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LETTER DATED 1 AUGUST 1960 FROM THE DEPUTY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS TO THE UNITED NATIONS,
ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

New York, 1 August 1960

In accordance with the instructions of the Government of the USSR I request you to issue as documents of the General Assembly and of the United Nations Disarmament Commission the text, attached hereto, of messages dated 23 July addressed by Mr. N.S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, to Mr. H. Macmillan, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Mr. C. de Gaulle, President of France, and Mr. J. Diefenbaker, Prime Minister of Canada, on the question of disarmament, together with the text of a note dated 25 July 1960 addressed by the Soviet Government to the United States Government on that question.

P. MOROZOV
Deputy Permanent Representative of the USSR
to the United Nations

MESSAGE FROM MR. N.S. KHRUSHCHEV TO MR. H. MACMILLAN

dated 23 July 1960

Sir,

The contents of your message of 29 June 1960 prompt me to make a further statement on the problems of disarmament.

I noted that you emphasize your fervent desire to secure agreement on disarmament. However, that assurance does not unfortunately accord with the contents of your message.

I must inform you that my colleagues and I were greatly surprised by the statement in your message that the work of the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee had been broken off through the fault of the Soviet Government. It is obvious to any impartial observer even broadly acquainted with the Committee's work that such an assertion is manifestly at variance with the facts.

As we know, the Committee was called upon to examine specific proposals designed to achieve general and complete disarmament. Wishing to promote the success of the Committee's work, on which the nations had placed such high hopes, the Soviet Government submitted for the Committee's consideration its new plan of 2 June 1960, which made many concessions to the wishes of the Western Powers. The Soviet Government hoped that its proposal would enable the Ten-Nation Committee to continue its work and to set about carrying out its principal task in a business-like manner.

Unfortunately, these hopes on the part of the Soviet Union were not justified, and for almost an entire month the Western Powers in the Committee engaged in fruitless verbalistic disputes instead of discussing in specific terms the new Soviet proposals concerning the basic clauses of a treaty on general and complete disarmament which were before the Committee; thus they demonstrated once again their unwillingness to enter into a serious discussion of specific problems of disarmament. Now they are trying to create the impression that the Soviet Union wished to avoid discussion of the proposals put forward by the United States representative on 27 June after the work of the Ten-Nation Committee had been discontinued. In view of your statements regarding those proposals, it seems necessary to say a few words on the subject.

It is evident from a first perusal of the United States document, presented under the impressive title of "A programme of general and complete disarmament with effective international control", that these "new" proposals are to all intents and purposes no more than a slightly modified version of the Western Powers' old proposals of 16 March, whose inadequacy and unacceptability were demonstrated at the first stage of the Ten-Nation Committee's work in March and April of this year.

Indeed, in the United States plan, as in the Western Powers' proposals of 16 March, all attention is concentrated from the very first stage on instituting broad control measures without the execution of disarmament measures of any kind, and what is proposed is, in effect, the conclusion of an agreement based purely on this first phase.

These proposals envisage neither the elimination of the means of delivering nuclear weapons nor the prohibition of these weapons themselves. Nor do they contain any provision for the elimination of foreign military bases in the territory of other countries or for the withdrawal of foreign troops from those countries.

Without proposing any reduction in armed forces in the first stage, the United States is nevertheless trying to place all the armed forces and armaments of the USSR and other States under foreign control. This is, however, purely and simply an attempt to carry out espionage under the guise of international control and is something to which, of course, no State that is concerned with its security could agree.

Instead of a genuine reduction and elimination of armaments, the United States proposes that specific quantities of armaments should be placed, under the supervision of international inspectors, in storage depots situated in the territory of the States concerned. However, it should be apparent to everyone that a State which wished to use these weapons for aggressive purposes could at any time remove the inspectors, take these weapons from the depots and put them to use.

