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President : Mr. A. PATIÑO (Colombia)

Present :

Representatives of the following States: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, India, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Senegal, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Yugoslavia.

Observers for the following Member States: Algeria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Central African Republic, Greece, Hungary, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, South Africa, Sweden, Venezuela.

Observer for the following non-member States: Federal Republic of Germany.

Representatives of the following specialized agencies: International Labour Organisation, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Monetary Fund, World Health Organization.

The representative of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

AGENDA ITEM 7

Economic and social consequences of disarmament

United Nations activities in implementation of the declaration on the conversion to peaceful needs of the resources released by disarmament (E/3736 and Add.1-8)

1. Mr. UNWIN (United Kingdom) said that universal disarmament under effective control would represent the greatest possible achievement for all mankind. His

government's hopes had been renewed by the current talks in Moscow between Mr. Khrushchev, Mr. Harriman and Lord Hailsham. If they succeeded in working out a partial test ban, it might pave the way for more extensive disarmament measures.

2. During the past fifteen years, arms expenditure in the United Kingdom had reached proportions undreamed of in times of peace. But his government had not embarked willingly on that course: it had been compelled to do so by the pressure of outside forces. It would like nothing better than to beat its swords into ploughshares and increase its aid to developing countries as a result of disarmament.

3. But he did not think that possibility was yet in sight. Meanwhile, further detailed studies on the conversion to peaceful needs of the resources released by disarmament were a waste of time and energy. If the idea of disarmament became a reality, there would be time enough to study the problems involved. For the moment, disarmament should be discussed in the appropriate forum. The Council should restrict its discussions of the subject to a minimum and concentrate on the many other pressing problems before it.

4. Mr. KOPCOK (Yugoslavia) observed that the continuing armaments race was not only a serious danger, but an immense burden for the world to bear. Nearly all the discoveries made in the field of atomic energy were being applied in the manufacture of armaments.

5. World public opinion was in favour of general and complete disarmament, but not even the initial steps had yet been taken in that direction. An initial agreement — even a partial one — would have a very favourable effect, since it would help to establish mutual confidence among the peoples of the world.

6. Disarmament would help to close the gap between the developed and the less developed countries. While annual expenditure on armaments throughout the world amounted to \$120,000 million, total expenditure on economic and social development in less developed countries was only \$30,000 million. Further, many qualified scientists and technicians were engaged in the manufacture of armaments, and it had been calculated that an agreement on general and complete disarmament would allow 20,000 scientists and engineers to devote themselves to the peaceful uses of atomic energy. A rapid application of discoveries in nuclear physics would help to accelerate the development of the world economy as well. His delegation therefore believed that studies of the uses of atomic energy for peaceful purposes should be continued.

7. The conversion of armament industries should not give rise to any insurmountable difficulties. Calculations which had already been made demonstrated that the reconversion could be carried out without any serious dislocation. The question of the economic and social consequences of disarmament should therefore remain on the Council's agenda. Yugoslavia had always attached great importance to disarmament, as was evident from the many statements made on that subject by President Tito. Accordingly, his government took the view that the research and studies already undertaken should be continued. It attached great importance also to the current negotiations in Moscow and firmly believed that they would eventually result in agreement. Even if the agreement was only partial, it would have immense repercussions throughout the world.

8. Mr. BINGHAM (United States of America) associated himself with the remarks of the United Kingdom and Yugoslav representatives concerning the talks in Moscow. He was sure that no one would want the Council to do anything which would jeopardize their success. Internationally agreed disarmament would free mankind from the hideous threat of modern war and enlarge opportunities for improving the economic and social conditions of all peoples. But if those opportunities were to be fully realized, the major Powers must be able to cope effectively with the many problems involved in channelling resources now spent on arms into constructive civilian channels. No one could foresee with any assurance when an international agreement on disarmament might be achieved or the staging and timing of the disarmament process for which an agreement would provide. Studies relating to the problems of conversion should therefore be kept under review in the light of pertinent developments. It was in recognition of that need that the Council had adopted resolution 891 (XXXIV), as a result of which the Council had before it a new series of replies by governments (E/3736/Add.1-8). The reply of his government in Addendum 1 was fairly brief because its original response (E/3593/Rev.1/Add.1-5) to General Assembly resolution 1516 (XV) had been extremely detailed and comprehensive. The current statement contained additional up-to-date information on his country's activities in relation to the economic and social aspects of disarmament.

