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OFFICIAL RECORDS



ELEVENTH SESSION, **431st**  
MEETING

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LAKE SUCCESS, NEW YORK

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*President:* M. Hernán SANTA CRUZ (Chile).

*Present:* Representatives of the following countries: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, India, Iran, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Representatives of the following specialized agencies:

International Labour Organisation, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, World Health Organization.

**Plans for relief and rehabilitation of Korea**  
(A/1435, E/1851/Rev.1, E/1851/Add.1,  
E/1852, E/1864, E/L.114, E/L.122 and  
E/L.125) (*continued*)

1. The PRESIDENT recalled that the Council had held a general debate on the plans for relief and rehabilitation of Korea and must now take a decision on the over-all cost of the programme and on methods of financing it. Three draft resolutions had been submitted in connexion with the latter question, one by Australia (E/1852) and two by the United States (E/L.114 and E/L.125).

2. He inquired whether the members of the Council wished to discuss the two questions separately.

3. Mr. LUBIN (United States of America) thought it would be better to discuss the questions separately and to consider first the report of the temporary Committee on Korean Relief Needs (E/1864).

4. Mr. DE SEYNES (France) said that there was a close link between the total cost of the programme and the methods of financing. It would be difficult for his delegation to take a stand on the question of the cost of the programme without knowing how it was to be financed. The latter question should therefore be examined first; his delegation however preferred the Council to discuss both questions together.

5. Mr. LUBIN (United States of America) observed that his delegation had submitted two separate draft resolutions in documents E/L.114 and E/L.125. Document E/L.114 contained a draft resolution which might be submitted to the General Assembly for its approval; it would in fact be advisable for the competent Committee

tee of the General Assembly to discuss the problems involved in it. Document E/L.125, on the other hand, was a draft resolution submitted to the Council for approval.

6. Mr. DE SEYNES (France) felt that if the Council adopted the draft resolution set forth in document E/L.125, it would divest itself of a part of the tasks assigned to it, turning that part over to the competent organ of the General Assembly. The latter had requested the Council<sup>1</sup> to submit recommendations on certain aspects of the problem. He would have no objections if the Council were to transmit the entire problem to the General Assembly without debate; he did not, however, think that the Council could discuss the over-all cost of the assistance programme without also studying the methods of financing.

7. The PRESIDENT said that the Council would then discuss first the problem as a whole and later take a decision on the method it would adopt in dealing with the two draft resolutions submitted to it.

8. Mr. WALKER (Australia), acting as Rapporteur of the temporary Committee on Korean Relief Needs, submitted the report of that body (E/1864). He emphasized that statements on estimated requirements had been submitted to the Committee by the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General in Korea, by the representative of the United States on behalf of the Unified Command and by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea. The Committee had decided to establish the initial estimates of requirements by taking as a basis the period ending on 31 December 1951. The various estimates submitted to the Committee were approximately of the same order if the supplies required before the end of 1950 were taken into account.

9. The Committee had been well aware of the difficulty of establishing accurate estimates at the present time. It had, however, based its conclusions on the estimates submitted to it which were the most accurate that could be obtained at the present time. In the opinion of the Committee, the cost of the programme would be \$250 million for a period beginning on 1 January 1951 and extending until the end of that year.

10. Mr. FENAUX (Belgium) congratulated Mr. Walker on the way he had drawn up the report of the

<sup>1</sup> See document A/1435.

temporary Committee. In view of the data available at the present time, it would have been difficult to have drafted more thoughtful and flexible conclusions.

11. He would, however, observe that in the text of paragraph 21 it was stated that "The Committee therefore considers, on the basis of the figures submitted to it, that a programme . . . will be required . . ." In order to render more accurately the conclusions unanimously agreed to by the members of the Committee, that text should be altered so as to read: "According to the figures submitted to it, the Committee notes that a programme . . . will be required . . ." The present text might lead to the conclusion that the Committee had made a recommendation, whereas the Council had not requested it to do so and that, had it done so, the members of the Committee could not possibly have complied with such a request.

