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*President:* Mr. Hernán SANTA CRUZ (Chile).

*Present:* Representatives of the following countries:

Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, India, Iran, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Representatives of the following specialized agencies:

International Labour Organisation, Food and Agriculture Organization, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, World Health Organization, International Refugee Organization.

**Plans for relief and rehabilitation of Korea (A/1435, E/1851/Rev.1, E/1851/Add.1, E/1852, E/1853, E/1856, E/1858, E/1858/Corr.1 and E/1859) (*continued*)**

1. The PRESIDENT recalled that at its 419th meeting the Council had decided to give consideration to the general principles on which United Nations policy with regard to relief and rehabilitation of Korea could be based. He therefore submitted for discussion annex II of the Australian draft resolution (E/1852), entitled "Statement of general policy on Korean relief and rehabilitation".

2. Mr. WALKER (Australia) said that a preliminary discussion of general principles would facilitate the examination of proposals on the organization of relief. That, moreover, was the procedure which the Council had followed in 1949 in connexion with the establishment of the Technical Assistance Board and the organization of the Technical Assistance Programme.

3. In annex II to its draft resolution the Australian delegation had taken the initiative of setting forth certain general principles on which the General Assembly might base itself in organizing relief for Korea. In addition, those principles should provide some guidance to whatever authority was put in charge of administering the relief and rehabilitation programme. In drawing up those principles, the Australian representative had proceeded on the basis of certain semi-official proposals which the Secretariat had circulated, and of

exchanges of views which he himself had had with certain Secretariat officials.

4. Before submitting to the Council the proposals outlined in annex II, he wished to say a few words on the three principles which he had not considered it necessary to include in that text, but which were nevertheless of great importance, and would certainly be stated in other decisions taken by the General Assembly. Firstly, the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea would certainly have to play a highly important part in the work of assistance to Korea, since the political problems for which it was responsible were closely bound up with economic problems. Secondly, the Commission could nevertheless not be expected to deal with questions of detail; it would therefore be necessary to establish an administrative body, which should be as independent as possible, to buy the necessary supplies, despatch them to Korea, distribute them, etc. Thirdly and lastly, the countries which took the greatest share in financing the programme and supplying the necessary goods and equipment should be in a position to influence and control the development programme. He trusted that all the members of the Council and of the General Assembly would accept those three principles.

5. It would be noted that his own proposals for organization differed slightly from those submitted by his United States colleague (E/1858 and E/1858/Corr.1), as regards the distribution of emphasis among those three principles. He was convinced, however, that a satisfactory compromise could be reached on that subject.

6. Passing on to deal with the general principles, Mr. Walker said that his proposals were intended only as a basis for discussion, that they were in no way restrictive, and that the United States delegation had, moreover, already contributed certain amendments. He reserved the right to make certain drafting changes in the text of those amendments, but he was already prepared to accept them in principle, since they introduced a number of new and highly useful elements into his own proposals.

7. It might also be desirable to mention certain further principles, such as the need to make a distinction

between the long-term development programme and the relief and rehabilitation programme made necessary by the devastation Korea had suffered as a result of the aggression committed against it. Furthermore, it should be made clear that the rehabilitation programme should be financed on as equitable as possible a basis, and that all countries should make their contribution. He had not thought it necessary to state those principles however in annex II, which he submitted for the Council's consideration.

8. That statement covered a large number of points, and he would not examine them in detail. The first four points were of a general nature, the third stressing that the United Nations programme was to be a supplement to the efforts to be undertaken by the people of Korea themselves. Point 5 dealt with the question of priorities; and here the United States delegation had suggested an amendment (E/1859) which appreciably improved the wording. Points 6 to 13 dealt with problems which the world had already had to face after the Second World War. Their object was to ensure control of distribution, combat inflation, reduce to reasonable levels remuneration earned by traders for their services, ensure the equitable distribution of essential commodities, exempt relief and rehabilitation supplies from import duties, and so forth. Points 11 and 12 in particular laid down that United Nations personnel should be free to supervise the distribution of relief supplies, and should enjoy on Korean territory the privileges, immunities and facilities necessary for the fulfilment of their mission. These two provisions might perhaps apply also to the work of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, and might therefore require to be repeated in a different context.