9. In recent years, the defence programme of the United States had absorbed roughly one tenth of the gross national product and somewhat less than that proportion of the employed labour force. Nevertheless, in relation to total economic demand, defence expenditure was not so great as to make the economy vitally dependent on it. The proportion of United States resources spent on armaments in the Second World War had been many times greater. Yet, when hostilities had ceased, the economy had proved itself astonishingly resilient. There was every reason to believe that the problems of maintaining effective demand under any internationally agreed disarmament programme could be dealt with successfully.

10. Problems of readjustment would be greatest in those areas and industries of the United States where defence production was highly concentrated, but United States industry was resourceful and the labour force had a rela-

tively high degree of mobility. In his country's free-enterprise economy, the task of converting industrial production from defence to civilian uses would mainly devolve upon the firms affected. But businesses were constantly faced with the prospect of shifting patterns of demand; and the problems of readjustment, in the event of disarmament, though intensified, would not be essentially different.

11. Although the United States was producing a vast quantity of goods and services for civilian use, it expected a substantial civilian demand for the additional peacetime products which reconversion would make available. In addition to expanded demand from the private sector, there were great potentialities for increased governmental investment in education, public health, roads and urban development. The federal Government would also be ready to adopt whatever measures might appear necessary to help to maintain production and employment at the desirable level during the transition period. Disarmament would enable the United States capital goods industries to increase production for economic development abroad, while the improved political climate would encourage development capital to move in greater volume to less developed countries.

12. His delegation was preparing a draft resolution¹ which would express the Council's continuing interest in the economic and social problems of disarmament. It would recall previous resolutions on the subject and endorse the report of the Secretary-General (E/3736), particularly paragraphs 6, 7, 8 and 9. In line with that report, it would propose an exploration of the possibilities for an extensive international study of the problems that might arise regarding those primary commodities the demand for which might be significantly affected during the transition period. The Secretary-General would be requested to determine the requirements for an adequate international study of that problem; to inquire of Member States the extent to which they would be prepared to furnish data and analyses of the kind deemed essential by the Secretary-General for preparation of the study; to determine on the basis of the replies whether the Secretariat should proceed with the study; and to report to the Council at its thirty-seventh session on the progress made.

13. Mr. MIGONE (Argentina) said that the studies carried out so far had led to the unanimous conclusion that disarmament would benefit the whole world: in particular, it would help to enlarge the resources available for economic development.

14. Another important conclusion was that there was no problem connected with disarmament which could not be solved by intergovernmental co-operation. The United Nations was engaged in research which should be of great value in solving the problems concerned. He was thinking in particular of the studies on world commodity trade prospects and the effect of that trade on the balance of payments of various countries. Mention should also be made of the work on the longer-run reshaping of international trade relations, economic and social develop-

¹ Subsequently issued as E/L.1018.

ment planning activities and the studies on the flow of capital and assistance to developing countries.

15. Until complete agreement was reached on disarmament, it was essential to ensure that those studies retained their priority over activities of secondary importance, and that the best possible use was made of available resources, particularly by applying them realistically to further the efforts being made by the regional economic commissions. With regard to the information requested by the Secretary-General in pursuance of Council resolution 891 (XXIV), though his government's expenditure on armaments was very modest, the necessary investigations were being made in his country and would be completed under the over-all development plan which was in course of preparation.

16. Sir Ronald WALKER (Australia) said, with reference to paragraph 6 of the Secretary-General's report, that the seriousness of the problems of maintaining adequate stability in national balances of payments during the conversion period would depend on the extent to which strategic materials entered into the over-all trade pattern of the countries concerned. In most cases, the consequences were unlikely to be very grave because phased disarmament was more probable than immediate disarmament. Countries devoting part of their export earnings to expenditure on armaments would have more to spend on capital goods or, in some cases, on consumer imports. On the other hand, the few countries which exported military equipment on a large scale should not find it impossible to convert arms industries into those producing capital goods which other countries would like to import for peaceful purposes.

