



Tuesday, 20 March 1951, at 3 p.m.

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**President: Mr. Hernán SANTA CRUZ (Chile).**

**Present:** The representatives of the following countries:

Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Iran, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay.

The representatives of the following specialized agencies:

International Labour Organisation, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

**World economic situation (*concluded*): report of the Economic Committee (E/1957, E/L.156 and E/L.171) (*concluded*)**

[Agenda item 3]

1. Mr. NOSEK (Czechoslovakia) said that his delegation would vote for the Polish draft resolution (E/L.156), for which it had voted in the Economic Committee. That draft resolution was in full conformity with the objectives of the United Nations Charter and provided a precise and concrete basis for their attainment. As the delegations of the USSR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia had shown the Council, the present expenditure on armaments in the capitalist countries was causing the standard of living of the working masses to decline, while the armaments industries of those countries were enjoying unprecedented profits. That made it imperative for the Economic and Social Council to recommend all governments to take effective measures, for which the draft resolution of Poland provided an appropriate basis.

2. The Czechoslovak delegation would also vote for the USSR amendments (E/L.171) to draft resolution A (E/1957), which recommended appropriate mea-

sures to remedy the situation arising from the increase in the military expenditure of a number of countries.

3. Mr. CRISTOBAL (Philippines) said that, since the USSR representative appeared to have misunderstood the objections his delegation had voiced to the proposals he had submitted, he wished to speak again in order to make his delegation's position perfectly clear.

4. In its opinion, the recommendation made in the USSR proposals that all Member governments should diminish the scale of their war production and increase civilian production was a matter which could more appropriately be discussed at a high-level conference of the great Powers. A recommendation to governments regarding the allocation of their budgetary resources was moreover a violation of their sovereignty guaranteed by the Charter.

5. The USSR representative had interpreted the Philippine delegation's opposition to its proposal regarding increased appropriations for social services as a lack of concern for the improvement of the standard of living. The Philippines had, however, done everything in its power to improve social conditions in its own territory; more than a third of its budget was, for example, spent on education, a percentage which could stand comparison with that of many more advanced countries.

6. The USSR representative had asserted that there was a majority in the Council which sought to impose its views. If such a majority existed, it was not a mechanical majority, but a consensus of opinion based on common sense and good judgment.

7. Mr. BORATYNSKI (Poland) supported the USSR amendments to the Economic Committee's draft resolution A. Throughout the entire discussion of the

USSR proposals, a majority of the members of the Council had endeavoured to avoid the issue by raising procedural questions. The representative of France had questioned the competence of the Council to deal with the draft resolution and amendments now under consideration, and had expressed the view that they could be more appropriately dealt with by other bodies. In the Polish delegation's view, there was no legal basis whatsoever for that contention. He could not admit that, simply because other organs of the United Nations had failed to deal with the problem successfully, the Council did not have the moral or legal right to discuss the proposals at present before it.

8. The PRESIDENT invited the Assistant Secretary-General in charge of the Department of Economic Affairs to make a statement before a vote was taken on the proposals before the Council.

9. Mr. OWEN (Assistant Secretary-General in charge of the Department of Economic Affairs) said that the Council would have noted that in the report of the Economic Committee contained in document E/1957 no cost figure was mentioned though the terms of reference of the group of experts to be appointed under paragraph 19 of Council resolution 290 (XI) had been modified to an extent which would probably require that group to sit longer than had originally been estimated; thus the amount set aside for that group in the 1951 budget might not quite suffice. However, the Secretariat felt that the sum set aside for another group of experts, that to be appointed under paragraph 13 of resolution 290 (XI), to prepare a report on the long-term balance of payments prospects and commodity structure of trade, would permit any necessary extension of the work of the group of experts to be appointed under paragraph 19. That feeling was based on the fact that the group of experts to be appointed under paragraph 13 had not yet been appointed, and that by delaying recruitment of staff the Secretariat had already saved enough money to provide the necessary funds.

