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President: Mr. Hernán SANTA CRUZ (Chile).

Present: Representatives of the following countries: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, India, Iran, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Representatives of the following specialized agencies:

International Labour Organisation, World Health Organization.

Plans for relief and rehabilitation of Korea (A/1435, E/1851/Rev.1, E/1851/Add.1, E/1852, E/1864, E/L.114, E/L.122 and E/L.125) (*continued*)

1. Mr. DE FARO (Brazil) said that the Brazilian delegation had carefully considered the report of the temporary Committee on Korean Relief Needs (E/1864) and the financial arrangements envisaged in both the United States and the Australian draft resolutions (E/L.125 and E/1852).

2. In the absence of more specific information than the scanty data supplied in the report of the temporary Committee, his delegation was in no position to pass considered judgment on the reliability of the estimates involved. Nevertheless the sum of 250 million dollars tentatively suggested by the Committee seemed extremely high. That figure was close on 10 per cent of the funds spent by UNRRA to cover a much wider area, a much larger population, to repair damages of a war that had been far more destructive than the Korean conflict. Even if price changes were taken into consideration, it seemed clear that a much greater relief and rehabilitation investment was contemplated in regard to Korea than had been the case in connexion with UNRRA operations.

3. While there could be no doubt of the need for a major co-ordinated effort by all Members of the United Nations to alleviate the sufferings of the Korean people, he agreed with the Pakistani representative's observation that through a tragic irony the United Nations seemed to be more capable of action for reconstruction

of war damage than for development of resources in under-developed areas. The United Nations could not continue to wait for war and destruction to take place before it began thinking of co-operation. The best method of avoiding recurrence in other parts of the world of the tragic events in Korea was in eliminating the basic causes of political unrest and economic distress in under-developed countries. While the succession of recovery programmes, such as UNRRA, the European Recovery Program, Korean Relief, etc., was distressing and somewhat frustrating in the absence of any corresponding development programme, the pressing and acute needs of Korea could not be disregarded.

4. He pointed out that Brazil, an under-developed country faced with enormous and urgent internal problems, would, in any case, only be able to make very limited resources available for Korean relief. There were also other factors to be considered because a change in administration would soon take place in Brazil as a result of recent elections. Thus, no new long-range financial commitments could be made before the new administration had had time to examine the present and potential importance and impact of such undertakings.

5. Commenting on the methods of financing Korean relief contemplated in the draft resolutions, he said that, quite apart from the merits of the Korean case, the Brazilian delegation considered the method suggested in the original United States draft (E/L.114) as unacceptable in principle. Brazil had always advocated the principle of voluntary contributions in connexion with operational budgets. The United States proposal for a system of assessments by percentages would involve a semi-compulsory system which furthermore might be related only indirectly to the actual resources that various governments might be able and willing to allocate for Korean relief and rehabilitation. The Brazilian delegation did not concur in the view that sub-paragraph 2 of the United States draft involved no compulsory element. Either the assessment of percentage was decided by a majority vote—a procedure which by itself was of a compulsory nature—or the percentages were freely established by each government, in which case there was no need for a system of percentage contributions. In the latter case it would

be more appropriate to adopt the Australian suggestion for voluntary declarations of contributions at a special conference.

6. Moreover, the United States formula seemed extremely rigid, since Member States were supposed either to accept immediately a percentage assessment applicable not only to present requirements but also to future needs which would be determined by the General Assembly, or go on record as being unwilling to co-operate in Korean relief and rehabilitation. Many countries, however, might well find themselves in the intermediate position of being unprepared to accept a percentage assessment of a semi-compulsory budget and having to request such appropriations from their parliaments and yet, at the same time, be reluctant to refuse participation in the programme of Korean relief. Such countries might wish to participate within the limitations imposed by the financial situation and political prospects within their own borders, and might be prepared to offer contributions at a future date, provided they were left free to fix the rate of such contributions on the basis of practical considerations.

7. The Brazilian delegation therefore favoured a system of voluntary contributions, as suggested by the representative of France and others. In view of the successful operation of the system of voluntary contributions in the cases of the Technical Assistance Programme and the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund, a pessimistic attitude regarding the degree of participation of Member States seemed unfounded. The Australian suggestion for a special conference in which governments would freely declare how much and under what conditions they would be prepared to contribute to the Korean relief programme without committing themselves to any specific budgetary percentage was, in the view of the Brazilian delegation, the most realistic and acceptable approach. It also supported the view of the representative of Belgium (431st meeting) that no definite time-limit should be fixed for the expenditure of the recommended sum of 250 million dollars since the estimate of needs as given by the temporary Committee was based on information which had not been properly assessed by governments.