9. Mr. ALI (Pakistan) pointed out that his country had, from the outset, given its support to the efforts of the United Nations to aid the Korean people, and had, in addition, accepted membership of the Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea. Pakistan was well aware of the needs of Korea, and would do everything in its power to aid that country.

10. Very recently, however, Pakistan had itself suffered from a disastrous flood which had destroyed about 3,000 villages, caused the death of 300 persons, left 300,000 families homeless, destroyed 10,000 head of cattle and very seriously damaged next year's harvest. His government also had to take energetic action against the danger of epidemics in the region affected. The Government of Pakistan was undertaking exactly the same task as the one in which the Economic and Social Council was now engaged in relation to Korea: namely, planning relief and rehabilitation for those who had suffered from the flood. All this would certainly prevent it from taking as active a part as it would have desired in the work of assistance to Korea.

11. Passing on to the actual principles on which such assistance should be based, he recalled that, before thinking of rendering aid to Korea, the world had waited until a disaster had taken place. What was necessary was the contrary. Disasters of that nature should be prevented by rendering in good time the assistance of which many countries were in need. He trusted therefore that after the Korean events, the

United Nations and the relatively advanced countries would not stop at Korea, but would extend their assistance to all the countries of Asia which stood in need of development.

12. With regard to the long-term programme of assistance to be rendered to Korea, the first essential was to assemble precise information on the economic situation in that country and the devastation it had suffered as a result of aggression. A special body should therefore be set up for that purpose. Once the necessary information had been obtained, a planning centre should be established to formulate the details of the development programme. It was to be hoped that by that time Korea would have a democratic government, and that that government would approve the plan thus drawn up and assume responsibility for its execution. The planning centre should assist it in that work, and the Commission would supervise the distribution of supplies.

13. In conclusion, he reserved the right to speak once more when the Council took up the question of the cost of the development programme.

14. Mr. FENAUX (Belgium) agreed in principle with the Australian representative's proposals.

15. It should be stated at the outset that the programme of assistance to Korea was merely a complement to the restoration of peace. There should be no question of a long-term programme of economic development, but solely of an assistance programme designed to meet the most urgent needs. It was essential, moreover, to stress that the under-developed countries must in the first place help themselves; and this applied equally to Korea. Lastly, he was very glad to note that the Australian and United States delegations were endeavouring to lay down an order of priorities.

16. With regard to the remaining principles set forth in annex II of the Australian proposals, he felt that exemption from taxes might be extended somewhat further than the Australian representative had envisaged, and should not be limited to import taxes. In conclusion, he thought points 11 and 12 might be usefully combined in a single paragraph, and he reserved the right to submit a corresponding text at a later date.

17. Mr. LUBIN (United States of America) wished to make some remarks on the amendments which he would like to have made in the Australian text (E/1859).

18. The text that he proposed to substitute for paragraph 3 stressed the fact that the aim of the relief programme was to supplement the efforts to be made by the Korean people on their own initiative.

19. His amendment to paragraph 5 was in line with the idea that the Australian representative had formulated in his initial draft without, however, fixing definite priorities. It was clear that in the initial period Korea must be provided with the basic necessities and the raw materials needed to put its existing industrial facilities into operation. The resources needed for the rehabilitation of its economic system would not be provided until later. It would be necessary, of course, to give the administrator of the assistance programme some latitude in that respect since it might prove necessary at the very outset to restore certain facilities