10. In addition, he wanted to take that opportunity to inform the Council that, under the present economic conditions in the world and the prevailing uncertainties, the Secretariat entertained serious doubts as to the practicability of preparing the type of study contemplated under paragraph 13 of resolution 290 (XI), namely a report on the long-term balance of payments prospects and commodity structure of trade. The matter was, however, being given further thought, and a statement on that subject might be made to the Council when it met again its thirteenth session in some four months' time.

11. The PRESIDENT put to the vote the first USSR amendment (E/L.171) to draft resolution A submitted by the Economic Committee (E/1957).

*The amendment was rejected by 13 votes to 3, with 1 abstention.*

12. The PRESIDENT put to the vote the second USSR amendment (E/L.171) to draft resolution A submitted by the Economic Committee (E/1957).

*The amendment was rejected by 14 votes to 3.*

13. The PRESIDENT put to the vote draft resolution A submitted by the Economic Committee (E/1957).

*The draft resolution was adopted by 13 votes to none, with 4 abstentions.*

14. The PRESIDENT put to the vote draft resolution B submitted by the Economic Committee (E/1957).

*The draft resolution was adopted by 14 votes to none, with 3 abstentions.*

15. Mr. FREI (Chile), speaking in explanation of his vote, said that he had not voted against the USSR amendments because he was opposed to any reduction in the scale of operation of war industries or to an increase in civil production, but because those amendments were purely theoretical, inasmuch as they were subordinated to the political situation. He had therefore voted in favour of the resolution submitted by the Economic Committee, which recognized the world situation for what it was.

16. Mr. CORLEY SMITH (United Kingdom) said that he had abstained from voting on draft resolution B, not because he was opposed to the general trend of the resolution, but because it contained the proposal to give further consideration to the *World Economic Report 1949-1950* at the thirteenth session of the Council. He was aware that delegations might not have had as much time as they would have liked to study that report, and his delegation had proposed in the Economic Committee that the Council should remain at Santiago for a few days longer to consider it, if sufficient members deemed that necessary. His delegation was also prepared to discuss the report at the fourteenth session of the Council, as the agenda for the thirteenth session was very heavy. It already contained 53 items and it seemed highly undesirable to add yet another item.

17. Sir Ramaswami MUDALIAR (India), explaining his vote, said that, since his Government had recently reduced its armament expenditure by approximately 20 per cent, it would be the first to support any recommendation for a general reduction of armaments. But, as the statement made at the 477th meeting by the USSR representative had shown, neither the General Assembly nor the Security Council, with whom the primary responsibility for recommendations regarding disarmament lay, had achieved any success in that field. It was therefore unlikely that the Economic and Social Council, which had not been given any special responsibility in the matter, would succeed where they had failed. It was not a question of competence but of taking effective action. The Council should avoid making recommendations which no government would take seriously. For that reason, he had voted against the second USSR amendment, the one to the operative part of the resolution. The USSR amendment to the preamble of resolution A, however, stated an undeniable truth. But since he could not support the USSR amendment to the operative part of resolution A, which was the logical consequence of its amendment to the preamble, he had abstained in the vote on the USSR amendment to the preamble.

18. Mr. ARDALAN (Iran) said that unless and until general agreement were reached among the great Powers regarding the methods to be followed in reducing armaments, any decision taken by the Council would be of no practical value. He had accordingly voted against the USSR proposals.

19. Mr. MICHANEK (Sweden) said that he had abstained from voting on draft resolution B for the same reasons as the United Kingdom representative.

20. The PRESIDENT put to the vote the Polish draft resolution (E/L.156).

*The draft resolution was rejected by 15 votes to 3.*

21. Mr. CORLEY SMITH (United Kingdom) said that the reasons why his delegation had voted against the Polish draft resolution had been stated in the Economic Committee and need not therefore be re-stated.

22. Mr. CABADA (Peru) wished it to be placed on record that his delegation had voted in favour of the resolutions adopted by the majority.

