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**Letter dated 15 March 2016 from the Chair of the Security Council
Committee established pursuant to resolution 1572 (2004) concerning
Côte d'Ivoire addressed to the President of the Security Council**

On behalf of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1572 (2004) concerning Côte d'Ivoire, I have the honour to transmit herewith the final report of the Group of Experts on Côte d'Ivoire.

I would appreciate it if the present letter and the report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(Signed) Elbio **Rosselli**
Chair

Security Council Committee established pursuant to
resolution 1572 (2004) concerning Côte d'Ivoire



Letter dated 22 February 2016 from the Group of Experts on Côte d'Ivoire addressed to the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1572 (2004)

The members of the Group of Experts on Côte d'Ivoire have the honour to transmit herewith the final report of the Group, prepared in accordance with paragraph 27 of Security Council resolution 2219 (2015).

(Signed) Roman **Brühwiler**

(Signed) Raymond **Debelle**

(Signed) Lipika Majumdar **Roy Choudhury**

(Signed) Roberto **Sollazzo**

(Signed) Manuel **Vázquez-Boidard**

Final report of the Group of Experts on Côte d'Ivoire pursuant to paragraph 27 of Security Council resolution 2219 (2015)

Summary

During the reporting period, Côte d'Ivoire achieved significant progress with regard to the overall stabilization of the country since the end of the post-electoral crisis of 2010-2011. The presidential elections held in October 2015, considered to be a benchmark in the normalization process, were inclusive, transparent and free of violence.

The factors contributing to the current peaceful security environment include the presence of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire and the French forces that support it and the fact that Ivorian stakeholders do not perceive the use of violence as politically advantageous.

The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process, which ended on 30 June 2015, was only partially successful, given that, according to data from the Ivorian authorities, at least 16,500 ex-combatants were not demobilized and large quantities of weapons and ammunition remain unaccounted for. Furthermore, the Group of Experts on Côte d'Ivoire documented the acquisition of some 300 tons of materiel by the former Forces nouvelles in the aftermath of the post-electoral crisis.

Although significant progress was made with regard to the security sector reform process, with the National Assembly adopting a military planning law on 4 January 2016, to date the Ivorian security forces remain highly dysfunctional. The former zone commanders, who occupy key roles in the Ivorian security apparatus, continue to have access to private assets, financial resources and weapons and related materiel.

Limited efforts to combat impunity, alongside the unbalanced allocation of posts in favour of the pro-Ouattara camp, hamper the pace of national reconciliation.

The stability in Côte d'Ivoire has had a positive effect on the countries in the subregion. The security situation at the border with Liberia and Ghana continues to improve. There remains, however, the risk that the weapons and related materiel present in Côte d'Ivoire will be exported to the subregion.

Since 2004, violations of the arms embargo have involved small arms, heavy weapons and related ammunition. During its mandate, the Group identified violations of the sanctions regime by the Forces nouvelles that were committed in 2011, consisting of the above-mentioned acquisition of 300 tons of weapons and related materiel. Côte d'Ivoire has not entirely complied with the provisions of the arms embargo, namely regarding the import of night-vision equipment in 2015. Nevertheless, the sanctions regime has been successful in preventing the acquisition of major weapon systems, including military aviation assets.

The Group welcomes the progress achieved in deploying the customs administration, but notes the limited progress made in re-establishing normal border control operations at the land borders. Major reform and rehabilitation programmes need to be effectively undertaken. Côte d'Ivoire continues to rely heavily on its armed forces for border control operations.

The western border with Liberia and Guinea remains affected by illegal cross-border movements of natural resources and persons.

Diamond smuggling from Côte d'Ivoire continues unabated. Illegal artisanal and small-scale gold mining persists, notwithstanding the closure, *manu militari*, of several sites by the authorities. The smuggling of cocoa and coffee has cost the Treasury CFAF 106 billion (\$182 million) over the past three years. The Ministry of Petroleum and Energy has still not undertaken reforms in the oil sector. Côte d'Ivoire, nevertheless, has successfully curbed the smuggling of cashew nuts and cotton to Burkina Faso and Ghana.

Efforts by the Government to implement the asset freeze and the travel ban are negligible. Banks in Côte d'Ivoire applied the freeze only in January 2013, even though three of the designated individuals were designated as long ago as February 2006. Consequently, those individuals could freely draw upon the funds in their accounts until then. A study of the transactions in accounts held by Lt. Col. Martin Kouakou Fofié showed the movement of \$3 million, mainly in cash, indicative of his many revenue-yielding activities.

Contents

	<i>Page</i>
I. Introduction	7
II. Investigation methodology	9
III. Compliance with requests for information	9
IV. Sanctions-related regional issues	9
V. Cooperation with stakeholders	11
A. Other groups and panels	11
B. Ivorian authorities	11
C. United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire	11
VI. Arms	11
A. Materiel of Sudanese production	13
B. Materiel with characteristics similar to Chinese production	14
C. Materiel located at the premises of the close protection unit for the President of the National Assembly in Abidjan	15
D. VZ58 assault rifles and ammunition with characteristics similar to former Czechoslovakian production	15
E. Materiel with characteristics similar to Iranian production	15
F. AIM assault rifles with characteristics similar to Romanian production	16
G. Materiel not observed or recorded in Côte d'Ivoire	16
H. Materiel supplied through the territory of Burkina Faso	16
I. Weapon management in Côte d'Ivoire	17
J. Transfers of materiel brought into the country in violation of the embargo	18
K. Security risk of the storage of materiel at the cantonments of the fourth infantry battalion in Korhogo	19
L. Destruction of arms with erased serial numbers	19
VII. Customs and transport	19
A. Border measures and controls	19
B. Redeployment of the customs administration	20
C. Implementation of the arms embargo	25
VIII. Diamonds and natural resources	27
A. Diamonds	27
B. Gold	30
C. Cocoa and coffee	34

D.	Cashew nuts and cotton	36
E.	Oil	37
IX.	Finance: illegal checkpoints	37
X.	Targeted sanctions measures	38
A.	Asset freeze	38
B.	Travel ban	43
C.	Implementation of the asset freeze and travel ban	43
XI.	Recommendations	44
A.	General	44
B.	Arms	44
C.	Customs and transport	44
D.	Diamonds and natural resources	45
E.	Finance	46
F.	Targeted sanctions measures	46

Annexes*

* The annexes are being circulated in the language of submission only and without formal editing.

I. Introduction

1. In a letter addressed to the President of the Security Council dated 29 May 2015 (S/2015/399), the Secretary-General announced the appointment of five members of the Group of Experts on Côte d'Ivoire as follows: Roman Brühwiler (Switzerland, customs/transport), Raymond Debelle (Belgium, arms), Lipika Majumdar Roy Choudhury (India, finance), Roberto Sollazzo (Italy, diamonds/natural resources) and Manuel Vázquez-Boidard (Spain, regional issues). He also designated Mr. Vázquez-Boidard to serve as the Coordinator of the Group.

2. The Group of Experts began its work in the field on 14 June 2015. Its activities included meetings with Member States, international and regional organizations and the Ivorian authorities with a view to obtaining information relevant to its investigations. The Group visited Angola, Belgium, Bulgaria, France, the Netherlands and the United States of America, in addition to conducting field visits throughout Côte d'Ivoire. A list of the meetings and consultations held by the Group is provided in annex 1.

3. The Group underlines the significant progress achieved by Côte d'Ivoire with regard to the overall stabilization of the country since the end of the post-electoral crisis of 2010-2011. The policies implemented by the Administration of Alassane Ouattara have contributed to the restoration of the country's economic dynamism and regional leadership and to appeasing the Ivorian political environment. Nevertheless, the current peaceful context is also attributable to the fact that Ivorian stakeholders do not perceive the use of violence as politically advantageous.

4. Since the establishment of the sanctions regime, the Group has documented violations by the parties to the conflict, including the import of large quantities of weapons and related materiel and the provision of training and technical assistance. Nevertheless, the Group emphasizes that the sanctions regime, in particular the arms embargo, has been successful in preventing the acquisition of heavy weapon systems that could have led to the security situation in the country worsening dangerously.

5. Since March 2015, the Group's findings in relation to weapons at the cantonments of the fourth infantry battalion in Korhogo, the former military training school in Bouaké and the premises of the close protection unit for the President of the National Assembly in Abidjan demonstrate the lack of full control by the State authorities of considerable quantities of arms and related materiel. The Group estimates that additional quantities of such materiel remain under the control of military structures that do not necessarily fall within the official chain of command within the military.

6. Although the authorities have initiated measures to limit the military and financial power of the former zone commanders, their implementation remains slow and of limited effectiveness.¹ Although most of the former zone commanders have been integrated into the military, they continue to have independent political and financial influence. Consequently, the *modus operandi*² adopted when the Forces

¹ At the time of writing, Lt. Col. Martin Kouakou Fofié had not accepted his reassignment from Korhogo to Daloa.

² See S/2014/266, para. 63. This included a parallel taxation system, also encompassing all business activities and direct participation in the profits obtained from the smuggling of natural resources and the sale of agricultural products.

nouvelles controlled the north of the country has now been extended nationwide. Former zone commanders remain pivotal to the security apparatus, given that they control the military units posted at the borders (battalions for the security of the east, west and south-west regions and the fourth infantry battalion), the Republican Guard and the close protection unit for the President. Furthermore, they continue to control large sectors of the economy (see S/2014/266, para. 62) and maintain access to private assets, financial resources and weapons and related materiel.

7. The conclusion, on 30 June 2015, of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process is a notable achievement in the stabilization process in Côte d'Ivoire. The opinions previously expressed by the Group on the process (see S/2013/228, para. 5; S/2013/605, para. 6; S/2014/729, paras. 29 and 31; and S/2015/252, paras. 63, 68, 71, 72 and 75), however, remain valid: the process was only partially successful, given that large quantities of weapons and materiel remain outside the full control of the State authorities and at least 16,500 ex-combatants still need to be reintegrated.

8. The Group highlights significant progress in the security sector reform process. On 4 January 2016, the National Assembly adopted a military planning law for 2016-2020³ and an interior security forces planning law. The security sector reform process has to date allowed the authorities to justify the creation and equipping of several special operations units.⁴ The main problems of cohesion and effectiveness inside the military continue, however.

9. The presidential elections of 2015, notwithstanding a lower turnout than in 2010,⁵ reflected the progress achieved in national reconciliation. They were not tainted by any major episode of violence and also saw the participation of the opposition, spearheaded by Pascal Affi N'Guessan⁶ (Alliance des forces démocratiques de Côte d'Ivoire).

10. Before the elections, on 8 July 2015 the Ivorian Special Investigation Unit conducted hearings of two former zone commanders, Chérif Ousmane and Losseni Fofana (also known as "Loss"), with regard to offences relating to human rights violations committed during the post-electoral crisis of 2010-2011. Progress in efforts to combat impunity has since been marginal. The trials of Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Blé Goudé before the International Criminal Court began on 8 January 2016. In contrast, the efforts of the Ivorian authorities to bring to justice supporters of Mr. Ouattara who allegedly committed human rights violations in 2011 remain in abeyance. This means that the perception of "victor's justice" in Côte d'Ivoire is reinforced.

³ The law is aimed at modernizing the military and the gendarmerie: the total budget allocated for the period 2016-2020 is CFAF 2,254 billion (\$3.8 billion). The amount of CFAF 800 billion (\$1.3 billion) has been allocated for the purchase and/or modernization of materiel.

⁴ Such as the Operational Decisions Coordination Centre, the close protection unit for the President, the Republican Guard, the special forces and the battalions for the security of the east, west and south-west regions.

⁵ The turnout was 52.86 per cent, compared with 83.7 per cent in the first round of the presidential elections of 2010 and 81.1 per cent in the second round.

⁶ Pascal Affi N'Guessan, the former Prime Minister in the Gbagbo Administration, was delisted on 26 February 2015. He participated in the elections and won 9.29 per cent of the votes.

II. Investigation methodology

11. The Group's investigation methodology complies with the standards recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions in its report of December 2006 (S/2006/997). Those standards call for reliance on verified, genuine documents, concrete evidence and on-site observations by experts, including photographs wherever possible. When physical inspection was not possible, the Group corroborated information using multiple independent sources to appropriately meet the highest achievable standard, placing a higher value on statements by principal actors and first-hand witness accounts.

12. While it intends to be as transparent as possible, in situations in which identifying sources would expose them or others to unacceptable safety risks, the Group does not identify them and places the relevant evidence in United Nations archives.

13. The Group is committed to the highest degree of fairness. It therefore endeavours to make available to parties, where appropriate and possible, any information in the report for which they may be cited, for their review, comment and response within a specified deadline.

III. Compliance with requests for information

14. During its mandate, the Group addressed 153 official communications to Member States, international organizations and private entities and individuals. The Group will present the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1572 (2004) with the full list of parties that have provided satisfactory responses, incomplete responses or no responses at all to its requests by the end of its mandate.

IV. Sanctions-related regional issues

15. The Group notes the continued cooperation between the Ghanaian and Ivorian authorities with regard to the activities of the pro-Gbagbo radical wing⁷ operating from Ghana. The Group notes that the wing's military capacity in Côte d'Ivoire has considerably diminished.

16. The Group underlines that, while the improved security situation in Côte d'Ivoire has had a positive impact throughout the region, the structures and military capacity (in terms of combatants and weapons and related materiel) of mercenaries in Liberia can be appraised as dormant and ready to be activated. As suggested in the past by the Group and the Panel of Experts on Liberia, the activities of Liberian mercenaries are closely linked with internal political dynamics in Côte d'Ivoire.

17. The security situation between Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire has generally improved since 2011, leading to a steady return of Ivorian refugees from Liberia.

⁷ See S/2012/766, para. 28, and S/2013/228, paras. 24-39. The pro-Gbagbo radical wing is a political and military structure that receives financial support from former representatives of the Gbagbo regime and whose objective is to bring about a change of government through violent acts in order to regain the power and influence lost after April 2011.

Nevertheless, the attack on 2 December 2015 on the Ivorian security forces (including a detachment of the special forces) in Olodio, in which seven soldiers and four assailants were killed, has raised concern. The attack, carried out by 15 assailants (Ivorian militiamen and Liberian mercenaries) trained in Liberia (on Kity island, located between Tiboto and Soklodogba), shows that the security situation, although improving, remains fragile.

18. During its mandate, the Group also determined that weapons and related materiel had been transferred from Côte d'Ivoire to Ghana and Mali.

19. On 15 December 2015, the Ghanaian police seized 20 weapons, including a 7.62x51mm machine gun, in Kumasi (see annex 2). The Group identified two weapons previously documented in Man and Daloa, which the Ivorian military had marked for destruction⁸ (see annex 3).

20. The Group notes that some of the ammunition used during the attacks on the Malian towns of Misséni and Fakola⁹ had previously been found in Côte d'Ivoire (see annex 4a). The individuals involved in the attacks transited through Ivorian territory when moving between the locations of the attacks. On 12 November 2015, the Ivorian military found nine weapons that it considered to be linked to the aforementioned attacks near Tengréla, among which the Group identified a VZ58 assault rifle marked for destruction¹⁰ by the military (see annex 4b). Although the weapons were located in Côte d'Ivoire, they were used in the attacks in Mali, thus illustrating the challenges posed by the circulation of weapons and ammunition across borders (see [S/2013/228](#), paras. 63 and 66).

21. On 27 January 2016, the Ivorian customs authorities seized, in Ferkessédougou, two 12-gauge shotguns and two packages of ammunition: 7.65mm (for pistols) and 22LR (for pistols or carbines). The materiel was concealed in a vehicle travelling from Bobo-Dioulasso, Burkina Faso, to Abidjan. The Group established that the shotguns had been produced by Khan Arms (Turkey) and legally exported on 27 November 2014 by Kayhan Shotguns Industry (Turkey) to Signal Distribution SARL, a company located in Ouagadougou, for delivery to the Presidency of Burkina Faso (see annex 5).

22. The terrorist attacks in Ouagadougou on 15 January 2016 had a destabilizing effect on Burkina Faso and also an important political impact on Côte d'Ivoire, given that terrorism is now coming to be recognized as an emerging threat to peace in the region. The Group remains concerned that weapons and related materiel stockpiled in northern Côte d'Ivoire, which are not under the full control of the State authorities, could be diverted to the benefit of illegal armed groups.

23. Lastly, the relationship between Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire was affected by the broadcasting of a recorded conversation between the President of the

⁸ The weapon marked CI FT9 AD291 was marked on 26 June 2014 in Man and part of the arsenal of the battalion for the security of the west region; the weapon marked CI FT5 AD34 was marked on 20 May 2013 in Daloa and part of the arsenal of the second infantry battalion. The United Nations Mine Action Service is responsible for the disposal of such materiel.

⁹ The towns, near the border with Côte d'Ivoire, were attacked on 9 and 10 June 2015, respectively, by individuals claiming to belong to the terrorist group Ansar Eddine.

¹⁰ The weapon was marked CI FT1 AD93 (the original marking had been mechanically erased), thus indicating that it belonged to the first commando parachutist battalion (Abobo, Abidjan) and was set for destruction.

National Assembly of Côte d'Ivoire and former Secretary-General of the Forces nouvelles, Guillaume Kigbafori Soro, and the former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Burkina Faso, Djibril Yipènè Bassolé. In the recording, Mr. Soro contemplates the assassination of political opponents, armed attacks and the transfer of funds to support a military coup in Burkina Faso.

24. Investigations carried out by the Group, as reflected herein, show the territory of Burkina Faso as being the origin of transfers of weapons intended for the Forces nouvelles into Côte d'Ivoire from April to May 2011 (see sect. VI).

V. Cooperation with stakeholders

25. In the present section, the Group describes its cooperation with various stakeholders.

A. Other groups and panels

26. In pursuance of paragraph 20 of Security Council resolution 2219 (2015), the Group maintained a strong working relationship with the Panel of Experts on Liberia, especially in terms of regularly exchanging information.

27. The Group also cooperated and exchanged information and views with the Panel of Experts on the Sudan, the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic.

B. Ivorian authorities

28. Although the Group maintained good cooperation with the Government of Côte d'Ivoire throughout its mandate, it is concerned about the lack of responses to some of its official requests for information.

C. United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire

29. The Group expresses its appreciation for the valuable support provided by the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) during its mandate. The Operation continued to make available offices, transport and administrative support. Its Integrated Embargo Monitoring Unit provided logistical and administrative support to the Group and shared quantitative information relating to the embargo, in particular data concerning ammunition and materiel that entered Côte d'Ivoire in violation of the sanctions regime.

VI. Arms

30. Continuing investigations indicate that the Forces nouvelles took advantage of the post-electoral crisis of 2010-2011 to increase their stocks of arms and materiel, both materiel seized from the former Ivorian defence and security forces during military operations in 2010-2011 and materiel acquired from other sources.

31. The above-mentioned arsenal includes materiel brought into Côte d'Ivoire in violation of the sanctions regime that is not yet under the full control of the military.¹¹

32. The Group documented the acquisition of relevant quantities of weapons and ammunition, estimated at 300 tons,¹² by the Forces nouvelles in the aftermath of the post-electoral crisis. Guillaume Soro directly handled the acquisition of the materiel, its shipment to Bouaké and Korhogo and its distribution among members of the Forces nouvelles.

33. In Bouaké, the materiel was in the custody of the close protection unit for the Prime Minister. In Korhogo, it was stored under the custody of Fansara 110,¹³ the unit commanded by Lt. Col. Martin Kouakou Fofié, a former zone commander under United Nations sanctions since 2006. The materiel had characteristics similar to the productions of Albania, Bulgaria and the Sudan.

34. The Group cross-verified the characteristics of the weapons and ammunition, the method of packaging, the markings and the serial numbers (where available) with records of imports to neighbouring States available in the public domain or that the Group could obtain from States, companies and confidential sources.

35. Between April and August 2011, Burkina Faso imported large quantities of materiel from Albania and Bulgaria, at a total cost of \$3.5 million. In Korhogo, the Group observed Albanian¹⁴ and Bulgarian materiel (see annexes 6 and 7, respectively) corresponding to the quantity delivered to Burkina Faso. Furthermore, the serial and lot numbers of that materiel are identical to those of the materiel delivered by Bulgaria to Burkina Faso.¹⁵ The Group thus considers that the materiel entered Côte d'Ivoire in violation of the embargo.

36. The then head of the Presidential Guard of Burkina Faso, Gen. Gilbert Diendéré, selected two companies, Dignia Systems Ltd. and Pointec Corporation,¹⁶ based in Israel and Nigeria, respectively, to procure the materiel.

¹¹ The current Ivorian armed forces are the result of the integration of the Forces nouvelles and the former Ivorian defence and security forces under a unified command in 2012.

¹² The Group estimates this quantity to be 30 per cent of the total materiel currently in the possession of the military.

¹³ The elements of Fansara 110 have, since 2012, been integrated into the fourth infantry battalion in Korhogo.

¹⁴ In 2011, the Albanian authorities reflected in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms two transfers of weapons and ammunition to Burkina Faso. The first transfer consisted of fifteen 82mm mortars and twelve 120mm mortars, while the second consisted of twenty-four 60mm mortars and 300 rounds of PG-7 ammunition. The Group confirmed the legal sale and shipment by air of the materiel to Burkina Faso.

¹⁵ The Bulgarian authorities showed the Group an authorization from the Economic Community of West African States to transfer arms to Burkina Faso, dated 30 June 2011, which included, but was not limited to, the quantities at issue. A comparison between the materiel listed on the authorization and that documented by the Group can be found in annex 8.

¹⁶ No record of this company exists in the public domain and the Group is awaiting the necessary information from the Government of Nigeria about it.

A. Materiel of Sudanese production

37. During its inspections at the cantonments of the fourth infantry battalion in Korhogo¹⁷ and other military units in Côte d'Ivoire, the Group identified materiel of Sudanese production (see table 1 and annex 9).

Table 1
Materiel of Sudanese production identified in Korhogo

<i>Weapon</i>	<i>Annex containing further information</i>
7.62x54Rmm machine gun	9a
12.7x108mm heavy machine gun	9b
RPG-7 grenade launchers	9c
AGL07-35 automatic grenade launchers	9d
Mortars (60, 82 and 120mm)	9e, 9f and 9g
107mm multiple rocket launchers	9h

38. Most of the heavy weapons had intact markings and serial numbers, while the markings on the small arms had been mechanically removed (although the Group recovered them with the help of a forensic laboratory). The Group noted the obliteration of packing crates, serial numbers and/or factory identification markings on weapons and the absence of head stamps on some ammunition (see annex 12). The Group is of the opinion that the serial numbers and factory identification markings were removed with the intention of hampering any identification of the origin and the supplier. All the materiel had markings consistent with those used by the Military Industry Corporation of the Sudan, showing that it had been manufactured and/or quality-controlled between 2007 and March 2011. The Group thus considers that the above-mentioned materiel entered Côte d'Ivoire in violation of the embargo.

¹⁷ Since 2011, neither the Group nor UNOCI had been allowed to fully inspect the cantonments in Korhogo. However, after insisting repeatedly, the Group was granted access and conducted a thorough inspection. The inspection revealed an estimated 160 tons of light and heavy weapons and related ammunition (see annex 10). The Group also documented materiel that formed part of the arsenal of the former Ivorian defence and security forces. That materiel (see annex 11) was recovered by the Forces nouvelles and transferred to the north of the country in the aftermath of the post-electoral crisis of 2010-2011 (see [S/2014/729](#), paras. 59-75).

B. Materiel with characteristics similar to Chinese production

39. The Group documented large quantities of weapons and ammunition with characteristics similar to Chinese production.¹⁸ The Group has no information suggesting that China may have sold such arms and ammunition directly to Côte d'Ivoire in violation of the sanctions regime. In addition, the Ivorian military arms register lists 2,183 type 56 and type 56-2 assault rifles (see annexes 13a and 13b) with serial numbers and factory markings erased. The Group noted, however, that on several weapons a logo similar to that of State Factory 66, a Chinese factory, remained readable.

40. At the cantonments of the fourth infantry battalion in Korhogo and at other Ivorian military facilities, the Group documented assault rifles with characteristics similar to type 56, type 56-1 and type 56-2 assault rifles.

41. The Group has also documented assault rifles with characteristics similar to type 56-1 assault rifles bearing a serial number beginning with "48", but with the factory markings removed (see annex 13d). The Group recovered the markings with the help of a specialized forensic laboratory, which showed that they all bore the digits "313", similar to production of State Factory 313 in China (see *ibid.*). During an inspection at the premises of the close protection unit for the President of the National Assembly in Abidjan in February 2016, the Group found 20 assault rifles with similar characteristics to type 56-1 assault rifles, in their original packaging, that also bore serial numbers beginning with "48".

42. At the premises of the Republican Guard in Yamoussoukro, the Group observed 100,000 rounds of 7.62x54Rmm ammunition (see annex 13e) and 166,050 rounds of 12.7x108mm ammunition (see annex 13g), bearing a head stamp with characteristics similar to Chinese production of 2010, but with packaging markings used in the Sudan. The Group has written to the Sudan in order to advance its investigations on the matter.

43. To determine how materiel with characteristics similar to Chinese production entered the territory of Côte d'Ivoire, the Group wrote to China to request information on the materiel documented above. The Group is awaiting additional information from China and will continue its investigations in order to determine how weapons were diverted to Côte d'Ivoire.

¹⁸ The assault rifles documented present features and characteristics identical to type 56, type 56-1 and type 56-2 models, such as the markings "56-1" engraved on the left side of the weapon. In the same position, markings suggesting production at Chinese State Factory 313 and State Factory 66 were also present. The fire selector also bears markings consistent with Chinese-manufactured assault rifles ("L"/"D"). The letter "D" and the scale numbered from 1 to 8 on the rear sight are also consistent with Chinese manufacture. The ammunition documented presents manufacturer codes in the head stamp consistent with those used by the Chinese military industry ("945" and "41"). Ammunition (7.62x54Rmm and 12.7x108mm) was observed in crates marked with contract numbers including "XSD", the abbreviation used by Xinshidai Company. Packaging units (tin crates for 7.62x54Rmm and 14.5x114mm ammunition) appear to be identical to those used by the Chinese military industry (including when compared with older lots with crates marked with Chinese characters).

C. Materiel located at the premises of the close protection unit for the President of the National Assembly in Abidjan

44. The close protection unit for the President of the National Assembly is officially equipped with 225 weapons. Some had had serial numbers or factory markings mechanically erased and others were not part of the arsenal of the former Ivorian defence and security forces before the imposition of the embargo in 2004 (see annex 14). The Group is of the view that the serial numbers and/or factory markings are deliberately removed in order to prevent any attempt to determine their origin and supply source in the event of a violation/contravention involving the arms (see [S/2013/228](#), paras. 70-75). The Group is investigating further.

D. VZ58 assault rifles and ammunition with characteristics similar to former Czechoslovakian production

45. The Group documented 336 VZ58 assault rifles manufactured in the former Czechoslovakia (see annex 15). The weapons were not part of the arsenal of the former Ivorian defence and security forces, but were observed in the possession of Forces nouvelles elements in 2011. Most had had their serial numbers mechanically removed. The Group is of the view that the serial numbers and/or factory markings are deliberately removed in order to prevent any attempt to determine their origin and supply source in the event of a violation/contravention involving the arms.

46. During inspections in Abidjan, the Group found two crates for VZ58 assault rifles, both labelled with stickers showing that the materiel was delivered by Petina International A.S. (based in Bratislava) to the Ministry of Security of Burkina Faso. The Group also documented 4,000 rounds of 7.62x39mm ammunition in crates labelled with similar stickers (see annex 15b). The Group is investigating further.

E. Materiel with characteristics similar to Iranian production

47. The Group identified 79 RPG-7 rocket launchers manufactured in the Islamic Republic of Iran (see annex 16), together with PG-7 rockets and 7.62x54Rmm and 12.7x108mm ammunition (see annexes 16d and 16e). Most of the rockets bore serial numbers in the same series, which could indicate that they were part of the same delivery.

48. The ammunition was stored with other rounds manufactured in the Sudan; the 12.7x108mm ammunition was even packaged in black polyethylene bags, a method normally used by the Military Industry Corporation of the Sudan. The materiel, which was not previously observed in the arsenal of the former Ivorian defence and security forces, was identified as being used by Forces nouvelles elements in April 2011. The Group requested the Iranian authorities to confirm, or otherwise, the production and export of the weapons, but has received no response. The Group is investigating further.

F. AIM assault rifles with characteristics similar to Romanian production

49. In the Ivorian military arms register, the Group found that 364 7.62x39mm AIM assault rifles (see annex 17) with characteristics similar to Romanian production were part of the stockpiles of the first commando parachutist battalion and the special forces (both based in Abidjan). The weapons were produced in 2005 and 2008, after the imposition of the arms embargo, and there is no record of a legal transfer to Côte d'Ivoire. The Group thus concluded that the materiel had entered the country in violation of the embargo.

G. Materiel not observed or recorded in Côte d'Ivoire

50. The Group noted substantial differences between the materiel of Sudanese origin identified during inspections in Côte d'Ivoire and the materiel reflected in the Economic Community of West African States authorization to transfer arms to Burkina Faso dated 30 June 2011 (see above). Given that its formal requests to Burkina Faso and the Sudan regarding the status of the materiel remain unanswered, the Group is unsure whether the variation in quantities can be attributed to non-delivery of the materiel or to its storage in undisclosed or unknown locations in Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire or the region.

51. Large quantities of arms and ammunition seized by the Forces nouvelles during the post-electoral crisis (see [S/2013/228](#), para. 75) were stored in the Ferkessédougou area. The Group is investigating further.

52. The Group considers that the presence in Côte d'Ivoire of undeclared stocks of arms and materiel is a potential threat to the peace process and poses the attendant risk of illicit trade in and diversion of the arms and ammunition to unintended users, especially in the subregion.¹⁹

H. Materiel supplied through the territory of Burkina Faso

53. The territory of Burkina Faso was a source of supply during the post-electoral crisis and in the following months, being home to arms, ammunition, related materiel and even instructors (see table 2).

¹⁹ The Group identified the transfer of weapons and ammunition from Korhogo to Boko Haram in its previous final report ([S/2015/252](#), paras. 115-116).

Table 2
Materiel or activity recorded by the Group in Burkina Faso

<i>Report of the Group</i>	<i>Paragraph(s)</i>	<i>Materiel or activity</i>
S/2014/266	47	Propelled grenades and small calibre ammunition, likely of Romanian origin
S/2013/605	30-32	Condor grenade launchers — AM600 (37/38mm, non-lethal) and AM640 (40mm, lethal and non-lethal) — and associated ammunition
S/2013/228	70-72	Convoy of weapons and ammunition
S/2013/228	73	Delivery to the Forces nouvelles of support weapons: ZPU1, ZPU2, ZPU4 (14.5mm heavy machine guns) and related trainers
S/2013/228	74	Delivery of ammunition: F-1 hand grenades, bombs for 60mm and 82mm mortars, RPG-7, 14.5mm
S/2013/228	76	Training in 2010 of Forces nouvelles elements at the commando training centre located in Pô
S/2012/766	24-26	7.62x39mm ammunition, Romanian origin
S/2012/196	37	7.62x39mm ammunition, Romanian origin
S/2011/272	107-112	Transfer of weapons and ammunition
S/2011/271	101-110	9mm ammunition, Serbian origin
S/2010/179	36	Failure by the authorities of Burkina Faso to follow up with investigations, as requested by the Group
S/2009/521	103	12-calibre hunting cartridges
S/2009/521	145-151	Transfer of weapons and ammunition
S/2009/521	157	Uniforms produced by Marck (France)
S/2006/964	18	Follow-up on end-user certificate and IVH Trading Ltd.
S/2006/735	30-34	End-user certificate and IVH Trading Ltd.

I. Weapon management in Côte d'Ivoire

54. The Group notes that most of the arms inspected in the cantonments in Abidjan, Korhogo and Yamoussoukro, including those whose serial numbers had been mechanically erased, are recorded in the military arms register and bear the seal of the Economic Community of West African States and a registration number.

55. The registration was carried out in accordance with the rules of the National Commission on the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons. The arms have been marked for destruction, which demonstrates the willingness of Côte d'Ivoire to fully comply with the provisions of Security Council resolution 2219 (2015).

56. The Chief of Staff of the armed forces informed the Group that, as at 7 January 2016, a stocktaking and marking of arms had determined that 16,371 weapons had been allocated to army units. An Ivorian official indicated that 30 per cent of the military's weaponry consisted of arms marked for destruction, mainly owing to the absence of serial numbers. The Group is of the view that the serial numbers and/or factory markings are deliberately removed in order to prevent any attempt to determine their origin and supply source in the event of a violation/contravention involving the arms.

57. Notwithstanding the directives of the military headquarters (see annex 18), most former zone commanders, while allowing the arms to be marked, retain control of their own arsenals. Not having been deposited in State armouries, those arms are not under State control. While the military arms register listed 2,371 weapons in the inventory of the Republican Guard as at January 2016, the Group has observed that that unit is in physical possession of only 809 weapons. The 1,562 missing weapons constitute some 10 per cent of the total military arsenal.

58. The missing arms are in the possession of Lt. Col. Issiaka Ouattara (also known as "Wattao")²⁰ and his brother, Mourou Ouattara (also known as "Commando Atchengue"). Among them are eleven 7.62x54Rmm or 7.62x51mm machine guns, eight RPG-7 rocket launchers and three SVD-1 Dragunov sniper rifles. The Group has ascertained some of the registration numbers of the missing weapons.

J. Transfers of materiel brought into the country in violation of the embargo

59. Under paragraph 22 of Security Council resolution 2219 (2015), all arms identified as having entered Côte d'Ivoire in violation of the embargo are to be collected by UNOCI and disposed of as appropriate. This would apply to the materiel inspected at the cantonments of the fourth infantry battalion in Korhogo.

60. The above requirement notwithstanding, the military headquarters ordered three transfers of weapons and related materiel from the battalion in 2015.

61. On 4 February 2015, the military headquarters ordered the transfer to Abidjan of 800 AR-M1F assault rifles, 14 MG-1MS machine guns, 24 60mm mortars and 10 RPG-7 rocket launchers (see annex 19).

62. On 14 April 2015, the military headquarters ordered the transfer to Abidjan, for destruction (see annex 20), of 200 AR-M1F assault rifles (inspected by the Group in March 2015). The serial numbers of the weapons had been mechanically removed. The Group determined that the weapons had not been destroyed and that 120 of them had been redistributed to units deployed for operations in the north, on the border with Mali and Burkina Faso. The other 80 had been distributed to units in Abidjan.

²⁰ The existence of Wattao's parallel stock was recorded by the Group in its midterm report for 2014 (S/2014/729, para. 33).

63. On 6 July 2015, the military headquarters ordered the transfer of ammunition²¹ to units deployed for operations on the border with Mali and Burkina Faso (see annex 21).

64. The military has recorded the presence in Bouaké of 140 tons of materiel, mostly similar to the Sudanese materiel described above and thus likewise brought into Côte d'Ivoire in violation of the embargo. In late 2014, the military ordered the redistribution of the materiel, stored under the custody of the close protection unit for the Prime Minister (see annex 22), subsequently disbanded, to other units.²² The Group points out that, under paragraph 22 of Security Council resolution 2219 (2015), UNOCI, within the monitoring of the arms embargo, is mandated to collect, as appropriate, arms and any related materiel brought into Côte d'Ivoire in violation of the embargo and to dispose of such arms and related materiel as appropriate.

K. Security risk of the storage of materiel at the cantonments of the fourth infantry battalion in Korhogo

65. The Group notes that the storage of ammunition at the cantonments of the fourth infantry battalion in Korhogo poses a risk to the security of the soldiers there and the civilians living nearby. The military authorities informed the Group that they were planning to move the above-mentioned materiel to the Bouaké airbase depot, subject to the completion of its refurbishment, planned for March 2016.

L. Destruction of arms with erased serial numbers

66. Several thousand weapons with erased serial numbers have been marked for destruction by the military. The Ministry of Defence and the Chief of Staff of the armed forces informed the Group that they would be destroyed as soon as new weapons had been acquired.

