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Held at Headquarters, New York,
on Thursday, 23 October 1975, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. GHORRA (Lebanon)
Rapporteur: Mr. ARTEAGA-ACOSTA (Venezuela)

- Question of Korea /119/ (continued)
- (a) Creation of favourable conditions for converting the armistice into a durable peace in Korea and accelerating the independent and peaceful reunification of Korea
 - (b) Urgent need to implement fully the consensus of the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly on the Korean question and to maintain peace and security on the Korean peninsula

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The meeting was called to order at 10.50 a.m.

AGENDA ITEM 119 (continued)

QUESTION OF KOREA:

(a) CREATION OF FAVOURABLE CONDITIONS FOR CONVERTING THE ARMISTICE INTO A DURABLE PEACE IN KOREA AND ACCELERATING THE INDEPENDENT AND PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION OF KOREA

(b) URGENT NEED TO IMPLEMENT FULLY THE CONSENSUS OF THE TWENTY-EIGHTH SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON THE KOREAN QUESTION AND TO MAINTAIN PEACE AND SECURITY ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA (A/10142, A/10191; A/C.1/1054, 1060, 1061 and 1063; A/C.1/L.708/Rev.1 and L.709).

Mr. MURRAY (United Kingdom): Mr. Chairman, since this is the first occasion that I have had to address this Committee during this session, may I say how delighted I am that it should be under your chairmanship. Your skill as a diplomatist and negotiator is well known to us all and has already been amply demonstrated during this debate. You have a nice sense of humour, a quality particularly useful in this forum. Over the years you have proved yourself a good friend of the United Nations and of my country.

As we have been often reminded in this debate, the question of Korea was first inscribed on the agenda of the General Assembly in 1947. Young men of many nations fought and died in Korea between 1950 and 1953, when the Armistice Agreement was signed. Many of those who survived that war must now be grandfathers. And yet the United Nations is still debating the Korean question.

It is no wonder that most delegations now view this debate on Korea with increasing weariness and frustration or that those countries which have entered the United Nations comparatively recently are tempted to

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argue that these sterile and often acrimonious debates are an anachronistic survival of the cold war and do not concern them. Importuned by both sides for their votes, delegations must often be tempted to recommend to their Governments that the safest course is to abstain on everything and offend no one. Such feelings are understandable, but they must be resisted. Members of the United Nations should not opt out of any situation where peace is at risk. And peace could all too easily be at risk in Korea were the General Assembly to act imprudently.

As we all know, although the Armistice Agreement was signed 22 years ago, there is still no real peace in the Korean peninsula. The expectations raised by the Joint Communiqué issued by the two sides in July 1972 and by the 1973 consensus have not been realized: families remain divided, violent incidents are a frequent occurrence and the political dialogue between the South and the North was broken off unilaterally by North Korea in 1973 and has not been resumed.

There is, alas, no easy and ready way out of this tragic situation. We have all heard the spokesmen of North and South Korea, and must have drawn our conclusions. It is clear that deep fears and antagonisms divide the two sides. It is clear that there is no early prospect of a peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula. Time and much patience will be needed if we are to remedy the present state of affairs. But this does not mean that there is nothing that we can do now. It is important that we should make a start and devise practical steps to be taken forthwith in the hope of bringing the two sides closer together.

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The Foreign Minister of Singapore, in his thoughtful and stimulating statement in the general debate proposed four basic rules for the conduct of negotiations. His first rule -- and I shall come back to the others -- was that:

" ... to be successful in any negotiation one must examine the most constructive proposals the opponent offers. One needs to find a position offered by one side acceptable to the other side, and try to build from there." (A/PV.2360, p. 26)

Prompted by such considerations, my delegation, together with other like-minded delegations, has in the last few years made a number of determined efforts to find common ground with the countries which support North Korea. We carefully reviewed the long-standing requirements of the supporters of North Korea, to wit: the dissolution of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK); the dissolution of the United Nations Command; and the withdrawal of troops under the United Nations flag. In 1973 my delegation and others sponsored a resolution agreeing to the dissolution of UNCURK; this was subsequently incorporated in the 1973 consensus. Last year, prompted once again by the considerations outlined in Mr. Rajaratnam's rule one, we took another look at the problem of the dissolution of the United Nations Command and acknowledged that the Command was in some respects anachronistic. General Assembly resolution 3333 (XXIX), which was adopted at the twenty-ninth session and which we and others sponsored, for the first time expressed readiness to give consideration, in consultation with the parties directly concerned, to the dissolution of the United Nations Command, in conjunction with appropriate arrangements to maintain the Armistice Agreement.

This was a serious proposal, and the parties directly concerned on our side have since shown their willingness to carry it out. On 27 June, the permanent representative of the United States sent a letter to the President of the Security Council outlining the measures which his Government was prepared to take in implementation of

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resolution 3333 (XXIX) and proposed a detailed time-table which provided for the dissolution of the United Nations Command by 1 January 1976, subject to prior agreement being reached on appropriate arrangements to maintain the Armistice Agreement. The Government of the Republic of Korea issued a parallel declaration. The United States Government and the Government of the Republic of Korea undertook meanwhile to reduce manifestations of the United Nations Command, including restricted use of the United Nations flag.

The United States Government on 22 September sent a further letter to the President of the Security Council reporting on the steps that had been taken.

On 27 June, my delegation had joined with others in requesting the inscription on the agenda of an item entitled "Urgent need to implement fully the consensus of the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly on the Korean question and to maintain peace and security on the Korean Peninsula". A draft resolution was appended to the explanatory memorandum. That draft resolution which is now before us in document A/C.1/L.708/Rev.1**, revised to incorporate the valuable amendments introduced by France, and so ably presented and explained by our French colleague on the opening day of this debate, constitutes a logical follow-up to resolution 3333 (XXIX) adopted last year in that it suggests practical steps which might be taken to implement the proposals contained in last year's resolution. This year's draft resolution expresses the hope that all the parties directly concerned will enter into negotiations on new arrangements designed to replace the Armistice Agreement; that those discussions should be completed and alternative arrangements for the maintenance of the armistice agreed upon in time to enable the United Nations Command to be dissolved on 1 January 1976, so that by that date --- and I quote our text --- "... no armed forces under the United Nations flag will remain in the South of Korea".

The Government of the United States, in the person of Mr. Kissinger, and the Government of the Republic of Korea, have meanwhile proposed to the parties to the armistice the convening of a conference to discuss ways to preserve the Armistice Agreement. They have also expressed their readiness to explore other means to reduce tension in the Korean peninsula, including the possibility of a larger conference to negotiate a more fundamental agreement. In welcoming those proposals in his valuable statement yesterday, the Permanent Representative of Australia rightly pointed out that they indicated --- and I quote --- "further areas and avenues for discussion". (2062nd meeting, pp. 38-40)

These various proposals, if acted upon, would indeed constitute "a great leap forward", if I may borrow this picturesque Chinese expression, in resolving the Korean situation. It is particularly disappointing, therefore, that the other side has made no attempt either to take up these proposals, or to offer any concession on its side. They have, on the contrary, taken what can only be

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described as "a great leap backward" in that draft resolution A/C.1/L.709, submitted by Algeria and others, calls upon "the real parties" to the armistice to negotiate a peace agreement to replace the armistice. And the "real parties", according to the memorandum of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, issued on 17 August, are only the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. This proposal to exclude the Republic of Korea from any peace negotiations is not only unacceptable to my delegation, it is also unrealistic. The Republic of Korea is a reality. It cannot simply be wished out of existence. As Ambassador Saito reminded us on the opening day, the Republic of Korea was a full participant in the Geneva Conference of 1954. It remains an independent sovereign State recognized as such by over 90 countries many of which are represented in this room. It exercises authority over territory where more than two thirds of the population of the Korean peninsula live. The North Koreans may not like the Republic of Korea -- for that matter the Republic of Korea has many well-founded objections to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea --- but you cannot conclude a peace settlement in Korea by leaving out one of the two principal parties. That proposal is not only objectionable, it is also new --- and retrograde. The draft resolution sponsored by Algeria and others in 1972, for instance, expressed the hope (and I quote): "that North and South Korea will successfully pursue the political negotiations under way in order to conclude a peace agreement". President Kim Il Sung repeated that proposal, in 1973, in the context of his five-point programme. One can of course rewrite history. But the practitioners of that devious art do not yet have access to the United Nations archives in the Dag Hammarskjold Library.

