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*President:* Mr. S. Amjad ALI (Pakistan).

*Present:* The representatives of the following countries:

Argentina, Belgium, Canada, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, France, Iran, Mexico, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay.

An observer from the following country:

Chile.

The representatives of the following specialized agencies:

International Labour Organisation, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Monetary Fund.

**Full employment, and report of the experts on the problem of reducing the international impact of economic recessions and on measures required to mitigate the effect of fluctuations in international markets on the economies of under-developed countries (Council resolutions 290 (XI), paragraph 19 and 341 A (XII), paragraph 5) (E/2156, E/2189, E/2194 and E/L.313) (*continued*)**

[Agenda item 4]

**Economic development of under-developed countries (*continued*): (f) Integrated economic development and commercial agreements**

**General Assembly resolution 523 (VI), E/2243, E/2243/Add.1, E/2243/Add.2 and Corr.1, E/2243/Add.3 and E/2257) (*continued*)**

[Agenda item 5 (f)]

1. Mr. VAVRICKA (Czechoslovakia) was glad to see that the question of full employment had been placed permanently on the Council's agenda, since it was one on which the fate of millions of human beings depended. The statements made that morning by representatives of the specialized agencies had, with the exception of that of the ILO representative, been characterized by the fact that none of them had referred to the problem of unemployment or made any practical suggestion towards its solution. His delegation would therefore lay its main emphasis on the problem of unemployment, since it was convinced that millions of unemployed looked to the Council for concrete measures to put an end to ever-increasing unemployment.

2. The experts' report on *Measures for International Economic Stability* (E/2156),<sup>1</sup> although based on the theories of capitalist economists, in particular Lord Keynes, had not supported the idea that militarization of the economy and the armaments race could bring about the abolition of unemployment. The aim of such propaganda was to awaken the workers' interest in the armaments race, which would supposedly ensure them full employment and high wages. Despite such assertions by leading politicians in the United States and Western Europe, the experts' report recognized the

<sup>1</sup> United Nations Publications, Sales No.: 1951. II. A. 2.

imminence of an economic crisis in the capitalist countries, although it prudently called it a "recession". It further noted that the United States was the cause of the present world recession, and showed, perhaps involuntarily, that the inevitable consequence of the armaments race would be a still more pronounced recession. His delegation supported those conclusions.

3. On more detailed analysis, however, the report was unsatisfactory. Paragraph 5 for instance stated that "a range of unemployment varying between 2 per cent and 5 per cent" was "a legitimate margin of tolerance". That meant that the experts considered the present level of unemployment in Western Europe, affecting more than 11 million people, normal. His delegation rejected that opinion, which was in contradiction with the spirit and principles of the Charter, and particularly of Article 55.

4. Paragraph 13 of the report was disturbing, since it merely noted the fact that the immediate economic problems arose chiefly out of the vast re-armament programmes being undertaken in the United States and elsewhere, without making any specific recommendation that the vast sums spent on armaments production could be reduced. The experts should have pointed out that concentration on war production would not only create full employment but would in fact increase unemployment.

5. The United States was increasingly restricting civilian production for the benefit of military production. The decrease of employment in the manufacturing industries in the United States was so large in certain sectors that it could not be explained solely by reduced allocations of raw materials. The largest decrease in the labour force had taken place in the textile and automobile industries, and was due to the fact that the monopolies controlling those industries had limited their production from fear of over-production, artificially stimulated at the outset by feverish buying in case of war. In the textile industry an agreement had been reached with the trade union leaders to increase the amount of work expected from each worker, so as to enable it to meet competition from mills in the South. That was a traditional method of exploiting unemployment in order to cut wages; the manoeuvres had been still farther strengthened after the outbreak of hostilities in Korea by legal measures authorizing the prosecution for disloyalty of any trade unionists who protested.

6. Those two sectors of the United States economy gave a typical picture of the consequences of the placing of the economy on a war basis and the restriction of civilian production. The total number of unemployed or partially unemployed persons in the United States was now 13 million, as the USSR representative had shown in his statement on 5 June 1952 (591st meeting). Between December 1951 and February 1952 the number of totally unemployed in the United States had risen by 25 per cent from 1,600,000 to 2,100,000. At the same time, average weekly wages had decreased, for the first time since 1946.

