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President: Mr. C. W. A. SCHURMANN
(Netherlands).

Present:

Representatives of the following States: Afghanistan, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Denmark, France, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Spain, Sudan, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Venezuela.

Observers for the following Member States: Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Czechoslovakia, El Salvador, Greece, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Yugoslavia.

Observers for the following non-member States: Federal Republic of Germany, Holy See.

Representatives of the following specialized agencies: International Labour Organisation; Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations; United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; World Health Organization.

The representative of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

AGENDA ITEMS 16 AND 20

Organization and operation of the Council

Consideration of the provisional agenda for the thirtieth session and establishment of dates for opening debate on items

(E/3331, E/3355, E/L.853, E/L.861, E/L.868)

1. The PRESIDENT drew the Council's attention to the documents before it. Referring to the list of agenda items for the thirtieth session (E/3331), he pointed out that the Secretary-General, in order to facilitate the discussion of the reports of the regional economic commissions, had listed them as a separate item and not as a sub-item of item 2 (World economic situation), as had been the practice hitherto. He called attention to

the Secretary-General's proposals for meetings at the ministerial level (E/L.853). In addition to the items already listed, the Council would have to include in the agenda the Secretary-General's report on opportunities for international co-operation on behalf of the former Trust Territories and other newly independent States. The Council could include it under item 4 (Economic development of under-developed countries), thus ensuring that it would be considered initially in plenary meeting. As a consequence of the Council's adoption of resolution 751 (XXIX) setting up a Committee for Industrial Development, six members of the Committee who were not members of the Council would have to be elected under agenda item 19 (Elections). That might be done during the first half of the thirtieth session. There was also a proposal by the Secretary-General for the election of a member of the Permanent Central Opium Board (E/3355). Finally, there was a draft resolution (E/L.861) submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics calling for the inclusion in the agenda of the thirtieth session of an item entitled: "Study of the economic and social aspects of general and complete disarmament."

DATE OF ELECTIONS TO THE COMMITTEE FOR INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

2. Mr. PENTEADO (Brazil) said that he had been requested by a number of delegations, both members and non-members of the Council, to make a formal proposal that the election of the six additional members of the Committee for Industrial Development should be held during the twenty-ninth session of the Council and not postponed until the thirtieth session. Those delegations had felt that there was a persistent undercurrent of ill will towards the new Committee and that an effort was being made to delay the election. That could not be allowed to happen. It was the recognition of the desperate urgency of bringing relief to the poverty-stricken two-thirds of the world and the further realization that industrialization alone could eliminate that poverty in a reasonably short time that had been behind the proposal to set up the Committee. It followed that the establishment of the machinery to solve the problem was equally urgent; the Council should accordingly proceed without delay to implement its decision.

3. The only argument advanced to justify the postponement of the election until the thirtieth session had been that to hold elections at the present session would not be fair to countries which were not at present members of the Council but might possibly wish to be elected to the new Committee. If that argument were well-founded it would be altogether convincing and his delegation for one would not promote a decision that would be unfair to other delegations. However, all the Members of the United Nations had participated in the debates on the question at the fourteenth session of the General Assembly. They were perfectly aware of the decision the General Assembly had taken, namely, to recommend that the Council should give consideration

to the prompt establishment of a commission for industrial development. Moreover, during the past two months several members of the Council had taken the initiative of holding a series of informal meetings open to all Members of the United Nations to reach a tentative agreement on the text of the draft resolution to be submitted to the Council in compliance with General Assembly resolution 1431 (XIV) and among the most active participants in those meetings had been a number of delegations which were not members of the Council at the present time. All the other delegations were well aware, through their permanent missions, of what had been going on. They had all therefore had ample time to decide whether they wished to stand for election to one of the six additional seats.

4. The General Assembly had recommended that the Council should give consideration to the prompt establishment of the new body, not that it should give prompt consideration to its establishment. That could mean only that it should do so at once, without delay. If that were done the Committee could, if the Council so chose, hold its first formal meeting in July. By so doing it would obtain much favourable publicity. The first formal meeting of the Committee, since it would of necessity be a short one to take stock of what was to be done, would not interfere with the normal work of the Council and could be particularly fruitful if held when the Ministers of Economic Affairs of the States members of the Council were still in Geneva. That did not mean that his delegation did not approve of arranging the Committee's regular meetings to coincide with the Council's spring session; in fact, it supported the idea.

