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President : Mr. M. KLUSAK (Czechoslovakia).

Present :

Representatives of the following States: Belgium, Cameroon, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, France, Gabon, Guatemala, India, Iran, Kuwait, Libya, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Sierra Leone, Sweden, Turkey, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Venezuela.

Observers for the following Member States: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, China, Greece, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, United Arab Republic.

Observers for the following non-member States: Federal Republic of Germany, Switzerland.

Representatives of the following specialized agencies: International Labour Organisation, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Monetary Fund.

The representative of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

AGENDA ITEMS 13 AND 9

Multilateral food aid

- (a) Programme of studies called for in General Assembly resolution 2096 (XX) (E/4352 and Corr.1 and Add.1, E/4370)
- (b) Report of the Intergovernmental Committee of the World Food Programme (E/4332, E/4378, E/4407)

Increasing the production and use of edible protein (E/4343)

REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC COMMITTEE (E/4412)

1. The PRESIDENT invited the Council to consider the Economic Committee's report on agenda items 13 and 9 (E/4412), and in particular the three draft resolutions contained in paragraph 12 thereof. Draft resolutions I and II related to agenda item 13, and draft resolution III to agenda item 9.

2. Mr. de SEYNES (Under-Secretary for Economic and Social Affairs) said that there had been useful discussion in the Economic Committee on the subject of multilateral food aid and increasing the production and use of edible protein. The Committee had, however, treated the problems in a manner that could only be regarded as provisional. Draft resolution I on the World Food Programme would help the Executive Director of the Programme to continue his important work and would encourage Governments to increase their contributions to the Programme. Draft resolution III on edible protein would, it was to be hoped, give added impetus to the activities of interested public and private institutions. The lucid analysis of the problem set out in the report of the Advisory Committee on the Application of Science and Technology to Development (E/4343) was most valuable, and on behalf of the Secretary-General he expressed his gratitude to the members of that Committee. He hoped to be able to report back to the Council in the near future with news of practical achievements in the field covered by the report.

3. Speakers in the Economic Committee had stressed the urgent need for action to attack the fundamental causes of food deficits. There had also been broad agreement to the effect that a holding operation should be organized to deal with the deficit which now existed and seemed likely to persist for many years to come.

4. The Council, by the general character of its mission and with its representative organization and democratic procedures, was, under the authority of the General Assembly, particularly well placed to formulate a development strategy in the extremely complex sphere of world food aid. However, it had been prevented by the fact that discussions on the subject were proceeding in other forums from taking the lead in that critical development problem. He felt nevertheless that the Council would wish to continue to keep a close watch on the problem, so that it could assume at the right moment the leading role which the General Assembly had envisaged for it. That was desirable, for the other agencies dealing with the problem either were not as representative of the whole

world community as the Council, or did not function under such democratic procedures, or again did not serve so general a purpose, and were less well qualified to fit a food aid programme into the context of total aid. Meanwhile, research work would proceed along the lines indicated in the outline submitted last year, with any modifications necessitated by subsequent developments. FAO had already stated its intention of studying four specific problems mentioned in that outline. They were (i) alternative sources of supply of foodstuffs usable as aid; (ii) methods by which a large-scale multilateral food programme might procure the commodities it needed with the least disruption of regular markets; (iii) ways and means by which developing countries with food deficits could handle supplies from abroad with the least potential damage to domestic agriculture; (iv) methods of making the best possible advance estimates of impending deficits. Those problems were referred to in the Secretary-General's progress report (E/4352 and Corr.1), but were not dealt with in any depth.

5. The Secretariat would inform the Council at its forty-fifth session of any relevant new events and policies, their implications for the economic development of the countries concerned and their impact on the world economy.

6. Mr. WILLIAMS (International Monetary Fund) said it had been stated during the Economic Committee's discussion of agenda item 13 that the Fund had in the spring refused a loan to the United Arab Republic, a member country. That statement was based on a misunderstanding, due perhaps to confused and inaccurate newspaper reports.

