



## ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL

Sixteenth Session

OFFICIAL RECORDS

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*President:* Mr. Raymond SCHEYVEN (Belgium).

*Present:*

The representatives of the following countries: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, China, Cuba, Egypt, France, India, Philippines, Poland, Sweden, Turkey, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.

Observers from the following Member States: Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Iran, Israel, Netherlands.

Observers from the following non-member States: Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Libya.

The representatives of the following specialized agencies: International Labour Organisation, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

**Report of the Commission on Human Rights (ninth session) (E/2447): report of the Social Committee (E/2482 and Corr.1)**

[Agenda item 13]

1. The PRESIDENT invited the Council to consider the report of the Social Committee (E/2482 and Corr.1) on the report of the Commission on Human Rights (ninth session) and, in particular, the Social Committee's two draft resolutions therein.

2. Mr. ORLOVSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), speaking to draft resolution A, wished to explain how he intended to vote. He recalled that, when the matter had been discussed in the Social Committee, opinion had been divided on the question of the draft covenants on human rights. A number of delegations had recommended that they should be transmitted to the General Assembly at its eighth session, whereas

others had wished them to be sent back to the Commission on Human Rights with a request that it should complete their drafting at its tenth session. Both in the Social Committee and in the Commission on Human Rights, the Soviet Union delegation had constantly emphasized the need for taking all possible steps to ensure the full enjoyment of vital human rights, and it considered that the most appropriate means of achieving that end would be to request the Secretary-General to place the report of the ninth session of the Commission on Human Rights, as a separate item, on the provisional agenda for the eighth session of the General Assembly. However, the Social Committee had not found it possible to follow that course, and draft resolution A in its report represented a compromise between the two conflicting points of view.

3. Paragraph 1 thereof requested the Commission on Human Rights to complete the drafting of the covenants on human rights during its tenth session. The Soviet Union delegation would not oppose that proposal, although it was still convinced that further delay in completing the covenants could not be tolerated.

4. Paragraph 2 provided for the transmission to the eighth session of the General Assembly of the report of the ninth session of the Commission on Human Rights, but that did not mean that the report would be automatically placed on the General Assembly's agenda. Hence, the General Assembly would in all probability be unable to examine the substance of the Commission's report. Again, the possibility of undesirable delay was clear. None the less, in a spirit of conciliation, and to make agreement as nearly unanimous as possible, his delegation would vote for the Social Committee's compromise draft resolution A.

5. The PRESIDENT then put to the vote the Social Committee's draft resolution A (draft international covenants on human rights) (E/2482 and Corr.1).

*Draft resolution A was adopted by 14 votes to none, with 2 abstentions.*

6. Mr. VIRA (India), apologizing for his late arrival, said that he would like it to be noted in the summary record that he would have voted in favour of the draft resolution had he been present.

7. The PRESIDENT then put to the vote the Social Committee's draft resolution B (development of the work of the United Nations for wider observance of, and respect for, human rights and fundamental freedoms throughout the world, and annual reports on human rights) (E/2482).

*Draft resolution B was adopted by 15 votes to 2.*

8. Mr. ORLOVSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) explained that his delegation had voted against draft resolution B for the reasons given by his delegation in the Social Committee and in the Commission on Human Rights. The proposals covered by resolution B infringed, or would lead to the infringement of, national sovereignty, and would lead the Commission far away from the problems with which it should really concern itself.

**Prevention of discrimination and protection of minorities: report of the Commission on Human Rights (ninth session) (E/2447): report of the Social Committee (E/2499 and E/2500)**

[Agenda item 14]

9. The PRESIDENT drew attention to the eight draft resolutions submitted by the Social Committee in its report on prevention of discrimination and protection of minorities (E/2499). He proceeded to put to the vote the Social Committee's draft resolution A (membership and future sessions of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities).

*Draft resolution A was adopted by 16 votes to none, with 2 abstentions.*

10. At the request of Mr. ZDANOWSKI (Poland), the Social Committee's draft resolution B was put to the vote in parts, part I being "Abolition of discriminatory measures" and part II "Protection of minorities".

*Part I of draft resolution B was adopted unanimously.*

*Part II of draft resolution B was adopted by 16 votes to none, with 2 abstentions.*

11. Mr. PLEIĆ (Yugoslavia), explaining his vote, said that while he had voted for part II of resolution B, his delegation had expressed in the Social Committee its regret and concern at the absence from that resolution of any effective provision for the protection of minorities. He wished a specific reference to his delegation's statement in the Social Committee<sup>1</sup> to be included in the summary record of the meeting.

12. The PRESIDENT put to the vote the Social Committee's draft resolution C (co-operation of non-governmental organizations).

*Draft resolution C was adopted unanimously.*

13. The PRESIDENT put to the vote the Social Committee's draft resolution D (position of persons born out of wedlock).

*Draft resolution D was adopted by 17 votes to none with 1 abstention.*

14. The PRESIDENT put to the vote the Social Committee's draft resolution E (Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide).

*Draft resolution E was adopted by 14 votes to none, with 4 abstentions.*

15. Mr. VIRA (India) explained that he had abstained from the vote only because the Indian Government had

not yet been able to ratify the Convention in question. He wished to place on record, however, that the crime of genocide was already punishable under the existing legislation of India, and under the Indian Constitution.

16. Mr. MUÑOZ (Argentina) said that he had abstained from the vote for reasons similar to those given by the Indian delegation, and also because of the humanitarian aspect of the matter, which tended to be clouded by political considerations.