- such as cement factories which could produce the cement necessary for rebuilding houses and factories. Generally speaking, however, the principle of priorities should be respected.
20. Mr. Lubin felt that his amendments to paragraphs 9 and 10 took into consideration the suggestions just put forward by the representative of Belgium. The delegation of the United States also proposed to add to the Australian text a new paragraph providing that the Korean Authorities should take the necessary economic and financial measures to insure the judicious use of contributions furnished under the United Nations programme as well as Korean resources. In that connexion, he proposed that the word "business-like" at the end of that new proposed paragraph should be replaced by the word "efficient".
21. The last two proposals of the United States dealt with the information to be supplied and accounting matters.
22. Mr. DE SEYNES (France) said that the mission of the Economic and Social Council in Korea was much less thankless, and its responsibilities there less tragic than those which the Security Council and the General Assembly had had to assume. Moreover, it could expect its assistance programme to receive the unanimous support of its members, since even the minority of the General Assembly which had refused to support the resolution adopted by it had included in its counter-proposal a paragraph dealing with the rehabilitation of Korea and the part to be played by the Economic and Social Council.
23. While the General Assembly had expressly declared that the United Nations assumed a certain responsibility with regard to the rehabilitation of Korea, it had in no way defined the scope of that responsibility. It was therefore for the Economic and Social Council to interpret the Assembly's intentions.
24. The Council had already appropriately drawn a distinction between the programme of immediate assistance and the long-term development programme. The former was an emergency task requiring emergency measures. The latter, on the other hand, must be considered against the more general background of the economic development of under-developed areas.
25. As regards the work of rehabilitation which alone should engage the Council's attention at present, certain distinctions should be drawn. Emergency relief was easy to define, but the problem of reconstructions raised certain difficulties. Two questions arose in that respect. First the share of the responsibility to be borne by the United Nations and Korea respectively must be determined. Secondly, a distinction must be drawn between war damages, reconstruction and rehabilitation.
26. With regard to war damages, it was difficult, at present, to go beyond the provisions of the Australian and United States drafts. In any case, the answer to that question might vary considerably according to the period set for the United Nations programme.
27. As far as the second case was concerned, he felt that the responsibility of the United Nations did not extend beyond reconstruction of what had been damaged as a result of the war.
28. Consequently the United Nations could not be required to repair any structures in Korea which might have deteriorated or been destroyed before the war.
29. Furthermore, it might not be necessary to repair all the damages caused by the war. Some of the works which had been destroyed might have been constructed before the war to meet needs arising out of the division of the country into two separate regions. With the establishment of a unified State, the repair of such works would become unnecessary. He thought it might be advisable to bring out points more clearly in the statement of policy under consideration.
30. In other respects, the representative of France supported the principles stated by the delegations of Australia and the United States in their respective texts. He reserved the right to speak again when the different paragraphs were considered in detail.
31. Mr. CORLEY SMITH (United Kingdom) remarked that the economic rehabilitation of Korea would constitute a third phase following those of military operations and unification. There might be some overlapping of these three different problems, however, and it was essential that not only the armies but also the principles of the United Nations should win the victory in Korea. The new democratic regime which would be set up in Korea should be based on a sound economy established through the efforts of the population and with the assistance of the United Nations. The United Kingdom representative hoped that all countries, even those which had not participated in military operations, would be able to contribute to the work of rehabilitation.
32. The question of long-term economic development was not within the scope of the present discussion. Korea might subsequently receive technical assistance and other forms of economic aid on the same basis as other States. In spite of the magnitude of the war damage it was likely that, if the full energies of the population of Korea were mobilized for the work of rehabilitation, that task could be achieved sooner than was generally believed. It was essential, however, that the work should be undertaken not only for the Koreans but by the Koreans themselves, with the United Nations merely assisting them.
33. The United Kingdom representative was glad to see that the United States amendment stressed the primary importance of the Koreans' own efforts. He assumed that an agreement laying down the terms of collaboration between the United Nations and the Korean Authorities would be concluded before the work of rehabilitation was begun; that was indispensable if misunderstandings were to be avoided.
34. He was also glad to see that the principles set forth in the Secretariat's first text (E/1851/Add.1), the Australian draft resolution and the United States amendments showed no basic differences. He hoped therefore that unanimous agreement could be reached. It might later be advisable to set up a drafting committee. For the time being he wished to express his agreement in principle, reserving the right to return to specific points.
35. Mr. ARUTIUNIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) recalled that the representative of France had stressed the importance of clearly defining the

action of the Council with regard to assistance to be rendered to Korea. It was essential in that connexion that the assistance should not serve as a pretext which would permit certain countries to intervene in the internal affairs of Korea. In point of fact, such assistance had often enabled certain countries to further their own political, strategic, commercial and other interests. The statement of general principles did not contain sufficient guarantees in that respect, and that could give rise to certain doubts.

36. In order to remedy those defects the delegation of the Soviet Union wished to propose the following three amendments (E/L.108) to annex II of the Australian draft resolution (E/1852):

37. The first amendment consisted in the addition of the following paragraph to annex II:

“Assistance to Korea shall be carried out in such a way as to contribute to the rapid restoration of the country’s economy in conformity with the national interests of the Korean people, having in view the strengthening of the economic and political independence of Korea and the principle that such assistance must not serve as a means for foreign economic and political interference in the internal affairs of Korea and must not be subject to any political conditions.”