The proposal for halting the production of fissionable materials for use in weapons also has no practical bearing on the solution of the problem of banning nuclear weapons. It is common knowledge that the stockpiles of atomic and hydrogen bombs which have already been accumulated are large enough to destroy whole States. Thus, the implementation of this measure would in no way eliminate the danger that an aggressor might launch an atomic war, particularly when it is borne in mind that

existing nuclear weapons and nuclear materials are easy to conceal, even if an attempt were to be made to find them.

As for the disarmament measures envisaged for the second and third stages of the disarmament programme, the United States plan is drafted in such a way that these measures will never be carried out, since no specific time-limits are given for their implementation and the transition from the first stage of disarmament to the second and third is made contingent on the fulfilment of a set of further conditions.

It is quite clear from all that I have said that the purpose of the so-called new United States proposals is not genuine disarmament, but the deception of world public opinion. Obviously those proposals could not serve as a basis for negotiation or promote the success of the Committee's work.

In your message you tried to draw a parallel between the military preparations conducted by the United Kingdom Government jointly with the United States Government and the defence measures taken by the Soviet Union. You state that there is nothing provocative in the collective military measures you are taking in conjunction with the United States and that the Soviet Union is doing the same.

The whole world knows, however, that it is not the Soviet Union which sends military reconnaissance aircraft into the air space of foreign States, encircles other countries with its military bases and dispatches bombers carrying nuclear weapons in the direction of those countries, but the United States of America, acting with the approval and support of its allies, and in some cases with their direct participation.

It is not the Soviet Union that is intensifying the armaments race by increasing military appropriations and stepping up the construction of nuclear missile bases in foreign territory, nor is it the Soviet Union which pursues a policy of open incitement of the German militarists and revanchists, equipping the Bundeswehr with nuclear weapons, granting the Federal Republic of Germany military bases on its territory and collaborating closely with it in the joint manufacture of modern weapons, including various types of missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads; all this is done by the Governments of the United Kingdom and its allies.

This simple comparison is in itself a plain answer to the question which States are engaging in provocative activities, fraught with the most serious consequences.

We remain firmly convinced that progress in the disarmament negotiations can be assured only if all participants in those negotiations, not only the Soviet Union and the countries friendly to it, strive to accomplish effective measures of disarmament in accordance with the resolution on general and complete disarmament which was adopted unanimously by the United Nations General Assembly on 20 November 1959.

So far, unfortunately, the Western Powers have refused to do this and - to speak frankly - have pursued a policy of obstruction in matters of disarmament.

The Soviet Government, which throughout the work of the Ten-Nation Committee patiently and persistently strove to bring about genuine negotiations on disarmament, was forced to the conclusion that the Western Powers do not desire serious negotiations and that in practice the Ten-Nation Committee was being used to deceive the peoples. Naturally, the Ten-Nation Committee's work could not continue in these conditions. The Soviet Union could not put itself in the position of an accomplice of those who were using the Committee as a screen to cover the arms race. For that very reason the Soviet Government, having been obliged, in the circumstances, to suspend its participation in the Committee's work, submitted a proposal that the question of disarmament and the situation with regard to the fulfilment of the General Assembly resolution of 20 November 1959 on that question should be considered at the next session of the United Nations General Assembly. This clearly raises the additional question of the Committee's composition and that of drawing into the negotiations, in the interests of the cause, other States besides those represented in the Ten-Nation Committee.

The Soviet Government expresses the conviction that discussion of the disarmament question at the next session of the United Nations General Assembly, that is to say, in the forum in which the resolution on general and complete disarmament was adopted, will contribute towards a constructive solution to the disarmament problem.

The Soviet Government continues to attach cardinal importance to the disarmament problem and will do everything in its power to bring about a constructive solution of this problem. I should like to believe that the United Kingdom, whose interest in attaining agreement on disarmament should be no less than that of the Soviet Union, will make a real contribution to the solution of this urgent problem.

With respect,

N. KHRUSHCHEV

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23 July 1960

MESSAGE FROM MR. N.S. KHRUSHCHEV TO MR. C. de GAULLE

dated 23 July 1960

Sir,

I have studied very carefully your reply to my message of 27 June on the question of disarmament.

