work. We also thank last year's Chairman, Ambassador Sujka, and the Polish delegation for their efforts and devotion and the useful work they undertook.

In our view, the most formidable problem to be solved is that of verification. Not because of the technicalities of the problem of finding an adequate verification régime. Although the technical problems are complex, they cover more fundamental questions. They conceal the underlying issue of how to strike a balance between confidence and suspicion. If there is no effectively verifiable convention, suspicions about non-compliance cannot be removed. On the other hand, confidence is required, confidence that the risk of detection is sufficiently serious for countries to deter them from illicit action. The risk of undetected deliberate non-compliance can never be entirely eliminated. But we must at some moment reach the point at which we can say that that risk is considered smaller than the risk of getting entangled in an ever-expanding cobweb of proliferation and building up of new chemical weapons.

Challenge inspection remains fundamental for the verification régime to be established. An international inspection team should at any moment, at very short notice, be permitted to inspect a site or plant, if a country has doubts about compliance with the core rules of the convention. We are pleased that this concept has broadly been accepted. An essential feature of the challenge inspection régime remains that the country to which the request is addressed has no right to refuse and, in fact, should fully co-operate, guided by the desire to remove the doubts that are at the origin of the request.

However important challenge inspections under the convention may be, the basic pattern should, of course, remain the routine inspections, inspections that are part of the normal system, not triggered by a country that is suspicious about non-compliance. Routine inspections will take place to monitor chemical weapons stocks, production facilities and destruction plants, as well as to search for hidden operations within parts of the chemical industry. It is important that this "normal" part of the verification régime

(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

should not only be effective, by deterring non-compliance, but also realistic, by being geared to specific situations, as these may arise, and by being pursued with a sense of practicality. It is for that reason that we welcome trial inspections being carried out by various countries, in particular to test schedule [2] procedures. The results of the trial inspections will help in paving the way for a number of international trial inspections, which in turn should give us here in the Conference the information required for the finalization of the detailed provisions concerned.

I might recall that the first trial inspection was held in the Netherlands in 1986 at a time when, of course, work on the verification provisions was less advanced. In a few months, a new trial inspection will be held in my country in a sophisticated schedule [2] multi-purpose plant. Moreover, preparations to test certain challenge inspection procedures in military establishments are at an advanced stage. Trial inspections are also helpful in alerting ministries and governmental agencies concerned to the role they will have to play with respect to the actual implementation of the verification provisions. The experience thus gained will be a starting-point for the preparation of national legislation and other provisions required for the implementation of the convention, including the appointment of the national authority, which is needed as a liaison with the Technical Secretariat.

Various speakers have addressed the question of whether we may need another type of inspection, in addition to the routine inspections and challenge inspections, and if so, in what form. In my statement on 13 September last year, I briefly touched upon the concept of ad hoc checks, a system to deter illegal production in chemical facilities that may be capable of producing chemicals relevant to the convention, but that are not covered by the routine inspections under schedules [1] and [2]. Minister Genscher made clear in his statement of 2 March that these ad hoc checks could be triggered without the prior request of another country. It is clear that other variants of inspections could be envisaged, inspections that are not triggered by suspicion, yet are necessary in order to enable inspection teams to visit locations outside the areas of schedules [1] and [2]. Perhaps it is premature to discuss the modalities of additional types of inspection, as long as we have not a sufficiently clear picture of the nature of the lacuna to be filled. At any rate, my delegation has an open mind on ways to cope with possible devices to make the inspection régime more comprehensive, more suitable to deter any form of circumvention of the core obligations under the convention. However, we wish to make a few general observations on any possible complementary types of inspection, whether they are called ad hoc checks, ad hoc inspections, or otherwise.

The first is that we should review any additional types of inspection as to their deterrence value. What is the risk assessment of situations that would be covered by these inspections? What is the risk assessment of situations outside declared or registered activities? What is the chance of detection? Of course, the higher the risk and the greater the deterrence value, the more reason there would be to consider additional measures. Second, we think additional types of inspection should also be considered in

(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

terms of their cost-effectiveness. The higher the cost and the greater the risk that illegal activities will not be detected, the more cautious we must be in treading new paths. Third, any inspection outside the realm of routine inspections cannot rely on procedures laid down in the "facility attachments", or on permanent verification equipment installed on the spot. The effectiveness of challenge inspections and any other additional inspections outside routine inspections will greatly rely on the intrusiveness and analytical capabilities of portable equipment carried by the inspectors. In my country an initial modest research programme on mobile verification equipment has started. We understand that in other countries research and development is also under way. It is important that such efforts focus on the development of portable equipment that can easily be carried by inspectors. The exchange of information on different programmes in this area could lead to the development and production of a full range of tools necessary for effective inspections.

Besides verification, there are other complex problems to be addressed. They may be delicate, sometimes thorny, but perhaps they can more easily be solved once an effective verification régime has been agreed upon. I am thinking of such problems as: the tasks of the Executive Council vis-à-vis those of the Conference of States Parties, and the composition of the Council; ratification requirements; questions of assistance and sanctions in the event of non-compliance; the relationship with the Geneva Protocol of 1925; and the issue of technical co-operation, which is particularly important for developing countries.

Let me at this moment limit myself to the time perspective within which the ban could be realized. Minister Genscher said earlier this month that, given the good will of all concerned, it ought to be possible to reach agreement by the end of the year. Others think that we will need the whole of next year and perhaps even much more. But let us assume for a moment that the convention will be signed by the end of 1990. For some it undoubtedly sounds like an optimistic scenario. But then an interim phase starts, which lasts till the convention enters into force. We think that, given the great complexities of the convention and the need for elaborate national legislation to permit implementation, it would be realistic to assume that a couple of years will elapse before the required number of ratifications has been reached. In that case the destruction of stocks would start well into the 1990s, and the last stocks would be destroyed at the end of a 10-year period - maybe far beyond the year 2000. I for my part do not consider this an entirely satisfactory perspective. What can we do to shorten this period, without, of course, deviating from the course of diligence and caution that has characterized the negotiations up to now?

First, we must consider leaving purely technical matters as much as possible to the Preparatory Commission to be established after the signing of the convention. This is normal practice during the inception phase of an international convention. Time can be saved, and it has the additional advantage that arrangements can be made without the time-consuming legal niceties inherent in treaty language. We feel that sometimes costly time is spent in working groups on issues that are in themselves important and

(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

interesting, but do not need to be settled now in legal texts. Moreover, certain matters should, in our view, be left to the Technical Secretariat, under the guidance of the Executive Council, in order to ensure effective handling of purely technical and administrative matters.

Second, we would be in favour of a more rational, effective rhythm for the conduct of the negotiations. As Minister Andreotti said, we should also think in terms of restructuring some negotiating methods. The tempo of our negotiations seems mainly to be determined by the time required for the drafting of position papers and the response to such initiatives. My delegation still believes that time would be saved if more time were available for preparing positions, at home and within our delegations, but also in consultations within groups and in informal contacts between members of different groups. In my statement a year ago I made a few organizational suggestions for the Conference on Disarmament, including a change in the time schedule of the Conference, by spreading the sessions over the whole year, allowing delegations to use the intervals for reflection and preparation of positions. Limiting myself now to chemical weapons only, I wish to repeat what I have already said for the Conference as a whole: a system of, let us say, four to six weeks of negotiations alternating with three-to-five-week intervals for preparation of positions and informal contacts would in our view be far more effective and would in itself lead to intensified efforts during the sessions.

A third way in which we could accelerate the process would be to make optimum use of the period between the signing and the entry into force of the convention. Therefore discussions in the Ad hoc Committee on the tasks of the Preparatory Commission are useful, in particular in order to assess the financial needs for the work of the Technical Secretariat, as well as possible ways to cover those needs. We also hope that the period between signature and entry into force might be shortened if countries could prepare in time for the legislative process. As I said, trial inspections may have a catalytic function in this respect.