7. While the Fund's relations with its members were necessarily confidential, he felt that it would not be a breach of confidence to set the record straight by stating the facts of the case. The United Arab Republic had had active relations with the Fund for many years. It had made extensive use of the Fund's resources, including drawings under the Fund's compensatory financing facility. The Fund had not refused to work out a standby arrangement with the United Arab Republic. In fact, a new United Arab Republic stabilization programme, intended to serve as a basis for a new standby arrangement with the Fund, had been discussed between the Fund's staff and United Arab Republic officials in April 1967, and had been approved by the Government. However, the events of May had made it questionable whether some elements of the stabilization programme could be carried out. Accordingly, the Minister of Economy of the United Arab Republic had requested the Managing Director of the Fund to postpone all action relating to his Government's request for a standby arrangement. That remained the situation at the present time.

8. The PRESIDENT put to the vote draft resolution I, on the World Food Programme.

*Draft resolution I was adopted by 21 votes to none, with 2 abstentions.*

9. The PRESIDENT invited the Council to take a decision on draft resolution II, concerning the amendment of World Food Programme General Regulation 6.

10. Mr. TAYLOR (United Kingdom) said that although his delegation had voted in favour of the draft resolution in the Economic Committee, it reserved its position with regard to the resolution's financial implications.

*Draft resolution II was adopted unanimously.*

11. The PRESIDENT invited the Council to take a decision on draft resolution III, on edible protein.

12. Mr. POZHARSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that his delegation had no objection to the adoption of draft resolution III without a formal vote, but wished to repeat the reservations it had voiced in the Economic Committee with regard to operative paragraphs 2 and 6. It felt that the reference in operative paragraph 6 to the fourteen proposals of the Advisory Committee was too unqualified in its terms, having some doubts about the value of some of the proposals. It also had reservations regarding the financial implications of programmes involving the use of edible protein as set out in the Advisory Committee's report, considering them inadequately supported. It therefore regarded the question of financial implications as remaining open.

13. Subject to those reservations, his delegation approved the draft resolution.

14. Mr. STAHL (Czechoslovakia) said that while his delegation had voted in favour of draft resolution III in the Economic Committee, it considered that the humanitarian measures proposed should be open to all countries even if they were not members of the United Nations or of the specialized agencies. If a separate vote had been taken in the Committee on operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution, his delegation would have abstained.

*Draft resolution III was adopted unanimously.*

15. The PRESIDENT said that the Council had now concluded its consideration of agenda items 13 and 9.

#### AGENDA ITEM 2

**General discussion of international economic and social policy (E/4332, E/4343, E/4352 and Corr.1 and Add.1, E/4353 and Add. 1 and Add. 1/Corr.1, E/4361, E/4362 and Corr.1, E/4363 and Add.1-2, E/4370, E/4378, E/4392, E/4396 and Add.1-3 and Add.1/Corr.1; E/L.1172/Rev.1, E/L.1173, E/L.1174; E/CN.11/L.184, E/CN.11/L.185/Rev.1; E/CN.12/767, E/CN.12/768; E/CN.14/370, E/CN.14/397; E/ECE/656) (resumed from the 1489th meeting)**

16. Mr. ZAKHAROV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) introduced the USSR draft resolution on action to deal with the economic consequences of Israel's aggression against the Arab States, contained in document E/L.1172/Rev.1. The discussion in the Council had underlined the gravity of the situation in the Middle East, and had shown that many member countries wished to protect the legitimate rights and interests of the Arab countries which had suffered from Israel's aggression. As many delegations had stated, the problems of economic

and social development could only be satisfactorily solved under conditions of lasting peace, which implied the renunciation of all policies of military aggression. Many delegations had also expressed the view that economic and political problems were closely linked, and that the Council was the appropriate forum for discussing aspects of international economic and social policy in the light of the principles and objectives set forth in the Charter, the cornerstone of which was the concept of peace, security and international co-operation. As had been shown, the recent events in the Middle East not only had had grave economic and social consequences for the Arab countries but affected the economic interests of other peace-loving countries.