17. The PRESIDENT put to the vote the Social Committee's draft resolution F (protection of newly created minorities).

*Draft resolution F was adopted unanimously.*

18. The PRESIDENT put to the vote the Social Committee's draft resolution G (technical assistance in the fields of prevention of discrimination and protection of minorities).

*Draft resolution G was adopted by 16 votes to none, with 2 abstentions.*

19. The PRESIDENT put to the vote the Social Committee's draft resolution H (Programme of Work of the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities).

*Draft resolution H was adopted by 15 votes to none, with 3 abstentions.*

20. The PRESIDENT drew attention to the draft resolution in document E/2500, submitted by the Social Committee for adoption by the Council, and taking note of the report of the ninth session of the Commission on Human Rights (E/2447).

21. Mr. ORLOVSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that, although his delegation considered that a number of desirable provisions, such as the right of peoples to self-determination, had been included in the draft international covenants on human rights, those instruments still suffered from a number of serious defects. For example, certain of the provisions relating to economic, social, cultural, civil and political rights were couched in the form of a proclamation, and no provision at all was made for their effective implementation, for instance by firmly stipulating the right to work, the right to social security and so forth. Moreover, such inadequate measures for implementation as had been included in the draft covenants involved encroachment on the sovereign rights of States. Finally, his delegation could not but deplore the fact that the original first draft international covenant on human rights should have been split into two separate covenants, one dealing with economic, social and cultural rights, the other with civil and political rights. All those rights were clearly so closely inter-connected that they could not possibly be dealt with in two separate instruments. For all those reasons he would be obliged to abstain from the vote on the draft resolution taking note of the report of the Commission on Human Rights.

*The draft resolution in document E/2500 was adopted by 16 votes to none, with 2 abstentions.*

22. Mr. KOTSCHNIG (United States of America), intervening on a point of order, asked the President

<sup>1</sup> See document E/AC.7/SR.251, pages 4 and 5.

whether it had been decided that, should the Interim Committee on Programme of Conferences be unable to reach agreement on the length of the next (tenth) session of the Commission on Human Rights, the matter would be taken up in plenary meeting when the Council came to discuss the report of that Committee.

23. The PRESIDENT confirmed that such would be the case.

**Question of assistance to Libya (General Assembly resolution 515 (VI)) (E/2469 and Corr.1 and E/L.563)**

[Agenda item 21]

24. Mr. ANEIZI (Observer for the Government of the United Kingdom of Libya), speaking at the invitation of the PRESIDENT, said that it was the first time that a representative from the United Kingdom of Libya had appeared before the Council. He would like to express his Government's gratitude to the President and to members of the Council for the opportunity afforded him of acquainting the Council with his Government's views on the provision of additional financial and technical assistance for his country. His Government wished also to express the thanks of the Libyan people to the United Nations for declaring Libya's independence, and for providing the necessary assistance to give effect to that decision under the leadership of the United Nations Commissioner in Libya and the United Nations Council for Libya.

25. Libya regarded itself as the child of the United Nations, and looked to it to continue to provide assistance until its own government services had been organized and the preliminary measures for the development of its economy completed. His Government hoped to be admitted to membership of the United Nations, and had indeed applied for it on the very day on which it had gained its independence—24 December 1951.

26. He recalled that the United Nations Council for Libya, set up by the General Assembly to assist the United Nations Commissioner in his task, had from time to time recommended that the Commissioner draw on all the resources available to the United Nations and the specialized agencies, to assist the country with its economic development programme. At the Council's eleventh session,<sup>2</sup> on the basis of General Assembly resolution 266 (III) the problems of the economic development and social progress of the former Italian colonies had been discussed in detail, even before the resolution on Libyan independence had been adopted by the General Assembly (387 (V)). Similar discussions had taken place at the fourth session of the General Assembly,<sup>3</sup> culminating in resolutions [389 (V) and 398 (V)] which provided for extensive technical assistance to be rendered to Libya. At the Council's thirteenth session,<sup>4</sup> the United Nations Commissioner had recommended that

Libya should be provided, at least in the initial stages, with substantial financial assistance over and above technical assistance under the expanded programme. As the outcome of those discussions, continued at the sixth regular session of the General Assembly, the latter had adopted resolution 515 (VI), which was referred to in the draft resolution before the Council (E/L.563), submitted jointly by the Egyptian and Turkish delegations.

27. He attached the utmost importance to the present discussions. The needs of his country were indeed great. The best estimate of its yearly income was approximately 35 dollars per head of population, the infant mortality rate was at least 300 per thousand, the illiteracy rate was 85 to 90 per cent, and the country's modest budget was approximately 35 per cent in deficit. The country's only known resources were land, water and the latent skills of the indigenous population which, however, required development and improvement. Its agriculture laboured under the handicap of a harsh and capricious climate with inadequate rainfall. Capital was lacking.

28. In those circumstances, he was certain that members would agree that the United Kingdom of Libya deserved additional, and long-term assistance, both from the United Nations and from its Members individually. Its needs were small by comparison with the vast resources of Member States, and his Government's aim was the worthy one of increasing the national production and income in order to be able to meet its administrative expenses out of its own resources and to raise the standard of living.