8. Mr. CORLEY SMITH (United Kingdom) noted that although the Council had faced the difficult subject of fund raising on previous occasions, the case of Korea was unique both because the sum involved was so large and because of the moral aspects of the question. The need for relief in Korea had arisen as a direct consequence of collective action by the United Nations to repel aggression. The United Nations must display the same solidarity and unity of purpose in remedying the damage as it had shown in its action to resist aggression. It was therefore most important that the maximum possible number of countries should contribute to the programme of Korean relief not only because of the real and pressing needs but also as a gesture of continuing solidarity.

9. In order to insure the participation of as many countries as possible, a delicate balance must be sought: the size of the fund must not be too high and the method of collection must not be too harsh or alarming.

10. Despite his doubts regarding the ultimate validity of the figures contained in the report of the temporary

Committee, the representative of the United Kingdom stated that that body had done admirable work and that the limitations of its findings were due solely to the circumstances in which it had been forced to work. While the estimates were the best that could be produced at the time, the Committee had had no opportunity to examine the assumptions and data on which they were based. In the circumstances, it was impossible to have accurate budgeting in the sense usually understood in parliaments.

11. Questions repeatedly arose. That was particularly the case in connexion with the rehabilitation section. The reference made by the representative of the United States to textile factories (431st meeting) from which machinery had been looted was a case in point. Was it to be assumed that the looted machinery would be recovered or that it would have to be replaced? No one could be blamed for the absence of facts since information was unavailable. Items and totals were therefore necessarily guesses. Although the ultimate cost of the operation could not be estimated, it was clear that the needs were great and that heavy contributions must be undertaken even at great sacrifice.

12. In his view, there was no fundamental disagreement between the representatives of France and the United States in the matter of the speed of the programme of Korean relief. Each took a different approach to the question. Those who had suffered war devastation knew that priorities must be established in reconstruction, and that the programme often extended over a long period. There was however great merit in the United States argument that an immediate capital expenditure reduced sustaining costs. It was always more expensive to buy on the instalment plan but sometimes people simply were not in a position to make an outright purchase. Again the Council must strike a balance between the two factors.

13. He recalled that during the Second World War, the United Kingdom had given priority to certain obvious immediate needs: food, warmth and shelter. The priority of other items had been determined on the basis of individual cases. Immediate needs were, however, easier to assess than long-term reconstruction needs. It would therefore be a positive advantage to maintain a degree of flexibility and elasticity in the relief programme. In that connexion it was gratifying to note that the temporary Committee had not established a fixed period for the first stage of the programme. Even so, the figure of 250 million dollars for that initial period seemed to be very high and the representative of the United Kingdom expressed the hope that it would be possible to compress it to the utmost by cutting down expenses through efficient operation rather than by reducing the scope of the work to be done. He was not sure whether it would be more appropriate for the Fifth Committee to discuss the figures but in any case rigorous economy was essential.

14. Compression of the total amount was desirable since it would permit participation by the greatest possible number of countries. The method of contribution was also an extremely important factor in achieving solidarity. While all the proposed schemes had merit and were based on the best of intentions, the implications of each must be carefully weighed. A rigid system of assessment might deter many countries from joining

in the programme since a commitment to contribute a definite percentage of an indefinite total might be a risk they could not face. While it was true that that procedure was followed in the case of the United Nations administrative budget, it must be remembered that the sum involved was much smaller and that the total did not vary substantially from year to year. In Korea, the total needed was unknown and the period over which it would be needed was equally unknown. In the case of a system of assessment, he asked whether those who were able to contribute but refused to do so would have a voice in determining the size and scope of the programme. If governments felt unable to face unknown commitments, a compromise between a mandatory and a voluntary system should be sought.

15. The representative of the United Kingdom stated that he preferred the Australian suggestion to hold a special conference and pointed out that that procedure had been adopted for the Technical Assistance Fund and that the full sum required had been raised by voluntary means. While, because of the moral pressure exerted, a world conference would not really be entirely voluntary, no country would be forced to undertake burdens which it believed to be beyond its capacity. Although the sum needed for technical assistance had been much smaller than that required for Korea, he thought the method used in connexion with the Technical Assistance Programme would be the most appropriate one to adopt in connexion with Korea.

16. Mr. YU (China) expressed appreciation of the temporary Committee's report. The question of the rehabilitation of Korea provided the United Nations with a unique opportunity to do good; as the United Nations had originally undertaken the task of unifying and liberating Korea, it had a special obligation in respect of relief for that country. It was, in fact, a task which amounted to more than mere relief work, such as the United Nations had undertaken before. At a time when the world was passing through a crucial period, and sacrifices had to be made, the Koreans were sacrificing something more than dollars and cents, namely, their lives.

