UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL OFFICIAL RECORDS



ELEVENTH SESSION, **426th** MEETIING FRIDAY, 27 OCTOBER 1950, AT 11 A.M.

Page

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CONTENTS

Plans for relief and rehabilitation of Korea (A/1435, E/1851/Rev.1, E/1851/Add.1, E/1852, E/1858/Rev.1, E/1858/Rev.1/Corr.1, E/1858/Rev.1/Add.1, E/1859, E/L.112/Rev.2, E/L.113 and E/L.114) (continued) 409

President: M. Hernán SANTA CRUZ (Chile).

Present: Representatives of the following countries: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, India, Iran, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America.

Representatives of the following specialized agencies:

International Labour Organisation, Food and Agriculture Organization, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, and World Health Organization.

- Plans for relief and rehabilitation of Korea (A/1435, E/1851/Rev.1, E/1851/Add.1, E/1852, E/1858/Rev.1, E/1858/Rev.1/Corr.1, E/1858/Rev.1/Add.1, E/1859, E/L.112/Rev.2, E/L.113 and E/L.114) (continued)
- JOINT DRAFT RESOLUTION SUBMITTED BY AUSTRALIA AND THE UNITED STATES (E/1858/Rev.1, E/1858/ Rev.1/Corr.1 and E/1858/Rev.1/Add.1) (continued)

1. The PRESIDENT called for the resumption of the discussion of the plans for the relief and rehabilitation of Korea and informed members of the Council that representatives of three specialized agencies were prepared to make statements on that subject.

2. Mr. TROCLET (International Labour Organisation) wished to give the Council some indication of the ways in which the ILO could contribute to the programme for Korea's recovery. His remarks would be provisional and would relate both to the immediate tasks in Korea and to the long-term recovery programme.

3. Labour problems were among the most urgent problems facing the United Nations in Korea. The ILO had considerable experience in that field and had already once before, at the request of the United Nations, dealt with similar problems in connexion with the assistance given to Palestine refugees in the Near East. The ILO could make a valuable contribution in four specific fields: 4. Occupational census of refugees: although a large number of refugees now dispersed throughout Korea would no doubt be able to return to their homes and resume their agricultural occupations, a large proportion of them would have to find other work. Furthermore, there would be a large labour demand both for reconstruction work and for small industries. The ILO would be able to help in organizing a professional census.

5. Selection and placement procedure for helping refugees to find both emergency and regular employment: the ILO could supply information and practical advice concerning the methods used to determine the physical qualifications necessary for various types of work. That problem would arise mainly whenever large numbers of workers were needed for construction work.

6. Organization of an employment service: the ILO would be able to give technical advice and help in the organization of an employment service and also to contribute to the creation and organization of pilot and regional employment centres.

7. Vocational training: the ILO would be able to help in surveying needs and problems pertaining to vocational training and in establishing the necessary programmes and arrangements to meet those needs and solve those problems. That was a field in which the ILO had very wide experience and in which it had been very active recently, having, for instance, set up a special field office for vocational training at Bangalore, in India. He had already given full information on that subject to the Second Committee during the general debate on the economic development of under-developed countries and technical assistance to such countries.¹

8. The four specific fields he had mentioned covered only a small part—though undoubtedly a very important one at the beginning of Korea's recovery—of the contribution which the ILO could make to the relief and rehabilitation of Korea. Once the immediate aims had been attained, the ILO would also be prepared to cooperate in any long-term programme in Korea. The ILO was not content with expressing general support for the humanitarian work of the United Nations in promoting the relief and rehabilitation of Korea—it would

¹See Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, Second Committee, 125th meeting.

also give effective, practical aid on the basis of its long and varied experience.

9. Mr. McDOUGALL (Food and Agriculture Organization) said that his organization had expressed its views on relief and rehabilitation of Korea in a memorandum addressed to the Secretary-General in August 1950. He understood that copies of that memorandum had been circulated to members of the Council. His organization had also taken part in the elaboration of the programme submitted to the Council by the Secretary-General (E/1851 and E/1851/Rev.1). The FAO could only welcome the provisions in the Australian and United States joint draft resolution E/1858/ Rev.1, E/1858/Rev.1/Corr.1 and E/1858/Rev.1/ Add.1) which recommended that the United Nations agent general for Korean rehabilitation should consult with the heads of the specialized agencies, make use of their advice and technical assistance and, where appropriate, request them to undertake specific projects for special tasks.

