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*President:* Mr. SCHEYVEN (Belgium).

**Tribute paid by the Economic and Social Council to the "Apollo 11" flight**

1. The PRESIDENT wished to express the admiration felt for the remarkable technical achievement and courage of the three United States astronauts, two of whom had walked on the surface of the moon. He congratulated all those who had contributed to that undertaking, which had ushered in a new era for mankind, and paid a tribute to the memory of the United States astronauts and Soviet cosmonauts who had lost their lives in the course of their missions. He asked the United States representative to convey the sentiments of the Council to the three astronauts and their families, to the scientists and technicians of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and to the President, Government and people of the United States. He invited the Council to observe a minute's silence in honour of that historic event.

2. Mr. OLDS (United States of America) thanked the President and said he would convey to all concerned his kind message regarding the United States astronauts' landing on the moon. Since the dawn of civilization, many men had contributed to the fulfilment of that dream and had helped to lay the technological foundation for the launching of "Apollo 11". The power so achieved should be put to the use of progress and not become an instrument of destruction. The United States would always view that development as a responsibility assumed in the interest of all mankind.

AGENDA ITEM 2

**General discussion of international economic and social policy (E/4638, E/4674, E/4679, E/4687 and Add.1-3, E/4688, E/4695, E/4701; E/CN.11/878; E/CN.12/825 and Add.1; E/CN.14/435; E/ECE/741) (*continued*)**

3. Mrs. ZAEFFERER de GOYENECHÉ (Argentina) associated herself with the President's message of congratulation to the United States people on the feat accomplished by the "Apollo 11" astronauts. That feat emphasized the need for the development of a universal conscience so that what was today a triumph of science would tomorrow be a triumph of a human race whose morality was on a level with its scientific accomplishments. The machinery available in the United Nations and the specialized agencies must be utilized for that purpose and, if that machinery was not as effective as was desirable, it would have to be transformed or eliminated.

4. Now that the first United Nations Development Decade was drawing to a close, it could be said that the targets fixed ten years before had virtually been achieved. But that was not enough to bridge the wide gap between the developing and the developed countries, and it was thus necessary to consider the real possibilities and limits of international co-operation and adapt them to the goals which such co-operation was intended to serve.

5. Efforts at co-operation in connexion with the Second Development Decade could merely complement the efforts of the countries themselves. Unfortunately, an appreciation of the complementary role of international co-operation had too often been lacking in both the developing and the developed countries. As a result of the aspirations aroused by the sight of the sustained progress of other nations the developing countries, realizing the ineffectiveness of the normal machinery of trade, had often been led to place excessive hopes in the possibilities of international co-operation and to expect results from bilateral and multilateral assistance which neither was capable of yielding. There were, however, positive aspects of such co-operation, which should be emphasized. For the developing countries, the first Development Decade had been a time of organization and classification, of identifying their problems and needs and seeking possible solutions. The Latin American countries had, for their part, given infinitely more than they had received. During the seven years in which the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress had been in existence, the Latin American countries had invested \$132 thousand million, while the United States had supplied only \$5.7 thousand million, mostly in the form of loans, of which \$2.7 thousand million had already been repaid in the form of interest.

6. The developed countries often lacked the political will to devise and apply some of the most urgently needed measures of international co-operation. The absence of that political will in the developed countries was due to their fear that the adoption of certain

measures and the conclusion of certain international agreements might upset an order and system which had enabled them to make unparalleled progress. But those fears were unfounded: at the beginning of the first Development Decade, it had been estimated that the establishment of a generalized system of preferences for manufactures and semi-manufactures from the developing countries—a system which would enable those countries to increase their exports by \$10 thousand million per annum and thus to secure the necessary foreign currency to achieve the targets fixed — would have necessitated the reorientation of only a fraction of the productive capacity of the countries granting such preferences, representing a mere 4 per cent of the annual increase in their labour force. Despite the disparity between the advantages of such a system for the developing countries and the limited sacrifice it would impose on the contributing countries, discussions on its establishment had not been possible until the end of the first Development Decade.

7. International co-operation was not passing through a period of crisis, but rather the reverse: the means and resources available to it, although inadequate, were more extensive than ever before. A careful study should therefore be made to determine the sectors in which the efforts and co-operation of the international community were producing positive results and those in which the results were negative.