Another and equally serious objection to the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.709 is that it calls for the dissolution of the United Nations Command and the replacement of the Armistice Agreement by a peace agreement, without making any provision for alternative arrangements to safeguard the armistice until such time as a peace agreement can be concluded. This is an unrealistic and dangerous proposal, particularly in view of the statement in the North Korean memorandum of 17 August that, and I quote:

"If the 'UN Command', a signatory to the Korean Armistice Agreement, is dissolved, the Armistice Agreement, too, will have no alternative but to cease its existence." (A/C.1/1054, p. 16)

(Mr. Murray, United Kingdom)

This statement was repeated in this room the day before yesterday by the representative of North Korea.

A peace agreement in Korea is an ultimate goal which, if we are honest, we all recognize has little hope of being realized in the immediate future. What we should be concerned with now are practical steps which can be taken straight away to promote a dialogue between all the parties directly concerned, while at the same time ensuring that the armistice is not put at risk, the armistice which, as the representative of Sweden so aptly put it yesterday, is the "very slender minimum basis for the continued security of the Korean people and for East Asia as a whole". (A/C.1/PV.2062 p. 56)

It is because we believe that draft resolution A/C.1/L.708/Rev.1**, of which my delegation has the honour of being a sponsor, offers just such a practical way forward, that we appeal for the widest possible support for that draft resolution. We also call for the rejection of draft resolution A/C.1/L.709 which is unrealistic in its demands and totally lacking in the spirit of conciliation -- and unless both sides are prepared to compromise there can be no progress.

I have already quoted the first rule in negotiations proposed by the Foreign Minister of Singapore. I shall conclude by commending to the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.709 Mr. Rajaratnam's other three rules. These are: that you can accomplish nothing by knocking your opponent over the head; that every party to a negotiation must be prepared to sacrifice some of its demands and to make some concessions; and that every country has a certain irreducible minimum national interest and it is unreasonable to expect a country to consent to any proposal which detracts from this. To be present at your own peace negotiations is surely "an irreducible minimum national interest". With what possible justification are the North Koreans demanding that we should abandon what our Japanese colleague rightly described as "the universal practice to invite the parties directly concerned in an area to participate in discussing the peace and security of that area so that the interests of all parties are represented". (2060th meeting, p. 47)

I hope I have shown that the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.708/Rev.1** had the considerations advanced by Mr. Rajaratnam very much in mind, both in the spirit in which we have put our resolution forward and in the careful way in which it is drafted. We on our side have moved a long way in the last two years.

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(Mr. Murray, United Kingdom)

It is normally left to elder statesmen like our universal adopted father, Jamil Baroody, to appeal for conciliation. May the mantle of conciliator on this occasion be assumed by someone I hope rather younger but much less experienced.

I appeal to the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.709 to consider whether the time has not come for their side to show an equal willingness, with our own, to compromise. The 1973 consensus showed that there was, and is, considerable common ground. Let us end this sterile annual confrontation. Let the two sets of sponsors set a good example to the two parts of Korea. It is said that happy countries have no history. We must all work for the day when the question of Korea can be amicably removed from our agenda and Korea can once more be rightly described as "The Land of Morning Calm".

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of the United Kingdom for the very generous and kind remarks he made about me.

Mr. ASHTAL (Democratic Yemen): This year the Korean question is being discussed in the First Committee in the light of important developments which have far-reaching implications. The peoples of Viet-Nam, Cambodia and Laos crowned their heroic struggle with the achievement of a complete and neat victory over United States imperialism and its lackeys. The lessons are all too clear: no repressive client régimes can prolong their reign of terror by relying on foreign troops and forces; no imperialist military intervention can break the will of a fighting people.

The authorities in Seoul choose to be oblivious of those realities. Instead, they institutionalize their repression by muffling even the mildest of opposition; they harp on the so-called imminent danger from the north, thus inviting more American military involvement. The United States, on the other hand, attempts to cover up the bankruptcy of its military adventurism by hanging on to a government clique in Seoul. That serves two purposes: one is real, the other is imaginary.

First, it keeps its industrial military complex rolling by diverting to Seoul whatever arms were earmarked to Viet-Nam and Cambodia. Thus it postpones economic crises by playing with fire. Secondly, it endeavours to salvage its shrinking influence in East Asia by clinging to an antiquated theory of geopolitics predicated on brute force and utter disregard for the general will of peoples. Yet the lessons are there for everyone to learn.

After decades of debates in this Committee, and a perilous armistice in Korea, we are surprised that the United States is only now anticipating a change of berets: it ostensibly expresses its readiness to stop camouflaging itself with the banner of the United Nations. We certainly have not moved much. Except for the rational decision of some other States to withdraw their troops in time from South Korea, the situation has not changed.

The draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.708, even after its amendment (A/C.1/708/Rev.1) only begs the question. It does not contain a new element which could promote the search for a genuine solution. It tends to stabilize the status quo

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by not addressing itself to the real issue, namely, the withdrawal of all foreign troops stationed in South Korea. It does not even mention the independent and peaceful reunification of Korea -- a fact which was agreed upon by North and South Korea in their Joint Communiqué of 4 July 1972. Two years after the consensus statement adopted by the General Assembly on 28 November 1973, that draft resolution only expresses the hope that

"... all the parties directly concerned will enter into negotiations on new arrangements designed to replace the Armistice Agreement..."

(A/C.1/L.708/Rev.1)

It is a known fact that South Korea is not a party to that Armistice Agreement. Is this, then, another attempt to inject an extraneous factor, thus further complicating the issue? Since the consensus statement was adopted, no tangible steps have been taken towards negotiation. It is therefore the duty of this Committee clearly to stipulate terms which will stimulate the negotiating process. The withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea is one of them.

The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea maintain friendly relations based on the common struggle against imperialism. As a divided country, we fully understand the aspirations of North Korea to the independent and peaceful reunification of that country. Furthermore, we share their view regarding the withdrawal of all foreign troops from South Korea. In our own region we have consistently called for the total withdrawal of all foreign troops from Oman. We are of the view that a régime which is sustained by a foreign military presence and not by the will of its people can be neither independent nor sovereign. The independent reunification of Korea can take place only when South Korea is itself independent of the United States military presence. That is the real meaning of the withdrawal of all military troops from South Korea.

My delegation is happy to sponsor the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.709, which calls upon the real parties to the Armistice Agreement to replace the Korean military Armistice Agreement by a peace agreement. South Korea is not a party to that Armistice Agreement. The United States

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Government is called upon to negotiate with North Korea, on whose territory there is not one foreign soldier. In operative paragraph 3, our draft resolution urges the north and the south of Korea to observe the principles of the North-South Joint Communiqué and to take practical measures to reduce tension in the peninsula. That, we believe, would remove any military confrontation and do away with any justification for the continued presence of foreign troops in South Korea.

The United States, whose permanent representative to the United Nations laments with alarm the waning of the democracies and considers that the majority of States Members of the United Nations are either undemocratic or repressive, should now begin to question its total identification with a repressive régime of the first order. Any rational foreign policy with regard to Korea should take into account the new realities and political developments. After more than two decades of what is a United States military guarantee for South Korea, that country should at least be in a position to discharge its duties independently, the more so since North Korea is free from foreign military presence. Our draft resolution would help the United States to extricate itself from a burdensome foreign commitment and help the Korean people to live in peace and to reunify their country without foreign interference.

Mr. PETRIC (Yugoslavia): Once again, at this session of the General Assembly, we are seized of the question of Korea, as the Assembly failed, at its twenty-ninth session last year, to adopt an appropriate decision along the lines suggested by almost the same group of sponsors, including my own delegation, as is now presenting draft resolution A/C.1/L.709, entitled "Creation of favourable conditions for converting the armistice into a durable peace in Korea and accelerating the independent and peaceful reunification of Korea". The very title of our draft indicates the objectives to be attained and the road to be followed, if we wish to achieve the substantive change in the question of Korea that is indispensable in the light of current relations.