5. He therefore formally proposed that the six additional members of the Committee for Industrial Development should be elected during the Council's twenty-ninth session and that a decision on the question should be taken by roll-call vote before the end of the meeting.

6. The PRESIDENT took it that if the Brazilian representative's proposal were adopted, the elections in question would take place under item 17 of the Council's agenda.

7. Mr. HESSELLUND-JENSEN (Denmark) supported the Brazilian motion to elect the six extra members of the Committee for Industrial Development at the current session of the Council, under agenda item 17. Both the General Assembly and the Council had stressed the urgency of establishing a body to deal with industrial development, for reasons which his delegation entirely endorsed. It would be perfectly in keeping, therefore, to elect the extra members at the current session so that the Committee could meet as soon as possible.

8. Mr. SERAFIMOV (Bulgaria) associated his delegation with the Brazilian proposal: the Committee would have many difficult and urgent problems to deal with and ought, therefore, to be set up as soon as possible, so that no further time was lost. His delegation believed that the six extra members should be representatives of under-developed countries.

9. Mr. SOSA RODRIGUEZ (Venezuela) also supported the Brazilian representative's proposal: the reasons prompting the decision to set up the Committee also justified the election of its members at the current session so that it could start work as soon as possible on the important problem of the industrialization of the under-developed countries.

10. Mr. SHANAHAN (New Zealand) said that his delegation was not convinced that the present was the best

time to adopt the course proposed by the Brazilian representative. In thinking so, it believed that its attitude was in line with the parliamentary tradition of the United Nations whereby Member States were given proper notification of decisions and a full opportunity to study them and to decide what their interests were and whether they wished to submit their candidature for election to new bodies. It was true that there had been informal consultations on the present topic and that many delegations had thereby been able to secure a knowledge of the decision taken; he doubted, however, whether that amounted to proper notification. He believed that his delegation's views, which were shared by other delegations, reflected normal United Nations procedure; he saw no reason why that procedure should be dispensed with in the present instance. Such a position could not be said to constitute an undercurrent of ill will or an attitude of passive resistance. His delegation attached as much importance as others to the problem of the industrialization of the under-developed countries and was concerned that the best methods should be adopted to secure the results desired. He was convinced that the Committee for Industrial Development would secure those results and that its discussions at a technical level would be of direct benefit to the under-developed countries.

11. The New Zealand delegation did not intend to carry its position to the point of opposing what might appear to be the will of the majority of the Council.

12. Mr. SOBOLEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) agreed with the Brazilian representative that the election of the six extra members of the Committee for Industrial Development should be held at the current session, for the reasons that representative had given.

13. Mr. PHILLIPS (United States of America) was not clear whether the Brazilian proposal concerned both the date of the election of the extra members of the Committee and the date on which the Committee's first meeting was to be convened. About the first question there had been honest differences of opinion. As the New Zealand representative had said, there were no devious motives behind the attitude of those who believed that the present was not the best time for conducting the elections in question; their sole consideration had been that all Member States, including, for example, the African States, should be given an adequate opportunity to present their candidature. With regard to the second matter, there would be real difficulties about convening a meeting of the Committee as early as July of the present year. For instance, the Council had given its approval to an industrialization programme for the whole of 1960; if the Committee met in the summer it would presumably have to reconsider that programme.

14. Mr. PENTEADO (Brazil) explained that his proposal related only to the timing of the elections; his reference to the possibility of holding the first meeting of the Committee during the summer session of the Council had been purely incidental.

15. Mr. MATSUDAIRA (Japan) agreed with the representative of New Zealand that it would have been advisable to hold the elections after all Member States had been given ample time to consider whether or not they wished to submit their candidature. Nevertheless, his delegation would not oppose the Brazilian proposal.

16. Mr. MEIJER (Netherlands) associated his delegation fully with the observations made by the representa-

tive of New Zealand. He would adopt a similar position if a vote were taken. His attitude was based entirely on his concept of proper procedure in the United Nations, where all Members had equal rights.

17. Mr. AUBOIN (France) stressed that his delegation's main concern was that the new Committee, to which it attached great importance, should be in a position to do serious and constructive work. It had been its view that the best interests of the Committee would not be served by elections at the present session. In that matter he entirely agreed with the remarks of the New Zealand representative. In view, however, of the general opinion that the matter was urgent he would not oppose the Brazilian proposal.