8. For example, commendable progress had been made in bilateral and multilateral technical assistance. The assistance provided by United Nations bodies had made it possible to introduce new techniques into a number of developing countries and to carry out projects in those countries which could never have been undertaken otherwise. It was now for the developing countries themselves to find ways of deriving full advantage from all the possibilities at present afforded by international co-operation.

9. Progress in financial co-operation was much slower. The total resources available for development purposes were still insufficient, and the machinery for supplying those resources needed improvement. Supplementary financing, commodity buffer stocks and the diversification of agricultural production in developing countries were all areas in which the stage of implementation measures had not yet been reached. A more favourable situation existed with regard to multilateral food aid. Because of their number and variety, the projects carried out through WFP had yielded excellent results. The resources available for that purpose must be considerably increased; in other words, WFP must be enlarged and the necessary steps taken to ensure that food aid was beneficial not only to the recipient countries but also to the developing countries which supplied foodstuffs.

10. On the other hand, very little progress had been made in the trade in commodities and in manufactures and semi-manufactures. Negotiations with a view to the establishment of a generalized system of preferences had

made no headway, and the Kennedy Round negotiations had brought only slight advantages to the developing countries. Many developed countries were still applying non-tariff protective measures which were truly discriminatory. Agricultural commodity trade had contracted rather than expanded. Nothing had been done to liberalize international commodity trade, to give commodities easier access to the markets of the developed countries or to discourage marginal production, which detracted from the effectiveness of the economy as a whole and limited the export possibilities of the developing countries. Large-scale international action was essential in that area, for it was through trade and not some form of aid that the developing countries would be enabled to achieve sustained growth.

11. The Argentine delegation fully appreciated the need to ensure that the agricultural sectors in the developed countries enjoyed income levels similar to those in the other branches of their economies, but it could not subscribe to national policies aimed at maintaining those income levels by subsidizing unprofitable production. There was no outlet on the international markets for surpluses so produced, except at absurdly low prices, and such surpluses compelled countries to devote to subsidy policies resources which could be better spent on structural reforms in unprofitable sectors. Such reforms would enable developing countries to expand their exports and income and thus increase their power to purchase capital equipment and durable consumer goods from the developed countries themselves. Until the agricultural structures of the developing countries were radically transformed, no progress could be made in the international liberalization of trade, whether between developed and developing countries or among the developed countries themselves, nor could the threats to the international monetary system be eliminated. That was a task to which a very high priority must be given in the future.

12. The developing countries could not of course hope to raise their level of living simply by increasing their agricultural exports: they must also be assured of adequate industrial growth. International co-operation in science and technology was only in its early stages. The adoption of modern techniques was essential for development, and the transfer of technology and of manufacturing processes from the developed to the developing countries should be facilitated. That transfer must not be accompanied by conditions that would offset the multiplier effect that such techniques should have on economies of the recipient countries. Developing countries must also be encouraged to invent and adapt new techniques. International co-operation should play a vital part in that connexion.

13. With regard to the human environment, her delegation hoped that the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, to be held in 1972, would provide an opportunity for defining all the relevant problems and for contributing to their solution.

14. In conclusion, the problem of youth must be resolved not by the demagogic method of giving young people the right to make decisions for which they were unprepared, but rather by increasing their possibilities for education and training and especially by giving more attention to the sectors of social development which seemed to be neglected in most contemporary societies. Within their respective spheres of competence, the United Nations and the specialized agencies should tackle that problem with the seriousness it deserved.

15. Mr. CONSTANTINESCU (Observer for the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) speaking at the invitation of the President, congratulated the astronauts, whose exploit was a triumph of modern technology testifying to the genius of mankind.

16. To illustrate his conviction that exchanges of information were always highly useful, he quoted the example of the co-operation that had existed for the past twenty years within CMEA and outlined its future evolution. His organization had studied most attentively the Secretary-General's reports, the statements already made and the documents before the Council at the current session. One of the most important agenda items was that relating to international strategy for the Second Development Decade, designed to prepare the ground for future economic and social progress. Mankind had reached a stage where the international division of labour could no longer be effected in the same forms and with the same methods as twenty years before.

17. The economic links between countries and peoples were contingent on the development of productive capacities and increased output. However, in the modern world that process also involved non-economic factors which impeded the potential progress of a world-wide division of labour and were particularly prejudicial to the former colonial countries. The victory of socialism in fourteen countries and the downfall of the colonial system underlined the need to find new avenues and methods of international co-operation. The argument that the industrial development of some countries could upset the balanced economic development of industrialized countries was belied by the progress made by the CMEA countries.