12. It was impossible at the present time to estimate, even approximately, the extent of the devastation in Korea, the size of the requirements of that country in terms of relief and rehabilitation and the urgency of those requirements. Nor was there any information available on the situation in Korea prior to the aggression, on its budget, its national income and trade balance, all of which might have been used as factors of comparison.

13. The estimates submitted by the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General and by the representative of the United States on behalf of the Unified Command were of approximately the same order. On the other hand, the figures submitted by the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Korea were considerably higher; they amounted to a total of \$680 million for the period 25 June 1950-31 December 1951. Moreover, the Korean Government estimated the total cost of the reconstruction of the country at \$2,000 million. The United States representative had justly remarked that the estimates of the Korean Government might be applicable to a programme of economic development. The Council was not, however, concerned at the moment with the economic development of Korea; under the terms of the resolution which it had adopted, the General Assembly merely invited the Council<sup>2</sup> to provide a plan for Korean relief and rehabilitation. It would of course be difficult to draw a line between the rehabilitation of a country and its economic development.

14. The Council must base itself upon an objective criterion, i.e., the immediate requirements of Korea as estimated by the most competent institutions and persons. Nor must it overlook another, somewhat more subjective, criterion: the ability of the Member States of the United Nations to pay.

15. The Members of the General Assembly who had voted for the resolution adopted on 7 October 1950 had undoubtedly assumed a moral obligation to contribute to the relief and rehabilitation of Korea. But many countries, themselves victims of aggression and devastated by war, were painfully rising from the ruins by carrying out reconstruction plans extending over several years. The significance of that factor should not be under-estimated.

16. It should also be borne in mind that there was a close link between the period over which the imple-

mentation of the plan would extend and the total cost that would involve. In that connexion, the Belgian delegation had submitted to the temporary Committee certain observations, which were mentioned in paragraph 16 of the report, and which reflected the views of several delegations. If the estimated requirements were, of necessity, arbitrary, the determination of the period within which the programme should be carried out was likewise arbitrary. It would no doubt be ideal to insure the quickest possible rehabilitation of Korea. Circumstances were, however, such that it would be better to proceed by successive stages. Several delegations had found the first estimates "impressive": that would seem to be a reason to distribute the costs over a rather long period of time, thus enabling all the Members of the United Nations to contribute effectively to the rehabilitation project.

17. The report of the Committee contained no recommendation whatever in that respect, although it recognized the connexion which must exist between the total cost of the programme for a given period and the amount of the contributions which Member States would be able to pay during that period. When it had submitted the first estimates of expense, the Committee had been led to fix a period extending to 31 December 1951, but it had considered that period only as a basis of calculation, without establishing any link between the estimates and the proposed period.

18. He considered that the Council would fulfil its duty if it were to submit the most accurate available estimates of requirements to the General Assembly. It was for the General Assembly to determine definitively the scope and stages of the programme, bearing in mind the methods of financing and, above all, the importance of the contributions which Member States would be inclined to make.

19. He reserved his right to outline at a later stage the attitude of his delegation toward the draft resolution submitted by the United States (E/L.125).

20. The PRESIDENT said paragraph 21 of the report of the Committee would be amended as requested by the Belgian representative.

21. Mr. DE SEYNES (France) recalled that in the resolution which it had adopted by an overwhelming majority on 7 October last, the General Assembly had established the responsibility of the United Nations in the field of economic assistance to Korea. Following that, in part II of its resolution adopted at the 430th meeting, the Economic and Social Council had declared that "The United Nations programme of relief and rehabilitation in Korea is necessary to the restoration of peace and the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic government in Korea" (E/L.122). The principle of that assistance having been established, it was for the Economic and Social Council to formulate concrete proposals for its implementation and to define the scope of the responsibilities which the General Assembly had accepted for the United Nations in its resolution of 7 October.

22. After setting up the administrative machinery and establishing the guiding principles for the executive organs in their day-to-day operations, the Council now had to deal with the most delicate part of its task, that of determining the scope of the collective effort of the

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

United Nations and the individual efforts of the Member States. While the United Nations had accepted a responsibility, it had as yet entered into no definite undertaking concerning either the collective responsibility of Member States—i.e., the total amount of the relief programme—or the individual responsibilities, —i.e., the shares to be contributed by each Member State to that programme. There were two problems before the Economic and Social Council: one concerning the cost and detailed requirements of the programme of relief—dealt with in the temporary Committee's report; and the other concerning the methods of financing. On the latter problem, the Council had before it draft resolutions submitted by the Secretariat, Australia and the United States.