38. The adoption of that amendment would make it possible to ensure that the assistance provided would serve the interests of the people of Korea and the independence of that country.

39. The second amendment took account of the necessity of strengthening the role of the Koreans in the work of rehabilitation; it consisted in the addition of the following paragraph to annex II:

“The determination of Korea’s needs in relief and rehabilitation and the drawing up of programmes, plans and applications in regard to relief and rehabilitation shall take place with the participation of representatives of the Korean people. All matters pertaining to assistance to Korea shall be carried out by the United Nations likewise with the active participation of representatives of the Korean people.”

40. Dealing next with paragraph 7 of the statement of general policy submitted by Australia in annex II, Mr. Arutiunian pointed out that the statement provided for the distribution of relief supplies by private enterprises which would thereby be enabled to make considerable profits. Provision, however, could be made for distribution to be carried out mainly through public agencies such as the Red Cross, government departments and the like. In that way the profits derived from the distribution could be used for the relief work itself. Private enterprise should play only a secondary part in distribution. The definition of profit in the Australian text, described as “fair and reasonable” was too vague. Profits should be kept to a minimum to prevent speculators from growing rich on assistance to Korea, a phenomenon that had occurred only too often. Both the possibility of political interference and that of speculators’ profits must be removed from United Nations relief work.

41. The representative of the Soviet Union, therefore, proposed a third amendment as follows:

“The necessary measures shall be taken by the authorities in Korea for the distribution of supplies to be carried out through Red Cross agencies, through State, co-operative and other social organizations, and through private trade. At the same time measures shall be taken to ensure that profit from the sale of supplies is kept to the minimum.”

42. Mr. KHOSROVANI (Iran) endorsed the principles embodied in the Australian and United States texts. He questioned, however, the advisability of including a statement of general principles in the annex to the resolution rather than in the preamble or the operative part of the resolution itself.

43. Mr. DICKEY (Canada) agreed with the general principles contained in the general statement of Australia and in the United States amendments, which constituted an acceptable basis for discussion. All were agreed that it was not sufficient to wipe out aggression but that the damage caused by the war must also be repaired. United Nations assistance must be given as quickly as possible and continued until the Koreans were able to assume the direction of their own economic development. It was impossible, however, to mention explicitly all the principles that should be observed, and the Australian representative had himself referred at the beginning of the meeting to several principles which were not included in the draft resolution of his delegation.

44. Mr. Dickey also wished to stress a few important points. He emphasized first the absolute necessity, pending the establishment of a long-term policy, of keeping up shipments of relief supplies, as urged by Mr. Katzin (417th meeting). Long-term plans should be based on a realistic estimate of the needs of the Korean economy; they should be in conformity with the wishes of the population. The success of the work of rehabilitation required the active participation of the Korean population. It was essential to make use of all existing organizations, both national and international, governmental and non-governmental, and their activities should be co-ordinated by the United Nations. The application of that method would, doubtless, enable the objections raised by the representative of the Soviet Union to be met.

45. The Canadian representative welcomed the attitude of the USSR representative on the subject of interference in domestic affairs and hoped that the interest shown by Mr. Arutiunian in the distribution of supplies indicated that the Soviet Union proposed to make a substantial contribution to the work of rehabilitation.

46. Mr. DAYAL (India) approved the statement of principles drawn up by Australia and, in particular, was pleased by the importance attached to the efforts of Korea itself. He also agreed with the order of priority that had been laid down, but considered that the importation of raw materials should be speeded up, as proposed in the United States amendment, in order to ensure employment for the population.

47. In spite of all the sympathy it felt for the Koreans, India was prevented by its own difficulties from giving them the full aid which it would have liked to offer. Recent floods and earthquakes had created similar

problems in India itself and had reduced its capacity to render aid to other countries.

48. Mr. SCHNAKE VERGARA (Chile) was satisfied on the whole with the statement of principles drawn up by the Australian delegation, from which the United States amendments showed no major departures. The purpose of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea was clear: Korea had to be given assistance and then helped to adopt a long-term plan.