23. Mr. LUBIN (United States of America) said that his delegation's vote had been fully explained in the Economic Committee. A resolution providing for the supervision by an outside body of budgetary appropriations by individual governments could hardly be taken seriously, especially when supported by governments which were unwilling to provide the United Nations with the necessary basic information to enable it to take effective measures in regard to the reduction of armaments.

24. Mr. CRISTOBAL (Philippines) said that he had voted against the Polish draft resolution for the reasons his delegation had given in the Economic Committee.

25. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) took exception to the terms in which the United States representative had referred to his delegation's draft resolution and pointed out that Poland had always been among the first to support proposals directed towards the maintenance of international peace and security.

26. Mr. BURINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the statement he had made at the previous meeting completely refuted the United States representative's assertion that the USSR had impeded general disarmament.

**Financing of economic development of under-developed countries (concluded): report of the Economic Committee (E/1958 and E/L.170)**

[Agenda item 6]

27. The PRESIDENT invited the Chairman of the Economic Committee to introduce its report on that item.

28. \*Sir Ramaswami MUDALIAR (India) said that the Economic Committee had given careful consideration to the question of the financing of economic development. He regretted that the draft resolution it had submitted to the Council had not been adopted unanimously; it had, however, received large measure of support from delegations.

29. The proposal that the Economic Committee should meet a week before the thirteenth session of the Council to consider practical methods of improving or augmenting existing sources of external finance had not received unanimous support. The majority of delegations had, however, considered that, in view of the importance of the problem, such a preliminary meeting of the Economic Committee would be the best method of drafting recommendations for consideration by the Council.

30. The amendments proposed by the USSR delegation had been considered by the Economic Committee but had not received the support of the majority.

31. Mr. FREI (Chile) said that his delegation had submitted a draft resolution on the financing of economic development to the Economic Committee jointly with the delegations of India, Mexico and Pakistan (E/L.153). It had done so because it was concerned at the slow progress being made in a matter of such importance to the under-developed countries, whose economic difficulties had been aggravated by the present international situation. The draft resolution which it had co-sponsored provided for the establishment of an *ad hoc* committee to consider means of improving or augmenting existing international machinery so that additional international funds could be made available to under-developed countries, as well as proposals presented by Member governments and specialized agencies in accordance with General Assembly resolution 400 (V) or by the group of experts to be appointed by the Secretary-General under Council resolution 290 (XI).

32. The Chilean delegation, like the other co-sponsors of that draft resolution, had agreed to accept the alternative proposal submitted by the delegations of Belgium and Canada, which they considered covered the ideas contained in their own proposal and would result in a full study of the problem at an early date.

33. The USSR delegation had submitted two amendments to the draft resolution adopted by the Economic Committee. While the first of those amendments was quite acceptable in substance, the Chilean delegation thought that the underlying idea of attracting foreign capital was too passive; it was necessary to provide conditions not only to attract foreign capital but also to provide for an active flow of investment capital.

34. Mr. QURESHI (Pakistan) associated himself with the views of the representative of Chile. As regards the USSR amendments to the Committee's draft resolution, it was his view that the first amendment involved no substantial modification of the original text, but merely added certain unessential details. He could not support the second amendment, since he felt that the reports of individual experts should play an important part in the Economic Committee's discussions on the matter under consideration.

35. Mr. BARRETO (Peru) observed that the question of the financing of the economic development of under-developed countries was of increasing interest to the entire world, owing to the fact that the existing international situation required the acceleration of that

development. The Committee's draft resolution acknowledged the necessity of adopting practical methods of financing at the earliest possible moment, and outlined a reasonable procedure by which, after further study of the question, the Economic Committee could present to the Council at its thirteenth session a report which should facilitate such a decision. The draft resolution reconciled the views of a number of delegations, and took into consideration the importance of the role to be played in the economic development programme by private, as well as public capital, and the necessity for the under-developed areas to develop sound domestic economic policies which would attract private capital. His delegation would therefore support the Committee's draft resolution.