18. There was no disputing the fact that the development of international co-operation was extremely important in view of the differences and gaps which existed between countries in relation to their level of technological development and their resources. Indeed, while engaged in raising its scientific and technical potential and its level of living, a country might develop certain sectors of activity even if it did not possess all the necessary means to that end (raw materials, skilled manpower and so on). Hence the importance of creating economic links among sovereign States.

19. The purpose of CMEA was to promote co-operation among its members in order to speed up their develop-

ment processes and raise their living levels. The successes already achieved showed that the combination of the speedy development of each CMEA member and the raising of the over-all economic level met the requirements of general economic growth, as did economic, scientific and technical co-operation.

20. Thus, compared with the prewar figures, industrial output had risen substantially in the member countries of CMEA. In fact, industry played a leading part in the development of those countries, where it now accounted for more than half of the national income.

21. The workers' level of living had risen: in relation to 1960, their real wages had increased by 28 per cent in Bulgaria, 16 per cent in Hungary, 17 per cent in the German Democratic Republic, 32 per cent in Romania, 34 per cent in the USSR and 12 per cent in Czechoslovakia. The income of farm workers had risen owing to higher productivity in agriculture.

22. The economy of each CMEA member had undergone radical changes, which had made it possible to lay sound foundations for the coming years. Intensified scientific and technical co-operation had enabled the socialist countries to establish relations more in keeping with their rapid economic development. The differences observed between the development levels of the member countries should be eliminated by making the utmost use of the natural potential and advantages afforded by the socialist system on a world-wide basis.

23. The CMEA countries were co-ordinating their economic plans for the period 1971 to 1975 at two levels: bilaterally, by means of direct talks and consultations to examine the problems facing the various member countries and matters such as co-operation on geological, scientific and technical research, the supply of certain goods and the establishment of transport networks; and multilaterally, to study certain problems of concern to member countries and reach conclusions to serve as a basis for suitable solutions.

24. Another field of co-operation was that of specialization and collaboration in production. The study of the problem had started in 1955, and between then and 1968 CMEA had formulated recommendations on 2,350 different items relating in particular to models, aggregates, equipment and machinery. That co-operation had made specialization more effective.

25. Co-operation within CMEA in science and technology consisted of the exchange of information and documentation. Between 1948 and 1966, the member countries had exchanged more than 40,000 scientific and technical documents.

26. The substantial increase in the trade of the CMEA countries with the developed and developing countries might be cited as a specific example of the widening of trade relations to mutual advantage. Their economic co-

operation with all countries, including the developing countries, was based on the principle of reciprocal benefit and non-interference in internal affairs, and on respect for each country's sovereignty. The socialist countries made long-term public credit available at an interest rate of approximately 2.5 per cent, repayable in twelve years or more, and advantageous terms were offered for paying off the principal. Furthermore, the CMEA countries accepted, in settlement, deliveries of goods manufactured in plants built with the help of that credit. The member countries of CMEA also contributed directly to the training of skilled manpower even in the recipient countries.

27. For 1970 and beyond, CMEA was developing highly efficient methods of collaboration and giving close attention to the establishment of better economic relations so as to encourage the more rapid development of key activities such as electronics and the services sector, areas necessitating considerable investment and advanced research.

28. At the twenty-third session of CMEA, held in April 1969, a powerful impetus had been given to the economic co-operation established within that organization. The future directions of collaboration and the follow-up action to be taken on the decisions adopted had been discussed. The measures envisaged were intended to promote the co-ordination of economic development plans; that would continue to be the principal method of economic co-operation among the member countries of CMEA. It was planned to strengthen the relations between the institutes of member countries, establish whatever bodies might be necessary for the further improvement of co-operation and also to set up an investment bank. It was proposed to place increasing emphasis on developing links among the ministries, economic organizations and even the enterprises of the member countries. Those activities were accompanied by a steady improvement in the working methods of the organs of CMEA.

29. Improving such co-operation was a constant process, since the economic development requirements of the member countries had to be satisfied. Scientific and technical co-operation would also be promoted at all times in accordance with the principles of equal rights and the sovereignty of member countries and on the basis of mutual benefit.

30. Implementation of the measures approved at the twenty-third session of CMEA would help to strengthen economic co-operation. His organization would continue to apply those principles and would strengthen the economic, scientific and technical links among its members. All those aspects were interdependent and connected with the activities to be carried out during the Second United Nations Development Decade.