Finally, I wonder whether there would not be scope for shortening the destruction period. Many years ago the transition period was set at 10 years. At the time, the two major Powers considered that such a period was technically needed to destroy all obsolete and modern chemical weapon stockpiles, assuming also that actual destruction would only start some time after the entry into force of the convention. In practice, the situation seems to have changed. Both Powers have started, or will soon start, with the destruction of their stockpiles on a voluntary basis. We assume that at the time of entry into force of the convention the bulk of the obsolete stocks may have been destroyed. Once we have a better insight into the size of the stocks of the two big stock-holding countries and their destruction capacity, we may also be able to assess the existing technical capacity for any possible accelerated destruction programme. In fact, would it not be worth considering creating the technical facilities that would enable parties to shorten the destruction period?

(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

I would remind delegates that it was in 1899 that the issue of chemical weapons was addressed for the first time. In that year, 90 years ago now, the Hague Declaration on the prohibition of the use of asphyxiating gases was adopted. We hope that, 100 years later, after a century of suffering and perseverance, a world without chemical weapons will no longer be an illusion.

Another important subject on the agenda is item 1, on a comprehensive nuclear test ban. We think that the debate on the test ban and the work on testing issues here in the CD should be seen against the background of what is being done elsewhere, and in the perspective of what on the international agenda will be done on the subject. First, I should mention the bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States, which are now starting their second year. We hope that soon the stage-by-stage negotiations, which began in December 1987, will produce their first concrete outcome. Once the conditions for ratification of the threshold test-ban Treaty and the peaceful nuclear explosions Treaty with their new protocols are fulfilled, the next stage of the negotiations will - as we have been given to understand - focus on negotiations on further intermediate limitations in yield and/or numbers on nuclear testing. We look forward to the results of those negotiations.

Progress is also important in the light of the non-proliferation Treaty review conference, to be held in 1990. Let me add that we do not yet see how the proposed conference to amend the partial test-ban Treaty could lead to concrete results. In our view it is painstaking work on concrete issues, of which verification is the most important one, that is required. That work is being undertaken in the bilateral negotiations, and it should be complemented in the CD. In addition to the valuable work of the Group of Seismic Experts, such concrete, pragmatic work should also be undertaken again in the ad hoc committee, which now has not met for more than five years.

For my delegation it continues to be puzzling why the Conference cannot do concrete work on testing issues, whilst the major nuclear Powers have shown that on their part they are prepared to do the work and, in their bilateral context, have given us an example of how to deal with problems that up to now have prevented us from agreeing on a mandate for the ad hoc committee. I have carefully listened to the statements of those who have not yet accepted the proposal of former Ambassador Vejvoda of Czechoslovakia as a basis for discussion of the mandate. I have full understanding for the points they make. But the net result is that we cannot do the type of work that actually is going on in the bilateral talks between the United States and the Soviet Union. In the words of Stanley Baldwin: "I often think that we rather resemble Alice in Wonderland, who tried to play croquet with a flamingo instead of a mallet". In fact, we need a mallet to do concrete work. And concrete work is needed, even if we disagree on the time span within which a comprehensive test ban should come within reach. We therefore wholeheartedly endorse the efforts you, Mr. President, are actually undertaking in your individual contacts, trying to bridge the narrowing gap, trying to find that mallet.



(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

Let me also add that agreement on the modalities of doing concrete work in an ad hoc committee should in our view not serve as a device to dodge actual differences that continue to exist on the urgency of reaching the goal of a CTB as such. Those differences of view continue to exist and they ought to be discussed here at the Conference, in parallel with the concrete work of the ad hoc committee. My delegation is, in fact, anxious to discuss those differences. We see the realization of the ultimate goal of a CTB in close relation with the bilateral negotiations under way on the actual reduction and elimination of categories of nuclear weapons. We believe that efforts to secure reductions in testing and the ultimate achievement of a CTB should be placed in the context of the overall efforts to reduce nuclear arsenals. As long as nuclear arsenals are needed as part of the overall strategy of deterrence and dissuasion of the Western Alliance, the nuclear testing issue is in our opinion best served by a stage-by-stage approach, as part of an effective disarmament process. As regards the efforts in the Conference on Disarmament to make progress on practical nuclear issues, we believe that the work in the CD would greatly benefit from the results of the joint American-Soviet verification experiments, once these results could be injected into the work of the CD.

Finally, a word on outer space. In that field the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union have, of course, major consequences for our work in the CD. We hope that the negotiations on the period of non-withdrawal from the anti-ballistic missile Treaty will soon resume and bear fruit, thus adding to stability. In the multilateral context further work needs to be done. The mandate of the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space offers us a broad orientation for our activities. The mandate directs us, amongst other issues, to "take into account all existing agreements", and I think we should make proper use of that language.

I believe we should keep in mind two realities. One is that there is at present no consensus on the need to design and draft new legislation in order to prevent an arms race in outer space. But second, on the basis of existing legislation there seems to be scope for at least the introduction of confidence-building and security-building measures in relation to outer space. My delegation therefore supports the Australian/Canadian initiative in August 1988 embodied in document CD/OS/WP.25. In this document suggestions are made aiming at increasing the transparency of States' activities in relation to outer space. We also agree with those who argue that both the outer space Treaty of 1967 and the registration Convention of 1975 contain provisions that lend themselves to further elaboration and clarification.

We therefore propose that the Ad hoc Committee should review the text of those conventions, in order to identify areas where implementation could be strengthened and where, if appropriate, countries may agree voluntarily to take further measures on the basis of the provisions of those conventions. Of course, it is the common goal of prevention of an arms race in outer space that should inspire such further steps. In particular, in the field of information to be supplied under the registration Convention, we believe that there is room for improvement. This would also be in accordance with the

(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

recommendations of the European Space Agency. The information to be provided to the Secretary-General of the United Nations could become more extensive, on the basis of guidelines to be drafted to this effect. Also, we may think about an understanding on the importance of providing information prior to the launching of space objects.

In short, we would be in favour of setting a modest goal for the short term: gathering more timely information on space activities, thus increasing their transparency. Progress in this direction would assist us in creating conditions in which a longer-term goal could be considered: the immunity of certain types of satellites. I believe that progress on the latter will not be possible if we have not achieved first a clearer understanding on the present ongoing activities in outer space.

Time and timing have been an essential element in my statement. Some may think I want to go too fast on one subject, others that I am too slow on another one. So be it. The differences on timing will vanish. This weekend was Easter. Who still remembers that the timing of Easter was hotly debated and finally fixed at the Nicene Council in the year 325 A.D.? How unimportant those differences of the past now seem to be! Let us hope our differences will soon also vanish as the melting snow did on this sunny Easter weekend.

Mr. TRAN HOAN (Viet Nam) (translated from French): Mr. President, since this is the first time I have taken the floor, allow me first of all, on behalf of the delegation of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, to extend to you my warmest congratulations on your success in conducting the work of the Conference as President during the month of March. I am firmly convinced that, thanks to your personal prestige and your wealth of diplomatic experience in international affairs, you will greatly contribute to speeding up the pace of negotiations here in Geneva. I would also like to welcome warmly Mr. Akashi, the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, whose presence testifies to the importance of disarmament issues and the role to be played by the United Nations in this field. I would also like to extend my warmest greetings to all the distinguished delegates present here.

Among the very important matters on the agenda of this Conference, even if nuclear disarmament always has the highest priority, the elimination of chemical weapons would also deserve special attention from the international community. In my view there is not the slightest doubt that chemical weapons, whose appearance on our planet dates back earlier, constitute one of those means of mass extermination which has caused so many disasters for all of mankind. During the First World War, where chemical weapons were used for the first time, although they were still primitive in nature, they caused the death of nearly 90,000 people and left their mark on more than a million others. During the Second World War, more than two and a half million prisoners in concentration camps died because of the effects of these same weapons. During the war in Viet Nam, the utilization of the toxic Agent Orange had harmful long-term consequences for the ecology and the environment and for successive generations of Vietnamese. Today, 14 years after the end of the Viet Nam war, one may still see areas of arid land, denuded forests and deformations.