I must state frankly that that reply only confirms my impression that since the time of the conversations we held during the course of my visit to France in March-April 1960 the position of the French Government on the vital contemporary problem of disarmament has in fact undergone substantial modification.

As you will recall, in our conversation of 25 March you spoke in favour of initiating disarmament with the destruction of the means of delivering nuclear weapons: rockets and aircraft capable of carrying atomic bombs. I replied at the time that we shared your views on that question; and I added that the problems of disarmament could, now, in our opinion be settled in one of two ways: either our Western partners could accept our proposal, under which disarmament would be initiated with a substantial reduction in conventional armaments and specified steps in the field of nuclear disarmament, the prohibition and destruction of rockets being carried out at the final stage; or, if the Western countries did not accept our proposal, a beginning could be made in the manner proposed by you, i.e. with the destruction of the means of delivering nuclear weapons. In this connexion I made it clear that in the latter event disarmament should simultaneously be extended to aircraft, rocket launching sites and military bases on foreign territory. In those circumstances conditions would be equal for both sides.

You said you regarded my statement as highly important; and at the conclusion of our talk you added that you considered the destruction of the means of delivery and of rocket launching sites to be the only practical measure which could facilitate a settlement of the problem. I noted with satisfaction that our positions on this important question either fully coincided or were not far apart, and you raised no objection to that conclusion.

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In our conversation of 1 April you said that the question of nuclear disarmament and the elimination of the means of delivering nuclear weapons, including floating and fixed bases, rocket bases etc., should be raised frankly at the summit meeting. I replied that we were in favour of that proposal.

Summing up our exchange of views on the question of disarmament, you expressed satisfaction on 2 April that we had reached mutual understanding on this important question.

Thus, the course of our conversations showed us to be in agreement that disarmament should be initiated with the destruction of the means of delivering nuclear weapons. In our conversation of 25 March you referred to the fact that France had made its proposal for the destruction of the means of delivery in various international bodies; and, indeed, such a statement was made by the French representative to the United Nations General Assembly at its fourteenth session, in October 1959.

In your letters of 11 and 30 June, the primary emphasis has been shifted from the means of delivering nuclear weapons to the establishment of control over such weapons, while the question of their destruction is not touched upon. Those, however, are two completely different things. It is one thing to destroy the means of delivery and thereby to preclude the possibility of their use once and for all; it is quite another thing to be content merely with control over such means.

The great goal of which many generations of men have dreamed - to put an end to war, to eliminate war altogether from the life of human society - can be achieved only through the destruction of weapons of all types and the disbandment of all armies; in other words, through general and complete disarmament. This is the only really dependable basis on which, in the existing circumstances, a firm and inviolable peace among all States can rest.

If our goal is to achieve genuine disarmament, the question of the means of delivering nuclear weapons can be settled in one way only, namely, by their destruction. So long as the means of delivering nuclear weapons are preserved, no inspectors will be able to avert a surprise attack, for there will be nothing to prevent a State which contemplates such an attack from removing the inspectors at any time and setting the means of delivering nuclear weapons into motion for the purpose of committing aggression, a matter nowadays of minutes only. Indeed, what can inspectors really do to avert an attack if the control panels are not in their hands? Thus no matter how broad a control over the means of delivery were instituted, it would not of itself remove the threat of a nuclear-rocket war.

You also state that "it has already become difficult if not impossible to control the total elimination of nuclear warloads and bombs and their reconversion" inasmuch as "there are too many stocks in existence and it would be too easy to conceal all or part of them". I understand this position, for the establishment of control over the destruction of nuclear weapons is certainly made difficult by the fact that such weapons can be concealed. Your argument, however, simply confirms the necessity for the destruction of the means of delivering nuclear weapons. If the means of delivery are eliminated, then atomic weapons will lose all practical value, for it will be impossible to use them; and consequently the temptation to conceal stockpiles of such weapons will disappear. Atomic devices, after all, are not pocket weapons.