18. Mr. DUDLEY (United Kingdom) felt that there were strong arguments on both sides, and strong feelings had been expressed in favour of an early election on the part of some. He had been impressed by the earnestness with which the Brazilian representative had put his case, while the views of the New Zealand representative had been expressed very persuasively. He regretted the former's suggestion that there was any ill will in the Council towards the Committee for Industrial Development; he hoped that any belief that it existed had been dispelled. He did not think that it would be helpful if a roll-call vote were taken on the Brazilian proposal but would suggest rather that, at the end of the discussion, the President should inform the Council what the consensus of its members was. In order that his motive in suggesting that should not be misunderstood he would state that in the event of a vote he would vote in favour, but on the ground that that seemed to be the general will of the Council and not for any other reason.

19. Mr. PAZHAWAK (Afghanistan) said that he had listened with great interest to the statements made in order to discover whether there were any real objections to the holding of the elections at the present session, but no such objections had been made. The Brazilian representative had presented a very strong case, and his delegation fully supported his proposal. He hoped that the proposal would be adopted unanimously, without a vote. The main concern should be the interests of the under-developed countries as a whole.

20. In reply to a question from the PRESIDENT, Mr. PENTEADO (Brazil) said that he would not insist that a roll-call vote be taken on his delegation's proposal.

21. The PRESIDENT said that in that case no vote would be taken on the proposal. Although not all members of the Council had spoken he had gained the impression from the statements made that several members felt very strongly that the elections to the Committee for Industrial Development should be held at the present session. Other members, on the other hand, felt that on grounds of principle the normal procedure should be followed and the election held at the next session. Those holding that view, however, did not intend seriously to oppose the Brazilian proposal. It thus appeared to be the majority opinion of the Council that the elections in question should take place at the current session. Those elections would therefore be held in connexion with item 17 of the Council's agenda.

It was so decided.

PROPOSAL FOR THE INCLUSION IN THE PROVISIONAL AGENDA FOR THE THIRTIETH SESSION OF THE QUESTION OF A STUDY OF THE ECONOMIC

AND SOCIAL ASPECTS OF GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT (E/L.861, E/L.868)

22. Mr. SOBOLEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) introduced his delegation's draft resolution (E/L.861), by which the Council would include in the agenda for its thirtieth session an item entitled "Study of the economic and social aspects of general and complete disarmament", and would request the Secretary-General to prepare and submit to the Council at that session a preliminary report setting forth ideas and recommendations on practical steps which might usefully be taken in the United Nations with a view to studying the economic and social aspects of disarmament. The proposal flowed directly from General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV) which had been so warmly welcomed by the peoples of the world, for all agreed that, as the resolution stated, the question of general and complete disarmament was the most important one facing the world. That was indeed the case, for on the settlement of that question depended the fate of the world—whether it was heading towards a new war or towards material prosperity for all. Although the idea of general and complete disarmament was gaining more and more support all over the world, there were at the same time many who feared the economic consequences of disarmament, particularly in the capitalist countries. If only for their benefit, therefore, the subject should be considered and the various questions arising in connexion with disarmament and its economic and social effects should be answered. It was the task of the Economic and Social Council to help the world community gain a clearer view of the effects of disarmament. The Council could not evade the issue since it was clearly within its competence to help bring about a situation which would vastly increase the possibilities for the fulfilment by the United Nations of its obligations under Article 55 of its Charter.

23. He would like to make some suggestions as to how the study of the economic and social aspects of general and complete disarmament should be carried out. In the first place the extent of the means and resources which would be released as a result of the adoption of disarmament measures or measures leading to disarmament should be ascertained. It was well known that hundreds of millions of dollars and vast human resources were being spent annually on the maintenance of the armaments race, laying heavy burdens on taxpayers and consumers and workers generally, and it was easy to imagine the effect on general prosperity, if all that money, labour, energy and knowledge were devoted to constructive ends. The study his delegation proposed would reveal the incalculable benefits, economic, social, cultural and other, to be derived from general and complete disarmament, not for one country or one group of countries alone but for all countries in the world. In the first place, however, the study should concentrate on the possibilities disarmament would open up for the under-developed countries. Their economic plight was well known and the deplorably low standards of living of their people. The United Nations economists had calculated that the under-developed countries needed some \$14,000 million annually in order to cure their economic backwardness in a short time. The study his delegation proposed would show that that money could be obtained without difficulty if measures of partial or complete disarmament were implemented. Those countries' economies would gain much from the productive use of the sums they them-

selves at present wasted on military purposes—sums calculated at some \$5,000 million a year.