As a matter of fact, 22 years since the conclusion of the Armistice Agreement, the Korean people are still divided artificially. Foreign troops, in fact the forces of the United States, are stationed in the southern part of Korea under the command and flag of the United Nations, a situation which in itself constitutes, today, an anachronism and a legacy of the cold war. It should be recalled that the aforementioned Armistice Agreement had already provided, in its Article 4, that,

"In order to ensure the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, the military Commanders of both sides hereby recommend to the Governments of the countries concerned on both sides that, within three (3) months after the Armistice Agreement is signed and becomes effective, a political conference of a higher level of both sides be held by representatives appointed respectively to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question etc." (S/3079 pp. 34 and 35)

This provision has not been implemented, but its objectives have not become less important. On the contrary, in the meantime developments in the two parts of Korea have been moving in the opposite direction.

For a long time already, there have been no foreign troops in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, while in South Korea -- which opposed the Armistice Agreement and, for that reason, did not sign it -- strong United States military forces, armed with the most modern weapons, including nuclear weapon, continue to be stationed. Consequently, it is clear that it is high time to achieve a peaceful settlement of the Korean question, a goal set by the Armistice Agreement itself, and this involves, in the first place, the withdrawal of all foreign military forces.

(Mr. Petric, Yugoslavia)

Three years ago the North-South Joint Communiqué on Korea of 4 July 1972, which was welcomed and supported by our Assembly, laid down three principles of national reunification, namely: independence, peaceful unification and great national unity. Further, the same Joint Communiqué stipulated that reunification should be achieved independently without reliance upon outside force or its interference. If the North and the South were able to reach agreement on these principles of peaceful and independent unification of the country, which undoubtedly reflect the deepest aspirations of the entire Korean people, then it is all the more the duty of the United Nations to help the Korean people to achieve this objective. Actually, one of the basic principles of our Charter is the right of every country to solve its problems independently, in the spirit of the right of peoples to self-determination without outside interference. There is no justification whatsoever, nor has anyone the right -- for any motives of a strategic or other nature -- to deny the Korean people's right to self-determination and independence, as many other peoples have already achieved this and were rightly supported and encouraged by our Organization.

It is not my intention to deal with the history of the Korean problem which is a long, complex and very instructive one for all of us. However, one thing is obvious, namely that it is high time to effect the necessary changes with respect to the question of Korea. In the conditions of an easing of tensions in international relations -- true, still within limited frameworks -- and ever greater progress towards the emancipation of many peoples and countries which refuse to submit to foreign subjugation and dependence -- and the victory of the peoples of Indo-China underlines the irrepressible character of this process -- it is imperative that our Organization should promote this development, especially where its responsibility is directly and obviously involved, as in the case of Korea. The time for this is all the more ripe, as trends towards its peaceful unification are becoming stronger in Korea every day.

(Mr. Petric, Yugoslavia)

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has been, for many years, insisting on the right of the Korean people to unite and to decide its own fate, independently and without outside interference. In this connexion, I should like to recall its five-point proposal for the national reunification of Korea: to eliminate military confrontation and ease tension between the North and the South; to realize multilateral collaboration and dialogue between the North and the South; to convene a great national congress composed of the representatives of people from all walks of life, political parties and social organizations in the North and the South; to institute a North-South Confederation under the single name of "Confederal Republic of Koryo"; and to enter the United Nations as a single State under the name of the Confederal Republic of Koryo.

At the same time, we are all aware that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea does not belong to any military alliance and has no foreign bases on its soil, which, of course, cannot be said for South Korea whose régime is actually relying for its existence on a foreign power and on foreign military forces stationed in its own territory. Therefore, it is natural that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which opted for the principles and policy of non-alignment, that is for independence and its own way of development, for peace and equitable co-operation with all countries, thus contributing to international security, was admitted to the non-aligned movement as a full member at the recent Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Non-Aligned Countries, held in Lima.

(Mr. Petric, Yugoslavia)

At that Conference, just as at earlier gatherings of non-aligned countries, due attention was devoted to the Korean problem. That was done within the context of the constructive efforts of the non-aligned countries to contribute to the search for just and lasting solutions to international conflicts and the elimination of focal points of crisis. Thus, in its paragraphs 60 and 61, the Lima Programme for Mutual Assistance and Solidarity, in addition to support for the principles stipulated in the North-South Joint Communiqué of 4 July 1972, reaffirmed the support of non-aligned countries for the policy of independent and peaceful reunification without foreign interference and demanded that:

"... all foreign troops that remain stationed in South Korea under the United Nations flag be withdrawn and the present Korean Military Armistice Agreement be replaced with a peace agreement, in order to create favourable conditions for converting the armistice into a durable peace in Korea and accelerating the independent and peaceful reunification of Korea."

(A/10217, para. 60)

The foregoing constitutes the essence of the draft resolution which was introduced on behalf of our group of sponsors by the Ambassador of Algeria in such a convincing and elaborate manner. The dissolution of the so-called United Nations Command; the withdrawal of all foreign military forces from South Korea which are there under the flag of the United Nations; the replacement of the Armistice Agreement by a peace agreement; and the continuation of the dialogue between the North and the South of Korea with a view to achieving an independent and peaceful reunification of the country, these are the basic elements for a genuine solution of the Korean problem. That would be in the interest of the Korean people and of security and peace in that part of the world and, consequently, also in the interest of the United Nations.

During the debate in the Committee we have heard views to the effect that the cessation of the validity of the Armistice Agreement and the withdrawal of foreign military forces before a peace agreement was concluded would create a gap that would aggravate the situation in Korea. Our draft resolution (A/C.1/L.709) provides, in its operative paragraph 3, for a number of concrete measures aimed at maintaining peace and easing tension in Korea and at accelerating the independent and peaceful reunification of that country, and it is up to the real parties to the Armistice Agreement to conclude a peace agreement, as our draft resolution urges them.

(Mr. Petric, Yugoslavia)

In conclusion, I should like to stress once again the necessity of taking measures, without further delay, to eliminate the heavy legacy of the cold war in Korea. We can achieve this only if we adopt measures that will mark the end of foreign interference in the affairs of the Korean people, and that can be obtained through the withdrawal of American military forces from Korea and unequivocal support from the United Nations for the right of the Korean people to reunification in peace and security.

The draft resolution of the other group of sponsors does not pursue the same course. Furthermore, by omitting to mention the necessity of concluding a peace agreement and by including vague provisions on foreign military forces, which could be interpreted as making it possible for them to continue to be stationed in South Korea -- the said draft wholly fails to open prospects for the solution of the Korean problem. Bearing all this in mind, my delegation recommends whole-heartedly to the Committee that it adopt the resolution in document A/C.1/L.709.

Mr. DOSUMU JOHNSON (Liberia): As the Committee should know, the Liberian Government is a country that has friendly relations with both North and South Korea. As such, we are here as peacemakers. Our intervention, therefore, I hasten to say, will be influenced by that consideration, based on objectivity.

The position of the Liberian Government over the past two decades has been that the people of South and North Korea, without outside interference, should enter into a dialogue with a view to a peaceful settlement of the problems that tend to hinder their reunification; hence our anxious support for their achieving observer status in the United Nations at the last session. In this regard we were strengthened by the assumption of their ultimate acceptance as full Members of the United Nations, on the basis of recent precedents in similar circumstances. Unfortunately, our wish seems far from fulfilment.

The difficulty in the unification process seems to be in the terrain of ideological conflict which has polarized the attitude of the two sides. Left to themselves, they have the capacity to arrive at a modus vivendi and thereby to normalize the existing dialogue between them, to agree to a dissolution of the

(Mr. Dosumu Johnson, Liberia)

United Nations Command in Korea without prejudice to peace and security, and ultimately to enter into peaceful negotiations leading towards new arrangements to supersede the existing Armistice Agreement. Any contrary action that will substitute confrontation for mutual understanding and dialogue will only lead to fratricidal war with all its consequences of great-Power intervention, resulting only in a Pyrrhic victory for whichever side wins.

The responsibility for peaceful foreign policy by and large depends upon the political philosophy of the 142 Members of this Organization. On the ideological plane, every effort is being made to use diplomacy and propaganda to strengthen influence among friends and contain inroads made by adversaries. In the bloodless battle for influence, reason is dwarfed by ideological propaganda which is very efficient in a closed society in which officially distributed material is easily absorbed.