17. His country, because of unfortunate circumstances, was probably not in a position to do very much for the time being. However, to prove its willingness to help those in need, his government had recently communicated with the Korean authorities offering to contribute coal, rice and DDT.

18. If it was impossible to raise 250 million dollars by a quota system or through governments, there were plenty of individuals, in various countries, willing to assist their fellow human beings, and the United Nations could perhaps consider conducting a campaign urging such individuals to help.

19. His delegation wanted to stress the fact that every effort must be made to work out a relief programme for Korea and make of it a first moral lesson of which the United Nations would be proud in years to come. If the opportunity was not seized and the world was not shown that the United Nations was ready to combat aggression there might not be such a good opportunity **in the future**. It was not the time to cavil at the amount to be spent; the estimates made were not too high from the point of view of the United Nations. An effort

should be made therefore to meet the figures that had been given. His delegation did not think it too high, though it was not in the best position to contribute a large sum for the time being. Mr. Yu therefore urged the Council to meet that minimum figure by appealing to world opinion for individual contributions.

20. Mr. SCHNAKE VERGARA (Chile) agreed with the United Kingdom representative that a large sum of money would certainly be necessary for the work to be done and stressed the moral nature of the undertaking. Most, if not all, the Members of the United Nations ought to contribute. Chile wanted to help and would do so as far as it was able.

21. The quota method, which seemed very simple at first sight, involved many complications, and did not appeal to his delegation to be satisfactory. It was very important to make sure that the contributions were purely voluntary. In the circumstances, the Australian proposal seemed the best suited to the situation.

22. It might be necessary to arrange for contributions to be made on a more definite basis but it remained important that such contributions should be purely voluntary and that they should constitute an expression of the will of the United Nations to rehabilitate Korea. The General Assembly should be asked to give its opinion on the matter.

23. Mr. ARUTIUNIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that he had only two comments to make.

24. First, he did not consider that the report of the temporary Committee to the Council had covered the ground which it was intended to cover. On 16 October, the Council had instructed the Committee (418th meeting) to prepare a provisional report "on the scale of the programme required for such period as may be appropriate, together with an estimate of the cost" (E/1856). It was clear from the report that the Committee had failed to carry out that task. It admitted in paragraph 17 of its report (E/1864) that it had not been in a position to examine the assumptions and detailed data on which the estimates—of requirements submitted by the representative of the United States and by the representative of the Secretary-General—had been based.

25. He understood the difficulties of the case, but that fact nevertheless remained. He did not want to go into the reasons for it, but he did not doubt that one basic reason was the absence of a representative of the Korean people at the discussions of the Council. The USSR had proposed that representatives of the Korean people should be invited to testify, but that suggestion had been rejected (418th meeting). In the absence of such representatives, it was naturally impossible for the Committee to do its work fully.

26. It was strange that the figures received from the United States and from the Secretariat should be so similar. It was probable that they did roughly correspond to requirements, but it was surely not necessary for the Committee to have taken twenty days to consider them. The current situation made it difficult to make any real assessment, and the Committee had obviously found it difficult to do so.

27. The second point he wished to make was that contributions from countries should be on a voluntary basis; it should be made possible for them to make such contributions in national currencies. It was his understanding that that principle was widely accepted by the members of the Council.

28. Mr. WALKER (Australia) said he had only a few comments to make. His delegation had submitted its draft resolution (E/1852) early in order to allow other members of the Council to study it and to express their opinion.

29. In a sense, any scheme such as the one concerning relief and rehabilitation of Korea had to be voluntary but a certain amount of compulsion naturally followed. Everyone should feel the need to help the Koreans.

30. It was possible, however, that the difference between the Australian and the United States proposals were not as wide as they appeared. He thought that everybody was prepared to bear his share of the burden; he had hoped, therefore, that his delegation's proposal would entail an exchange of views.

31. The United States draft resolution appeared rather peremptory in tone, but it probably allowed plenty of room for discussion. He agreed that the whole question would probably have to be handed over to the Fifth Committee. It must, of course, be discussed by the General Assembly.

32. His delegation had thought of a special conference, for it was possible that some non-member States might wish to contribute to Korean relief. That, however, could still be arranged in the Fifth Committee.

33. He was not suggesting that the United States and Australian delegations should submit a joint resolution.

34. He could say that his government, like other governments, had not yet formally decided on the amount of its contribution.

35. In conclusion he thanked other speakers for the tributes they had paid him as Rapporteur of the Committee and the other members of the Committee for their assistance.

36. The PRESIDENT wanted to clear up certain points which representatives had made. Certain references had been made to the Fifth Committee; he pointed out that that particular question had already been referred to the Joint Second and Third Committee. If that Committee decided in favour of a special conference, there would be no need to refer the matter to the Fifth Committee.