(Mr. Tran Hoan, Viet Nam)

Currently, the prodigious development of the chemical industry has led to the appearance of new types of highly sophisticated chemical weapons with a destructive power several times greater than the chemical weapons which existed at the beginning of this century. Needless to say, chemical weapons now constitute a grave danger for peace and international security, a great danger indeed for the whole of mankind, both for human life and human health and for the ecology and the environment. And in the face of such a threat, we may rightly rejoice at the success of the international conference on chemical weapons held in Paris in January 1989, where a common feeling emerged which President Mitterrand in his opening statement described in the following terms: "Everywhere there is an expectation, a new demand that the world should be released from the threat of chemical weapons". It was in Paris that the 149 States taking part in the Conference stressed "the necessity of concluding, at an early date, a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons, and on their destruction". Moreover, whilst recognizing "the importance and continuing validity of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed on 17 June 1925 in Geneva", the participating States called on the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva "to redouble its efforts, as a matter of urgency, to resolve expeditiously the remaining issues and to conclude the convention at the earliest date". Is the international Conference in Paris not a decisive milestone for the whole of mankind on the road towards the elimination of chemical weapons?

Whilst appreciating the historic importance of the international Conference in Paris on chemical weapons, we cannot in any way underestimate the problems which will be encountered by the negotiations in Geneva on the elimination of these weapons. To arrive at a global convention to ban chemical weapons, the negotiations here in Geneva will have many concrete problems to resolve relating to the intricate system of verification, the guarantee of undiminished security for all participating States, protection of the victims of chemical attack, the system of assistance and co-operation to develop civilian chemical industries in the participating States, the composition of the Executive Council, and so on. Yet it could be stated that once the basic issues have been settled, all the outstanding problems will be certainly resolved by a spirit of consensus, provided that all the parties concerned continue to display the necessary political will. Is there any need to add that France's decision to abandon the maintenance of security stocks, the Soviet Union's unilateral decision to destroy chemical weapons, the positive statements made by the leader of the present American Administration during his election campaign, and finally the active participation of all delegations in the Conference on Disarmament all constitute favourable factors which will help to speed up the negotiating process in this decisive stage as we work towards the final draft of the convention?

We fully agree with the view expressed by several delegations that for the time being the negotiations ought to be focused on the settlement of the principal outstanding problems relating to the order of destruction of chemical weapons and production facilities in order to guarantee undiminished security for all participating States during the 10-year period of transition

(Mr. Tran Hoan, Viet Nam)

from the entry into force of the convention, and the elaboration of inspection procedures within the context of an effective international system for verification of the non-production of chemical weapons in industry. Obviously, we would like to stress here the need for the convention to include specific provisions guaranteeing protection for victims of attack using chemical weapons, as well as provisions which provide for assistance and co-operation to participating States in the development of their civilian chemical industry. We welcome the national trial inspections of chemical weapon production facilities conducted by a number of countries. The experience gained from these inspections could undoubtedly help to speed up our work to draw up inspection procedures.

On the one hand, Viet Nam has been the victim of the use of chemical weapons on an enormous scale, while on the other it neither produces nor holds any chemical weapon. We oppose the use of any chemical weapon of any description. We call for and are working for a world without chemical weapons. Together with the other countries in South-East Asia we are striving for a chemical-weapon-free and nuclear-weapon-free zone. In this spirit we continue to support the initiative of the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Romania for the establishment of a chemical-weapon-free zone in central Europe. We also support the Australian initiative for the non-proliferation of chemical weapons in South-East Asia and the Pacific.

Allow me to conclude by expressing the hope that the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva will "redouble its efforts, as a matter of urgency, to resolve expeditiously the remaining issues and to conclude the convention at the earliest date", thus responding to the pressing appeal of the 149 States participating in the international Conference in Paris on the prohibition of chemical weapons, and meeting the interests of peace and international security.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Tran Hoan of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam for his statement and for the very kind words he addressed to me. The next speaker is the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr. Lüdeking.

Mr. LUDEKING (Federal Republic of Germany): At the last plenary meeting the Chairman of the Group of Scientific Experts, Dr. Dahlman, presented the Group's fifth report to the Conference on Disarmament. We take note with satisfaction of the results achieved during the 27th session of the GSE. We are particularly pleased about the progress recorded in the report regarding a common concept of a future global seismic data exchange system. The successful conclusion of this latest round of GSE discussions has taken us a step forward towards the establishment of a world-wide seismic monitoring system that could effectively verify compliance with a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

Owing to the spirit of co-operation and compromise displayed by all members of the Group of Scientific Experts, it was possible to adopt a pragmatic approach which provides for experimental exploration of all proposed

(Mr. Lüdeking, Federal Republic of Germany)

data exchange systems. We are encouraged by the growing support for our "open station" concept, which we believe will provide the most effective and, at the same time, easy-to-handle system for the exchange of seismic data. The preparations for the second comprehensive data exchange experiment was the focal point of the discussions during the latest round of the Group of Scientific Experts. We have already taken part in all start-up tests which took place in 1988. We welcome the agreement reached on the stages of the implementation of the experiment. To meet the suggested timeframes for these stages, extensive and detailed preparations are required. My delegation will not be found wanting in efforts to make the second comprehensive data exchange experiment a success. Comprehensive participation in this experiment is of crucial importance. Only with broad participation by countries in all parts of the world will we be able to test a system which will have to be reliable and truly global. I thus urgently call upon all States to join in the undertaking and actively take part in the experiment.

A comprehensive nuclear test ban is an important arms control objective. I wish to underline my Government's long-held commitment to this goal. At the same time I wish to stress also that a comprehensive nuclear test ban cannot be a substitute for substantial reductions in existing nuclear arsenals. We are thus hoping for early results in the START negotiations between the United States of America and the Soviet Union.

In preparing for a comprehensive nuclear test ban the Conference on Disarmament has an important role to play. We attach great importance to the very concrete and valuable work undertaken by the Group of Scientific Experts. The establishment of a reliable seismological monitoring system is, in our view, an essential precondition for a CTB. I would like to avail myself of this opportunity to thank the members of the Group of Scientific Experts for their dedication and commitment, and I would in particular like to thank Dr. Dahlman, who as Chairman of that Group has significantly contributed to its success.

We would also welcome the re-establishment of an ad hoc committee on item 1 of our agenda. I hope that your consultations, Mr. President, on the question of the mandate will be successful.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Mr. Lüdeking of the Federal Republic of Germany for his statement. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? There seems to be none.

I have no other business for today. I now intend to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 30 March at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.05 a.m.

# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.499  
30 March 1989

ENGLISH

---

## FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND NINETY-NINTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva  
on Thursday, 30 March 1989, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Chusei Yamada (Japan)

The PRESIDENT: The 499th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is now called to order.

The Conference continues, at this plenary meeting, its consideration of agenda item 4, entitled "Chemical weapons". In conformity with rule 30 of its rules of procedure, however, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference. I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Morocco, Kenya, Brazil and Bulgaria.