10. The FAO would be in a position to assist the agent general in all matters pertaining to food, nutrition, agricultural rehabilitation, forestry, timber supplies, fisherics and, on a long-term basis, with questions concerning a land tenure and rural welfare.

11. Mr. BARGER (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) welcomed the arrangements set forth in the joint Australian and United States draft resolution and expressed his organization's willingness to do its utmost to help the United Nations agent general in promoting the relief and rehabilitation of Korea. His organization could give most valuable help and it was obvious that questions such as education and technical training would be of paramount importance in any relief and rehabilitation programme, whether of a short-term or long-term nature.

12. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) thought that before embarking upon a discussion of the whole draft resolution submitted by the United States and Australian delegations, the Council should decide whether it might not be possible to delete paragraphs 3 and 4 of the preamhle of that draft resolution. Such a deletion would only make the discussion more business-like and fruitful.

13. The Korean people were undergoing very great suffering, and great devastation and havoc had been wrought throughout their country. In those circumstances, it was the obvious duty of the Council to disregard all political considerations and to concentrate on the essential aim, which was to alleviate the suffering of the Korean people and assist them in their recovery. Hitherto the Council had tackled the problem in a most business-like manner and had avoided controversial political issues. The only discordant note had been introduced at the previous meeting by the representative of the so-called International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, whose statement had had no bearing on the question of the relief and rehabilitation of Korea.

14. The third and fourth paragraphs of the preamble to the joint draft resolution referred to "aggression by North Korean forces and their warfare against the United Nations". There was nothing in Chapters IX and X of the Charter to empower the Economic and Social Council to assign the responsibility for any aggression in the world. Matters relating to peace and security and breaches thereof were clearly within the exclusive competence of the Security Council.

15. He was most anxious that the Economic and Social Council should avoid any controversial political or other extraneous subjects, which could only hinder it in its task of promoting the relief and rehabilitation of Korea. Furthermore, the inclusion of the two paragraphs in question might lead to discrimination in the distribution of supplies made available by the United Nations for the people of Korea. For the sake of keeping the proceedings of the Council free from any political factors, which were quite irrelevant to the subject, he prosposed that the two paragraphs should be deleted and that the Council should proceed with its task in a non-controversial manner, as it had done thus far.

16. Mr. WALKER (Australia) suggested that, in order to meet the views expressed by the Polish representative, the Council should postpone discussion on the preamble until it had discussed the operative part of the draft resolution and taken a decision on it. In the light of that discussion, it would then be able to examine the preamble itself.

17. Mr. CORLEY SMITH (United Kingdom) said that the proposal made by the Polish representative amounted in fact to a substantial amendment of which the Council had had no prior notice and which members would no doubt wish to examine more thoroughly. He therefore supported the Australian suggestion that the discussion on the preamble should be postponed until the completion of the discussion on the operative part.

18. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) regretted that he could not agree to the suggestion of the Australian representative. The unfortunate experience of the previous meeting, when the Council had heard the representative of the so-called International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, had made it clear how essential it was to keep the discussion free from any political considerations. He was only sorry that the Australian delegation should have amended its original draft by the inclusion of the two paragraphs in question, which were taken from the original United States draft. Those paragraphs of the preamble had no direct connexion with the operative part of the draft resolution, yet they could have a decisive influence on its application. Consequently, the retention or deletion of those two paragraphs would determine his delegation's attitude to the remainder of the draft resolution.

19. He sincerely hoped that there would be no need to have a discussion on that point and that the sponsors of the draft resolution would readily agree to delete the two paragraphs in question. Otherwise his delegation would have to prove, as it was ready to do, that the war had in fact been started by the South Koreans, that it was the intervention of the United States in Korea which had constituted an aggression, and that the destruction which the United Nations now had to repair had been caused by American bombing. In no circumstances would his delegation be able to agree with the assertions set forth in those two paragraphs.

¹See Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, Second Committee, 125th meeting.

20. He realized that his proposal had been submitted without prior notice to the Council and that delegations were entitled to ask for some time to consider it. None the less, in view of the urgency of the matter, he hoped that they would forego that right and take a decision on the preamble immediately, so that the Council could address itself to the extremely urgent task of helping the Korean people.