VII. Customs and transport

67. Pursuant to paragraphs 33 and 34 of Security Council resolution 2219 (2015), the Group assessed the redeployment of the customs and border police and the re-establishment of normal customs and border control operations. Pursuant to paragraphs 1 to 10 of the resolution, the Group investigated potential violations of the sanctions regime at ports of entry.

A. Border measures and controls

68. The Group conducted field visits to locations at the borders with Burkina Faso, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia and Mali (see annexes 23 and 24) in order to update its

²¹ It ordered the transfer of 40 crates of 7.62x39mm ammunition, 30 crates of PG-7 rockets, 30 crates of 82mm mortar bombs, 10 crates of 60mm mortar bombs and 20 crates of 12.7mm ammunition.

²² The Group documented some of the arms of Sudanese origin in various units, such as the Republican Guard cantonments in Abidjan and Yamoussoukro, and the battalion for the security of the western region.

assessment of the border measures and controls and the redeployment of the customs administration. To that end, the Group held meetings with the authorities and regional and international actors.

69. The Group notes that progress has been made compared with the situation stated in its previous final report (S/2015/252, paras. 118-151). Such progress, however, remains limited in the absence of a holistic approach. Major reform and rehabilitation programmes still need to be effectively undertaken in order to increase the monitoring capacity of the customs administration and the border police at the land borders. Côte d'Ivoire continues to rely heavily on its armed forces for border control operations.

B. Redeployment of the customs administration

70. The Group observed that 29 of the 30 customs offices located at land borders were operational. Six customs offices (Niablé, Noé, Ouangolodougou, Pogo, Sipilou and Takikro), which have the necessary equipment and infrastructure, are authorized to clear goods. The activity of the remaining 23 offices thus remains limited to surveillance tasks. In this regard, the situation has not changed since the previous mandate. The Group thus reiterates its view (see S/2015/252, para. 124) that the existence of an insufficient number of customs offices authorized to clear goods encourages informal cross-border traffic, thereby complicating efficient border control. The Group, whenever it visited the borders, observed and/or obtained reports of informal cross-border trade activities, even though the borders were officially closed for such movements. It is clear that this represents a risk of trafficking of natural resources and arms in violation of the sanctions regime, given that cargo is, in general, not subject to inspection. It further has the consequence of distorting trade statistics relevant for a fair assessment of infrastructure and equipment requirements, which are based on volumes of trade.

71. Only the customs office in Noé, on the border with Ghana, has been completely rehabilitated, with work at the remaining 29 offices at various stages, from almost completed to yet to begin (see annex 25). In that context, the Group welcomes plans by the customs administration to relocate the offices that are currently situated several kilometres within the country's boundaries to the borders themselves. As the Group has previously pointed out (see S/2015/252, para. 125), to prevent individuals from circumventing customs checks, numerous legal and illegal checkpoints are established between the customs offices and the border. The resulting losses in terms of time and money stemming from the controls and systematic racketeering at the checkpoints discourage individuals from using the official crossings, thereby complicating efficient border monitoring.

72. The Group reported on the situation of customs premises occupied by other forces in its previous report. It observed improvements during its current mandate. The customs administration has returned to 10 of its premises at the borders with Burkina Faso, Ghana and Mali,²³ while 8 remain occupied by other forces, especially in the west. The Group welcomes that positive step in the redeployment of the customs administration because it increases the monitoring capacity in border

²³ Customs officers have been deployed in Ngandana, Nigouni, Tengréla and Varalé, which were previously unmanned.

regions that it identified as representing a high risk of informal cross-border traffic and, in particular, illegal trafficking of natural resources and arms (see [S/2015/252](#), para. 127). Nevertheless, the Group considers that the overall monitoring capacity of the customs administration remains limited because the officers continue to lack adequate equipment and training to monitor the borders efficiently.

Borders with Guinea and Liberia

73. To date, the borders with Guinea and Liberia remain closed as a result of the outbreak of Ebola virus disease in the region. Exceptions are made in cases of humanitarian exigency, such as the repatriation of refugees. One economic operator in Liberia is also authorized by the Ivorian authorities to move goods to the port of San Pedro through the customs office in Prollo. The Group also noted that cross-border cooperation in the framework of the Mano River Union, in particular the joint border security and confidence-building units, had stalled since the closure of the borders.

74. In general, the customs premises in the region are in disrepair, although, with support from UNOCI, some rehabilitation work has been initiated at the office in Péhé Kanhouébli (near Toulépleu) and Prollo. The Group notes that five of the eight offices at the Liberian border are occupied by the Ivorian military, even though there are military barracks, built following the recurring cross-border attacks in the region, available.

75. The Group observed and obtained reports confirming cross-border movements of goods (including natural resources) and persons in the region, even though the borders are officially closed. In addition, the Group observed that the military elements present at the borders reported to Losseni Fofana, whose name has figured in previous reports as a result of his involvement in the illicit exploitation of cocoa in the region.

76. The Group is thus concerned that the border areas represent a risk of informal cross-border traffic in general and illicit trafficking of natural resources and arms in particular. The authorities also expressed concern regarding illicit trafficking of natural resources, in particular cocoa and coffee, in the region. They have recently established a special squad to tackle the problem.

Border management

77. The Group notes that the situation at the borders remains as it indicated in its previous final report ([S/2015/252](#), para. 132). All the security forces and agencies, i.e. the military, the water and forestry authority, the gendarmerie, the police and the customs administration, are present, although only the last-mentioned and the border police are in the main concerned with the movement of goods and persons across the Ivorian borders. The forces and agencies operate individual checkpoints to inspect travellers and vehicles at short distances from one another, complementing the customs offices, which are generally situated several kilometres inside the country. The Group remains concerned because travellers and vehicles are systematically subjected to racketeering at the checkpoints. If travellers pay the illicit taxes demanded, they are almost always granted passage with little or no inspection. It is clear that such behaviour represents a risk of illicit cross-border movements of goods and persons, not to mention violations of the sanctions regime.

78. The Group notes the efforts by the Ivorian authorities to avoid overlapping remits in the framework of weekly meetings among the local authorities, the security forces and agencies and representatives of civil society in order to exchange information on the security situation and coordinate activities. Nevertheless, this remains a challenge. For example, the Group continues to observe the involvement of military elements in the checking of vehicles, freight and identification documents, even though their official role is solely to support the other forces and agencies by providing security, given that the military is the only force adequately equipped to do so.

79. The Group maintains that Côte d'Ivoire could significantly increase efficiency and transparency and reduce instances of racketeering by developing a border management strategy.

80. The Group notes that Côte d'Ivoire is developing a national strategy on migration in cooperation with the International Organization for Migration. It is aimed at, among other things, defining the remits of the ministries represented at the borders in order to avoid overlapping actions, carry out integrated checks at one-stop border posts and ensure the cost-effective use of resources by promoting the shared use of infrastructure and equipment among the security forces tasked with border surveillance.

81. The Group welcomes the initiative and encourages the Ivorian authorities to reduce, in particular at border crossings with little movement of goods and/or persons, the number of forces present by delegating areas of jurisdiction (such as security, migration and import/export authorizations). The focus should be on the management of movement of goods and persons in an integrated manner, such as by establishing a single border surveillance force with the powers necessary to address the illicit movement of persons and goods across borders, thereby saving resources and avoiding coordination issues.

Border surveillance

82. The Group notes that the surveillance squads, tasked to monitor the border area in the vicinity of the customs offices, and the mobile squads, tasked to monitor the border area between two consecutive customs offices, continue to lack the necessary equipment and training. The Group maintains its previously expressed views regarding the training needs of those units (see [S/2015/252](#), para. 142), i.e. that the skill sets required for efficient border surveillance differ considerably from those required for clearance of goods at a customs office (such as risk exposure, strategy and environment). The same applies to the border police officers tasked to counter illegal migration.

83. The Ivorian borders remain largely unpatrolled, given that both customs officials and border police officers are static at their posts. This facilitates informal movements of goods and persons and also represents challenges to combating the illegal exploitation of natural resources in the border areas. Individuals involved in illegal mining and logging activities generally avoid arrest by crossing the border into a neighbouring country, such as Ghana. Border forces are unable to pursue them because they lack mutual agreements with neighbouring countries for hot pursuit.

Non-registered military elements in the border areas

84. The Group observed that the presence of non-registered military elements in the border area with Ghana, most of whom were involved in illegal taxation and facilitation of illicit trafficking (see [S/2015/252](#), para. 143), had diminished. The Ivorian authorities confirmed that, with the end of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process on 30 June 2015, many of those elements had left their positions and joined the process. The Group noted, however, that the 200 non-registered military elements whom it had observed securing illegal gold-mining sites and the border crossings to Burkina Faso (see *ibid.*, para. 129) in the region of Doropo remained in place at the crossings. The Group is concerned because the presence of those elements at the borders continues to represent a risk of illicit trafficking of natural resources and arms in the area. The Group has no categorical information on the presence and activities of such elements at the borders with Guinea, Liberia and Mali and is continuing its investigations on the subject.

Risk analyses, profiling and investigation

85. The Group notes the progress made regarding the establishment of a transnational crime unit,²⁴ aimed at combating drug trafficking, organized crime, trafficking in persons and the smuggling of diamonds and protected species of fauna and flora in cooperation with similar units in other countries of the subregion. The unit is scheduled to become operational during the first quarter of 2016. The Group considers that the cooperation network of those units throughout West Africa will create the ability to tackle organized illegal cross-border traffic in the region and violations of the sanctions regime in Côte d'Ivoire.

86. The customs administration is following a modernization process in conjunction with the Africa Regional Technical Assistance Centre of the International Monetary Fund. The initiative is aimed at simplifying customs procedures, developing automated risk analysis software and reinforcing capacity regarding the transit procedure, customs exemptions, post-clearance audits, fraud control and human resources management.

87. The Group acknowledges that, while focused mainly on the revenue aspect, the initiative also contributes to the monitoring of sanctions-related issues, among other things by providing capacity to combat fraud by reinforcing the investigative capabilities of the customs administration. The automated risk analysis software provides an important starting point because additional parameters can be integrated in the course of its development, for example to identify shipments containing goods subject to the arms embargo. The tool has become operational at the port of Abidjan and is currently in its first evaluation phase. The Group commends Côte d'Ivoire on the progress and encourages it to further develop the tool and rapidly expand its use to other customs offices, in particular the port of San Pedro and the airport in Abidjan. The Group maintains, however, that it is important to have sufficient data for risk analysis. For example, information on goods trans-shipped

²⁴ Transnational crime units are the result of the West Africa Coast Initiative, launched by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations of the Secretariat, the United Nations Office for West Africa and the International Criminal Police Organization with a view to enhancing national and international coordination and enabling intelligence-based investigations.

through the port of Abidjan remains insufficient and therefore escapes risk analysis by the customs authorities.

88. The Group noted that the Ivorian authorities had acquired two additional container-scanning units, as foreseen in the 2014-2015 action plan of the Ministry of Budget concerning the customs administration. One scanner is intended to supplement the existing unit at the port of Abidjan and the other is to be deployed at the port of San Pedro by the end of March 2016.

89. The Group also followed up on the risk assessment process regarding travellers leaving Côte d'Ivoire through the airport in Abidjan. It notes that the procedure to date remains unchanged. Apart from some random inspections by water and forestry officials, the luggage of departing travellers is subject only to standard airport security controls. The Group considers the practice a risk for the illicit export of goods, especially gold and diamonds, which are normally smuggled using the most direct routes, such as airports.

90. The above-mentioned efforts increase monitoring capacity at the ports of entry in Abidjan, which remain the main points of entry and exit for goods. As monitoring capacity increases, however, so too does the risk that goods will be diverted to the poorly monitored land borders. It is the Group's view that Côte d'Ivoire, to ensure a holistic reform process that would increase monitoring capacity at all its borders, could benefit from assessing its needs, perhaps in the framework of the Columbus Programme of the World Customs Organization.²⁵

Assessment on informal trade

91. During its visits to border areas where customs offices are not authorized to clear goods, the Group nevertheless observed that goods, including natural resources, continued to be exchanged across the border. To assess that informal traffic, the Group put official requests to Côte d'Ivoire and the neighbouring countries to obtain statistics regarding goods exchanged across their land borders from 1 June 2014 to 31 May 2015. It received answers from Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Mali.

92. The Group focused on the export of commodities identified as possible sources of funding for the purchase of weapons and related materiel. It therefore mirrored customs data based on the code numbers of the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System of the World Customs Organization for cashew nuts, cocoa, coffee, timber and arms and related materiel.

93. The Group noted that data obtained from land crossing points showed no significant quantities of cocoa, coffee or cashew nuts having been registered, either as exports or imports, during the period in question. This is in line with the policy of Côte d'Ivoire that all goods subject to the single export tax must be exported through its seaports.²⁶

94. Large discrepancies were observed regarding the export of timber. The Group focused on data on timber in rough forms or that processed by sawmills and

²⁵ Côte d'Ivoire conducted a needs assessment of its customs administration in the framework of the Columbus Programme in 2007, but did not progress to the planning and implementation phase.

²⁶ The following goods are subject to the tax under certain conditions: cocoa, coffee, cashew nuts, timber, cola nuts and seeds of the shea tree.

manufacturing plants (Harmonized System codes 4403, 4407, 4408, 4412 and 4413) because it had seen such shipments cross the land borders. The Group noted that Mali had registered imports of 13,371 tons, with a value of CFAF 682 million (\$1.1 million), in excess of the quantities recorded by Côte d'Ivoire. The Group also noted that Burkina Faso had registered 22,543 tons, with a value of CFAF 525 million (\$902,061), in excess of the quantities recorded by Côte d'Ivoire. The Group is concerned because such significant discrepancies in trade statistics are an indicator of illicit export of timber across the northern borders. It is investigating further.

95. The Group notes reports regarding significant movements of ammunition. Côte d'Ivoire reported the export of 48.7 tons of ammunition (Harmonized System codes 9306.30 and 9306.90) with a value of CFAF 1,407 million (\$2.4 million), while Burkina Faso declared no such imports from Côte d'Ivoire. Burkina Faso, on the other hand, reported the export of 5.6 tons of ammunition (Harmonized System code 9306.90) with a value of CFAF 89 million (\$152,920) to Côte d'Ivoire, which has not been reported. The Group is further investigating the discrepancies.

C. Implementation of the arms embargo

96. The Government of Côte d'Ivoire is, under paragraph 10 of Security Council resolution 2219 (2015), to allow the Group and UNOCI access to exempted arms and lethal materiel at the time of import. The Group wrote to the Government at the beginning of its mandate requesting to be informed of such imports. On 27 January 2016, the Group was notified by the Ivorian authorities that assault rifles and pistols imported for the military and the gendarmerie were at the transportation stage. The Group notes that that was the first time that it had received such information in advance and stands ready to inspect the materiel upon its arrival in Abidjan.

97. The Group continued to monitor ports of entry during its mandate, investigating shipments based on risk analysis and carrying out post-clearance audits where justified.

Import of NVG7-2I night-vision goggles and FLIR BTS-XR Pro thermal imaging devices

98. On 28 August 2015, the UNOCI Integrated Embargo Monitoring Unit, during a routine inspection at the airport in Abidjan, identified a shipment of 60 NVG7-2I night-vision goggles (see annex 26). After inspection, the goggles were transferred to the National Police Academy in Abidjan under the supervision of the Unit. The Group also identified a second shipment, containing five FLIR BTS-XR Pro thermal imaging devices, that arrived in January 2015 (see annex 27). Both shipments were imported by BSD-Afrique Ltd., a company based in Abidjan, which has previously been mentioned by the Group in connection with violations of the sanctions regime (see S/2015/252, paras. 102-106).

99. GromaTech LLC, a company based in the United States of America, shipped the goggles to BSD-Afrique Ltd. in Côte d'Ivoire. GromaTech LLC informed the Group that the export had been carried out in accordance with national regulations because the goggles were designed for boating and recreational uses and would therefore not need an export licence or the issuance of an end-user certificate. The Group notes that several companies were involved in the shipment. Initially, BSD-Afrique Ltd. approached Troya Tech Defense Ltd., a company based in Israel.

The request by Troya Tech Defense Ltd. for an export licence was denied because its night-vision goggles are considered combat equipment by the Israeli authorities and as such would need prior approval from the Security Council. The company therefore approached Silverback Industries Pte. Ltd., a company based in Singapore, which connected it with GromaTech LLC, the final exporter (see annex 26).

100. Regarding the FLIR BTS-XR Pro thermal imaging devices imported in January 2015, the Group notes that Troya Tech Defense Ltd. directly exported the devices from Israel (see annex 27). The Group put several official requests to the company for information relating to the export, but has received no reply. The Ivorian authorities assisted the Group in organizing a meeting with the Managing Director of BSD-Afrique Ltd. He informed the Group that the devices were not subject to export restrictions in Israel because they were considered to be a civilian product.

101. The aforementioned shipments are part of an exemption request sent by Côte d'Ivoire to the Committee in September 2013. The Committee put the entire request on hold in order to obtain additional information regarding some of the materiel. Pursuant to Security Council resolutions 2153 (2014) and 2219 (2015), night-vision and night-shooting devices (listed in the annex to the resolutions) are subject to an exemption request being granted by the Committee. The Group considers that, in the absence of further precision in the resolution, the restriction applies regardless of the nature of such devices. Accordingly, both shipments entered Côte d'Ivoire in violation of the sanctions regime. The night-vision goggles are currently in use by various units of the military and security forces²⁷ and the thermal imaging devices by the military.

Import of night-vision equipment by the Ivorian authorities

102. In January 2016, Sovereign Global Solutions Middle East LLC, a company based in the United Arab Emirates tasked by the Ministry of Defence of Côte d'Ivoire to supply the Ivorian contingent in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali with equipment, explained to the Group that it was delivering equipment to Côte d'Ivoire and that four night-vision devices had already been delivered. The Group informed the company of the relevant provisions of the sanctions regime in order to avoid further violations and invited it to inform the Committee accordingly.

Donation of night-vision devices to the military by the coffee and cocoa regulatory body

103. The Group notes that on 15 July 2015 the coffee and cocoa regulatory body donated equipment worth CFAF 285,864,900 (\$491,176) to the Ivorian armed forces. The donation comprised several 4 x 4 vehicles, motorbikes, communications equipment and three night-vision devices. The Group contacted the Ministry of Defence to obtain information relating to the devices and is awaiting a response.

²⁷ Such as the special forces, the gendarmerie intervention unit and the navy commandos.

Donation of 21 military trucks to the military

104. Investigations continued regarding the 21 Renault TRM-2000 military trucks donated to the military on 25 April 2014 by Kouao Niamoutié.²⁸ The Group provided the French authorities with the chassis numbers of the vehicles and was informed that they had been exported by a French military surplus company, Framery, to Côte d'Ivoire in two shipments, on 1 August and 2 October 2013, respectively. The Group contacted the company, which confirmed the sale and shipment of the vehicles to Villers Services Côte d'Ivoire, an Ivorian waste disposal company headed at the time by Mr. Niamoutié (see annex 28). The Group had earlier attempted to obtain the declaration made at the time of the vehicles' import into Côte d'Ivoire, to verify the end use, but preliminary investigations did not reveal any such declaration. The Group is still seeking to obtain the import documentation filed with the Ivorian customs administration.

105. TRM-2000 trucks have been designed as military vehicles and are still in use as such, for example by the French armed forces. The Group observes that the vehicles were exported to a private company in Côte d'Ivoire and that, at the time of the transfer, nothing indicated their end use by the Ivorian military. Exemptions foreseen in the resolution for materiel destined for the support of or use in the Ivorian security sector reform process could therefore not apply. The Group therefore considers the transfer of the 21 TRM-2000 military trucks to Côte d'Ivoire a breach of the embargo on arms and related materiel as set out in resolution 2101 (2013).

VIII. Diamonds and natural resources

106. Pursuant to paragraph 26 of Security Council resolution 2219 (2015), the Group focused mainly on three patterns of exploitation of natural resources that could be sources of revenue for the purchase of arms and related materiel and activities: diamonds, gold and coffee and cocoa. The Group takes note of the considerable progress made by Côte d'Ivoire in curbing cashew nut and cotton smuggling to neighbouring countries. The Group closely monitored those natural resources and found no matters of concern.

A. Diamonds

Diamond production and sales

107. According to Ivorian official records, 14,000 carats of diamond sales have been exported from producing areas in Séguéla from May 2014, after the lifting of the ban on exports of rough diamonds imposed by the Security Council, to date (some 8,000 carats per year).

108. The amount of 8,000 carats per year constitutes a sharp drop in rough diamond production when compared with the some 50,000 carats extracted per year from 2005 to 2013, which the Group ascribes to two factors: first and foremost, the known diamond deposits in the Séguéla area (Bobi, Diarabana, Forona and Toubabouko)

²⁸ CI Logistique operates the single-window system for the import of vehicles to Côte d'Ivoire (see [S/2015/252](#), paras. 157-161).

were mined almost to depletion between 2002 and 2012 when the area was under the control of the Forces nouvelles (see S/2012/766, paras. 98-99; S/2012/196, paras. 157, 160 and 188; S/2011/642, paras. 69-71; S/2011/272, paras. 254-259; and S/2011/271, para. 213), and, second, to date, still at least 60 per cent of production is smuggled outside the legal trading chain certified through the Kimberley Process by the network of Sekou Niangadou, Koné Abdoul, El Hadj Thiam and Touré Orange (see S/2015/252, paras. 171-174, and S/2014/266, paras. 190-195 and 198-204). Analysis of the Ivorian diamond trade by the Property Rights and Artisanal Diamond Development II project substantiates the Group's estimates.

109. The Group observed that the aforementioned individuals, who are currently authorized diamond buyers, were in possession of large stocks of rough diamonds that they claimed to have held from before the lifting of the diamond embargo. Those stocks were not recorded in any official statistics or supported by any proof of purchase. The Group is aware that Mr. Niangadou and his accomplices smuggle diamonds from those stocks, which are then replenished through new purchases, also not supported by any certificate or proof of payment. During the Kimberley Process review visit to Côte d'Ivoire in March 2015, Mr. Niangadou claimed to hold more than 4,000 carats of rough diamonds purchased before May 2014, for which he did not show any legal proof of purchase.



110. Mr. Niangadou and his accomplices monopolized diamond purchases from the area of Séguéla. The Group thus estimates the combined volumes of rough diamonds officially sold and smuggled from Côte d'Ivoire at some 20,000 carats per year (40 per cent of 8,000 carats officially exported through the Kimberley Process = 20,000 carats per year; as 8,000 carats represents only 40 per cent of the total production, the remaining 60 per cent, which is smuggled, equals 12,000 carats (8,000 * 60/40) and thus the total production will be 8,000 + 12,000 = 20,000 carats).

111. Diamond sales in Côte d'Ivoire are recorded in a system that does not show the distribution of profits among the actors along the trading chain. Knowing how value is added along the chain will indicate whether policies that could distort the regular supplier-buyer relationships are in place (such as those typical of a closed-

pipe circuit; see [S/2014/266](#), paras. 190-195), thus allowing Ivorian regulators to consider the appropriateness of introducing corrective measures. The Group takes note that the secretariat of the Kimberley Process in Côte d'Ivoire is adopting a new data collection system to register transactions along the chain and will follow up on its implementation, which is scheduled to begin by the first quarter of 2016.

Ministry of Industry and Mines and the Société pour le développement minier de la Côte d'Ivoire

112. The Group notes that the Société pour le développement minier de la Côte d'Ivoire has fully reoccupied its premises in Bobi and Diarabana since March 2015 and is registering actors along the diamond value chain (diggers, middlemen, financiers and buyers), in a process known as *encadrement*.

113. In Tortiya, the resumption of viable diamond production remains hampered by the fact that the research and exploitation rights to the area held by the Société pour le développement minier de la Côte d'Ivoire are challenged by other private stakeholders who claim overlapping rights, including permits for agricultural and gold exploitation. Furthermore, the Ministry of Industry and Mines has not yet authorized the registration of diamond miners in Tortiya. Consequently, the illegal diamond exploitation and financing that existed before the lifting of the ban on exports of rough diamonds imposed by the Security Council continues.

114. The Group maintains that the Société pour le développement minier de la Côte d'Ivoire needs to actively engage in exploration for new, viable diamond deposits in order to revitalize the staggering diamond sector. In that regard, the Group recalls that, the sharp drop in diamond production notwithstanding, diamonds remain the primary source of livelihood for some two thirds of families in the Séguéla area (where around 10,000 people are directly involved in mining activities) and for nearly 40 per cent of the families in Tortiya (2,000 miners).²⁹

Diamond fingerprinting

115. The Group has again reached out to a South African firm, Mintek, about its offer to fingerprint diamonds of supposed Ivorian origin that were seized by the Malian customs authorities in 2011 (see [S/2015/252](#), paras. 175 and 325, and [S/2014/266](#), para. 290). No action has been taken by Mintek to date.

Kimberley Process Certification Scheme

116. By paragraph 16 of its resolution 2219 (2015), the Security Council invited the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, in particular its Working Group on Monitoring, its Working Group on Statistics and its Working Group of Diamonds Experts, to communicate information, as appropriate, regarding compliance by Côte d'Ivoire with the Scheme to the Council, through the Committee, and when possible, for review by the Group.

117. To date, however, the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme has sent no such information. At the thirteenth Kimberley Process plenary meeting, held in Luanda in November 2015, the Group reiterated its readiness to assist in that regard and has since sent official letters to the Chairs of the Process Administrative

²⁹ Data gathered by the Group and confirmed by a survey commissioned in 2015 by the Property Rights and Artisanal Diamond Development II project.

Support Mechanism and to the three working groups. The Group has received no responses.

B. Gold

Ministry of Industry and Mines

118. The Ivorian programme for the formalization of artisanal and small-scale gold mining, launched in 2013, is expected to come to an end by 2016. In the framework of the programme, 160 illegal mining sites have been detected in the centre and north of the country and 100 in the east. The identification of illegal sites in the west is currently under way and should be finalized by mid-2016.

119. On 21 December 2015, the Ministry of Industry and Mines issued 14 licences to buy and sell gold. It informed the Group that the identification of areas for artisanal and small-scale mining was under finalization.

120. Notwithstanding the commendable efforts by the Ministry of Industry and Mines, the Group observed that the approach adopted for the formalization of artisanal and small-scale gold mining fell short in addressing key needs and opportunities for the effective regulation of the gold sector. First and foremost, the programme has yet to identify clearly defined, unoccupied and geologically viable parcels for mining. The absence of such sites is, to date, the main factor driving illegal miners back to sites whence they have been evicted. Furthermore, to fully enforce formalization policies, the programme would first need to register actors along the value chain (diggers, middlemen, financiers, final buyers and exporters); such registration could easily be modelled on the system successfully used in the diamond sector.

121. In tackling issues pertaining to formalization, the programme needs to recognize that large-scale industrial mining could peacefully coexist with artisanal and small-scale mining, in line with the models developed, among others, in the document entitled “Working together: how large-scale mining can engage with artisanal and small-scale miners”, produced by the International Council on Mining and Metals and the Communities and Small-scale Mining initiative of the World Bank. In doing so, the Group points out the advantages for the programme of developing partnerships with international technical and financial partners (including the African Development Bank, the German Agency for International Cooperation, the International Council on Mining and Metals, the United Nations Environment Programme, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization, the United States Agency for International Development and the World Bank) that have a proven track record of successful development of artisanal and small-scale mining sectors and positive large-scale industrial mining/artisanal and small-scale mining interaction. The Group notes, however, that, notwithstanding the almost exclusive focus of the Ministry of Industry and Mines on large-scale industrial mining operations, no recognized body exists in Côte d’Ivoire that represents the mining industry as a whole (the Chamber of Mines does not in fact hold this status), resulting in the absence of a focal point to coordinate government-industry policies.

122. The Group also expressed its concerns to the Ministry of Industry and Mines about the fact that some large-scale gold-mining companies in Côte d’Ivoire have paid and continue to pay protection money to two military commanders, Lt. Col.

Martin Kouakou Fofié, who is subject to sanctions imposed by the Security Council since 2006 (see [S/2009/521](#), paras. 199 and 202), and Losseni Fofana, since at least 2009. The Group notes that the practice was in vogue even in 2013 and also understands that no specific permission was granted by the Government to allow its armed forces providing security services to private entities not to receive compensation for the same.

123. A framework that would enable the aforementioned issues to be addressed is embedded in the Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas, prepared by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. The Organization and the Group have undertaken extensive awareness-raising activities with the Government and a broad range of stakeholders in Côte d'Ivoire on this matter.

Discrepancies in gold trade statistics

124. The Group has observed discrepancies between the quantities of unwrought gold (Harmonized System code 7108) declared as exported by Côte d'Ivoire and the quantities declared as imported by its partner countries in 2013 and 2014 (most recent available data). Table 3 provides further details.

Table 3
Gold exported and imported

<i>Country</i>	<i>Trade flow</i>	<i>Partner</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Quantity (kg)</i>	<i>Value (United States dollars)</i>
Côte d'Ivoire	Export	Switzerland	2014	10 142	399 721 760
Switzerland	Import	Côte d'Ivoire	2014	11 844	475 111 225
Côte d'Ivoire	Export	Switzerland	2013	5 509	247 083 937
Switzerland	Import	Côte d'Ivoire	2013	6 307	248 054 420
Côte d'Ivoire	Export	Netherlands	2014	188	7 391 040
Netherlands	Import	Côte d'Ivoire	2014	–	–
Côte d'Ivoire	Export	India	2014	159	6 575 107
India	Import	Côte d'Ivoire	2014	195	6 650 551
Côte d'Ivoire	Export	France	2013	154	5 207 168
France	Import	Côte d'Ivoire	2013	–	–
Côte d'Ivoire	Export	Lebanon	2014	–	–
Lebanon	Import	Côte d'Ivoire	2014	25	901 423
Côte d'Ivoire	Export	Lebanon	2013	–	–
Lebanon	Import	Côte d'Ivoire	2013	58	2 757 060
Côte d'Ivoire	Export	United Arab Emirates	2014	–	–
United Arab Emirates	Import	Côte d'Ivoire	2014	13	416 918

125. The Group is investigating the reasons for the differences in quantities and whether they stem from gold smuggling from Côte d'Ivoire.

126. The Ministry of Industry and Mines is actively cooperating with the Group and has confirmed that only the four entities currently operating industrial gold mines

(Agbaou and La Mancha, both owned by Endeavour Mining, the Bonikro gold mine owned by Newcrest and the Tongon project run by Randgold) are authorized to export gold from Côte d'Ivoire.

Illegal gold-mining operations in Gamina (Daloa region)

<i>Nature of incident:</i>	Illegal production of some 2,500 kg of gold per year
<i>Actors involved:</i>	Société coopérative des orpailleurs du Tchologo; Société minière Kindo Adama; Société d'exploitation — recherche minière et services
<i>Time frame:</i>	2013-2015
<i>Relevance to mandate:</i>	Obstruction to freedom of movement of UNOCI/Group; illegal use of gold to maintain armed elements; human rights violations
<i>Type of evidence:</i>	Written documents; interviews

127. The Group has previously described illegal gold mining in the sub-prefecture of Zaïbo on the site named Gamina (see [S/2015/252](#), paras. 179-206). It takes note of its closure by order of the Ministry of Defence since 15 October 2015. The Group also takes note that the actors involved were not prosecuted.

128. After extensive investigations, the Group ascertained that three companies were benefiting from the illegal gold exploitation in Gamina: Société coopérative des orpailleurs du Tchologo; Société minière Kindo Adama and Société d'exploitation — recherches minières et services.

129. As explained below, the managing directors of the Société coopérative des orpailleurs du Tchologo claim to have personal affiliations with Guillaume Soro, and the other two companies to the family of the former President of Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaoré.

130. On 25 and 26 November 2014, the village chiefs of Gamina and Bobo Nissoko wrote two separate letters to the sub-prefect in Zaïbo to indicate that the Société coopérative des orpailleurs du Tchologo was to be considered the sole authorized operator of the mining sites in Zaïbo and Gamina. The representative of the company signed contracts with landowners for the development of parcels for gold extraction (see annex 29).

131. The president of the Société coopérative des orpailleurs du Tchologo is Ouattara Kaweli,³⁰ who was the former delegate of the Forces nouvelles in Ferkessédougou and one of the closest collaborators of Mr. Soro.

132. The Group analysed bank statements of the Société coopérative des orpailleurs du Tchologo and other shell companies that it used to transfer money for gold purchases in Zaïbo/Gamina. They show movements of CFAF 2,350 million (\$4 million) for the purchase of gold in 2014 alone.

³⁰ Born on 3 December 1968 in Nanyéfongo, Côte d'Ivoire, with Ivorian identity No. C 0090 2132 21, issued on 11 October 2009 by the National Identification Office in Ferkessédougou.

133. The Group saw gold exploitation contracts signed in 2014 on behalf of the Société minière Kindo Adama, a mining company founded by a businessperson from Burkina Faso, Kindo Harouna, a close ally and business partner of the Compaoré family. After the ousting of Blaise Compaoré from the presidency on 31 October 2014, the aforementioned village chiefs of Gamina and Zaïbo took the decision to appoint the Société coopérative des orpailleurs du Tchologo as the sole operator because “Société minière Kindo Adama had become unable to fulfil its engagements after the ousting of Blaise”.

134. The Group also saw gold exploitation contracts signed by Salif Ouedraogo on behalf of the Société d’exploitation — recherches minières et services. Besides Mr. Ouedraogo, the company is managed by Inessa Guénatou Badini, a national of Burkina Faso and the daughter of Boureïma Badini, who was the special envoy of Mr. Compaoré as mediator of the crisis in Côte d’Ivoire from 2007 to 2011.

135. A wide range of stakeholders at the mining sites confirmed and referred to Mr. Ouedraogo as “the owner of the Société d’exploitation — recherches minières et services” or “Ms. Badini’s man”.

Illegal gold operations in the area of Tengréla

136. The area of Tengréla has not yet been covered by the programme for the formalization of artisanal and small-scale gold mining. The Group observed several illegal artisanal gold-mining sites in the sub-prefectures of Kanakono and Papara, along the border with Mali, run by nine cooperatives. Some 3,000 people work at the sites, most being citizens of Burkina Faso, Guinea and Mali.

137. Gold is purchased at CFAF 15,000 (\$25) per gram and mostly sold in Mali by a network centred on five Malian buyers and financiers. The Group is working to determine their identity. Furthermore, the Group takes note that the Ministry of Industry and Mines signed an authorization for a buying office in Tengréla on 21 December 2015.

138. The Group analysed in particular the situation in Papara, where it observed that four cooperatives received between CFAF 20 million and CFAF 30 million (between \$34,000 and \$51,000) each from their financiers every two weeks, which they used to purchase gold. Each cooperative thus purchases between 1.3 and 2 kg of gold every two weeks at CFAF 15,000 (\$25) per gram. The overall gold production from the sites controlled by the four cooperatives can thus be estimated at between 2.6 and 4 kg of gold per week, valued at between \$91,000 and \$140,000 (between \$4.5 million and \$7 million per year) on the international market.³¹

139. The Group is particularly concerned that this flow of money could be used to financially support armed groups, including jihadist movements, such as those that directed the attacks in Fakola and Misséni in June 2015. Investigations by the Ivorian authorities revealed that the perpetrators had stayed in Kanakono after the attack in Misséni, disguised as gold buyers or miners. Before the attack in Fakola, the perpetrators hid weapons in Missasso, on the border with Mali.

³¹ At \$1,089.31/oz (\$35,000/kg) for 22-carat gold (price on 9 February 2016).

C. Cocoa and coffee

140. Côte d'Ivoire has successfully reduced cocoa and coffee smuggling from eastern producing areas towards Ghana, most notably through increased cooperation with the Ivorian military commanders responsible for the eastern border and increased awareness and vigilance at border crossings.

141. Those efforts notwithstanding, 100,000 tons of cocoa and 20,000 tons of coffee continue to be smuggled out of the country every year, especially from the western producing areas, resulting in a combined loss of CFAF 106 billion (\$182 million) in fiscal revenue alone over the past three campaigns (2013-2015).