24. Disarmament would also permit the industrially advanced countries greatly to increase their assistance to the less developed countries. Even if they devoted only a small proportion of the sums released by disarmament to that purpose, a new economic era would arise in Asia, Africa and Latin America. For example, one-tenth of the sum now being spent on armaments would suffice to build forty metallurgical works of the kind being constructed at Bhilai in India, or ten Aswan dams. The Soviet Union, for its part, had always expressed its readiness to co-operate with other countries in giving help to the under-developed countries from the resources released by disarmament.

25. To those who feared that disarmament would lead to economic crises and other difficulties he could say that the Soviet Union, which had recently drastically reduced its armed forces, had experienced no economic difficulties as a result; on the contrary, the tempo of the country's development had increased as a result. The only problems which had arisen had been those connected with the re-training of the men demobilized from the army but those matters had been dealt with successfully in an orderly way and the Soviet Union would be glad to give other countries the benefit of its experience in that respect. Whether or not the Western countries would encounter difficulties in converting their economies from a war-time to a peace-time structure was a question which could well be answered by the study his delegation had proposed. His delegation had proposed. His delegation considered that the conversion could take place without particular shocks or difficulties. The problems had been far greater, after all, at the end of the Second World War than they would be if disarmament were gradually introduced. Not that he wished to minimize the difficulties which a number of Western countries would undoubtedly have to face. However, the proposed study would help those countries successfully to overcome them. It would also reveal the positive advantages to be derived from disarmament: for example, the enormous burden of direct and indirect taxes which now swallowed up a large part of the incomes of workers in Western countries would be reduced. The reduction of taxation would greatly improve the material conditions of the population, and the increased demand for durable consumer goods would bring with it an increase in employment. Disarmament would also permit the liquidation of the national debt which had reached astronomical figures in some countries, and it would reduce those inflationary tendencies which meant higher prices and the reduction of the real incomes of the workers.

26. Another important item of study would be the opportunities disarmament would open up for an increase in international trade, which was at present seriously affected both in its structure and in its direction by the armaments race. Militarization destroyed the traditional economic links between the countries of the East and the West and created unfavourable conditions for many articles, particularly raw materials. Disarmament would remove artificial barriers to world trade and would greatly increase the exchange of goods between all countries and make it easier to grant and receive foreign loans. At the same time the increase in the purchasing power of the population as a result of the reduction of taxes would lead to an increase in the volume of goods available, both capital and consumer. Large additional external

markets would thus be opened up and so would opportunities for the investment of the capital released. The end of militarization would also mean the stabilization of certain markets, particularly those for raw materials, and certain harmful practices such as those connected with the formation of strategic stockpiles would be brought to an end. The stabilization of the prices of certain basic raw materials would have a very beneficial effect on the foreign exchange positions of a great many under-developed countries and would guarantee them the resources they needed for the purchase of essential equipment and other goods. Disarmament would remove any justification for the discriminatory limitations at present placed on trade with the socialist countries. An increase in international trade would be of benefit to all countries, large and small, developed and under-developed alike, and would prevent the occurrence of any economic disturbances as the result of disarmament. That was a view shared by economists and statesmen in all countries.

27. The economic and social aspects of disarmament were many and complicated. All should be the subject of study and research. Such study and research could naturally not be undertaken by national organizations; it could be done only by the United Nations with the active co-operation of Member States. That was why the USSR delegation had submitted its proposal; he hoped that the Council would give it serious consideration and be able to adopt it.