36. Mr. GARCIA (Philippines) also supported the draft resolution of the Committee, which represented a definite step forward. It would be of particular significance to the under-developed countries, since those countries could not bring their own efforts to fruition without the assistance of foreign capital, both public and private, in the form of either loans or direct investments. He shared the views of the representative of Pakistan as regards both the USSR amendments.

37. Mr. BURINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) stressed the fact that the purpose of his first amendment was to include in the draft resolution the specific reasons why foreign capital was necessary and the purposes for which it should be used; he considered it important that those purposes should be stated clearly, in order that the resolution might truly serve the aims and objectives of the Charter. If, however, the Chilean representative objected to the use of the term "attracting" in the English version, he was quite willing to consider a proposal for the substitution of another word. He felt that the difficulty was purely one of drafting, and hoped that agreement on the wording might be reached in order that his amendment, which he considered to be one of substance, might be accepted.

38. Mr. FREI (Chile) felt that the original text conveyed the same meaning as the USSR amendment, and preferred to support the former.

39. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) said he would support the Committee's draft resolution provided that the USSR amendments were adopted. In his opinion, those amendments brought the text into closer conformity with the decisions taken at the ninth session of the Council and confirmed by the General Assembly at its fourth session, which reaffirmed the principle that foreign capital must be used to strengthen the economic independence of the under-developed countries. The text as it stood left too much room for interpretations which might be at variance with that principle.

40. As regards the second USSR amendment, he reiterated the view he had expressed during the general debate, to the effect that there had lately been too much tendency to rely in those matters on teams of experts. The experience which had been gained lately with a group of experts in a certain country had not, however, been too encouraging in that respect. The time had come for strong national action in drawing up and carrying out development programmes with the advice and assistance of the United Nations.

41. Mr. NOSEK (Czechoslovakia) said he would support the USSR amendments for the reasons he had set forth during the general debate.

42. The PRESIDENT put to the vote the first USSR amendment (E/L.170).

*The amendment was rejected by 12 votes to 3, with 3 abstentions.*

43. The PRESIDENT put to the vote the second USSR amendment.

*The amendment was rejected by 15 votes to 3.*

44. The PRESIDENT put to the vote the Economic Committee's draft resolution (E/1958).

*The draft resolution was adopted by 14 votes, with 4 abstentions.*

45. The PRESIDENT pointed out, with regard to the comments which had been made concerning possible interpretations of the resolution just adopted, that throughout the history of the Council's debates on the subject of economic development of under-developed countries, it had at all times been made abundantly clear that the sole purposes of such development were the improvement of the standard of living of those countries, an increase in their productivity and the strengthening of their economic independence.

46. Mr. CORLEY SMITH (United Kingdom) explained that he disagreed with the procedure laid down in the resolution for the conduct of the Council's work; therefore, observing that a substantial majority of the Council was available in favour of the resolution, he had abstained from voting in order to express his misgivings.

47. Mr. CREPAULT (Canada) said he had abstained from voting on the first USSR amendment. That amendment had originally been submitted during the debate in the Economic Committee, as an amendment to the joint draft resolution of Belgium and Canada, and had been accepted by his delegation. Later, however, when that draft resolution had been superseded by another joint draft resolution which the Committee had adopted, the USSR amendment had appeared superfluous, since its substance had been fully covered by the new text.

48. Mr. BURINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) stated that he had merely wished to stress the fact that such economic development should be strictly in the interests of the national economies of the countries concerned, and not result in big profits for foreign monopolies.

### **Relief and rehabilitation of Korea (E/1913, E/1913/Add.1 and E/L.173)**

[Agenda item 21]

49. The PRESIDENT recalled briefly the history of the question of the relief and rehabilitation of Korea, as discussed by the Council and the General Assembly. Since thus far it had been impossible to carry out the programme envisaged, owing to developments in the military situation in Korea since the General Assembly's latest decision, the Council was unable to



furnish the progress reports which had been requested of it. Accordingly, the report now before the Council for its consideration, in documents E/1913 and E/1913/Add.1, was a report by the Secretary-General.