37. In reply to a question from Mr. LUBIN (United States of America), the PRESIDENT said that the Fifth Committee would only intervene if financial obligations were incurred which affected the United Nations budget as a whole.

38. Mr. ENCINAS (Peru) said that he had not intended to speak on the subject, but did not wish his silence to be attributed to indifference on the part of his government. He wished to call attention to the fact that, for the time being, his Government was awkwardly placed as regards payments of contributions. Peru had recently suffered several great disasters which had put a heavy burden on its finances.

39. The PRESIDENT declared the general debate closed and suggested that further action on the item might be deferred until the following meeting.

40. In order to facilitate the work of the Council, he requested the representatives of Australia and the United States to formulate their draft resolutions in the customary form of Council resolutions for transmittal to the General Assembly.

41. He also pointed out that the Australian draft resolution made no reference to the report of the temporary Committee (E/1864): the Australian representative might wish therefore to include a paragraph recommending the action to be taken in regard to the report.

42. Mr. FENAUX (Belgium) recalled that his delegation's position in the matter had already been made clear in the general debate (431st meeting). The United States draft resolution was unacceptable as it stood and he accordingly introduced two amendments (E/L.126).

43. First, he thought that the preamble was drafted in too strong terms and he felt it might be wiser to substitute the wording used by the temporary Committee in its report.

44. In the second place, the provision contained in the first operative paragraph had not been recommended by the temporary Committee and he thought that the tenor of the general debate had been clearly against its acceptance. The paragraph should be limited therefore to a recommendation to the General Assembly to study the estimates submitted in the temporary Committee's report.

45. He hoped that the amendment would make it possible to secure unanimity in the Council and thus help to attain the objective advocated by the United Kingdom representative, which was solidarity of action by the United Nations in the work of relief and rehabilitation in Korea.

46. The PRESIDENT, before adjourning the discussion, announced that the Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations had unanimously recommended that the Council should grant a hearing to the representative of the World Federation of Trade Unions. He proposed that that representative should be heard at the Council's next meeting. If there were no objections, he proposed that that representative should be heard at the Council's next meeting.

It was so agreed.

Arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations (E/1862, E/1863, and E/L.123 and E/L.124)

47. The PRESIDENT called attention to the relevant documents and declared the discussion open.

48. Mr. ARUTIUNIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) stated that his delegation had received the memorandum by the Secretary-General (E/L.123) only on arriving for the Council's morning meeting. Hence, it would be difficult for him to take up discussion of the matter at once without having had sufficient time to study it.

49. Mr. DE SEYNES (France) endorsed the USSR representative's remarks. Moreover, it would be wiser

to defer discussion of the item until the examination referred to in paragraph 13 of the memorandum had been completed.

50. The PRESIDENT noted that the document in question had been distributed on 3 November. There were accordingly no procedural grounds for deferring the discussion.

51. Mr. DE SEYNES (France) moved the adjournment of the debate.

52. In accordance with the rules of procedure, the PRESIDENT intimated that he would give the floor to one speaker for and one against the motion for adjournment.

53. Mr. LUBIN (United States of America) observed that a careful perusal of the memorandum revealed the fact that the Secretary-General was not yet in a position to pass judgment on all of the issues raised in the Council's resolution of 28 October 1950 (428th meeting).

54. He also noted that the United States Government itself had not, so far, reached any authoritative conclusion of the relationship between the Internal Security Act and the Headquarters Agreement (paragraph 10). He stated that the Headquarters Agreement contained no specific provision governing the question of attendance of representatives of non-governmental organizations at the General Assembly (paragraph 12), and that examination of the section concerned was still in progress (paragraph 13).

55. Since the matter was still in negotiation, he was of the opinion that consideration of the item should

be deferred until the Secretary-General had submitted a further report.

56. Mr. ARUTIUNIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) disagreed with the view just expressed by the United States representative. Despite the fact that the United States had taken no definite stand, it would be seen from paragraph 17 of the memorandum that the Secretary-General had reached conclusions on both of the issues raised. There was therefore no reason why the subject should not be considered on the basis of that document, after delegations had had sufficient time to study it. The policy of procrastination adopted by the United States Government in the matter should not be allowed to impede the Council's consideration of the item.

57. He supported the French motion for adjournment.

58. After Mr. LUBIN (United States of America) had intimated that he did not wish his observations to be interpreted as an amendment to the French motion, the PRESIDENT put to the vote the motion for adjournment.

The motion for adjournment was carried unanimously.

59. Mr. ARUTIUNIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) requested that the Russian text of document E/L.124 should be revised: in the preamble, the sense of the original English version had been distorted.

60. The PRESIDENT gave an assurance that a revised text would be issued.

The meeting rose at 5.15 p.m.