In your letter you propose as the decisive and almost the only possible measure "to prohibit rockets and 'strategic' aircraft from carrying nuclear warloads and bombs and from being equipped with the necessary devices for doing so". We are in favour of the prohibition of the means of delivering nuclear weapons, but that prohibition will be a reality only if such means are destroyed. What you propose does not solve the problem, for a potential aggressor will disregard the prohibition and remove the inspectors, and given the present level of technical development, will quickly and easily equip rockets and strategic aircraft once more for military use.

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I agree with you that it would not be feasible "to destroy all rockets and all aircraft and to prevent the construction of others ... in our century, which is in essence the century of aircraft, of rockets and - now - of satellites". Nor has anyone, to my knowledge, made such a proposal. In any event, the Soviet Union, whose role in marking out man's road into the cosmos is well known, has no such intention.

In our proposals of 2 June concerning the basic clauses of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, we referred, inter alia, to the destruction only of military rockets of all ranges, military aircraft, the military bases on which they are deployed, submarines and surface warships, artillery capable of firing nuclear warheads and all other means of delivering weapons of mass destruction to their targets. We propose to eliminate the means of military attack in order to free mankind from the fear of a new war and direct all its energies and resources towards peaceful, creative ends.

In our proposals on disarmament we took into account a number of ideas expressed by our partners in the negotiations, particularly by France. You yourself, Mr. President, acknowledge in your letter that the Soviet Government's action in bringing into the foreground the problems relating to the means of delivering nuclear weapons, is in line with French ideas. Hence it appears to us that it would be possible to find a basis on which our positions could be brought closer together and thereby to facilitate a positive solution of this problem. It is therefore surprising that the French representative on the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee, instead of directing his main efforts towards a constructive elucidation of the points on which our positions coincide, should have concentrated on finding differences between them. In so doing, he was, in fact, supporting the line taken by the United States representative, or rather the Pentagon, the aim of which is to deflect the Ten-Nation Committee from its task, namely, the search for mutually acceptable decisions in the sphere of disarmament.

The Soviet Union did everything in its power to make the work of the Ten-Nation Committee successful and constructive and to that end it patiently explored possible means of reconciling the various positions.

With regard to your remark that the French representative in the Ten-Nation Committee did not receive a reply to his questions on control, I might point out that such replies were given, and on more than one occasion. In that connexion, the Soviet representative noted that we do not disagree with France concerning the need to include control provisions in the treaty, but he drew attention to the fact that the French representative was evading discussion of the substance of actual disarmament measures.

The statements of the representatives of the Western Powers in the Ten-Nation Committee degenerated into idle words and the Committee itself began to be used by the Western Powers as a screen behind which to conceal the arms race. Naturally, the Soviet Union could not accept that situation. In the interest of the cause, the Soviet Union proposed that the question of disarmament and of the situation with regard to the fulfilment of the General Assembly resolution of 20 November 1959 on that question should be discussed at the session of the United Nations General Assembly. Clearly, the question of the Committee's composition will also arise in the course of the discussion. In our opinion, it could only help matters if certain other interested States took part in the negotiations for the settlement of that urgent problem confronting mankind - disarmament.

The Soviet Government, as in the past, is firmly resolved to secure by every means the earliest possible attainment of an agreement on general and complete disarmament. It expresses the hope that the Government of France will make a constructive contribution to the solution of that problem.

With respect,

N. KHRUSHCHEV

23 July 1960

MESSAGE FROM MR. N.S. KHRUSHCHEV TO MR. J. DIEFENBAKER

dated 23 July 1960

Sir,

I have carefully read your message of 30 June 1960, and I must tell you that it confirmed once again the correctness of the Soviet Government's decision to suspend its participation in the work of the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee and to refer the question of disarmament, together with the situation which has arisen in the Ten-Nation Committee, for consideration at the next session of the United Nations General Assembly.