29. Technical assistance experts had made a number of studies of the Libyan economy, following which Libya had received assistance under the expanded programme of technical assistance. His Government was most grateful for that help, and in particular for the waiver of its obligation to pay local costs, without which it could not have afforded the essential technical assistance experts. He paid a tribute to the quality of the technical assistance activities of the United Nations and specialized agencies. Initially, those activities had been concentrated on studies, surveys and recommendations, but they had now reached the stage of the practical application of programmes and projects, particularly in the field of education, the training of manpower, agriculture and public administration. He regretted to learn that shortage of financial resources might result in a reduction, both in personnel and equipment, below the minimum recommendations of the technical assistance experts who had studied Libya's needs, and far below the requests of the Libyan Government itself. His Government was on the point of submitting additional requests for 1954 and very much hoped that it would at least be possible to meet those; for its part, it had provided everything it possibly could in the way of funds, facilities and manpower to facilitate the execution of technical assistance projects. It had also helped itself, and made a modest but, in relation to its resources, substantial contribution to the Technical Assistance Fund.

30. He wished to express his Government's thanks for the bilateral assistance received from the United States

<sup>2</sup> See: *Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Eleventh Session, 413th Meeting.*

<sup>3</sup> See: *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fourth Session, 248th to 250th Plenary Meetings.*

<sup>4</sup> See: *Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Thirteenth Session, 539th Meeting.*

Government under the Point Four Programme, which he hoped would be continued and expanded. The Libyan-American Technical Assistance Service, set up in agreement with his Government, had started work in January 1952, and its projects had been planned on the basis of expert recommendations, and with a view to their dovetailing with projects being carried out under the United Nations programmes of technical assistance.

31. His Government had established co-ordinating machinery, based on the Libyan Economic Planning Committee, for technical assistance and development. It had also established, on the recommendation of the United Nations Commissioner in Libya and with advice from United Nations and other experts, two financing agencies designed to receive and expend, on behalf of the Libyan Government, foreign grants for financing development projects. The Libyan Public Development and Stabilization Agency had been set up primarily to deal with projects which could not be expected to yield an immediate return, and had accordingly to be financed on a grant-in-aid basis. The other agency was the Libyan Finance Corporation, whose function was to finance productive projects, particularly in agriculture and related industries, by means of development loans. His Government had received funds from the Governments of the United Kingdom, France and Italy to enable it to establish and operate those agencies, and he hoped that those Governments would increase their contributions, and that other governments would also see their way to making funds available with a view to the agencies undertaking a more ambitious programme.

32. His Government had set out in the memorandum before the Council (E/2469, pages 19-34) details of its five-year development plan, which was designed to raise the country's economy to the minimum level at which it could be self-sustaining. The plan was based on a series of reports by United Nations experts, and also on requests from the provincial administrations of Libya for assistance in developing the country. It had been worked out, too, with the assistance of experts from the United Nations specialized agencies. The first part provided for development expenditure (including some urgent projects on a minimum basis in the field of irrigation and agriculture), schools and hospitals, and some public utilities, such as water works, electric power plants and port facilities. The second part contemplated the creation of a famine reserve for stabilization purposes, and was designed to protect Libya against the disastrous effects of recurrent droughts. The development programme entailed a total expenditure of \$17,973,000—or an average of \$3,734,000 per year—over and above the Government's normal administrative budget. The stabilization reserve would cost \$2,800,000, to which should be added a fund for agriculture credits costing a minimum of \$700,000. His Government's plans for capital and current expenditure, he emphasized, were all closely co-ordinated with technical assistance projects.

33. His country was still suffering grievously from heavy war damage which, a United Nations expert had estimated, it would cost at least \$35 million to repair. The bulk of that damage was in the province of Cyrenaica. The cities of Bardia and Tobruk had been razed to the

ground, and two-thirds of Benghazi had been destroyed. Some repairs had been carried out on a care and maintenance basis, but these, with such reconstruction as had been possible, had swallowed up a large part of the limited funds available for development. He recalled that Libya had received no help for its post-war reconstruction either from the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) or under the Marshall Plan. Libya was therefore at a disadvantage *vis-à-vis* the many other countries which had been assisted in the repair of their war damage.

34. He felt, accordingly, that by any criterion Libya stood in need of substantial assistance from the United Nations and from its Member States, so that it could improve its economic and social conditions and achieve true economic and financial independence. His Government would welcome fresh or additional contributions, provided they were compatible with the country's independence and sovereignty. The amount asked for represented the barest minimum required for basic development.

35. He earnestly hoped that his appeal would not fall on deaf ears and that his country would shortly be able to stand completely on its own feet. There was among the people of Libya a profound feeling of gratitude towards the United Nations and of confidence in its willingness to display the same generosity as in the past. Nevertheless, it was a matter of national self-esteem to hasten the process of development in order to win economic and financial independence at the earliest possible moment. The greater the assistance rendered now, the sooner would that national ideal come true.

36. He hoped that the draft resolution (E/L.563) recommending additional financial assistance to Libya, sponsored jointly by Libya's old friends Egypt and Turkey, would be adopted.

37. Mr. KURAL (Turkey) said that his delegation took great pleasure in submitting, jointly with the Egyptian delegation, the draft resolution on assistance to Libya (E/L.563), and thanked the representative of Libya for his clear and cogent statement. That statement and the memorandum submitted by the Acting Prime Minister (E/2469) showed that Libya was faced with very serious difficulties—a situation causing much concern to Turkey, which felt deep friendship for the Libyan people. The United Nations had played a primary part in the creation of the State of Libya, and had the duty of assisting it to overcome its present difficulties, which were due not only to the natural poverty of the land, but also to the devastation caused by the second world war. In his communication the Prime Minister had described the situation in realistic terms, and had shown the means available to the Government for promoting Libya's economic development and social progress.