17. The problems of converting international trade relations would also be less grave under a phased programme of disarmament. But some quite serious trade problems could arise. Australia was not very impressed by the suggestion made by the Consultative Group (E/3593/Rev.1, para. 132) that one result of disarmament should be that advanced countries would open their markets more widely to imported foodstuffs. Protectionism would remain and it was difficult to see how high-income countries could consume appreciably more imported food unless their domestic production was reduced. Furthermore, without careful planning, the disposal of stockpiles of strategic war materials could have serious repercussions on exports of such goods, particularly from the developing countries.

18. Undoubtedly, reductions in expenditure on armaments would lead to at least some increase in the flow of international aid and private capital investment. The Consultative Group had estimated that the world was spending roughly \$120,000 million annually on military account. But even complete disarmament would not actually release that total; there would still be a need for domestic police forces and there would remain many claims on such funds within the advanced countries themselves.

19. One of the most important results of disarmament would be that scientists engaged on defence would become available for more constructive work. The armed

forces of most countries contained many highly skilled technicians who, upon their release, would make a significant addition to the world's skilled labour force.

20. Undoubtedly, the achievement of general and complete disarmament would be an unqualified blessing for all mankind. It was the task of the United Nations to work continually towards that objective and, particularly in view of the current talks in Moscow, his delegation looked forward to the day when, the basic decisions having been taken in the matter of political security, the economic and social aspects of disarmament would assume a new urgency.

21. Mr. HAJEK (Czechoslovakia) said that activities relating to the economic and social consequences of disarmament undertaken in the various countries and at the international level were becoming increasingly systematic and had already produced results of considerable value. The research and studies carried out had helped to secure world-wide acceptance for the idea of general and complete disarmament, as proposed by the Soviet delegation in the General Assembly and set out in the 1961 Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations by the United States and the USSR. So far, the studies were more or less hypothetical in character, but they stimulated further activity and helped to clarify and popularize the idea of disarmament. They helped to show that the idea of disarmament was no chimera.

22. The economic studies revealed the harm done by the armaments race. They also proved that there were no serious economic obstacles to disarmament. Disarmament would, of course, create problems, but they were not insoluble and, as the Czechoslovak Government had pointed out in its reply (E/3593/Rev.1/Add. 1-5), to the note on the economic and social consequences of disarmament, sent to all countries in September 1961, they were far less serious than those created by the armaments race itself.

23. Economic, scientific and technical research on disarmament daily offered further proof that the fundamental condition for disarmament was the will of the various countries to achieve it. He associated himself with those speakers who had emphasized the crucial importance of the current negotiations in Moscow. Mr. Krushchev's latest statements showed the devotion of the USSR to peace and its desire to reach a settlement. It was to be hoped that the western Powers would show more realism and more good-will in assessing that desire than they had in the past.

24. Economics was a determining factor in disarmament. The hostility which could be observed in certain countries to any effective form of disarmament reflected a lack of desire to reach a settlement. But the origin of the atomic obsession was not psychological; it was the expression of certain material interests. There were in Czechoslovakia no social groups with a vested interest in arms production. Such groups, however, existed in the capitalist countries and their excessive influence had been denounced by President Eisenhower in January 1961. Apart from economic pressure-groups, certain other sectors of the population in the capitalist countries were convinced that

their economic security depended on the manufacture of armaments. Objective analysis revealed the fallacy of that belief: hence the particular importance of the joint research that had been carried out in that connexion. The Consultative Group, which was composed of economists of very different outlooks, had arrived at agreed conclusions and had defined certain problems and even recommended practical measures. Definitive solutions should be worked out in the same co-operative spirit.

25. Even during its initial phase, the disarmament process would have beneficial effects on the trade and economic and social development of the under-developed countries. The Preparatory Committee of the Conference on Trade and Development was therefore right in placing the question of the economic and social consequences of disarmament on the agenda for the Conference. The social consequences of disarmament should not be neglected, and he accordingly endorsed the decision of the Social Commission in its resolution 4 (XV), to request that further studies on the impact of disarmament in the social field should be carried out.