Indeed, your message in effect repeats the standard contention of the opponents of disarmament, which is that the most recent actions of the Soviet Union have been intended to create differences among the Western Powers represented in the Ten-Nation Committee. It is scarcely necessary at this point to go into these assertions in detail once again, since this has never been and is not now the aim of the Soviet Government.

Now a few observations on the substance of the matter. In submitting its proposals of 2 June 1960, the Soviet Government emphasized the great importance assumed by the question of disarmament after the collapse of the projected summit conference. It decided for that very reason to submit for consideration by the Ten-Nation Committee its new plan, which made many concessions to the wishes of the Western Powers, particularly in such matters as the prohibition and destruction of all means of delivering nuclear weapons, the maintenance of international peace in conditions of general and complete disarmament, the detailed presentation of provisions for the organization of an international control system, and so forth. Thus, it hoped that this Soviet proposal would enable the Committee to complete "the opening phases of the negotiations", as you put it in your message, and to set about carrying out its principal task in a businesslike manner.

Unfortunately, these hopes on the part of the Soviet Union were not justified, and for almost an entire month the Western Powers in the Ten-Nation Committee engaged in fruitless verbalistic disputes instead of discussing in specific terms the new Soviet proposals concerning the basic clauses of a treaty on general and complete disarmament which were before the Committee; thus, they demonstrated once

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again their unwillingness to enter into a serious discussion of specific problems of disarmament. Now they are trying to create the impression that the Soviet Union wished to avoid discussion of the proposals put forward by the United States representative on 27 June after the work of the Ten-Nation Committee had been discontinued. Since the subject of these proposals has been brought up, let us turn to them for a moment.

It is evident from a first perusal of the United States document, presented under the impressive title of "A programme for general and complete disarmament under effective international control", that these "new" proposals are to all intents and purposes no more than a slightly modified version of the Western Powers' old proposals of 16 March, whose inadequacy and unacceptability were demonstrated at the first stage of the Ten-Nation Committee's work in March and April of this year.

Indeed, in the United States plan, as in the Western Powers' proposals of 16 March, all attention is concentrated from the very first stage on instituting broad control measures without the execution of disarmament measures of any kind, and what is proposed is, in effect, the conclusion of an agreement based purely on this first stage.

These proposals envisage neither the elimination of the means of delivering nuclear weapons nor the prohibition of those weapons themselves. Nor do they contain any provision for the elimination of foreign military bases in the territory of other countries or for the withdrawal of foreign troops from those countries.

Without proposing any reduction in armed forces in the first stage, the United States is nevertheless trying to place all the armed forces and armaments of the USSR and other States under foreign control. This is, however, purely and simply an attempt to carry out espionage under the guise of international control and is something to which, of course, no State that is concerned with its security can agree.

Instead of genuine reduction and elimination of armaments, the United States proposes that specified quantities of armaments should be placed, under the supervision of international inspectors, in storage depots situated in the

territory of the States concerned. However, it should be apparent to everyone that a State which wished to use these weapons for aggressive purposes could at any time remove the inspectors, take the weapons from the depots and put them to use.

The proposal for halting the production of fissionable materials for use in weapons also has no practical bearing on the solution of the problem of banning nuclear weapons. It is common knowledge that the stockpiles of atomic and hydrogen bombs which have already been accumulated are large enough to destroy whole States. Thus, the implementation of this measure would in no way eliminate the danger that an aggressor might launch an atomic war, particularly when it is borne in mind that existing nuclear weapons and nuclear materials are easy to conceal even if an attempt were to be made to find them.

As for the disarmament measures envisaged for the second and third stages of the disarmament programme, the United States plan is drafted in such a way that these measures will never be carried out, since no specific time-limits are given for their implementation and the transition from the first stage of disarmament to the second and third is made contingent on the fulfilment of a set of further conditions.

Thus, it becomes absolutely clear that these so-called new proposals of the United States do not pursue the objective of genuine disarmament, and consequently could not, to quote your words, "bring new life into the negotiations". On the basis of many years' experience of disarmament negotiations and the content of the above-mentioned United States proposals, we have every reason to assert that these proposals represent yet another attempt to deceive world public opinion and to make it easier for the proponents of the armaments race to continue to pile up arms, with all the hazardous consequences that this entails.