Mr. BENHIMA (Morocco) (translated from French): Mr. President, my first words go to congratulate you on behalf of my delegation at the end of your term as President, which you have served with competence and talent. No representative of Morocco could resist the temptation to point out the major similarities between our two countries, despite the geographical distance which separates the empire of the rising sun from the country of the setting sun. I will mention only our firm foundation of tradition and our openness to the modern age. Personally I have had the great pleasure of appreciating in you this twofold virtue which characterizes your people. In the message that he addressed to the Conference on Disarmament on 7 February last, the United Nations Secretary-General, Mr. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, welcomed the improvement characterizing the current international situation. In this context, he added: "As the international situation improves, so must the Conference, as the single multilateral negotiating forum for disarmament, meet the challenges before it". In the view of my delegation, the challenges which were referred to in the Secretary-General's message, and which we should take up this year, certainly include the items relating to nuclear disarmament. However, there is another task on whose priority we are also all agreed, which is that of the prohibition of chemical weapons. The international campaign which is burgeoning around such a ban and the need to step up efforts to formalize it reflects the urgent necessity for the international community to fill a major gap in the law. The fervent international determination to ban these inhuman weapons forever and to free the world of the threat they represent is not new. It is the logical extension of sustained and persevering efforts going back to the Brussels Declaration of 1874. The first steps towards such a ban already reflected the concern then felt at the use of poisons and poisoned bullets as weapons of war. This use was the first sample of what was later to become terrifying chemical weapons.

The initial groundwork towards the prohibition of certain toxic gases and weapons was laid in the Declaration of the Hague of 1899 and the Hague Convention of 1907. These legal hurdles were unfortunately so fragile that they did not withstand the first blast of poison gas used during the First World War. These events, which were shocking because of the large numbers of victims both military and civilian, and because of the appalling suffering they caused, obliged States at that time to reiterate and strengthen the ban on chemical weapons. This led to the drawing up of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. This international legal instrument, which since then has been the corner-stone of all efforts to eliminate chemical warfare, spared mankind the horrors of poison gases during the Second World War.

(Mr. Benhima, Morocco)

Efforts to ban recourse to these weapons once and for all were to be stepped up after the Second World War. And thus the issue of the prohibition of chemical weapons has been on the agenda of the United Nations since its inception. Twenty-five years later, it was the General Assembly which, in its resolution 2826 (XXVI), recommended that States should sign the biological weapons Convention of 1972. This new legal structure, alas, did not meet the expectations of the international community, which sought a comprehensive and unequivocal ban on chemical weapons. Hence the continuation of discussions within the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on the various aspects of a chemical weapons ban, and particularly the scope of such a ban and the question of its verification. These debates were to remain of little significance until the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. In paragraph 21 of its Final Document, the Assembly stressed that "an agreement on elimination of all chemical weapons should be concluded as a matter of high priority". The provisions of this paragraph were rapidly followed up following the establishment of a subsidiary body of the Committee on Disarmament duly mandated to negotiate a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their destruction. These negotiations have been continuing for almost a decade. It is true that progress has not been in line with our expectations. None the less, chemical disarmament at the present time is the most promising area of our agenda. Consequently, we believe that more than ever this convention is within our reach. Indeed, the optimism which inspires us leads us to say that our Conference has never been so close to its goal as it is now.

At a time when the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons has entered a decisive phase in its negotiations, some might wonder about the purpose of this historical survey. The reasons for such a recapitulation are manifold. Firstly, to grasp the disappointment of the international community and the hurdles it has encountered on its path towards the prohibition of these weapons. Secondly, to sound out ways and means as well as the necessary political will better to meet the exigencies and priorities which are internationally recognized in chemical disarmament. Thirdly and finally, an attempt to make good use of this unprecedented international context in the annals of negotiations on chemical weapons. Within the same perspective, my delegation would like to stress that the resumption of the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons has this year been preceded by a two-fold consensus, incontestably corresponding to two developments of equally unprecedented historical significance. First we have the adoption by the last session of the General Assembly of two resolutions by consensus, 43/73 A and 43/73 B. This "first" in this particular area of disarmament is the reflection of a new universal state of mind in the perception of chemical weapons, based on the rejection of these weapons, which should no longer have a place in a civilized world. It is encouraging to note that these two resolutions stress both the high priority that should be accorded to the negotiations on the chemical weapons convention as well as their urgent nature. The second consensus was that which led to the adoption of the Final Act of the Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons. This consensus was described by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Roland Dumas, in his statement before this Conference, as a "point of reference" and a "stimulus". A point of reference, he explained, which "establishes firmly the indispensable foundations for your deliberations, by



(Mr. Benhima, Morocco)

confirming the will of the entire international community to bring the endeavour of chemical disarmament to a successful conclusion". As for the impetus, he explained that "on behalf of the international community it expresses a fervent obligation: to conclude at an early date a convention on the prohibition" of chemical weapons. In the view of my delegation, this two-fold consensus provides the political underpinning for our negotiations on an international convention. Hence it is our duty not only to strengthen this underpinning but also to draw from it the thrust which is necessary for the conclusion of our work as soon as possible. The conditions currently obtaining both within the Conference and in the international arena, which are favourable to negotiations, require consistent behaviour and a political commitment commensurate with their importance. The many statements made here since the beginning of our session encourage us in our optimistic assessment of the likelihood of the rapid finalization of the convention. The repeated commitments and readiness to step up the negotiations mark the beginning of the implementation of the provisions of the two United Nations resolutions mentioned above and the articles of the Paris Declaration.

Before making certain comments on the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons itself, I must first of all reiterate my delegation's congratulations to its new Chairman, Ambassador Pierre Morel. We wish him every success, as we do the chairman of the five working groups. I cannot fail to pay a very special tribute to his predecessor, Ambassador Sujka of Poland, who was the dedicated Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee in 1988. Turning to the work of this Committee, my delegation is pleased at the thematic approach begun this year by its Chairman. It is an innovative method which is best suited to the current stage of the negotiations. It is also a step that enables us to identify the problems and define the difficulties they raise in order better to focus efforts on the search for solutions that are called for.

One of the subjects that has caused most debate within the Ad hoc Committee as well as in plenary remains the question of verification and respect for the provisions of the convention. It is, moreover, a subject that has been covered by a considerable number of proposals and documents. The wealth and abundance of the documentation of the Conference on this issue marks the extremely crucial nature of error-free international verification. Certainly, verification is not and must not be perceived as an end in itself, but rather the means of making sure that the various provisions of the convention are scrupulously respected. Past experience, whether the recent past or the distant past, teaches us that without appropriate verification machinery no disarmament treaty is immune from breaches. That is why we believe that the viability, not to say the effectiveness of an international instrument depends on what we can call its very backbone, namely, verification. In this connection, my delegation would like to stress that the proliferation of proposals on this aspect of the future convention is a positive trend. The process of comparing them, analysing them and collating them will necessarily give rise to procedures that will ensure maximum respect for this convention.

(Mr. Benhima, Morocco)

The international procedures currently being considered in the first working group, chaired by Mr. Lüdeking of the Federal Republic of Germany, should in our view lead to a minimal degree of interference, to ensure the full confidence of all parties in the aims of this convention. The duality of national and international machinery is necessary. These two institutions, whose roles are complementary, must perform their verification functions in a spirit of co-operation and consultation. The international organs should not be resorted to automatically in cases of alleged breaches of the terms of the treaty. Such resort should first give way to extensive consultations between the parties to seek solutions to problems, before the appropriate verification procedures are triggered. Currently, the Ad Hoc Committee is debating one of the most sensitive elements within the verification system, namely, the arrangements relating to the handling and protection of confidential information. The consideration of this issue in the inter-sessional period provided a better understanding of the various positions on this aspect of verification. My delegation, while in favour of a continued exchange of views on this delicate problem, believes that the role of the convention is to set out major principles which should preside over respect for the confidentiality of information. As far as details are concerned, it would be a good idea to leave them to the various organs of the organization that is going to ensure respect for the convention. It is up to these bodies to lay down, as precisely as possible, the code of conduct to be followed in the matter.