50. Mr. OWEN (Assistant Secretary-General in charge of the Department of Economic Affairs) pointed out that the Agent General had been unable to furnish a report as requested in General Assembly resolution 410 (V), because he had only recently been appointed. The reports received from the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea indicated that the refugee problem was becoming increasingly grave and that relief needs were more pressing than ever. Moreover, the problem of ensuring the provision of adequate financial resources was becoming increasingly serious.

51. Mr. CORLEY SMITH (United Kingdom) observed that the draft resolution presented by his delegation was simple and non-controversial; he hoped that it would receive the support of the Council. Speaking not only as the United Kingdom representative but also as the Chairman of the Negotiating Committee set up by the General Assembly under resolution 410 B (V) to approach Member and non-member governments with regard to contributions for aid to Palestine refugees and for the relief and rehabilitation of Korea, he stated frankly that the results achieved thus far by that Committee had fallen far short of its expectations. Whereas some governments had provided military assistance in Korea and others had contributed to civilian relief, there were many which had made no contribution at all. He felt that all Members of the United Nations were in a position to make some contribution, and that it was their duty to do so, according to their individual means, if only to demonstrate the solidarity of the United Nations and the universality of its appeal. Unless they did so, he feared that the threat of widespread starvation and disease in Korea could not be averted.

52. Mr. FENAUX (Belgium) thought that the United Kingdom draft resolution was a reasonable one and should be acceptable to the Council. He agreed with the United Kingdom representative that the contributions made by some States should be matched by the other Members of the United Nations. In that connexion, he pointed out that the efforts already put forth by the Member States were not fully reflected in the report before the Council. His own country, a small State which was still recovering from war devastation and the effects of a long occupation, had thus far contributed some two million dollars for civilian relief in Korea, over and above the military aid it had provided.

53. Mr. BURINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that his delegation's attitude in the matter of assistance to the civil population of Korea had been fully stated at the eleventh session of the Council and at the fifth session of the General Assembly. His delegation had not opposed such assistance but had insisted that it should not serve as a pretext for interference in the domestic affairs of Korea and should not be accompanied by any political conditions. It had also taken the view and continued to take the view that representatives of the Korean people should

play a direct part in determining the country's needs, and that efforts should be made to keep profits from the sale of supplies at the minimum.

54. The report submitted by the Secretary-General, which was a biased and tendentious document, failed to indicate the character and extent of the destruction in Korea, the causes of that destruction and the practical steps being taken to alleviate the plight of the civil population.

55. The question of assistance to Korea had arisen in consequence of the provocative attack on the People's Democratic Republic of Korea by the South Korean forces, acting under the instructions of the United States and in accordance with a previously prepared plan. The USSR had submitted exhaustive evidence to the General Assembly, which proved that the ruling circles of the United States were the true aggressors in Korea and there was no need to submit the same evidence to the Council. That evidence was contained in the official collection of documents published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea. The Secretary-General's report did not, however, see fit to mention that collection of documents, contenting itself with deliberately false assertions, such as, for example, that the shortage of medical supplies in Korea had been due to pillage and destruction perpetrated by the communist forces.

56. It had, however, been admitted by newspapers such as *The New York Times*, which could hardly be suspected of any bias in favour of the North Koreans, that precisely the reverse was the case. In its issue of 3 March 1951, for example, an article by its special correspondent was entitled "The vast damage inflicted by United Nations forces is rousing the wrath of the Koreans". The Secretary-General's report did not stop at the distortion of the facts. His responsibility was in no way diminished by the fact that the statement in question was made in the supplement and not in the report itself.