17. The representatives of Libya, Kuwait and Morocco and the observers from the United Arab Republic, Iraq and Algeria had described the economic loss sustained by the Arab countries, parts of whose territory were still occupied by Israel, and the suffering of their people. Most representatives who had spoken in the debate agreed that Israel's aggression had adversely affected the world economic situation, especially in the Arab region, had retarded the execution of the Arab countries' national economic and social programmes, had hindered the progress of United Nations economic programmes, and was still causing the Arab countries serious economic hardships.

18. The debate had also revealed the true identity of those who had incited and encouraged the aggressor and continued to do so. It was understandable that they should oppose any Council measures in that connexion based on the principles of the Charter. They had made no serious attempt to justify their position, since in fact there was no justification. Indeed, Israel's aggression against the Arab States was merely the latest expression of their own policy of military aggression. The attitude and actions of the aggressor's patrons and the speeches of its supporters were permeated with hostility towards the Arab countries.

19. The preambular paragraphs of the draft resolution summed up the main currents of thought which had emerged in the debate, and the operative part provided that Israel should pay compensation for the damage caused to the Arab countries and sought United Nations economic assistance for them. He believed that the draft resolution was entirely consonant with the Council's functions and responsibilities, in the context of the international economic situation which had arisen during the Council's session. Its adoption would help to give weight to the Council's role as the United Nations organ having primary responsibility for the solution of international economic and social problems.

20. The discussion on the economic consequences of Israel's aggression against the Arab States had occupied a prominent place in the work of the current session and should be appropriately recorded in the Council's report to the twenty-second session of the General Assembly. His delegation would have more detailed comments to make on that subject under item 23 of the Council's agenda (Arrangements regarding the report of the Council to the General Assembly).

21. Mr. ATTIGA (Libya) expressed his delegation's gratitude to the USSR delegation for its initiative in submitting the draft resolution. In view of the fact that the political and legal aspects of Israel's recent aggression against the Arab States were matters for the Security Council and the General Assembly, he wished to limit his comments to its economic and social consequences, which were matters within the competence of the Council under articles 55 and 60 of the Charter. Israel's aggression had done great harm to United Nations efforts to help the developing countries to overcome their economic and social difficulties and raise the standard of living of their peoples. The Council should consider the economic and social consequences of Israel's aggression not only because of the serious damage it had inflicted on the Middle East but also because any delay in the normal economic development of that region was bound to have serious repercussions in other parts of the world. Israel's aggression had resulted in the occupation of part of the territory of Jordan, Syria and the United Arab Republic. In addition, it had delayed the development plans of those countries, inflicted severe losses on their economies and caused serious economic and social dislocation throughout the region.

22. The fact that the General Assembly and the Security Council had not yet found a just solution to the problem as a whole should not prevent the Council from discussing the effects of Israel's aggression on international economic co-operation, international trade and the economic development of the developing countries. The Council would fail in its duty if it remained indifferent in face of the disaster which had befallen the economy and international trade of the Middle East. No one could deny that Israel's aggression against the Arab States had affected the economic development of that area and, in addition, trade and international co-operation. Nor could anyone deny that those were matters which could properly be considered under item 2 of the agenda. Again it could not be denied that Israel, by its bellicose attitude and by its refusal to withdraw from the illegally occupied territories, was obstructing United Nations efforts for peace and violating the Charter, as well as obstructing the work of the Economic and Social Council for the promotion of international co-operation and development. It was for those reasons that his delegation had supported the USSR proposal for the inclusion of a new item in the agenda relating to the economic and social aspects of Israel's aggression (see E/4409). His delegation fully supported the USSR draft resolution, and was confident that the Council would study the question with objectivity and impartiality, unaffected by those influences which had hitherto prevented the General Assembly and the Security Council from facing up to their responsibilities.