(Mr. Dosumu Johnson, Liberia)

Fortunately for our Committee, every member is presumably committed to accepting issues and arriving at conclusions on merit, rather than on ideological surmise; and this is fast becoming Africa's approach to all issues. If we did otherwise we should be making a mockery of the great principles of non-alignment. The founders of the non-aligned movement were free thinkers and they determined all issues on merits and not on any form of affinity. They did not permit sentimentality and words of herd morality to influence their consideration of cold facts. All representatives of member States of the United Nations are free, sovereign and independent representatives, bound only by the policies of their respective Governments and not by the whims and caprices of any other State, be it communist, capitalist or non-aligned. They are free to see, think, and act, subject only to the sensitivity of other representatives.

Since the Korean war in the early 1950s and the armistice that followed the cessation of active hostility in the Korean peninsula, the Korean people have been divided into those of the north and those of the south thus constituting two separate ideological entities, and both have observer status here as sovereign and independent States. In recognition of their independent status the United Nations, by resolution 376 (V) of 7 October 1950, set up a Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, which Commission was dissolved by the United Nations last year.

As everyone in this Committee should know, North Korea is receiving Russian and Chinese assistance and South Korea is under United States supervision. In such circumstances unification cannot be automatic. It involves time, patience and mutual confidence, which the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.709 completely ignores. North Korea insists on the withdrawal of United Nations troops as a precondition of unification. Apprehensive of North Korea's intentions, South Korea has systematically resisted the withdrawal of troops before talks on unification. In 1972 a form of compromise was reached for a dialogue between the two States without a departure from previous positions. In 1973 the United Nations invited both Koreas to take part in the discussion of the Korean question in the hope of facilitating the dialogue.

(Mr. Dosumu Johnson, Liberia)

After mature reflection the First Committee recommended, and the General Assembly adopted, a resolution to the effect that the two Koreas be given time to continue the dialogue on the assumption and in the hope that they might reach an acceptable settlement. That aspiration and hope the Algerian draft resolution (A/C.1/L.709) seeks to undermine by calling for interference in the internal affairs of two free, sovereign and independent States.

Each of those States has developed its own social, economic and political philosophy, on systems diametrically opposed to each other. In such a situation I cannot envisage the possibility of automatic integration and unification of the two States. It is like trying to integrate and unify the United States and the Soviet Union. It is like telling the United Nations to suspend all discussions on peace in the Middle East and elsewhere, and/or on disarmament, until all States have destroyed their stockpiles of weapons. The best thing we can do for the Korean States at this stage is to ensure peace in the area, and in the meantime to recommend the admission of both North and South Korea to the United Nations as permanent Members, as was wisely done in the case of Germany. Unless my memory fails me, I did not at that time hear that the forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or of the Warsaw Pact and the occupation forces of the Soviet Union, France, Great Britain and the United States should first be withdrawn before the two States were admitted. As recently as last week the Allied Powers were still thinking of freeing Rudolph Hess from Spandau Prison, as the media reported.

We have accorded the two Korean States de facto membership in the United Nations, in the fervent hope of their ultimate unification without war and suspicion. We must therefore enter upon the present debate with astute statesmanship, not as communists or socialists or capitalists, as democracies or non-aligned nations acting in concert, but as sentient beings, rationally and morally responsible for our own decisions and actions.

(Mr. Dosumu Johnson, Liberia)

In that context I should like to ask the following pertinent questions.

Is there anyone in this Committee who would permit any State to dictate the ways of his country, or who should give it technical assistance, or for that matter from whom it should secure weapons and military advisers?

In the defence of the territorial integrity of his country, would he permit any State, or even the United Nations, to dictate the source of its military assistance?

All knowledgeable persons in this Committee and all true lovers of their fatherland know what is taking place in States as far away as North Korea, through the media, and they will answer, a thousand times, no.

I should like to repeat that since the Korean war in the early 1950s the Korean people have continued to be divided, South Korea under the umbrella of the United Nations arrangement provided by resolution 2516 (XXIV) of 25 November 1969. North Korea, under communist shelter, has systematically advocated the withdrawal of United Nations troops from South Korea. Apprehensive of North Korea's intentions, the South has systematically resisted the withdrawal of troops without new arrangements being made to secure the peace without prejudice.

In 1972, as we have been told, some compromise was reached for a dialogue between the two States without any departure from previous positions. In 1973 however, I repeat, the United Nations invited both North Korea and South Korea to take part in our discussions and they are here with us. At the same time the Committee recommended and asked the Assembly to adopt a resolution in accordance with which the two sides would continue their dialogue and, it was hoped, reach an acceptable settlement. Since each State is different socially, economically and politically, the most that the United Nations can do for them is to ensure peace in the area by granting them United Nations membership without further delay.

(Mr. Dosumu Johnson, Liberia)

I have said that if outside Powers do not meddle in the affairs of the Koreas, the two States will in time work out a modus vivendi. This belief is strengthened by the words of the representative of the Democratic People's Republic in this Committee on 25 November 1974:

"It is our belief that the north and the south may deepen mutual understanding and trust through this course, and may institute a Confederation under the single national title, the Confederal Republic of Koryo. Under this Confederation the two sides will implement the policies discussed at the Great National Congress while retaining the present political systems of North and South Korea as they are for the time being.

"If we do not impose our system on the South Korean side, and they do not impose their system on us, both sides can realize the great unity of the nation, transcending the differences of political views and religious beliefs, even though the two political systems existing in the north and the south are left intact as they are. In that case there will be neither arms drive nor war, and a strong basis will be built for realizing the complete reunification of the fatherland."

(2029th meeting, p. 42)

While I think this quotation is tendentious, taken at its face value, it is a noble idea which everyone is duty-bound to support. One thing is clear from these words: it is that the north is agreed on cultural and scientific co-operation but not on political integration at this stage. It implies, first and foremost, co-operation, détente, mutual respect and coexistence.

Every fair-minded member of this Committee should be puzzled by the call for withdrawal of troops as a precondition of negotiation. It is without parallel in modern political practice, especially so since North Korea has treaty relations with the Soviet Union and South Korea with the United States, and the north has the edge because of its contiguity to Russia and China in terms of common boundaries. The story of Viet-Nam after the withdrawal of American troops is a case in point.

(Mr. Dosumu Johnson, Liberia)

I did not see or hear those who were loudest in insisting on the withdrawal of United States troops as a condition of a peaceful settlement in Viet-Nam do or say anything when the communist forces attacked and swallowed up South Viet-Nam and Cambodia. There is nothing in the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.709, nor have the sponsors done anything, to convince this Committee that South Korea will not suffer the same fate.

I must repeat, if the sponsors of draft resolution in A/C.1/L.709 will leave the Koreans to themselves, they will settle their problem in time. While their statements to the contrary have been useful, they have not been convincing. They try to be more Catholic than the Pope. In this context, let me direct you to the words of the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea when he addressed this Committee on Tuesday, 21 October 1975:

"The draft resolution sponsored by peace-loving countries accords with the Lima Programme adopted with unanimous support of all the non-aligned countries at the Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-Aligned Countries some time ago.

"The Lima Programme reads as follows:

"'The Conference ... reaffirms its support of the policy for the independent and peaceful reunification without any foreign interference in its internal affairs advocated by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and demands that all foreign troops that remain stationed in South Korea under the United Nations flag be withdrawn and the present Korean Military Armistice Agreement be replaced with a peace agreement, in order to create favourable conditions for converting the armistice into a durable peace in Korea and accelerating the independent and peaceful reunification of Korea.'" (2061st meeting, p. 27)

The Lima decision is clear on the point of continuing the validity of the Armistice Agreement until it is replaced by new arrangements for lasting peace.

(Mr. Dosumu Johnson, Liberia)

Politics must focus on things as they are. It is now common knowledge that if Korea had not been divided into two parts at Yalta, and if North Korea had not invaded South Korea on 25 June 1950, there would have been no Korean War; and there would have been no United States or United Nations intervention, with implicit commitments under the Charter of the United Nations and with a force from 16 Member States under the authority of the Security Council, withdrawal of which can be authorized only by the Security Council. The United Nations Command, as it now stands, is just a handful of senior military men to supervise the Armistice. To remove them without proper safeguards would mean war. Let me make it unmistakably clear that the United Nations Command and the United States forces in South Korea are separate and distinct entities.