7. In the United Kingdom there had been 433,000 unemployed in 1952 and between July 1951 and March 1952 the number of unemployed had increased by 28,000

a month. The Minister of Labour had hinted that the Government could not cope with the increasing unemployment in the textile industry, where unemployment was greatest and the crisis had come suddenly at a time when the influence of Japanese competition had not yet made its impact.

8. In France, the latest official statistics gave the number of unemployed on relief as 39,400, and there were 127,000 persons not on relief registered as seeking employment. *Le Monde* of 22 June 1952 had indicated that the official figures did not represent all those who were unemployed. The transformation from a peace to a war economy in France meant a constant increase in the number of unemployed. The textile industry had been the first to suffer and working hours in textile factories throughout the country had been cut. Moreover, unemployment benefits were absolutely inadequate to provide for the minimum needs of workers. In other consumer industries the situation was equally bad.

9. In Italy at the end of 1951 there had been 1,900,000 unemployed, not counting seasonal workers and partially unemployed, and industry was only working at 60 to 70 per cent of capacity. *Le Monde* of 25 April 1952 had said that there were about 2,000,000 to 2,200,000 unemployed in Italy, not counting the partially unemployed.

10. In Western Germany the number of unemployed had risen from 1,259,000 in August 1951 to 1,650,000 in December 1951. Counting the western sectors of Berlin there were more than 2 million or 11 per cent of the population unemployed in February 1952. Moreover, those figures only included people who had been formerly employed. Counting those who had just left school and were unable to find employment, a conservative estimate gave two and a half to three million completely or partially unemployed in Western Germany and the western sectors of Berlin.

11. Those figures provided irrefutable proof that the United States armaments race was having a disastrous influence on employment in Western Europe and they belied the theory that militarization could save countries from unemployment, inflation and crisis. Another theory held by the western economists was that inflation could be combated by restricting wage increases. But while blocking wages, the capitalist governments were imposing ever higher taxes on the people to enable them to meet their military expenditure. Thus it was the working masses who were supporting the cost of the armaments race.

12. Since the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, taxes in the United States had been increased three times. Before the rise in November 1951, 20 to 25 per cent of the workers' wages had already been absorbed by taxation. In the United Kingdom, in 1951-1952, total direct and indirect taxation represented 53 per cent of the national income as compared with 29 per cent in 1937-1938. Characteristically, the direct taxes borne by the mass of the population had increased much more than taxes on profits. A similar situation existed in France and in Western Germany; in the latter country, the workers were, through taxation, financing the United States plan to convert the region into a war base.

13. Unemployment was becoming particularly serious in the under-developed countries, but it was not possible to obtain exact statistics. That unemployment was of a special nature, being due to the lack of industrialization, the backward agricultural systems and the low standard of living resulting from exploitation by the imperialist countries and by native landlords and capitalists.

14. His delegation could not agree with the conclusions and recommendations contained in the experts' report. It deliberately omitted mentioning the possibility of intensified economic co-operation between the capitalist countries on the one hand and the USSR and the people's democracies on the other. It passed over in silence the fact that such co-operation would lead to a decrease in unemployment in the capitalist countries.

15. His delegation had already indicated on many occasions that Czechoslovakia had completely succeeded in solving the problem of unemployment. Its problem was rather that of shortage of labour for its growing industry.

16. Through peaceful co-existence and co-operation with other peoples, Czechoslovakia could contribute to a reduction in unemployment and to the raising of the workers' standard of living throughout the world. One of the prerequisites for such co-operation was, however, renunciation of the armaments race, the inevitable consequences of which were inflation, poverty and continued unemployment. Despite all obstacles, his country offered its active co-operation to all nations desirous of promoting economic relations, since it saw therein a way to peace and to the improvement of conditions everywhere.