26. Czechoslovakia had always supported measures to promote disarmament — as, for example, the proposed denuclearization of central Europe. The studies carried out in Czechoslovakia showed that, once a disarmament agreement was concluded, Czechoslovakia — thanks to its planned economic system — could convert its military production to peaceful purposes without any serious economic or social dislocation. It was ready to support any draft resolution consistent with the principles that he had enunciated.

27. Mr. YOKOTA (Japan) said that the early achievement of general and complete disarmament was the long-cherished hope of all mankind. The resources thus released could be utilized for the economic advancement and social welfare of the entire world. His delegation fully supported the suggestions put forward by the Secretary-General in paragraphs 5 to 9 of his report. The proposed work programme seemed to be appropriate and it would perhaps be the maximum which the United Nations could contribute, for, at the current stage of negotiations, no specific conditions governing the scope and timing of disarmament had yet been worked out.

28. Certain essential and theoretical questions remained to be examined in connexion with the report of the Consultative Group. They included the impact of disarmament on employment in the developing countries; possible change of demand for primary commodities as a result of disarmament; the impact of disarmament on economic growth and foreign aid; and an analysis of the process of conversion in the centrally planned economies. Study of such topics should be carried out by the major Powers.

29. Defence expenditure represented some 8.61 per cent of Japan's total budget. Its curtailment would probably have only a marginal effect on the national economy. For the moment, therefore, no systematic study of the problems of reconversion was being undertaken in Japan. However, the Japanese Government had taken adequate measures to disseminate the report of the Consultative Group and was ready to co-operate with the United

Nations in connexion with the economic and social consequences of disarmament.

30. Mr. CHAKRAVARTY (India) joined the other speakers who had expressed interest in the negotiations in Moscow. He hoped that the negotiations would have fruitful results not only in respect of the nuclear test ban, but also of disarmament in general.

31. It was agreed by all that the conclusion of an agreement on general and complete disarmament would be an unqualified blessing. It was also admitted that the transition from the production of armaments to peaceful production could be made without great difficulty. What was needed in that respect was advance study and advance planning, and further studies should therefore be conducted. The need for such further studies was recognized in General Assembly resolution 1837 (XVII); those studies would have the added psychological advantage of projecting the picture of a disarmed world. For those reasons, his delegation could not agree that it was premature or academic to discuss the economic consequences of disarmament at the current stage.

32. Indian military expenditure had been kept at the lowest possible figure and represented only 2 per cent of the gross national product, as compared with between 8 and 10 per cent for the more industrialized countries. Unfortunately, the unprovoked aggression perpetrated in 1962 had forced India to increase its defence expenditure. However, the increase had been small, and disarmament would not involve any economic problem: it would, in fact, contribute to the resources available for economic development, industrialization, and social services. Moreover, demobilization would add to the strength of the disciplined and skilled labour force and thereby assist in the process of industrialization.

33. Regarding the balance of payments, since strategic materials did not play any significant part in India's export trade, any change in that respect would have no serious effect. Disarmament, however, could be expected to have a favourable effect on the imports of developing countries. There had recently been a steady increase in the prices of capital equipment, and any transfer from armaments production to peaceful production could be expected to check that upward trend.

AGENDA ITEM 12

Reports of the regional economic commissions (E/3727/Rev.1, E/3820; E/L.1008 and Add.1, E/L.1016, E/L.1017 (resumed from the 1270th meeting)

34. The PRESIDENT recalled that draft resolutions I, II and IV in part IV of the annual report of ECA (E/3727/Rev.1) still remained to be considered.

35. The Council could begin with draft resolution II, together with the communication dated 15 July 1963 received from the Ambassador of South Africa at Berne (E/3820) and the draft resolution submitted jointly by Ethiopia and Senegal (E/L.1017). The Council would thereafter consider draft resolution IV, the nine-Power draft resolution (E/L.1008 and Add.1) and lastly draft resolution I.

36. Mr. WAKWAYA (Ethiopia) explained that the draft resolution (E/L.1017) submitted by his delegation and that of Senegal was intended to replace draft resolution II in the ECA report.