38. In spite of the difficulties facing them, the Government and the people of Libya were not dismayed; they were proudly and calmly resolved to lay solid foundations for their future. Nevertheless, Libya must be given the outside assistance necessary to enable it to satisfy its people's needs; only thus could the country's recovery and economic independence be ensured. Since the United Nations had recognized the economic inter-

dependence of nations, it should appeal to Member States to give Libya assistance on as ample a scale as possible. That was the spirit underlying the joint draft resolution.

39. Its authors' intention was that the assistance granted to Libya should be extended, and that no available means of providing it should be overlooked. The draft resolution provided for two forms: first, voluntary contributions made in the spirit of the United Nations, and secondly, any other assistance acceptable to the Libyan Government. In the last analysis it is governments that can furnish financial assistance, and hence the draft resolution asks the General Assembly to invite those governments which are in a position to do so to furnish, within their possibilities, financial and technical assistance to Libya to aid its economic development. That paragraph had been drafted in the broadest possible terms so that everyone could give Libya assistance with no restrictions attached such as would impair the economic development of that country. In conclusion, he outlined the other points of the joint draft resolution, and strongly urged the Council to give it sympathetic consideration now that the Libyan Government was turning to the United Nations in its need.

40. Mr. ABDEL-RAZEK (Egypt) observed that the United Nations had always been interested in the destinies of the former Italian colonies and in their economic and social development. In its resolution 266 (III) the General Assembly had recommended that, in studying and planning its activities in connexion with economically under-developed regions, the Council should take into consideration the problems of the economic development and social progress of the former Italian colonies. In its resolution 289 A (IV), the General Assembly had recommended that Libya should be constituted an independent and sovereign State and that its independence should become effective not later than 1 January 1952. Similarly, it had recommended the formulation of a Constitution for Libya and the appointment of a United Nations Commissioner in Libya with a Council to aid and advise him. The General Assembly had thus guaranteed the unification and independence of Libya. It had, however, been necessary to strengthen that political independence by efforts to achieve economic development and social progress. To that end, the United Nations Commissioner had been asked to offer suggestions to the General Assembly and the Council on the measures that might be adopted during the transitional period regarding the economic and social problems of Libya (resolution 289 A (IV), paragraph 9). Those provisions had been confirmed by resolution 387 (V), paragraph 4. Again, in resolution 389 (V) the General Assembly had instructed the Secretary-General to study the problem of war damages in connexion with such technical and financial assistance as Libya might request. Moreover, in resolution 398 (V), the General Assembly had recognized the special responsibility of the United Nations for the future of Libya, and had stressed the need for continuing technical assistance to Libya without interruption, even after the attainment of its independence; it had also recognized the need for immediate study of a complete plan for

the economic, social and cultural development of Libya. The Libyan Government had just submitted a five-year plan to the Council, thus meeting the General Assembly's wishes.

41. In accordance with the General Assembly's request in resolution 289 A (IV), the United Nations Commissioner in Libya had submitted a report<sup>5</sup> on economic and social measures to be adopted in the country. That report and the memorandum from the Acting Prime Minister of Libya (E/2469), showed that 85 per cent of the total area of Libya was desert and that 80 per cent of the arable land consisted of pasture, the rest being under dry, half-irrigated or irrigated crops. The main feature of the Libyan climate was its great irregularity; in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica there was often complete drought. Every two or three years the country suffered from brief periods of drought; every seven years there was a great drought, causing extremely heavy losses to the Libyan economy. It was therefore necessary to take measures to increase agricultural production and thus raise the people's standard of living.

42. Libya had no mineral resources of any importance apart from a few deposits of sodium and potassium carbonates, carnallite and sulphur. Its main industries were tunny and sardine fishing, sponge fishing and oil processing and refining. Twenty per cent of the population lived in towns and 40 per cent in settled rural communities, the remaining 40 per cent being nomads. It was therefore essential to establish new agricultural communities so as to reduce nomadism. So far as education was concerned, 85 to 90 per cent of the population were illiterate, and less than 20 per cent of children of school age received any education. Higher education was non-existent. With regard to public health, trachoma and tuberculosis were still widespread, while the infantile mortality rate stood at 300 per 1,000. Thus Libya was urgently in need of hospitals and dispensaries.

43. Much damage had been caused by the war; the towns of Cyrenaica had been almost completely destroyed. Nevertheless, Libya had received no aid under the Marshall Plan, and it was only latterly that it had been receiving assistance from the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF).

44. Libya's national income was very small, amounting to no more than 40 million dollars a year, corresponding to the very low figure per head of population quoted by Mr. Aneizi. The wages of unskilled workers in urban areas were about 42 cents a day, the cost of food for a family of four persons amounting to twice the real wage. The financial resources of the State were inadequate, and the budget deficit amounted to 35 per cent. Finally, Libya had a balance-of-payments deficit which was particularly large during drought years. To meet that deficit, it had received subsidies from France, the United Kingdom and Italy.

45. The United Nations Commissioner and the Libyan Government had asked that Libya should be granted financial assistance. In the field of technical assistance, the High Commissioner had done signal service, acting

<sup>5</sup> See: *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixth Session, Supplement No. 17A*, paragraphs 98-110.



in the spirit of the relevant General Assembly resolution. He had asked the Council and the Assembly to ensure that Libya should be provided with technical assistance under United Nations auspices even before her accession to independence. Libya was also receiving technical assistance from the United States of America under the Point Four Programme.