The question of the scope of the future convention is of major importance by virtue of representing its *raison d'être*. It is an area where divergences still persist. Consequently, we greatly rely on the perspicacity of the Chairman of the second working group, entrusted with legal and political questions, Mr. Mohammed Gomaa of Egypt, to stimulate and relaunch the negotiations on this question. The main goal of this convention is the complete and unreserved prohibition of chemical weapons and the permanent elimination of the threat they embody for the international community. Consequently, one of the priorities of this working group should be to channel all its energies towards eliminating the obstacles that prevent this major part of the "rolling text" from being "clean", i.e., without brackets and footnotes. We are aware that any advance in the negotiations on the general provisions on scope is dependent on progress in negotiations on article II on definitions. None the less, current differences should not prevent the group from redoubling its efforts to arrive at a consensus text on scope. The other subject this group is entrusted with, which is of particular interest to my delegation, relates to article XI - "Economic and technological development". This article was the subject of an ample exchange of views last year. This debate provided an opportunity for countries to set out the hopes they place in this article, but left us with the impression that it still causes much hesitation. We hope, none the less, that this year the debate on the subject will lead to positive results.

To have such an article in a treaty on chemical disarmament is neither innovative nor anachronistic. It is a clause which draws on other arms limitation treaties that have proved themselves and shown their usefulness. We can cite the example of the Convention on biological weapons and that on nuclear non-proliferation. Thus, through this article, we plead for the internationally recognized right for the promotion of co-operation, particularly in the peaceful uses of chemical science and technology. The

(Mr. Benhima, Morocco)

principle of this right, which has been recognized elsewhere, should be neither denied nor concealed, nor even modified by any suspicion that such co-operation might be diverted towards non-peaceful purposes.

Working group No. 3, under the chairmanship of Mr. Rakesh Sood of India, deals with the general subject of the institutions which are to be set up by the convention to enhance its application. This group has a hard task before it, since while those involved agree as to the bare bones of the organization, there are still many areas of disagreement in respect of the composition, functions, decision-making machinery and financial cost of this administrative apparatus. This pyramid-shaped structure, whose prime function is the implementation of the convention, requires very careful preparation. This difficult task has devolved upon the Preparatory Commission which will have the delicate task of ensuring the effectiveness of the convention from the first day by making sure that it enters into force in the best possible conditions. In this connection my delegation is pleased with the generally convergent points of view expressed concerning this Preparatory Commission and its tasks. In respect of the latter, my delegation would like to express the wish that the mandate to be entrusted to this Commission will be confined to ways and means of ensuring that the convention is effectively operational from the moment of its entry into force, ruling out any possibility of a re-opening of discussion of the terms of the convention. The task of the Commission should be oriented towards preparations for the future rather than going back on the substance of the treaty. It is obvious that any attempt to call the text into question will lead to a delay in the entry into force of the instrument in question. Finally, my delegation is awaiting with keen interest the paper promised by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Roland Dumas, containing the French proposal on the Scientific Council.

The area of definitions remains the area where positions are still very far apart, not to say static. For many delegations this bottleneck in our negotiations constitutes a source of concern. The standstill concerning the definition of chemical weapons, production facilities, stockpiles, the concept of jurisdiction or control by a State party, etc., is a sort of incapacitating shock wave affecting the other articles of the convention. Over the years, the question of definitions has been perceived as the parameter indicating more or less accurately whether progress has been made in our work. Let us hope this year, however, that the problem of definitions will be resolved positively to give us concrete grounds for believing that the conclusion of the convention is imminent.

The fifth and last working group, chaired by Dr. Krutzsch of the German Democratic Republic, deals with the transition period. All speakers on this point have agreed on the crucial nature of this period. There is also unanimous agreement on the need to ensure that this 10-year period begins and ends in the best possible conditions. In my delegation's view, the future of the convention will hinge on this period passing smoothly. Any departure from or breach of commitments entered into will threaten the edifice we have been building for a number of years with collapse. This is why we believe that responsibility for a smooth transition is collective, as indeed is the security of all the members of the community. The concept of "undiminished" security should have no place in consideration of this period. For we believe more than ever that the destruction of chemical weapons will in no way

(Mr. Benhima, Morocco)

diminish the security of States. On the contrary: the very existence of the convention will create and then strengthen a new security context, not only for those States that will be destroying their stockpiles of chemical weapons, but also for all other countries. To attain this objective common to all mankind, all the future States parties must become persuaded that in order to negotiate this transition period successfully, trust must take the place of suspicion.

The history of the clause concerning assistance and protection against chemical weapons is a great source of satisfaction to us. The place that this provision has acquired, not to say conquered, within the body of the convention is the expression of a need for international solidarity to come to grips with the horrors of chemical weapons. This article, along with the article on economic and technological development, constitute elements which are likely to contribute to the universality of the convention - a universality for which the Secretary-General of the United Nations made a fervent plea in his message to the Conference.

Much as we note with satisfaction the progress recorded in the last two years in the negotiations on this convention, we are obliged to recognize that certain problems - and not the least important ones - remain insoluble. These include problems whose complexity is fundamentally technical in nature. They do not concern us unduly, as we have full confidence in the negotiators, and more particularly the experts among them, who will be able to find appropriate solutions. As far as the other problems are concerned, we must acknowledge that they call for political decisions. These decisions may be difficult to take, but the collective responsibility we all assume in this Conference makes them essential in order to realize the universal promise of this convention. May each member of this Conference find in the expectations of the whole of mankind, as well as in the commitments we have all entered into, both before the General Assembly of the United Nations and at the Paris Conference, the necessary stimulus to display his or her share of political will. Only the sum total of these efforts will enable us to present to the world at the earliest opportunity this convention on chemical weapons so long awaited.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Benhima of Morocco for his statement and for the very kind words he addressed to me and to my country. The next speaker is the representative of Kenya, Ambassador Bullut.

Mr. BULLUT (Kenya): On behalf of the Kenya delegation, and on my own behalf, I would like to congratulate you most warmly on your assumption of the duties of President of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of March. You represent Japan, a country with which Kenya has very close relations based on friendship and co-operation. With your experience and diplomatic skills you have presided over the work of the Conference for the month of March with great success. I would like to thank you sincerely for the warm welcome you extended to me on taking up my duties in this Conference. I would also like to congratulate Ambassador Aldo Pugliese of Italy, who presided over the work of the Conference for the month of February so successfully and with distinction due to his diplomatic qualities and experience in disarmament affairs.

(Mr. Bullut, Kenya)

Although I am very new to this Conference I would like to extend a warm welcome to the Ambassadors who, like myself, have recently joined the Conference on Disarmament. I would like to assure them as well as the other delegations that my delegation will co-operate with them in the work of this Conference. I would like to thank all those heads of delegations who have warmly welcomed me to this Conference, both officially and personally. I am grateful for this kind and friendly gesture.

The improvement of the international political situation appears to give States confidence that solutions to complex international problems can be explored and found. This confidence is founded on the political will demonstrated by States which have clearly underlined their preference for negotiations and discussions and their rejection of threats and confrontation. There are several indicators of the current positive international political climate: the implementation of the 1987 United States/Soviet Union Treaty eliminating all their land-based intermediate-range nuclear forces; the United States/USSR negotiations on 50 per cent reductions in their strategic nuclear arsenals; the parallel negotiations on further confidence-building and security-building measures and conventional disarmament in Europe; the unilateral reduction of troops and armaments by the Soviet Union and some of its allies; the agreements on the settlement of regional conflicts in Afghanistan and in Angola; the delicate ceasefire in the Iran/Iraq war; and the Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons which was held in early January this year.

Political solutions to other vexing international problems continue to be sought. However, if the present achievements could be used as a basis for prediction, then there is hope that solutions to these diverse problems can finally be found, that is, if the prevailing optimism at present is not temporary but a permanent feature in international affairs. The United Nations has played a crucial role in the settlement of some of the regional conflicts. Its role in bringing peace to various troubled regions of the world has been emphasized and recognized.