31. The contacts CMEA had with the United Nations bodies would, he hoped, be maintained and prove useful. The CMEA system of economic, scientific and technical

co-operation provided a convincing example of what could be done to promote human progress.

32. Mr. BOMANI (United Republic of Tanzania) expressed the hope that the Council would endeavour to find solutions to the manifold problems of international co-operation for development which, in the words of the Secretary-General, were bound to endanger peace and stability at the national as well as the international level.

33. The Council had chosen as the central theme of its forty-seventh session the preparation of an international strategy for the Second Development Decade. The volume of preparatory work already accomplished had aroused alarm and fears in some quarters that the Development Decade was being "over-prepared". While it was advisable not to engage in more theoretical work than was ever likely to be needed or applied in practice, it must be recalled that the failure of the first Development Decade was generally attributed to the fact that it had been launched without adequate preparation. Therefore the preparatory work by the various bodies concerned should deal primarily with the implementation of the objectives of the Second Development Decade and should be effectively co-ordinated and rationalized in order to increase its practical applicability.

34. The reports of the Preparatory Committee for the Second United Nations Development Decade on its first, second and third sessions (E/4624 and Add.1) and of the Committee for Development Planning on its fourth and fifth sessions (E/4682), which were before the Council, indicated clearly that considerable progress had been made in setting out the broad framework of the international development strategy for the 1970s and in defining some of its basic social and physical objectives. It was to be regretted that the achievements of the Preparatory Committee had been adversely affected by the non-participation of the socialist countries in its work and by the failure of the UNCTAD Trade and Development Board to recommend measures and policies regarding a wide field of international co-operation in trade and external capital financing.

35. His delegation had been particularly pleased to note the emphasis which the Preparatory Committee and the Committee for Development Planning, in their recommendations relating to the development strategy for the 1970s, had placed on social objectives as opposed to physical production targets, and the special importance placed on a more equitable distribution of incomes and wealth in the developing countries. Real development goals were primarily social; in the last analysis, economic objectives were merely the means required to achieve them.

36. Economic progress in Africa had been sluggish because the gross domestic product *per capita* in 1966 had been less than \$200 per year in thirty-two African countries, compared with \$3,800 in the United States. Among the various factors cited as contributing to the slow econ-

omic growth were the inefficiency of the economic structures, the pattern of resource availability and use, the limited size of markets and the shortage of technical skills. In the view of his delegation, the true cause of the prevailing under-development in the African continent was not insufficient natural resources but the lack of capital and high-level manpower resources resulting from the historical circumstances of colonialism. At the time of the African countries' accession to independence, their economies had been geared to the production of one or two cash crops for the industrial requirements of the metropolitan Power, while all manufactures had been imported. In those circumstances, the question of the size of national or regional markets had not even arisen, much less that of economic integration, and the African countries had consequently remained economically isolated from one another. In the early years of independence, the African countries had been primarily preoccupied with problems related to the consolidation of political independence and nationhood. That was undoubtedly the reason why the first Development Decade had not been a period of growth in Africa.

37. Tanzania, for its part, had embarked upon a policy of economic self-reliance, aware that the burden of development rested squarely on the shoulders of the individual developing countries themselves. To that end, it had made vigorous efforts to ensure the maximum mobilization and full involvement of its domestic economic and social forces in the process of development. In its second development plan, which had just become operative, particular emphasis had been placed on rural mobilization. In order to make maximum and efficient use of the two scarce resources - capital and technical personnel - new socialist organizational methods centred on "Ujamaa" villages had been adopted. With a view to helping the individual peasant farmers, who did not have the financial resources which would enable them to improve their means of production by making use of modern scientific knowledge and technological methods, the second development plan stressed that the Government would aim increasingly at directing available infrastructural and institutional services into larger collective productive units, whose establishment it would actively encourage.