23. The amendments to the USSR revised draft resolution submitted by his delegation with those of Kuwait and Morocco (E/L.1174) consisted mainly in the addition of a preambular paragraph noting that Israel troops had looted and damaged United Nations property, molested United Nations personnel and killed members of the United Nations peace-keeping force. Some of those facts had been reported by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly on 14 July 1967. The proposed

amendments drew attention to those facts, on which the Council could not remain silent. Such acts were unprecedented in the history of the United Nations, and testified to Israel's contempt not only for the Secretary-General but also for the numerous resolutions adopted by the United Nations with a view to the maintenance of peace in that area. His delegation urged the adoption of the revised draft resolution, subject to the proposed amendments.

24. Mr. GOLDSCHMIDT (United States of America) regretted having to intervene in a highly controversial political debate which in his view should not be taking place in the Economic and Social Council.

25. He regarded the USSR draft resolution and the proposed amendments to it as not receivable, and therefore moved under rule 66 of the rules of procedure that the Council should take no action thereon. While the draft resolution and amendments had been submitted under agenda item 2, they in fact carried forward the rationale of an item whose inclusion in the Council's agenda the Soviet Union had requested, but which had not been included. After an exhaustive political debate, identical in substance with those which had recently taken place in the General Assembly and the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council at its 1492nd meeting had decided, without objection, to postpone further discussion of the Soviet request and revert to it if and when there was a likelihood of unanimity on the subject. It would be inconsistent with that decision for the Council to discuss and take action on the Soviet draft resolution, which moreover dealt with issues within the competence of and under consideration by the General Assembly and the Security Council. The question of competence was important for the protection of the technical integrity of the Economic and Social Council.

26. The draft resolution and the amendments to it, like the agenda item proposed by the Soviet Union, were based on the inequitable and unconstructive assumption that a political finding had been made that one of the countries concerned was guilty, whereas both the General Assembly and the Security Council had refused to make such a finding. Indeed, they had rejected the one-sided approach adopted in the draft resolution, and it was unthinkable that the Economic and Social Council should entertain any draft resolution or proposal based on such an approach. To do so would trample on the Council's procedures and complicate the work of the political organs of the United Nations and would not contribute to the establishment of an equitable, lasting peace in the Middle East. He had therefore formally proposed, under rule 66, second paragraph, of the rules of procedure, that the Council should take no decision on the USSR draft resolution and the amendments thereto.

27. Mr. HARKETT (Morocco), describing the damage done to the economies of the three Arab countries directly affected by the Israel aggression, said that Jordan had lost a large proportion of its richest arable land and its main source of foreign exchange; its economic potential was thus largely destroyed. The Zionist aggression had caused the closure of the Suez Canal, thus depriving the

United Arab Republic of its major source of revenue. Moreover, Israel was exploiting the oil resources of Sinai for its own benefit at the expense of the people of the United Arab Republic. Israel's aggression had also had disastrous economic consequences for Syria. The conflict had come at a time when the Governments of the Arab countries were making commendable efforts to develop their economies for the benefit of their people. Those efforts were now compromised, and effective international economic co-operation in the region was out of the question.

28. In view of the functions and responsibilities conferred on it by the United Nations Charter in the economic and social field, the Council should give serious consideration to the economic consequences of Israel's occupation of territory belonging to Jordan, the United Arab Republic and Syria. It should also proclaim that Israel must pay compensation for the losses caused by its aggression and that the Arab countries affected should be given United Nations economic assistance.

29. In addition to attacking the Arab countries in violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter, Israel had also seized or destroyed United Nations property in the Middle East and killed or ill-treated members of the United Nations Emergency Force. He had therefore co-sponsored an amendment introducing references to those acts into the Soviet draft resolution, which he whole-heartedly supported.