21. Mr. TAUBER (Czechoslovakia) supported the views expressed by the Polish representative and said that it would be difficult for his delegation to discuss the operative part of the draft resolution without knowing the exact contents of the preamble.

22. Mr. LUBIN (United States of America) said that in arguing against a political discussion, the Polish representative had himself embarked upon one. He pointed out that the Economic and Social Council was acting under a resolution of the General Assembly of 7 October 1950² which specifically stated that "an attempt has been made by an armed attack from North Korea to extinguish by force the Government of the Republic of Korea" and referred to United Nations armed forces operating in accordance with the recommendations of the Security Council of 27 June 1950.³ In his opinion the Economic and Social Council was fully at liberty to make any reference it wished to action taken by the General Assembly or the Security Council, particularly since it was involved in a problem that had been referred to it by the General Assembly.

23. He supported the Australian suggestion that the discussion of the preamble should be postponed until a decision had been taken on the operative part of the draft resolution.

24. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) emphasized that the political element had been introduced for the first time in the debate by the inclusion of the two paragraphs in question; they were sponsored by the United States. Mr. Lubin had referred to the General Assembly resolution under which the Council was now acting; it should be pointed out, however, that the Council was acting under paragraphs 3 and 4 of that resolution and that they contained no reference to any aggression and were merely concerned with relief and rehabilitation.

25. Mr. ARUTIUNIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that he could not leave unanswered the statement made by the United States representative in justification of the substance of two paragraphs of the preamble of the joint draft resolution. Although the United States representative had accused the Polish representative of having embarked on a political discussion in speaking on the substance of the two paragraphs, he had done so himself under cover of references to various decisions of the General Assembly and of the Security Council, and had repeated the unfounded assertion that the war in Korea had been caused by aggression from North Korea.

26. If the United States really believed that aggression had come from North Korea it was difficult to understand why it had refused to hear representatives from North Korea. Following the example of the United States representative, he too could refer to vari-

ous documents and facts to show that, in reality, it was the United States which had been guilty of aggression in Korea.

27. The General Assembly resolution under which the Council was now acting contained many points. His delegation had voted against some of them but it had also voted in favour of the provisions for aid and assistance to Korea. That fact alone should have led those who genuinely wished to co-operate in that humanitarian undertaking not to introduce any element of discord or controversy into the work of the Council.

28. His delegation would not renounce its views on the origin of the aggression which had taken place in Korea, neither would it ask the United States to do so. All the USSR delegation asked was that no element of discord should be introduced into the draft resolution under discussion and that the Council should be allowed to proceed with its work in a business-like manner. To achieve that aim it was essential to examine the preamble first and to delete the two irrelevant paragraphs in question.

29. The course suggested by the Australian, United Kingdom and United States representatives, namely that the discussion on the preamble should be postponed until a decision had been taken on the operative part, amounted to a procedural manoeuvre based on their ability to command an obedient majority in the Council. The Council should not bury that vital issue as though it were purely procedural, but should try to reach a unanimous decision on the important task before it. Consequently, it should discuss the draft resolution in a normal manner, beginning with the preamble.

30. Mr. NORIEGA (Mexico) wondered whether any practical result would be achieved by postponing the discussion on the preamble. Indeed, that discussion had already begun. It would obviously be easier for some delegations to take a decision on the operative part if they knew the exact contents of the preamble. Personally, he believed that the preamble might be drafted in a less controversial manner; in any case that was a matter which should be settled as soon as possible so as to expedite the work of the Council.

31. The PRESIDENT said that he had before him two proposals: the Polish delegation had proposed that the third and fourth paragraphs should be deleted from the preamble to the joint Australian-United States draft resolution as a preliminary to the discussion of the resolution. If that proposal were rejected, he would call for a vote on the Australian proposal to postpone the consideration of the preamble until a decision had been taken on the operative part of the joint draft resolution.

The Polish proposal was rejected by 11 votes to 5, with 2 abstentions.

The Australian proposal was adopted by 12 votes to 4, with 2 abstentions.

Discussion of the operative part

32. Mr. ALI (Pakistan) pointed out that whereas the resolution adopted by the General Assembly placed the responsibility for relief and rehabilitation in Korea on the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, the joint draft resolution proposed that the responsibility should be vested

² See document A/1435.

³ See Official Records of the Security Concil, Fifth Year, No. 16,