17. Mr. NUÑEZ PORTUONDO (Cuba) said that his delegation had on 4 June 1952 (590th meeting) already stated at length its view that the under-developed countries could enjoy little economic development unless their trade was relatively stable and favourable and that without adequate development, they would continue to be vulnerable to external fluctuations and the standard of living they had already achieved would be endangered.

18. The brevity of his intervention should not be interpreted as meaning that his delegation did not appreciate the experts' report. It was one of the most stimulating documents which had been submitted to the Council, not because of the originality or variety of its ideas, but because of the frank and prudent way in which they were stated, and the experts' obvious intention of proffering practical suggestions. The experts had stated that they were concerned, not to prepare plans for rigid automatic stabilization measures, but to recommend policies which would help to improve international economic stability and to discuss the conditions under which such policies might be made practicable and effective.

19. The principal measures recommended by the report were: to mitigate the effects of short-term fluctuations in the demand and supply of basic products by the conclusion of international commodity arrangements, possibly by creating buffer stocks; to ensure a steady flow of international capital to under-developed countries, by an expansion of the long-term programmes

of the International Bank, so that those countries might maintain a stable rate of development and general economic activity; to expand international monetary reserves by increasing the resources and amending the operational procedure of the International Monetary Fund.

20. His delegation was in general agreement with those recommendations. The second and third, particularly the third, might bring excellent results. At the same time, it must be borne in mind that such measures, which called for constitutional reforms of the Bank and the Fund, would require a sustained and major effort. The first recommendation was not an innovation. It had long been accepted that the system of commodity arrangements was one of the best ways of achieving stability in world markets, and a beginning had already been made in putting it into application through the International Wheat Agreement, the International Sugar Agreement, and the working groups established to examine the possibility of inter-governmental agreements for various primary products. Nevertheless, in chapter II of the report there was one aspect which deserved particular attention—the use of buffer stocks. In referring to such stocks, the experts suggested the possibility that the International Bank might provide 50 per cent of the monetary reserves needed for their maintenance. Since the experts had consulted the Bank before preparing their report, it could be assumed that that organization had not rejected the possibility. The participation of the Bank would be important, since the chief difficulty so far encountered in the setting up of buffer stocks was that very aspect of financing. It was, however, necessary to proceed with caution, since opinions were still divided as to the influence such stocks might have on the prices of basic products.

21. His delegation, like the experts, thought that the time was ripe for the conclusion of international commodity agreements, since it was generally agreed that there was a long-term tendency for prices and production to follow an upward trend, which would dissipate the importing countries' fears of a possible depression. Moreover, the conclusion of the International Wheat Agreement and the attempt to revise the International Sugar Agreement showed that circumstances were auspicious.

22. Mr. Nuñez Portuondo referred to the draft resolution on world economic stability and international arrangements concerning trade in primary commodities (A/C.2/L.141) which had been submitted by his delegation to the Second Committee during the sixth session of the General Assembly.<sup>2</sup> The Second Committee had decided to refer the proposal to the Council for consideration in connexion with the relevant item of its agenda, and that decision had been approved by the Assembly. After unofficial consultations, his delegation had reached the conclusion that the time had not yet come to consider the draft resolution, since certain governments had indicated their desire to study it more fully. He therefore formally withdrew the draft resolution, while maintaining his delegation's right to

<sup>2</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixth Session, Second Committee, 187th meeting.*

submit for consideration at a later session those aspects of it which had not been discussed.

23. Finally, his delegation intended to submit a draft resolution which would: (a) note with approval the recommendations made in the experts' report; (b) ratify the opinion stated in the report that stabilization of international markets for primary products should be achieved through the conclusion of an individual international arrangement for each commodity; (c) request the Secretary-General to proceed with the necessary studies so that soft-currency countries would not be compelled by lack of monetary resources to limit their imports of primary products from hard-currency countries, and would thus be able to maintain high levels of production and consumption.

24. Mr. SCHEYVEN (Belgium) wished particularly to commend the experts for their optimistic approach and for their realistic spirit in presenting their proposals. The problems dealt with in the report were extremely complex and would require further study. Thus he was unable as yet to express any opinion on behalf of his Government.