23. The Council did not have any specific or definite facts on the basis of which it could solve the first problem. That did not mean that the temporary Committee had not done the task entrusted to it, as it was not to be expected that its work would lead to exact results. The Committee deserved credit for making no attempt to conceal the imperfections of its work but, on the contrary, repeatedly emphasizing the uncertain character of its conclusions.

24. The temporary Committee's report was dominated by two figures: \$250 million for the year 1951, and \$364 million for the period between the outbreak of hostilities on 25 June 1950 and 31 December 1951. The French Government regarded those two figures merely as an indication; they neither represented a previously made commitment, nor did they constitute a legal obligation. From the temporary Committee's report it appeared that the Belgian representative alone had considered it necessary to make reservations on the figures and to request that the period to which they applied should not be specified for the time being. Like Belgium, France unfortunately had wide experience of problems of relief and rehabilitation. For more than thirty years, France had been reconstructing almost without interruption; he was therefore familiar with preliminary estimates hastily drawn up and at a time when the civil authority was blended with the military which had its own particular methods of drawing up estimates. Experience had shown that the first estimates might bear no relation whatsoever to the final estimates drawn up when more normal conditions had been re-established. That situation, which was precisely the one prevailing in Korea, was further complicated by the fact that the work of reconstruction would be carried out in a country in which peace had not been completely restored and in which there were important areas still uncontrolled even by military authority.

25. Even if those difficulties of calculation and evaluation did not exist, even if the members of the Council knew the extent of the damage and the amount of expenditures already incurred and if the cost of reconstruction could be estimated with some certainty, the figures transmitted by the Committee would merely serve as an indication and would not be hindering, as it had not yet been determined how much of the cost of reconstruction and rehabilitation would be borne by the United Nations and how much would fall to the share of the Korean people.

26. He considered that the temporary Committee had been right in emphasizing, in its report, the "absorp-

tive capacity" of the Korean economy rather than its needs. The concept of needs was a vague one as there were different ways of determining them depending upon the standpoint and ambitions of the evaluator.

27. "Absorptive capacity", on the other hand, lent itself to more objective examination and the figure estimated would show at least the upper limit of what could be done by the combined efforts of the Korean people and the United Nations. In determining the upper limit, however, account should be taken of certain constant factors such as the urgent and indispensable expenditure required to meet the emergency needs of persons who had no shelter or means of subsistence, in other words, assistance to the mass of persons displaced as a result of military operations or to those who had remained on the spot but who had been deprived of shelter as a result of war destruction. Such expenditures were invariable and relatively easy to determine; he regretted that in the classification drawn up by the Committee those factors had not been sufficiently defined. In addition to constant factors, account should be taken of certain changing factors, such as the total period during which the work of reconstruction would last. There was considerable difference of opinion on the latter point, as those countries recently devastated by war which had drawn up reconstruction plans extending over five to twenty years seemed to have been less ambitious than certain others.

28. For those reasons he considered the stand taken by the Belgian representative to be just and reasonable; he agreed with him that the figures which had been transmitted to the Council should not be regarded as applying to a predetermined period. On the contrary, they should be taken as a general indication of early needs in Korea—such as was required by the Council to make the necessary arrangements for the financing of the programme—but not as relating to a programme which must at all costs be carried out within a given period. The determination of the period of implementation would depend upon a great many factors, including the share of effort which in the present circumstances each Member State of the United Nations was prepared to assume. That was bound to be a decisive factor.

29. The French delegation would find it difficult to understand that a figure representing the total amount of the programme should be submitted to the Council as a final estimate of the collective effort of the United Nations, without taking into account the contributions which the various governments would be prepared to make. The total figure of the programme was essentially dependent on the amount of the individual contributions.