38. Tanzania had learnt from experience that any meaningful economic self-reliance was impossible without adequate national control. Appropriate measures had therefore been taken to ensure that the public sector assumed an increasingly predominant role in the economy. Similarly, effective measures had been taken for the consolidation and expansion of existing savings and investment institutions. Tanzania's policy of economic self-reliance did not mean, however, that it would become a self-sufficient society, and it attached great importance to regional economic co-operation, as had been demonstrated by its signature of the treaty establishing the East African Community. Negotiations were under way with a view to expanding the East African Community to include Burundi, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Somalia and Zambia. At their recent meeting at Lusaka, the heads of State of eastern

and central African countries had stressed the importance of increased regional economic co-operation in the next few years. In that connexion, he drew attention to the decisive role which ECA had played, in spite of limited personnel and inadequate financial resources. Despite the modest results achieved so far, the African States members of ECA were firmly convinced that the Commission was the most powerful instrument available for the economic and social development of Africa. During ECA's ninth session, the member States had agreed to restructure the administrative machinery of the Commission to enable it to play a greatly increased role in the coming decade. ECA had indeed a decisive role to play, particularly with regard to the promotion of economic co-operation among the countries of the region, the expansion of intra-African trade and the establishment or enlargement of multinational training and research institutions.

39. While the developing countries must, of course, seek to achieve self-reliance, their success would depend on global co-operative efforts. Tanzania's second development plan, for example, projected an increase in imports at the rate of more than 7 per cent per year, while exports were expected to grow at about 5.5 per cent; in other words, the resulting foreign-exchange gap would have to be met by external capital financing, which was therefore expected to increase at the rate of about 1.5 per cent per year. While the external sector played a most dynamic role in the process of economic development, it was also the most unstable and the least subject to individual national policies. In that connexion, the points raised on the eve of the Second Development Decade were essentially the same as those that had been raised for the first, namely, that the developing countries could not plan and carry out investment objectives in the 1970s if, within the period of a few years, the fall in the market price of a single export commodity, as had been the case for Tanzania with sisal, caused a country to lose much more foreign exchange than it was likely to receive in the form of external aid during the same period. Secondly, the volume and terms of external aid made available to those countries should be such as to ensure that viable growth would not be strangled for lack of foreign exchange. Lastly, aid policies should be tailored to development needs and to the debt-servicing capacities of developing countries and should not be motivated by the political will and whims of donor countries.

40. Tanzania had consistently emphasized the superiority of trade over aid; indeed, trade was more compatible with economic self-reliance; the proportion of external trade in economic activity was considerably higher; and foreign exchange earned through the export of goods and services had the advantage of being usable for financing imports without any tying as to sources of procurement or use. It was therefore essential that all countries should rationalize the international trade system as a matter of primary concern in the interest of the international community as a whole. It had been sufficiently demonstrated that the failure of the second session of the

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and the problems of commodity price stabilization were largely due to the lack of serious attention on the part of the developed countries, which had, however, made special efforts to resolve their own problems in the Kennedy Round or by a system of special drawing rights. His delegation therefore hoped that the international trade arrangements contemplated as part of the international development strategy would include not only commitments but also a specific time-table for implementation, and that high priority would be given to the need for guaranteeing remunerative price levels for the export commodities of the developing countries.

41. His delegation firmly believed that the need for external aid would gradually disappear if, during the Second Development Decade, the developed countries gave to the developing countries, whose absorptive capacity had increased much more rapidly than had the volume of aid during the first Development Decade, aid in adequate amounts and on sufficiently flexible terms. Furthermore, the donor countries should reorient their aid policies away from prestige projects in favour of rural development programmes that would make it possible to ensure an equitable income distribution.

42. In any event, development problems required a dynamic and constantly evolving long-term approach. Two prerequisites for the success of an international development strategy were an increased application of the policy of economic self-reliance by the various developing countries and closer co-operation among the developed countries, on the one hand, and between those countries and the developing countries, on the other. If the first Development Decade was said to have failed, it was undoubtedly because those two prerequisites had not been fulfilled.

43. Before concluding, he wished to congratulate the United States and the Soviet Union on their achievements in space exploration during the first Development Decade. In that connexion, he associated himself with the remarks made by the President and the United States representative on the occasion of the first landing by man on the moon. It was essential, however, not to lose sight of the real and more pressing problems facing man on earth; the greatest priority should still be the conquest of the earth by ridding it of the ills suffered by the overwhelming majority of its inhabitants.

44. In conclusion, his delegation suggested that the theme of the international development strategy should be interdependence and co-operation. While the 1950s had been marked by the cold war and the 1960s by confrontation, it was essential that the 1970s should be a decade of co-operation.

45. Mr. BOHIADI (Chad) associated himself with the other delegations in warmly congratulating the Government and people of the United States on the success of the "Apollo 11" flight.