46. In a word, Libya needed every possible form of technical assistance, under conditions consonant with the principles of the Charter and those laid down by the Council in Annex I ("General Principles") to its resolution 222 (IX). However, the implementation of a Technical Assistance programme involved difficulties; in that connexion he read out paragraph 3 from page 11 of document E/2469, in which the Libyan Government pointed out that it would be unable to meet local costs from its own financial resources.

47. In the spring and summer of 1951 some surprise had been occasioned by the holding of a conference of representatives of the States directly interested in the future of Libya. That conference, which had met first in London and then in Geneva, had been a grave mistake, since no distinction should have been made between the States directly and those indirectly concerned with the fate of Libya. Following the conference, Libya had joined a currency bloc and had set up its Public Development and Stabilization Agency and the Libyan Finance Corporation. The first-named body had been given the task of implementing economic and social service plans, using funds made available by the United Kingdom, France and Italy. For the financial year 1952-53 those grants amounted to £L409,000. One-quarter of that sum had been spent on drought relief, while the bulk of the money had been spent on reconstruction rather than economic development. It was not known what the Agency's income for the financial year 1953-54 would be.

48. The Libyan Finance Corporation had been established with a nominal capital of £L1,000,000, the paid-up capital £L100,000. Its purpose was to grant loans for economic development purposes. In view of the inadequacy of the Corporation's paid-up capital, the Libyan Government hoped to receive a grant of £L250,000 for the establishment of an agricultural credit institution. It would accordingly be appropriate for the United Nations to step in and grant Libya financial assistance; in that connexion, he drew attention to the provisions of paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution 515 (VI), which constituted the necessary authority.

49. The Libyan Government had submitted a five-year development plan to the Council providing solely for urgent projects and giving priority to the expansion of agricultural production and the rehabilitation of public utilities. £L6,419,000 would be necessary for carrying out the plan, to which £L50,000 should be added for the implementation of the Technical Assistance programme, £L250,000 for the establishment of the agricultural credit institution and £L1,000,000 for that of a stabilization reserve fund. Thus Libya's annual financial requirement would amount to £L1,600,000 for a period of five years.

50. In conclusion, the Egyptian representative read out the first two sentences of the last paragraph on page 8

of the communication from the Acting Prime Minister of Libya (E/2469). In life, he observed, every cloud had its silver lining; but in the series of misfortunes which had overtaken the Moslem peoples it took some finding. It was his hope that the United Nations would help those disinherited peoples to regain their human dignity.

51. Mr. MEADE (United Kingdom) joined in the welcome extended to the Libyan representative, and in thanking him for his most informative and helpful statement. He thought it was clear from that statement, from the letter from the Acting Prime Minister of Libya, and from the accompanying memorandum (E/2469), that substantial financial assistance would have to be provided if the Libyan Government was to be enabled to overcome the grave and urgent problems with which it was faced. As the country was almost completely lacking in mineral resources, economic development would have to be planned very largely on the basis of an expansion of agriculture, and the rugged character of the terrain and the unpredictable, and often violent, climate added to the country's difficulties. During the war, moreover, Libya had suffered severe devastation, still largely unrepaired, particularly in the coastal towns, which formed the centres of trade, communications and administration.

52. To deal with those problems the Libyan Government had drawn up a five-year development programme with the help of expert advisers from the United Nations and specialized agencies. Without wishing to comment in detail thereon, he wished to say that it appeared to be a serious attempt to deal with Libya's difficulties. He was glad to note the special attention given to projects for the conservation of crops in good years, and for the building up of stocks for use in bad years, and the priority accorded to much needed irrigation schemes and water conservation works. It was encouraging to learn that the plan would be co-ordinated by the Libyan Government's Economic Planning Committee and that a Libyan Public Development and Stabilization Agency and a Libyan Finance Corporation, which should prove admirably suited to the stimulation and supervision of economic development, had been set up. The programme should, however, be put into practice with due regard for possible inflationary effects.

53. It was now incumbent on all governments to consider, in the light of their existing resources and commitments, whether they could do anything to help. So far as the United Kingdom delegation was concerned, it would support the joint draft resolution which, he hoped, would command a wide measure of support and have fruitful results.

54. Mr. GARREAU (France) took pleasure in welcoming the observer for the Government of the United Kingdom of Libya on behalf of his delegation. Libya's financial and technical assistance requirements had been made plain by the Acting Prime Minister's memorandum and the Libyan observer's statement. Libya, apart from being a naturally poor country, had been terribly devastated by the war.

55. He had himself seen the damage to the port facilities at Tobruk, Derna and Benghazi. The reconstruc-

tion of those ports was an enormous task. Libya's irrigation and waterways system also needed rehabilitation.

56. The French delegation was glad to note that Libya had already done a great deal in the way of reconstruction and development. The Libyan Public Development and Stabilization Agency, and the Libyan Finance Corporation, in particular, had done good work. Unfortunately, the Finance Corporation's revenue for the financial year 1952-53 had largely had to be spent on grain for famine relief, following a particularly severe drought.

57. The French delegation had noted with satisfaction that with the help of the above institutions the Libyan Government had been able to submit a systematic plan for capital investment in which priority was given to the development of agriculture, and that the Libyan observer had emphasized his Government's determination to press on energetically with the work it had begun. The French Government was ready, as in the past, to give its support to that work, within the limits of its resources.