25. As economic fluctuations were inevitable in the contemporary economic world and as their repercussions were particularly great in the case of under-developed countries, the experts had rightly devoted, in chapter II, particular attention to methods of protecting such countries against fluctuations. The report recognized the fact that progress in economic development and in diversification of economy represented the greatest possible protection for under-developed countries.

26. In that connexion the experts' recommendations relating to the International Bank deserved consideration, because the Bank could play an important part by increasing the rate of economic development and because that might materially help to stabilize the international movement of capital, ordinarily the most unstable element in world economy. As, under its Articles of Agreement, the Bank performed the function of compensating for the lack of private capital, it was natural to request it to increase its activities in time of depression. To that end, under-developed countries must, with the co-operation of the Bank, give priority to well-conceived programmes, public works and productive investment, so that in time of depression they could step up the rate of execution of such works promptly and without improvisation. Thus, the Bank should encourage the establishment on an international scale of anti-cyclical investment budgets, comparable to those set up on a national scale in a number of countries.

27. As it was difficult to estimate the additional resources which the Bank would require or even to decide in advance whether such action would be fruitful, the International Bank should be requested to consider the matter promptly.

28. That recommendation applied equally to periods of prosperity and of inflation. The Bank should limit its loans to the currencies of States able to make additional exports and should refrain from pressing for the widest possible use of the funds subscribed by its members, thus in some cases aggravating inflation or increasing payment difficulties. It was illogical that certain European countries now in great financial distress and

obliged to establish stringent restrictions should, at the request of the International Bank, devote a part of their inadequate production to foreign loans, which should be the exclusive province of surplus countries. The Bank's attention should be drawn particularly to the advisability of not using the 18 per cent of the capital subscribed by deficit countries, because use of those funds would tend to increase the existing disequilibrium in the international balance of payments.

29. International arrangements for raw materials, recommended by the experts, were basic to a programme for international economic stability. The conclusion of such agreements and the creation of buffer stocks involved serious problems, not only of finance but also of determining *inter alia* the relative level of prices and the choice of raw materials to be stocked. Obviously, each raw material required individual treatment. The procedure outlined in chapter VI of the Havana Charter might well be adopted without change.

30. While it was impossible, and perhaps undesirable, to eliminate price fluctuations in raw materials entirely, it was important and feasible to mitigate such fluctuations. As immediate solution of the problem on an international basis could not be achieved, it might be possible to request the United States, the greatest economic Power in the world, to begin to apply the concept of stabilization independently. The United States might reasonably be asked to carry out its programme of stockpiling strategic raw materials with due attention to the international repercussions of its actions and by making its operation an element of stabilization rather than an additional cause of disorganized price movements. The United States Government could carry out its programme of strategic purchases in an anti-cyclical spirit.

31. Going one step further, the current programme of supporting agricultural prices might conceivably be extended to the prices of industrial raw materials on an international scale. If the greatest purchaser of raw materials in the world announced its intention within the next ten years to purchase up to a given maximum of raw materials offered to it below parity price, a great advance would be made toward the stabilization of raw material markets.

32. To finance such a programme of stockpiling, the United States might be asked to use a part of the gold deposited in Fort Knox, particularly as that gold served no essential economic purpose. Adoption of that unorthodox procedure would be advantageous, in that the United States would obtain the strategic reserves of raw materials it deemed essential without having to impose additional taxes or increase its public debt. In addition, the gold used in purchasing those raw materials would increase the monetary reserves of Member States and thus encourage them to eliminate restrictions and bring about the convertibility of their currency, which was the very basis of lasting prosperity, economic stability and freedom. Moreover such large stocks of raw material would enable the United States, when it wished, to exercise an anti-inflationary force by putting those stocks into circulation on the American market. While such a project would admittedly involve great legal and practical problems, their solution would

not require greater imagination and courage than the United States had shown in carrying out Lend-Lease or the Marshall Plan.