The Final Declaration of the Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons bears testimony to the urgent desire of numerous States to ban the use of such hideous weapons for ever. The holding of the Conference was an international reaction to events which were definitely eroding the spirit and letter of the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. I would like to repeat once again the gratitude of the Kenya Government to the Government of France for the very excellent organization of the conference and for the very warm hospitality accorded to all participants, including the Kenya delegation. I would also like to thank, through the delegation of France, His Excellency Mr. Roland Dumas, who, on 7 February this year, the opening day of the spring session of this Conference, presented to the Conference the Final Act, including the Final Declaration adopted by the Paris Conference. The Kenya delegation, aware of the important role played by the Government of France in hosting the Paris Conference and its subsequent success, was therefore pleased with the appointment of Ambassador Pierre Morel, the head of the delegation of France

(Mr. Bullut, Kenya)

to this Conference, as the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. We all remember his untiring efforts, before and during the Paris Conference, to ensure that the Conference realized its goals. We are confident that with his dynamism the Ad hoc Committee will be able to achieve positive results in its 1989 session.

The Final Declaration of the Paris Conference records, among other important issues, the determination of 149 States to prevent any recourse to chemical weapons by completely eliminating them. This important document also stresses the necessity of concluding, at an early date, a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their destruction, which is being negotiated in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. The Ad hoc Committee has been re-established, albeit after serious efforts to modify its existing mandate to bring it into line with the letter and spirit of the Final Declaration of the Paris Conference and the most recent General Assembly resolutions on chemical weapons. It was clear that the genuine enthusiasm of the Group of 21 to have the mandate changed to reflect the important results of the Paris Conference foundered on the perceivable reluctance of the Conference as a whole to accommodate the proposed changes in the mandate.

The Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons has embarked on its work in earnest, and it will of course build on the achievements accomplished in its 1988 session and during the inter-sessional period. The Ad hoc Committee will also address all existing problems through a very inspiring organizational framework as proposed by its Chairman. The Kenya delegation would like to thank Ambassador Sujka of Poland and the three chairmen of working groups A, B and C for the very valuable work that they performed to achieve the results contained in the report of the Ad hoc Committee in document CD/881.

During the current session, the Ad hoc Committee has established five working groups to concern themselves with specific and clear tasks which we believe will further refine the quality of the existing "rolling text". The Kenya delegation would prefer the resolution of as many problems as possible currently existing in the "rolling text". The Kenya delegation would like to urge the Conference to conclude negotiations on a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction. I would like to repeat the declaration made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation of Kenya, His Excellency Dr. Robert Ouko, in his speech to the Paris Conference prohibiting the use of chemical weapons:

"Kenya has no capacity to manufacture chemical weapons. Kenya does not desire to acquire such a capacity, and Kenya will neither purchase chemical weapons nor use them on humans or on any living thing. We pledge our total commitment to the banning of chemical weapons. Kenya is a party to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and will sign and ratify the convention as soon as it is concluded."

It is hoped that all States will accede to the proposed convention once it is opened for signature.

(Mr. Bullut, Kenya)

Nuclear disarmament is an objective that the international community has committed itself to attain. The bilateral United States/Soviet Union agreement to eliminate all land-based intermediate-range nuclear forces is a small but appreciable step towards that much desired objective. This bilateral treaty has kindled hopes for other treaties eliminating nuclear weapons. The successful conclusion of the United States/Soviet Union bilateral negotiations on 50 per cent reductions in their strategic nuclear arsenals is being anxiously awaited. A lot still remains to be done before nuclear disarmament is accomplished. There are important steps which could be taken in this multilateral negotiating forum to demonstrate the commitment of States to total nuclear disarmament. One of these important steps would be the attainment of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty.

For too long the Conference on Disarmament has not been able to agree on an appropriate mandate for a subsidiary body to address the nuclear test ban issue effectively. Proposals do exist for a mandate for an ad hoc committee on this issue. For the Kenya delegation the draft mandate proposed by the Group of 21 contained in document CD/829 provides the best framework for addressing this issue in its totality. However, the Kenya delegation is prepared to consider any other proposal that would seek to address the real issues relating to a nuclear test ban if such a proposal could obtain the necessary consensus vital to the establishment of an ad hoc committee to consider this very important subject.

The General Assembly has adopted numerous resolutions urging the cessation of nuclear tests. General Assembly resolution 43/63A of 7 December 1988 appeals to all States members of the Conference on Disarmament to promote the establishment, at the beginning of its 1989 session, of an ad hoc committee with the objective of carrying out the multilateral negotiation of a treaty on the complete cessation of nuclear test explosions. The continued delay in launching meaningful work on a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty in this Conference has led to the consideration of alternative avenues to achieve a nuclear test ban. The Kenya delegation is aware of the proposal, submitted by some member States of the Conference, to amend the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water to include the banning of underground nuclear tests. Naturally the Kenya Government would welcome any effort that could ensure that a comprehensive nuclear test ban was achieved.

The United States and the Soviet Union are engaged in joint experiments in nuclear test verification, which in itself falls far short of the expectations of the international community, which has called for a total halt to nuclear weapon tests by those States that conduct such tests. The more there is a delay in achieving a nuclear test ban, the more nuclear weapons will continue to be modernized. It also raises the possibility of some States acquiring nuclear weapon technology.

We in Africa have clearly stated that Africa should be a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa adopted by the OAU heads of State and Government in 1964 expressed the wish of the African countries at that meeting to have their continent free of nuclear weapons. However, it has been common knowledge for some time now that the

(Mr. Bullut, Kenya)

racist régime of South Africa has acquired a nuclear weapon capability. Such a development poses a serious threat to the security of other African States and is contrary to the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa.

The prevention of an arms race in outer space is crucial. Outer space is the common heritage of mankind and should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. Civilian and military activities are currently being conducted in outer space. We consider it important that current military uses of outer space should not be a prelude to an arms race in outer space. The development of any space-oriented weapons should be effectively banned, and any objects launched into outer space should not in any way be used as weapons to destroy any objects in space or on Earth. In our view it is necessary to have a total ban on and destruction of all existing anti-satellite weapons, as well as the prohibition of the development of any new such weapons. It would be extremely difficult to curb an arms race in outer space once it began, and while there is still time let us exert all efforts in this Conference to ensure that an arms race in outer space does not become a reality and further complicate current efforts to halt the ongoing arms race on Earth. The Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space should, in our view, continue its valuable work on the consideration of measures relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

At an opportune time the Kenya delegation will make its views known on the other, equally important items on the agenda of this Conference.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Bullut of Kenya for his statement and for the very kind words he addressed to me and to my country.

Distinguished delegates, I note the presence among us today of the new representative of Algeria, Ambassador Messaoud Ait-Chaalal, who is attending the plenary for the first time. On behalf of the Conference, I extend to him our most cordial welcome and wish him every success in his important assignment here in Geneva.

Mr. AZAMBUJA (Brazil): I would also like to welcome our new colleague from Algeria and to indicate how welcome he is in our midst and how much I look forward to fruitful co-operation with himself and with his delegation.

This morning's session is, I believe, the last plenary we shall hold with you, Sir, in the Chair. May I just say how much my delegation appreciated your stewardship and tireless efforts to make our Conference fully operational. Some of your timely initiatives will only bear fruit some time in the future, but surely credit must be given to you for having set quite a few wheels in motion.

I asked for the floor today to introduce document CD/895, containing the technical report on a national trial inspection conducted by my country.

The inspection was carried out at a facility owned by Química da Bahia S.A. located at the Camaçari petrochemical complex in the State of Bahia. It is a multi-purpose plant, operating on a batch system, to produce amines used as intermediates in the manufacture of pesticides, pharmaceuticals and synthetic rubbers. For the sake of carrying out a simulated inspection, the



(Mr. Azambuja, Brazil)

chemical substance monoisopropylamine (MIPA) was treated as if it were one of the substances listed in schedule [2] (listing key precursors for the production of chemical weapons), although MIPA does not possess the properties required for its being assigned to any of the lists of controlled products.