58. It was in that spirit that the French delegation would vote for the joint draft resolution (E/L.563) which allowed for all the possible methods of furnishing assistance to the Libyan Government both through the United Nations and through institutions recognized by Libyan law.

59. The amount of financial and technical help that could be extended at the present time to the Libyan Government should not be overestimated, particularly the help offered through the United Nations Expanded Technical Assistance Programme. Nevertheless, the French delegation hoped that the adoption by a large majority of the joint draft resolution would pave the way for more effective help to the Libyan Government in the future.

60. Mr. BAKER (United States of America) welcomed the Libyan observer, and expressed his hope that he would return to his country satisfied with the action taken by the Council.

61. He regarded the establishment of the United Kingdom of Libya as one of the constructive achievements of the United Nations. Libya was now a sovereign State, but, in the long run, its unity and independence would rest largely upon the progress which its people were able to make towards a better life. The magnitude of the difficulties it would have to overcome was indicated in the memorandum prepared by the Government of Libya (E/2469) and by the statement of the Libyan observer himself. Nevertheless, an encouraging start had been made in the fight for economic and social improvement. The capital development programme outlined in the memorandum was a constructive effort to ensure that sound use was made of the country's resources.

62. It was clear, however, that external assistance would be necessary if Libya was to cope successfully with its economic problems. The United States Government was completely in agreement with the aim of the

joint draft resolution, which proposed that the General Assembly should respond to the appeal for assistance of the Libyan Government by calling on all countries in a position to do so to extend financial and technical assistance to it. If the General Assembly approved that measure it would, for the first time since the new State had come into being, lend the prestige of the United Nations to such an appeal on behalf of the country.

63. During the discussions on the second annual report of the United Nations Commissioner in Libya at the sixth session of the General Assembly,<sup>6</sup> the United States Government had pledged itself to do its part in assisting the Libyan people to improve their standard of living. To that end, his Government had supported the provision by the United Nations of technical assistance to Libya, and he was happy to note that that country had one of the largest technical assistance programmes, and the largest on a *per capita* basis. He hoped that the United Nations would continue to support those activities in Libya.

64. At the same time, the United States Government would continue to extend technical assistance to Libya directly through the Libyan-American Technical Assistance Service which, as the Libyan observer had pointed out, had been set up for that purpose in agreement with the Government of Libya. For the fiscal years 1952 and 1953 over \$3 million had been made available to Libya in technical assistance, supplies and equipment. The work of that programme would continue to be closely co-ordinated with the United Nations Technical Assistance Mission and with the appropriate authorities and agencies of the Libyan Government.

65. In accordance with his Government's traditions of sympathy towards newly independent peoples, it would continue to give consideration to the provision of every appropriate assistance to Libya. He would vote for the draft resolution (E/L.563).

66. Mr. B. SEN (India) also wished to welcome the Libyan observer, and to thank him for his interesting statement. Assistance to Libya raised important questions, especially in the light of certain recent developments. The Egyptian representative had already given a clear historical survey of the United Nations resolutions on Libya and he would not repeat what had already been said. Ever since the question had first been brought before it in 1949, the United Nations had maintained a close and sustained interest in the independence and economic and social development of Libya. The General Assembly had given special attention to three particular aspects of assistance to Libya; relief during the interim period; the reconstruction of war damage; and general financial assistance. On the first point, it had adopted resolution 398 (V). On the second, it had studied the Secretary-General's survey of the problem (A/2000)<sup>7</sup> and had adopted resolution 529 (VI). On the third, it had studied the *Second Annual Report* of the United Nations

<sup>6</sup> See: *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixth Session, 370th Plenary Meeting.*

<sup>7</sup> "Libya. Problem of War Damages." Report by the Secretary-General.

Commissioner in Libya.<sup>8</sup> and the *Supplementary Report*<sup>9</sup> which described Libya as one of the poorest independent countries in the world and emphasized the need for sustained financial assistance over a long period (paragraphs 98-110). It was against that background that the Assembly had adopted resolution 515 (VI), asking the Council to study ways and means by which the United Nations could furnish additional assistance to Libya. The word "additional" required some explanation, and it doubtless referred to the financial assistance given by the two Administrating Powers at the time of the transfer of power to the independent Government of Libya, as well as to the other assistance which United Nations agencies were already affording to Libya.

67. During the current session of the Council, some delegations had held informal discussions in an attempt to find a formula which would not interfere with the flow of bilateral assistance but which would yet contribute towards the main objective embodied in the General Assembly resolution (515 (VI)) by facilitating the flow of assistance from Member governments through the appropriate machinery of the United Nations. The development which had brought an entirely new factor into the situation was the announcement of the bilateral Treaty between the United Kingdom and Libya signed on 29 July 1953 at Benghazi. Under that Treaty, Libya was to furnish certain military facilities to the United Kingdom, including permission to station armed forces on Libyan territory, and, in return, the United Kingdom had undertaken to provide financial aid for twenty years.

68. Libya was an independent country, and was entitled to decide for itself what form of assistance was best suited to its requirements. Nevertheless, it was a special case for the United Nations because, in addition to the part it had played in bringing about Libyan independence, the United Nations had also assumed special responsibility for helping Libya to preserve and consolidate its independence and to build a sound economic foundation without which independence would have little real meaning for the Libyan people. Thus any remarks made by his delegation concerning the relations between two sovereign States were valid only in the light of that special responsibility assumed by the United Nations.