57. The report gave the impression that the destruction in Korea was not in fact very extensive. But according to *The New York Times* of 1 March 1951, General MacArthur had stated in conversation that he had never seen such destruction in all his military experience. Daily reports in the Press indicated that the armed forces of the United States were continuing their work of destruction, which had cost the lives of almost a million Koreans.

58. The Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea had on many occasions called the attention of the United Nations to the atrocities which were being perpetrated in its territory. To give a few examples only, 1,812 houses had been destroyed by fire on a single day — on 3 January 1951 — at Pyongyang. The population of that city, which had been 500,000 before the war, had been reduced to a bare 50,000. While similar examples could be found in any issue of the daily press, they were not to be found in the Secretary-General's report.

59. In the light of that destruction, the question of assistance to Korea took on an unusual aspect. The American interventionists were razing Korean towns

and villages to the ground and at the same time were handing out charity to the puppet régime of Syngnam Rhee. But the little assistance which reached the Korean people, mainly through the black market, bore no relation to the damage inflicted on the country as a result of military operations.

60. The best way to help the people of Korea was to end the destructive war, to withdraw foreign forces from the country and to give the Korean people themselves an opportunity of directing their own internal affairs and of embarking on the reconstruction of their country. The proposals which the delegation of the Soviet Union had submitted to the Security Council and the General Assembly and which had been rejected by the Anglo-American bloc in the United Nations, had had that object in view.

61. Mr. GARCIA (Philippines) agreed with the Belgian representative that the United Kingdom draft resolution should receive the support of the Council. His delegation, which had always supported the principle of assistance to Korea, would endorse that proposal. As regards the statement of the USSR representative, he pointed out that the Council was not concerned with the political implications of the draft resolution; nevertheless, since his own Government had sent troops to fight in Korea, he felt constrained to point out that the military operations referred to represented United Nations action and not, as had been claimed by the USSR delegation, intervention by the United States.

62. Mr. LUBIN (United States of America) said that he had not intended to discuss the political aspects of the Korean situation, but he felt bound to reply briefly to the remarks made by the USSR representative. The General Assembly had decided by an overwhelming majority that the communist forces of North Korea were guilty of aggression. Those who had supported that resolution would therefore be able to assess the false charges of the USSR at their true value. The General Assembly had assumed the responsibility for driving back the aggressors and providing for the relief and unification of Korea. On 14 August 1950 the Economic and Social Council had unanimously adopted resolution 323 (XI) regarding the relief and rehabilitation of Korea and on 7 November 1950 had submitted a resolution (338 (XI)) to the Assembly proposing the establishment of the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency. Again by an overwhelming majority, on 1 December 1950 the Assembly had adopted resolution 410 (V) and the Reconstruction Agency had already commenced operations.

63. The record of the relief work in Korea shown in the Secretary-General's report (E/1913 and E/1913/Add.1) was impressive. Twenty-two countries had made materials and money available to the Unified Command through the Secretary-General, and several organizations had also made valuable contributions of supplies and personnel. By 7 February 1951 the contributions made by private organizations in the United States had amounted to approximately 3 million dollars.

64. The needs, however, were still tremendous, and the United Nations should do its utmost to help the

homeless, the sick and the suffering in Korea. During the Council's eleventh session it had been estimated that approximately 250 million dollars would be required to cover the relief and rehabilitation programme for 1951 and the first part of 1952. Since then there had been further disasters and undoubtedly much more would be needed to repair the damage. Thus far only 18 Member States had made offers to the Negotiating Committee, and the amounts offered had not yet reached the original estimate of 250 million dollars. It was obvious, therefore, that greater efforts were needed. Several countries had already made generous contributions to the emergency relief programme before the establishment of the Reconstruction Agency, but he hoped that those countries would be able to make still further efforts and additional contributions. He warmly supported the United Kingdom draft resolution (E/L.173) and emphasized that it was the duty of all those who loved freedom to share in the great humanitarian task of providing relief for the suffering people of Korea.