Membership in this Organization is the surest means of maintaining peace in that area. Without such membership, it would be peculiarly obtuse for anyone to ask South Korea to remove the props whereby its security is maintained. The draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.709 is mischievous and, to say the least, divisive. Its aim is to keep Korea divided by inviting outside forces to obstruct its reunification.

Without further reciting the history of the item before us, let me say that South Korea is a sovereign State and, like North Korea, has an absolute right to enter into bilateral agreements for troops and arms to defend itself against foreign intervention. And only the Republic of Korea can, under international law, authorize their withdrawal. To coerce South Korea at this stage against its will would be a blow of potentially historic proportions to international peace and understanding and the present delicate *détente*.

(Mr. Dosumu Johnson, Liberia)

Let us leave the Korean problem to the Koreans themselves, lest we repeat the tragic consequences of Indo-China with emphasis -- I am referring to Viet-Nam. We in Africa have greater problems that require priority consideration. The crisis of malnutrition, food shortage, disease, development and so on calls for a shift of emphasis. Bloc voting in the third world is depriving us of many things and tends to minimize our importance in the constellation of States.

Finally, the Armistice Agreement has been a source of continued peace in the Korean peninsula. Without it there will be chaos. Let us encourage the continuation of the political dialogue on the basis of the Joint Communiqué of 4 July 1972 and extend the life of the South-North Co-ordinating Committee in its efforts to find a way to reunification.

If number is the criterion for determining important issues in the United Nations, the Committee will agree with me that the views of South Korea, which has two thirds of the whole population, should take precedence over the views and wishes of North Korea.

All those who have a genuine interest in peace in North and South Korea and on the peninsula generally will vote in favour of a draft resolution designed to continue that dialogue without any alteration in the present military balance in the area.

At the appropriate time I shall address myself to the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.708/Rev.1. In the meantime, let me say that it is ethically balanced and goes straight to the point. It will improve the stature of the two States and induce them to create a climate propitious for new initiatives. This implies that the Committee should reject the draft in document A/C.1/L.709 because it is fraught with danger, doubts, divisiveness and, above all, fear.

Mr. GUTIERREZ (Bolivia) (interpretation from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, my delegation wishes to extend to you and to the other officers of the Committee sincere congratulations upon your election and best wishes for success in your work.

As is well known, the objectives enshrined in our Charter are the maintenance of international peace and security, respect for the self-determination of peoples and the economic and social development of nations. It is the First Committee which bears a heavy responsibility for the first of these objectives, which falls squarely within its competence. To a very large degree the hope of mankind to live in peace and unity depends on its decisions.

A number of speakers have in this Committee referred to the causes of tension threatening international peace and undermining security. The questions of the Middle East, Cyprus, Korea, the division of Germany, the decolonization of Angola, Western Sahara and other colonial Territories, racial discrimination and apartheid -- all have been reviewed. Other speakers have referred to the problems besetting the entire world and engendering a climate of uncertainty.

Recently the latest of these, the question of the admission of the two Viet-Nams to the United Nations has been taken up. Stock has been taken of the acute phenomenon of the population explosion, and the related questions of adequate food supplies, the energy crisis, the continued deterioration of international trade, the inflationary scourge and the collapse of the classical monetary system have been mentioned also, as have the imbalance in the development of nations, the profound difference between industrialized and developing countries, the alarming present arms race and the progressive growth of the nuclear arsenals of the great Powers and the consequent dangers of a world holocaust.

Similarly, speakers have indulged in lengthy dialectical disquisitions to show that progress is being made towards the achievement of our aims. The détente which some believe has been achieved is lauded, the main examples given being the end of the Indo-Chinese war, the disengagement agreement between Egypt and Israel, the Helsinki Conference on European security the establishment of new denuclearized zones in the world, the Convention prohibiting the use of bacteriological weapons, reiterated endeavours to limit the intensive production of weapons, the search for a formula allowing for rational disarmament and finally the internationalization of all political, economic and social problems, with the inevitable sequel of interdependence among States.

(Mr. Gutierrez, Bolivia)

Whatever the subject -- the causes of tension, general problems weighing heavily on the international community and efforts to solve them -- each speaker gives his views according to his own directives. We are fortunate in that we are still able to speak freely and without fear in this international forum. The right to dissent is the essence of democracy and allows human intelligence to show where the error lies, to try and learn more about man's origin and destiny and to travel along the positive road of renewed technology, along the enlightened avenues of ever more fascinating and beneficial science.

We are at present specifically considering one of the items regarded as controversial -- namely, the question of Korea, a country divided into two parts, the North and the South, as a result of the Second World War. A dividing line known as the 38th parallel was established at the time. That line has significant political connotations.

Following my Government's instructions, which reflect the democratic and nationalist thinking of the Government of Bolivia, I wish in turn to address myself to this question and to substantiate my delegation's sponsorship of the draft resolution submitted at the thirtieth session of the General Assembly by the countries friendly to the Republic of Korea and desirous of preserving peace.

It might be worthwhile at the outset to recall the profound national spirit of the Korean people. The peninsula's lengthy coasts, washed by the Sea of Japan and the Yellow Sea, have suffered great vicissitudes in the course of Korea's history. Yet domination by China in past centuries, the Japanese occupation beginning in 1910 and the intervention of the allies on its territory during the last great world war have never undermined the historic spirit of the Koreans, who have always fought to defend their vigorous personality.

The vagaries of the war of the 1940s led to the present unhappy situation in which Korea finds itself divided into two States. The continuation of that phenomenon in that country can be a surprise to no one, since the same is true of the Europe of the century of enlightenment, with the partition of Germany into two States. And this in a country with so strong a national character, of such advanced culture and civilization, in which stand in splendour two eternal cities of the old world to which mankind owes so much for their contribution to the progress of philosophy, science, the arts and letters.

(Mr. Gutierrez, Bolivia)

While the parties concerned do not agree on their unification in the same way as the two Germanys -- which are one nation -- now form a part of the constellation of countries that make up the world Organization, the two Koreas should be admitted to the United Nations. We must emphasize the fact that we all ardently aspire to the unification of Korea through free, impartial and guaranteed elections, whereby the people could express their will. And it is to this end that all our initiatives and efforts in this forum must be directed.

Let us not wait until the Koreans themselves unite. This could be dangerous. Nations do not renounce their rights nor do they resign themselves to live forever as mutilated States. History like the seas can rise up in anger.

It may be said that the process of reunification will be achieved gradually, that natura non facit saltus, but although nature may not proceed by leaps and bounds, neither can it be held back indefinitely for it will inevitably seek to assert itself and each time more violently.

To come to the substance of the matter, namely, the withdrawal of the so-called foreign troops from South Korea, we must look back to the origin of the present state of affairs. The Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea were constituted as separate States as a result of the Second World War when that territory was occupied by the Allied Powers.

Now then, North Korea has concluded a treaty of alliance and mutual defence with the Soviet Union, in the exercise of its right. South Korea, for its part, in the exercise of its sovereignty and in the interests of its security, has concluded a similar undertaking with the United States.

Further still; in 1950 a civil war broke out in Korea. It was a lengthy, bloody and devastating war. When it came to an end, an Armistice Agreement was signed which ratified the division of Korea into two States with the guaranteeing presence of the United Nations Command, with a demilitarized zone and with a view to the peaceful reunification of that country.

(Mr. Gutierrez, Bolivia)

In the light of these antecedents, if today it is agreed that the United Nations Command must be withdrawn, nothing and no one can prevent the Governments of the United States and South Korea from deciding, freely and in all sovereignty, to maintain United States forces on Korean territory, together with the native reserve and defence troops.

What the United Nations cannot and should not fail to do is to demand that the Armistice Agreement be upheld, while ensuring that it remains in force. That is, when the Command is abolished, it should be expressly stated that the Armistice remains in force. This is of vital importance for the maintenance of peace. If this is not done, South Korea will be left at the mercy of its own devices and exposed to the sudden resumption of the war with a view to the annexation of its Territory. This we cannot and should not allow, if we are to uphold the principles of our Charter.

South Korea has given proof that it wishes to negotiate with the authorities in the North. It has always been frustrated in its patriotic and peaceful endeavours. In 1971 it proposed formal talks; in 1972 a Joint Communiqué was issued by the North and the South. The co-ordinating committee was abandoned unilaterally in 1973 by North Korea. Military preparations in that part of Korea are obvious. A tunnel was dug under the demilitarized zone to invade South Korea, despite the presence of the United Nations Command. Finally the physical elimination of the President of the Republic of Korea has been sought in order to bring about the downfall of his régime, a crime which cost the life of his distinguished wife.