37. He recalled that ECA had been concerned with its terms of reference and membership ever since its third session. At its third and fourth sessions it had decided, by the unanimous vote of its African members, to address certain recommendations to the Council on that subject, but they had been either rejected or referred back to ECA for reconsideration.

38. At its fifth session, ECA had re-examined the matter and had taken steps to reconsider the position of Spain. It was the feeling of the African countries that Portugal and South Africa, which had both refused to comply with requests made to them by the General Assembly and by ECA, should be excluded from ECA. There were two reasons for South Africa's exclusion: the first was its policy of apartheid, which was contrary to the accepted standards of present-day international life and fraught with consequences for the whole world; the second was that South Africa had refused to comply with General Assembly resolutions and requests by ECA regarding South West Africa.

39. The sponsors would request that their joint draft resolution be voted upon before the ECA draft resolution.

40. The PRESIDENT noted that, under rule 66 of the rules of procedure, draft resolution II would have to be voted upon first, since it had been submitted before the joint draft resolution. However, it was open to the Council to agree upon a different order.

41. Mr. BINGHAM (United States of America) said he had no objection to the joint draft resolution's being voted upon first.

42. Conditions had changed materially since the Council's adoption of resolution 927 (XXXIV) at its resumed thirty-fourth sessions and his delegation was prepared to have the question of membership in ECA reconsidered. He wished to make it clear, however, that it was not the intention of his delegation to seek to reaffirm the Commission's earlier decision.

43. The Council had before it the important communication from South Africa. Another new development was the adoption by the Council, at the 1269th meeting, of draft resolution III in the ECA report regarding the status of France, the United Kingdom and Spain as associate members of ECA, a decision which had been taken with the full consent of those States.

44. Accordingly, if draft resolution II was put to the vote, its two operative paragraphs should be voted upon separately. His delegation would vote for operative paragraph 1, but it could not support operative paragraph 2 or the joint draft resolution, because the participation in ECA of the two States concerned was a matter for the Council to decide. The ECA had been set up by the Council in pursuance of Article 68 of the Charter; its terms of reference and membership were based on decisions of the Council. It would be a serious mistake

if the Council surrendered its responsibilities and, without any action on its own part, transmitted to the General Assembly the ECA recommendation in respect of its own membership.

45. Mr. DUPRAZ (France) said he would not object if the joint draft resolution were substituted for the ECA draft resolution.

46. The Council should not abandon so important a prerogative. Although his delegation was against submitting the matter of the General Assembly, it was not otherwise opposed to a review of the question, since the Council was competent to deal with the terms of reference of ECA. On the other hand, his delegation would abstain on the question of review, since it considered — as stated earlier in the session — that in a matter with political implications it would be wise, once it was being discussed at the political level, for the Council to wait and see what steps the Security Council, which was due to meet that day, would take. His delegation was mindful of the African delegates' pleas and the views expressed by several other delegations that the question should be dealt with before the end of the session. However, the session was not over and the Council would do well to await clarification from the political organ on the political aspects of the texts before it.

47. Mr. EL-FARRA (Jordan) said that he would confine his remarks to the procedural issue raised by the United States representative and reserve his right to revert to the merits of the case. The United States representative had referred to Article 68 of the Charter. However, under Article 60, responsibility for the discharge of the United Nations functions set forth in chapter IX dealing with international economic and social co-operation was vested in the General Assembly and, under the authority of the General Assembly, in the Economic and Social Council. It was thus clear that the Council's powers in the matter had been delegated to it by the General Assembly. It was therefore always open to the Council to submit any matter to the Assembly.

48. Mr. UNWIN (United Kingdom) thought that the Council had acted wisely at its resumed thirty-fourth session when it had referred the question of membership back to ECA. One of the results had been the new draft resolution III by ECA regarding Spain, which the Council had adopted. Another change had been the communication by the South African Government regarding its withdrawal from participation in ECA's activities.

49. His delegation agreed that the Council should begin by voting upon the joint draft resolution and then proceed to deal with ECA draft resolution II.