65. Mr. FAROOQ (Pakistan) associated himself with the humanitarian aims referred to by the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom. No one could possibly deny the urgent need for relief in Korea, and his delegation would support the United Kingdom draft resolution. His Government had been one of the first to make a fairly large offer of help in terms of wheat, and would always be glad to give as much as lay within its power. However it was severely handicapped by its own refugee problem which existed on a scale unparalleled in human history. In addition, the province of the Punjab was still recovering from the disastrous floods of the previous year and the Government also had many commitments in connexion with its development programme. In view of those facts he hoped that no one would misinterpret it if his country was unable to make any further large scale contribution to the relief work in Korea.

66. Mr. WAGNER DE REYNA (Peru) pointed out that the item on the agenda had been fully discussed during the Council's eleventh session at its resumed session at Lake Success and during the fifth session of the General Assembly. He very much regretted that political considerations had been introduced into the discussion, and since the exponents of the two opposing theories had already spoken, he proposed the closure of the debate.

67. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) and Mr. NOSEK (Czechoslovakia) strongly protested against the proposal for closure at that stage in the debate, when several delegations had not yet had the opportunity to speak.

68. At the request of the PRESIDENT Mr. WAGNER DE REYNA (Peru) withdrew his proposal.

69. Mr. NOSEK (Czechoslovakia) reminded members that his delegation had abstained from voting on General Assembly resolution 410 (V). It had abstained because the resolution deliberately concealed the real causes of the economic devastation in Korea and the real identity of the aggressors. Furthermore, the reso-

lution did not even mention the destruction wrought by the United States Air Force in its raids on civilian targets. The United States amendments which had been incorporated into that resolution had been submitted with the purpose of dividing the Korean people in order to weaken their resistance against the aggressors and of discriminating against the people of North Korea so that the whole country could fall a prey to the United States monopolies.

70. His delegation was in principle in favour of assistance to the Korean people, but he could not agree to United States expansion in the guise of a relief programme.

71. The draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom delegation was based on General Assembly resolution 410 (V). The reasons which had led his delegation to abstain on that resolution also determined its attitude towards the United Kingdom draft resolution.

72. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) recalled that, during the Council's resumed eleventh session, his delegation had strongly supported the idea that relief and rehabilitation should be provided for Korea. At the same time, his delegation had pointed out that several provisions of the resolution eventually adopted by the Council, including the extensive powers granted to the Korean Reconstruction Agency, constituted infringements of the sovereign rights of the Korean people. It was essential that any United Nations organization for relief and rehabilitation should work in close collaboration with the local organizations, and should be controlled by responsible persons with a full knowledge of local problems. His delegation had wanted to make sure that the relief programme would not be used as a political weapon, and it had eventually been forced to abstain from voting because of the defects in the resolution.

73. The United States representative had once more repeated his charge that the forces of North Korea had been guilty of aggression. However, members had been informed of the documents captured after the liberation of Seoul and submitted by the USSR and the Korean Democratic People's Republic to show where the responsibility for aggression really lay. Those documents showed that the aggression had been carefully planned long in advance by the puppet régime of Syngman Rhee, with the active participation of United States officials and officers. The General Assembly, however had violated the basic principle of justice in refusing to grant a hearing to the representative of the Korean Democratic People's Republic and had simply accepted the false statements of the Syngman Rhee régime.

74. The fact that the United States was the real aggressor in Korea was clear from the way in which its forces had been sent into the country even before the Security Council had taken its illegal decision. Thus, for the United States to speak of relief and habilitation was sheer hypocrisy. The wanton destruction carried out by the United States forces in Korea defied description. The Press, even in the United States and Western Europe, was full of stories describing the

machine-gunning of civilian refugees and the total destruction of whole villages. Some representatives might argue that the sufferings of the civilian population in Korea were the normal results of war. The Nürnberg Tribunal, however, had clearly stated that the orders of a superior or the plea of military necessity could not be accepted as excuses for the wilful destruction of a civilian population. It was true that bomber-pilots sometimes made mistakes and missed their targets, but the same could not be argued of the man behind the machine-gun who was bound to see his victims and to be able to distinguish civilians from soldiers. The horrors of the war in Korea were reminiscent of the atrocities perpetrated by the Germans during the Second World War.