142. Furthermore, 60,000 tons of Ivorian cocoa certified as sustainably farmed by agencies such as Fairtrade International, the Rainforest Alliance or UTZ are mixed every year with non-certified cocoa. Given that, as an incentive, certified cocoa is bought at CFAF 150,000 (\$250) per ton more than the minimum price paid for non-certified cocoa, the perpetrators unduly benefit from CFAF 9 billion (\$15.5 million) per year (CFAF 150,000 x 60,000 tons).

143. Cocoa and coffee smuggling and fraud in western Côte d'Ivoire are made possible by the existence of well-organized networks that actively involve the Ivorian military and other law enforcement agents (such as the agency in charge of the management of the country's eight national parks and six protected reserves) and are seemingly tolerated by the prefects in those areas. An example is given of the trade of some 10,000 tons of cocoa produced illegally by occupants of the Mount Péko National Park.

Illegal cocoa production inside the Mount Péko National Park

<i>Nature of incident:</i>	Smuggling of some 10,000 tons of cocoa a year; illegal taxation
<i>Actors involved:</i>	“Representative council of the occupants of Mount Peko” (Kiebré Seydou, Vincent Bingoure, Sana Mamadou); Cpt. Polo Ouattara; Maj. Moses in Bangolo; Sory Sangare, Prefect of Duékoué
<i>Time frame:</i>	2013-present
<i>Relevance to mandate:</i>	Obstruction to freedom of movement of UNOCI/Group; illegal use of natural resources to maintain armed elements; destabilization
<i>Type of evidence:</i>	Written documents; audio tapes; interviews

144. The park remains illegally occupied by some 28,000 individuals, mostly nationals of Burkina Faso, who have transformed 20,000 of its 34,000 ha into cocoa plantations. They produce some 10,000 tons of cocoa per year, for a free-on-board value of CFAF 17.3 billion (\$28.4 million). The Ivorian coffee and cocoa regulatory body confirmed that the plantations could yield 500 kg per ha per season, or 10,000 tons per year (500 kg x 20,000 ha = 10,000 tons).

145. On 31 July 2014, the Governments of Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire introduced a coordinated approach through the creation of a mixed committee that would begin implementing an eviction plan for the park and ensure its acceptance by all the stakeholders; however, the political turmoil in Burkina Faso over the past year has stalled those efforts. The situation has thus been entirely managed by a management committee, led by the Prefect of Duékoué, Sory Sangare.

146. Three individuals, Kiebré Seydou, Vincent Bingouré ("Karsamba") and Sana Mamadou, have imposed a fee of CFAF 10,000 (\$17) per ha of cocoa plantation per year on the occupants through a structure called the "representative council of the occupants of Mount Peko", on the pretext of ensuring that the illegal occupants remain and farm cocoa in the park indefinitely.

147. The Group gained access to the statements for bank account No. 13991510005, which was opened by Vincent Bingouré and Kiebré Seydou at the branch of Banque atlantique — Côte d'Ivoire in Duékoué, through which the sum of CFAF 36 million (\$61,855) collected by the council transited. The Group estimates, however, that the council should have collected around CFAF 200 million (\$343,642) per year (CFAF 10,000/ha x 20,000 ha of plantations).

148. The officer in charge of the park, Capt. Ouattara Polo, has put in place a system of eight choke points to allow illegal cocoa from inside the park to be sold with a fee of CFAF 100 (\$0.17) per kg. Vincent Bingouré and Sana Mamadou were in charge of collecting the fee at the choke points named Canada 1 and Petit-Guiglo, respectively.

149. Capt. Ouattara ordered the blocking of most of the routes leading into the park to ensure that the cocoa produced must transit by (and be thus taxed at) the choke points. Furthermore, the Group spoke to individuals, wearing uniforms of the parks agency and of the water and forestry authorities, who said that they had been tasked by Capt. Ouattara to patrol the access routes.

150. Every buyer met purchasing cocoa at the choke points confirmed paying CFAF 100 per kg to Capt. Ouattara's men and CFAF 900 (\$1.54) per kg to the illegal producers. The Group thus estimates that the illegal taxation system put in place by Capt. Ouattara generates revenue of CFAF 1 billion (\$1.72 million) per year (CFAF 100/kg x 10,000 tons).

151. Some 1,000 buyers are mandated to purchase cocoa on behalf of the 40 cocoa buyers based in Duékoué, who in turn sell it to processing plants or exporters. They informed the Group that no buyer in Duékoué had ever asked them whether the cocoa originated from illegal plantations inside the park.

152. The Group thus maintains that some 10,000 tons of cocoa illegally produced per year inside the park are allowed to reach the legal market. The Group is also worried by the admission of the prefect of Duékoué that "everybody in Duékoué (including the Ivorian authorities) knows that illegal cocoa from Mount Péko is regularly sold to the legal supply chain".

153. The Group has identified three pillars in the system of choke points: the first is the so-called "representative council of the occupants of Mount Peko" and its initiators, Vincent Bingouré, Sana Mamadou (both currently imprisoned in Man) and Kiebré Seydou, who have collected CFAF 200 million (\$343,642) per year since 2014 from illegal cocoa growers inside the park and used part of that amount to

bribe Ivorian officials. The second pillar is centred on Capt. Ouattara Polo, who created and maintains a system of total control over the access routes to dispose of cocoa produced inside the park, allowing him to impose illegal taxes that yield CFAF 1 billion (\$1.72 million) per year. The third pillar is founded on the complicity of other Ivorian authorities, namely the military based in Bangolo commanded by Maj. Moses and the Prefect of Duékoué who seemingly tolerate the illegal taxation system built by Capt. Ouattara through the choke points.

154. The Group is particularly concerned about the threats by Capt. Ouattara to prosecute its sources “if they let the United Nations approach Mount Péko”. To ensure his right of reply, the Group asked him on what legal basis the Group or its sources could face prosecution, but he refused to comment. The Group thus maintains that the activities of Capt. Ouattara contribute to further destabilizing a fragile sociopolitical situation created by the illegal occupation of the park and the plans to evict the occupants.

155. Overall, the Group maintains that the activities of Capt. Ouattara are fully relevant to its mandate under paragraph 26 of Security Council resolution 2219 (2015).

156. The Group is of the view that illegal acts generated by the occupation of the park will cease only through the implementation, without further delay, of the peaceful eviction strategy approved by the authorities in 2014.

D. Cashew nuts and cotton

157. In previous reports (S/2013/605, para. 63, and S/2014/266, para. 82), the Group observed that cashew nuts and cotton were smuggled mainly from the eastern and northern producing regions (Boukani, Gontougo, Poro and Tchologo) to Burkina Faso and Ghana.

158. To curb the smuggling of cashew nuts, which was at a level of some 150,000 tons per year in 2011 and 2012,³² Côte d’Ivoire put in place a series of reforms, mainly aimed at increasing local processing capacity, which was raised to 91,000 tons per year (although only 41 per cent of such maximum transformation capacity has been attained). By customs administrative decisions Nos. 1483 of 17 June 2011 and 1497 of 29 August 2011, the Ivorian authorities also prohibited the export of cashew nuts across the land borders, limiting it to the ports of Abidjan and San Pedro. To enforce the measure, Côte d’Ivoire successfully raised the awareness of the military commanders responsible for enforcing vigilance at the crossing points along its eastern border (see sect. VII). Lastly, the Ivorian cotton and cashew nuts regulatory authority harmonized prices between Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana, thus reducing a significant incentive for smuggling.

159. In 2015, Côte d’Ivoire became the world’s leading producer of cashew nuts, overtaking India and Viet Nam and recording production of 750,000 tons. The Group estimates that the increase over the past years is also partially due to the curbing of smuggling, with some 150,000 tons previously being smuggled outside the country and hence not recorded.

³² The value of the smuggling, at a free-on-board price in 2012 of between \$1,275 and \$1,400 per ton, is thus estimated at between \$191.25 million and \$210 million.

160. In the cotton sector, producers, processing plants and traders are represented by an association called Intercoton. Among its statutory objectives, Intercoton aims at improving the collection, analysis and dissemination of data along the cotton trading chain. The Group acknowledges that improved data collection, together with a review of minimum prices paid to Ivorian cotton producers in order to bring them into line with those paid in neighbouring Burkina Faso and Ghana put forward by the regulatory authority, has had a positive impact in reducing the smuggling of cotton.

E. Oil

161. The Group continues to follow up on the diversion of \$106 million from the accounts of the Société nationale d'opérations pétrolières de la Côte d'Ivoire in 2010 (see S/2011/642, para. 27, and S/2012/196, paras. 94-97), but is still encountering the same lack of cooperation from the relevant entities that has hampered its investigations to date. The Ivorian chapter of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative also highlighted irregularities in the accounts of the company in the amount of CFAF 20 billion (\$34.4 million) for the period 2009-2011. The Ivorian finance ministries, however, have yet to appoint an independent auditor, as mandated by the Initiative's rules, to verify the accounts for the above-mentioned period.

162. In 2015, the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy announced a series of reforms to promote transparency, accountability and good governance in the sector and to avoid any repeat of the negative practices similar to those under the Gbagbo Administration. Low oil prices since 2015 have hampered fundamental investments to revitalize the oil sector in Côte d'Ivoire, also forcing some international companies out of business. Furthermore, the partially State-owned Société ivoirienne de raffinage, the country's largest industry, has been saddled with high debt and low returns, putting its economic viability at risk. The Group is thus concerned that the situation could hamper the adoption of reforms, de facto encouraging the continuation of the above-mentioned negative practices.

163. The Group will closely monitor the situation and inform the Committee accordingly.

IX. Finance

Illegal checkpoints

164. By paragraph 33 of its resolution 2219 (2015), the Security Council called upon the Ivorian authorities to continue to take the measures necessary to dismantle illegal taxation networks, including by undertaking relevant and thorough investigations, further reduce the number of checkpoints and prevent incidents of racketeering throughout the country. The Group continues to monitor the issue.

165. The authorities have made efforts to dismantle illegal taxation networks. They have set up organizations to ensure free movement, including a traffic flow observatory. It carries out intensive public information campaigns and awareness-raising workshops for the agencies manning the checkpoints, together with field missions to verify operations at the checkpoints and to initiate action against errant officials. The authorities emphasized to the Group that checkpoints had been

authorized in only 33 locations. The realities on the ground, however, are considerably different, as ascertained by the Group during its field missions and discussions with several interlocutors.

166. Restricting checkpoints to 33 locations does not, per se, mean the existence of only 33 checkpoints. All the major entry and exit points for the particular locality have checkpoints, manned by all the agencies (police, gendarmerie, customs administration, water and forestry police). For example, Bouaké has four exit and entry points, each with a checkpoint. This is the same in all the specified locations.

167. The Group notes that the situation on the main routes leading to Ghana (Abidjan-Noé), Burkina Faso (Abidjan-Ouangolodougou-Laléraba) and Mali (Abidjan-Ouangolodougou-Pogo) remains stable, with no checkpoints apart from official checkpoints and those at the borders. The Group notes, however, that, on secondary roads, a good number of illegal checkpoints can still be observed. For example, on the road from Apropronou to Daoukro (some 70 km), the Group observed four checkpoints manned by the military, the gendarmerie, the police and the customs administration. The Group also notes that mainly gendarmes and military elements are posted at the roadside at various locations. For example, on the road from Man to Odienné (some 250 km), the Group noted seven such posts and observed that vehicles were being systematically stopped and subjected to racketeering at those locations. Its observations have been confirmed by several sources, both official and private.

168. In recent months, however, there has been an increase in the number of checkpoints and observation points in various regions. The Group notes that in the border regions in particular multiple illegal checkpoints are set up, especially on market days. The racketeering at the checkpoints often results in tensions between the transporters and the security forces. For example, transporters in Bondoukou suspended their operations from 29 January to 1 February 2016 to protest against the multiple checkpoints up to the border with Ghana.

169. The foregoing shows that the problem of extortion and unauthorized checkpoints is continuing and a source of income for those manning the checkpoints. Not only does it increase the transaction costs for the transport of merchandise, but also it restricts the freedom of movement of good and persons.

X. Targeted sanctions measures

170. In accordance with the measures imposed by the Security Council in paragraphs 9 to 12 of its resolution 1572 (2004) and paragraph 12 of resolution 1975 (2011), as renewed in paragraph 12 of resolution 2219 (2015), the Group is continuing its investigations into possible violations of the travel ban and the asset freeze. There are currently six individuals subject to the measures: Charles Blé Goudé, Eugène N'goran Kouadio Djué, Martin Kouakou Fofié, Laurent Gbagbo, Simone Gbagbo and Désiré Tagro.

A. Asset freeze

171. Details of bank accounts held in the Ivorian banking system by the designated individuals were made available to the Group in November 2014 by the Central

Bank of West African States. The Group is continuing its investigations into the accounts to determine whether the assets remain frozen and to ascertain the source of the funds.

172. The Group had two meetings with officials from the Central Bank of West African States in Côte d'Ivoire and discussed the measures put in place to ensure the effective implementation of the asset freeze with regard to bank accounts held by the designated individuals. It appeared that the Central Bank had no specific rules to monitor the implementation of the freeze and was therefore asked to clarify what directives or procedures it had put in place to ensure proper implementation. In the particular instance of Côte d'Ivoire, three individuals have been subject to the freeze since February 2006 and three others since March 2011. The Central Bank, however, communicated that information to the Ivorian banks only through a letter dated 13 December 2012. As observed from the records, the banks applied the freeze only with effect from January 2013. It thus follows that the individuals could have freely drawn upon the funds in their accounts until then.

173. The Group is also examining other sources of revenue for the designated individuals to determine whether the asset freeze has been violated.

Charles Blé Goudé

174. The Group has previously emphasized the non-response from the French publisher, L'Harmattan, concerning the publication of Charles Blé Goudé's book, *Le traquenard électoral*, in 2011 and the payment of royalties therefor (see [S/2015/252](#), para. 280).

175. The Group met the Managing Director of L'Harmattan in June 2015 in Paris. He indicated that there had been no contract with Mr. Blé Goudé, that no correspondence had been exchanged and that there had been no financial dealings. He further specified that a limited number of copies had been published and thence there had been no question of financial implications.

176. He subsequently furnished, by e-mail, the list of sales of the book. From 2011 to May 2015, 1,497 copies had been sold. The Group requested him to supply further information on the cost of publication, including whether it had been borne by the publishing house or by a third party. More importantly, the Group asked whether Mr. Blé Goudé had expressly renounced his rights to a third party.

177. No response has been received to date, notwithstanding several reminders and a further meeting in January 2016. A separate communication was addressed to the French authorities, seeking their assistance in acquiring the information and requesting their comments. The French authorities have indicated that they are still awaiting a response from L'Harmattan.

178. The Group met Mr. Blé Goudé, accompanied by his two lawyers, on 19 February 2016 at the International Criminal Court detention centre in Scheveningen, the Netherlands. The Group explained the scope of the individual sanctions and the procedures for requesting delisting and exemptions. In response to specific questions, Mr. Blé Goudé said that he had no other accounts in Côte d'Ivoire apart from the two in Banque de l'habitat de Côte d'Ivoire and one in Banque pour le financement de l'agriculture, of which the Group was already aware. He stated that he had had an account at a branch of HSBC in Manchester, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, dating from his student days there

in 2002, but that he knew neither the details nor the balance therein. He acknowledged the publication of his book by L'Harmattan, but categorically stated that he had never received any payment or signed any contract. According to him, his company, Leader's Team Associated, is no longer in existence.

179. When confronted with the fact that he had had free access to funds from 2006 to 2012 and that his company had functioned during that period, he said that he had been running a business and had had to pay his employees. He also stated that, once in exile in Ghana, he had never travelled abroad and never used his Malian passport (see S/2013/228, para. 287).

180. He requested the Group to inform the Committee that he was actively committed to contributing to the process of peace and national reconciliation in Côte d'Ivoire.

Martin Kouakou Fofié

181. From the communication received from the Central Bank of West African States in November 2014, the Group observed that Lt. Col. Martin Kouakou Fofié had nine bank accounts: six in Banque atlantique, two in Banque nationale d'investissement and one in NSIA Banque.

182. Pursuant to the Group's requests, Banque atlantique provided details of the accounts held by Lt. Col. Fofié in the branch in Korhogo. It was clarified that the accounts had been blocked in January 2013, pursuant to a communication from the Central Bank of West African States.

183. Scrutiny of the transactions revealed that large deposits had been made in cash from the date of opening of the accounts to the time at which they were blocked. They were made by Lt. Col. Fofié and other individuals and almost entirely withdrawn. Table 4 provides details of deposits and withdrawals in just one account, opened in December 2007, to illustrate the sums involved.

Table 4

Transactions in an account belonging to Lt. Col. Fofié

(CFAF)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Credit</i>	<i>Debit</i>	<i>Balance^a</i>
2007	1 300 000	5 500	1 294 500
2008	17 051 900	12 578 100	5 768 300
2009	75 834 490	78 358 395	3 244 395
2010	469 462 300	472 160 436	546 259
2011	368 090 500	341 310 163	27 326 596
2012	1 001 401 200	1 020 710 529	8 017 267
2013	10 000 000	66 000	17 951 267

^a The deposits total CFAF 1,943,390 (\$3 million). The balance in June 2015 was CFAF 17,849,017, on account of deduction of bank charges.

184. In yet another account opened in 2009, again in Banque atlantique, Lt. Col. Fofié received CFAF 582,226,300 (\$964,000) from 2009 to 2012. He transferred CFAF 229 million (\$379,000) to the account detailed above.

185. In 2007, Banque nationale d'investissement had opened a branch in Korhogo at which Lt. Col. Fofié opened two accounts, the first in September 2007 and the second in October 2012. Because Lt. Col. Fofié was subject to United Nations sanctions, it had apparently written to the Group on 29 October 2007 to request instructions or recommendations. A reminder had apparently been sent on 10 April 2013, with the bank stating that Lt. Col. Fofié was an influential person, in political and security terms, in the areas under the control of the former Forces nouvelles. Mindful of the security of its property and personnel, the bank had deferred the application of the asset freeze pending the Group's response.

186. From the regular cash infusions by himself and others (some \$3 million in under six years in just one account in Banque atlantique) and subsequent regular expenditure, it is clear that Lt. Col. Fofié had unimpeded access to funds, despite being subject to the asset freeze since February 2006.

187. The Group sought to identify any other assets and financial resources held by Lt. Col. Fofié. In several of its earlier reports, the Group consistently highlighted the common knowledge that Lt. Col. Fofié had several economic activities that gave him access to regular income (S/2009/521, paras. 203 and 483; S/2011/271, paras. 430-431; and S/2011/272, paras. 314-316).

188. During its mandate, the Group ascertained from several credible sources that Lt. Col. Fofié had the following revenue-yielding activities:

- (a) Several houses in Korhogo that were being rented to tenants, with a manager appointed to collect rent on his behalf;
- (b) Hotel-restaurant complexes;
- (c) Private security agency;
- (d) Construction firms;
- (e) Educational institutions.

189. The Group is seeking to substantiate Lt. Col. Fofié's involvement in those activities. It does not expect, however, to find his name on any legal documents, given that the activities would, in all probability, be managed by others on his behalf. The other stumbling block is the general reluctance to provide information about him, for fear of serious consequences.

190. The above information is supported by the remarks in a bank "Know your customer" form prepared in July 2013 that the account functions through the deposit of funds received from his activities, such as the restaurant business, hotels and the renting of property.

191. Furthermore, a suspicious transaction report had also been filed with the relevant government authorities, in the light of potential laundering of illegal funds.

192. Concerning the link between Lt. Col. Fofié and the security company, the Group looked into the activities and transactions of the latter. The company is currently providing security for the premises of major government agencies, hotels, banks and other businesses in the Korhogo area. One of the persons authorized to operate the company's bank account is Drissa Dembele, who was under Lt. Col. Fofié's command but has since, according to credible sources and Lt. Col. Fofié

himself, been demobilized. Two accounts held by Lt. Col. Fofié show large cash deposits by a Drissa Dembele.

193. Furthermore, Lt. Col. Fofié commands the fourth infantry battalion, based in Korhogo. He receives a salary and allowances totalling CFAF 600,000, together with CFAF 120,000 as a rental allowance. The Government has not, however, responded to the Group's request for details of the remuneration and of the steps taken to comply with the provisions of the resolutions relating to the asset freeze.

194. The Government has neither requested nor received exemptions from the asset freeze from the Committee to make salary and allowance payments. Such payments would therefore constitute a violation of the sanctions measures.

195. To ensure Lt. Col. Fofié's right of reply on several issues, the Group met him on 16 January 2016 and explained the provisions of the asset freeze, including the procedures for requesting delisting or the granting of exemptions. The latter is provided under paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 1572 (2004). Concerning the violations of the freeze imposed in relation to his bank accounts, Lt. Col. Fofié stated that he had no accounts other than the nine detailed above.

196. The Group also asked whether he had informed the various banks that he was subject to the asset freeze, but he did not respond. With regard to the large cash deposits by several individuals over the years and the purposes thereof, he clarified the matter only in respect of the identity of two persons — a member of his security detail and his uncle. He provided no details about the others and did not explain the source of or reason for the payments. Lastly, he claimed that the large sums that he had received until 2012 had been paid to him by the Forces nouvelles for administrative expenses in his area of control, but did not elaborate further.

197. The unwillingness of Lt. Col. Fofié to cooperate with the Group on matters relating to the asset freeze notwithstanding, it can reasonably be inferred that the sums are revenue from his various economic activities, which he chooses not to reveal.

198. The Group has obtained Lt. Col. Fofié's passport and national identity card (see annex 30). On the passport, his profession has been shown as a company director rather than as a government official.

199. With regard to the passport, the Group has written to the Government to ascertain why it was issued in 2012 and what measures have been taken to ensure compliance with the travel ban since its issuance. No response has yet been received.

Laurent Gbagbo

200. In follow-up to the investigation into payment of copyright fees to Laurent Gbagbo, the Group wrote to the legal counsel of the French publishing house, Les éditions du moment. No response has been received, despite further reminders. The French authorities were requested to assist the Group in obtaining the necessary information and they conveyed the reply of the publishing house to the effect that no royalties had been paid to Mr. Gbagbo.

201. The Group is also examining the financial implications of the publication of the English-language version of the book by NextAfrika Publishing, a company based in the United States.

202. The Group continues to investigate the movements in the bank accounts in Côte d'Ivoire held in Mr. Gbagbo's name and any other assets that he may hold, directly or indirectly, whether in Côte d'Ivoire or elsewhere. The Group also awaits a response to a request for information made to the International Criminal Court on the subject.

Eugène N'goran Kouadio Djué, Simone Gbagbo and Désiré Tagro

203. The Group is continuing its investigations into the assets and activities of Eugène N'goran Kouadio Djué and Simone Gbagbo and the assets of the late Désiré Tagro.

204. The Group has previously mentioned the payment of a dividend, for 2011, to Ms. Gbagbo by SOGESPARG, a share management company, entirely owned by the Société générale de banques en Côte d'Ivoire (see [S/2013/228](#), para. 309). It learned from reliable sources that the dividends that would have accrued to Ms. Gbagbo would amount to CFAF 89,246,763 (\$141,317), but that the money had not been made available to her. Further verification is under way.

205. As regards the late Désiré Tagro, the Group is aware that there were two accounts in his name in Versus Bank. The latter had informed the Central Bank of West African States that, as at 18 December 2012, Mr. Tagro's heirs had asked to take possession of the funds in those accounts as part of their succession rights. The Group has asked the Government what measures it has taken to ascertain the nature and value of all movable and immovable property held by Mr. Tagro and also what steps have been taken to ensure the maintenance of the asset freeze in respect of his assets.

B. Travel ban

206. The Group has found no evidence of violations of the travel ban by the designated individuals.

C. Implementation of the asset freeze and travel ban

207. It is amply clear that Banque nationale d'investissement was aware of the asset freeze, and it would appear that all the banks in Côte d'Ivoire would also have been aware, considering that the freeze imposed on three individuals in February 2006 was widely reported in the press. Furthermore, in earlier mandates (from 2006), the Group wrote on multiple occasions to all the banks in Côte d'Ivoire to ask whether the sanctioned individuals held accounts with them. Nevertheless, the banks continued to allow the sanctioned individuals free access to their funds, in some cases for at least six years.

208. The foregoing shows the inherent flaws in the system of ensuring the asset freeze. Although the imposition of sanctions on individuals is in the public domain, the banks in Côte d'Ivoire have not applied the freeze, probably because there were no directions from the national authorities to do so. Under paragraph 11 of Security Council resolution 1572 (2004), States have a duty to freeze the funds and ensure that those funds are prevented from being made available by their nationals or by any persons within their territories, to or for the benefit of such persons or entities.

When the matter was discussed with representatives of the Ministry of Justice, they indicated that the resolution took precedence over national law and was therefore immediately applicable. Each ministry would take the measures necessary, within its purview, to put it into effect. The Group has asked the Government to indicate the measures taken to comply with the resolution and a reply is awaited.

209. The Group observes that commercial entities tend to not fully appreciate the scope of the asset freeze and do not respond to the Group's queries, as the two instances cited herein show. In fact, in one case, the correspondence has been continuing since 2011. There is no indication to date that the Government has instituted any formal inquiry into the two cases to determine whether there has been a violation of the freeze, notwithstanding the information provided in several reports of the Group.

210. The individual cases discussed above would constitute sufficient grounds to launch investigations into the sources of revenue of the designated individuals by both Côte d'Ivoire and other countries. Depending on the results, Member States could take further action to ensure compliance with the provisions of Security Council resolution 1572 (2004), as reiterated in paragraph 12 of resolution 2219 (2015). The Group's assessment, after having seen several cases of actual and possible violations of the asset freeze, is that that provision of the resolution is honoured more in the breach than the observance. There needs to be a proper understanding of the same and a mechanism of awareness-raising and oversight instituted by national Governments themselves, given that it is their duty to implement the United Nations sanctions measures.

XI. Recommendations

A. General

211. The Group recommends that Member States provide training programmes on the implementation of the sanctions regime aimed at the relevant government departments and conduct industry outreach and public awareness programmes on the sanctions regime.

B. Arms

212. The Group recommends that Côte d'Ivoire review the potential discrepancies between the number of registered weapons and the number actually present in the armouries of the security forces.

213. The Group recommends that Côte d'Ivoire establish an interministerial agency to investigate the loss of materiel belonging to the security forces, materiel that entered the country in violation of the arms embargo and materiel not under the control of the State authorities.

C. Customs and transport

214. The Group recommends that Côte d'Ivoire develop a national border management strategy aimed at reducing the number of security forces, agencies and

checkpoints. The strategy should take into account established best practices such as one-stop border posts, where security forces and agencies, if several are present, share the same premises and carry out integrated controls.

215. The Group recommends that Côte d'Ivoire authorize additional customs offices to clear goods and implement consistent reporting processes at all border crossings in order to curb informal cross-border traffic.

216. The Group recommends that Côte d'Ivoire increase cooperation with the customs administrations of its neighbouring countries to curb informal cross-border traffic through joint investigations of trade statistics discrepancies and the use of the agreement on the use of custom export declarations in the country of import as a check on the legality of exports.

217. The Group recommends that Côte d'Ivoire, in developing its national migration strategy, consider the management of movements of goods and persons in an integrated way by establishing a single border surveillance force with the powers necessary to combat the informal movement of persons and goods across borders.

218. The Group recommends that Côte d'Ivoire, to ensure a holistic reform process of its customs administration, reassess its needs in the framework of the Columbus Programme of the World Customs Organization.

D. Diamonds and natural resources

219. The Group recommends that the Société pour le développement minier de la Côte d'Ivoire clarify its status and claims over diamond permits in Tortiya and obtain the authorizations necessary to begin organizing operators along the artisanal diamond value chain (diggers, middlemen, financiers and final buyers) following the model of the *encadrement* system adopted in Séguéla.

220. The Group recommends that Côte d'Ivoire urge all diamond collectors and buyers licensed to operate in the country to declare the stockpiles of rough diamonds in their possession and to prove that they have not been acquired in contravention of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (for those acquired after April 2014) or the United Nations diamonds embargo (for those acquired before April 2014). It also recommends that the data collection system that records the transactions along the diamond trading chain in use in Côte d'Ivoire be improved to show the distribution of profits among the actors along the chain.

221. The Group recommends that the Ministry of Industry and Mines streamline internationally recognized best practices into a national strategy to allow the development of a transparent, accountable and viable artisanal and small-scale gold-mining sector.

222. The Group recommends that Agbaou Gold Operations SA, LGL Mines CI SA, Occidental Gold SARL, the Société des mines d'Ity and the Société des mines de Tongon SA reveal without delay whether army officers or other member of the security forces in their area of operations impose fees for security or other activities.

223. The Group recommends that Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire establish the mixed committee foreseen in the treaty of friendship of 2014 to manage the peaceful eviction of those living illegally in the Mount Péko National Park and provide it with the resources necessary to carry out its mandate.

224. The Group recommends that Côte d'Ivoire take action to stop the racketeering inside the Mount Péko National Park by Capt. Ouattara Polo.

E. Finance

225. The Group recommends that the Central Bank of West African States instruct all banking and financial institutions to undertake thorough verification ("Know your customer" check) of existing and first-time customers and vet them against all United Nations lists for designations under the asset freeze.

F. Targeted sanctions measures

226. The Group recommends that the Security Council consider including in future resolutions a provision to endorse the travel documents of individuals subject to a United Nations travel ban with a notice describing his or her status.

227. The Group recommends that Côte d'Ivoire provide the Committee with the biometric data of the six individuals included on the sanctions list.

228. The Group recommends that Member States cooperate with the World Customs Organization to foster greater cooperation among all border control agencies and between border control agencies and carriers in the development and use of the advance passenger information system, for the effective implementation of the travel ban.

Annexes

Annex 1. Meetings and consultations held by the Group of Experts in the course of its mandate	48
Annex 2. Arms and ammunition seized in Kumasi (Ghana)	50
Annex 3. Codification of the markings.	53
Annex 4a. 7.62x39mm ammunition documented in the Misséni attack.	54
Annex 4b. Weapons documented in Missaso cache.	55
Annex 5. Turkish materiel seized in Ferkessedougou	58
Annex 6. Weapons and ammunition exported from Albania.	63
Annex 7. Weapons and ammunition manufactured in Bulgaria	80
Annex 8. ECOWAS authorization for arms transfer to Burkina Faso	106
Annex 9. Weapons and ammunition from the Sudan.	114
Annex 10. Weapons and associated ammunition documented in Korhogo	180
Annex 11. Korhogo – Ammunition seized by Forces Nouvelles from the former regular army (FDS).	183
Annex 12. Removal of serial numbers and factory identification marks.	223
Annex 13. Weapons and ammunition with characteristics similar to Chinese military industry production	226
Annex 14. Weapons and ammunition located at the GASPAN premises in Abidjan.	259
Annex 15. Weapons and ammunition with characteristics similar to former Czechoslovakian production	269
Annex 16. Materiel with characteristics similar to Iranian production	274
Annex 17. Weapons and ammunition with characteristics similar to Romanian production	284
Annex 18. Actions taken by FRCI headquarters to recover arms and ammunition	285
Annex 19. Transfer order dated 4 February 2015	291
Annex 20. Transfer of arms for destruction in Abidjan dated 14 April 2015.	293
Annex 21. Transfer of ammunition dated 6 July 2015.	295
Annex 22. Weapons and associated ammunition recovered by FRCI HQ from Bouaké in November 2014	297
Annex 23. Locations visited by the Group.	298
Annex 24. Ivorian customs offices and mobile brigades.	299
Annex 25. Rehabilitation of customs offices	300
Annex 26. Documents related to the transfer of 60 NVG7-21 night vision goggles.	301
Annex 27. Documents related to the transfer of 5 FLIR BTS-XR Pro thermal imaging devices.	305
Annex 28. Documents related to the transfer of 21 TRM-2000 military trucks	308
Annex 29. Contracts signed in Gamina illegal gold exploitations	317
Annex 30. Passport and national identity card of Martin Kouakou Fofié	323

Annex 1. Meetings and consultations held by the Group of Experts in the course of its mandate

ANGOLA

Multilateral and bilateral entities

Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS)

BELGIUM

Multilateral and bilateral entities

European Commission; World Customs Organization (WCO)

BULGARIA

Government

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

CÔTE D'IVOIRE

Government

Commission nationale de lutte contre la prolifération et la circulation illicite des Armes Légères et de Petit Calibre (ComNat-ALPC); Conseil Café Cacao (CCC); Conseil Coton Anacarde (CCA); Conseil National de Sécurité (CNS); General Directorate of Customs; Ministry of Agriculture; Ministry of Defence; Ministry of Economy and Finance; Ministry of Industry and Mines; Ministry of the Interior and Security; Ministry of Justice; Mano River Union Sub-Office; Kimberly Process Secretariat in Côte d'Ivoire (SPRPK-CI)

Diplomatic missions

Embassy of Belgium; Embassy of France; Embassy of Spain; Embassy of the United States of America;

Multilateral and bilateral entities

European Union Delegation; National Chapter Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (CN-ITIE); United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI); United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS); United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC); The Property Rights and Artisanal Diamond Development Project (PRADDII); Regional Technical Assistance Centre of the International Monetary Fund (AFRITAC Ouest); International Organization of Migration (IOM)

Regional entities

Banque Centrale des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (BCEAO)

FRANCE

Government

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Multilateral and bilateral entities

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OCDE)

THE NETHERLANDS

Multilateral and bilateral entities

International Criminal Court (ICC)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Diplomatic missions

Chairman of the 1572 Committee;

Annex 2. Arms and ammunition seized in Kumasi (Ghana)

<http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/crime/Kumasi-arms-cache-belonged-to-Ivorians-Police-400878>

The police have explained that the large cache of arms which were retrieved at Alabar in Kumasi at the weekend belonged to a gun runner from Ivory Coast.

The gun runner and his cohorts were said to be using Ghana as a transit point to war torn areas in West Africa to sell.

The arms, which included bullets packed in two big trunks were retrieved from the bedroom of 72-year-old Moro Sata, an Ivorian who told the police he received the ammunition from Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso and Niger.

At a press briefing on Monday, the police said some of the arms were capable of shooting down an aircraft, eleven AK 47 rifles, 10 G3s, 45 automatic side-arms, 9mm AK 47 tracer ammunitions, one machine gun, 45 automatic G3 ammunitions, four firing pins, and five 12.7mm ammunitions.

The arrest was made following a tip off. Sata told the police **he received his supplies from Abdul Kadri Aria, another Ivorian who has been delivering to him from Ivory Coast.**

The Ashanti Regional Police Commander, DCOP Nathan Kofi Boakye said police investigations have established that apart selling them outside of Ghana, Sata also sell guns to some Ghanaians.

Four other Ghanaian suspected armed robbers who have been purchasing ammunitions from the gun runner have also been arrested.

DCOP Boakye said the police have mounted coordinated investigations into the matter and would not give the names of those arrested for fear of compromising the ongoing investigations.

He assured the public that the Regional Police Command would do all within its power to preserve the peace in Kumasi and urged the public to cooperate and volunteer information that would lead to the arrest of criminals.



Comment by the Group: The photographs show AA-52 machine-guns (France), Type 56-2 (Characteristics similar to Chinese production), AK-47 assault rifles (various models of different origin) and FSA semi-automatic rifles (France). These are standard arms used by the security forces of Côte d'Ivoire.