28. Mr. DUDLEY (United Kingdom) said that the item was a procedural one, and that long statements on matters of substance would not be in order. However, he would make a few comments in reply to those made by the USSR representative. He did not need to prove that the United Kingdom earnestly desired disarmament; no country had taken more positive steps to achieve it. His country had also been among the first to recognize that real disarmament could result in the release of funds for economic development, and he quoted a statement to that effect by the United Kingdom Minister of State, Mr. Ormsby-Gore, at a meeting of the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva. However, that was a long-term goal, and it was necessary to think of the needs of the under-developed countries in more practical terms, and give the maximum aid now, without waiting for possible future developments. Mr. Ormsby-Gore had made that point also, speaking in the Second Committee (616th meeting) at the fourteenth session of the General Assembly. The draft resolution might be taken to imply that preliminary planning was necessary because disarmament might lead to economic disruption in the non-Communist world, but the United Kingdom was not as concerned about that as Marxist textbooks might lead one to think, and looked forward to an upsurge of production for peaceful purposes when disarmament became a reality. But, however bright that future might be, neither the Council nor the Secretariat was able to draw up a blueprint for it. The United Kingdom Government and its economists had learnt that even to forecast demands for coal or electric power, for example, had many pitfalls. Long-range economic forecasting of a hypothetical degree of disarmament such as that proposed in the Soviet draft resolution would be an impractical academic exercise and could not lead to any reliable conclusions. That did not mean that those who did not support that draft resolution were abandoning their hopes of disarmament, but merely that they

did not consider that any useful purpose would be served if the Council indulged in any such academic exercise at its current or forthcoming sessions.

29. Mr. PHILLIPS (United States of America) said that the United States had been a pioneer both in trying to bring about disarmament under effective international control and in promoting the idea of large-scale assistance to countries that were recovering from war or under-developed countries striving to improve their standard of living. But in his delegation's view, any Council resolution linking those two questions would hinder rather than promote either of those two aims. In 1946 the United States had consulted other Governments about disarmament and peaceful relations among countries. The United States, which at that time had had a monopoly of atomic bombs, had nevertheless offered to work towards an agreement to abolish such weapons subject to sufficient control to ensure honest compliance, an essential proviso in view of every country's duty to ensure its own security and that of any other country whose security was bound up with its own. Unfortunately, the USSR Government had rejected that historic offer. The United States had none the less demobilized a great part of its armed forces, although the next most powerful State, the Soviet Union, had maintained its own armed forces largely intact. The massive demobilization that had then taken place in the United States, far from harming its economy, had led to a great increase in economic activity. The USSR representative's statement had implied that some countries were not eager to promote disarmament because of its supposed adverse economic effects; although that view had been expressed previously by the Soviet Union, Mr. Khrushchev had stated during his visit to the United States that he was not convinced that the United States would suffer serious economic consequences from disarmament. The United States had striven for fourteen years to achieve disarmament under effective international control, and it wished to assure the Council that efforts to achieve an equitable and workable agreement would be continued.

30. However, the Council was not a body with responsibilities in the field of disarmament, and he would therefore turn to the economic aspects.

31. The United States had no need to apologize for its achievements in the economic co-operation field; it had been the first country to provide large-scale economic aid, and was the largest participator in bilateral and multilateral arrangements for economic co-operation. At present there was little relationship between a country's military expenditure and the amount of aid it provided; the present military strength of the Soviet Union was about equal to that of the United States, but the economic aid provided by the United States was many times greater than that provided by the Soviet Union. It was true that as the Soviet Union had provided no official figures to the United Nations relating to the magnitude of its bilateral aid programmes, it was difficult to establish an exact comparison, but the figures for assistance provided through the United Nations and its specialized agencies showed that the United States pledged twenty times as much as the Soviet Union to the two United Nations technical assistance programmes; and the United States participated in the work of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Monetary Fund and the International Finance Corporation, whereas the Soviet Union did not. Mr. Khrushchev had made it clear on a number of occasions that the Soviet Union preferred to provide

aid through bilateral programmes. United States aid through multilateral and bilateral arrangements amounted to many thousands of million dollars.

32. The United States was well aware that through disarmament, funds might become available to improve the welfare of millions of people of the less developed areas, and statements to that effect had been made by both President Truman and President Eisenhower. That aspect had also been referred to in General Assembly resolution 724 A (VIII) in 1953, when the United States and many other countries had hoped that agreement on internationally supervised world disarmament might be reached in the near future. But the United States had considered that the problems facing the under-developed countries were much too urgent to wait on eventual disarmament. It had accordingly taken the lead in establishing the new International Development Association. The inference to be drawn from the USSR draft resolution was that the needs of the under-developed countries could wait, and that the United Nations could devote its energy to academic studies rather than practical forms of assistance to those countries. It was wholly unrealistic to look to disarmament as a source of additional funds for economic development before any disarmament agreement had been reached. If, as could happen, no such agreement were reached, any Council resolution linking economic assistance with disarmament might serve as an excuse not to make the maximum effort to assist economic development now, and might thus prove to be a backward step.