69. There could, of course, be no objection in principle to bilateral assistance to Libya. The agreements signed in December 1951 by the United Kingdom and France had been bilateral, and had not aroused disapproval in the United Nations. In fact, bilateral assistance was regarded as one of the established methods of international assistance. India was itself receiving bilateral assistance from several countries, but such assistance was given and accepted only on the basis that the promotion of economic and social well-being was an essential contribution to world peace and stability.

70. There was, however, definite cause for anxiety when bilateral assistance was offered with political conditions attached—particularly if the parties to the arrangement were entirely unequal in bargaining strength. Economically, according to the report of the United Nations Com-

missioner, Libya was one of the poorest independent countries in the world. It was still suffering from war devastation, and stood in need of external assistance for a long period before it could become economically viable. In such a case it seemed doubtful whether the trading of aid against political and military concessions could really be in the long-term interest of the country.

71. His remarks were intended in a spirit of complete friendliness towards the people and Government of Libya. His country had taken a great interest in the creation of an independent Libya, and looked forward with anxious sympathy towards the establishment of a happy and prosperous country, even though at the present moment, owing to its own gigantic refugee problem among other things, India was unable itself to furnish any material assistance.

72. In the light of those considerations, the joint draft resolution (E/L.563) did not commend itself to the Indian delegation. The draft resolution contained no specific suggestions for additional assistance such as the Assembly had asked the Council to study, neither did it examine the possibility of opening a special account for voluntary contributions. The latter omission was apparently due to the apprehension that such a special account might disturb the bilateral assistance which was at present forthcoming. It was true that the draft resolution stipulated that any assistance should be given in the spirit of the United Nations Charter, but invocation of the Charter had not always been a guarantee of its observance. In adopting such a draft resolution, which did nothing towards instituting United Nations machinery for voluntary assistance, but at the same time, although indirectly, gave blanket approval to "other channels" of assistance, he felt that the Council would be unwittingly giving its moral support to forms of bilateral assistance which some delegations, at least, did not consider likely to be altogether in the interests of a young and under-developed country, such as Libya was at present. Consequently, he could not support the draft resolution, but as he wished to leave the door open for every possible assistance to Libya he would abstain when the text was put to the vote.

73. Mr. MATES (Yugoslavia) emphasized the point that the United Nations had a special interest in the development and prosperity of Libya because of the history of the achievement of its independence. He welcomed the Libyan observer to the Council and said that his oral statement, together with the Libyan Government's memorandum (E/2469), amply illustrated that country's urgent need for assistance. In the circumstances, therefore, the United Nations was in duty bound to come forward with assistance. The primary aim of the United Nations in the matter should be to strengthen the Libyan economy so that the country might prosper and develop as an independent State. At the same time, however, it must be borne in mind that organized assistance through the United Nations was not as yet forthcoming. Consequently, the Council should advise the Assembly to take immediate action for the short-term requirements, to bear in mind the need for assistance on a more continuing basis and to give special attention to Libya's technical assistance

<sup>8</sup> See: *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixth Session, Supplement No. 17.*

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, *Supplement No. 17A.*



requirements. Those three points were, in general, covered by the joint draft resolution (E/L.563), paragraph 2 (c) of which should be read in conjunction with the statement in paragraph 3 of the Annex to Council resolution 470 (XV) that "in cases of extreme hardship general waivers may be granted by the Executive Chairman in consultation with the Technical Assistance Board" (TAB). If the joint draft resolution was adopted, he hoped that TAB would consider Libya as one of the cases covered by paragraph 3 of the Annex to resolution 470 (XV) and grant that country special facilities.

74. In the opinion of his delegation, the draft resolution had considerable shortcomings, but he would not dwell on them at present because he felt that to do so would hinder rather than help the Council's main aim, which was to promote assistance to Libya. He would vote for the joint proposal to express his country's deep interest in giving all possible moral and material support to Libya. On the other hand, he still believed that the General Assembly would have to consider many questions which were only touched upon in the draft resolution, particularly in view of the fact that it was the Assembly's duty to assist the development of Libya as an independent country. He might therefore have further comments to make when the question came before the General Assembly.

75. Mr. ARUTYUNYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that he was pleased to welcome the Libyan observer to the Council, and had listened with attention and sympathy to his statement, which left no doubt whatever about Libya's need for assistance. The Soviet Union had consistently supported Libya's demands for independence, and that attitude had played quite an important part in the country's eventual attainment of independence. Consequently, his delegation was naturally in favour of assistance being granted to Libya. That, however, must be done in accordance with the principles of the United Nations, and must not be based on any political or military concessions likely to jeopardize the country's independence.

76. Paragraph 2 (a) of the joint draft resolution naturally focused attention on the recent Treaty concluded between the United Kingdom and Libya, the news of which had only reached him the day before the submission of the draft resolution. On 30 July 1953, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd had made a statement on the Treaty in the House of Commons, and had explained that the United Kingdom would give financial assistance over a period of twenty years in exchange for the right to station ground forces on Libyan territory and for other military privileges. Mr. Selwyn Lloyd had not specified what those other military privileges would be. In commenting on the Treaty, the Paris edition of the *New York Herald Tribune* had remarked that it would give the United Kingdom new, stable bases in the Near East at a time when its other bases were threatened by the tide of Arab nationalism. His delegation fully agreed with what the Indian representative had said about the Treaty, which clearly violated the principles of the United Nations. He emphasized that one of the general principles laid down in Annex I to Council resolution 222 (IX) was that assistance should not be a means of foreign economic and

political interference in the internal affairs of the country concerned and should not be accompanied by any considerations of a political nature. Libya, as an independent State, was, of course, free to decide what conditions it was prepared to accept. He had no intention of interfering in Libya's affairs, and would therefore merely note that the terms of the Treaty between Libya and the United Kingdom were contrary to the decisions and principles of the United Nations.