Some very general conclusions can be drawn from our experiment at this stage. Firstly, the test inspection was conducted according to the general outline contained in document CD/CW/WP.213, prepared under the co-ordination of the former Swedish representative to this Conference, Ambassador Rolf Ekéus. These guidelines were considered to be appropriate for the conduct of experiments that aim at assessing the efficiency of the verification procedures set out in our "rolling text". Secondly, our experience would appear to prove that these trial inspections do not necessarily inconvenience or significantly disturb the normal operation of the facilities in which they are conducted. The data collection in Química da Bahia S.A. was carried out without introducing any alteration in the programming or in the outcome of the production run. Thirdly and lastly, the protection of confidential information and sensitive equipment, which we consider to be a very critical point, was assured throughout the inspection. This would appear to prove, in our view, that it is possible to strike a fair balance between the requirements of effective verification and the protection of sensitive information.

In our trial inspection, a confidentiality agreement was signed by the inspection team, adding to the confidence of the party which was to open its facility for inspection. This practice of confidentiality agreements, or some similar arrangements, could provide part of the answer to the important question of how to safeguard the commercial and industrial interests of the chemical industry. This agreement and other additions and corrections will be included in a revision of the report to be circulated very shortly, and the Brazilian consultant who was in charge of the whole operation will be joining us very early next week to give further clarification and the authority of his personal experience.

My delegation considers that the willingness of a significant number of States members of the Conference on Disarmament to conduct national trial inspections is a very important development in work towards a global ban on chemical weapons. We hope that the experience of national trial inspections will help to speed up our negotiations and bring us nearer the conclusion of a convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction. This kind of initiative is absolutely without precedent in negotiations on disarmament agreements, and should be sufficient to reassure those that still doubt the effectiveness of the verification measures already contained in the draft convention.

The Brazilian participation in the national trial inspection programme testifies to our strong commitment to the urgent conclusion of a comprehensive and verifiable chemical weapons convention, on a universal and non-discriminatory basis.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador de Azambuja of Brazil for his statement and for the very kind words he addressed to me.

Mr. KOSTOV (Bulgaria): Since today is the last plenary meeting under your presidency, I would like to express the gratitude of my delegation for your tireless efforts at providing fresh impulses to the work of this year's session of the Conference on Disarmament. You have fulfilled your important and difficult duties with great tact and high professional skill which cannot but be appreciated very much by my delegation. I would also like to seize this opportunity to warmly greet Mr. Akashi, Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, and express our satisfaction at seeing him participate in the plenary meetings of the Conference in the course of the past two weeks. Finally, I would like to join you, Mr. President, in welcoming our new colleague, the Ambassador of Algeria.

My statement today will be devoted to agenda item 1, "Nuclear test ban", to which my country has always attached great importance. There is hardly another problem in the field of disarmament on which so much has been said and written. In the course of almost three decades it has occupied a priority place on the international disarmament agenda. And rightly so. As early as 1963, in the second preambular paragraph of the partial test-ban Treaty, the States parties pledged that they would seek to achieve the "discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time". Article I of the same Treaty stipulates that its provisions related to other environments "are without prejudice to the conclusion of a treaty resulting in the permanent banning of all nuclear test explosions, including all such explosions underground, the conclusion of which, as the Parties have stated in the Preamble to this Treaty, they seek to achieve". This commitment was confirmed in the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Most unfortunately, 20 years after its signing, nuclear tests still continue.

That, with good reason, raises the question of the seriousness with which some of the countries with particular responsibility in the field of security and disarmament look upon their international commitments. It is clear to everyone that if a CTBT has not yet been concluded, it is not because of a lack of awareness of the exceptional importance and urgency of this problem. Such a treaty has always been and continues to be regarded as an effective means of curbing the arms race and the qualitative development and proliferation of nuclear weapons. The international community has expressed its support for the conclusion of such a treaty in numerous resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly including resolutions 43/63 A and B adopted at its last session. Both the desire of the majority of States to make this question the subject of multilateral negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament, and their deep disappointment of the years-long standstill on the matter, are therefore quite natural. The question raised by Ambassador Loeis of Indonesia on 14 March this year is well-founded: Why was it possible to create a subsidiary body on a nuclear test ban in 1982 when confrontation prevailed on the international scene, but not now, when the international climate seems to favour agreements for disarmament?

Indeed, the elimination of medium-range and shorter-range missiles, the prospect for 50 per cent reductions in United States and Soviet strategic offensive weapons, the general improvement in relations between the two great Powers and between East and West as a whole, ought to create a new atmosphere around the question of nuclear testing. One might rightly expect in these circumstances that the problem of priority in the relationship between an NTB

(Mr. Kostov, Bulgaria)

and nuclear disarmament, which for a long time was subject to debates, would disappear. We hope that the lack of any progress is not due to some new and hidden plans in the military field, but is rather a result of continuation of the standstill which has persisted over the years. Accordingly, we are tempted to believe that the answer to the question put by our distinguished colleague Ambassador Loeis could lie in Antonio Gramsci's words: "The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appears". We view the proposal for the convening of a conference of the States parties to the 1963 Treaty precisely as an expression of disappointment with the practical inaction of the Conference on Disarmament and a desire to find a way out of the crisis. This proposal was supported by Bulgaria. We do not think that such a conference would have an adverse impact on our work here in the CD. On the contrary, we share the view expressed by Ambassador Rodrigo of Sri Lanka on 16 March this year that a conference of this kind would provide fresh impulses to the CD, as this year's Paris Conference did with respect to the negotiations for a chemical weapon ban.

A comprehensive treaty banning all nuclear tests everywhere and for all time could be achieved in one step or in several. Even if we set up an ad hoc committee on a nuclear test ban - something that Bulgaria strongly urges - we would probably pass through different stages until we achieve the desired goal - the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. All international initiatives and actions which pursue the same goal would be conducive and helpful to our work. It is from the same point that we look at the bilateral Soviet-American negotiations and the Joint Verification Experiments being carried out in the framework of those negotiations. We hope that the momentum accumulated in the negotiations will lead to the speedy ratification of the 1974 Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests and the 1976 Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, which would constitute an important step towards the achievement of a comprehensive test ban. We are of the opinion that the results of the Joint Verification Experiments should be made available to the public. In this context I would like to associate myself with the statement of Ambassador van Schaik of the Netherlands that "the work in the CD would greatly benefit from the results of the Joint American-Soviet verification experiments, once these results could be injected into the work of the CD".

We are aware of the readiness of the USSR, concurrently with the holding of the negotiations, to observe, on a mutual basis, a moratorium on nuclear explosions. Bulgaria considers such an approach correct and productive. The time is coming when, in our opinion, we shall also have to think in practical terms about the involvement of all nuclear-weapon States in the search for a solution to this acute international problem. The great importance which the majority of countries attach to the question of a nuclear test ban has again been confirmed during this year's discussion in this chamber. In declaring itself decisively in favour of its speedy resolution, Bulgaria holds the view that the Conference on Disarmament can and should play an active and paramount role. In order to do that, the first condition is to set up an ad hoc committee. We feel encouraged by the fact that a number of delegations have expressed readiness to show flexibility and accept the draft mandate proposed by Czechoslovakia in document CD/863 as a basis. And indeed, in the present circumstances, this represents a fair compromise, which at least makes it

(Mr. Kostov, Bulgaria)

possible to move beyond procedural discussions and provides us with a structure for our work without prejudging individual positions of delegations. Up till now we have heard no objections by any member of the CD against this draft mandate. We highly appreciate your efforts, Mr. President, aimed at removing the obstacles to the establishment of an ad hoc committee. Unfortunately they have not succeeded. We believe, however, that these efforts have not been in vain and that it will be possible to establish an ad hoc committee on item 1 before the end of the spring part of this year's session.