Serial numbers of Ivorian arms seized in Ghana (source UNOCI IEMU)


Type	Serial number
AA52 (France)	A 35007
AKM (Bulgaria)	BE 100480
AKM (Bulgaria)	BA 194644
Type 56-2 (Characteristics similar to Chinese production)	37 22701
Type 56-2 (Characteristics similar to Chinese production)	37 28824
Type 56-1 (Characteristics similar to Chinese production)	48 391270
MAS 36 (France)	L 67762
MAS 36 (France)	N 38821
MAS 36 (France)	FG 87667
MAS 36 (France)	K 22446
MAS 36 (France)	BH 19895
MAS 49-56 (France)	39366
Not available	No serial number, marked "CI FT5 AD34"
Not available	No serial number, marked "CI FT9 AD291"
Not available	No serial number, marked "CI FT1X AD16 ¹ "
Not available	No serial number, marked "CI GP1 AD03"

Sample CI FT9 AD291**CI:** Côte d'Ivoire**FT9:** BSO – located in Man**AD:** à détruire (to be destroyed)¹ Reference incomplete

Annex 3. Codification of the markings

MODE DE MARQUAGE DES ARMES

2. Codification de marquage adopté

Logo de la CEDEAO	Code pays	Code de l'institution utilisatrice de l'arme		Numéro de série
	CI	Com Terre	FT	AI2178135QS
		Com Air	FA	
		Com Mer	FM	
		Unités rattachées	UR	
		Police	PN	
		Gendarmerie	GN	
		Douanes	DN	
		Eaux et Forêts	EF	
		Société privée de sécurité	SP	

Sample



AD = “A détruire” (to be destroyed)

Annex 4a. 7.62x39mm ammunition documented in the Misséni attack

No.	Identification	Producer	Year	Qty	Previously documented
1	1_39_10	The Sudan	2010	2	Côte d'Ivoire, Mali
2	10_02	Bulgaria	2002	1	Côte d'Ivoire
3	10_11	Bulgaria	2011	1	Mali
4	17_65	Former Soviet Union	1965	1	Côte d'Ivoire
5	270_*_50_*	Former Soviet Union	1950	1	Côte d'Ivoire
6	270_*_51_*	Former Soviet Union	1951	2	Côte d'Ivoire
7	270_Г	Former Soviet Union	1952	5	Côte d'Ivoire
8	270_E	Former Soviet Union	1954	3	Côte d'Ivoire
9	270_И	Former Soviet Union	1955	1	Côte d'Ivoire
10	3_52	Former Soviet Union	1952	1	Côte d'Ivoire
11	31_66	Characteristics similar to Chinese production	1966	3	Mali
12	31_69	Characteristics similar to Chinese production	1969	1	Mali
13	31_94	Characteristics similar to Chinese production	1994	1	Mali
14	311_02	Characteristics similar to Chinese production	2002	3	Côte d'Ivoire
15	539_*_51_*	Former Soviet Union	1951	2	Côte d'Ivoire
16	539_75	Former Soviet Union	1975	1	Côte d'Ivoire
17	539_80	Former Soviet Union	1980	2	Mali
18	60_*_Д_*	Former Soviet Union	1953	2	Côte d'Ivoire
19	61_08	Characteristics similar to Chinese production	2008	22	Mali
20	61_02	Characteristics similar to Chinese production	2002	1	Côte d'Ivoire
21	61_97	Characteristics similar to Chinese production	1968	7	Côte d'Ivoire, Mali
22	61_77	Characteristics similar to Chinese production	1977	2	Not documented
23	61_68	Characteristics similar to Chinese production	1997	2	Mali
24	711_88	Former Soviet Union	1988	9	Mali
25	711_89	Former Soviet Union	1989	5	Mali
26	811_08	Characteristics similar to Chinese production	2008	10	Mali
27	9121_75	Characteristics similar to Chinese production	1975	1	Mali
28	92_ZI	Zimbabwe	1992	1	Côte d'Ivoire
29	9661_70	Characteristics similar to Chinese production	1970	1	Mali
30	*Arabic script	Egypt	Unk	1	Mali
31	S&B_*_7.62x39_*	Former Czechoslovakia	Unk	1	Côte d'Ivoire
32	ППЧ_2002	Former Yugoslavia	2002	2	Côte d'Ivoire
Total				98	

Unk = unknown

Annex 4b. Weapons documented in Missaso cache.



AK-47 – Manufactured in the former Soviet Union – Year of manufacture 1974 - Serial number: BL761



AK-47 – Manufactured in th former Soviet Union – Year of manufacture 1955 - Serial number: Not readable.



ARM – Manufactured in Bulgaria – Year of manufacture 1963 – Serial number: VP2204



ARM – Manufactured in Bulgaria – Year of manufacture unknown – Serial number: MB 44 2113



ARM – Manufactured in Bulgaria – Year of manufacture unknown – Serial number: CV 47 3642



Type 56-1 light machine-gun (RPD) – Characteristics similar to Chinese production
Year of manufacture : unknown - Serial number: 705310



VZ58V – Manufactured in the Former Czechoslovakia – Year of manufacture: unknown.
Serial number: mechanically erased.
Arm identified as belonging to the 1st Commando Parachutist Battalion (Abidjan).
This arm has been marked « to be destroyed » on 7 November 2013 in Abobo.

7.62x39mm ammunition documented in the Missaso cache

No.	Identification	Producer	Year	Qty	Previously documented
1	10_79	Bulgaria	1979	-	not documented
2	61_68	Characteristics similar to Chinese production	1968	-	Mali
3	61_77	Characteristics similar to Chinese production	1977	-	Mali
4	61_08	Characteristics similar to Chinese production	2008	-	Mali
5	71_71	Characteristics similar to Chinese production	1971	-	Mali
6	343_72	Poland	1972	-	Mali
Total				1.561	



10_79
Not documented before



61_68
Documented in Misseni attack
as well as Timbuktu region



61_77
Documented in Misseni attack



61_08
Documented in Misseni attack,
Timbuktu, Mopti regions and
Bamako.



71_71
Documented in Gao, Mopti and
Timbuktu regions



343-72
Documented in Gao region in
several terrorist attacks

Annex 5. Turkish materiel seized in Ferkessedougou



Two 12 gauges shotguns produced by
Khan Arms (Turkey)



Serial numbers P14-00209



Barbaros Mah. Mer Simbol Sk. No 5
 Dolmaba Palata D: 24 Kat: 1 34746
 Bati Aksehir - Istanbul / Turkiye
 Tel: +90 216 290 35 27 - 28
 Fax: +90 216 290 35 24
 www.unidef.com.tr
 info@unidef.com.tr

Ref No: IY160225

Mr. Manuel Bressan

Secretary

Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1572 (2004) Concerning Cote d'Ivoire

Subject : The shotguns caught in Ivory Coast

Referred : The fax message received from UN with reference number S/AC.45/2016/GE/OC36 dated 15 February 2016

Dear Mr. Bressan,

We received the referred fax message related to the shotguns caught in Ivory Coast.

Unidef United Defence Industry and Trade Inc. is a project management company operating in the defence business in Turkey. Unidef company is carrying out its business activities in the field of weapon integration to military platforms being in the inventories of Turkish Armed Forces and Turkish Law Enforcement Organisation. The shareholders of Unidef company are Kayhan Shotguns Industry and Foreign Trade Limited and Samsun National Defence Inc.

We would like to inform you that the two shotguns mentioned in the referred fax message belong to the exports lot carried out by our shareholder Kayhan Shotguns Industry and Foreign Trade Limited to Burkina Faso.

These shotguns were exported to Signal Distribution Sari company for the delivery to the End-User Burkina Faso Presidency. The related End-User Certificate signed and stamped by their authority were submitted to our side.

The shotguns are stated as sportive ungrooved rifles in accordance with the International Customs Tariff Statistics Position Number 93032010 and are not subject to export and import permit. The said export procedure was carried out via Turkish Airlines Cargo service after the finalization of all legal custom and transport operations.

Accordingly, we suggest you to contact the Signal Distribution Sari company to investigate what happened with these shotguns. You can find the contact details of this company in the attached Airway Bill.

All the legal documents are presented attached for your examination.

Yours sincerely,

General Manager

R. Cem Kurter



KHAN ARMS

KAYHAN AV TÜFEKLERİ SAN. VE DİŞ TİC. LTD. ŞTİ.

Kayıtlı Vergi Dairesi : 536 028 4555 Tic. Sic. No: 482083-429675

FATURA / INVOICE

ALICI ADRESİ / DELIVERY ADDRESS

Signal Distribution SARL
04 BP 8154 Ouagadougou 04

BATİ AFRİKA BURKİNA FASO



İL KODU : 34



TARİH / INVOICE DATE

0749962

SERİSİMBAC / CONWNO

27.11.2014

SEVKİRSALİYE NO / CONSIGMENT NOTE NO


0425220

SEVKİ ŞARTLARI / TERMS OF DELIVERY

EXW İstanbul

ÖDEME ŞARTLARI / TERMS OF PAYMENT

MAL MUKABİLİ



AÇIKLAMA / PRODUCT DESCRIPTION	MİKTARI QUANTITY	BİRİM FİYATI UNIT PRICE	TUTAN NET AMOUNT
12 KAL 47 CM POMPALI YIVSIZ AV TÜFEĞİ	30	340,00	10.200,00 USD
12 KAL 40 CM POMPALI YIVSIZ AV TÜFEĞİ	31	190,00	5.890,00 USD
TOPLAM KAP : 12 KOLİ	TOPLAM ÜRÜN	81	
<p>Mallar Türk Menşelidir. İmalatçı Firma : ARTHEMIS SİLAH SAN VE TİC. LTD.ŞTİ. ALFA TÜFEK-(ALAATTİN ERDEN) Aracı Banka: TÜRK EKONOMİ BANKASI (TEB) KÜÇÜKSAKALKÖY ŞUBESİ Ödeme Şekli :MAL MUKABİLİ</p>			
YALNIZ ONALTBİNDOKSANDOLAR ONLY		ÖZEL TOPLAM TOTAL	16.090,00 USD

Yeni Sahra Mah. Necla Sk.
No:22 Alayehir / İstanbul

Tel : +90 216 632 75 55 pbx info@khanarms.com
Fax: +90 216 632 74 44 www.khanarms.com

THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY
MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

END-USER CERTIFICATE

1. Name and Address of Applicant :

2. Name and Address of Exporter : KHAN ARDG

3. Name and Address of End User : **Presidence Du Faso BURKINA FASO**

4. Contract or Order Reference : _____ Date : _____


5. Articles/Data :
We certify that we have placed an order with the person named in item 2 for the following articles/data in the quantity and value shown below:

Quantity	Articles/data description	Value
100pcs	-Tac Force Duo Sys,12 Ga, 47 cm Bbl,3"Chamber,telescopic stock, with heat shield, w/ doorbuster,MC-1,with cling. Pump Action Sporting Shotgun	44 900 \$
100pcs	-A-Tac Spark,12 Ga, 40 cm Bbl,3" chamber, Fixed choke, w/ heat shield, with sling, Pump Action Sporting Shotgun	25 200 \$

6. To be used for the following purpose(s) : **use by security forces**


7. Certification of Consignee :
We certify that we are importing the articles/data listed in item 5 for delivery to the end-user in item 3. We undertake not to sell, lend or deliver to any third party under any conditions whatsoever, with or without compensation, temporarily or permanently, the articles listed in item 5 including equipment and spares, delivered in connection with the after-sales support, documentation and operating manuals, without the prior written approval of the Turkish Government.

Signature of official : **GILBERT DIENDERE**
Name & title of signer : **Général de Brigade**

Date signed : _____
Seal : 


8. Certification of End-User :
We certify that we are the end-user of the articles/data listed in item 5. We undertake not to sell, lend or deliver to any third party under any conditions whatsoever, with or without compensation, temporarily or permanently, the articles/data listed in item 5 including equipment and spares, delivered in connection with the after-sales support, documentation and operating manuals, without the prior written approval of the Turkish Government.

Signature of official : **GILBERT DIENDERE**
Name & title of signer : **Général de Brigade**

Date signed : _____
Seal : 

9. Certification of Government :
We undertake not to authorize the re-export, resale or other disposition of the articles/data listed in item 5 including equipment and spares delivered in connection with the after-sales support, documentation and operating manuals outside the country in item 3 without the prior written approval of the Turkish Government.

Signature of government official : **GILBERT DIENDERE**
Name & title of signer : **Général de Brigade**

Date signed : _____
Seal : 



27.11.2014

KHAN ARMS
 SIGNAL DISTRIBUTION SARL
 SERIAL NUMBERS
 SHIPMENT 1

A-Tac Force Duo-Sys, 12 Ga, 47 cm Bbl, 3" Chamber, telescopic stock, with heat shield, w/doorbuster, MC-1, with sling, Pump Action Sporting Shotgun					
BOX 01	14-PY0057	14-PY0058	14-PY0059	14-PY0060	14-PY0061
BOX 02	14-PY0062	14-PY0063	14-PY0064	14-PY0065	14-PY0066
BOX 03	14-PY0067	14-PY0068	14-PY0069	14-PY0070	14-PY0071
BOX 04	14-PY0072	14-PY0073	14-PY0074	14-PY0075	14-PY0076
BOX 05	14-PY0077	14-PY0078	14-PY0079	14-PY0080	14-PY0081
BOX 06	14-PY0082	14-PY0083	14-PY0084	14-PY0085	14-PY0086

A-Tac Spark, 12 Ga, 40 cm Bbl, 3" Chamber, Fixed choke, w/heat shield, with sling, Pump Action Sporting Shotgun					
BOX 07	P14-00196	P14-00197	P14-00198	P14-00199	P14-00200
BOX 08	P14-00201	P14-00202	P14-00203	P14-00204	P14-00205
BOX 09	P14-00206	P14-00207	P14-00208	P14-00209	P14-00210
BOX 10	P14-00211	P14-00212	P14-00213	P14-00214	P14-00215
BOX 11	P14-00216	P14-00217	P14-00218	P14-00219	P14-00220
BOX 12	P14-00221	P14-00222	P14-00223	P14-00224	P14-00225
	P14-00226				

Annex 6. Weapons and ammunition exported from Albania**Weapons**

60mm mortar – Type 31	Annex 6a
82mm mortar – Type 53	Annex 6b
120mm mortar – Type 55	Annex 6c

Ammunition

60mm mortar bomb	Annex 6d
82mm mortar bomb	Annex 6e
120mm mortar bomb	Annex 6f
PG-7 rocket	Annex 6g
7.62x39mm ammunition	Annex 6h
7.62x54Rmm ammunition	Annex 6i

Annex 6a

60mm mortar - Type 31		Origin	Characteristics similar to Chinese production
Quantity documented	5	Year of production	Unknown
Place of observation		Abidjan, BASA (<i>Bataillon d'Artillerie Sol Air</i>) - (3 mortars)	Abidjan, 1st Armoured battalion – (2 mortars)
<p>Comment: Materiel reportedly transferred to Abidjan from Korhogo in 2015. Marking codes documented on the mortars are consistent with those used by the Chinese military industry (State factory 67). Serial numbers: 122586 / 122060 / 122295 / 122959 / 122956.</p>			



Serial number 122586



Serial number 122060



Serial number 122295

Annex 6b

82mm mortar – Type 53		Origin	Characteristics similar to Chinese production
Quantity documented	8	Year of production	Unknown
Place of observation		Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion	
Comment: Marking codes observed on the mortars are consistent with those used by the Chinese military industry (State factory 41). Serial numbers: 1942 09697 / 3321 12262 / 3333 12364 / 51372 100013 / 51372 100272 / 221317 6099 / 730972			



Serial numbers 51372 100013



Serial numbers 3333 12333

10 Optics associated with 82mm mortars

State factory 398
Serial numbers: 905359 / 1001173 / 1001393 /
1200623 / 1202286 / 1292843

State factory 59
Serial numbers: 300791 / 300419

State factory 18
Serial numbers: 400860 / 402058



State factory 398: Serial number 1292843



State factory 398: serial number 1202286



State factory 398: Serial number 905359



State factory 59: serial number 300791



State factory 59: serial number 300419



State factory 18: serial number 400860



State factory 18: serial number 402058

Annex 6c

120mm mortar – Type 55		Origin	Characteristics similar to Chinese production
Quantity documented	8	Year of production	Unknown
Place of observation		Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion	
Comment: Marking codes observed on the mortars are consistent with those used by the Chinese military industry (State factory 41). Serial numbers: 30348 / 30464 / 30496 / 40086 / 40112 / 40207 / 40272 / 40316			






Serial number 40207



Serial number 30496



Serial number 40112



Serial number 40272



Serial number 40316



Serial number 40086




Serial number 30464



Serial number 30348

Annex 6d

60mm mortar bomb		Origin	Characteristics similar to Chinese production
Quantity documented	180	Year of production	1964
Place of observation		Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion	




« Round complete with charge » (Group's translation from Albanian)



Propulsion charge, ignition cartridge and ammunition

Annex 6e

82mm mortar bomb		Origin	Characteristics similar to Chinese production
Quantity documented	156	Year of production	1970
Place of observation		Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion	



Annex 6f

120mm mortar bomb		Origin	Characteristics similar to Chinese production
Quantity documented	100	Year of production	1965
Place of observation		Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion	





« Round complete with charge » (Group's translation from Albanian)

Annex 6g

PG-7 rocket (Type-69 rocket)	Origin	Characteristics similar to Chinese production	
Quantity documented	300	Year of production	1972
Place of observation		Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion	
			
			

Annex 6h

7.62x39mm ammunition		Origin	Characteristics similar to Chinese production
Quantity documented	650,000	Year of production	1972
Place of observation		Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion	





« Cartridge 7.62mm Model 56 (containing lead) – 1.440 rounds » (Group's translation from Albanian)



71_67

Annex 6i

7.62x54Rmm ammunition		Origin	Characteristics similar to Chinese production
Quantity documented	220,000	Year of production	Miscellaneous
Place of observation		Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion	



Document in Albanian language dated 2009



Annex 7. Weapons and ammunition manufactured in Bulgaria


Weapons

Supporting documentation from Arsenal JS Company	Annex 7a
End user certificate produced by the Ministry of Defense and Veterans of Burkina Faso	Annex 7b
Delivery verification certificate produced by the Ministry of Defense and Veterans of Burkina Faso	Annex 7c
AR-M1F assault rifle	Annex 7d
7.62x54Rmm MG-1MS machine gun	Annex 7e
UBGL-1 under barrel grenade launcher	Annex 7f
ATGL-L grenade launcher	Annex 7g
ATGL-H recoilless gun	Annex 7h

Ammunition

40mm grenade for UBGL-1	Annex 7i
GHD-2 fragmentation grenade	Annex 7j
120mm mortar bomb	Annex 7k
Propulsion charge for 120mm mortar bomb	Annex 7l
PG-9 rocket	Annex 7m
Links for 7.62x54Rmm ammunition	Annex 7n

Annex 7a. Supporting documentation from Arsenal JS Company



Arsenal J.S. Company
 100, Rozova Dolina St.
 6100 Kazanlak, Bulgaria
 Tel.: +359 431 6 33 22;
 +359 431 6 31 13
 Fax.: +359 431 6 33 32;
 +359 431 6 31 32
 arsenal@arsenal-bg.com
 www.arsenal2000.com

To the attention of Mr. Kiho Cha - Secretary

Security Council Committee

No 2789, 29.04.2015

Established pursuant to resolution 1572 (2004), concerning Cote d'Ivoire

Reference: Your letters: S/AC.45/2015/GE/OC.32, dated March 18, S/AC.45/2015/GE/OC.33;
 S/AC.45/2015/GE/OC.34, S/AC.45/2015/GE/OC.35 and S/AC.45/2015/GE/OC.36 dated April 01, 2015;
 S/AC.45/2015/GE/OC.39 dated April 24, 2015

Dear Mr. Cha,

In regards to your above-mentioned letters, concerning weapons (Machine Guns MG-IMS, Assault Rifles AR-MIF, Under Barrel Grenade Launchers UBGL-1, Anti-Tank Grenade Launchers ATGL-L and ATGL-H), and ammunition (40 and 73mm Rounds, 120mm Mortar Bombs and Hand Grenades), discovered in Cote d'Ivoire, please find enclosed the following documents, certifying the legal export of the said goods, which took place in 2011:


- End User Certificate, issued by the Ministry of National Defense and Veterans of Burkina Faso
- Exception certificate from ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States)
- Delivery Verification Certificate



We hope that the said documents would provide your institution with the necessary clarifications on this subject.

Kindest regards,

Nikolay Ibratov
 General Director
 Arsenal JSCo.





arsenal® Armament, Ammunition *AQAP-2110*
Machine Tools ISO 9001  

Arsenal J.S. Company
100, Rozova Dolina St.
6100 Kazanlak, Bulgaria
Tel.: +359 431 6 33 22;
+359 431 6 31 13
Fax: +359 431 6 33 32;
+359 431 6 31 32
arsenal@arsenal-bg.com
www.arsenal2000.com

0768 27-04-2015
No

To the attention of Mr. Kiho Cha - Secretary
Security Council Committee

Established pursuant to resolution 1572 (2004), concerning Cote d'Ivoire

Reference: Your letters S/AC.45/2015/GE/OC.33, S/AC.45/2015/GE/OC.34, S/AC.45/2015/GE/OC.35 and S/AC.45/2015/GE/OC.36 dated April 01, 2015

Dear Mr. Cha,

Herewith we wish to provide clarifications in regards to your above-mentioned letters, concerning weapons (Assault Rifles AR-M1F, Under Barrel Grenade Launcher UBGL-1, Anti-Tank Grenade Launchers ATGL-L and ATGL-H), and ammunition (40 and 73mm Rounds, 120mm Mortar Bombs and Hand Grenades), discovered in Cote d'Ivoire. We wish to inform you that the said weapons were legally exported by Arsenal JSCo. The export was permitted by the Bulgarian authorities, for the following End User institution – the Armed Forces, Ministry of Defense of Burkina Faso. To the application for Export License we attached an original End User Certificate, issued by the Ministry of Defense of Burkina Faso, with authentic document legalizations from the Embassy of Burkina Faso in Bulgaria, based in Rome, Italy, and Direction Consular Services at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria. An original exception certificate from ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) was also submitted, concerning the import of the goods to Burkina Faso. The export took place on August 5, 2011, with Bulgarian exit border point – Sofia Airport. In order to confirm that the goods were received, a Delivery Verification Certificate was provided, issued by the Ministry of Defense of Burkina Faso; the said document contained information that the goods were delivered to the End User, and accepted on August 7, 2011.

We remain at your disposal, if any further clarifications and co-operation from our side is required.

Kindest regards,


Nikolay Ivanov


General Director
Arsenal JSCo.

Annex 7b. End user certificate produced by the Ministry of Defense and Veterans of Burkina Faso

MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND VETERANS

Call number (226) 50 30 72 14

1244 / MDAC/CAB



Colonel Théodore Naba PALE
Attaché de Défense

BURKINA FASO
Unity - Progress - Justice


End User Certificate

This is to certify that the items listed below which are to be supplied from Arsenal JSCo, 100 Rozova St, 1000 Kazanlak, Bulgaria, through DIGNIA SYSTEMS LTD, 9 Shemkar St. Herzlia, 46725 Israel are for the use of Burkina Ministry of Defense and armed Forces.


N°	Description of Goods	Quantity
1	7.62 x 39 mm AR - M1F Rifle	1,000
2	7.62 x 54 mm Machine Gun MG-1MS	60
3	40 mm ATGL - L Launcher	60
4	73 mm ATGL-H Launcher	12
5	40 mm Underbarrel Launcher UBGL-1	20
6	7.62x39 mm cartridge ball	1,000,000
7	7.62x54 mm cartridge ball	250,000
8	Links for 7.62x54mm cartridges	500,000
9	40/73 mm Round RHEAT-7MA	300
10	60 mm Mortar bomb HE 80	200
11	82 mm Mortar HE 82	160
12	120 mm Mortar Bomb HE 120	240
13	73 mm Round RHEAT - 9MA	120
14	Hand Grenade Defensive GHD-2	1,000
15	40 mm Round RHE - F	3,000

We, also certify that the above listed goods are for the exclusive use of Burkina Faso armed Forces and will not be re-sold, re-exported or transferred to any third party without the written permission of competent Bulgarian Authorities.

Furthermore we take the responsibility to send "Delivery Verification Certificate" to Arsenal JSCo for individual consignment of goods within 30 days from the date of its receipt.



Permanent Secretary



Ouagadougou, le 31 Mars 2011
The Minister in charge of Defense and Veterans

Annex 7c. Delivery verification certificate produced by the Ministry of Defense and Veterans of Burkina Faso

**MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
AND VETERANS**

BURKINA FASO

CABINET

Unité – Progrès – Justice

No 2011 – 428 /DEF/CAB

Ouagadougou, 8th September 2011

CONFIDENTIEL

DELIVERY VERIFICATION CERTIFICATE

We, The Ministry of Defense and Veterans of Burkina Faso, hereby declare, certify and confirm that the below listed goods which are in compliance with End User Certificate Nr 244/MDAC/CAB, have been delivered and accepted by us on 07 August, 2011 at Ouagadougou (BURKINA FASO).

No	Description of goods	Quantity, pes
1.	7.62x39mm ARSENAL Assault Rifle AR-MIF with folding butt	1000
2.	7.62x54 mm ARSENAL Machine Gun MG-IMS	60
3.	40 mm ARSENAL Light Anti-tank Grenade Launcher ATGL-L	60
4.	40 mm ARSENAL Underbarrel Grenade Launcher UBGL-1	20
5.	73 mm ARSENAL Heavy Anti-tank Grenade Launcher ATGL-H	12
6.	Link for 7.62x54mm cartridges	500 000
7.	73 mm Round RHEAT-9MA with High-Explosive Anti-Tank Grenade GHEAT-9MA	120
8.	Hand Grenade Defensive GHD-2	1000
9.	120 Mortar Bomb HE 120	140
10.	40 mm Round RHE- F with Fragmentation Grenade	3 000


 of the President of Burkina Faso
 Chief of Burkina Faso Armed Forces,
 Ministry of Defense and Veterans and on his order
 The Assistant Private Secretary

Assimi KOUANDA
Commandeur de l'Ordre National

Annex 7d

AR-M1F assault rifle		Origin	Bulgaria
Quantity documented	1,000	Year of production	2011
Place of observation		Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion	



Serial numbers mechanically erased on some of the assault rifles.



Upper sample: serial numbers mechanically removed.
 Lower sample: serial numbers still present.

MADE IN BULGARIA **arsenal**

7.62x39mm ARSENAL
Assault Rifle with
Folding Butt AR-M1F

PACKING LIST

case No 0044

№	PART DENOMINATION	QUANTITY/pcs
1	7.62x39mm ARSENAL Assault Rifle with Folding Butt AR-M1F	10
2	Magazine	40
3	Case for 4 magazines	10
4	Oil bottle	10
5	Box with accessories	10
6	Sling	10

Case dimensions: 1380x530x387mm; Volume: 0.275 m³

Individual №

1	<u>BEst 1021</u>	6	<u>BEst 0475</u>
2	<u>1109</u>	7	<u>0446</u>
3	<u>1206</u>	8	<u>1275</u>
4	<u>1196</u>	9	<u>1216</u>
5	<u>0937</u>	10	<u>0593</u>

WEIGHT:

GROSS	<u>82</u> kg
NET	<u>52</u> kg

PACKER: MS QC: [Signature]

DATE: 20.06.2016.

Document found by the Group in on of the crates

Annex 7e

MG1-MS machine-gun		Origin	Bulgaria
Quantity documented	60	Year of production	2011
Place of observation		Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion	





Serial numbers mechanically erased on some of the machine guns.



MADE IN BULGARIA

Arsenal®

name of goods

7.62x54 mm ARSENAL
Machine Gun on Support
(tripod) MG-1MS


PACKING LIST

case No *021*

No	DENOMINATION	Q-ty
1	7.62x54 mm ARSENAL Machine Gun MG-1M No <i>HM50290</i>	1
2	Tripod No <i>50 HM290</i>	1
3	Barrel No 2	1
4	Extractor	1
5	Extractor axle	1
6	Extractor axle pin	1
7	Extractor spring	1
8	Firing pin	1
9	Drift	1
10	Screwdriver	1
11	Cleaning rod	1
12	Extracting device for split cartridge cases	1
13	Brush	1
14	Box with cover	1
15	Scourer	1
16	Bag for SPTA set	1
17	Canvas for MG	1
18	Canvas for spare barrel	1
19	Sling for MG	1
20	Cross strap	2
21	Strap for fixing ammunition boxes to tripod in traveling po	1
22	Breast strap	1
23	200 round belt	4
24	Ammunition box for 200 round belt	4
25	Operation Manual	1
26	Record Book	1

Weight

Gross *56* kgNet *25* kgPacker: *OSR*QC: *OSR*Date: *28.07.2010*

<p>MACHINE GUN GENERAL DATA Denomination: 7.62x54 mm ARSENAL Machine Gun on Support / Tripod/ Designation: MG-1MS Machine Gun Ser. No.: <u>11950290</u> Tripod Ser. No.: <u>35409290</u> Year of production: 20<u>11</u> g.</p> <p>ACCEPTANCE CERTIFICATE</p> <p>Machine Gun MG-1MS Ser. No. <u>11950290</u> corresponds to the technical documentation. The Machine Gun aiming is adjusted. In the process of acceptance and aim adjustment the following number of shots have been shot:</p> <p>with 1st barrel <u>155</u> shots; with 2nd barrel <u>80</u> shots;</p> <p>Machine Gun is fitted for operation.</p> <p><u>HR</u> <u>28.07.2011</u></p> <p> <u>28.07.2011</u></p> <p style="text-align: center;">4</p>	<p>GUARANTEE OF THE PRODUCER</p> <p>The producer guarantees the quality, perfect working order and no-failure operation of the Machine Gun up to 25 000 shots by observing the operation requirements. After that the Machine Gun should be inspected in order to define if further reliable operation is possible.</p> <p>The guaranteed service life of the barrel is 20 000 shots and of the parts included in the individual set of SPTA is at least 15 000 shots.</p> <p>The replacement of faulty parts with parts from SPTA set is carried out in the case of need at repair shop and should be recorded in the corresponding section of the Record Book.</p> <p>PACKING AND PRESERVATION</p> <p>In order to increase the storage life, the Machine Gun is slushed with grease PJX TY 38 101 1315-90 with additive AKOP-I GOST 15171-78. The guaranteed period of preservation is 5 years.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">5</p>
--	---

Documents dated 28 July 2011 found by the Group in on of the crates

Annex 7f

UBGL-1 Under barrel grenade launcher		Origin	Bulgaria
Quantity documented	7	Year of production	2011
Place of observation		Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion	



40 mm ARSENAL Underbarrel Grenade Launcher

UBGL-1

OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS



7.62 mm ARSENAL Assault Rifle AR with attached
40 mm ARSENAL Underbarrel Grenade Launcher UBGL-1

Annex 7g

ATGL-L Anti-tank grenade launcher		Origin	Bulgaria
Quantity documented	60	Year of production	2011
Place of observation		Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion	







MADE IN BULGARIA **Arsenal**

Optical sight SGL-7A
for ATGL-L

PACKING LIST

case No 15

No	DENOMINATION	QUANTITY pcs
1	Optical sight SGL-7A for ATGL-L	36

WEIGHT:
GROSS - 73 kg
NET - 33 kg

Head of workshop *[Signature]* QC *[Signature]*

Date 6.06.2011

Arsenal

MADE IN BULGARIA

NAME OF GOODS

40 mm ARSENAL Light Anti-tank Grenade Launcher ATGL-L

PACKING LIST

case No 3

No	No. Det. and assy	DENOMINATION	QUANTITY/pcs
1	3780.00.00.00	40 mm ARSENAL Light Anti-tank Grenade Launcher ATGL-L	9
2	5002.20.00.00	Lap assy	2
3	5002.70.00.00	Belt with covers	9
4	5002.03.00.00	Sling	9
5		Record Book	9
6	5002.42.00.00	Cleaning rod	1
7	5002.80.00.00	Case with SPTA set 1:9	1

Individual No

KT 50 0052	KT 50 0119	KP 50 0101
KT 50 0183	KT 50 0112	KP 50 0154
KT 50 0185	KP 50 0100	KP 50 0088

WEIGHT:

GROSS -	108	kg
NET -	64	kg

Head of workshop _____

QC: _____

Date: 3.06.2011

Documents dated 2 and 6 June 2011 found by the Group in the crates

Annex 7h

ATGL-H Recoilless gun		Origin	Bulgaria
Quantity documented	6	Year of production	2011
Place of observation		Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion	



MADE IN BULGARIA

arsenal[®]

**73 mm ARSENAL
HEAVY ANTI-TANK
GRENADE LAUNCHER
ATGL-H**

PACKING LIST

Case No /

No	PART DENOMINATION	QUANTITY/pcs
1	73 mm ARSENAL HEAVY ANTI-TANK GRENADE LAUNCHER ATGL-H No <u>162 X</u>	1
2	Tripod No <u>173 X</u>	1
3	Optical Sight PGOK-9 No <u>AE 500 143</u>	1
4	Bag with set of spare parts and accessories	1
5	Bag for 3 grenades	2
6	Front canvas cover	1
7	Rear canvas cover	1
8	Cleaner assy (Cleaning rod)	1
9	Oil brush (brush for chamber)	1
10	Oil brush canvas cover	1
11	Cleaner canvas cover	1
12	Canvas gloves	1 pair
13	Support Maintenance Manual for 73 mm ARSENAL Heavy Anti-tank Grenade Launcher ATGL-H (General and Direct Support Manual)	1
14	Operation Manual for 73 mm ARSENAL Heavy Anti-tank Grenade Launcher ATGL-H	1

WEIGHT:

GROSS - 137 kg
NET - 65 kg

Head of workshop _____

QC Date: 30.06.2011

Document dated 30 June 2011 found by the Group in one of the crates

Annex 7i

40mm grenade for UBGL		Origin	Bulgaria
Quantity documented	3,000	Year of production	August 2009 January 2010
Place of observation		Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion	
			
			




Annex 7j

GHD-2 fragmentation grenade		Origin	Bulgaria
Quantity documented	1,000	Year of production	April 2010
Place of observation		Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion	
			
			
			
		Sticker dated 20 November 2011	

Annex 7k

120mm mortar bomb		Origin	Bulgaria
Quantity documented	140	Year of production	Unknown
Place of observation		Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion	
			
			
			

Annex 71

Propulsion charges 120mm mortar bomb		Origin	Bulgaria
Quantity documented	140	Year of production	2011
Place of observation		Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion	
			
			

Annex 7m

PG-9 rocket		Origin	Bulgaria
Quantity documented	138	Year of production	April and May 2011
Place of observation		Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion	

0



PACKING LIST No. 13

Plant 10 Lot No. 05-11

Round RHEAT-9MA for Heavy Anti-Tank Grenade Launcher ATGL - H




No.	Articles	Measuring unit	Quantity	Note
1.	Grenade GHEAT-9MA Completely loaded	pcs	6	
2.	Start Booster CP-91	pcs	6	

Packer: 1895 Inspector: [Signature]

Date: 23.06.11

Document dated 23 June 2011 found by the Group in one of the crates

Annex 7n


Links for 7.62x54R mm ammunition		Origin	Bulgaria
Quantity documented	14 crates of 15.000 items	Year of production	Unknown
Place of observation		Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion	
			
			

Annex 8. ECOWAS authorization for arms transfer to Burkina Faso



COMMUNAUTÉ ECONOMIQUE
DES ETATS DE L'AFRIQUE
DE L'OUEST

ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
OF WEST AFRICAN STATES



**CERTIFICAT NO.11/11 D'AUTORISATION D'IMPORTATION D'ARMES
ET MUNITIONS VERS LE BURKINA FASO**

LE PRESIDENT DE LA COMMISSION de la Communauté Economique des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEDEAO);

VU les dispositions de l'Article 3 de la Convention de la CEDEAO sur les armes légères et de petit calibre, leurs munitions et autres matériels connexes relatives à l'interdiction des transferts d'armes légères et de petit calibre vers les territoires des Etats membres;

VU l'article 3 paragraphe 2 de ladite Convention qui interdit tout transfert d'armes légères et de petits calibres à des acteurs non étatiques lorsqu'un tel transfert n'est pas autorisé par l'Etat importateur ;

VU les dispositions de l'Article 4 de la Convention précitée, relatives aux conditions d'exemption de l'application de l'Article 3 de ladite Convention;

VU l'Article 5 de la Convention précitée relatif aux procédures d'exemption de l'application de l'Article 3 de cette Convention et en particulier les dispositions du paragraphe 3 relatives à la délivrance d'un certificat d'autorisation;

VU la Note Verbale n° 2011/335/MDNAC/SG/DC/MD en date du 17 janvier 2011 du Ministère de la Défense Nationale et des Anciens Combattants du Burkina Faso transmettant au Président de la Commission de la CEDEAO, la requête aux fins d'importation d'armes et de munitions vers le Burkina Faso.