77. In the light of recent events, therefore, the draft resolution was unsatisfactory, because it contained no guarantee whatsoever that assistance to Libya would not be based on political, military and economic demands inconsistent with the country's independence. The mere reference to the spirit of the Charter was insufficient, since the Council was well aware that the United Kingdom and other countries, including the United States of America, were constantly acting contrary to the spirit of the Charter. The Egyptian representative had spoken of the United Nations' special responsibility for the economic and political independence of Libya, and had emphasized that assistance should not run counter to the principles of the United Nations. The same representative had also criticized the restricted membership of the Libyan currency conferences, which had resulted in Libya being drawn into a specific currency area. Perhaps the sponsors of the draft resolution had not appreciated the fact that their text appeared to sanction the agreement between the United Kingdom and Libya, and thus to encourage Libya to follow a course which might be highly detrimental to its independence. In the circumstances, it was strange that Egypt should sponsor such a text when it was itself striving to regain its freedom from the military provisions of its 1936 Treaty with the United Kingdom.

78. He emphasized the vital importance of independence, which could never be sacrificed for the sake of economic or financial assistance. The whole question as it affected Libya was somewhat obscure. News of the latest Treaty had arrived one day, and on the next the draft resolution had been submitted which appeared to take no account of the existence of that Treaty. In view of the speed with which events had moved and the lack of any real information about the type of assistance which was being furnished to Libya, he regretted that he would be unable to support the draft resolution. On the other hand, he would not vote against it, because his country wished to emphasize its support for United Nations assistance to Libya. In conclusion, he hoped that the Libyan observer would convey to his Government upon his return the concern expressed by two delegations, both of which had firmly supported Libyan independence and were anxious that it should be preserved.

79. Mr. ABDEL-RAZEK (Egypt) said that the Soviet Union representative seemed to have overlooked the connexion between the provisions of the last paragraph of the preamble of the joint draft resolution and those of sub-paragraph (a) of paragraph 2 of the operative part. It was "within the United Nations" and "in the spirit of the United Nations Charter" that Governments were asked to give assistance to Libya. For that reason

the Egyptian delegation would be unable to agree to any assistance which might involve political or military domination. Following the Indian representative's statement regarding the Treaty recently concluded between Libya and the United Kingdom, the Egyptian delegation wished to enter the most express reservations with regard to the possible consequences of that Treaty.

80. Mr. MEADE (United Kingdom) said that reference had been made to the Anglo-Libyan Treaty of Friendship and Alliance which had been signed at Benghazi on 29 July 1953. It had been suggested that the affording of military facilities was not compatible with Libyan independence. On the contrary, his Government regarded the terms of the treaty as fully consonant with the independence of Libya and consistent with the principles of the United Nations Charter. As evidence of that, he read Article 4 of the Treaty, which provided that:

" Nothing in the present Treaty is intended to, or shall in any way, prejudice the rights and obligations which devolve, or may devolve upon either of the High Contracting Parties under the Charter of the United Nations, or under any other existing international agreements, conventions or treaties, including, in the case of Libya, the Covenant of the League of Arab States."

81. Mr. ARUTYUNYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) took note of the United Kingdom representative's statement, but remarked that the text he had read simply underlined the contradiction between the purposes of the Treaty and the principles of the United Nations Charter. Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, speaking in the House of Commons, had clearly stated that the United Kingdom was giving financial assistance to Libya in exchange for military facilities, and that type of assistance was contrary to the principles of the Charter.

82. With regard to the Egyptian representative's remarks, he emphasized that the reference to "other channels acceptable to the Libyan Government" in the

last paragraph of the preamble to the draft resolution in effect sanctioned the Anglo-Libyan Treaty, despite the Egyptian representative's reservations on that point. Consequently, he still regarded the draft resolution as a disservice to Libya, even though it had been jointly sponsored by a country which had constantly worked for the independence of Libya and, in general, for the good of oppressed peoples throughout the world.

83. The PRESIDENT declared closed the general discussion on item 21.

**Question of access to Headquarters of representatives of non-governmental organizations in consultative status: report by the Secretary-General on the result of his negotiations with the United States Government (concluded)**

[Agenda item 33]

84. The PRESIDENT, speaking on behalf of the Council, voiced the gratification felt by the various delegations at the Secretary-General's presence. The fact that the Council had been able after the discussions at the 743rd and 745th meetings to adopt a draft resolution unanimously had been due not only to the conciliatory spirit shown by the authors of the proposal and the understanding attitude displayed by members of the Council, but also to the information given by the Secretary-General.

85. Mr. HAMMARSKJÖLD (Secretary-General) thanked the President for his kind words. He had been happy to take part in the work of the Council and hoped that the question which had been under discussion at the two meetings in question would not again arise. He was confident that his attendance during the preceding few days would mark the beginning of a period of fruitful collaboration between the Council and himself. He would do everything he could to play his part in the Council's work in the future.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.