30. Mr. AL-SABAH (Kuwait) said that Israel's long-planned and premeditated aggression against the three Arab States and its continued occupation of parts of their territory had caused great economic harm and suffering. The Council would fail in its responsibilities as one of the principal United Nations organs if it did not take appropriate measures to ensure that the economic consequences of Israel's aggression were remedied. As many delegations had already pointed out, the Council was fully competent under the Charter to undertake such measures. The Soviet draft resolution clearly stated the facts of the situation, and it was only just that Israel should compensate the three Arab countries for the losses its aggression had occasioned them, and the United Nations for the damage done to its property and the casualties inflicted on its personnel.

31. Mr. KIDRON (Observer for Israel), speaking under rule 75 of the rules of procedure, referred to the views his delegation had expressed at the 1490th meeting on the occasion of the original Soviet attempt to involve the Council in the Middle Eastern issue. The USSR delegation's draft resolution and introductory statement closely reflected the language and ideas expressed in the USSR representative's letter requesting the inclusion of an additional item in the agenda and in the statement he had made to the Council at the 1490th meeting. All those moves were designed to bring about, by constant repetition of spurious charges, the rewriting of recent history in the Middle East in a form which the General Assembly and the Security Council had refused to accept. Those bodies had rejected the Soviet allegations against Israel in general terms, but more specifically, on 4 July 1967,

the General Assembly had rejected by 54 votes to 34 the Soviet demand that Israel be required to pay compensation for the damage caused by the recent hostilities in the Arab countries. Thus the Soviet case, which rested on the allegation of Israel's aggression, could not be sustained; yet the Soviet Union continued to press its discredited charges.

32. Between the middle of May and the beginning of June 1967 a gigantic plan for the destruction of Israel had been publicly launched by the United Arab Republic. The eviction of the United Nations Emergency Force had been a clear warning of impending aggression. The subsequent blockage of Eilat, a classical act of aggression—labelled as such on a previous occasion by the Soviet Union itself—the mounting concentration of troops and war materials in Sinai and other frontier areas, the conclusion of military pacts with Jordan and Iraq and the mobilization carried out in all the Arab countries had left no doubt about the impending attack on Israel. The Arab leaders had publicly stated their intention to attack and destroy Israel and had proclaimed a Holy War.

33. Since 1948, when the new State of Israel, founded in accordance with a General Assembly resolution, had first been attacked by the Arab States, the latter had claimed, as they still claimed, belligerent status. A state of war proclaimed by one side was an act of aggression, and he failed to see by what logic the USSR could accuse Israel of aggression when the Arab States had preached and practised aggression against Israel for nineteen years. What they now demanded was to be protected from the consequences of their acts.

34. Although couched in economic terms, the Soviet draft resolution was blatantly political in substance and purpose. The main economic consequences of the recent hostilities for the Arab countries had been the destruction of the bulk of their armaments, which could hardly cause concern to any United Nations body, the closure of the Suez Canal, which so far as Israel was concerned could and should be opened to shipping of all nations without discrimination in accordance with international law as soon as possible, and the suspension, by the Arabs themselves, of oil shipments to certain Western markets. The other damage and dislocation caused was unavoidable in warfare. Injury to Arab non-combatants had been on a comparatively small scale, but the Government of Israel was doing its best to carry out relief measures and restore normal conditions as soon as possible. If any compensation was to be paid, it was owed by the aggressors, which had claimed belligerent status for nineteen years and had instigated, planned and waged war against Israel.

35. A much more significant economic factor was the immense burden of military expenditure borne by poor, under developed countries for the sole purpose of pursuing a belligerent policy against Israel and engaging in armed intervention in other parts of the Middle East. The USSR was directly implicated in responsibility for the misery caused by those adventures. The arms race in the Middle East had been instigated by the USSR, which had sold immense quantities of military equipment since 1955, mainly to the United Arab Republic and Syria. The economic harm done by the arms race could easily be

reversed by the decision of the USSR, Syria, the United Arab Republic and other Arab countries to devote their resources to peace instead of war. Israel would not be unresponsive to such a move, which the world would applaud.