In your message you refer to a statement by the Canadian delegation in the Ten-Nation Committee on 24 June 1960, in which, as you say, the Canadian delegation made detailed suggestions designed to bring the Ten-Nation Committee "to grips with the task of real negotiation". Consequently, you yourself admit

that up to 24 June the Ten-Nation Committee was not engaged in effective disarmament negotiations. But this was the very reason why the Soviet Union suspended its participation in the work of the Ten-Nation Committee and proposed that discussion of the entire disarmament question and of the situation which has arisen in the Committee should be referred to the next session of the United Nations General Assembly. As regards the proposals put forward by the Canadian representative, he himself stated in the Committee that they deal only with the method of conducting negotiations, in other words, they are procedural in nature. Instead of embarking upon a concrete examination of the new Soviet proposals, the Canadian representative in the Ten-Nation Committee put forward some extremely vague ideas concerning "balanced concessions", thus diverting the Committee even further from practical negotiations on the substance of the new Soviet plan. Endless discussion of methods of conducting the negotiations cannot, however, take the place of actual negotiations on disarmament.

The Soviet Government, which throughout the Ten-Nation Committee's deliberations patiently and persistently strove to bring about genuine negotiations on disarmament, was forced to the conclusion that the Western Powers do not want serious negotiations but are attempting to use the Committee to deceive the peoples. The Ten-Nation Committee's work could not continue in these conditions. Hence, the Soviet Government, which was obliged in the circumstances to suspend its participation in the Committee's work, submitted a proposal that the question of disarmament and the situation with regard to the fulfilment of the General Assembly resolution of 20 November 1959 on that question should be considered at the next session of the United Nations General Assembly. Clearly, there also arises in this connexion the question of the Committee's composition and that of drawing some other States, in addition to those represented in the Ten-Nation Committee, into the negotiations.

The Soviet Government expresses the conviction that discussion of the disarmament question at the next session of the United Nations General Assembly, that is to say, in the forum in which the resolution on general and complete disarmament was adopted, will contribute towards a constructive solution of the disarmament problem.

The Soviet Government continues to attach cardinal importance to the disarmament problem and will do everything in its power to bring about a constructive solution of this problem. I should like to believe that Canada, which should be no less interested than the Soviet Union in the achievement of an agreement on disarmament, will make a real contribution to the solution of this urgent problem.

With respect,

N. KHRUSHCHEV

23 July 1960

NOTE FROM THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

dated 25 July 1960

With reference to the United States Embassy's note No. 11, dated 2 July 1960, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has the honour, on behalf of the Soviet Government, to make the following statement:

The Soviet Government made it clear in its letter of 27 June 1960 that the Soviet Union no longer considers it possible to continue to take part in the fruitless discussions in the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee, in view of the manifest refusal of the United States and the other Western Powers to work out a practical disarmament programme, and their unwillingness to negotiate on anything but separate measures of control without disarmament of any kind.

Although throughout the protracted work of the Ten-Nation Committee it submitted not a single specific proposal on disarmament, the United States Government nevertheless attempts, in its note of 2 July, to shift the responsibility for the breakdown of the negotiations in the Ten-Nation Committee from itself to the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Government categorically rejects this assertion on the part of the United States Government as entirely at variance with the obvious facts.

The USSR Government is compelled to note that, while it is doing everything possible to create conditions favourable for the success of the disarmament negotiations, the Government of the United States is stubbornly persisting on another course - one which has nothing in common with the cause of genuine disarmament.