CONSIDERANT que l'acquisition de ces armes et munitions dont les spécifications techniques et les quantités sont indiquées ci-dessous, permettra au Burkina Faso d'équiper ses Forces Armées nationales.

N° Ordre	Désignations	Quantités
01	Fusil de 7.62 x 39 mm AR - M1F	1000
02	Fusil mitrailleur de 7.62 x 54 mm MG - 1MS	60
03	Lance roquette de 40 mm ATGL - L	60
04	Lance roquette de 73 mm ATGL - H	12
05	Lance roquette de 40 mm UBGL-1	20
06	Cartouche de 7.62 x 39 mm	7 000 000



- 2 -

		1 200 000
07	Cartouche de 7.62 x 54 mm	500 000
08	Mailfon pour cartouches 7.62 x 54 mm	300
09	Roquettes de 40/73 mm 7MA	1 900
10	Obus de 60 mm HE 80	228
11	Mortier de 82 mm	1030
12	Obus de 120 mm HE 120	120
13	Roquette de 73 mm 9MA	4 000
14	Grenade à main	3 000
15	Roquette de 40 mm	6 500
16	Fusil AKM or AK-47	60
17	Fusils PKMS	660
18	Lance Roquette RPG7	12
19	Canon Bitube de 14,5 mm	12
20	Canon Bitube de 12,7 mm	198
21	Mortier de 60 mm	2 500
22	Obus de mortier de 82 mm	32
23	Mortier de 120 mm	50
24	Lance Grenade antichars SPG-9	30
25	Lance-grenade anti personnel	20
26	Lance-grenade lacrymogène	22
27	Lance missile anti aérien	12
28	Mitrailleuse de 14,5 mm ZPU	38
29	Mitrailleuse de 12,7 mm	300
30	Grenade antichars PG-7	18
31	LRM de 107 mm	



- 3 -

32	Missile anti aérien 9M36-1 strela - 3	10
33	Fusil automatique de 7,62 mm M70 AB2	1 000
34	Cartouches de 12,7 x 108 mm	550 000
35	Cartouche Gerenov PKMS	500 200
36	Roquette PG7	3 800
37	Roquette OG7	2 996
38	Roquette PG9	788
39	Grenade 35 mm AC	1250
40	Grenade 35 mm AP	1705
41	Roquette de 107 mm	300
42	Lance grenade AGL	30
43	Cartouche de 14,5 mm	202 000
44	Cartouche de 19 x 9 mm	200 000
45	Charge 4 BN 17	500
46	Sniper	05
47	Dispositif de vision nocturne	25
48	Dispositif de vision de jour	50
49	Télémètre laser	25
50	Cartouche de 12,7 mm	500 000
51	Charge roquette de RPG7	200
52	Gillet pare Balie	1500
53	Casque pare éclat	1500
54	Masque à gaz	300
55	Véhicule pick up	20
56	Radio HF	20
57	Radio portatif UHF ou VHF	150



- 4 -

CONSIDERANT que la demande d'autorisation d'importation d'armes faite par le Burkina Faso satisfait aux conditions pertinentes des dispositions de l'Article 6 de la Convention de la CEDEAO sur les armes légères et de petit calibre, leurs munitions et autres matériels connexes ;

EN CONSEQUENCE, accueille favorablement ladite requête;

ETABLIT le présent Certificat d'autorisation d'importation des armes et munitions ci-dessus mentionnées qui est immédiatement transmis aux autorités burkinabé compétentes, pour servir et valoir ce que de droit.

FAIT À ABUJA, LE 30 JUIN 2011


S.E. Georges Victor GBEHO
Président de la Commission

Comparison between the ECOWAS authorization for arms transfer to Burkina Faso and materiel documented by the Group in Côte d'Ivoire

Line	Type of materiel	Qty	Materiel documented by the Group	Reference
01	Assault rifle 7.62x39mm AR-M1F	1,000	Materiel manufactured in Bulgaria. 1,000 assault rifles AR-M1F documented.	Annex 7d
02	Machine gun 7.62x54Rmm MG1-MS	60	Materiel manufactured in Bulgaria. 60 machine guns MG1-MS documented.	Annex 7e
03	Rocket launcher 40mm ATGL-L	60	Materiel manufactured in Bulgaria. 60 rocket launchers ATGL-L documented	Annex 7g
04	Rocket launcher 73mm ATGL-H	12	Materiel manufactured in Bulgaria. 6 rocket launchers ATGL-H documented	Annex 7h
05	Grenade launcher 40mm UBGL-1	20	Materiel manufactured in Bulgaria. 7 grenade launchers UBGL-1 documented.	Annex 7f
06	7.62x39mm ammunition	7,000,000	1,594,500 ammunition (Cal 7.62x39mm) manufactured in the Sudan documented.	Annex 9k, l, m
			650,000 ammunition (Cal 7.62x39mm) with characteristics similar to Chinese production but legally sold by Albania documented.	Annex 6h
07	7.62x54mm ammunition	1,200,000	204,000 ammunition (Cal 7.62x54Rmm) with Sudanese markings on the crates documented.	Annex 9n, 13e
			220,000 ammunition (Cal 7.62x54Rmm) with characteristics similar to Chinese production but legally sold by Albania documented.	Annex 6i
08	Links for 7.62x54mm	500,000	Materiel manufactured in Bulgaria. 210,000 link documented.	Annex 7n
09	40/73mm rocket 7MA	300	300 rockets PG-7 with characteristics similar to Chinese production but legally sold by Albania documented.	Annex 6g
10	60mm mortar bomb HE80	1,900	65 mortar bombs (Cal 60mm) manufactured in the Sudan documented.	Annex 9u
			180 mortar bombs (Cal 60mm) with characteristics similar to Chinese production but legally sold by Albania documented.	Annex 6d
11	82mm mortar	228	12 mortars « Aboud » (Cal 82mm) manufactured in the Sudan documented.	Annex 9f
			8 Type 53 mortars (Cal 82mm) with characteristics similar to Chinese production but legally sold by Albania documented.	Annex 6b
12	120mm mortar bomb HE120	1,030	70 mortar bombs (Cal 120mm) manufactured in the Sudan documented.	Annex 9x
			100 mortar bombs (Cal 120mm) with characteristics similar to Chinese production but legally sold by Albania documented.	Annex 6f
			140 mortar bombs (Cal 120mm) manufactured in Bulgaria documented.	Annex 7k
13	73mm rocket 9MA	120	138 rockets PG-9 manufactured in Bulgaria documented.	Annex 7m
14	Hand grenade	4,000	1,000 fragmentation grenades GHD-2 manufactured in Bulgaria documented.	Annex 7j
15	40mm rocket	3,000	3,000 grenades for UBGL-1 manufactured in Bulgaria documented.	Annex 7i
16	AKM or AK-47 assault rifle	6,500	More than 1,000 assault rifles Type 56-1 with characteristics similar to Chinese production documented. Factory markings on these weapons have been mechanically erased.	Annex 13c, d
			More than 3,000 of AKM, AK47, Type 56, Type 56-2, VZ-58, AIM assault rifles with serial numbers mechanically erased documented.	Annex 13a, 13b, 15, 17
17	PKMS machine gun	60	A-80 « Mokhtar » (Cal 7.62x54Rmm) manufactured in the Sudan documented. Serial numbers on these weapons have been mechanically erased.	Annex 9a
18	RPG7 rocket launcher	660	RPG-7 grenade launchers manufactured in the Sudan documented. Serial numbers on these weapons have been mechanically erased.	Annex 9c

			79 RPG-7 grenade launchers manufactured with similar characteristics to materiel produced in Iran documented.	Annex 16a
19	Twin barrel 14.5mm gun	12	2 ZPU-2 (Cal 14.5x114mm) twin barrel guns with erased serial numbers documented.	Annex 14c
20	Twin barrel 12.7mm gun	12	Not documented	-
21	60mm mortar	198	48 mortar « Nimir » (Cal 60mm) manufactured in the Sudan documented.	Annex 9e
			5 Type 31 mortars (Cal 60mm) with characteristics similar to Chinese production but legally sold by Albania documented.	Annex 6a
22	82mm mortar bomb	2,500	830 mortar bombs (Cal 82mm) manufactured in the Sudan documented.	Annex 9v
23	120mm mortar	32	6 mortars « Ahmed » (Cal 120mm) manufactured in the Sudan documented.	Annex 9g
			8 Type 55 mortars (Cal 120mm) with characteristics similar to Chinese production but legally sold by Albania documented.	Annex 6c
24	Recoilless gun SPG-9	50	Under investigation	Annex 11aa
25	Anti personnel grenade launcher	30	Not documented	-
26	Tear gas grenade launcher	20	Not documented	-
27	Air defense missile (Manpads)	22	Not documented	-
28	14.5 heavy machine gun ZPU	12	3 heavy machine guns ZPU-1 (Cal 14.5x114mm) with erased serial numbers documented.	Annex 16b
29	12.7mm heavy machine gun	38	20 12.7x108mm heavy machine guns « Khawad » manufactured in the Sudan documented.	Annex 9b
30	PG-7 rocket	300	300 rockets PG-7 with characteristics similar to Chinese production but legally sold by Albania documented.	Annex 6g
31	107mm multiple rockets launcher	18	10 MRL « Taka » (Cal 107mm) manufactured in the Sudan documented.	Annex 9h
32	9M36-1 Air defense missile (Manpads) « Strela 3 »	10	Not documented	-
33	Assault rifle M70 AB2	1,000	2 assault rifles M70 AB2 manufactured in former Yugoslavia documented.	-
34	12.7x108mm ammunition	550,000	334,800 ammunition (12.7x108mm) with Sudanese markings on the crates documented.	Annex 9f, g
35	7.62x54R ammunition	500,200	204,000 ammunition (Cal 7.62x54Rmm) with Sudanese markings on the crates documented.	Annex 9n, 9e
			220,000 ammunition (Cal 7.62x54Rmm) with characteristics similar to Chinese production but legally sold by Albania documented.	Annex 6i
36	PG-7 rocket	3,800	1,326 PG-7 rockets manufactured in the Sudan documented.	Annex 9q/r
37	OG-7 rocket (anti personnel)	2,996	24 OG-7 rockets manufactured in the Sudan documented.	Annex 9p
38	PG-9 rocket	788	126 PG-9 rockets manufactured in the Sudan documented.	Annex 9t
			138 PG-9 rockets manufactured in Bulgaria documented.	Annex 7m
39	35mm AC grenade	1,250	AC grenades (Cal 35mm) manufactured in the Sudan documented.	Annex 9o
40	35mm AP grenade	1,705	AP grenades (Cal 35mm) manufactured in the Sudan documented.	Annex 9o
41	107mm rocket	300	482 rockets for MRL « Taka » (Cal 107mm) manufactured in the Sudan documented.	Annex 9z
42	35mm automatic grenade launcher	30	15 automatic grenade launchers AGL07-35 (Cal 35mm) manufactured in the Sudan documented.	Annex 9d
43	14.5mm ammunition	202,000	106,878 ammunition (Cal 14.5x114mm) documented.	Annex 9h

44	19x9mm ammunition	200,000	Not documented	-
45	4BN17 charge (explosive)	500	Not documented	-
46	Sniper rifle	5	Not documented	-
47	Night vision device	25	2 Night vision goggles « Sary » manufactured in the Sudan documented.	Annex 9j
48	Observation device (day)	50	Not documented	-
49	Laser telemeter	25	2 Laser telemeters « Rashid » manufactured in the Sudan documented.	Annex 9i
50	12.7mm ammunition	500,000	334,800 ammunition (Cal 12.7x108mm) with Sudanese markings on the crates documented.	Annex 9f, g
51	Propulsion charge for RPG-7	200	Under investigation. The Group obtained a end user document illustrating that this materiel was to be supplied by Albania. This document remains confidential.	Non releasable information
52	Balistic protection jacket	1,500	Not documented	-
53	Balsitic helmet	1,500	Not documented	-
54	Antigas mask	300	Not documented	-
55	Pick up vehicle	26	Not documented	-
56	HF radio	20	Not documented	-
57	VHF/UHF hand held	150	Not documented	-

Annex 9. Weapons and ammunition from the Sudan

Weapons

7.62x54Rmm A-80 machine gun « Mokhtar »	Annex 9a
12.7x108mm heavy machine gun « Khawad »	Annex 9b
RPG-7 grenade launcher « Sinnar »	Annex 9c
AGL07-35 automatic grenade launcher « Abba »	Annex 9d
60mm mortar « Nimir »	Annex 9e
82mm mortar « Aboud »	Annex 9f
120mm « Ahmed »	Annex 9g
107mm Multiple rocket launcher « Taka »	Annex 9h
Laser range finder « Rashid »	Annex 9i
Night vision goggles « Sary »	Annex 9j

Ammunition

7.62x39mm ammunition (production 2010-2011)	Annex 9k
7.62x39mm ammunition (production 2001)	Annex 9l
7.62x39mm ammunition (without headstamp codes)	Annex 9m
7.62x54Rmm ammunition	Annex 9n
35mm grenade AP-AT and AP-AC for AGL07-35	Annex 9o
OG-7 rocket	Annex 9p
PG-7 rocket	Annex 9q
PG-7 rocket without marking	Annex 9r
PG-7 rocket inert	Annex 9s
PG-9 rocket	Annex 9t
60mm mortar bomb	Annex 9u
82mm mortar bomb	Annex 9v
82mm mortar bomb inert	Annex 9w
120mm mortar bomb	Annex 9x
120mm mortar bomb inert	Annex 9y
107mm rocket	Annex 9z






Annex 9a

A-80 « Mokhtar » Machine-gun		Origin	Characteristics similar to Sudanese production
Quantity documented	4	Year of production	NA
Place of observation		Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion	



Remaining serial number: 2165



Reserve barrels for A-80 « Mokhtar » machine-guns		Origin	Characteristics similar to Sudanese production
Quantity documented	3	Year of production	NA
Place of observation		Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion	
Comment: Serial numbers partially erased. Serial numbers: 2165-2 / 2991-2 / 5197-2			
			
			
			
2165-2	2991-2	5197-2	

A-80 « Mokhtar » produced by Sudanese Military Industry Corporation (MIC)



Serial number: 2165
Documented in Korhogo



A-80 Machine-gun documented in Bambari, Central African Republic, in the hands of the UPC faction of Séléka forces.



A-80 Machine-gun presented in March 2015 by MIC at IDEX exhibition.

Annex 9b

12.7mm heavy machine-gun « Khawad »		Origin	The Sudan
Quantity documented	20	Year of production	2011
Place of observation		Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion Abidjan, GASPAN Various locations of Côte d'Ivoire	
Comment: Reference to these weapons was also made in S/2014/729 report, Para 62 and Annex 13. Weapons documented bears factory code indicating production in 2009 and 2011.			



A-80
2009 production – Serial number 090249



S-80
2011 production – serial number 11-0511

Optic associated with « Khawad » machine-guns		Origin	China
Quantity documented	4	Year of production	Unknown
Place of observation		Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion Abidjan, GASPAN	
Comment: Initially designed for the Chinese military industry W-85 Heavy machine-guns (calibre 12.7x108mm).			
			
			
			
			



12.7x108mm Heavy machine gun « Khawad » documented

090083	Abidjan, GASPAN
090220	Transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014
090221	Transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014
090228	Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion
090229	Transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014
090249	Abidjan, GASPAN
11-0252	Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion
11-0511	Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion
11-0520	Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion
11-2432	Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion
11-2484	Transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014
11-2438	Transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014
11-2521	Transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014
11-2541	Transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014
11-2616	Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion
11-2821	Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion
11-2876	Transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014
11-3028	Abidjan, GASPAN
11-3029	Abidjan, GASPAN
11-3030	Abidjan, GASPAN

Annex 9c

RPG-7V « Sinnar » - Grenade launcher		Origin	The Sudan
Quantity documented	10 ²	Year of production	Unknown
Place of observation		Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion Abidjan, BASA Abidjan, GASPAN	

Comment: The manufacture serial numbers of all the weapons had been mechanically removed. An additional RPG-7V « Sinnar » has been documented in January 2016, at the *Bataillon d'artillerie sol air* (BASA) in Abidjan. This materiel had been reportedly transferred to Abidjan, in 2015, from Korhogo. A document, dated 2010, bearing the quality control stamp used by the Sudanese military industry was also collected by the Group.



² 236 RPG-7 rocket launchers with erased serial numbers are reported on the FRCI registers. All the RPG-7 with such characteristic documented by the Group are either from Sudanese or Bulgarian origin.



RPG-7V
AR - 12 - 11
A 30



Rear view of the aluminium plate covering the percussion mechanism.
The « A 30 » factory marking known to be used by the Sudanese military industry is visible.



Empty crate for RPG-7 similar to other crates documented in Korhogo and bearing factory codes compliant with those used by the Sudanese military industry.



Sudanese quality control document dated 2010 found by the Group in the crate.

Annex 9d

AGL07-35 « Abba » Automatic grenade launcher		Origin	The Sudan
Quantity documented	15	Year of production	Unknown
Components for seven AGLs (Automatic Grenades Launchers) also documented.			
Place of observation		Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion Treichville, Republican Guard Abidjan, GASPAN	
<p>Comment: Copy of the Chinese military industry model QLZ-87 (Caliber 35mm).</p> <p>Packing list for AGL mounting and drum (available in one of the crates) refers to January 2011. The same document bears a stamp of the Sudanese industry.</p> <p>The Group also documented the presence of six tripods, spare parts for seven AGLs and five optics sets.</p> <p>This model is presented in a video-footage available on the Sudanese Military Industry Corporation (MIC) Website (http://www.mic.sd/pages/ar/library/showvideo/27)</p>			



Serial number 0108



Tripods for 6 weapons have been documented:

Serial numbers: 151002 / 151005 / 151010 / 151015 / 151048 / 151075

The Group could also document that tripods number 151005, 151015 and 151075 had been legally exported to the Sudan, in 2010, from China.



Packing List for mounting & round drum of AG135mm

Date:- \ /2011.

No.	Name	Code	Qty
1	Mount	01.02.03/WA25025	1
2	Drum 15-Round	WQ019.FJ5	4
3	Peg	04/WA025	1

Inspector: 

Sudanese quality control document dated January 2011 found by the Group in the crate

Spare parts (bolt carriers) for seven AGL



014-1



0092-2



0108-1



0114-2



0115-2



0127-1




0151-2

Optic for AGL07-35 « Abba » - Automatic grenade launcher		Origin	China
Quantity documented	5	Year of production	Unknown
Place of observation		Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion Treichville, Republican Guard	
<p>Comment: Originally mounted with QLZ-87 / 06PWG 35mm Automatic Grenades Launcher produced in China.</p> <p>Serial numbers: 0006-06-559 (Sticker with 0151) 0079-06-559 (Sticker with 0127) 0151-06-559 (Sticker with 0157) 0661-06-559 (Sticker with 0149) 0097-06-559 (Sticker with 0100)</p> <p>The Group could also document that optics 0061-06-559, 0097-06-559 and 0151-06-559 had been legally exported to the Sudan, in 2010, from China.</p> <p>A document mentioning seven optics for AGLs has been presented in the Annex 15 of its S/2014/729 report.</p>			



Serial number 079-06-559



Operation and maintenance manual for optical sight for 06PWG 35mm grenade launcher.

The document, dated 31 January 2007, bears the logo of Facyory Jiangsunorth Hugon Co. Ltd (China).

Document extracted from S/2014/729 report – Annex 15

This document mention seven optics for AGL

Jumelles = 20
 Lunette (a pair) = 06
 Lunette de tir nocturne = 08
 Lunettes AGL = 07.
 RPG 7 = 40.
 Lunettes = 03 - Caisses de RPG 7 (3 lunettes) +
 04 lunettes
 Munition : Atk 47 = 03 sacs (4500)

Mention is also made, on the same document, to Laser telemeter (on line 2 - see Annex 9i) and to Night vision goggle (on line 3, see Annex 9j).

AGL07-35 Automatic Grenade Launchers documented

0092	Abidjan, GASPAN (non marqué)
0108	Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion
0115	Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion
0116	Republican Guard (but missing during the inspection)
0118	Abidjan, GASPAN
0119	Transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014
0126	Transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014
0128	Abidjan, GASPAN (non marqué)
0129	Republican Guard (but missing during the inspection) – Documented at the GASPAN
0130	Republican Guard (but missing during the inspection)
0131	1St Armoured battalion
0143	Transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014
0149	BSSO
0152	BSSO
0180	Abidjan, GASPAN

Components for four other AGL07-35 documented

014	Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion
0114	Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion
0127	Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion
0151	Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion

Annex 9e


60mm mortar « Nimir »		Origin	The Sudan
Quantity documented	48	Year of production	2007
Place of observation		Various locations, including Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion	
<p>Comment: 29 mortars 60mm « Nimir » have been transferred from Bouaké in 2014. They were under control of GASPM elements.</p> <p>24 mortars 60mm, including 19 « Nimir » stored at the Korhogo, Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion have been handed over by FRCI in February 2015.</p>			



Serial number 110-2485724 - Year of production 2007



Serial number 10-248453




شهادة جودة سلاح

تم تصنيع الأسلحة الطول عيار 60mm

المرفقة في الصندوق رقم (760) وعددها (1) قطعة بتاريخ 2010 / 3 / 5

طبقا للمواصفات وتم اختبارها واعتمادها كأسلحة جاهزة للاستعمال

توقيع رئيس الجودة التاريخ 16 / 3 / 2011



نموذج رقم	FP 4 0014	رقم الإصدار	00/1	تاريخ الإصدار	28 / 10 / 2008
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Translation of the Quality Certificate (dated March 2011) from the manufacturer (Sudanese Military Industry). Translation from Arabic by the Panel.

CERTIFICAT DE QUALITE D'ARME

-----000-----

La Fabrication de ce Mortier de calibre 60mm, qui se trouve dans la caisse numéro 760 dont le nombre est égal 01, cette arme a été fabrique en date du 05/03/2010.

Elle a été fabrique suivant le norme, testée et prête pour l'utilisation.

Signé par le chef d'usine en date du 06/03/2011

60mm mortar variant documented in Treichville (Abidjan) at the Republican Guard



Serial number 110-2485768



60mm mortar « Nimir » documented

110-24492	
110-24498	Transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014
110-24502	Transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014
110-24510	
110-24514	Transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014
110-24562	
110-24572	Transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014
110-24576	Transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014
110-24596	
110-24604	
110-24630	Transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014
110-24652	
110-24696	Transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014
110-24718	Transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014
110-24732	
110-24734	
110-24738	Transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014
110-24744	Transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014
110-24746	
110-24778	
110-24806	
110-24820	Transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014
110-24822	Transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014
110-24832	
110-24834	
110-24866	
110-24900	Transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014
110-24910	Transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014
110-24914	
110-24922	Transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014
110-24924	
110-24926	Transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014
110-24940	Transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014
110-24966	Transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014
110-24972	Transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014
110-28402	Transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014
110-28420	Transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014
110-28474	Transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014
110-28880	Transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014
110-2485530	
110-2485724	
110-2485760	
4829	Transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014
8412	Transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014
8453	Transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014
8454	Transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014
8455	Transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014
8481	Transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014

Annex 9f

82 mm mortar « Aboud »		Origin	The Sudan
Quantity documented	12	Year of production	Probably 2008
Place of observation		Various locations, including Korhogo, Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion	

Comment: The Group also obtained Quality control and Delivery certification documents, dated 27 October 2008, for the 82mm mortar with serial number 1353 from the Republican Guard, in Abidjan.



Serial number 110-55870129




Bulgarian-manufactured Optic associated with 82mm mortar « Aboud »



82mm mortar « Aboud » documented

110-46670401	Transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014
110-55870007	
110-55870019	
110-55870077	
110-55870079	
110-55870115	
110-55870129	
110-55870131	Transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014
110-55870205	Transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014
110-55870209	
110-55870257	
1353	



Sudanese quality control document dated 27 October 2008

Translation of the Quality Certificate (dated October 2008) from the manufacturer (Sudanese Military Industry). Translation from Arabic by the Panel.

Bismillah rahman rahim

GROUPE INDUSTRIEL "AL YARMOUK"

DECLARATION DE LIVRAISON DE PIECES

SECTEUR ARMEMENT - DIRECTION QUALITE (Usine A10)

Date 27/10/2008

Déclaration numéro (G11)

ATTESTATION DE CONTROLE DE QUALITE

Le mortier numéro (1353) calibre 82mm a été fabriqué

le 27/10/2008

selon les normes et a été testé et prêt à être utilisé.

DIRECTEUR USINE A10

po/ DIRECTEUR DE LA DIRECTION
QUALITE

Annex 9g

120mm mortar « Ahmed »		Origin	The Sudan
Quantity documented	6	Year of production	2008
Place of observation		Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion (4) Treichville, Republican guard (1) Abidjan, Escadron Blindé de la Gendarmerie (1)	



Optic associated with 120mm mortar « Ahmed »

Serial number 31865

120mm mortar « Ahmed » documented

110-21861842	Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion
110-21861844	Agban, Gendarmerie
110-21861890	Treichville, Republican Guard
110-21861916	Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion
110-21861922	Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion
110-21861924	Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion

Annex 9h

107mm multiple rockets launcher « Taka »		Origin	The Sudan
Quantity documented	10	Year of production	Unknown
Place of observation		Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion	
<p>Comment: Six MRL 107mm « Taka » mounted on 4x4 Land Cruiser technical vehicles operated by the GASPM (<i>Groupement Autonôme de Sécurisation du Premier Ministre</i>) have been previously documented (See Para 60-61 and Annex 10 of its S/2014/729 report).</p> <p>Four additional MRL 107mm « Taka » were documented, while stockpiled in their crates.</p>			



GASPM = *Groupement Autonôme de Sécurité du Premier Ministre*







PACKING LIST

NO. PL1 - 003

PACKING LIST OF : 107 MM ROCKET LAUNCHER ACCESSORIES

BAG
(BY00250)

NO.	DESCRIPTION	CODE	QTY
1	GENERATOR	HG00103	1
2	FIRING MECHANISM	BY00106	1
3	15 LINES CABLE	BY00268	1
4	2 LINES CABLE	BY00269	1
5	JEEP CABLE	BY00278	2

TOTAL : 1 BAG INCLUDING 5 ITEMS

PACKING : SUITABLE BAG

PACKING DEPT. FINAL CONTROL Q.C. DEPT

Sudanese quality control document found by the Group in one of the crates

Annex 9i

Laser range finder « Rashid »		Origin	The Sudan
Quantity documented	2	Year of production	Unknown
Place of observation		Treichville, Republican Guard Abidjan, GASPAN	
Comment: A reference to « <i>laser optics</i> » in a document obtained in Korhogo is presented in the Annex 9d.			



<http://www.mic.sd/pages/en/product/productDetails/100>



Two similar devices have been presented by the RSP (*Régiment de Sécurité Présidentiel du Burkina Faso*) during a public display on the 6 October 2015.

<http://www.burkina24.com/2015/10/06/la-ceremonie-de-fin-du-desarmement-de-lex-rsp-en-images/>

Annex 9j


Night vision goggle « Sary »		Origin	Characteristics similar to Sudanese production
Quantity documented	2	Year of production	Unknown
Place of observation		Abidjan	
<p>Comment: A reference to « <i>night vision goggle</i> » in a document obtained in Korhogo is presented in the Annex 9d.</p> <p>This materiel has already been presented in the annex 21 of its S/2015/252 report</p>			



Similar devices have been presented by the RSP (*Régiment de Sécurité Présidentiel du Burkina Faso*) on the 6 October 2015.

<http://www.burkina24.com/2015/10/06/la-ceremonie-de-fin-du-desarmement-de-lex-rsp-en-images/>

Annex 9k

7.62x39mm ammunition		Origin	The Sudan
Quantity documented	Total: 1,594,500 - 711,000 (Korhogo) - 702,000 (Akouédo) - 181,500 (Yamoussoukro)	Year of production	2010 and 2011
Place of observation		Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion Akouédo, FRCI ammunition storage Abidjan, GASPAN	
<p>Comment:</p> <p>Produced in 2010 – Lot 1, 13, 14, 15, 28 and 29. Produced in 2011 – Lot 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 11 and 12.</p> <p>The presence in Korhogo of Sudanese 7.62x39mm ammunition produced in 2001, 2003 and 2004 has already been reported by the Group (See Para 138 and 142 to 144 of its S/2009/52 report).</p> <p>In June 2011, UNOCI documented 21,000 7.62x39mm ammunition produced in 2010 (Lot 14) at the Golf hotel in Abidjan.</p>			
			
<p>In 2013, UNOCI reported « several ten of thousands » 7.62x39mm ammunition produced in 2010 (Lot 14) and 2011 (Lot 1) have been identified withn FRCI deployed in western Côte d'Ivoire and in weapons collection events relating to the continuing process of disarmament of ex-combatants (See Para 45-46 and Annex 7 of its S/2013/228 report).</p>			
<p>In 2014, UNOCI documented 7.62x39mm ammunition produced in 2010 (Lot 01, 13, 14, 15) in the stockpile of the Republican Guard in Treichville (Abidjan) (See Annex 16 of its S/2014/266 report).</p>			



2010 production (Crates for 1,500 cartridges).



Lot . NO : 11
1500 Cartridges 7.62 X 39 ball
VOL : 21.7 dm 3
GW :28.10 Kg NW:24.44Kg
Date : 2010

Lot . NO : 13
1500 Cartridges 7.62 X 39 ball
VOL : 21.7 dm 3
GW :28.10 Kg NW:24.44Kg
Date : 2010

Lot . NO : 14
1500 Cartridges 7.62 X 39 ball
VOL : 21.7 dm 3
GW :28.10 Kg NW:24.44Kg
Date : 2010

Lot . NO : 15
1500 Cartridges 7.62 X 39 ball
VOL : 21.7 dm 3
GW :28.10 Kg NW:24.44Kg
Date : 2010

Lot . NO : 28
1500 Cartridges 7.62 X 39 ball
VOL : 21.7 dm 3
GW :28.10 Kg NW:24.44Kg
Date : 2010






Lot . NO : 29
1500 Cartridges 7.62 X 39 ball
VOL : 21.7 dm 3
GW :28.10 Kg NW:24.44Kg
Date : 2010

7.62x39 – 2010 Production

Crates for 500 cartridges



2011 production (Crates for 1,500 cartridges).



2009 production (+/- 36,000 rounds), documented in Akouédo FRCI ammunition storages.

The ammunition documented in Akouédo FRCI ammunition storages, was transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014.

Crates have been over painted in grey colour.





Annex 91

7.62x39mm ammunition		Origin	The Sudan
Quantity documented	10,000	Year of production	2001
Place of observation		Akouédo, FRCI ammunition storages	
Comment: Ammunition contained in hessian bags. Identical rounds of ammunition were already documented by the Group, in different locations and stockpiles, during previous mandates (from 2008 onwards).			





01_SU_1_39
 Documented by the Group in 2016






Documented by the Group in 2008

Annex 9m

7.62x39mm ammunition		Origin	Characteristics similar to sudanese production.
Quantity documented	8,000	Year of production	Unknown
Place of observation		Akouédo, FRCI ammunition storages	
Comment: Absence of headstamp codes. Ammunition contained in hessian bags and mixed with Sudanese manufactured 7.62x39mm ammunitons (lots produced in 2001, 2009 and 2010).			
 <p>Absence of headstamp code</p>			
7.62x54Rmm ammunition with similar absence of markings have been documented in Korhogo. These ammunition were contained in black polyethylene bags similar that those used by Sudanese industry.			

Annex 9n


7.62x54Rmm ammunition		Origin	The Sudan
Quantity documented	104,000	Year of production	2011
Place of observation		Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion (4,000) Yammousoukro, Republican Guard (100,000)	
This ammunition documented in Yamoussoukro, was transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014.			
The majority of the rounds belonging to the documented lots bear no headstamp codes.			



Absence of headstamp codes

Annex 9o

35mm grenade AT/AP for AGL07-35		Origin	The Sudan
Quantity documented	Several hundreds	Year of production	2008
Place of observation		Treichville, Republican Guard Anyama, DDR process Abidjan, GASPAN	
<p>Comment: Ammunition for this weapon have been cited in Para 57 and Annex 13 of its S/2013/228 report, Annex 20 of its S/2014/729 report and Para 72, 73 and Annex 19 of its S/2015/252 report.</p> <p>A crate marked DFJ87 35mm / AT-AF / 02-08-101 has been documented at the Republican Guard in Treichville (Abidjan).</p>			




QLZ-87 DFJ (AT/AP) ammunition manufactured in 2008 by Factory 101 (The Sudan).



Headstamp codes AL 101 07 02.

35mm grenade AP/AC for AGL07-35		Origin	The Sudan
Quantity documented	Several hundreds	Year of production	2005 and 2008
Place of observation		Abidjan, GASPAN	



DFS87-35, HEI, identification code 1-08-101.
Fuze markings on the type DFJ ammunition read DRJ/DF J87-35 3-07-9624.
Headstamp codes: AL 101 07 1.



Factory 101 – Year of production 2008 – Lot 1
(The Sudan)



Factory 101 – Year of production 2007 – Lot 2
(The Sudan)

Annex 9p

OG-7V rocket « Sinnar »		Origin	The Sudan
Quantity documented	24	Year of production	2010
Place of observation		Akouédo, FRCI ammunition storages.	
Comment: This ammunition was transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014.			




Sudanese quality control document dated 2010

Annex 9q

PG-7 rocket « Sinnar »		Origin	The Sudan
Quantity documented	834 (Korhogo) 246 (Akouédo)	Year of production	April 2010
Place of observation		Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion Akouédo, FRCI ammunition storages	
Comment: This ammunition, documented in Akouédo FRCI ammunition storages, was transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014.			





Sudanese quality control document dated 2010



PG-7 rocket from another lot 101-05-10





Annex 9r

PG-7 rocket « Sinnar » without marking		Origin	The Sudan
Quantity documented	246	Year of production	Unknown
Place of observation		Akouédo, FRCI ammunition storages Abidjan, GASPAN	

Comment: The Group observes that crates have been overpainted in grey and the absence of marking on the rocket, apart from those visible on the propeller. Features of the ammunition are however similar to Sudanese PG-7s.

This ammunition documented in Akouédo FRCI ammunition storages and in Abidjan (GASPAN, was transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014.






21-09-23
14/09-45


Annex 9s

Inert PG-7 rocket « Sinnar »		Origin	The Sudan
Quantity documented	18	Year of production	1995
Place of observation		Akouédo, FRCI ammunition storages	
Comment: Rear section of these inert PG-7 rocket have been produced in Bulgaria. This ammunition was transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014.			



Annex 9t

PG-9 rocket « Soba »		Origin	The Sudan
Quantity documented	126 6 (Akokro) 60 (Akouédo) 60 (Abidjan)	Year of production	1996
Place of observation		Akokro, Republican Guard ammunition storages Akouédo, FRCI ammunition storages Abidjan, GASPAN	
<p>Comment: Sudanese quality control documents dated 2010 were documented in the crates inspected.</p> <p>This ammunition, documented in Akouédo FRCI ammunition storages and in Abidjan (GASPAN), was transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014.</p>			
			
			
		 <p>Propulsion charges produced in 1992 in Bulgaria.</p>	



Sudanese quality control document dated 28 October 2008



Inscription on the crates : « Korhogo »

Annex 9u

60mm mortar bomb		Origin	The Sudan
Quantity documented	65 40 (M'Bengue) 25 (Akouédo)	Year of production	2008
Place of observation		M'Bengue, elements of the Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion deployed on the field. Akouédo, FRCI ammunition storages	
Comment: Sudanese quality control documents, dated August 2008, were also documented inside the crates, all painted in grey.			





1 - 07 - 937
Lot 1 - Production year 2007 - Factory 937
(Characteristics similar to Chinese production)




937 - 06



Sudanese quality control document dated 5 November 2008

Annex 9v

82mm mortar bomb		Origin	The Sudan
Quantity documented	830	Year of production	January and February 2011
Place of observation		Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion	
Comment: Sudanese quality control documents, dated August 2011, were also documented.			