Reference to these events is not made merely by way of recrimination; it is easy to ascertain the veracity of these facts. The merit of these remarks is that they reflect an attitude that deserves to be taken into account. They should therefore not be regarded as sterile but rather as enlightening.

(Mr. Gutierrez, Bolivia)

There is an old Spanish proverb which says that a job well done has more value than the best of reasoning. Therefore, let us try to arrive at a mutual agreement on non-aggression; let the necessary climate be created for a lasting peace; let the frontiers dividing Southern from Northern Koreans be opened in order to promote among them an active exchange of persons and goods. Thus will the necessary climate of confidence required for general elections, under conditions of freedom, impartiality and guarantee be ensured.

Let us prompt the Koreans not to war, but to the sharing of all they possess among their peoples, by opening their frontiers. Let us encourage the Governments to feel that they are in a position to do this. It is through communication that human communities understand themselves better. Let there be no more 38th parallel cutting the two peoples off from each other like a Chinese Wall. If all this is achieved it will necessarily lead to the democratic reunification of Korea and I do not see why the Government of North Korea can oppose a cordial dialogue between the North and the South or the unification of families, or object to trade as in the past, when theirs was a united, happy and brotherly community.

If the United Nations Command is to be abolished in the legendary peninsula of Korea, let the continuity of the Armistice Agreement be duly guaranteed through a general consensus. Otherwise, the state of affairs preceding the war might be renewed and military operations could begin again at any time. This is so obvious it would be absurd to attempt to deny it.

If this is our view in regard to this difficult and complex question of Korea, it is because Bolivia is faced with a similar situation. If the Koreans seek reunification, we, the Bolivians, seek an outlet to the sea. And we cannot as some impatient elements would wish to do, ignore our peace treaty with Chile. To do so would lead us back to the truce period with the undeniable possibility of a resumption of hostilities. Because of this precedent we are firmly of the opinion that the Armistice Agreement must be maintained in force, and we hold this view in the light of our own experience.

(Mr. Gutierrez, Bolivia)

I am confident that the peoples of both Korea and Bolivia will achieve their great historic objectives sooner or later, but only by using the civilized expedient of dialogue and peace.

The need to turn the Armistice Agreement into a peace treaty is the thesis advanced by some participants in this debate. But I see an initial difficulty in this; namely, that instruments of this character imply, first, a definition of boundaries, and, if definitive boundaries are to be established between the North and the South, this means that we are in advance discarding the national unification of the Koreans.

Without clear, defined and agreed boundaries, peace cannot be ensured. Neither can there be a peace treaty between the two countries which have been at war and live under great tension without a delimitation of territories. A peace treaty without geographic definition, with only the intent of preparing a country for unification and elections, does not appear to me to be something that is lasting or durable.

The primary, the priority task is to guarantee peace in Korea. And there is only one way of achieving it; that is, by maintaining in force the Armistice Agreement. Only thanks to peace will the Korean people be able to understand each other and unite.

(Mr. Gutierrez, Bolivia)

I am tempted to express this view because I am among those who believe and have stated earlier that the United Nations is duty-bound to encourage and promote this dialogue and, if necessary to supervise the elections.

As regards the presence of foreign troops in South Korea -- as stated by the representative of France -- this question is not incumbent on this Committee. It is incumbent on the sovereignty of the Government of Seoul, and the General Assembly would be wrong in pronouncing on this matter, which would represent a flagrant interference in the affairs of two States. If the United Nations decides to withdraw its command from South Korea it must pronounce on the validity of the Armistice Agreement. It can neither cancel it nor leave it in the air. That is the legal statute which regulates peace in that region of Asia. If our Organization discards it, it will show that the United Nations has lost its reason, that openly and shamelessly, acting in opposition to the spirit and principles of its own Charter, it opens the door to the unleashing of a new war.

Allow me to make some further remarks. The question of Korea is not an isolated problem. It is similar to so many other problems derived from the allied victory in the last World War. It is therefore connected with many other problems which will emerge with the passage of time. Perhaps the most direct and viable route to a solution would be for the protagonists in the cold war and the new Eastern member of the Security Council to come to an agreement or to declare their neutrality, as suggested yesterday by the veteran representative of Saudi Arabia, Mr. Baroody.

We must attempt by all means to freeze war-like preparations. In this Committee, which is concerned with international peace and security, Korea should be placed within the general context of all political equations. Is this possible? Have we not after all recognized the internationalization of problems and their interdependent character?

Another idea that comes to mind is the following. Why is it that we speak only of the dangers of North Korea invading South Korea? Why does no one accuse South Korea of attempting to dominate by force the northern part of the country? Is this not circumstance showing that aggression is incubating in North Korea? Is there not here a general and implicit recognition of which way the winds blow in that part of the world?

(Mr. Gutierrez, Bolivia)

Another question that comes to mind is why there is such a profound interest in doing away with the Armistice Agreement. Can we not see quite clearly that this seeks to remove a juridical obstacle which prevents the reactivation of the war of conquest by North Korea against the South? The naiveté of the proposition that it would be replaced by a peace treaty deceives no one.

I am certain that the peace treaty that is advocated will never be concluded, as history is my witness. It is argued that if the Command is dissolved the agreement of which it is a part must disappear. The speaker in question must forgive me, but there is no logic in his argument. International agreements are liable to amendment, modifications or revisions without their necessarily coming to an end. The termination of the Command is an amendment to the agreement, and no more; and one amendment can be replaced by another if deemed fit by those who concluded the agreement.

Over 20 years have elapsed since the Armistice Agreement was signed, and peace has been maintained. Why, then, suddenly are there those who speak of colonialism in Asia, and see the possibility of the unleashing of a new war? These sound like ominous forebodings of a gathering storm: Hannibal at the gates. And before he moves forward the world is being alerted to his ineluctable march. As justification of this, arguments of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism are put forward. Time, the supreme judge of the conduct of men and nations, will give its verdict. It is said that the devil knows more because he is old than because he is a devil.

The constable of the General Assembly, Mr. Baroody, appears yesterday to have told us another truth. He said that the United States has not only economic but also strategic interests in Korea. From this we draw the conclusion that what is sought is not the true and mere reunification of Korea, or even the conquest of its southern part. What is sought is to get rid of the United States in that area -- a country which is part of the general system of security of the western world. And why? Is it because some want the United States to abandon a fort and, at the same time, sacrifice a free, sovereign republic which has given proof that it can govern itself?

Beware! The Korean peninsula has been shown to be the key to the union of two socialist Powers in the grip of communism. Let those who wish to succumb add fuel to the fire.

In conclusion, allow me to reiterate in this First Committee the profession of faith in democracy expressed by the President of Bolivia before the General Assembly. He stated emphatically that his Government was ready to establish relations with all countries provided our culture and sovereignty are respected.

If we are not able to maintain unity in diversity, a phenomenon so current in the world today; to live peacefully with our differences and antagonisms; to solve through intelligent understanding the tragedy of some peoples; to distribute wealth equitably in order to combat poverty; to contribute to solving other acute problems; to co-operate in unity in order to narrow the wide gulf dividing the industrialized countries from the developing countries and to protect the freedom of the peoples of the world, then we shall all, men and peoples, be exposed to the dangers of a world holocaust which would turn our presumptuous planet to dust and ashes.

Mr. GIAMBRUNO (Uruguay) (interpretation from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, since this is the first time I have spoken in this Committee, I wish to convey to you the expression of my sincere admiration and respect, which of course I extend also to the Government and people you represent in this Organization. Uruguay is a special friend of Lebanon and perhaps sometimes, just as we were called the Switzerland of Latin America, they might well have called us the Lebanon of Latin America, because we have seen ourselves reflected, as it were in the mirror of Lebanon, a democratic and free country for whose future prosperity I express our best wishes.

I shall be brief in speaking on the question of Korea. I believe that preceding speakers have made the positions they represent and the questions on which there is a difference sufficiently clear.

My delegation is one of the sponsors of the resolution in document A/C.1/L.708/Rev.1**, a draft that was submitted, introduced and elaborated on by the Ambassador of Japan so eloquently that it is unnecessary for me to add anything to what he said.