30. Turning to the problem of distribution of expenditures in the provisional programme of relief and reconstruction for Korea, he was glad to note that the Australian delegation had not included in its proposal the concepts contained in the United States draft resolution (E/L.114). The only formula which could be adopted was that contained in paragraph 2 of draft resolution III submitted by Australia (E1852), to the effect that the contributions which individual governments would be prepared to make towards the programme of relief for Korea should be determined at a special conference in accordance with the procedure previously applied with regard to the Technical As-

sistance Programme. In the French delegation's view that was the only practicable, reasonable and fair solution in the circumstances and the only one which it could support.

31. The United States draft resolution, on the other hand, provided for compulsory allocation of contributions, as it was difficult to see how the scale of contributions mentioned in paragraph 2 of that draft resolution could be established except by majority decision of a United Nations organ. If it were left to participating governments to determine the percentage each would contribute, the total would not add up to one hundred per cent.

32. Without wishing to embark on a discussion of the different methods of financing projects which might be undertaken under the auspices of the United Nations, he wished to explain why his government considered that, in the present instance, no system would be equitable unless it was based on the principle that contributions were not only voluntarily accepted but voluntarily determined. The principle of compulsory allocations, whatever the criterion on which it was based, was generally applicable to lasting, or at least very long-term projects, which, in fact, constituted a permanent obligation for participating States. The ordinary budgets of the United Nations and of the specialized agencies fell into that category. When, however, it was a case of a temporary, extraordinary or particularly urgent project of a non-recurring nature, the contributions should be freely determined by each participant. Of course it was sometimes difficult to decide into which category a particular programme fell, but there were a number of precedents such as the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund and the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees.

33. Voluntary contributions from the participating governments had been called for even in the case of a lasting programme such as the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance, whose importance Member States had recognized just as they had recognized the importance of the rehabilitation of Korea. Any compulsory allocation must necessarily be based, at least to a large extent, on criteria which were permanent or subject to a very slow process of evolution, such as the national *per capita* income.

34. In the case of a permanent budget, it was normal, in fixing contributions, that the capacity of each participant over a long period should be taken into account; but where exceptional and non-recurring expenditure was involved, allowance should be made for temporary circumstances, since some participants might be faced with heavy temporary expenses reducing their ability to pay for the time being.

35. In the course of the meetings which the Council had devoted to the question of plans for relief and rehabilitation of Korea, the representative of Pakistan (420th meeting) and a number of other speakers had emphasized the inability of their governments to make as large a contribution to the rehabilitation of Korea as they would have liked on account of exceptional circumstances which were at present affecting the economy of their countries. If it was possible to plead natural causes such as floods or earthquakes, there were even

stronger grounds for taking into account the war damage suffered by a large number of countries. France, for example, had been subjected for over five years to the same trials as the Korean people were at present enduring—military operations, bombing of the civilian population, invasion and occupation accompanied by looting and depredations. The French had still a long way to go before everything was restored, replaced and rebuilt; many of them were still living in improvised homes and it had been necessary to postpone the execution of capital projects in order to combat the inflationary trends which had manifested themselves in France.

36. No organ of the United Nations, whether the Economic and Social Council, the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly or the Committee on Contributions, could assess such individual and subjective factors in drawing up a scale of contributions to cover the cost of the programme for the rehabilitation of Korea. But, if that scale was to be equitable, those considerations must be taken into account. The Government, Parliament and people of France were anxious to make the largest possible contribution towards the rehabilitation of Korea and were convinced of the importance of that task; they could not, however, agree to their contribution being considered outside the context of French reconstruction.

37. Furthermore, since the United Nations had already sanctioned a number of programmes financed by voluntary contributions, it was becoming more and more difficult to work out an equitable scale of assessments for a new programme without taking into account the contribution which each country had made to previous programmes, for example, the contributions to the ICEF, the Technical Assistance Programme and the Programme of Relief for Palestine Refugees, to which only a very small number of countries were contributing. It was not easy to see how a United Nations organ could take so many different factors into consideration in order to insure an equitable distribution of the efforts to be made, and the representative of France therefore asked the Council whether it would not be better to leave it to each government, with the full knowledge of its obligations and its available resources, to decide for itself how much it could do.