50. His delegation would vote for operative paragraph 1 of draft resolution II, if it were put to the vote first. It would, however, vote against operative paragraph 2 and also against the joint draft resolution which was identical in purpose. It would be an abdication of the Council's responsibilities to transmit the ECA recommendations directly to the General Assembly. The Council had

established ECA by means of resolution 671 A (XXV), adopted in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 1155 (XII). It was clear from those resolutions and from certain precedents connected with other regional economic commissions, as indeed from Articles 60 and 68 of the Charter, that the Council had the responsibility and the authority to take a decision in the matter.

51. Mr. DUCCI (Italy) stressed that the Economic and Social Council, notwithstanding its name, had a political responsibility in the matter. It should not divest itself of duties assigned to it by the General Assembly. He therefore agreed with other delegations regarding the assertion of the primary responsibility of the Council in the matter under discussion.

52. His delegation had been somewhat puzzled by the introduction of the joint draft resolution, which was identical in substance with paragraph 2 of draft resolution II. As to the order of voting, it would be wiser to take separate votes on the two operative paragraphs of draft resolution II rather than to vote first on the joint draft resolution.

53. There was also some merit in the French representative's suggestion. It was a striking coincidence that the political implications of what was mainly a political problem should be concurrently under discussion in the Security Council. It would therefore seem advisable to await developments in that political organ.

54. Lastly, his delegation considered that the Economic and Social Council should take some action in the matter under discussion before the end of its session.

55. Mr. JEVTIĆ (Yugoslavia) supported the joint draft resolution, which would pave the way towards a solution of the problem in accordance with the unanimous wishes of the African countries.

56. With regard to the reluctance of certain delegations to by-pass the prerogatives of the Council, it would be easier to take that position into consideration if the members of the Council were to give the African countries the assurance that they were supported in their decision to exclude Portugal and to deprive South Africa of membership in ECA.

57. Lastly, with regard to the status of the Council, it would be a blow to its prestige if it did not unanimously endorse the views of the African countries on the important matter under discussion.

58. Mr. PASTORI (Uruguay) said that his delegation had no preference as regards the order of voting, since both draft resolution II and the joint draft resolution purported to transmit the views and recommendations of ECA to the General Assembly.

59. Any decision on the joint draft resolution or on operative paragraph 2 of draft resolution II would undoubtedly constitute a political pronouncement. As such,

it would fall outside the competence of the Council. Any consideration of the subject under discussion by the Council would involve a pronouncement on matters of domestic policy and would be contrary to the principle of non-intervention, to which his country attached vital importance and which had been reasserted recently at Addis Ababa. He recalled the rejection by the Council at its 1278th meeting of the proposal to include in the agenda of its current session an additional item entitled "Policy of genocide which is being pursued by the Government of the Republic of Iraq against the Kurdish people". That decision was consistent with the principle which he had just formulated.

60. For the reasons indicated, his delegation would be unable to support either of the two draft resolutions under discussion.

61. Mr. MIGONE (Argentina) had no objection to priority being given to the joint draft resolution. With regard to the important matter of competence, it would be setting a dangerous precedent for the future of the Council merely to transmit the ECA recommendations to the General Assembly.

62. It was essential to re-examine the question of membership in ECA. There had been two important new developments: the communication from South Africa and the Council's adoption of the resolution regarding the associate membership in ECA of France, Spain and the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, the Council should reach a decision at its current session on the membership of Portugal and South Africa in ECA.

63. It was essential for the Council first to take a decision on the prior question of competence. By virtue of Article 68 of the Charter, the Council had the power to set up and abolish regional economic commissions, to set up new commissions and to decide on the membership of the regional commissions. Its action in those respects should be prompted solely by the desire to promote the effectiveness of the work assigned to those commissions. The Council's competence in the matter had no political aspect whatsoever.

64. It was also true that, under Article 60 of the Charter, the General Assembly had the right of ultimate control. However, that should not prevent the Council from discharging its own responsibilities. If it was considered that political aspects were involved, they should be referred to the appropriate political bodies — namely, the General Assembly and the Security Council.

65. His delegation would vote against operative paragraph 2 draft resolution II and the joint draft resolution, on the understanding that their rejection would not in any way prejudice the substance of the matter, on which the Council should decide at its current session.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.