Bulgaria values highly the work done so far by the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. The Group's fifth report (CD/903 and Corr.1), containing the basic initial concepts for a system for level II seismic data exchange, provides evidence of fruitful and effective work. We do not doubt that the system designed, consisting of high-capacity seismograph stations or arrays, national and international data centres and effective telecommunication channels capable of transferring wave-forms, has considerable advantages with respect to the old system - based only on parameter (level I) data and described in CCD/558 and CD/43. Among the essential advantages are:

The possibility of increasing the quality of processing of seismic data in international data centres, and hence a considerable improvement in the precision of initial bulletin parameters for seismic events, which are an important source for national verification;

Guaranteed acquisition in every national data centre of wave-form data for every event of particular interest kept in international data centres;

Availability of additional capabilities for requesting more data from the global network on the part of every national data centre, through international data centres, for portions of time of potential interest for a given country for the purposes of national verification.

A number of scientific and technical elements will be defined more precisely after the Group's Second Technical Test. Bulgaria has agreed to participate in this experiment, as far as it is able, as is shown in the documents submitted by our delegation to the Group.

We would like to note that the system on level II as a concept is fully acceptable, but there are still some controversial and unresolved questions. Most of them have to do with the telecommunication facilities and the transfer of data. This is really a new and complex task for the Group - there are large volumes of level II data and they require high-capacity telecommunication links. No effective technical solution to this task has been devised. The channels of the World Meteorological Organization are not yet ready to accept and transfer large amounts of level II data. To rely only on these channels for stage II of the experiment would be a bit risky. On the other hand, the technical alternatives proposed by some delegations unnecessarily complicate the system and make it more expensive, and disrupt concepts, co-ordinated earlier, about the need for independence of the telecommunication facilities for the purposes of the global system.

(Mr. Kostov, Bulgaria)

We also hold the view that more active work is needed on the basic cell of the system, a high-capacity three-component seismic station, and on the procedures for automatic extraction and preliminary processing of the necessary data. The countries which possess technical realizations of such stations could have been more prompt in proposing prototypes - that would facilitate the active participation of smaller countries, where the production of such equipment is not effective or even impossible. From this point of view we regard Canada's plans connected with the activities of the Yellowknife seismic array and the organization of an international workshop there in the autumn of this year, as extremely useful. We think that other countries, possessing such capabilities could take similar steps that would contribute to the speedy elaboration of less expensive prototypes of the "CD stations", which are a basic initial element of the new system and which must be carefully tested in practice.

Other scientific and technical questions also remain open, for example the formats for the transfer of level II data, data compression methods etc. We are convinced that the Group of Experts - with their proven high professional qualifications and experience - is in a position to find a satisfactory solution to all pending questions. The Bulgarian delegation will continue, through its expert Professor Hristoskov, to contribute to the further elaboration of the technical aspects of the international system for seismic data exchange. That is, however, only part of the larger question of verification in the context of a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

We fully agree, Mr. President, with your view - stated on 28 February - that "we may be coming to a point where we should start thinking seriously about the multiple facets of verification from a broader and more purpose-oriented perspective, and give proper guidance to the work of the GSE". Indeed, it is high time, by drawing on the work done so far by the GSE, to take up the detailed elaboration of other necessary methods and procedures for verification, which will undoubtedly also require expert advice. Some additional tasks which could be taken up by the GSE were indicated by the distinguished Ambassador of Sweden, Mr. Hyltenius, on 21 March: "on-site inspection and observation, the monitoring of airborne radioactivity and the use of satellite images for test ban verification". To this I would add that at the expert level practical solutions could be proposed, not only on the technical, but also on the legal, institutional and financial aspects of a global system of international verification. All these aspects could be integrated in a new and enlarged mandate for the GSE. A number of subsidiary bodies could function within the framework of the Group - one of which would continue to consist of seismologists. Such comprehensive consideration and elaboration of all the elements of the international verification system could, in our opinion, start even at this stage. In order not to become involved in an abstract discussion or move away from the main goal - a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty - two conditions are necessary and sufficient. First, we must proceed from the understanding that the verification issue will be examined as applied to a treaty which will ban all nuclear tests in all environments, will be of unlimited duration and will encompass all nuclear-weapon States; second, we must exert the necessary concern for efficiency and sense of urgency in order to quickly resolve all verification matters, which, as is universally recognized, should not pose major technical problems.

(Mr. Kostov, Bulgaria)

The main question which each of us, and all of us together, have to answer clearly is reduced in the final analysis to the following: Is there enough political will to solve a problem which is most directly linked with the effort to stop and reverse the arms race?

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Kostov of Bulgaria for his statement and for the very kind words he addressed to me. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? I recognize the representative of Algeria, Ambassador Ait-Chaalal.

Mr. AIT-CHAALAL (Algeria) (translated from French): Mr. President, I would like to tell you how much I appreciate the words of welcome you kindly addressed to me on the occasion of my taking up my duties in this Conference on Disarmament. I thank you most sincerely, and I am happy to be able to embark on my official mission under your presidency. My colleagues have informed me of the skill and effectiveness with which you have guided the work of the Conference throughout this month. I would like to assure you of my appreciation, my admiration and my warmest congratulations. I would also like to thank all my ambassadorial colleagues who have been good enough to welcome me, which has deeply touched me. I thank them very sincerely, and I would like to take the opportunity offered me today to express to all my fellow ambassadors and representatives of States in this Conference my esteem and respect, and assure them of my sincere desire for friendly co-operation with them all. I hope that this co-operation will be productive and fruitful - that at least is my most sincere wish. I would also like to say on behalf of my Government that I will spare no effort to move our work forward and make our modest contribution within this Conference in order to contribute to promoting the noble objectives to which this Conference is dedicated.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Ait-Chaalal of Algeria for his statement and the very kind words he addressed to me. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this moment? There seems to be none.

The secretariat has circulated today, at my request, the timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. The timetable is merely indicative and can be changed, if the need arises. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: As this is the last plenary meeting I am to preside over, I would like to make a brief observation.

On 9 March, the Conference established the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space and scheduled its first meeting for 14 March. I must express my disappointment and concern over the fact that the Ad hoc Committee has not yet been able to start its work. I sincerely hope that with a spirit of co-operation, mutual understanding and tolerance, you will overcome the differences and start work in the Committee without further delay.

(The President)

On 14 March, I informed you that I had initiated the process of exploring possible progress on our agenda item 1, "Nuclear test ban". The first round of my consultations on an informal and individual basis with the members is almost over. I am very grateful to all those delegations which have displayed such a co-operative and flexible attitude. I am happy to report to you today that there exists a strong desire to start substantive work on the nuclear test ban issue in the Conference, and that there is an emerging convergence of views on the question of a mandate for the establishment of an ad hoc committee on a nuclear test ban. I do believe it is important for us to continue this process of dialogue. I have received valuable co-operation and support from the item co-ordinators on the nuclear test ban, Ambassador de Azambuja of Brazil, Ambassador Dietze of the German Democratic Republic and Ambassador Fan of China. As the representative of a country which is deeply interested in the question, and also as a co-ordinator on this item, I pledge my continued contribution to the co-ordinators' joint efforts in search of a consensus.

I would like to take this opportunity to express my sincere gratitude to all of you, and in particular to the monthly co-ordinators, Ambassador Benhima of Morocco, Ambassador Varga of Hungary, Ambassador Marchand of Canada and Ambassador Fan of China, as well as Mr. Komatina, Secretary-General of the Conference, Mr. Berasategui, Deputy Secretary-General, and all members of the secretariat. Without your co-operation, assistance and friendship, I could not have fulfilled my duty.

I would also like to thank Mr. Yasushi Akashi, Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, for his visit to the Conference. I am certain that his presence has been beneficial to the members of the Conference. I wish him a successful meeting in Lagos, Nigeria, and a pleasant trip home to New York.

As I have no other business for this plenary meeting, I shall now proceed to adjourn it. May I extend my best wishes to Ambassador Bullut of Kenya for every success during his presidency next month.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 4 April, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.30 a.m.