75. If the United States was really concerned for the welfare of the people of Korea it should have accepted the repeated resolutions submitted by the USSR delegation to put an end to the bombing of the civilian population.

76. He could not support the United Kingdom draft resolution because it did not take the real facts into account. It was no use providing money for relief when the destruction was still going on. There could be no genuine programme for the relief and rehabilitation of Korea until the destruction had ceased and foreign troops had been withdrawn.

77. Mr. CORLEY SMITH (United Kingdom) said that the aim of his draft resolution was purely humanitarian, and he had hoped that it would not prove controversial. He regretted that other considerations had been introduced into the discussion and would refrain from joining in the controversy. He renewed his appeal to all men of good-will and to all governments to do their utmost in the humanitarian task of providing relief for Korea.

78. Mr. ALCAREZ (Mexico) supported the United Kingdom draft resolution and recalled that his Government had already contributed medical supplies for the relief of Korea. His delegation felt that a distinction should be drawn between the programme for relief and that for rehabilitation. All Member States should contribute towards the relief programme in proportion to their contributions to the United Nations, but the rehabilitation programme should be carried out by the countries which possessed the necessary capital resources.

79. The PRESIDENT put the United Kingdom draft resolution (E/L.173) to the vote.

*The draft resolution was adopted by 15 votes with 3 abstentions.*

#### **Report of the Executive Board of UNICEF: report of the Social Committee (E/1962)**

[Agenda item 20]

80. The PRESIDENT drew attention to the Social Committee's report and the draft resolution submitted for adoption by the Council (E/1962).

81. Mr. BURINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that his delegation had explained its

reasons for voting against the resolution during the discussion in the Social Committee. His delegation's attitude was based on the fact that the Executive Board of UNICEF had consistently discriminated against the People's Democracies in its allocation of funds.

82. Mr. FAROOQ (Pakistan) recalled that the draft resolution before the Council had been adopted by the Social Committee after a very brief discussion. The Committee had not intended to display any lack of interest in the vital humanitarian subject of aid to children, neither had it been unappreciative of the work done by UNICEF during the past four years. It had, however, wished to avoid a debate on the policy followed by the Executive Board of UNICEF until the Board had itself discussed the matter at its meeting to be held in May 1951. His delegation had also agreed not to go into that question until the following session but he wished to mention two general points of policy at the current session.

83. In the first place, since the primary aim of assisting the children in war-ravaged countries had been completed, there had been a gradual shift in the scene of the Fund's activities and the emphasis was at present placed on relief for children outside Europe. The General Assembly had approved of that shift in emphasis during its fourth and fifth sessions but, strangely enough, the Council had as yet done nothing to bring the Annex to its resolution 44 (IV) into line

with the altered circumstances. That question required serious consideration and the Executive Board of the Fund might well submit some concrete suggestions on the subject to the Council for consideration at the following session.

84. In the second place, there seemed to have been a very considerable decrease in the rate of contributions to the work of UNICEF since it had shifted its activities towards the children of the under-developed countries. It would be extremely unfortunate if such an impression were allowed to gain widespread credence and he hoped it would be realized that an outlay of approximately 150 to 200 million dollars on the future work of UNICEF could do more to foster international good-will and happiness than could be done by amounts several times that size spent in other ways.

85. The PRESIDENT put the draft resolution submitted by the Social Committee (E/1962) to the vote.

*The draft resolution was adopted by 15 votes to 3.*

86. The PRESIDENT thanked the Executive Director of the Fund for his collaboration in the work of the Social Committee.

87. Mr. WAGNER DE REYNA (Peru) added a tribute to the work of the Fund and also congratulated the Executive Director.

The meeting rose at 6.20 p.m.