As everyone knows, it was in fact the representative of the United States in the Ten-Nation Committee who, from the very outset of the Committee's resumed proceedings, opposed the basic proposals introduced by the Soviet Union, which offered a detailed programme of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, while submitting not a single constructive suggestion of his own on this programme and making no effort to formulate any measures of real disarmament. But this obstructionist position adopted by the United States

representative was simply a continuation of the United States Government's earlier line on questions of disarmament. As is clear from the United States Embassy's note of 7 June 1960, the United States Government did not even give its representative in the Committee instructions to strive for constructive discussion of a programme of general and complete disarmament in accordance with the General Assembly's resolution of 20 November 1959, but concentrated simply on attempting to secure the establishment of control without disarmament.

As was shown by the discussions which took place in the Committee after the Soviet Union had introduced its new proposals in the formulation of which the wishes of the Western Powers themselves were taken into account, the United States and other Western Powers have not moved a step forward from their own position, which is aimed at the establishment of control without disarmament and the acquisition of one-sided military advantages for themselves and their military blocs to the prejudice of and in opposition to the very idea of disarmament. Because of the Western Powers' position, the discussion in the Ten-Nation Committee became quite pointless and resolved itself into an empty exchange of words.

Nor could the Soviet Government ignore the fact that the tactics of endlessly dragging out the disarmament negotiations pursued by the United States Government in the Ten-Nation Committee have been accompanied by the fanning of war hysteria in the United States itself and the intensification of military preparations through the aggressive blocs headed by the United States.

While the Soviet Union's efforts in the Ten-Nation Committee were directed to securing the adoption of proposals for the earliest possible effective solution of the problem of disarmament, and while the Soviet Union was unilaterally carrying out a substantial reduction of its armed forces, the foremost statesmen and political leaders of the United States were appealing for the intensification of the cold war, the resumption of nuclear weapons tests and the expansion of the military expenditure, armed forces and armaments of the United States.

In the atmosphere of military hysteria fomented by such appeals and by the statements of responsible leaders of the United States Government proclaiming the violation of the sovereignty of other States to be the national policy of the United States, the latter country, as if to mock the work of the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee, substantially increased its appropriations for military purposes in comparison with the previous year, to a sum exceeding \$40,000 million.

The United States Government has also taken a number of foreign policy measures designed to increase international tension. It has been reported in the Western Press that in June the United States and United Kingdom military authorities jointly prepared a plan of round-the-clock patrol flights of English and American bombers carrying nuclear weapons.

The United States Government has at the same time continued to prepare the ground for arming its military block allies, in particular West Germany, with nuclear-rocket weapons. It is common knowledge that on his recent visit to Washington Mr. Strauss, Minister of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany, "showed interest" in the United States Polaris ballistic missile, and now, as is shown by statements of Mr. Brucker, United States Secretary of the Army, who has been visiting Bonn to conduct negotiations with the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, the United States is prepared to supply the West German army with Polaris rockets.

It is absolutely obvious that in these conditions the Ten-Nation Committee has ceased to serve any useful purpose. Indeed, it has begun to do harm by engendering in the peoples the illusion that something is being done in the field of disarmament, whereas in fact disarmament has been used by the Western Powers as a cover for intensifying the arms race and as a means of deceiving the peoples.

In these circumstances, the Soviet Government considers that it is fully justified in putting forward for consideration by the United Nations General Assembly at its regular session the question of disarmament and of the unsatisfactory situation existing with regard to the fulfilment of the General Assembly resolution of 29 November 1959 on this question.

The Soviet Union's appeal to the United Nations in no way, of course, contradicts the Security Council's resolution of 27 May, to which the United States Government refers. It may be recalled that this resolution was adopted after the Council's discussion of the aggressive activities of the United States Air Force, and that its primary content is an appeal for respect of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other countries. We all know to whom this appeal of the Security Council's was addressed. It was addressed to those who are conducting a dangerous policy of provocation regardless of the very serious consequences this policy may have for mankind.

The identity of the real culprit in the collapse of the summit meeting, also, is well known. There are no particular illusions on that score even in the United States of America. To realize this we need only peruse the records of the inquiry carried out by a special committee of the United States Congress.