36. He had already given details of his Government's efforts to restore normal conditions on the west bank of the Jordan and in the Gaza Strip. However, the plight of the Arab refugees had caused the world to overlook the fate of the remnants of the once great Jewish communities in certain Arab countries following the campaign of incitement launched against Israel. Cairo had long been the home of Nazi war criminals who were experts in anti-Jewish propaganda and mass murder. In Egypt all Jewish males between 20 and 50 years old were imprisoned under inhuman conditions, and Red Cross representatives were refused permission to visit them. Their property was sequestered and their families were left without support. In many of the Arab countries officially-inspired campaigns of violence and pillage were conducted against the Jewish communities. For many years the USSR's State-owned communications media had echoed Arab propaganda and threats against Israel and had reviled the State of Israel, its leaders and its people. In the USSR itself there was an oppressed Jewish minority deprived of national, cultural and religious rights and subjected to many forms of discrimination.

37. He believed that peace could come to the Middle East if it was freely negotiated between the countries concerned as equals. If the moral and intellectual qualities of the Middle Eastern peoples were diverted from the sterile arts of war to works of peace, all problems could be solved. It was a vision worth striving for.

38. Mr. KHALLAF (Observer for the United Arab Republic), speaking in accordance with the provisions of rule 75 of the rules of procedure, said that by resuming the present discussion the Council had reaffirmed its competence to deal with the matter. It had shown its concern over the economic consequences of Israel's aggression and its awareness that if effective aid was not given soon to the Middle Eastern peoples the situation would deteriorate further. Israel's aggression had been unique in its injustice and cruelty. It was a war of extermination, expansion and colonization. Towns and villages had been razed and thousands of Palestinian Arabs were being driven from their homes by terror and insecurity, adding a new wave of refugees to the flight which had begun in 1948 for the same reason. Before the aggression Israel had been faced with serious unemployment problems; yet now its leaders had appealed to Jews all over the world to send their sons to live in Israel, obviously for the purpose of exploiting the new opportunities offered by the annexation of territory in the war. That expansionism was not accidental, but was a basic tenet of Zionism, whose goal was a Jewish empire extending from the Nile to the Euphrates. The very existence of Israel depended on the support of the imperialist and colonialist Powers; but the link with colonialism went back to the very beginnings of modern Zionism, whose founder Theodor Herzl had proclaimed that Israel should be the



bulwark of European civilization against Asian barbarism. No doubt that now included African barbarism.

39. The war waged by Israel had caused loss of life and damage to public and private property and to the economic infrastructure of the Arab countries, and had slowed down the latter's economic, social and cultural progress at all levels. Further losses were now being incurred as a result of Israel's occupation of Arab territory, with the consequent loss to the countries concerned of income from their natural resources, from tourism, and from the Suez Canal. The Israel representative had urged the United Arab Republic to reopen the Canal. The Egyptian people had been the natural guardians of that waterway since the time of the Pharaohs and had kept it open for thousands of years. Before the Canal could be reopened, however, Israel must show its respect for international law by returning the territory it had occupied.

40. Although the Arab States had been Israel's first victims, they were not the only ones. Israel's action had been prejudicial to the interests of the international community, to the production and trade of the peace-loving countries, and to the United Nations itself, which had lost staff and property at Israel's hands. Was that the type of civilization that Israel wished to spread?