Sudanese quality control document dated 2011

Two types of ignition charge and cartridge documented with the bombs.

Sample A



Black polyethylene packaging consistent with Sudanese packaging.



Absence of marking



1 - 07 - 937
Lot 1 - Factory 937 - Production year 2007
(Characteristics similar to Chinese production)



Sample B



Black polyethylene packaging consistent with Sudanese packaging.



937 - 07
Factory 937 – Production year 2007
(Characteristics similar to Chinese production)


Annex 9w


Inert 82mm mortar bomb		Origin	The Sudan
Quantity documented	18	Year of production	2003
Place of observation		Akouédo, FRCI ammunition storages	
Comment: This ammunition documented in Akouédo FRCI ammunition storages, was transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014.			



Annex 9x

120mm mortar bomb		Origin	The Sudan
Quantity documented	70 - 20 (Korhogo) - 50 (Akakro)	Year of production	January 2011
Place of observation		Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion Akakro, Republican Guard storages	
Comment: Sudanese quality control documents, dated January 2011, were also documented with the materiel.			
Mortar bombs with similar markings have been documented in April and May 2013 in the stockpile of the Republican Guard in Treichville (Abidjan) (See Para 40-41 and Annex 9 of its S/2013/605 report).			
The Group believes that rounds documented in 2015 at Akakro Republican Guard storages are those previously documented in Treichville.			





Sudanese quality control document dated 28 October 2008



SUD 05
The Sudan – Production year 2005



1 – 08
Lot 1 - Production year 2008



Black polyethylene packaging consistent with Sudanese packaging

Annex 9y

Inert 120mm mortar bomb		Origin	The Sudan
Quantity documented	22	Year of production	2003
Place of observation		Akouédo, FRCI ammunition storages	
Comment: This ammunition was transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014.			



Annex 9z

107mm rocket		Origin	The Sudan
Quantity documented	482	Year of production	January 2010
Place of observation		Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion	
<p>Comment: Three different lots have been documented. 1-04-115 / 01-10-115 / 01-11-115</p> <p>10 Multiple Rockets Launchers 107mm "Taka" have also been documented in Korhogo (see Annex 23 of its S/2014/729 report).</p>			

Lots manufactured in 2010 and 2011

Same markings on ammunition contained in the crates 01-010-115 and 01-011-115

2004 manufactured lot



23.11.04

Packing No. 292

For Product 107 No. of Pcs 2

LOT 7 04 115

QC Name and Signature

Inspector Name and Signature

Date 1-04

Sudanese Quality Control document dated 2004

Annex 10. Weapons and associated ammunition documented in Korhogo

Weapons

Type of weapon	Quantity
AR-M1F assault rifle (some with erased serial numbers) - (Bulgaria)	1,000
MG-1MS machine gun (some with erased serial numbers) - (Bulgaria)	60
UBGL-1 Under barrel grenade launcher - (Bulgaria)	7
ATGL-L rocket launcher (RPG-7) - (Bulgaria)	60
ATGL-H recoilless gun (SPG-9) – (Bulgaria)	6
SPG-9 recoilless gun	1
AGL07-35 automatic grenade launcher « Abba » (the Sudan)	2
12.7x108mm heavy machine gun « Khawad » (the Sudan)	3
12.7x99mm heavy machine gun M2HB	3
14.5x114mm ZPU-1 with erased serial numbers	1
RPG-7 grenade launcher « Sinnar » (the Sudan)	4
RPG-7 grenade launcher (Misc origin) with erased serial numbers	6
RPG-7 grenade launcher (Similar to Iranian production)	2
M-80 / A-80 machine-gun « Mokhtar » with erased serial numbers	3
9M32M Manpads « Strela 2 »	2
60mm mortar « Nimir » (the Sudan)	2
60mm mortar (France)	5
81mm mortar (France)	1
82mm mortar (Similar to Chinese production)	8
82mm mortar (Similar to Bulgaria production)	8
120mm mortar « Ahmed » (the Sudan)	4
120mm mortar (Similar to Chinese production)	8
120mm mortar (Former Soviet Union)	1
107mm multiple rocket launcher « Taka » (the Sudan)	10
122mm multiple rocket launcher « BM21 »	2

Ammunition

PG-7 rocket	863
0G-7 rocket	68
PG-9 rocket	138
60mm mortar bomb	180
82mm mortar bomb	1,400
120mm mortar bomb	446
107mm rocket (for MRL)	482
Fragmentation grenade for UBGL-1	3,000
5.56x45mm ammunition	15,600
7.62x51mm ammunition	12,000
7.62x39mm ammunition	1,452,000
7.62x54Rmm ammunition	327,000
12.7x108mm ammunition	32,970
14.5x114mm ammunition	70,854
Fragmentation grenade (different models)	1,979

Stock of weapons and ammunition in Korhogo as on 16 May 2011

BLOC A Au 16 Mai 2011

Mag B

1/ LRN	04 C	5 = 04	
2/ Acc LRN	(Vot Armes)		

Mag C^{*}

1/ CHARGES MG	{ 300/28 100/30 100/28	1.485
2/ OBUS RPG-7	{ 1460/6 750/4	1.176
3/ OBUS 82 mm	{ 1400/10 520/3	1.556
4/ OBUS 60 mm	160/12	132

Mag D

1/ OBUS 120 mm	{ 1000/1 1500/2	138
2/ mortier 60	120 (2/0)	24
3/ Acc. mort. 60	14/24	24
4/ RTC 12,7	10000/170	180.660
5/ mort. 120	40/1	4
6/ RPG-3	-	1
7/ AGL	10/2	2
8/ Plaque RPG-3	-	1
9. CHARGES AGL	-	22
10/ TROPES AGL	-	3
11/ LUNDAS AGL	-	2
12/ MONTAN AGL	-	1
13/ BRUSSE AGL	-	4

Mag. E *

1/ Munition AK 47	{ 440/1000 11500	660.500
2/ Munition BCA	{ 5300/04 10/42	50.055
3/ OBUS 107 mm	2400 (1/0)	480

(Document obtained in Korhogo)

Analysis of the document showing the stock of weapons and ammunition in Korhogo as on 16 May 2011

Quantity	Materiel	Possible source of supply	Reference
----------	----------	---------------------------	-----------

Mag A

4	MRL 107mm	The Sudan	Annex 9h, z
-	MRL accessories		

Mag C

1,485	M6 charge (120mm mortar fuzes)	The Sudan	Annex 13k
1,176	PG-7 round	The Sudan (146 crates with 6 rounds > 866)	Annex 9q, r
		Albania (75 crates with 3 rounds > 300)	Annex 6g
1,596 ³	82mm mortar round	The Sudan (140 crates with 10 rounds > 1.440)	Annex 9v
		Albania (52 crates with 3 rounds > 156)	Annex 6e
192	60mm mortar round	Albania	Annex 6d

Mag D

138	120mm mortar round	Albania (100 crates with 1 round)	Annex 6f
		The Sudan (19 crates with 2 rounds)	Annex 9x
24	60mm mortar	Albania	Annex 6a
24	60mm mortar accessories		
186,660	12.7mm	The Sudan (1,098 crates with 170 rounds)	Annex 13f, g
4	120mm mortar	The Sudan	Annex 9g
1	SPG-9	Under investigation	Annex 11aa
2	AGL (AGL37-05)	The Sudan	Annex 9d
1	SPG-9 accessory	Under investigation	Annex 11aa
27	AGL drum	The Sudan	Annex 9d
3	AGL tripod		
2	AGL optic		
1	AGL accessory		
4	AGL accessory		

Mag E

660,500	AK47 ammunition	The Sudan (440 crates with 1,500 rounds 1 crate with 500 rounds)	Annex 9k, l, m
50,055	DCA ammunition (14.5x114mm)	The Sudan (532 crates with 94 rounds - 1 crate with 47 rounds)	Annex 13h
482	107mm rocket	The Sudan (241 crates with 2 rockets)	Annex 9z.

The comparison between the materiel inventorized on 16 May 2011 and the materiel documented by the Group in March 2015 illustrates additional supplies of weapons and ammunition. It also shows that 610 mortar bombs (caliber 82mm) and 186,600 rounds of ammunition for heavy machine guns (caliber 12.7x108mm) have been transferred from Korhogo to unknown locations.


³ Mistakenly noted as 1.556 in the original document.

Annex 11. Korhogo – Ammunition seized by Forces Nouvelles from the former regular army (FDS)

Designation	Origin	Quantity	Reference
5.56x45mm ammunition	Israel	1,600	Annex 11a
5.56x45mm ammunition	Portugal	14,000	Annex 11b
7.62x51mm ammunition link	France	9,600	Annex 11c
7.62x51mm ammunition	South Africa	2,400	Annex 11d
7.62x54Rmm ammunition	Former Czechoslovakia	1,500	Annex 11e
7.62x39mm ammunition	Former Yugoslavia	3,600	Annex 11f
7.62x39mm ammunition	Former Soviet Union	85,800	Annex 11g
12.7x108mm ammunition		32,800	Annex 11h
82mm mortar bomb	Bulgaria	570	Annex 11i
120mm mortar bomb		186	Annex 11j
120mm additional charge		140	Annex 11k
PG-7 rocket		8	Annex 11l
OG-7 rocket		68	Annex 11m
DF 37/46 defensive grenade	France	480	Annex 11n
F1 offensive grenade		50	Annex 11o
F1 fragmentation grenade	Fomer Soviet Union	100	Annex 11p
RGO-78 fragmentation grenade	Bulgaria	200	Annex 11q
M26-A9 fragmentation grenade	South Africa	149	Annex 11r
M9102-A1 Tear gas grenade		360	Annex 11s
7.62x25mm ammunition	Bulgaria	+/- 1,000	Annex 11t
	Former Soviet Union		
12.7x108mm ammunition	Similar to Chinese production	170	Annex 11u
14.5x114mm ammunition	Former Soviet Union	+/- 20,000	Annex 11v
M12 Fuze	Former Soviet Union	200	Annex 11w
M12 Fuze	Bulgaria	200	Annex 11x
Civilian explosives	Similar to Chinese production	20 Kg	Annex 11y
“Strela 2M” Manpads	Under investigation	2	Annex 11z
SPG-9 recoilless gun	Under investigation	1	Annex 11aa
82mm mortar	Under investigation	7	Annex 11bb
120mm mortar “PM43”	Under investigation	1	Annex 11cc
Multiple Rocket Launcher “BM21”		2	Annex 11dd

Annex 11a

5.56x45mm ammunition		Origin	Israel
Quantity documented	1,600	Year of production	2001 - 2002
Place of observation		Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion	
<p>Comment: Some of this ammunition was initially documented in the immediate aftermath of the post-electoral crisis, in Attécoubé naval base. 561,000 rounds are stored in Akouédo FRCI ammunition storages.</p>			



Lower pictures taken in Akouédo FRCI ammunition storages.

Annex 11b

5.56x45mm ammunition		Origin	Portugal
Quantity documented	1,600	Year of production	1991
Place of observation		Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion	
Comment: The previous chain of custody of this ammunition remains unknown.			



Annex 11c

7.62x51mm ammunition link		Origin	France
Quantity documented	9,600	Year of production	1983
Place of observation		Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion	
Comment: The Group considers it very likely that the Forces Nouvelles seized this ammunition from the former regular Ivorian army (FDS).			



Annex 11d

7.62x51mm ammunition		Origin	South Africa
Quantity documented	2,400	Year of production	1994
Place of observation		Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion	
Comment: The Group considers it very likely that the Forces Nouvelles seized this ammunition from the former regular Ivorian army (FDS).			



Annex 11e

7.62x54Rmm ammunition		Origin	Former Czechoslovakia
Quantity documented	1,500	Year of production	Unknown
Place of observation		Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion	
Comment: The Group considers it very likely that the Forces Nouvelles seized this ammunition from the former regular Ivorian army (FDS).			



Annex 11f

7.62x39mm ammunition		Origin	Former Yugoslavia
Quantity documented	1,600	Year of production	2001-2002-2003
Place of observation		Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion	
Comment: The Group considers it very likely that the Forces Nouvelles seized this ammunition from the former regular Ivorian army (FDS).			



Annex 11g

7.62x39mm ammunition		Origin	Characteristics similar to former Soviet Union production
Quantity documented	85,800	Year of production	Several
Place of observation		Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion	
Comment: The Group considers it very likely that the Forces Nouvelles seized this ammunition from the former regular Ivorian army (FDS).			

Markings on the crates (Lot number):

K75-72-188

K88-72-188

B10-64-188

S15-539

P24-60

R41-539

O-1-17





K75-72-188



K88-72-188



B10-64-188



S15-539



P24-60



R41-539



O-1-17

Annex 11h

12.7x108mm ammunition		Origin	Characteristics similar to former Soviet-Union production
Quantity documented	32,800	Year of production	Several
Place of observation		Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion	
Comment: The Group considers it very likely that the Forces Nouvelles seized this ammunition from the former regular Ivorian army (FDS).			
Marking on the crates (lot number): Lot 71_3 / 72_3 / 71_188 / 86_188			



3_72



3_71




188_71



188_86

Annex 11i

82mm mortar bomb		Origin	Bulgaria
Quantity documented	570	Year of production	1982 and 2000
Place of observation		Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion	
Comment: This ammunition was legally exported to Côte d'Ivoire prior the establishment of the arms embargo. Lots inspected by the Group were seized by the Forces Nouvelles from the former regular Ivorian army (FDS).			



Production year: 1982 – Lot 32



Annex 11j

120mm mortar bomb		Origin	Bulgaria
Quantity documented	186	Year of production	1979 and 1983
Place of observation		Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion	
Comment: This ammunition was legally exported to Côte d'Ivoire prior the establishment of the arms embargo. Lots inspected by the Group were seized by the Forces Nouvelles from the former regular Ivorian army (FDS).			



Production year: 1979 – Lot 5



Production year: 1983 – Lot 11


Annex 11k

120mm mortar charges		Origin	Bulgaria
Quantity documented	140	Year of production	1983
Place of observation		Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion	
Comment: This ammunition was legally exported to Côte d'Ivoire prior the establishment of the arms embargo. Lots inspected by the Group were seized by the Forces Nouvelles from the former regular Ivorian army (FDS).			




Annex 111

PG-7 rocket		Origin	Bulgaria
Quantity documented	14	Year of production	1998
Place of observation		Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion	
Comment: The Group considers it very likely that the Forces Nouvelles seized this ammunition from the former regular Ivorian army (FDS).			



Annex 11m

OG-7 rocket		Origin	Bulgaria
Quantity documented	68	Year of production	2002
Place of observation		Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion	
Comment: The Group considers it very likely that the Forces Nouvelles seized this ammunition from the former regular Ivorian army (FDS).			



Annex 11n

DF 37/46 defensive grenade		Origin	France
Quantity documented	480	Year of production	Unknown
Place of observation	Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion		
Comment: The Group considers it very likely that the Forces Nouvelles seized this ammunition from the former regular Ivorian army (FDS).			




Annex 11o

F1 Offensive grenade		Origin	France
Quantity documented	50	Year of production	1997
Place of observation		Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion	
Comment: The Group considers it very likely that the Forces Nouvelles seized this ammunition from the former regular Ivorian army (FDS).			



Annex 11p


F1 fragmentation grenade		Origin	Former Soviet Union
Quantity documented	100	Year of production	1982
Place of observation		Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion	
Comment: These grenades were contained in a crate dedicated for RGD-5 grenades and associated with UZRGM-2 fuzes (present in the crate).			



Variant – Fuze from another lot (97-89)



Variant – body of the grenade in grey colour.



Annex 11q

RGO-78 fragmentation grenade		Origin	Bulgaria
Quantity documented	200	Year of production	2003
Place of observation		Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion	

Comment: The Group considers it very likely that the Forces Nouvelles seized this ammunition from the former regular Ivorian army (FDS), as identical lots were documented during embargo inspections undertaken in Abidjan, in 2007 (See Para 20 to 22 of its S/2007/611 report).



Grenades documented by the Group in 2015
(Korhogo)




Grenades documented by the Group in 2007
(Abidjan)

Annex 11r

M26-A9 fragmentation grenade		Origin	South Africa
Quantity documented	149	Year of production	1995
Place of observation		Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion	
<p>Comment: The Group documented their presence in the former regular Ivorian army (FDS) stockpiles in 2007, but also reported (See Para 71 and Annex 42 of its /2012/196 report) that M26-A9 grenades were delivered in 2010 and 2011 to Côte d'Ivoire in violation of the arms embargo.</p>			

Grenades documented by the Group in 2015



Grenades documented by the Group in 2007



Annex 11s

Teargas grenade M9102-A1		Origin	South Africa
Quantity documented	360	Year of production	1999
Place of observation		Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion	
Comment: The previous chain of custody of these grenades remains uncertain. Presence of identical items were documented by the Group, in September 2007, under the custody of the former regular Ivorian army (FDS), in Abidjan.			



Grenades documented in 2015 (Korhogo).



Grenades documented in 2007 (Abidjan).

Annex 11t

7.62x25mm ammunition		Origin	Bulgaria and Former Soviet-Union
Quantity documented	+/- 1,000	Year of production	Bulgaria 1955 Former Soviet Union 1984
Place of observation		Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion	
<p>Comment: Ammunition documented was stored in a hessian bag. These ammunition have already been reported in Para 148 and table 4 of its S/2009/521 report.</p> <p>A large quantities of PPS-43 sub-machine guns, using ammunition from this calibre, have been documented in Korhogo. These weapons have the particularity that serial numbers have been mechanically removed (See Para 59 of its S/2013/228 report).</p>			



10_55 (Bulgaria 1955)



38_84 (Former Soviet Union 1984)

Annex 11u

12.7x108mm ammunition		Origin	Characteristics similar to Chinese production
Quantity documented	170	Year of production	1974
Place of observation		Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion	



9381_74
Factory 9381 – Production year : 1974

Annex 11v

14.5x114mm ammunition		Origin	Characteristics similar to former Soviet Union production
Quantity documented	20,000 approximately	Year of production	Various
Place of observation		Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion	
Comment: Ammunition in hessian bags. Lot 3_58 / 3_59 / 3_62 / 3_65 / 3_80 / 3_81 / 17_85 These bags and ammunition have already been reported in Para 151 of its S/2009/521 report.			





3_58



3_59



3_62



3_65



3_80



3_81



17_85



Some Polish made ammunition Lot 21_87 are also present in the hessian bags.

Annex 11w

M12 Fuzes for 120mm mortar bomb		Origin	Characteritics similar to former Soviet Union production
Quantity documented	200	Year of production	1977
Place of observation		Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion	
Comment: The Group considers it very likely that the Forces Nouvelles seized this ammunition from the former regular Ivorian army (FDS).			



Annex 11x


M12 Fuzes for 120mm mortar bomb		Origin	Characteristics similar to Bulgaria production
Quantity documented	200	Year of production	1989
Place of observation		Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion	
Comment: The Group considers it very likely that the Forces Nouvelles seized this ammunition from the former regular Ivorian army (FDS).			



Annex 11y

Civilian explosives





Trace of exudation on the explosives



Detonators



Bickford cord



Annex 11z

Strela 2M (Nato code SAM7b) Manpads		Origin	Characteristics similar to former Soviet Union production
Quantity documented	2	Year of production	Unknown
Place of observation		Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion	
Comment: These two manpads are not operational, due to the lack of essential components.			
Weapon A 9P54M 05-80-2 051145 9M32M 051145 OFK Battery 8517 49002077066 Battery connector 0121777 010		Weapon B 9P54M 05-80-2 05720 9M32M 05720 OFK Battery (not present) Battery connector 0024489 010	
			




912 17777





Annex 11aa

SPG-9 Recoilless gun		Origin	Unknown
Quantity documented	1	Year of production	Unknown
Place of observation		Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion	
Comment: This SPG-9 has been reportedly used during the post-electoral crisis, suggesting it had been delivered previously. According to Arsenal JS Company, this weapon has not been produced in Bulgaria.			



Serial number: AB 31021 (latin alphabet) - АБ3121 (Cyrillic alphabet)

Annex 11bb

82mm mortar		Origin	Similar characteristics to Bulgarian production.
Quantity documented	7	Year of production	Unknown
Place of observation		Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion	
Comment: Serial numbers: 98 / 112 / 148 / 162 / 172 / 1214 / 1646.			



Serial numbers
04506 41067



Serial number 162



Serial numbers

04506

01040000

186

Annex 11cc

120mm mortar – PM43		Origin	Characteristics similar to former Soviet Union production.
Quantity documented	1	Year of production	Unknown
Place of observation		Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion	
Comment: Identification of the provenance of this mortar still in process.			



3д 746
3905
52 845
1945



59 2758 3917

Annex 11dd

Multiple rocket launcher « BM21 »		Origin	Characteristics similar to former Soviet Union production.
Quantity documented	2	Year of production	
Place of observation		Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion	
<p>Comment: The Forces Nouvelles seized these « BM21 » from the former regular Ivorian army (FDS). They are bearing the GASPM logo.</p> <p>The « BM21 » are already reported in Korhogo in the S/2102/196 report, paragraph 145.</p> <p>Seizure of « BM21 » by the Forces Nouvelles: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ds-drylhc40</p>			



Extracted from S/2014/729 report, Annex 11.

Annex 12. Removal of serial numbers and factory identification marks



A-80 machine gun « Mokhtar » with serial numbers erased



RPG-7 « Sinnar » with serial numbers erased



Samples showing efforts to hide the origin (crates overpainted in grey).	Origin	The Sudan
 <p data-bbox="716 722 922 751">7.62x39mm crates</p>		
 <p data-bbox="285 1289 703 1318">Crate for RPG-7 grenades launchers</p>	 <p data-bbox="1040 1289 1175 1318">PG-7 crates</p>	
 <p data-bbox="350 1766 654 1795">60mm mortar bombs crate</p>	 <p data-bbox="873 1766 1354 1795">Crate containing a MRL 107mm « Taka »</p>	

Distribution of weapons with erased serial numbers within FRCI and gendarmerie units

Unit	VZ58 Assault rifle	Type 56 and Type 56-2	Type 56-1 Assault rifle	A-80 / M-80 Machine gun	RPG-7 ⁴ Rocket launcher
1 st Infantry Battalion	19	49	14	2	3
2 nd Infantry Battalion	4	103	10	1	8
3 rd Infantry Battalion	3	49	2	6	5
4th Infantry Battalion	10	216	-	3	4
BSE	32	128	3	-	5
BSNO	9	105	2	6	6
BSSO	12	190	16	2	20
BSO	126	540	-	4	59
1 st Battalion Comandos Parachutist	3	86	59	1	6
1 st Armoured battalion	1	67	13	2	6
Artillery battalion (Field artillery)	1	4	10	-	-
Artillery battalion (Air defense)	3	47	10	3	2
Engineer battalion	1	5	4	-	-
Land Forces command and support unit	1	103	1	3	41
Logistic division	1	-	-	-	-
1 st Military region	-	-	-	-	-
2 nd Military region	-	-	-	-	-
3 rd Military region	-	4	30	-	-
4 th Military region	1	3	-	-	-
Command and support battalion	3	19	1	-	6
Gpt ministériel des moyens généraux	-	7	-	-	-
GR Yamoussoukro	23	154	123	8	31
GASPAN			50		
GSPR	17	148	86	-	-
EFA	-	2	100	-	-
ENSOA	-	-	101	-	-
Ecole militaire préparatoire technique	-	1	-	-	-
Centre interarmée de formation initiale des militaires	-	-	100	-	-
Sapeurs pompiers militaires GSPM	1	4	-	-	-
Special Forces	65	126	245	2	31
CoMar	-	3	100	4	1
ComAir	-	-	-	-	-
Logistic battalion MINUSMA			3		
Penitentiary guards	-	20	-	-	-
Gendarmerie	Unknown	Unknown	200	Unknown	Unknown
Total	4,081	2,183	1,281	45	236
Weapons destroyed by UNMAS between December 2011 and 2014	20	285	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown
Grand total	4,386	2,468	1,281	45	236

⁴ Either from Sudanese or Bulgarian origin.

Annex 13. Weapons and ammunition with characteristics similar to Chinese military industry production**Weapons**

Type 56 assault rifle	Annex 13a
Type 56-2 assault rifle	Annex 13b
Type 56-1 assault rifle (Variant 2)	Annex 13d

Ammunition

7.62x54Rmm ammunition	Annex 13e
12.7x108mm ammunition	Annex 13f, g
14.5x114mm ammunition	Annex 13h
FJ-1 Fuze	Annex 13i
MP-11B Fuze	Annex 13j
M6 Fuze	Annex 13k

Annex 13a

Type 56 assault rifle		Origin	Characteristics similar to Chinese production.
Quantity documented	Hundreds	Year of production	Unknown
Place of observation		Various locations, initially documented in the hand of Forces Nouvelles elements.	
Comment: Serial numbers have been mechanically erased.			



Stamp similar to the Chinese Military Industry State factory 66 still visible

Annex 13b


Type 56-2 assault rifle		Origin	Characteristics similar to Chinese production.
Quantity documented	Hundreds	Year of production	Unknown
Place of observation		Various locations – initially documented in the hand of Forces Nouvelles elements.	
Comment: Serial numbers mechanically erased. Initial observation by the Group in 2010 (See Para 150-120 of its S/2010/272 report).			



Serial numbers and factory markings erased

Annex 13c

Type 56-1 assault rifle (Variant 1)		Origin	Characteristics similar to Chinese production.
Quantity documented	1,014	Year of production	Unknown
Place of observation		Various locations	
<p>Comment : Producer's marks have been mechanically and systematically erased, to be covered by an additional marking indicating the caliber. The weapons' original serial number is however still visible.</p> <p>These weapons were transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014.</p>			



1. Serial number – dot marked (4843976)
2. Remaining element from an initial marking mechanically erased (56-1).
3. Additional marking (laser marked) covering the factory code which was mechanically erased.

Sample 2 (poor quality laser marking)



Serial number 4835565

Sample 3 (without laser marking)



Serial number 4832309

Results of forensic analysis of another sample



From left to right:

1. Producer stamp: "313" (similar to State factory 313 production)
2. Type 56-1 rifle
3. Serial number: 4834755

Annex 13d

Type 56-1 assault rifle (Variant 2)		Origin	Characteristics similar to Chinese production.
Quantity documented	20	Year of production	Unknown
Place of observation		Abidjan, GASPAN	





Variant 1



Regular barrel

Variant 2



Striped barrel

List of Type 56-1 assault rifles with serial number starting with « 47 » or « 48 » documented in Côte d'Ivoire

4700387	4830334	4832600	4833861	4834723	4835565	4836610	4837882
4703976	4830437	4832603	4833862	4834756	4835568	4836624	4837889
4706058	4830461	4832619	4833870	4834761	4835570	4836627	4837919
4707738	4830521	4832641	4833871	4834772	4835572	4836646	4837928
4709306	4830741	4832655	4833894	4834782	4835600	4836685	4837945
4709364	4830750	4832681	4833925	4834802	4835607	4836726	4837980
4709431	4830799	4832682	4833944	4834807	4835622	4836748	4837989
4709560	4830806	4832716	4833948	4834836	4835694	4836764	4838002
4800360	4830820	4832752	4833949	4834849	4835705	4836771	4838020
4804168	4830850	4832841	4833950	4834862	4835761	4836773	4838024
4806185	4830918	4832879	4833977	4834868	4835770	4836791	4838049
4808431	4830920	4832895	4833978	4834882	4835792	4836800	4838050
4814160	4830922	4832938	4833986	4834906	4835797	4836807	4838055
4814753	4831021	4832977	4833987	4834909	4835798	4836837	4838079
4815339	4831039	4833060	4833988	4834912	4835804	4836872	4838095
4816062	4831041	4833139	4833992	4834943	4835813	4836891	4838114
4816250	4831071	4833156	4834003	4834946	4835814	4836902	4838126
4816876	4831081	4833176	4834028	4834951	4835837	4836910	4838140
4818014	4831087	4833191	4834029	4834978	4835897	4836966	4838143
4818563	4831102	4833202	4834040	4835002	4835911	4836985	4838161
4819879	4831122	4833207	4834047	4835007	4835918	4837048	4838162
4819891	4831156	4833213	4834051	4835013	4835933	4837107	4838166
4819924	4831213	4833228	4834053	4835032	4835966	4837167	4838195
4820709	4831235	4833249	4834055	4835033	4836030	4837176	4838219
4822326	4831248	4833255	4834066	4835041	4836034	4837185	4838275
4823425	4831265	4833257	4834080	4835083	4836042	4837199	4838276
4824080	4831274	4833263	4834101	4835093	4836046	4837201	4838297
4824093	4831283	4833264	4834102	4835098	4836055	4837214	4838336
4824402	4831288	4833307	4834109	4835140	4836059	4837218	4838344
4825005	4831298	4833317	4834121	4835145	4836072	4837220	4838357
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4827780	4831951	4833474	4834331	4835260	4836277	4837405	4838504
4827860	4831976	4833477	4834344	4835301	4836345	4837429	4838533
4828039	4831985	4833484	4834356	4835303	4836376	4837446	4838534
4828190	4832025	4833500	4834401	4835307	4836381	4837471	4838546
4828339	4832044	4833549	4834409	4835308	4836384	4837510	4838547
4828372	4832062	4833570	4834467	4835310	4836385	4837520	4838559
4828594	4832124	4833613	4834497	4835326	4836396	4837564	4838593
4828627	4832140	4833615	4834501	4835331	4836398	4837586	4838606
4828687	4832170	4833624	4834517	4835332	4836409	4837637	4838613
4828843	4832259	4833630	4834525	4835341	4836425	4837641	4838634
4829039	4832268	4833643	4834533	4835347	4836444	4837660	4838635
4829066	4832304	4833653	4834539	4835370	4836452	4837675	4838648
4829356	4832334	4833668	4834547	4835379	4836454	4837707	4838652
4829546	4832371	4833684	4834548	4835394	4836459	4837708	4838669
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4829768	4832421	4833698	4834561	4835403	4836477	4837745	4838708
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4829929	4832470	4833771	4834606	4835506	4836499	4837845	4838745
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4830195	4832530	4833801	4834616	4835532	4836534	4837857	4838856
4830248	4832538	4833812	4834634	4835539	4836557	4837859	4838872
4830249	4832581	4833844	4834702	4835553	4836605	4837863	4838895
4830307	4832590	4833852	4834705	4835559	4836609	4837868	4838923
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4838995	4840285	4841797	4842839	4844479	4846878	4849772	4851933
4839024	4840319	4841798	4842853	4844547	4846890	4849794	4852015
4839033	4840350	4841806	4842856	4844584	4846935	4849801	4852075
4839042	4840370	4841807	4842871	4844628	4846938	4849811	4852229
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4839053	4840403	4841814	4842881	4844722	4846975	4849851	4852363
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4839085	4840475	4841874	4842995	4844828	4847103	4850172	4852633
4839086	4840506	4841880	4843019	4844890	4847183	4850176	4852644
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4839143	4840632	4841920	4843105	4845180	4847444	4850333	4859878
4839174	4840699	4841933	4843112	4845197	4847466	4850345	4891663
4839187	4840706	4841935	4843161	4845232	4847478	4850371	4899617
4839203	4840780	4841936	4843203	4845242	4847481	4850384	4899922
4839209	4840816	4841959	4843204	4845285	4847546	4850393	4937931
4839219	4840892	4841961	4843214	4845294	4847550	4850430	4850957
4839236	4840902	4841963	4843231	4845319	4847585	4850469	4850970
4839271	4840910	4841976	4843237	4845423	4847596	4850497	4851071
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4839334	4840927	4842026	4843265	4845563	4847843	4850515	4851139
4839341	4840965	4842036	4843296	4845588	4847857	4850546	4851159
4839352	4841011	4842059	4843321	4845590	4847942	4850558	4851166
4839414	4841014	4842082	4843337	4845615	4847950	4850584	4851194
4839429	4841017	4842112	4843349	4845627	4848099	4850591	4851223
4839430	4841028	4842118	4843356	4845637	4848109	4850623	4851362
4839494	4841037	4842130	4843362	4845683	4848119	4850644	4851367
4839544	4841038	4842150	4843369	4845693	4848120	4850645	4851583
4839550	4841040	4842172	4843381	4845702	4848133	4850668	4851610
4839560	4841053	4842189	4843396	4845727	4848229	4850677	4851617
4839592	4841076	4842193	4843438	4845779	4848240	4850725	4851644
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4839632	4841133	4842251	4843475	4845807	4848297	4850752	4851657
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4839748	4841314	4842415	4843678	4846180	4848709	4850892	4852633
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4839763	4841357	4842446	4843713	4846313	4848755	4850930	4852763
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4839816	4841420	4842479	4843740	4846370	4848978	4851071	4853052
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4839948	4841431	4842527	4843807	4846385	4849121	4851139	4891663
4839960	4841443	4842533	4843809	4846440	4849131	4851159	4832309

4839966	4841516	4842536	4843831	4846448	4849229	4851166	4834755
4839969	4841535	4842541	4843895	4846480	4849244	4851194	
4839987	4841563	4842543	4843912	4846559	4849251	4851223	
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4840037	4841617	4842585	4843976	4846615	4849333	4851367	
4840074	4841682	4842624	4843978	4846648	4849357	4851583	
4840075	4841614	4842647	4844002	4846701	4849465	4851610	
4840115	4841617	4842650	4844114	4846720	4849495	4851617	
4840128	4841682	4842691	4844125	4846744	4849503	4851644	
4840216	4841767	4842713	4844205	4846765	4849596	4851652	
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4840271	4841781	4842755	4844434	4846810	4849702	4851763	


Type 56-1 assault rifles documented in April 2011 by Small Arms Survey in South Sudan.

Reference Annex 16 of its S/2013/228 report

4811827	4839856	4847939
4822324	4839886	4848521
4825443	4840157	4848592
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4831912	4841218	4849080
4831959	4841239	4849153
4832210	4841289	4849228
4833683	4841312	4849763
4833733	4841436	4850037
4833996	4841545	4850227
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4834474	4841979	4850714
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4835555	4843103	4851203
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4837031	4844219	4852475
4837278	4844584	4852575
4837296	4845113	4852615
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4838100	4845635	4852909
4841550	4845680	4852923
4841703	4845736	
4841745	4845930	
4841979	4846220	
4842001	4846395	
4842049	4846453	
4842814	4846785	
4842962	4847112	
4843103	4847236	
4839856	4847344	
4839886	4847851	

Annex 13e

7.62x54Rmm ammunition		Origin	Characteristics similar to Chinese production.
Quantity documented	100,000	Year of production	2011
Place of observation		Yamoussoukro, Republican Guard	
<p>Comment : This ammunition, with characteristics similar to the Chinese military industry production, was documented while packed in crates with Sudanese markings. Traces of mechanical abrasion – probably with a sand disk - are present on each crate.</p> <p>This ammunition, documented in Akouedo FRCI ammunition storages, was transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014.</p>			





Absence of markings on the tins.



"945_10" (Production year 2010)

The analysis of remaining inscriptions offers similar elements to those on crates documented in South Sudan and Darfur with the reference of a contract between a Chinese company and the Sudanese Technical Center (STC).