33. The USSR draft resolution referred to "the economic and social aspects of disarmament"; it did not specifically refer to the previous General Assembly resolutions—resolutions 724 A (VIII), 1148 (XII) and 1252 (XIII)—though the last preambular paragraph of the draft resolution reflected the idea expressed in resolution 724 A (VIII). The Council's principal aim was to help the economic development of the under-developed countries, and the draft resolution did not contribute to that aim because the action it proposed in operative paragraph 3 was quite impracticable. The Secretary-General would be requested to submit ideas and recommendations relating to the study of the economic and social aspects of disarmament, without knowing when or at what pace such disarmament would take place. Such a study would have to be based on information from Governments about what industries would be affected by disarmament, and many Governments would be unable or unwilling to provide such information. The draft resolution was open to criticism because of its one-sided treatment of General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV), but there would be no point in suggesting amendments, since the whole aim of the draft resolution was misguided.

34. The United States would continue its efforts in the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee to achieve disarmament under effective international control so that a discussion of the economic and social aspects might become fruitful. In the meantime the Council should concentrate on existing economic problems and leave disarmament questions to the current Geneva conference and to the forthcoming summit meeting. His delegation accordingly hoped that the USSR representative would not press his proposal.

35. Mr. MATSUDAIRA (Japan) said that Japan earnestly hoped for an early agreement on disarmament and believed that when it was achieved funds should be

made available for assistance to the less developed areas. He referred to General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV), and said that until the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee succeeded in agreeing on measures of disarmament, nothing could be known about the arrangements that might be reached and hence about what funds would be available; if the Council took any action before an agreement was reached, it would only be on the basis of hypothetical calculations and any conclusions that were reached could not be sound. His delegation could not agree that it was realistic to embark on the proposed study at the present stage, or that the time would be ripe to discuss the matter at the Council's thirtieth session.

36. Mr. MICHALOWSKI (Poland) said that the economic aspects of disarmament were a major element in appraising the economic situation, and yet those were the aspects that had received the least attention. The USSR draft resolution amounted to no more than a request that the Council, as the highest United Nations body in the economic field, should show some interest in the problem by including the question in its agenda at the thirtieth session. In view of the broad and complex nature of the problem, no time should be lost in undertaking its study. The combined annual national products of the world amounted to between \$700,000 million and \$900,000 million, of which the share of the less developed part of the capitalist world, with a population of 1,300 million people, was between \$180,000 million and \$200,000 million. World expenditure on armaments was estimated at \$92,500 million, of which about \$83,000 million was spent by seventeen of the most economically developed countries. It was thus clear that military expenditure had a tremendous impact on the world economic situation. It was agreed that unless there was a massive and prolonged transfer of wealth to the less developed countries the maldistribution of wealth between the developed and the under-developed countries would be increasingly marked. The above figures showed that military expenditure consumed over 10 per cent of the total national products of the whole world, and the percentage was even higher in the most developed countries. Clearly any transfer of wealth to the less developed areas must be linked with disarmament.

37. Any substantial change in military expenditure as a result of disarmament would have multiple effects on the domestic affairs of all countries, as well as making possible a vast increase in the funds available for the economic development of the less developed areas. At present those effects could only be estimated, but nothing had been done to ascertain the extent of the problem or to analyse the economic and social effects. Even a preliminary study would require long discussions, and his delegation therefore disagreed with those who held the USSR resolution to be premature.

38. The Council should undertake the study independently of the disarmament discussions currently taking place. The Polish delegation was optimistic about the outcome of those discussions; it was unthinkable that they should not succeed, since the alternative was a universal catastrophe. It might be that the ideal solution of a general and complete disarmament might not be attained immediately, and that only temporary or partial measures would be agreed on in the first instance, but those possible variations could be foreseen in the proposed study. It was the Council's duty under Article 55 and Article 62, paragraph 1, of the

Charter to undertake such a study and to initiate discussions on the subject.

39. All countries now agreed on the need for a planned approach to economic problems, and it was undeniable that disarmament would have vast economic implications. The Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee, of which Poland was a member, was considering the political and military aspects of disarmament, but it was not qualified to consider the economic aspects; that was clearly the Council's duty, and there was no danger that in so doing it would in any way interfere with or duplicate the work of that Committee. If it was suggested that the draft resolution had political propaganda aspects, the propaganda was for disarmament and should therefore win general support. The doubts that some delegations might have about the effect of the draft resolution on current or forthcoming disarmament discussions might be allayed by re-drafting, but he appealed to the Council to recognize where its own duty lay by accepting the basic idea of the draft resolution and including the proposed item in the agenda of its thirtieth session.