41. He trusted that the Council would adopt the USSR draft resolution, which recognized the Arab States' right to compensation for the damage caused by Israel. Not that he had much hope that such a resolution would be effective, for Israel had always disregarded United Nations resolutions. Following the aggression of 1948 the United Nations had called upon Israel to make reparation for the damage it had caused the Palestinians, but Israel had categorically refused to do so. Similarly, and more recently, it had refused to give up Jerusalem. He appealed to the Council to put a stop to a dangerous career which was plunging the world into anarchy.

42. As to the Israel observer's remarks regarding the USSR's role in supplying arms to the Middle East, he wished to point out that all countries bought arms, and that the USSR was not the only supplier. The USSR was, however, the only great Power which supplied arms without evil intent. Other great Powers not only sold arms but gave them away, and incited other countries to follow their example, making the recipient countries part of an international conspiracy.

43. He expressed his gratitude to the USSR for submitting its draft resolution, and thanked the countries which had submitted amendments to it and those which had supported the Arab cause.

44. Sir Edward WARNER (United Kingdom) said that he would not speak to the substance of the USSR draft resolution, since that was not a proper matter for discussion in the Council. The draft resolution sprang directly from the supplementary item which the USSR had sought to place on the Council's agenda. The Council would remember that after a lengthy debate it had been decided, on the proposal of India, to postpone discussion of the USSR proposal pending further consultation. The USSR draft resolution was therefore out of order on

procedural grounds. He therefore supported the United States motion.

45. Mr. FORTHOMME (Belgium) said that however horrifying Member States found the idea of war, the machinery of the United Nations must not be misused under the stress of emotion. As had already been cogently argued, the question dealt with in the USSR draft resolution was essentially political, and the Council must therefore await the decision on it of the appropriate United Nations bodies. Furthermore, the Council must respect its own previous decisions, if it was not to render them futile. It had adopted the Indian proposal, and should now adopt the United States motion.

46. Mr. KADLEC (Czechoslovakia) said that he did not intend to comment on the Israel representative's statement, although it gave a distorted picture of the situation in the Middle East. He strongly disagreed with the arguments advanced by the United States, United Kingdom and Belgian representatives. In the course of the Council's discussion of world economic trends it had been felt that the economic consequences of Israel's aggression could not be passed over in silence. The three representatives he had mentioned were opposed to discussion of the substance of the USSR draft resolution not because the Council was not competent to deal with it but because they feared such a discussion.

47. Under Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter the Council was fully competent to discuss the economic consequences of Israel's aggression and to take appropriate measures. Furthermore, it was in accordance with justice and international law that the aggressor should pay compensation for the damage it had caused and return the property it had stolen to the rightful owners. That the Council considered itself competent to deal with the economic consequences of world events was shown by the action proposed in connexion with the natural disasters which had occurred in Turkey, Colombia, Venezuela and Pakistan (see E/4415). If the Council could act to mitigate the consequences of natural disasters, it certainly had the duty to act to meet the consequences of aggression.

48. One of the most important tasks of the United Nations was to speed up the development of the developing countries, which Israel had seriously impeded. The Council should urge the United Nations to take the necessary action to aid the victims of Israel's aggression, as it was bound to do under the Charter. It could do so by adopting the USSR draft resolution, which he strongly supported.

49. Mr. YASSEEN (Observer for Iraq), speaking under rule 75 of the rules of procedure, said that the Council was obviously competent, both under the Charter and under international law, to deal with the economic and social consequences of Israel's aggression; there was indeed no rule of law which could prevent it from doing so. It was a truism to say that economic and social questions had political implications, and the Council would not be justified in refusing to deal with the present issue merely because it was a complex one. The Economic and Social Council and the Security Council had been

established to deal with aspects of international questions within their respective spheres of competence. Under Articles 55, 60 and 62 of the Charter, the Council was competent to discuss any economic or social question, and the damage caused by Israel was undoubtedly such a question.