According to the HSBA programme of the Small Arms Survey:

« A Factory 945 7.62×54R mm cartridge produced in 2010 and found in a Chinese box with the contract number '10XSD14E0128STC/SD'. Athor's SSDM/A had handed the box over to the SPLA. Jonglei, South Sudan, September 2012. »

« 7.62×54Rmm ammunition crates with the contract number '10XSD14E0128STC/SD' have also been seized by SPLM-N to Sudanese Armed Forces between 30 June and 1 July 2011 in al Hamra. South Kordofan (Sudan). »

« Contract "10XSD14E0128STC/SD" in reference is indicating that in 2010 ('10') the Xinshidai ('XSD') company of China signed a contract for the delivery of the ammunition to the Sudan Technical Center ('STC') of Sudan ('SD'). »

Ref: <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/working-papers/HSBA-WP32-Arms-Tracing.pdf>



Content of the box pictured in the previous image, showing packing list and two unmaked tins, each containing 500 rounds of 7.62x54Rmm ammunition (tin content documented in subsept image).



http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/arms-ammunition-tracing-desk/Weapons_seized_from_George_Athor_and_John_Duit.pdf

Annex 13f

12.7x108mm ammunition	Origin	Characteristics similar to Chinese production.	
Quantity documented	+ 169,000 - Several hundreds (Korhogo) - 153,750 (Akouédo) - 15,000 (Yamoussoukro)	Year of production	2011
Place of observation	Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion Akouédo, FRCI ammunition storages Yamoussoukro, Republican Guard		
<p>Comment: Headstamp codes "41_10" on these ammunition are identical to those used by the Chinese military industry.</p> <p>This ammunition, documented in Akouedo FRCI ammunition storages, was transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014.</p>			
			
 <p>Lot . NO: 150 Cartridges 12.7 X 108 ball Dimensions:480 X380 X130mm GW :21.90 Kg NW:18.40Kg Date : 2014</p>			



“41 – 10”
Production year 2010







Black polyethylene packaging consistent with Sudanese packaging



Annex 13g

12.7x108mm ammunition		Origin	Characteristics similar to Chinese production.
Quantity documented	166,050	Year of production	2011
Place of observation		Yamoussoukro, Republican Guard	
Comment : Traces of mechanical abrasion – probably with a sand disk - are present on each crate. This ammunition, documented in Akouedo FRCI ammunition storages, was transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014.			



The analysis of remaining inscriptions offers similar elements to those on crates documented in Southern Kordofan State (The Sudan), under the custody of the SPLM-North 1st Division and reportedly captured from the Sudanese Armed Forces, with the reference of a contract between a Chinese manufacturing-company and the Sudanese Technical Center (STC).





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12.7x108mm API ammunition crates with reference to “08XSD14E0128STC/SU” contract.
The Group notes similarities between the marking documented in Côte d’Ivoire and the one presented on this picture, reportedly captured from the Sudanese Armed Forces in Southern Kordofan, in July 2011.

Two crates of different origin for one single type of ammunition.

Comparison between Sudanese 12.7x108mm ammunition crates and ammunition crates similar to Chinese military industry production.



On the left Sudanese crates, on the right crates similar to Chinese military industry production




Sudanese crates



Crates similar to the Chinese military industry production


Analysis of the 12.7x108mm ammunition with “41_10” headstamp code.

Packaged in Sudanese crates	Packaged in crates similar to Chinese military industry production
<p>Step 1</p> 	
<p>Step 2</p> 	
<p>Step 3</p> 	


Step 4





Step 5



Step 6




Step 7



Step 8



Step 9




Annex 13h

14.5x114mm ammunition	Origin	Characteristics similar to Chinese production.	
Quantity documented	106,878 - 50,854 (Korhogo) - 12,032 (Akouédo) - 43,992 (Yamoussoukro)	Year of production	2009
Place of observation	Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion Akouédo, FRCI ammunition storages. Yamoussoukro, Republican Guard		
<p>Comment: Markings “41_09” appear to be consistent with those used by Chinese military industry.</p> <p>This ammunition documented in Yamoussoukro and Akouédo FRCI ammunition storages, was transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014.</p> <p>China specified to the Group that these ammunition were not exported from China to Côte d’Ivoire.</p>			





“41_09”
Production year 2009



Comparison of 14.5x114mm ammunition tins documented by the Group in Côte d'Ivoire and those documented in the Sudan.



Ammunition documented by the Group in Korhogo



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Ammunition documented by Conflict Armament Research in Southern Kordofan (The Sudan), in 2012. This crate was reportedly captured from the Sudanese Armed Forces, by the SPLM-North 1st Division, in July 2011.

A comparison of font and spacing of marks further suggests that the tins documented in Korhogo and in Southern Kordofan pertain to the same production lot and were produced by the same manufacturer.

Identical particularities in markings on tins (from left to right) include:

- The “5” in the “14.5” is of smaller font than “14”; in “API”, “AP” are written together with a larger space before “I”; “56” in TYPE “56” is in larger letters than “TYPE”;
- “5” in “5/7” is higher than “7”; “2/09-25” is in larger and bolder font than “5/7”; “2” in ‘25’ has a distinctive shape;
- “17” in “17-09-41” is of less bold font than “09-41”.

Crate with similar marking as those documented in Southern Kordofan.



SPLA–N fighters watch over ammunition and weapons captured from the Sudan Armed Forces, near Gos village in the Nuba Mountains, South Kordofan, the Sudan, May 2012.

© Goran Tomasevic/Reuters


Extracted from Small Arms Survey 2014 yearbook (Page 20)

<http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/A-Yearbook/2014/en/Small-Arms-Survey-2014-Chapter-7-summary-EN.pdf>



Annex 13i

FJ-1 Fuze		Origin	Characteristics similar to Chinese production.
Quantity documented	482	Year of production	2005
Place of observation		Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion	
Comment: Sudanese 107mm rockets (See Annex 13z) and these fuzes were packed together, each crate containing two rockets and two MJ-1-type fuzes. Fuzes inspected bore codes (MJ-1-5-05-5104) suggesting their manufacture in 2005.			



MJ-1-5-05-5104
 Lot 5, 2005, Factory 5105
 (Characteristics similar to Chinese production)

Annex 13j

MP-11B Fuze		Origin	Characteristics similar to Chinese production
Quantity documented	20	Production year	2008
Place of observation		Abidjan, GASPAN	



Lot 1, 2008, Factory 9324
(Characteristics similar to Chinese production)

Annex 13k

M6 Fuzes for 82mm mortar bomb		Origin	China
Quantity	1,536	Year of production	2009
Place of observation		Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion Treichville, Republican Guard Abidjan, GASPAN	

Comment: Materiel legally delivered to the Sudan (Yarmouk Industrial Complex).
Lot numbers 07-09-9324 and 11-09-9324.

Two crates containing M6 fuzes with similar marking (lots 07-09-9324 and 12-09-9324) have been documented in May 2013 in the stockpile of the Republican Guard in Treichville (Abidjan), (See Para 46-49 and Annex 11 of its S/2013/605 report).

The marking on several crates in Korhogo and on the crates documented in Treichville have been painted over (same colour of paint), most probably in an attempt to remove information on their origin.



Materiel exported by Xinshidai Factory (XSD), China, to Yarmouk Industrial Complex (YIC), the Sudan, under contract number 09XSD14E01YIC/SU



Lot 7 - 2009
Factory 9324
(China)



Lot 11 - 2009
Factory 9324
(China)



Annex 14. Weapons and ammunition located at the GASPAN premises in Abidjan

Table of weapons	Annex 14a
------------------	-----------

Weapons systems

14.5x114mm heavy machine-gun KPVT / ZPU-1	Annex 14b
14.5x114mm heavy machine-gun KPVT / ZPU-2	Annex 14c
14.5x114mm heavy machine-gun KPVT / ZPU-4	Annex 14d
ZU-23 23mm twin barrelled anti aircraft autocannon on vehicle	Annex 14e
ZU-23 23mm twin barrelled anti aircraft autocannon on trailer	Annex 14f

Miscellaneous

Toyota Land Cruiser vehicle	Annex 14g
Ammunition storages overview	Annex 14h

Annex 14a**Weapons located at the GASPAN premises in Abidjan potentially acquired in violation of the arms embargo**

Qty	Designation	Origin	Picture
63	Type 56-1 Assault rifle	Characteristics similar to Chinese production	Annex 13d
50	Type 56-2 Assault rifle	Characteristics similar to Chinese production	Annex 13c
9	VZ58 Assault rifle	Similar to former Czechoslovakian production	Annex 15
3	7.62x54Rmm Machine gun A-80 « Mokhtar »	The Sudan	Annex 9a
13	RPG-7 Grenade launcher « Sinnar »	The Sudan	Annex 9c
6	RPG-7 Grenade launcher	Similar to Iranian production	Annex 16a
6	12.7x108mm Heavy machine gun « Khawad »	The Sudan	Annex 9b
1	14.5x114mm Heavy machine gun ZPU-1	Unknown	Annex 14b
2	14.5x114mm Heavy machine gun ZPU-2	Unknown	Annex 14c
1	14.5x114mm Heavy machine gun ZPU-4	Unknown	Annex 14d
6	Automatic grenade launcher AGL07-35 « Abba »	The Sudan	Annex 9d
160	Total		

Annex 14b

14.5x114mm heavy machine-gun KPVT / ZPU-1		Origin	Unknown
Quantity documented	1	Year of production	Unknown
Place of observation		Abidjan, GASPAN	
<p>Comment: The Group previously documented that, in early 2011, four ZPU-4 heavy machine guns, six ZPU-2 heavy machine guns and four ZPU-1 heavy machine guns were supplied from Burkina Faso (See Para 70 to 75 of its S/2013/228 report).</p> <p>Two similar weapon systems were also documented at the GSPR in Abidjan and at the 4th Infantry Battalion in Korhogo.</p>			



Serial number mechanically erased



Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion



Serial number mechanically erased

Annex 14c

14.5x114mm heavy machine-gun ZPU-2		Origin	Unknown
Quantity documented	2	Year of production	Unknown
Place of observation		Abidjan, GASPAN	

Comment: The Group previously documented that, in early 2011, four ZPU-4 heavy machine guns, six ZPU-2 heavy machine guns and four ZPU-1 heavy machine guns were supplied from Burkina Faso. These heavy machine guns, all delivered with spare parts, required technical support and training for appropriate use: both were allegedly provided by six instructors from the Armed forces of Burkina Faso (See Para 70 to 75 of its S/2013/228 report).



Presence of two similar weapon systems on two separate vehicles



Serial number mechanically erased

Annex 14d

14.5x114mm heavy machine-gun ZPU-4		Origin	Unknown
Quantity documented	1	Year of production	Unknown
Place of observation		Abidjan, GASPAN	

Comment: The Group previously documented that, in early 2011, four ZPU-4 heavy machine guns, six ZPU-2 heavy machine guns and four ZPU-1 heavy machine guns were supplied from Burkina Faso. These heavy machine guns, all delivered with spare parts, required technical support and training for appropriate use: both were allegedly provided by six instructors from the Armed forces of Burkina Faso (See Para 70 to 75 of its S/2013/228 report).

A similar weapon system has been documented by the Group in the hands of the *Bataillon de Sécurisation de l'Ouest* (BSO) (See Annex 9 of its S/2014/729 report).



Serial number mechanically erased

Annex 14e

Light truck with ZU-23, twin barrelled anti aircraft autocannon (calibre 23mm)



In 2011, the Forces Nouvelles captured this ZU-23 weapon system at the BASA.




Barrels are dismounted

Annex 14f

ZU-23, twin barrel anti aircraft autocannon (calibre 23mm)



In 2011, the Forces Nouvelles captured this ZU-23 weapon system at the BASA.

Annex 14g**Toyota Land Cruiser vehicle used by GASPAN**

Sticker indicating that the vehicle was shipped to Nouakchott (Mauritania)
This origin is similar to the six Land Cruiser vehicles documented at the 4th Infantry Battalion in Korhogo.
(See Annex 17 of its S/2014/629 report)

Annex 14h

GASPAN ammunition storages overview



42 hessian bags with 7.62x39mm, 7.62x54Rmm, 12.7x108mm and 14.5x114mm ammunition.
7.62x39mm and 12.7x108mm ammunition, mostly of Sudanese origin.



Ammunition of various calibers, mostly seized from the former regular Ivorian army (FDS).

Annex 15. Weapons and ammunition with characteristics similar to former Czechoslovakian production

VZ58 assault rifle	Annex 15
7.62x39mm ammunition (production 1973)	Annex 15a
7.62x39mm ammunition (production 1983)	Annex 15b

SA VZ58 assault rifle		Origin	Former Czechoslovakia
Quantity documented	336	Year of production	1961,1962 and 1963
Place of observation		Various locations – initially under custody of Forces Nouvelles' elements.	

Comment: Serial numbers have been mechanically erased.
Both versions with standard fixed stock (VZ58P) and side-folding stock (VZ58V) have been documented.
VZ58 rifle have been documented under Forces Nouvelles' custody previously by the Group (see Annex 16 of the Group's report S/2013/228).



VZ58P



Production year 1961



Production year 1962




Production year 1963



VZ58V



Crate for 10 VZ58 assault rifles documented in Abidjan in January 2016.



Consignee : Ministry of Security of Burkina Faso

Annex 15a


7.62x39mm ammunition		Origin	Former Czechoslovakia
Quantity documented	6,000	Year of production	1973
Place of observation		Akouédo, FRCI ammunition storages	
Comment: Ammunition contained in hessian bags.			



bxII_73

Annex 15b






7.62x39mm ammunition		Origin	Former Czechoslovakia
Quantity documented	4,000	Year of production	1983
Place of observation		Abidjan, military camp	
Comment: A sticker on the crates refers to the Ministry of Safety – in Ouagadougou - Burkina Faso, as the consignee of the first transfer.			



Annex 16. Materiel with characteristics similar to Iranian production

RPG-7 grenade launcher	Annex 16a
RPG-7 optical sight	Annex 16b
PG-7 grenade	Annex 16c
7.62x54Rmm ammunition	Annex 16d
12.7x108mm ammunition	Annex 16e

Annex 16a

RPG-7 grenade launcher		Origin	Characteristics similar to Iranian production
Quantity documented	79	Year of production	Unknown
Place of observation		Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion Abidjan, GASPAN	
<p>Comment: Most of the 79 RPG-7 documented have been transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014. 49 of them are now in the hands of GASPAN. These weapons appear to come from the same lot and the majority appear to be new. Iranian PG-7 rocket documented in Korhogo have been reported in the Annex 22 of its S/2014/729 report.</p>			
			
			
0392 SY870392		0411 8790411	
			
Crate containing RPG-7 launchers			

RPG-7 grenade launchers with similar characteristics to Iranian production

SY8692494	Transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014.
SY8692820	
SY8692969	
SY8693387	
SY870047	
SY870069	Abidjan GASPAN
SY870083	Korhogo
SY870085	Abidjan GASPAN
SY870069	Yamoussoukro
SY870079	Transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014.
SY870085	Yamoussoukro
SY870117	Transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014.
SY870121	
SY870123	
SY870135	Abidjan
SY870137	Abidjan
SY870138	Transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014.
SY870182	
SY870196	Korhogo
SY870211	Korhogo
SY870219	Transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014.
SY870223	
SY870252	Abidjan GSPR
SY870269	Transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014.
SY870279	
SY870289	
SY870300	Abidjan GASPAN
SY870336	
SY870352	
SY870363	Abidjan GSPR
SY870392	Korhogo
SY870396	Transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014.
SY870409	
SY870411	Korhogo
SY870413	Abidjan
SY870416	Transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014.
SY870417	
SY870456	
SY870462	
SY870467	
SY870493	Abidjan
SY870499	Transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014.
SY870506	Abidjan
SY870525	Transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014.
SY870528	
SY870532	Abidjan GASPAN
SY870537	Yamoussoukro
SY870546	Transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014.
SY870560	
SY870577	Yamoussoukro
SY870590	Abidjan
SY870593	Transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014.
SY870604	
SY870610	
SY870616	
SY870632	Abidjan
SY870633	Transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014.
SY870639	
SY870651	Korhogo
SY870652	Abidjan
SY870666	Abidjan GSPR
SY8790065	Transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014.
SY8790409	
SY8790411	Korhogo

SY9790462	Transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014.
SY8790509	
SY8790528	Abidjan
SY8790546	Transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014.
SY8790622	Anyama (DDR)
SY9890644	Abidjan GASPAN
SY8790888	Korhogo
SY8791031	Transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014.
SY8791033	Korhogo
SY8791145	Korhogo
SY8792820	Transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014.
SY8792969	
SY8793212	Korhogo
SY8793387	Transferred from the custody of GASPM in Bouaké in late 2014.

Annex 16b

RPG-7 Optical sight		Origin	Characteristics similar to Iranian production
Quantity documented	1	Year of production	Unknown
Place of observation		Treichville, Republican Guard	
Comment: The picture of the actual optical sight documented has been compared with the pictures on Iranian website (www.diomil.ir)			




Serial number 0021



Extracted from www.diomil.ir






Operating instruction documented with the device.
The booklet did not make any reference to the producer or the producing country.

Annex 16c

PG-7 rocket		Origin	Iran
Quantity documented	7	Year of production	2001
Place of observation		Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion Anyama, DDR process Abidjan, Republican guard storages.	



Annex 16d

7.62x54Rmm ammunition		Origin	Iran
Quantity documented	Several hundreds	Year of production	2001
Place of observation		Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion	
Comment: Identical lots of ammunition (produced in 2000, 2001 et 2002) were already documented in Côte d'Ivoire (see Annex 2 of its S/2013/605 report).			



Lot 28-2001



Previoulsy documented Lot 40/2001
Annex 2 of its S/2013/605 report



Previoulsy documented Lot 43/2000
Annex 2 of its S/2013/605 report

Annex 16e

12.7x108 mm ammunition		Origin	Iran
Quantity documented	Several hundreds	Year of production	2002 and 2003
Place of observation		Korhogo, 4th Infantry Battalion	
Comment: This ammunition was packaged in black polyethylene bags consistent with Sudanese packaging and the outer packaging was hessian bag.			





Annex 17. Weapons and ammunition with characteristics similar to Romanian production

AIM assault rifle		Origin	Characteristics similar to Romanian production
Quantity documented	364	Year of production	2005 and 2008
Place of observation		Abidjan	
<p>Comment: 222 arms produced in 2005 have been documented in the 1st BCP (111 weapons) and in the Special Forces unit (111 weapons). 142 weapons produced in 2008 have also been documented in the Special Forces unit.</p>			




Serial number UR-0623-05 (Year of production 2005)



AIM with partially erased serial number.

Annex 18. Actions taken by FRCI headquarters to recover arms and ammunition
Directive from the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces dated 18 May 2015



- Le décret n°2009 - 154 du 30 Avril 2009, portant création de la Commission Nationale de lutte contre la prolifération des armes légères et de petit calibre, la COMNAT - ALPC ;
- Le décret n°2012-787 du 08 août 2012, portant création de l'Autorité pour le Désarmement la Démobilisation et la Réintégration des ex combattants (ADDR).

Grâce à ces outils institutionnels, des armes ont été collectées auprès des ex-combattants, marquées et attribuées aux différentes unités des Forces Républicaines de Côte d'Ivoire. Ce processus de retour à la normale a bénéficié du soutien actif de la communauté internationale dont l'action a consisté d'une part, à réhabiliter nos armureries et soutes à munitions et d'autre part, à effectuer le marquage des armes.

Malheureusement, en dépit de toutes actions de sensibilisation, certains militaires détiennent encore des armes, à titre personnel, soit dans leurs unités soit à leur domicile.

Cette situation ne peut plus prospérer et il faut y mettre un terme. C'est pourquoi, ces derniers sont impérativement invités, à rendre les armes qu'ils détiennent dans leurs unités respectives.

II - LES MODALITES D'EXECUTION

21- Modalités de réintégration

Le mode opératoire retenu est volontariat. A ce titre, tous ceux qui détiennent encore des armes et /ou des munitions de façon illégale, devront les rendre sans pression aucune, à leurs unités respectives.

Les armes ainsi rendues, devront être rangées en râteliers dans les unités.

Après un compte rendu d'exécution adressé à l'Etat-Major Général, la Division Logistique, en liaison avec les commandants de Forces et les chefs de corps, effectuera une mission de marquage desdites armes, selon un programme qui sera communiqué à tous.

22- Délais d'exécution

La phase de réintégration des armes dans les unités, qui revêt un caractère important, doit s'achever **avant la date butoir du 30 juin 2015**.

Les Commandants des Forces et les Chefs de Corps des unités rattachées à l'Etat Major Général sont invités à communiquer à l'Etat Major

Général le point des armements réintégrés au plus tard le **03 juillet 2015**, afin de permettre à la Division logistique de préparer leur marquage.

Il est rappelé à tous que, passé le délai imparti pour la réintégration des armes, la possession d'une arme non marquée constituera une infraction grave passible de poursuites judiciaires, en plus des sanctions disciplinaires qui seront infligées à leurs auteurs.


Vu l'importance de cette opération, les commandants de Forces et chefs de corps des unités rattachées à l'Etat-Major Général sont invités à faire une large diffusion de la présente note qui devra être commentée avec pédagogie et esprit de persuasion.

Destinataires :

- **Pour INFO (ATCR)**
 - Monsieur le Ministre auprès du Président de la République, Chargé de la Défense
- **Pour action**
 - COMTER
 - COMAIR
 - COMAR
 - COMPS
 - Cdts 1^{ère}, 2^{ème}, 3^{ème} et 4^{ème} Régions Militaires
 - Cdt BCS
 - Cdt GMMG
 - Cdt EFA
 - Cdt EMP1
 - Cdt CIFIM
 - Cdt GR
 - Cdt GSPM



Message from the Logistic Division of FRCI dated 18 May 2015



Arms inspection ordered by the Chief of the armed forces dated 27 July 2015

MESSAGE

FM CEMG
TO COMTER - COMAIR - COMAR - FS
 1^{ère} RM - BCS - GMMG - GR - GSPM - ENSOA - EMPT -
 DIRCA
INFO MINDEF (ATCR)
 CEMGAO - CEMGAS
 BT

NON PROTÉGÉ

URGENT N° 677-15/CEMG/DLOG/BE DU 27 JUIL 2015

OBJET : INSPECTION DES ARMES MARQUEES DES UNITES DE LA PLACE ABIDJAN.

HONNEUR VOUS INFORMER, UNE EQUIPE DE LA DIVISION LOGISTIQUE DE L'ETAT- MAJOR GENERAL PROCEDERA A L'INSPECTION DES ARMES MARQUEES DES UNITES DE LA PLACE D'ABIDJAN DU 10 AU 24 AOUT 2015 SELON LES MODALITES SUIVANTES :

PRIMO : PROGRAMME DES INSPECTIONS

- 10 - 11 - 12 AOUT 2015 : GR
- 13 AOUT 2015 : BCS - GMMG - GSPM
- 14 AOUT 2015 : COMAR - COMAIR
- 17 AOUT : UCS - BTON INF
- 18 AOUT 2015 : 1^{er} BB - BASA - ENSOA - EMPT
- 19 AOUT 2015 : 1^{er} BCP
- 20 ET 21 AOUT 2015 : FORCES SPECIALES
- 24 AOUT 2015 : GSPR

SECUNDO : DISPOSITIONS PRATIQUES

1 - LES CHEFS SERVICES TECHNIQUES ET RESPONSABLES ARMEMENT DES UNITES DEVRONT APPRETER LES REGISTRES ET CLASSER LES ARMES PAR ORDRE EN VUE FACILITER DITE INSPECTION.

2 - A LA FIN DES INSPECTIONS, UN POINT COMPLET DES ARMES MARQUEES EST ETABLI ET LES ARMES SONT ALORS PLACEES SOUS LA RESPONSABILITE DIRECTE DU CHEF DE CORPS DE L'UNITE. LES ARMES

SONT ENSUITE RANGEES ET ENCHAINEES DANS LES ARMURERIES DES UNITES

3 - PAR CONSEQUENT VOUS DEMANDE RASSEMBLER ET PRESENTER SYSTEMATIQUEMENT TOUT L'ARMEMENT DE VOS UNITES POUR CES INSPECTIONS

4 - TOUTE ARME NON MARQUEE DECOUVERTE LORS DES INSPECTIONS SERA SYSTEMATIQUEMENT MARQUEE ET ATTRIBUEE REGLEMENTAIREMENT A L'UNITE

TERTIO : COMPOSITION DE L'EQUIPE D'INSPECTION DE LA DIVISION LOGISTIQUE

- COLONEL KOFFI NGUESSAN LEONARD, CHEF DU BUREAU EQUIPEMENT DE LA DIVISION LOGISTIQUE
- CAPITAINE CHIGBEU KOUACHI JULIEN, CHEF CELLULE AMOI
- LTN KOUASSI SAINT CLAIR, ADJOINT CHEF AMOI
- ADJUDANT CHEF LATH LATTRO HUBERT
- ADJUDANT CHEF KONE OKAYO
- SERGENT CHEF DOUA FRANCOIS
- SERGENT CHEF COULIBALY T. ZOUMANA
- SERGENT CHEF GOUBO DOGBO MATHURIN
- SERGENT AZIE PRINCE HERMAN

QUARTO : COORDINATION

- PREVOIR ACCUEIL ET ALIMENTATION DE L'EQUIPE D'INSPECTION AU SEIN DE VOS UNITES
- POINT FOCAL DE CONTACT DE SUIVI DE TOUTES LES INSPECTIONS : COL MAJ ASSAMOUA GUIEZOU, CHEF DE LA DIVLOG : 01 15 40 80 - 08 04 46 84

BT.





Pour le Général de brigade Soudanissou GBAKOURO
Secrétaire Général Adjoint
NEMIN DETON LETHO
Chef d'Etat-Major Général Adjoint,
Chargé du Soutien


Annex 19. Transfer order dated 4 February 2015

PERCEPTION ARMES COMTER

N°	DESIGNATIONS	MODEL	TYPE	CAISSES	QUANTITE CAISSE	TOTAL	TOTAL GENERAL	OBS
1	ARMES	AK 47	T 56	80	10	800	800	
2		MORTIER	60 mm	12	2	24	24	
3		FM/T80	7,62*54	14	1	14	14	
4		RPG7	60mm			10	10	10

Scé Tam 4è Bton
ADJ SILVE


Officier Matériel Forces Terrestres

 Commandant KOU/KOU Gros
 Chef du Bureau Equipements
 et Solutions Techniques des
 Forces Terrestres
 par Interim

Responsable Armement

 Capitaine
 SORO Yacoub
 Cdt de la Cie d'Appui

Document dated 4 February 2015

Instead of the types mentioned in the above order the Group documented that the following types were transferred to Abidjan:

- 800 AR-M1F assault rifles.
- 14 MG1-MS machine-guns.
- 10 ATGL-L rocket launchers.
 - In January 2016, 58 of the above mentioned AR-M1F assault rifles and one MG1-MS machine-guns have been documented in the arms storage of the *Bataillon d'artillerie sol air* (BASA) and of the 1st Infantry Battalion located at the Akouédo camp (Abidjan).



Annex 20. Transfer of arms for destruction in Abidjan dated 14 April 2015

Forces Républicaines de Côte d'Ivoire
Etat - Major Général

N° 205 15 FRCIEMG/DLOG
La Division Logistique


République de Côte d'Ivoire
Union – Discipline – Travail
Abidjan, 14 AVR 2015

Autorisation de récupération de l'Armement

Je soussigné, **Colonel Major ASSAMOUA GUIEZOU KONAN**, Chef de la Division Logistique de l'Etat-Major Général des Forces Républicaines de COTE D'IVOIRE (FRCI) autorise le Lieutenant KOUASSI ADOU KOUAME SAINT CLAIR de la Cellule AMOI de la Division Logistique de l'Etat Major Général des FRCI à récupérer au 4^{ème} Bataillon de KORHOGO les armements suivants :


- Deux cent (200) T56-1
- Deux (02) carcasses de SIG 543
- Un LRAC de 89 mm

Les deux cent (200) T56-1 et les deux (02) carcasses de SIG 543 sont destinés à être détruits à ABIDJAN par l'UNMAS de l'ONUCL.

Le LRAC de 89 mm est destiné à l'instruction au profit des élèves officiers de l'EFA de ZAMBAKRO

Le Chef de Corps du 4^{ème} Bataillon d'Infanterie de KORHOGO apportera son concours à la Mission de la Division Logistique sur place à KORHOGO pour la récupération de ces matériels.

En foi de quoi est signée la présente autorisation.


Colonel Major ASSAMOUA GUIEZOU KONAN
Chef de la Division Logistique





Instead of the type mentioned in the above order the Group documented that 200 AR-M1F assault rifles were transferred to Abidjan.

Annex 21. Transfer of ammunition dated 6 July 2015

Korhogo, le 06/07/2015

BON DE SORTIE

Au profit du Groupement Tactique Inter-Armée (GTIA)
KOUTO.


Référence TO N° 3297-15/EMG/DLOG DU 06 JUILLET 2015

- QUARANTE(40) CAISSES DE MUNITIONS 7.62*39
- TRENTE(30) CAISSES DE MUNITIONS DE RPG 7
- TRENTE(30) CAISSES D'OBUS DE MO 82 mm
- DIX (10) CAISSES/ VINGT (20) CAISSES D'OBUS DE MO 60 mm
DEMANDEES.
- VINGT (20) CAISSES DE MUNITIONS DE 12.7 mm

POUR LE GTIA

LTN LATTE SIE ESMEL

48 75 87 66


DL LOG/SEA

Le Chef de Corps

CNE SORO O. ABOU

07 68 96 14





/060934Z/S:ch Meles

MESSAGE 1007/06-11052/824
MAMA

FM : CHEF D'ETAT-MAJOR GENERAL / FRCI

TO : CONTER

INFO :

- MPRCD (ATC I)
- CEMGA OPS - :EMGA SOUTIEN - 4^{ème} RM.

BT.

COURRIER ARRIVEE
 Le... 06 JUIL 2015
 A d... 11h05
 Reçu par... YAPC

CONFIDENTIEL
IMMEDIAT NMR 3297-15/BMG/DLOG DU 06 JUILLET 2015

CONFIDENTIEL DEFENSE

OBJET : MISE A DISPOSITION DE MUNITIONS.

IMMEDIAT

TXT

DANS CADRE OPERATION « BORDURE DE PROTECTION », HONNEUR VOUS DEMANDER VOULDR BIEN INVITER COMMANDANT 4^{ème} BATAILLON A METTRE A LA DISPOSITION DU COMMANDANT GTIA KOUTO, MUNITIONS SELON MODALITES SUIVANTES :

PRIMO : NOMBRE ET TYPE DE MUNITIONS

- QUARANTE (40) CAISSES DE MUNITIONS 7.62*39 mm
- TRENTE (30) CAISSES DE MUNITIONS DE RPG 7
- TRENTE (30) CAISSES D'OBUS DE MO 82 mm
- VINGT (20) CAISSES D'OBUS DE MO 60 mm
- VINGT (20) CAISSES DE MUNITIONS DE 12.7 mm.


SECUNDO : DATE ET MISE A DISPOSITION

- A COMPTER DU LUNDI 06 JUILLET 2015.

TERTIO : POINTS DE CONTACT

- CAPITAINE ASSI ARMAND, OFFICIER LOGISTIQUE AU COIA.
TEL : 03 81 95 25.
- LIEUTENAN LATTE SIE ESMEL, OFFICIER AU SEIN DE GTIA DE KOUTO,
TEL : 48 75 87 66.

BT.



General de Corps l'Armée
Soumo la AKAYOKO

9.16/060944Z/824.524/BM

ENREGISTREMENT
 " COURRIER ARRIVEE "
 S / N° 0839/06-07-2015
 N° Cht
 46 Bataillon d'Infanterie

Annex 22. Weapons and associated ammunition recovered by FRCI HQ from Bouaké in November 2014

Weapons

Type of materiel	Quantity
82mm mortar	3
60mm mortar	24
AGL07-35 – Automatic Grenade Launcher « Abba »	3
75mm Recoilless gun	3
RPG-7 Rocket launcher (Similar characteristics to Iranian production)	37
12.7x108mm Heavy Machine gun « Khawad »	9
7.62x54Rmm M-80 / A-80 Machine gun « Mokhtar »	6
7.62x39mm Type 56-1 Assault rifle – Serial '47 or 48'	1,000

Ammunition

Type of materiel	Transferred to Akouédo	Transferred to Yamoussoukro
7.62x39mm ammunition	738,000	181,500
7.62x54Rmm ammunition	-	200,000
12.7x108mm ammunition	153,750	181,000
14.5x114mm ammunition	12,032	43,992
60mm mortar bomb	25	-
82mm mortar bomb	18	-
120mm mortar bomb (inert)	22	-
OG-7 rocket	24	-
PG-7 rocket	492	-
PG-7 rocket (inert)	18	-
PG-9 rocket	60	-

Annex 23. Locations visited by the Group

	Location
General Directorate of Customs	Abidjan
Regional Directorate of Customs	Korhogo
Regional Directorate of Customs	San Pedro
Regional Directorate of Customs	Abengourou
Customs Subdivision	Odienne
Customs Subdivision	Bondoukou
Customs Office	Abidjan port
Customs Office	Nigouni
Customs Office	Sirana
Customs Office	Nigouni
Customs Office	Pekan-Huebly
Customs Office	Varalé
Customs Office	Soko
Mobile Brigade	Bouna
Mobile Brigade	Tingrela
Border post	Kati
Border post	Kouguienou
Border post	Kalamparo
Border post	Vankoro
Seaport	Abidjan
Seaport	San Pedro
Airport	Abidjan
Airport	Aboisso
Airport	Korhogo
Airport	San Pedro
Airport	Man

Annex 24. Ivorian customs offices and mobile brigades



Annex 25. Rehabilitation of customs offices

Rehabilitated	Under rehabilitation	Non rehabilitated	Closed
Noé (Ghana)	Varalé (Burkina Faso)	Frambo (Ghana)	Taï (Liberia)
	Soko (Ghana)	Afforenou (Ghana)	
	Ouangolo terrestre (Burkina Faso)	Bianouan (Ghana)	
	Pogo (Mali)	Takikro (Ghana)	
	Gbeleban (Guinea)	Niablé (Ghana)	
	Sipilou (Guinea)	Ebilassokro (Ghana)	
	Pekanhuebly (Liberia)	Assuefry (Ghana)	
		Transua (Ghana)	
		Soko (Ghana)	
		N'gandana (Mali)	
		Nigouni (Mali)	
		Tiéfenzo (Mali)	
		Minignan (Guinea)	
		Sirana (Guinea)	
		Booko (Guinea)	
		Ouaninou (Guinea)	
		Gbinta (Guinea)	
		Bin-houyé (Liberia)	
		Prollo (Liberia)	
		Grabo (Liberia)	
		Djouroutou (Liberia)	

Annex 26. Documents related to the transfer of 60 NVG7-21 night vision goggles



NIGHT VISION GOGGLES NVG7-21

- HEAD MOUNTED FOR HANDS-FREE USE
- COMPACT AND LIGHTWEIGHT
- INTERCHANGEABLE LENSES FOR DIFFERENT MAGNIFICATIONS
- BUILT IN INFRA-RED ILLUMINATOR

Lightweight, rugged and a top notch performer the NVG-7 is an exceptional choice for hands-free usage. High-resolution image intensifier, auto-brightness, and bright source shut-off. NVG-7 goggles also have a built-in IR for total darkness with indicator ON light within the FOV and flip. One AA, case and manual are included. ATN NVG-7 is an excellent choice for hands-free night vision applications.

STANDARD ACCESSORIES include:
Flip-up Head Mount Assembly - Allows for hands-free operation
Brow Pads - Changeable pads for secure head mount fit
Eye Caps - Prevents the emission of stray light or facial reflections
Soft Carrying Case - Provides convenient storage
Shoulder Strap - Attached to the NVG-7 carrying case for easy portability
Microfiber Lens Cleaning Cloth - Used to safely clean the objective and eyepiece glass surfaces
Day Light Filter - Filters excessive light. Protects objective lens from the elements
Operator's Manual - Instructional user's guide
Batteries - One (1) 3V Lithium CR123A or one (1) 1.5V AA type.