49. The only important difference concerned the disposal of local currency proceeds, which, under paragraph 9 of the Australian text, would have to be determined by the Commission, while, under the United States amendment, the powers in question would be vested in the Agent General.

50. However, although he considered that that particular point needed careful examination, Mr. Schnake Vergara had no objections to the statement of principles as a whole; it provided a clear definition of the Commission's aims, which coincided with the purposes of the United Nations. While agreeing in principle, Mr. Schnake Vergara reserved the right to speak again on points of detail.

51. The PRESIDENT declared the general discussion closed. The Council should accordingly proceed to consider the guiding principles with which the work of assistance would have to comply and its specific provisions. First of all, however, it would seem necessary to take a decision as to the form which that assistance would take, in other words as to the organs that would be entrusted with the execution of the programmes in accordance with resolution I which had been submitted by Australia and adopted at the 418th meeting.

52. Mr. WALKER (Australia) thought that members of the Council would be able to agree on the specific provisions and the amendments. The representative of Iran had said in that connexion that most of the general principles contained in annex II of the Australian draft resolution would be better incorporated either in the operative part or in the preamble of the resolution to be adopted by the Council. That argument deserved consideration.

53. The Australian delegation, however, had preferred to state the guiding principles separately because it wished to follow the precedent that had already been set by the Council, when it had formulated its recommendations concerning technical assistance. Stated separately in that way, the fundamental principles had been extremely useful to the Technical Assistance Board. The Australian delegation therefore considered that there were considerable advantages in that manner of presentation. It hoped that the Council would be able to agree without too much difficulty on the organization of assistance to the civil population of Korea, but it would deprecate any precipitate attempt to decide upon the formulation of the various organizational provisions to be adopted. In particular, his delegation would like to have time for a more thorough study of the amendments put forward by the United States.

54. The PRESIDENT pointed out that it was for the Council to decide whether the principles should be included in the text of the resolution or whether they

should appear as an annex; it was also for the Council to decide whether it wished to discuss the organization of assistance before the specific provisions, or *vice versa*. The President believed, however, that it would be difficult to discuss the specific provisions without first having taken a decision on the question of organization.

55. Mr. LUBIN (United States of America) observed that paragraph 9 was the only paragraph of annex II that could possibly affect the form that the organization responsible for assistance would take. He proposed, therefore, that all the provisions of annex II, except paragraph 9, should be studied first, so that, when the question of organization was taken up, agreement would already have been reached upon the principles to be followed.

56. The PRESIDENT asked the Council to take a decision on the procedure which the United States representative had proposed.

*The Council decided to adopt that procedure.*

#### **Report of the Council Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations (E/1857)**

57. The PRESIDENT said the Council NGO Committee had met on 13 October to hear the representatives of non-governmental organizations on the question of plans for relief and rehabilitation of Korea and to consider the request of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions to be heard. The Committee unanimously recommended that the representative of that non-governmental organization should be heard.

58. The President opened the discussion on the report of the Council NGO Committee.

59. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) recalled that Mr. Fischer, the representative of the World Federation of Trade Unions, a non-governmental organization with consultative status in category A, had been prevented by the United States Authorities from entering the United States. Following the incident, Mr. Katz-Suchy had asked<sup>1</sup> for a report on that violation of the Headquarters Agreement concluded between the United Nations and the United States of America and on the measures taken by the Secretary-General to remedy it.

60. The Secretary-General had informed the Council, through the President,<sup>2</sup> that discussions regarding the incident were in process between the Secretariat of the United Nations and the United States Authorities on how to apply the Agreement; no communication, however, had since been made on the result of those negotiations.

61. The PRESIDENT announced that he had received no further communication from the Secretary-General. All he knew was that the latter had sent a telegram to the WFTU advising it to ask the United States Embassy for a new visa for its representative, and that the WFTU had since written to the Secretary-General requesting his urgent intervention to ensure that the incident would not be repeated.

62. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) concluded that the WFTU must be encountering difficulties in obtaining a new visa. He pointed out that the matter could affect

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, Second Committee*, 118th meeting.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 121st meeting.

the extra-territorial status of the United Nations and that it raised a serious question which should be settled as soon as possible. The President should be instructed to ask the Secretary-General to take immediately the steps necessary to settle the question.