38. Another salient point of the United States draft resolution was that it invited the Member States to assume an undefined obligation. From sub-paragraphs 1 and 2 of the second paragraph of the draft resolution it appeared that the scale of percentages would be valid for the entire duration of the Korean rehabilitation programme, which had been reckoned at four or five years. Member States would know what they were undertaking for the first year since under the United States draft a total figure had already been mentioned, but the cost of carrying on the programme in subsequent years was still unknown; it might well be that a very small majority in the Economic and Social Council or in the General Assembly would fix the figure, and the participants in the programme would have no control over either the total or the percentage they would have to contribute. The adoption of the United States proposal would, therefore, mean that each State was signing a blank cheque. The French Government could not accept such a procedure. The future was too un-

certain to enable the French delegation to subscribe to such a course.

39. Nor did the United States draft resolution seem to be motivated by the spirit which should prevail in a humanitarian undertaking which was an example of international solidarity. Sub-paragraph 2 of the second paragraph made a distinction in a very ostentatious and rather arbitrary manner between those who were prepared to adopt the United States delegation's proposal and those who were not. It appeared that the latter would have to make a specific statement to that effect and that their identity would have to be made known. That was a distinction which did not correspond to the true facts of the situation, for although every Member State might wish to contribute to the rehabilitation of Korea, all of them did not have the means to participate in the programme under the conditions proposed by the United States delegation.

40. The French delegation thought the only tangible result of the system proposed by the United States delegation would be to exclude some States who were willing to participate in the programme. It left the various governments with too little control over the total expenditure and its distribution. That plan was not a realistic one. It did not take account of the relationship which must necessarily exist between the total cost of the programme and the total contributions the United Nations was prepared to make, and it did not give those Member States who wished to collaborate in the joint undertaking but who intended to determine the amount of their contribution themselves any opportunity to contribute. The scheme seemed to be based on an erroneous assumption, namely that a system of voluntary contributions would not achieve satisfactory results. The French representative thought the experience with the ICEF and the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance disproved that hypothesis, for experience had shown that large sums could be collected through a system of voluntary contributions.

41. It was also incorrect to suppose that a system of voluntary contributions would not establish a sufficiently close connexion between the requirements of the programme and the resources of each country. In the case of the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance, it had not been necessary to resort to pressure; each State had contributed as much as it honestly thought it could. In the French Government's view, that would be the proper procedure for the programme of international solidarity which the United Nations was undertaking; it was the procedure which the French representative hoped would be adopted in the end.

42. Mr. LUBIN (United States of America), in reply to the representative of France, said that in the execution of the Technical Assistance Programme, a distinction was, in fact, made between two categories of countries in the sense that the identity of those countries that did not see it fit to contribute to the cost of technical assistance was known to everyone. Sub-paragraph 2 of the second paragraph of the United States draft resolution (E/L.114) did not contain any mandatory provisions. Nor was it true that a small majority could impose its will in the matter upon all the States Members of the United Nations. All Member States, whether or not they were prepared to participate in the

Korean rehabilitation programme, would make their intentions known without any external pressure.

43. The Council had invited the temporary Committee to prepare a report on "the scale of the programme required for such period as might be appropriate". The estimates which the Committee had submitted were the most accurate at present available for the year 1951. The French representative had referred to the question of the length of the period to be covered by the rehabilitation programme. If the rehabilitation of Korea extended over a period of thirty years, for example, the annual contribution of Member States would no doubt be relatively small. The report to the Council mentioned Korea's requirements in fertilizers, industrial equipment and raw materials for the period ending 31 December 1951. It might be decided, for example, not to send fertilizers to Korea in 1951 but then it would become necessary to send footstuffs for an indefinite period thereafter and the cost would be greater in the long run. Similarly it might be decided not to furnish industrial equipment which would enable Korea to rebuild its textile industry, but then it would obviously be necessary to send textiles to Korea for a much longer period.

44. The Council had been instructed to transmit to the General Assembly estimates of requirements for the period ending 31 December 1951. It would fulfil that task by informing the General Assembly that the total cost of the requirements for that period amounted to about 250 million dollars. It would then be for the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly to take a decision as to the methods of financing and the contribution which Member States should make to the implementation of the programme.