46. As the Secretary-General had emphasized in his statement, many of the most dangerous situations today were largely rooted in unresolved social and economic ills. Such situations would already have proved catastrophic if, at the end of the Second World War, the United States had not placed considerable financial and material aid at the disposal of the devastated nations through the Marshall Plan. Why could such solidarity, which had proved its worth in Europe, not be emulated by the wealthy countries for the benefit of the developing countries?

47. The gap in living standards separating the developed from the developing countries continued to widen and several decades of tremendous effort would still be required to enable the latter to attain one-tenth of the level of development of some of the advanced countries. Obviously they must rely on their own resources, but they must also be given external aid which should be untied and not subject to political conditions which might impair their sovereignty. The success of co-operation between the developed and less advanced countries depended largely on the latter's will to set up lasting and efficient concerted machinery; for no Power could resolve in isolation the range of complex problems caused by economic and social backwardness.

48. Above all, collaboration between the developed and the developing nations should be conducted with due regard for the recipients. It had often been found that the rivalry between foreign Powers in Africa, Asia and Latin America tended to aggravate the difficulties of those continents instead of assisting them to get out of the rut of under-development. The developed countries, instead of conspiring to impose particular policies on the young States, should help them to resolve their problems. That did not mean committing the under-developed countries to capitalism or socialism, but rather suggesting adequate remedies appropriate to the particular situation of each country without infringing its sovereignty.

49. The essential purpose of co-operation should be to increase the facilities which the advanced countries placed at the disposal of the developing countries and to make international collaboration more effective by radically altering methods of technical, economic and financial assistance. For that purpose problems such as completion of the general infrastructure, surveys aimed at establishing zones of regional prosperity, investment in medium-sized industry and in large industrial complexes, aid for transforming agricultural structures and for social development and the stabilization of commodity prices must be given priority. Due attention must be paid to the peculiar situation of the least advanced countries, especially the land-locked countries, of which Chad was one.

50. His delegation regretted that the hopes placed in the first Development Decade had been shattered; its disappointment was heightened by the failure of the second session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Most of the developing countries had failed



by a considerable margin to reach the growth rate target of 5 per cent. The failure of the first Development Decade was due primarily to the shortcomings and the rigidity of world trade flows and the problems raised by foreign capital and external aid. The international community should bear in mind past experience in preparing for the Second Development Decade.

51. The responsibility for development rested with the less advanced countries themselves: international aid should merely supplement national effort. In demographic matters, for instance, the international organizations could not exercise control over the countries in any way: the solution of such problems should be left to the discretion of each State. The Republic of Chad, which had a very low population density, could not subscribe to the idea of international birth control.

52. The Committee for Development Planning and other United Nations bodies, the specialized agencies and particularly the Preparatory Committee for the Second United Nations Development Decade had a major role to play in working out a development strategy. The commitments which the developed and developing countries should assume in regard to external aid, while not constituting a legal instrument, should be clear and precise. The targets proposed should be revised periodically, and the important thing was the political will to achieve them.

53. Mr. BUHLER (World Confederation of Labour), speaking at the invitation of the President, said that the reports prepared by the Secretary-General showed that, although *per capita* national income had increased in the developing countries, the living conditions of the workers in those countries had deteriorated and the gap dividing the wealthy countries from the poor countries continued to widen. As many speakers had pointed out at the fifty-third session of the International Labour Conference, held in June 1969, the failure of the first United Nations

Development Decade should act as an incentive for achieving major social progress during the Second Development Decade.

54. One of the objectives of that decade should be the creation of a large number of employment opportunities in the developing countries. Governments, *entrepreneurs* and workers should co-operate towards that end, and the United Nations, in particular its Economic and Social Council, should make sure that all Member States took into account the possible repercussions of their national policies on the employment situation.

55. Society was passing through a period of profound transformation and unrest, and it was its duty to resolve the problems of peace and development. The alternative solutions offered by the capitalist, neo-capitalist, fascist and communist systems had all failed. In its advocacy of an up-to-date world trade-unionism, the World Confederation of Labour wished to contribute to the solution of the problems besetting the world.

56. The Confederation had held a conference in October 1968 to study the problems of world economic development in a humanist context. The conference had set up a standing committee to look into development problems and had decided to hold regional conferences on a continental basis and a world conference of developing countries.

57. The Second United Nations Development Decade must mark an era of progress for mankind with the participation of the entire world population; the professional and economic organizations representing the workers should have a say at all international meetings at which they were unfortunately not represented at present.

The meeting rose at 12.35 p.m.