63. Mr. DE SEYNES (France) pointed out that the situation still seemed to be confused. According to explanations previously given by the Secretary-General, Mr. Fischer had already obtained a proper visa. Why, then, did the Secretary-General advise him to apply for a fresh visa?

64. The PRESIDENT said he was prepared to approach the Secretary-General as requested by the Polish representative. He considered that he was entitled to do so since the matter affected the work of the Council.

65. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) stated that his delegation could not accept the explanation that non-governmental organizations having consultative status with the Economic and Social Council were entitled to attend meetings of the Council only, and not meetings of General Assembly Committees dealing with questions falling within the purview of the Council.

66. Mr. ARUTIUNIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) stated that representatives of non-governmental organizations in category A did in fact attend the discussions of the General Assembly and of its Committees; they could be seen there every day; their right in that respect was therefore well established. That right was being refused only to certain organizations while it was being granted to others, because that was what suited the Government of the United States, which took upon itself the right to make a choice, admitting those that agreed with State Department policy and excluding those that criticized it. Thus, it was the United States Authorities that decided who should or should not take part in the work of an international organization.

67. Such a procedure was inadmissible and arbitrary. In fact, it represented a violation of the Headquarters Agreement. The result of that procedure was that the Council NGO Committee had been able to hear only the representatives of those non-governmental organizations which the State Department had agreed to admit; it had not been able to hear the others.

68. Mr. Arutiunian would object to the Council hearing the representative of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions until all the representatives of non-governmental organizations that wanted to had been heard by the NGO Committee. He formally proposed that the consideration of the Committee's report be deferred until that time.

69. The PRESIDENT explained that he had not said that the representatives of non-governmental organizations had not the right to attend the work of the Assembly, but only that he felt entitled to comply with the Polish representative's request in so far as that request concerned the Council, i.e., since it had a bearing on the Council's work.

70. The President said that the floor was open to one speaker for and one speaker against the proposal that had just been made by Mr. Arutiunian.

71. Mr. TAUBER (Czechoslovakia) recalled that he had asked the President to have the meeting of the

NGO Committee postponed until the representative of the WFTU could attend it.<sup>3</sup> The Czechoslovak delegation was of the opinion that the discussion of the report should be deferred until the NGO Committee had been able to meet and had heard the representative of the WFTU. He asked the President also to do everything within his power to make it possible for the WFTU observer to be present as soon as possible.

72. As no representative asked to speak against the USSR proposal, the PRESIDENT put it to the vote.

*The proposal was rejected by 9 votes to 3, with 6 abstentions.*

73. Mr. DE SEYNES (France) explained that he had been unable to vote for the USSR proposal because the fact of hearing immediately the representative of one of the non-governmental organizations in no way prevented the Council from hearing later the representative of another non-governmental organization. His vote by no means meant that the French delegation was indifferent to the situation arising from the refusal to admit Mr. Fischer. The French delegation hoped very sincerely that the situation would be promptly remedied. It expressed that hope on behalf of the government of the country to which Mr. Fischer belonged, whatever his other connexions might be.

74. Mr. de Seynes recalled that when the General Assembly had met in Paris in 1948 for the first part of its third session, the French Government had made it a rule to admit anyone entitled to take part in the work of the Assembly. Citizens of the United States had made ample use of that privilege.

75. It was not for representatives to pass judgment on the internal legislation of a State member of the Council. They should all, however, be concerned with the conditions in which the Economic and Social Council did its work, and the status of non-governmental organizations had an important bearing on that work. The difficulties encountered by Mr. Fischer were damaging to the WFTU and even threatened to raise the whole question of the status of non-governmental organizations.

76. The French Government earnestly hoped that the matter might be settled as soon as possible.

77. Mr. ARUTIUNIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) observed that his proposal for delaying the consideration of the report of the NGO Committee, though perfectly reasonable in existing circumstances, had been rejected by a majority with little respect for the most elementary principles of proper organization of work. That being so, the USSR representative, noting that the Government of the United States made a selection among the observers of non-governmental organizations, formally called for the rejection of the NGO Committee's report, which had been drawn up under conditions of interference on the part of the United States in the work of the Economic and Social Council.

78. As no representative asked to speak for or against this proposal, the PRESIDENT put to the vote the report of the Council NGO Committee (E/1857).

*The report was approved by 13 votes to 3, with 2 abstentions.*

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 118th meeting.