In its communication of 27 June, the Soviet Government showed that the United States Government's efforts to intensify the arms race and heighten international tension were incompatible with the tasks of genuine disarmament; it also analysed in detail the position of the United States and the other Western Powers, which doomed the negotiations in the Ten-Nation Committee to collapse.

The United States Government, however, has preferred to keep silent on the serious questions raised in the Soviet Government communication of 27 June. Instead, the United States Government merely proposes a resumption of the empty exchanges of words in the Ten-Nation Committee, this time around a "new" United States plan.

What, then, does it amount to, this "new" plan which is presented under the high-sounding title of "Programme for general and complete disarmament under effective international control"?

In essence, this "new" plan is merely a slightly embellished, hastily assembled variant of the previous Western plan presented to the Ten-Nation Committee on 16 March. It is the usual attempt to confuse the peoples; it is a

screen to cover the United States Government's intention of continuing the arms race, nuclear weapons included.

Indeed, as is evident from a first perusal of the United States document, in this proposal, as in the Western Power's proposals of 16 March, all attention is concentrated, from the very first stage, on the institution of broad measures of control without disarmament, and the whole matter is reduced to the conclusion of an agreement on this first stage alone.

The United States, moreover, proposes no reduction of armed forces during the first stage, and at the same time seeks to place under foreign control all the armed forces and armaments of the USSR and other States. This, plainly, is nothing but a desire to use the screen of so-called international control for carrying out the collection of espionage information - something which, it is perfectly obvious, no State concerned with its security can accept.

Instead of any real reduction and elimination of armaments, the United States proposes that States should place in storage depots within their own territories specified quantities of armaments under supervision by international inspectors. But who can fail to see that a State which wanted to use these weapons for aggressive purposes could at any time remove the inspectors, take the weapons out of storage and put them to use? And putting modern weapons to use is a matter, not even of hours, but of minutes, as the United States Government well knows.

The United States proposals are completely silent on the question of liquidating foreign military bases in the territories of other States and withdrawing foreign troops from those territories. They provide neither for the destruction of the means of delivering nuclear weapons nor for the prohibition of these weapons themselves. In these circumstances, what practical significance for solving the problem of prohibiting nuclear weapons can be attached to the United States proposal to stop the production of fissionable materials for military purposes? Everyone knows that the stocks of atomic and hydrogen bombs already accumulated are sufficient to destroy whole States. Thus, the application of these measures - especially when it is considered that the nuclear weapons and nuclear materials already produced could easily be hidden even if an attempt was made to discover them - would do nothing to remove the threat that an aggressor might set off an atomic war.

As to the disarmament measures envisaged for the second and third stages of the disarmament programme, the United States plan is so drafted that the point of their practical application is never reached at all; for no specific time-limits are laid down for their completion, and the transition from the first to the second and third stages of disarmament is made dependent upon the fulfilment of various additional conditions: a situation which would simply allow the opponents of disarmament to spin out the implementation of the disarmament programme indefinitely.

All the foregoing leaves the USSR Government in no doubt that these so-called new United States proposals do not pursue the goal of real disarmament, but can only serve the purpose of deceiving world public opinion. If we face the facts, we must frankly say that these proposals could not afford a basis for negotiation or make for success in the work of the Committee.

The Soviet Government has always advocated negotiation on pressing international issues, and especially on an issue as urgent and vital as disarmament. It still considers that parity of representation is calculated to create favourable conditions for examination of the disarmament question. However, in view of the experience gained in discussing disarmament matters in the Ten-Nation Committee, the question arises whether some other countries, in addition to those already represented in the Committee, should not be brought into the negotiations.

The Soviet Government is firmly convinced that the problem of disarmament, on which the destiny of all mankind depends, must and can be solved. It hopes that this aim will be furthered by discussion of the disarmament problem at the forthcoming session of the United Nations General Assembly, the forum in which the resolution on general and complete disarmament was adopted.

It stands to reason that a practical solution to the disarmament problem will be possible only if the United States Government reviews its attitude to the solution of the problem and embarks on the course of serious negotiation on disarmament questions.

Moscow, 25 July 1960