33. He thought that attention should also be directed to the possibility of financing buffer stocks through the International Monetary Fund. Article V, section 3, of the Fund's Articles of Agreement provided for use of the resources of that agency within relatively narrow limits. A country could draw only 25 per cent of its quota in any twelve-month period and could not at any time hold more than 200 per cent of the quota of a member in the currency of that member. It was certain that in the case of countries producing raw materials, subject to sharp fluctuations of price, the resources of the Fund subject to those limitations could not provide substantial assistance. The assistance offered by the Fund to Australia, for example, was inadequate in the face of wide fluctuations in the balance of trade. As stated in the report, those restrictions could be waived at the discretion of the Fund, particularly when a member was prepared to pledge acceptable assets as collateral. The Fund might in such circumstances accept stocks of raw materials as collateral and authorize the drawing of funds in excess of the prescribed limits, thus providing another means of financing the creation of buffer stocks.

34. In connexion with the proposal in the report to counteract the effects of a possible recession originating in the United States by use of the resources of the Fund, he pointed out that the current resources of the Fund were inadequate for that purpose or for building buffer stocks. It was stated in the report that the 75 per cent increase in prices since the establishment of the Fund had cut in half the real value of its capital. It also showed that the holdings of the Fund were relatively small as compared with the reduction in dollars in circulation as a result of even a minor depression. It was therefore clear that if the Fund was to provide an effective bulwark, its assets must be considerably increased. Member Governments might not, however, in the light of that theoretical conclusion, be prepared to increase the capital of the Fund, possibly because the Fund had for the most part refrained from putting its assets into operation. It was also questionable whether the Fund should be expected to dispose of all its convertible assets in combating a recession, merely to prove that its assets were inadequate to influence the course of the recession. Finally, if the resources of the Fund were to be increased, it was his personal opinion that a formula of automatic compensatory payments by surplus countries, as proposed in the report on full employment, would be most likely to give the Fund forceful means of arresting an incipient recession.

35. All the questions he had raised required exhaustive and careful study. It was, however, incumbent upon the Council to consider the entire report carefully and to meditate seriously about ideas which, though they could not be put into practice immediately, might perhaps provide the foundation for progressive future development.

36. The PRESIDENT noted that there were no more speakers in the general debate and proposed that the further consideration of the item should be deferred.

*It was so agreed.*

**Food and famine (General Assembly resolution 525 (VI)) (E/2220, E/2261, E/L.373/Rev.2/Add.1, E/L.373/Rev.3, and E/L.385) (concluded)<sup>3</sup>**

[Agenda item 43]

37. Mr. SAKSIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that before introducing the USSR amendment (E/L.385) to the revised text of the joint draft resolution (E/L.373/Rev.3) on food shortages and famine, he wished to describe the domestic and international action the USSR had taken in that field.

38. In Czarist Russia, one of the greatest agricultural countries of its time, with a majority of the population engaged in agriculture, food shortages and famines had frequently occurred because of the technical backwardness of the country and its reactionary government. During the aftermath of the First World War, and following the additional devastation of the USSR resulting from the military invasion by fourteen nations, the food problem had become acute. But within the relatively short span of twenty to thirty years, Lenin and Stalin, the leaders of the USSR had succeeded in assuring an adequate supply of food for all and in eliminating food shortages and famine entirely.

39. Production had been increased through socialist industrialization and collectivisation or collective farming. Modern agricultural methods and techniques had been introduced, with the result that tremendous strides had been made and, even during the critical period of the Second World War, the USSR had maintained its agricultural production at a level adequate to supply both its armies and its civilian population.

40. Since 1945, further expansion of agricultural production had been achieved. In 1951 alone, USSR peasants had received from the Government 137,000 tractors, 53,000 combined harvesters and over two million smaller agricultural machines and implements. Rehabilitation had been effected promptly despite the great devastation due to the war, production had been resumed and extended, and all food rationing had been eliminated after two years in 1947. That record was commendable, particularly as other governments eight years after the end of the war had not succeeded in eliminating food rationing and had even reduced the rations allotted to their people. Agricultural progress in the USSR was based upon technological advances and the enthusiastic support of the peasants. The acreage under cultivation had been greatly increased in the post-war period and electrification was being introduced on a large scale. Because of the increased agricultural production, the USSR Government had been able to lower food and industrial prices on the domestic market repeatedly from 1947 onwards, the latest reduction of food and industrial prices having taken place in April 1952.