However, we do wish to make some remarks on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.709. We sincerely wish we had been in a position to support that draft, just as originally we felt that it might be possible for the Committee to be presented with a single resolution. Not only did we think so, we even made some humble efforts to bring the opponents closer together, because we felt that in this emergency the United Nations could have sought a solution to the problem similar to the one adopted approximately three years ago, when a consensus aiming at finding a lasting solution to the Korean crisis was found.

(Mr. Giambruno, Uruguay)

Regrettably, the prolonged discussions over the years have made the possibilities of rapprochement on this point more remote. The reason we are not in a position to support the draft resolution -- which I would call the communist draft because it is supported by all the communist countries and some nations associated with them --- is that it places us in an extremely dangerous position. If we were to dissolve the United Nations Command, which would be tantamount to leaving the armistice almost without effect -- the Armistice Agreement being the only existing juridical instrument which, perhaps in an incomplete manner but none the less in some degree, has made peace possible in Korea -- we would be faced with what another representative qualified as a dangerous vacuum.

We think that it is necessary first to find lasting solutions: a definitive peace agreement, a delimitation of boundaries. Otherwise the armistice will have to remain in force. The timely distribution a moment ago of copies of the Armistice Agreement enables me to see that in its preamble the signatories established that it guaranteed:

"... the complete cessation of hostilities and of all acts of armed force in Korea until a final peaceful settlement is achieved..." (S/3079, Appendix A)

In other words, it was the intent of the signatories to the Armistice Agreement that the latter should remain in force until lasting agreements were achieved. I believe that we are still far removed from those lasting agreements.

Moreover, last year we expressed the view that, despite anything that was said concerning the reunification of Korea, we believed that that reunification in the present state of affairs was no more than a myth, a pipedream. True; mankind also needs myths, and it is true that, in keeping with the express wishes of the parties, we should retain the idea of reunification as an ideal so that when all the hostility which regrettably still exists in the hearts of the participants in the Korean drama has disappeared an agreement may be achieved. But in the present state of affairs I do not think that this is possible.

Also, I must confess that it is rather reluctantly that I speak of the Korean problem. The reason is that I believe that in the years following the demarcation of the 38th parallel and the armistice which followed the hostilities two States

(Mr. Giambruno, Uruguay)

have been consolidated with full expression of sovereignty -- two States possessing the attributes essential to speaking for themselves and solving their own problems. Thus, to some extent I find it strange that the representatives of other countries should be speaking about what is desirable for those States. Were it not for the fact that we are all prompted by the desire that a lasting peace be achieved, I would say that we are invading the jurisdiction of those States.

Many attempts have been made to achieve that lasting peace, and yet I believe that we should seek other ways, other paths. I listened with all due respect to the statement of the Ambassador of Liberia and, like him, I too wish to refer to the desirability of seeking to reduce the differences which exist between the two Koreas in regard to their participation in the United Nations. Another representative -- the representative of Sweden, I believe -- also spoke of the desirability of the admission of the two Koreas as full Members. We support that idea, and if we should find it possible to reflect it in a vote in this Committee which would result in inviting those States to submit their requests for admission, on which a decision could be taken in a spirit of equity, we would have taken a step forward. The presence of the two Koreas as full Members would, I believe, be a further guarantee of compliance with the obligations under the Charter.

However, in this debate I have in mind the fact that in the presentation of the two points of view there have been very marked differences. The presentation of the point of view of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, as made not only by that country's Foreign Minister but also by all those who are part of the communist world and, in particular, those who have participated actively in Korea -- and I am referring especially to the People's Republic of China -- had unbelievably aggressive overtones. I understand that passion, when defending one's own causes, can lead one far beyond the limits of reason. But it seems to me that it would represent a danger to peace were we to consider in all seriousness many of the assertions which we have heard. Moreover, in those assertions, in the explanation and substantiation of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.709, there is a very serious short-coming. Reference is made to

(Mr. Giambruno, Uruguay)

reunification; reference is made to the avoidance of military confrontation and to the maintenance of a durable peace. But there is not a single reference to the manner in which this might be achieved.

For that reason too, I incline to favour the draft resolution which we ourselves have sponsored. That draft, in its second preambular paragraph, stresses the idea that for the attainment of that goal the freely expressed will of the Korean people must be taken into account. This history of the freely expressed will is nothing new. After the Geneva Conference which was held at the end of the war a number of ideas were expressed concerning the possibility of reunification. There were those who advocated free elections, but conditions laid down for those free elections by the participants in that Conference led to a dead end. I think that we too would come to a dead end if we attempted to impose that view. On the one hand there are States which agree that a peoples freedom of expression should be reflected in free elections; on the other hand there are other countries which have never even known that free elections exist. I do not wish to accuse anyone, but I believe that, with very few exceptions, among those sponsoring the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.709 there is no Government or nation which practises democracy or is based on free elections.

(Mr. Giambruno, Uruguay)

This would lead us to a debate on fundamental freedoms. It would lead us to an analysis of the existence of two types of society in Korea: a pluralist open society like that in the Republic of Korea which has had to fight arduously to build a democratic régime with the short-comings inevitably attaching to such a régime, and which has had to live under the constant threat of aggression; and on the other hand there is another society which has achieved undeniable progress under a great leader but in which the right of dissent does not exist. I revert therefore to my earlier assertion of the impossibility of achieving reunification.

What then would be the paths open to us which would lead us out of this difficulty? How can the United Nations conclude the tragic story of a war which we should not forget took hundreds of thousands of lives, whose memory we must respect. Lives were lost on both sides in Korea, lives were lost among the representatives of those 15 or 16 nations which gave their assistance in order to comply with what they felt was a binding mandate of the Organization -- among them a Latin American nation -- and lives were lost also that demand just as much respect from us among those other Powers which intervened either on a voluntary basis, like the Republic of China, or on any other basis.

We must not repeat that tragedy. And while it is true that the United Nations Command should put an end to its activity in Korea, we should never tolerate its withdrawal before we have a final peace settlement, before we get the two authentic parties -- the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea -- to achieve a definitive agreement and a delimitation of boundaries, and before they achieve what is perhaps more important, the creation of a climate of peace.

How can we press for reunification when both sides are continually alleging violations, and not just a few, but thousands of violations of the Armistice Agreement itself? How can we believe that those two communities, which make up a single people, can live in peace if it has not been possible for the families of one part to communicate with families in the other part, if it has not been possible for them to write to each other, or if it has not been possible on the occasion of their traditional festivities to make even a small breach in the towering wall that communism has raised between them.

(Mr. Giambruno, Uruguay)

Sometimes I make these criticisms in the belief that the United Nations and the legal instruments available to us are only a means to guarantee the happiness of individuals, since in essence the purpose of our Charter is to achieve ideal conditions for living. I am duty bound, therefore, but with all due respect, to speak against the kind of doctrine that imposes radical divisions. Not long ago, representatives witnessed manifestations begging for an attenuation of that cruel form of repression whereby human beings are locked up and are not allowed to communicate with their families, as is the case of the Japanese wives who chose their natural destiny, namely to follow their Korean husbands to their homeland, but found no understanding among the North Korean authorities when they sought to return to their countries so as to maintain such contact with their families as the most elementary principles of humanity should dictate.

I believe we must find a way out. I sometimes ask myself whether this problem of the Armistice Agreement and the possibility of going beyond it and of concluding other instruments, is not a legal problem as well as a political one. I wonder whether we should not request an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, whether it would not be possible -- I repeat -- to obtain from the Court an opinion that could serve as our guide. Perhaps this is a form of tribute which we must pay as States which believe that there can be no universal legal order until such time as there is automatic jurisdiction. From the very outset we advocated such a solution, and it is for this reason that we unreservedly support the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.

Similarly I believe it might perhaps be desirable to request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to participate more actively and to intervene more decisively. We have placed great hopes in all his endeavours in favour of peace, and it seems to us that if the Secretary-General were to try to approach the leaders of these two nations, the tension might be somewhat alleviated. In the meanwhile I see no possible solution.