- Lightweight, compact rugged Goggle system
- Multi-purpose: Hand-held, head-mounted or helmet-mounted
- Comfortable, flip-up headgear
- Multi-coated all-glass optics
- Wide angle infrared illuminator
- Optional 3x, 5x and 10x lenses available
- Water and fog resistant
- Limited Two-Year Warranty

SPECIFICATIONS

Magnification	7x
Lens System	F1.2, 26 mm
Protective Lens Coating	Yes
FOV	40°
Range of Focus	0.25 m to infinity
Dioptric Adjustment	-5 to +5
Controls	Digital
Automatic Brightness Control	Yes
Bright Light Cut-off	Yes
Automatic Shut-off System	Yes
Infrared Illuminator	Yes
IR Indicator	Yes (in FOV)
Low Battery Indicator	Yes (in FOV)
Power Supply	1 x 1.5V AA type battery or 1 x 3V CR123A type battery
Battery Life	80 hrs
Environmental Rating	Weather and fog resistant
Operating Temperature	-40 to +55 °C
Storage Temperature	-50 to +75 °C
Dimensions	175x65x102 mm / 6.9" x 2.6" x 4"
Weight	0.45 kg / 0.9 lbs

TUBE SPECIFICATIONS

HIGH QUALITY 2ND GEN IMAGE INTENSIFIER TUBE

DESCRIPTION	Standard
GENERATION	2+
PHOTOGRAPHIC TYPE	Multi-Anal
RESOLUTION, lines/mm*	40-45
FIGURE OF MERIT	>800
MTF1 - MEAN TIME BEFORE FAILURE, hours	5,000
EXPORT	Check with subject to EAR

* Specifications are provided for informational purposes only. Actual values may vary.





Export Warning: These products are subject to one or more of the export control laws and regulations of the U.S. Government. Pending the receipt of these products under the control jurisdiction of either the US Department of State or the US Bureau of Industry and Security, US Department of Commerce, Export without proper licensing or consent is strictly prohibited.

www.atncorp.com
 e-mail: sales@atncorp.com, info@atncorp.com

1341 San Mateo Ave,
 South San Francisco, CA 94080

Tel: 800-910-2962, 650-589-5100,
 Fax: 650-875-0129



TDY * ARCHIVE DOC *

Not to be attached to package

FROM: GROWTECH LLC 9 GROWTECH PLAZA 201-729-0388 99 MAIN ST STE A LAUREL, MD 20707 United States	DTG: 07/20/15 BWI
TO: BSD Afrique Ltd. B.P.3691 00 Abidjan 00 Cocody Danga	Contact: BSD Afrique Ltd. 22548931377
ABIDJAN Cote D Ivoire	
CI-ABJ-CHO	

Payment Code: SWI: SWI 847515628 Service: STU	Duties and Taxes Unpaid
---	-------------------------

Ref Code: 58-70-170-15 Account No.: 847515628 SWI: RES ITN Request	Date: 2015-08-18 Net Weight: 220.0 lb Pieces: 10
--	--

These commodities, technology or software were exported from the United States in accordance with the Export Administration Regulations. Diversion contrary to U.S. law is prohibited.



Customs Value: 67000 USD
 Content:
 Night Vision Goggles

WAYBILL 43 3488 6382

- License Plates of pieces in shipment :
- J001 4600 0022 5801 3007
 - J001 4600 0022 5801 3008
 - J001 4600 0022 5801 3009
 - J001 4600 0022 5801 3010
 - J001 4600 0022 5801 3011
 - J001 4600 0022 5801 3012
 - J001 4600 0022 5801 3013
 - J001 4600 0022 5801 3014
 - J001 4600 0022 5801 3015
 - J001 4600 0022 5801 3016

SENDER'S RECEIPT Waybill #: 43 3488 6382	Rate Release: \$2025.00 Protection: Smart Protection DL 67546 Description: Night Vision Goggles Customs Value: 67000 USD Weight (lbs.): 220.0 Ship Ref: 58-70-170-15 Special Inv: Shipment Value Protection Duties and Taxes Unpaid
To (Company): BSD Afrique Ltd. B.P.3691 00 Abidjan 00 Cocody Danga ABIDJAN Cote D Ivoire Attention To: BSD Afrique Ltd. Contact: 22548931377	Bill Shipment To: SENDER Bill To Acct: *****0628 Route: _____ Date: _____ Time: _____ For Tracking, please go to www.dhl-usa.com or call 1-800-225-6349 Thank you for shipping with DHL.

Proforma Invoice Value for Customs Purposes Only

GromaTech, LLC
 99A Main Street
 Laurel, MD 20707
 (703)801-3994
 accounts payable@groma-tech.com
 groma-tech.com



BILL TO
 Silverback Industries PTE LTD
 Blk 1013 Geylang East Ave 3
 #04-114
 Singapore 389728
 ATTN: Samuel Lai

SHIP TO
 BSO AFRIQUE LTD.
 B.P. 3691 08 Abidjan 08 Cocody Danga
 ABIDJAN
 Ivory Coast
 Tel: +225 4993 1377
 Email: office@bsafrique.com

INVOICE #	DATE	TOTAL DUE	ENCLOSED
1036	08/18/2015	\$67,380.00	

SHIP VIA WAYBILL PO# CURRENCY INCOTERMS
 DHL Express 43 3488 6382 SB-PO-178-15 USD ExWorks Origin

ACTIVITY	QTY	RATE	AMOUNT
Product: GT-NVGONVG72I Night Vision Goggles ATN NVG7-2I (Gen 2+) (No License Required)	60	1,123.00	67,380
Country of Origin: UNITED STATES			
Schedule B#: 9004900000			
Third party: AMITA - Agence internationale de transit et maintenance			
CUSTOMER: BP 1858 Abidjan 18, Cote d'Ivoire			
CUSTOMER AGENT: Contact person: M. KORO DIABY CHEICK			
Call: 06 72 60 03			
Tel: 21 24 29 11 / 20 32 60 77			
Email: cheickk@yahoo.fr			

Internal PID#: 3510

WARNING: This document may reference items whose export is restricted by the Arms Export Control Act (Title 22, U.S.C., §2752, et seq.) or the Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended (Title 50, U.S.C., App. 2401 et seq.). Violations of these export laws are subject to severe criminal penalties. Tariff Code: 9004900000 License: NLR Reg. Code: ECCN: 6A9928

BALANCE DUE **\$67,380.00**

Charles Johnson IV
 CHARLES JOHNSON IV
 GROMATECH
 PRESIDENT.

TROYA TECH DEFENSE LTD
 Negba POB 156
 79856
 ISRAEL
 TEL: +972 8 6774341



INVOICE

Number : 01/000003 Original

TO: BSD AFRIQUE
 Cocody Danga 08 BP 3691
 Abidjan
 Ivory Coast

Customer #: 00083
 Phone: 225 22446732
 Fax:
 ID #: 00000000-0

V.A.T- ID: IL 515179752
 Date: August-11-2015
 Time: 01:03

Page 1 of 1

#	Item Code	Part Description	Currency	Quantity	Unit Price	Total Line
1	NVG7-21	NVG7-21 Night Vision Goggles	USD	60.00	2,100.00	126,000.00
2	999	Shipping	USD	1.00	4,000.00	4,000.00

Troya's Bank Details for this purpose:
 TROYA TECH DEFENSE LTD,
 Mizrahi- Tefahot Bank
 Bank No. - 20
 Ra'anana Branch - 423
 Account No. - 124565
 Swift code: MIZBILT
 IBAN No.: IL650204230000000124565

61.00	Total :	130,000.00
0.00%	Account :	0.00
0.00%	V.A.T :	0.00
	USD	
	Total Payment :	130,000.00

Authorized Signature

TROYA TECH DEFENSE LTD
 515179752

Annex 27. Documents related to the transfer of 5 FLIR BTS-XR Pro thermal imaging devices



FLIR BTS-Series

see without being seen

BTS-Series are shock-resistant thermal imaging cameras. They produce a crisp image in the darkest of nights. The BTS-Series will dramatically increase your situational awareness.

The BTS-Series are bi-oculars. This means that it is less tiring to use for the eyes than a monocular. By using a bi-ocular the ability to detect faint objects is enhanced. This means that you have more chance to detect small objects against the background. It is also easier to hold bi-oculars steady when looking at an object. An advantage if you are looking at small things which are far away.

Extended Range Options
 The BTS-X Pro is equipped with an uncooled vanadium oxide detector. This provides excellent long range viewing with sharp 320 x 240 native resolution in the viewfinder and a 2x digital e-zoom step to 160 x 120 resolution.
 Powered by FLIR's 640 x 480 core, the BTS-XR Pro delivers greater range performance with crisp, clear 320 x 240 native resolution in the viewfinder AND while in the 2x digital e-zoom mode, plus an additional 4x digital e-zoom step to 160 x 120 resolution. Full 640 x 480 resolution imagery from the BTS-XR Pro Series is also accessible via the "see video" jack in the hot shoe.

Digital zoom
 The BTS-X Pro comes with a 2x digital zoom. The BTS-XR Pro has both a 2x and a 4x digital zoom. This allows you to have a closer look at the situation when necessary.

One touch video recording
 Just press a button and start recording thermal video on a removable SD card.

Image storage
 Both versions of the BTS-Series allow to store thermal images in JPEG format on a removable SD card. Images can be used as evidence.

Choice of lenses
 The BTS-Series can be ordered with different lenses. Longer lenses have a narrower field of view and allow you to see objects further away. Lenses are interchangeable. The specific lenses you require for your application need to be specified at time of order.

The following lenses are available:

	BTS-X Pro: 320 x 240 pixels		
Lens Options	18mm	15mm	100mm
FOV	13° x 10°	7° x 5°	6° x 4°
Detect man-sized target at:	780 m	1.40 km	2.1 km

	BTS-XR Pro: 640 x 480 pixels		
Lens Options	18mm	15mm	100mm
FOV	18° x 13°	10° x 8°	6° x 4°
Detect man-sized target at:	980 m	1.9 km	2.40 km

InstAlert™
White hot
Black hot

FROM: KETY BEN SHAM 972-3 9514122 EL MEC EME LTD 1 YOSEF LUSHANSKI ST RISHON LE-TSION 70600 ISRAEL	8 KG	1 OF 3	SHIP: 7600 XFGK VCS SHP WT: 36.5 KG SHP DWT: 69.5 KG DATE: 1 JAN 2015	 
SHIP TO: MR. DANIEL CHKROUN +22522446732 BSD AFRIQUE LTD 3691 08 ABIDJAN 08 COCODY DANGA ABIDJAN IVORY COAST			UPS EXPEDITED TRACKING #: 1Z 760 0XF 67 4338 0574 2	
Invoice No.: 101214			BILLING: P/P DESC: CAMERA KEY	

Fold Here and Place in Pouch



Shipper agrees to the UPS Terms and Conditions of service and the UPS service contract. The international air carriage, the Warsaw Convention or Montreal Convention may apply and make UPS liable for loss or damage to cargo. International carriage by road may be subject to the Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road Except as otherwise provided by national legislation or other applicable law. The UPS Terms and Conditions apply to all services provided by UPS. There are no shipping charges agreed upon at the time of receipt of the shipment and UPS reserves the right to make the shipment in any way it deems appropriate. Shippers advised by the shipper authorize UPS to act as forwarding agent for export control and customs purposes. If shipped from the US, shippers certify that the commodities, technology or software were exported from the US in accordance with the Export Administration Regulations. Shippers authorize us to be published.

SHIPPER'S SIGNATURE	DATE OF SHIPMENT

TROYA

INVOICE NO
16/12/14

DATE: 16/12/14

To:

Ship To:

BSD AFRIQUE LTD	BSD AFRIQUE LTD
Att: Mr. Daniel Chkroun	Att: Mr. Daniel Chkroun
B.P. 3691 08 Abidjan 08 Cocody Danga	B.P. 3691 08 Abidjan 08 Cocody Danga
ABIDJAN	ABIDJAN
Cote D'ivoire	Cote D'ivoire
Mobile : 225 49931377	Mobile : 225 49931377
Tel: +22522446732	Tel: +22522446732
E-mail: office@clearsky.com	E-mail: office@clearsky.com

SALESPERSON	P.O. NUMBER	SHIP DATE	SHIPPED VIA	TERMS
ERAN RESHEF	POT02-11-2014	16/12/14	UPS FREIGHT	EXWORKS

QUANTITY	DESCRIPTION	UNIT PRICE	AMOUNT
5	431-0006-06-00S- BTS-XR Pro thermal CAMERA 640x480 px, 9Hz, PAL, no lens	\$ 8,500	\$ 42,500
5	322-0181-12- 35mm Quick Disconnect Lens	\$2,000	\$ 10,000

COUNTRY OF ORIGIN : USA

"Release of the goods from customs (or anywhere else) is OK with presentation of the copy of the AWB and no original document is required".

VALUE \$ 52,500

Signed by

TROYA Israel
Kibbutz Negba POB 156,
79856, Israel
Tel: +972 8 6774341

TROYA Italy
Via Lucidde 56 Milan,
20134 MI, Italy
Tel: +39 366 338 5935

Web: www.troya-tech.com | Email: info@troya-tech.com

Page 1 of 1

SDV ROUEN
15 RUE ETIENNE DOLET
BP 262
76143 PETIT QUEVILLY CEDEX
Tel: 0232180036
Fax: 0232188348



Le : 13/08/2013

N.ref:	16500 B5 350214	Affaire suivie par:	
	RENIER Cathy	SDV Rouen	
Tel Dir:	02 32 18 00 36	Fax:	02 32 18 83 48
Email:	c.renier@sdv.com		
Tracking Number:			

S.E.E ALEX FRAMERY
8 ROUTE NATIONALE 19
94440 SANTENY
FRANCE

CONFIRMATION D'EMBARQUEMENT

Prétransport :	Prise en charge à :	Transporteur :	
		BOCS	
Moyen de transport :	Lieu de chargement :	Lieu de déchargement :	Destination finale :
AFRICAN FOREST	ROUEN	ABIDJAN	ABIDJAN
Marques et N°	Description marchandise	Poids	
		TONNE	
ABIDJAN	6 VEHICULES TRM 2000 PLATEAU DIM : 5.50X2.30X2.80 SERIE NR : VF6TRM20008000880/5254/ 5932/0633/0675/1626	24,600	

Messieurs,

Nous avons le plaisir de vous confirmer l'embarquement de la marchandise en rubrique, sur le navire :

AFRICAN FOREST, départ effectif le 12/08/2013.

Arrivée au port de déchargement prévue le : 25/08/2013

Pour réacheminement sur : ABIDJAN
Fournisseur ou destinataire : S.E.E ALEX FRAMERY


Avec nos sincères salutations.

RENIER CATHY

Instructions particulières :
Assurance March. transportée non souscrite à votre demande

SDV Logistique Internationale - Siège social : 31/32, quai de Dion Boulton. F-92811 PUTEAUX Cedex.
S.A.S au capital de 36 617 248 Euros - RCS Nanterre B 552 088 636 - APE 5229 B -
TVA FR 29 552 088 636
www.sdv.com

Bolloré
LOGISTICS
Doc N° : 49022
Page : 1

Shipper (full style and address) S E E ALEX FRAMERY 8 ROUTE NATIONALE 19 0440 SANTENY France		BIMCO LINER BILL OF LADING CODE NAME: "ONLINEBILL 2000"	
Consignee (full style and address) or Order VILLERS SERVICES SA 18 BP 1395 ABIDJAN 18 COTE D IVOIRE		BL No. UROBJ111/7	Reference No.
Notify Party (full style and address) VILLERS SERVICES SA 18 BP 1395 ABIDJAN 18 COTE D IVOIRE		Vessel M/S AFRICAN FOREST 13301	
		Port of loading ROUEN	Port of discharge ABIDJAN
PARTICULARS DECLARED BY THE SHIPPER BUT NOT ACKNOWLEDGED BY THE CARRIER			
Container No./Seal No./Marks and Numbers	Number and kind of packages; description of cargo 6 VEHICULE TRM2000 SERIE NR VF6TRM2000S000890 VF6TRM2000S005254 VF6TRM2000S005932 VF6TRM2000S000633 VF6TRM2000S000675 VF6TRM2000S001826 FRET PAYABLE AU DEPART ON BOARD	Gross weight, kg 24,600 T	Measurement, m ³
COPY NOT NEGOTIABLE			
SHIPPED on board in apparent good order and condition (unless otherwise stated herein) the total number of Containers/Packages or Units indicated in the Box opposite entitled "Total number of Containers/Packages or Units received by the Carrier" and the cargo as specified above, weight, measure, marks, numbers, quality, contents and value unknown, for carriage to the Port of discharge or so near thereto as the vessel may safely get and so always afloat, to be delivered in the like good order and condition at the Port of discharge unto the lawful holder of the Bill of Lading, on payment of freight as indicated to the right plus other charges incurred in accordance with the provisions contained in this Bill of Lading. In accepting this Bill of Lading the Merchant expressly accepts and agrees to all its stipulations on both Page 1 and Page 2, whether written, printed, stamped or otherwise incorporated, as fully as if they were all signed by the Merchant. One original Bill of Lading must be surrendered duly endorsed in exchange for the cargo or delivery order, whereupon all other Bills of Lading to be void. IN WITNESS whereof the Carrier, Master or their Agent has signed the number of original Bills of Lading stated below right, all of this tenor and date.		Total number of Containers/Packages or Units received by the Carrier	
		Shipper's declared value	Declared value charge
Freight details and charges			
Carrier's principal place of business  Bremen Overseas Chartering and Shipping GmbH Martinstrasse 29 28195 Bremen Tel: +49 421 36911-5 Fax: +49 421 36911-99 Telex 2 44 055		Date shipped on board	Place and date of issue Rouen, le
Signature _____ Carrier or, for the Carrier _____ as Master (Master's name/signature) _____ as Agent (Agent's name/signature)		Number of original Bills of Lading 3/three	Pre-carriage by**
		Place of receipt by pre-carrier**	
		Place of delivery by on-carrier**	

BIMCO is a member of
 The Baltic and International Maritime Council
 (BIMAC), Copenhagen, 2002

*As defined hereinafter (Cl. 1)
 **Applicable only when pre- or on-carriage is engaged in accordance with Clause 8

FRAMERY

8 Route de Paris
RN19
94440 SANTENY

SDV LI - ROUEN


Monsieur Johann VAIN

Monsieur,

Je, soussigné, Frédéric CABRIERES, Président de la société FRAMERY SAS, certifie que les 6 camions pour la société VILLERS SERVICES SA, n'ont aucun équipement militaire.

Fait pour valoir ce que de droit.

Santeney, le 31 Juillet 2013



Frédéric CABRIERES

FRAMERY

PIÈCES, OUTILS, ACCESSOIRES,
MATERIELS INDUSTRIELS
BERLIET • RENAULT • SAVIEM
8 route de Paris - RN19
94440 SANTENY

Tel : 33 (0)1 43 86 06 64
Fax : 33 (0)1 45 95 03 99
E-mail contact@framery.fr
www.framery.fr

VILLERS SERVICES
18 BP 1395
ABIDJAN 18
COTE D'IVOIRE

FACTURE FA201307004

Santeney le 12 septembre 2013

Q.	Articles / Prestations	P.U. H.T.	Total H.T.
15	Véhicules type TRM 2000	9 000,00 €	135 000,00 €
	6902 0170 VF6TRM2000S005296		
	6902 0338 VF6TRM2000S005484		
	6882 0689 VF6TRM2000S003375		
	6872 0071 000S002050		
	6892 1263 VF6TRM2000S005033		
	6902 0670 VF6TRM2000S005870		
	6912 0123 VF6TRM2000S006687		
	6882 0835 000S006035		
	6872 0074 000S002053		
	6882 2773 VF6TRM2000S003656		
	6882 0011 VF6TRM2000S001287		
	6872 1089 VF6TRM2000S002638		
	7872 0075 VF6JM2700S0002271		
	6892 1343 VF6TRM2000S005113		
	6892 1336 VF6TRM2000S005106		
Vente en exonération de TVA selon l'Article 275-1 du C.G.J. Attestation à nous fournir			
Total			135 000,00 €

Les marchandises restent la propriété du vendeur jusqu'à paiement intégral du prix. L'acheteur s'engage à ne pas disposer par quelque moyen que ce soit ni en pleine propriété, ni par constitution de gage ou nantissement du matériel acheté avant complète libération du prix.
En cas de litige, notre responsabilité sera limitée au remplacement gratuit des pièces qui seraient reconnues défectueuses, après examen en nos ateliers, sans aucun autre indemnité de quelque forme ou de quelque nature que ce soit.
En cas de contestation, le Tribunal de Commerce de Créteil sera seul compétent.

S.A.S au capital de 100 000 Euros - APE 4511 Z - N° Siret: 305 232 480 00015 - RCS Créteil - EORI FR30523248000015
BRED - Bne-Comte-Robert - Iban FR76 1012 7003 3900 5303 9186 812 - Code BIC BREDFRPPXXX - TVA Intracom. FR89 305 232 480

SDV ROUEN
15 RUE ETIENNE DOLET
BP 262
76143 PETIT QUEVILLY CEDEX
Tel: 0232180036
Fax: 0232188348



Le : 10/10/2013

FRAMERY ALEX S.E.E
8 ROUTE NATIONALE 19
94440 SANTENY
FRANCE

N.ref :	16500 B5 350249	Affaire suivie par :	
	RENIER Cathy	SDV Rouen	
Tel Dir :	02 32 18 00 36	Fax :	02 32 18 83 48
Email :	c.renier@adv.com		
Tracking Number :	16500 B5 350249		

V/Ref : MR ET MME CABRI

CONFIRMATION D'EMBARQUEMENT

Prétransport :	Prise en charge à :	Transporteur :	
		BOCS	
Moyen de transport :	Lieu de chargement :	Lieu de déchargement :	Destination finale :
AFRICAN WIND	ROUEN	ABIDJAN	ABIDJAN
Marques et N°	Description marchandise	Poids	Volume
		TONNE	METRE CUBE
ABIDJAN	15 A NU TRM 2000 PLATEAU DIM : 5.50X2.30X2.80 67622396/97/98/99/400/01/02/03/04/ 05/06/07/08/09/10 N°: 0000/000000/1 - 0000/000000/2	61,500	531,300

Messieurs,

Nous avons le plaisir de vous confirmer l'embarquement de la marchandise en rubrique, sur le navire :

AFRICAN WIND, départ effectif le 09/10/2013.

Arrivée au port de déchargement prévue le : 26/10/2013

Pour réacheminement sur : ABIDJAN
Fournisseur ou destinataire : VILLERS SERVICES SA


Avec nos sincères salutations.

RENIER CATHY

Instructions particulières :
Assurance March. transportée non souscrite à votre demande

SDV Logistique Internationale - Siège social : 31/32, quai de Dion Bouton. F-92811 PUTEAUX Cedex.
S.A.S au capital de 36 617 248 Euros - RCS Nanterre B 552 088 536 - APE 5229 B -
TVA FR 29 552 088 536
www.sdv.com

Bolloré
LOGISTICS
Doc N° : 50064
Page : 1

Shipper (full style and address) FRAMERY ALEX S E E 8 ROUTE NATIONALE 19 94440 SANTENY France		BIMCO LINER BILL OF LADING CODE NAME: "CONLINEBILL 2000" <small>Amended January 1990; August 1992; January 1993; July 1994; August 1996; January 1999; November 2000.</small>		
Consignee (full style and address) or Order VILLERS SERVICES SA 18 BP 1395 ABIDJAN 18 COTE D IVOIRE		B/L No. UROASJ11711	Reference No.	
Notify Party (full style and address) VILLERS SERVICES SA 18 BP 1395 ABIDJAN 18 COTE D IVOIRE		Vessel M/S AFRICAN WIND 13303		
		Port of loading ROUEN		
		Port of discharge ABIDJAN		
PARTICULARS DECLARED BY THE SHIPPER BUT NOT ACKNOWLEDGED BY THE CARRIER				
Container No./Seal No./Marks and Numbers COPY NOT NEGOTIABLE	Number and kind of packages; description of cargo 15 CAMIONS TRM EN COURS D USAGE N° SERIES : VFTRM20005005296 VFSTRM20005005484 VFSTRM20005003375 005002050 VFSTRM20005005033 VFSTRM20005005870 VFSTRM20005009887 005003521 / 005002053 VFTRM20005003656 VFSTRM20005001287 VFSTRM20005002638 VFSTRM20005002271 VFSTRM20005005113 VFSTRM20005005108 BSC FRET PAYABLE AU DEPART ON BOARD	Gross weight, kg 611500	Measurement, m³ EN ATTENTE	
SHIPPED on board in apparent good order and condition (unless otherwise stated herein) the total number of Containers/Packages or Units indicated in the Box opposite entitled "Total number of Containers/Packages or Units received by the Carrier" and the cargo as specified above, weight, measure, marks, numbers, quality, contents and value unknown, for carriage to the Port of discharge or so near thereto as the vessel may safely get and lie always afloat, to be delivered in the like good order and condition at the Port of discharge unto the lawful holder of the Bill of Lading, on payment of freight as indicated to the right plus other charges incurred in accordance with the provisions contained in this Bill of Lading. In accepting this Bill of Lading the Merchant expressly accepts and agrees to all its stipulations on both Page 1 and Page 2, whether written, printed, stamped or otherwise incorporated, as fully as if they were all signed by the Merchant. One original Bill of Lading must be surrendered duly endorsed in exchange for the cargo or delivery order, whereupon all other Bills of Lading to be void. IN WITNESS whereof the Carrier, Master or their Agent has signed the number of original Bills of Lading stated below right, all of this tenor and date.		Total number of Containers/Packages or Units received by the Carrier Shipper's declared value Declared value charge Freight details and charges		
Carrier's name/principal place of business  Bremen Overseas Chartering and Shipping GmbH Martinstrasse 29 28195 Bremen Tel: +49 421 36911-5 Fax: +49 421 36911-99 Telex 2 44 005		Date shipped on board Number of original Bills of Lading 3/free	Place of issue Pre-carriage by**	
Signature _____ Carrier or, for the Carrier _____ as Master (Master's name/signature) _____ as Agents (Agent's name/signature)		Place of receipt by pre-carrier** Place of delivery by on-carrier**		

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*As defined hereinafter (Cl. 1)
 **Applicable only when pre-ten-carriage is arranged in accordance with Clause 8

FRAMERY

8 Route de Paris
RN19
94440 SANTENY

SDV LI - ROUEN

Monsieur Johann VAIN

Monsieur,

Je, soussigné, Frédéric CABRIERES, Président de la société FRAMERY SAS, atteste que ces 15 camions sont en parfait état de marche et ont été révisés par nos soins. Il ne s'agit donc pas de déchets pouvant nuire à l'environnement.

Fait pour valoir ce que de droit.

Santeney, le 12 Septembre 2013



Frédéric CABRIERES

Siret : 305 232 480 00015 – APE : 4511Z – RCS : Créteil – N°TVA intracom : FR89 305 232 480
SAS au capital de 100.000 €
Tél. : 01.43.86.06.64 – Fax : 01.45.95.03.99 – www.framery.fr

FRAMERY

8 Route de Paris
RN19
94440 SANTENY

SDV LI - ROUEN

Monsieur Johann VAIN

Monsieur,

Je, soussigné, Frédéric CABRIERES, Président de la société FRAMERY SAS, certifie que les 15 camions pour la société VILLERS SERVICES SA, n'ont aucun équipement militaire.

Fait pour valoir ce que de droit.

Santeney, le 12 Septembre 2013



Frédéric CABRIERES

Annex 29. Contracts signed in Gamina illegal gold exploitations

Monsieur Gbessi Zébry Richard
 Chef du village de Gamina
 Cel : 07-76-39-25

A
 Monsieur le Sous-préfet
 de Zaïbo

Objet : Avis de choix d'exploitant
 de mines d'or

Monsieur,

Suite à la réunion du 22 novembre 2014 qui a vu la présentation du Syndicat National Autonome des Agriculteurs Menacés par les Exploitations Minières (SYNAAMEM), dont la conclusion a été de choisir une seule société, nous populations de Gamina avons pris la résolution de choisir la Société Coopérative des Orpailleurs du Tchologo comme seul exploitant devant occuper nos mines d'or.

Ainsi donc, l'Orpillage étant une activité génératrice revenue non négligeable, nous exigeons en retour que ladite société veuille réaliser nos infrastructures suivantes :

- 1- La construction du logement de notre Sous- préfet,
- 2- La construction du foyer des jeunes de Gamina,
- 3- La construction du logement de notre sage- femme,
- 4- La réhabilitation du terrain de football de Gamina,
- 5- La construction du palais de la chefferie de Gamina,
- 6- Ouverture des rues du village.

Pour conclure, nous souhaiterions que nos autorités administratives et militaires nous soutiennent dans notre démarche en veillant à la sécurisation des sites afin de parer à toute éventualité de fraudes.

Veillez agréer Monsieur le Sous- préfet, l'expression de ma plus haute considération.


Fait à Gamina, le 26 novembre 2014


Le Chef du village

Ampliation

- Le Directeur Régional des mines
- Le Député de Gboguhé- Zaïbo
- Le SYNAAMEM
- Le Commandant de compagnie de la gendarmerie
- Le Commandant de la Brigade ville
- Le commandant Régional des FRCI

GBESSI Z. Richard
 Chef de Village
 Gamina S/P de Zaïbo
 Cel: 07 76 39 25





PROTOCOL D'ACCORD D'EXPLOITATION D'UNE PARCELLE

Je soussigné Monsieur SANIA-SOURMATA
CM N° 5318/04 délivré le 30/11/2009 à Alane Tougné

reconnait avoir cédé une portion de superficie de 04 hectares à
Monsieur Koudraogo Seydou représentant la
Société Coopérative des Orpailleurs de Tchologo « SC.ORT-COOP CA », de
nationalité Burkina Faso pour exploitation semi-industrielle d'or.

En contrepartie, Monsieur Koudraogo Seydou s'engage à verser
aux personnes ci-après désignées:

- Propriétaire de champ : 500f
- Village : 100f
- Conseil général : 200f
- Sous-préfecture : 200f
- Sécurité : 200f
- propriétaire terrain : 250 f

En foi de quoi je lui délivre cette présente convention pour servir et valoir ce
que de droit.

Fait à Daloa le 24 juillet 2016

Le Cédant
SANIA SOURMATA
WWS

propriétaire terrain
Guindo Koudraogo Seydou
Koudraogo Seydou

l'Acquéreur
Poujo IDRISA
Poujo IDRISA

Témoins du Cédant

chef du village

Témoin de l'Acquéreur



SC.ORT-COOP CA

SC.ORT
1775

Au Capital Social de 1.000.000 FCFA
Siège social : Ferkessédougou, quartier Résidentiel
N°1775, Parc 208, Boite Postale 90 Ferkessédougou

PROTOCOL D'ACCORD D'EXPLOITATION D'UNE PARCELLE

Je soussigné Monsieur BANI AÏDOU PIERRE

CM N°.....délivré le... / ... /20... à.....

reconnait avoir céder une portion de superficie de.....hectares à
Monsieur Quadrangga Sankou représentant la
Société Coopérative des Orpailleurs de Tchologo « SC.ORT-COOP CA », de
nationalité Burkinabè pour exploitation semi-industrielle d'or.

En contrepartie, Monsieur Quadrangga Sankou s'engage à verser

aux personnes ci-après désignées:

- Propriétaire de champ : 500f
- Village : 100f
- Sous-préfecture : 200f
- propriétaire terrien : 250 f

En foi de quoi, je lui délivre cette présente convention pour servir et valoir ce que de droit.

Fait à NALGA, le 22/10/2014

Le Cédant

BANI D. Pierre

propriétaire terrien

BANI D. Pierre

l'Acquéreur

SAÏDOU

Témoins du Cédant

highely ALEX
[Signature]

chef de village

GBESSI Z. Nicolas
Chef de Village de
Gamina 5^{ème} de Zongo
Tel: 07 76 39 25

Témoin de l'Acquéreur

FORGU IORISSA

PROTOCOL D'ACCORD EXPLOITATION D'UNE PARCELLE

TITRE I : LES PARTIES

LES PROPRIETAIRES :

Le propriétaire du champ

Situé à :

BP

Tel :

CNI

Le Propriétaire terrien

De la parcelle de Monsieur :

BP

Tél : 1-92-62-56 / 96-74-36 65

CNI

La Communauté villageoise :

Représenté par : (Chef du village)

BP

Tél :

CNI

D'une part

L'EXPLOITANT : SEMKA (M. DE BE ANONE)

BP

Tél :

CNI BP 321001007029338

D'une part

Convient ce qui suit :

TITRE II : OBJET ET DUREE DU CONTRAT

OBJET : Le présent contrat définit les engagements et les responsabilités des parties dans le cadre d'une exploitation minière (or)

DUREE : Le présent contrat prend effet à compter de la date de signature pour une durée de deux ans (02) renouvelable selon la volonté des parties.

TITRE III : ENGAGEMENT DES PARTIES**ARTICLE 2****LE PROPRIETAIRE DU CHAMP**

S'engage à :

- Ne pas attribuer ladite parcelle à un autre exploitant ;
- Mettre ladite parcelle à la disposition de Monsieur pour exploitation minière.
- Suivre avec le représentant : le pesage au comptoir pour la détermination de sa part
- Fournir toutes les informations utiles à la sécurisation des ressources humaines et matérielles pour éviter la fuite frauduleuse des pierres extraites.

EXPLOITANT (.....)

Avant toute activité a donné une avance :

Propriétaire du champ FCFA

Propriétaire terrien FCFA

Communauté villageoise FCFA

En outre, il s'engage à :

- Installer un comptoir sur la dite parcelle pour le pesage de l'or extraite
- Mettre en règle les différents papiers relatifs à l'information du site
- Mettre à la disposition de la sécurité toutes les informations nécessaires à la sécurisation nationale ;
- A la fin du contrat à remblayer les parties exploitées et à le reboiser en fonction de la culture initiale ;
- **LE PROPRIETAIRE TERRIEN**
- S'engage à :
 - faciliter la mise à disposition de l'espace en question
 - Fournir toutes les informations utiles à la sécurisation des ressources humaines et matérielles pour éviter la fuite frauduleuse des pierres extraites
 - Ne pas attribuer la parcelle à un autre exploitant

LE CHEF DU VILLAGE

S'engage à :

Etre la caution morale du présent contrat pour veiller à sa bonne mise en application en tant que auxiliaire de l'administration.

TITRE IV : TRANSACTIONS FINANCIERES**ARTICLE 3**

COUT DE L'EXPLOITATIONS : Le coût de l'exploitation est déterminé en fonction du bilan des pesées de chaque période indiquées par les parties.

ARTICLE 4**PAIEMENT**

La clé de rémunération de chaque partie se définit comme suit

- Propriétaire du champ :FCFA sur chaque gramme extrait du site ;
- Propriétaire terrien.....FCFA sur chaque gramme extrait du site ;
- Communauté villageoise.....FCFA sur chaque gramme extrait du site ;
- Conseil régionalFCFA sur chaque gramme extrait du site ;
- Sous-préfectureFCFA sur chaque gramme extrait du site ;
- SécuritéFCFA sur chaque gramme extrait du site ;

ARTICLE 5

DELAIS DE PAIEMENT :

Les paiements se feront chaque 15 jours au bureau en espèce ou par chèque selon les deux parties après la rencontre pour les décomptes du poids extrait en présence de tous les acteurs signataires du présent protocole.

TITRE V – RESILIATION

ARTICLE 6

Le présent contrat pourra être rompu par l'une des parties en cas de non respect des engagements sus mentionnés.

ARTICLE 7

En cas de litiges, contestations ou différends sur l'application du présent contrat, les deux parties s'engagent à un règlement à l'amiable.

L'échec du règlement à l'amiable les conduira à se saisir d'un comité d'arbitrage.

Fait à GAMINA, le 2014



POUR PROPRIETAIRE DU CHAMP

POUR L'EXPLOITANT

LE PROPRIETAIRE TERRIEN
TANGA NGOUN NIGANG


LE CHEF DU VILLAGE

AUTRE TENDIN
TANGA NGOUN NIGANG

Amputation

Chaque acteur sus mentionnés

REPUBLIQUE DE CÔTE D'IVOIRE
Carte Nationale d'Identité
Immatriculation : **C 0047 4710 43**



FOFIE
Nom
KOUAKOU MARTIN
Prénoms


M **1,75**
Sexe *Taille (m)*

01/01/1968
Date de Naissance

BOHI (CIV)
Lieu de Naissance

Etablie le : **27/08/2009** *Valide jusqu'au* : **26/08/2019**

A : KORHOGO



Domicile : RESIDENTIEL III KORHOGO



Profession : ENTREPRENEUR

Signature
du
Titulaire



Père : YAO KOFFI FOFIE
Né le : 01/01/1930

Mère : KOSSONOU AMA KROMAN
Née le : 01/01/1932

Numéro de série : 039 0501 033 0002215631