41. It was the peaceful policy pursued by the USSR which made its achievements possible. During the last two years, on Stalin's initiative, the great plans of mechanization and electrification had been stepped up and the construction had been initiated on five large hydro-electric stations which would provide as much as 22,000 million kWh per year and open new land to cultivation

<sup>3</sup> Resumed from 623rd meeting.



in the South and South Eastern part of the country, making it possible to feed 100 million additional people and to build up substantial food reserves.

42. The consistently peaceful policy of the USSR on an international basis had been to assist countries which suffered disasters such as flood, famine or earthquakes. The USSR had given all possible help to Japan and India during the famines there. Food supplies had been sent to the flood victims in Northern Italy. All such assistance was tendered not only by the Government of the USSR but by communities and trade unions.

43. The operative part of joint draft resolution (E/L.373/Rev.3) should be completed by the insertion of an amendment which would ensure that assistance in time of famine was truly humanitarian and unselfish. Some representatives had pointed out that in a critical famine period, food prices were likely to rise rapidly and speculation would be rampant. Moreover, some countries with food surpluses agreed to provide food supplies to famine-stricken countries in exchange for political, economic or military privileges which it was difficult for such countries to reject. He was therefore submitting an amendment (E/L.385) to that effect. The USSR delegation would be glad to vote for the revised joint draft resolution as a whole.

44. The amendment would insert as a separate clause, before the last paragraph of the operative part, the following text:

“That it be adopted as a guiding principle that the rendering of assistance to areas suffering from food shortages and famine should not be made conditional on the granting of political, economic or military privileges to the countries rendering such assistance.”

45. Mr. LUBIN (United States of America) replying to previous speakers under rule 51 of the rules of procedure, said that he had been very much interested in the USSR representative's account of increased food production in his country, since the recent *Economic Survey of Europe in 1951* (E/ECE/140/Rev.1) appeared to show that there had been no *per capita* increase of food production in the USSR between 1940 and 1950. He was surprised that the USSR representative had omitted to refer to the fact that the hungry people in the USSR had been so ably assisted after the First World War by the American Relief Association, with funds appropriated by the United States Congress, that a tribute to its work had been paid by the highest authority in the USSR. The USSR representative had also omitted to mention the thousand million dollars of foodstuffs sent from the United States to the USSR during the Second World War and by UNRRA thereafter.

46. The implication in the USSR amendment (E/L.385) that any government had ever made the granting of assistance to areas suffering from famine contingent on the granting of any form of privilege was a reflection upon the honesty and integrity of every member of the Council; it was mere propaganda. Naturally, no objection could be raised against the principle; it had, indeed, been stated in paragraph 8 of General Assembly resolution 525 (VI). It did not seem necessary for the Council to recommend the observance of a principle already adopted by the higher body.

47. Mr. ABDOH (Iran) could accept the USSR amendment (E/L.385) to the draft resolution (E/L.373/Rev.3) submitted jointly by the Iranian, United States and Uruguayan delegations, as the principle had already been expressed in the basic Assembly resolution, but only on the distinct understanding that it should not be interpreted as casting any slur on the motives of any government supplying assistance to famine areas.

48. Mr. LESAGE (Canada) and Mr. MENDEZ (Philippines) felt some difficulties about voting for the USSR amendment, however much they approved of the principle, because it might seem to be directed against certain countries.

49. Mr. CHA (China) strongly opposed the USSR amendment. It was, in his opinion hypocritical. Over a year previously, when there had been a famine on the mainland of China, food had been shipped out of Manchuria to the USSR; such action was clearly inconsistent with the principle set forth in the amendment.