50. The USSR draft resolution was clearly pertinent to agenda item 2, and the fact that its substance was also the subject of a supplementary item which the USSR had wished to place on the agenda could not bar its discussion under agenda item 2. Under Article 55 of the Charter, the Council was responsible for promoting higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development. It was thus its duty to discuss all obstacles, including wars of aggression, which impeded the achievement of those goals. He failed to see how the economic and social consequences of a war could be held to be extraneous to the discussion of international economic and social policy.

51. It had been argued that acts of aggression were matters for other United Nations organs, but that should not prevent the Council from considering the economic and social consequences of aggression, which were clearly within its purview. The Council was not being called upon to take action with regard to Israel's act of aggression itself, but only to establish the principle that compensation must be paid for the damage it had caused. That was in accordance not only with international law but with every principle of natural justice. It had been maintained that the consequences of a war of aggression, even if they were economic, were within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Security Council; but that argument was disproved by the Council's own record. In its early years the Council had had to deal with many questions arising out of the Nazi aggression. The same principles applied to the present case. He trusted the Council would not reject the USSR draft resolution for political reasons, but would decide to do what was its obvious duty.

52. The Israel observer had said that Jews were being victimized in the Arab States; but no pogroms had taken place in the Middle East. In the Arab countries the Jews were on a footing of equality with the rest of the population, and those who had not been seduced by zionism received fair treatment, as was clear from a recent statement made by the Rabbi of Baghdad. On the other hand the Arabs in Israel, whether Moslem or Christian, were treated as inferiors and subjected to the racial discrimination the Israelis had learnt from the Nazis. It was impossible to do justice in words to the lamentable position of the Arabs in Israel. They were the rightful inhabitants of Palestine, the remnant of its original population left behind after the rest had fled to escape the Israel terror; yet they were persecuted by the Israelis, who had been drawn from the four corners of the earth to occupy a land which was not rightfully theirs. Israel called for peace negotiations between equals; but there could be no equality between an aggressor and his victim.

53. In seeking to justify the wrongs done by Israel to the Arab States the Israel representative had failed to mention one of the most serious—Israel's occupation by force of the territory of other States. Israel must withdraw its troops from the territories it now occupied in direct violation of the Charter. He was sure that with the co-operation of all men of good will justice would eventually be done.

54. He welcomed the USSR draft resolution, and also the amendments to it, which drew attention to the damage suffered by the United Nations itself.

55. Mr. GELBER (Canada) said his delegation felt that the Council was not the proper forum for the present discussion. That was not because it was indifferent to the issues involved; Canada had proposed that the Security Council should consider the situation in the Middle East, even before the outbreak of hostilities; but that proposal had been defeated because other delegations had considered that the time was not opportune. However, the Council had a heavy agenda, and was making slow progress. In the circumstances, he felt that the United States motion should be dealt with as quickly as possible, so as to enable the Council to get on with its work.

56. Mr. ZAKHAROV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) welcomed the support that his delegation's draft resolution had received. Those who had opposed it, and who were unwilling to support the Arab countries in their efforts to seek redress of the wrongs they had suffered at the hands of the aggressor, should ask themselves whether they in their turn might not in the future need the support of the Arab States.

57. Although his delegation disagreed with those who had maintained that the Council was not competent to consider the USSR draft resolution, he was obliged to admit that there was no prospect of the Council's adopting a decision on it under agenda item 2. Representatives should ask themselves who had prevented the Council from carrying out its duty under the Charter; it was as clear as daylight that the fault lay with the countries which were covering up for Israel, particularly the United States. If those countries failed to modify their attitude they would be assuming an onerous responsibility.

58. In the circumstances, he would not press his draft resolution (E/L.1172/Rev.1) to the vote, but the USSR would continue to keep the situation in the Middle East under review, with the interests of the Arab countries in mind. In doing so it would be following its traditional Leninist policy.

59. Mr. GOLDSCHMIDT (United States of America) said that as the USSR draft resolution was no longer before the Council, his procedural motion was no longer necessary. He therefore withdrew it.

The meeting rose at 1.5 p.m.