45. Mr. ALI (Pakistan) congratulated the Rapporteur on the care with which he had prepared the temporary Committee's report. The Committee had given the Council the most accurate estimates which were currently available. It had thus fulfilled the task which the Council had assigned to it.

46. With regard to the methods of financing, he endorsed the remarks of the representatives of Belgium and France. Each State should itself determine the amount of its contribution. Methods should not be adopted which would lay too heavy an obligation upon States.

47. He thanked the representative of France for the remarks he had made concerning the destruction caused in Pakistan by the floods. Pakistan had constantly been faced with great difficulties. For instance, it had had to solve the problem of refugees within the scope of its available resources. It would therefore be very difficult for the Pakistan Government to contribute to the Korean rehabilitation programme, much as it would have liked to have done so in other circumstances.

48. Mr. DICKEY (Canada) congratulated the Rapporteur and the members of the temporary Committee for the thorough job they had done and for the very full report they had submitted to the Council. It was on that report that the Council would base its recommendations to the General Assembly.

49. The Council was seized of a question on which it would have to take important decisions. It was clear that most of the members of the Council were aware



of the vital importance of the Korean relief and rehabilitation programme, and he was glad that the United Nations had undertaken to draw up plans in that field even before military operations had ceased. The proposed plan for relief and rehabilitation of Korea would supplement in a realistic fashion the energetic steps taken by the United Nations in the military field.

50. The Canadian delegation realized that it was difficult, if not impossible, to estimate the expenses of the Korean relief and rehabilitation programme accurately. In order to fix the total cost of carrying out a long-term programme in a reasonably accurate fashion, it would be necessary to have information gathered on the spot. While awaiting the information which would make it possible to clarify certain aspects of the long-term programme, however, the States Members of the United Nations had an immediate task, which was to draw up a programme to deal with urgent needs, in the hope that the provisional programme could be fitted into the framework of the long-term programme. The provisional programme proposed by the temporary Committee seemed to satisfy that requirement.

51. As some representatives had pointed out, for the relief and rehabilitation programme to be carried out successfully, it was necessary to take into account not only the needs of the Korean people but also the financial resources of the Member States. The public finances of the various Member States had to meet ever increasing demands for funds, and it was therefore necessary to work out a reasonable programme in a realistic way which would take the general situation into account. The interests of the United Nations and of the Korean people would be prejudiced if too ambitious a plan were adopted which proved impossible to carry out.

52. A large majority of the States Members of the United Nations recognized the Organization's responsibility in the matter of Korean relief. It was for the Council to work out a method of financing the programme which would take that responsibility into account but which would be reasonable enough to be accepted by all. In a general way, that aim could be achieved by permitting the Member States to decide the obligation which they thought they could assume.

53. He did not think the fears expressed by the French representative with regard to the United States

draft resolution (E/L.114) were completely justified. The responsibility of the United Nations with regard to Korea was of a special nature on account of the measures the Organization had already taken, and it was essential that the largest possible number of Member States should participate in carrying out the decisions taken on the various aspects of the Korean question.

54. He thought most of the objections raised by the French representative could be met within the framework of the plan proposed by the United States delegation. In his opinion, it was chiefly a matter of drafting. Furthermore, the plan had obvious advantages. In drawing up a scale of contributions, account could be taken of the special problems of all the Member States and the scale, once it had been prepared by a competent body such as the Committee on Contributions or the Fifth Committee, would give each country helpful guidance on the amount of its contribution. The Member States might change their contribution as fixed by the scale, in accordance with the various considerations they felt should be taken into account. He thought such an arrangement would be very satisfactory as it would suggest to each country the size of its contribution without compelling it to accept a figure which it might have valid reasons for rejecting. He therefore hoped that the United States proposal would be fully discussed.

55. The CHAIRMAN said the representative of the World Federation of Trade Unions had asked to be heard on the subject of the plans for relief and rehabilitation of Korea. The Council Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations would meet to consider that request.

56. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) remarked that Mr. Fischer, the representative of the WFTU, was in the Council chamber. He welcomed him and thanked him for the contribution he had made to the work of the Council and of the United Nations as a whole by fighting for respect for the status of the WFTU and the right of non-governmental organizations in general to participate in the debates of the United Nations organs on questions which were within their competence.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.