50. Mr. PEREZ CISNEROS (Cuba) said that, after the USSR delegation's propaganda statement, clearly directed against friendly nations, the Cuban delegation was unable to accept the USSR amendment in its present form because public opinion might gain the impression that it had been convinced by arguments which on the contrary it very firmly rejected. On the other hand, the Cuban delegation wished to vote in favour of the principle of non-intervention which, while contained in the USSR proposal, had been recognized by the General Assembly for a long time. To resolve the difficulty, the Cuban delegation proposed that the words “that it be adopted as a guiding principle” should be replaced by the words “reaffirms the guiding principle already adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution 525 (VI), namely...”

51. Mr. STERNER (Sweden) agreed with previous speakers' objections to the USSR amendment, but certainly could not oppose the principle. He therefore welcomed the Cuban amendment, but would have to abstain if it was not accepted. He was not wholly sure that the amendment, even thus amended, was necessary.

52. Mr. HASAN (Pakistan) supported the Swedish representative's view.

53. Mr. SAKSIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) accepted the Cuban oral amendment, since the consensus of opinion seemed to favour it.

54. Mr. LUBIN (United States of America) could accept the USSR amendment as amended.

55. Mr. MASPETIOL (France) observed that the basic documentation and the discussion had dealt mainly with famine, whereas the USSR amendment introduced the additional idea of food shortages; that might be confusing.

56. Mr. RODRIGUEZ FABREGAT (Uruguay) had not originally thought that the repetition of the principle enunciated in paragraph 8 of General Assembly resolution 525 (VI) was necessary, since it would never occur to any government to attach conditions to any assistance it rendered to famine-stricken countries. He would not, however, oppose it. He could not agree with the representative of France; hunger was hunger, however caused, and must be relieved. The difficulty

raised by that representative, although rather academic, might be obviated by using some such term as hunger caused by food shortages.

57. Mr. SAKSIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) observed that General Assembly resolution 525 (VI) referred to both food shortages and famine.

58. Mr. RODRIGUEZ FABREGAT (Uruguay) felt that the French representative's objection should be met, in order to obtain unanimity. He proposed that the words "food shortages and" in the USSR amendment should be deleted.

59. Mr. ABDON (Iran) suggested that the USSR amendment should be inserted in the preamble rather than in the operative part of the revised draft resolution.

60. After a discussion about the placing of that amendment, Lord SELKIRK (United Kingdom) proposed that it should be placed as the penultimate paragraph of the operative part.

*It was so agreed.*

*The Uruguayan amendment to delete the words "food shortages and" from the USSR amendment (E/L.385) was adopted by 7 votes to 3, with 8 absentions.*

61. Mr. SAKSIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) asked that a vote should be taken on the USSR amendment, as amended by the Cuban and Uruguayan representatives, by roll-call.

*A vote was taken by roll-call as follows:*

*The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* Union of Soviet Socialist Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Argentina, Belgium, Canada, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, France, Iran, Mexico, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Sweden.

*Against:* None.

*Abstaining:* None.

*The USSR amendment (E/L.385) to the joint draft resolution (E/L.373/Rev.3), as amended orally by the Cuban and Uruguayan representatives, was adopted unanimously.*

*The draft resolution (E/L.373/Rev.3) submitted jointly by Iran, the United States of America and Uruguay, was adopted unanimously.*

62. Mr. PEREZ CISNEROS (Cuba) explained that he had not voted for the Uruguayan oral amendment because his delegation considered that the resulting text was closer to the corresponding text of General Assembly resolution 525 (VI). The idea of famine also included famine and food shortages. All forms of hunger must be relieved, not merely dramatic cases such as famine, but the silent woe of slow starvation caused by food shortages.

63. Mr. RODRIGUEZ FABREGAT (Uruguay) explained that he had proposed the deletion of the reference to "food shortages and" because he believed that that would make the text stronger and clearer. He congratulated the Council on having voted unanimously for such an eminently humanitarian resolution.

64. Mr. SAKSIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) also congratulated the Council on having reached an unanimous decision, despite a debate that had at times become somewhat acrimonious. He would not deign to answer the assertions that had been made in connexion with China by Mr. Cha who represented no one but himself, since the USSR delegation recognized only representatives of the People's Republic of China. He also replied to the previous references made by the representative of the United States.

The meeting rose at 5.45 p.m.