Perhaps with the passage of time, when it becomes possible for what Fernando de los Rios called "the human sentiment of socialism" to flower; in other words, when the harshness of that régime that has condemned so many millions of people to despair has been softened, and there has been a meeting of minds among communists and the free world, our efforts may be crowned with success and

(Mr. Giambruno, Uruguay)

even in Korea it may be possible for the North Koreans and South Koreans to fraternize and even to unite. Then the time will have come when -- as I said in the beginning of my statement -- a pipedream may become a reality.

For the present, however, we maintain our draft resolution in the hope that it will command the support of the majority, in the hope, too, that the majority opinion will carry conviction -- although recommendations from the General Assembly unfortunately are not mandatory. And we shall vote against the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.709 because we believe that it could create serious dangers to peace.

(Mr. Giambruno, Uruguay)

We are, however, open to the urgings of some delegations and we associate ourselves with them in seeking a positive course -- the possibility of allowing the two Koreas to be admitted into the United Nations so that they may sit with us and bring us their problems and so that we may find a solution to those problems, which is the greatest hope of all those who are gathered here.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Giambruno for the very friendly remarks he addressed to me and to my country.

I shall now call on those who wish to speak in exercise of the right of reply.

Mr. NAJAR (Israel) (interpretation from French): I asked to speak to make one very short point of clarification. In his statement of 21 October, reflected in document A/C.1/PV.2061, which only reached us this morning, the representative of Syria intimated that South Korean volunteers had been sent to Israel during the operations of 1956 and 1967, and that 32 crew members, including 12 South Korean pilots of Phantom F-4 planes, had been despatched to Israel during the war of October 1973. This is a perfidious allegation; it is sheer fabrication, devoid of the slightest threat of truth, and I reject it vehemently.

No South Korean volunteer ever took part, in any capacity, in the struggles and fights of Israel, and it is well known that only Israeli citizens take part, and no one else is allowed to take part in the defence of Israel. Therefore, once again, this is blatant Syrian slander which is deserving of condemnation. But it is notorious and well known that North Korean volunteers joined the Syrian armed forces during the fighting in 1973, without however succeeding in helping Syria to bend events to its will.

As can be seen, the representative of Syria feels duty-bound to inject, shall we say, the inimical feelings which he bears toward Israel into every single one of his statements, no matter what the subject under discussion is.

(Mr. Najjar, Israel)

It is a kind of obsession and I most sincerely hope that he will recover, be it only in the interest of this Committee, whose work is already very heavy without adding to it the burden of a quarrel which will be fully dealt with in other Committees and in the General Assembly.

Mr. SUWAID (Oman) (interpretation from Arabic): I asked to speak in order to reply to what has been said by the representative of Democratic Yemen regarding my own country, which I think is interference in our internal affairs. Since the liberation movement started in Oman in July 1975, my country has been doing its utmost to establish friendly relations with all the States in that part of the world, on an equal footing and on the basis of mutual respect, not on the basis of interference in other people's affairs.

We hope that Democratic Yemen will reciprocate.

Mr. SIBAHI (Syrian Arab Republic) (interpretation from Arabic):

In this statement, which I hope will be very brief, I should like to answer the two major points raised. The first was in the statement made by the representative of Uruguay, when he said that the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.709 has been submitted by the communist countries and all those countries associated with that bloc. Since we are among the sponsors of the draft resolution, I am entitled to exercise our right of reply touching the fact that he said that my country was associated with the communist countries.

As regards the second point, I should like to answer what was said by the representative of Israel a few moments ago about our having an obsession at the current session. He believes that obsession leads us always to answer Israel's allegations and those of the States which support it, and that when I spoke of South Korea and the régime which exists in that country this also was the result of that obsession.

(Mr. Sibahi, Syrian Arab Republic)

May I say to the representative of Uruguay that my country, Syria, is an independent country, a sovereign State, and is not associated with or affiliated to any bloc. It only has its own independent policy and respects the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the charter of the non-aligned countries. The Syrian Constitution is closely allied to the Charter.

In Syria we have a democratic Constitution, and a referendum was conducted among the Syrian people in order to draft that Constitution by the People's Council in 1972. In that Constitution there are many provisions which refer to the sovereignty and independence of Syria, and it establishes a close relationship between the Syrian people and the other Arab nations, because Syria is part of the Arab homeland. This is what I am saying, and I repeat it with pride.

As regards our relationship with the Soviet Union, this is based on strong ties of friendship, of which we are proud, and not only as regards the Soviet Union, but also as regards the other socialist democracies, on the same footing, as well as the non-aligned countries. We are proud to participate in such friendship.

I am sure that the representative in Uruguay is competent to differentiate and distinguish between sovereignty and affiliation or association. If he needs further clarification in this matter, perhaps I could advise him to go back to the appropriate provisions of international law so that he may learn the difference between sovereignty and dependency.

(Mr. Sibahi, Syrian Arab Republic)

The other point on which I should like to reply to the representative of Israel is his statement to the effect that the Secretariat had already published something about that in this document which I have before me, the verbatim record. I also have taken note of the paragraphs relating to Israel in this document and I suggest that he refer to them to check the authenticity of this information. I am fully convinced that he only raised the issue of the information in which he said he was condemned and to which he felt it appropriate that he should have the right to reply in order to cover up the assistance which Israel receives from the imperialist and colonialist countries. Reactionary and puppet régimes consider that they have a good and true friend in the Middle East: Israel. That is very clear, and events have made it even clearer and fully explained it. The representative of Israel should not engage in factitious acts, and make allegations for he cannot succeed in denying what I have said. The representative of Israel has never spoken on any occasion except to support his allegations and lies.

I think that if he wants to speak the truth he should not open his mouth for a good while.

I do not wish to take up more time as I shall have an opportunity later, when we discuss other items to be taken up by this Committee, to answer and to raise other points.

Mr. HAMZAH (Democratic Yemen) (interpretation from Arabic): I fully appreciate that this Committee is short of time and realize that it has to complete its work in the time fixed and succeed in its task, and I also know that my statement should be limited to the item under discussion. I shall consequently not follow the course pursued by the representative of Oman, but I do wish to fill in some gaps that may still subsist after the statement made earlier this morning by the Ambassador of my country.

(Mr. Hamzah, Democratic Yemen)

When Ambassador Ashtal made his statement he referred to the presence of foreign troops in Oman and he wished to reconfirm the position of principle adopted by Democratic Yemen in rejecting violations of the rights of States to self-determination and to the control of their own natural wealth and resources, or of the principle of non-intervention by foreigners in the internal affairs of a State. Those are high and noble principles which have been enshrined in the United Nations Charter and should be respected by all of us here. We should not seek to violate them. The whole of the international community should seek to put an end to tensions throughout the world and to allow and enable every State to express its own thoughts and to enjoy its own sovereignty, free of foreign intervention whether in the form of military occupation, persecution and aggression.

Mr. SUWAID (Oman) (interpretation from Arabic): Mr. Chairman, I should like to reserve my right to reply to and comment upon the statement made by the representative of Democratic Yemen later.

Mr. GIAMBRUNO (Uruguay) (interpretation from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, I merely wish to offer a clarification.

The representative of the Syrian Arab Republic felt offended because he said that when I referred to the draft resolution of which he is a sponsor I included all the authors whereas I ought to have implied some diminution of sovereignty. Nothing is further from the truth. I explained that I called the draft a communist draft because a majority of communist countries supported it, but I did add "some nations associated with them", and in Spanish that does not even mean that they are friends but that they sympathize with them. Perhaps he got a wrong impression from the interpretation, and one which is unjustified. After all, among the sponsors of the draft resolution are many countries with which we maintain the best possible relations. In fact, we have the best possible diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. I was in no way trying to offend anyone. I did not use such words as "lackey",

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(Mr. Giambruno, Uruguay)

"satellite" or anything like that. I used a word which means something less than "friend" -- "sympathizer". I hope the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic will be satisfied with that explanation.

Mr. SIBAHI (Syrian Arab Republic) (interpretation from Arabic): I shall not take up much time, Mr. Chairman, as I think everyone is tired. I merely wish to thank the representative of Uruguay for kindly providing that explanation. I believe the misunderstanding was due to the interpretation of the description of the sponsors of the draft resolution as non-aligned countries and socialist countries and countries associated with or affiliated to them. "Affiliated" in Arabic means that they are dependent on them. In any case, I thank the representative of Uruguay for his clarification, which I accept wholeheartedly.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.