40. Mr. PAZHAWAK (Afghanistan) said that his delegation was attracted to the draft resolution, not only because it was concerned about what might be the impact of disarmament on small under-developed countries. The main concern of those countries was not to find funds but how and on what terms to find them so as to secure their national existence, particularly when economic weapons might well be substituted for military weapons. It was hardly necessary to say that Afghanistan would always support any efforts to divert funds from military expenditure to peaceful purposes. There was no reason why the economic aspects of disarmament should not be considered by the Council. He did not agree with the United Kingdom representative that it would be imprudent to attempt to draw up plans for the bright future for which all hoped. There could be no possible objection to the preambular part of the draft resolution, and his delegation would also support operative paragraphs 1 and 2. However, he had some doubts about operative paragraph 3; if it was voted on, his delegation might abstain from voting, but he hoped that the USSR representative would agree to reconsider it. If the rest of the draft resolution were adopted, the content of paragraph 3 could be discussed at the Council's next session.

41. Mr. DE LEQUERICA (Spain) also agreed that the preambular paragraphs were unexceptionable. No one could object to the idea that funds diverted from armaments should be spent on assistance to under-developed countries. However, he did not believe that the adoption of such a resolution would increase the chances of success of the current negotiations; the Council should wait for a positive achievement in disarmament before embarking on plans for the disposal of the funds that might become available. To do so now would be unrealistic and would not enhance the Council's reputation; moreover he was inclined to agree with the view that such a course might provide an excuse to direct attention to distant prospects at the expense of the work that was waiting to be done near at hand. He would therefore be unable to support the proposal.

42. Mr. AUBOIN (France) pointed out that France had been one of the first to draw public attention to the significance which an agreement on disarmament would have in respect to the raising of living standards generally and those of the under-developed countries

in particular. France was an active participant in the current negotiations on disarmament and hoped that concrete results would be achieved in the near future. In the meantime and without waiting for such results it was devoting a very high percentage of its national income to the development of the under-developed countries; in both 1958 and 1959 the figure had exceeded \$1,000 million. He believed that the Council should concentrate its attention on constructive work and was firmly convinced that a proposal such as that submitted by the USSR would be of no practical use unless and until there was agreement on disarmament. Therefore he did not think the item in question should be included in the agenda of the thirtieth session.

43. Mr. SOSA RODRIGUEZ (Venezuela) said that he had studied the USSR draft resolution with interest. He was not opposed to the substance of the proposal; his main quarrel was with the timing. His delegation's attitude towards both disarmament and aid for the development of the under-developed countries was well known. Its fervent desire was to see the disarmament problem settled in a way which would remove the prospect of war and make funds available for peaceful development purposes, particularly in the under-developed countries. Everyone, he believed, shared that desire.

44. As regards the use that should be made of funds which might be released as a result of disarmament, he had always held that due attention should be given to the interests of the under-developed countries. That was why the Venezuelan delegation had supported General Assembly resolutions 1148 (XII) and 1252 (XIII) and would support any resolution that specified that when sufficient progress had been made in disarmament the question of the use to be made of the funds released should be studied. That, however, was not the line taken in the USSR proposal. It raised a practical problem. What the under-developed countries wanted was assistance in improving their living conditions as rapidly as possible. They did not want their progress to be dependent on the prior attainment of very lofty ideals which were not likely to be achieved for a considerable time. It was therefore wrong to connect the question of aid to the under-developed countries with the disarmament question. The linking of the two questions would complicate matters still further and be detrimental to the interests of the under-developed countries. Thus, while he could support the preamble of the USSR draft resolution, he considered that operative paragraph 1 was mistimed. There was no point in carrying out the studies until it was known what funds would be available as a result of disarmament. It was always better to put such funds as were available to immediate use instead of postponing using them in the hope that they might be supplemented later so that more grandiose schemes could be undertaken.

45. Since discussions on disarmament were still in their early stages it would be better to postpone consideration of the proposals in the USSR draft resolution

until tangible results had been achieved. To do so would not be acting against the spirit or the letter of previous resolutions but adopting a practical attitude. His delegation, together with those of Chile and Costa Rica, was submitting a draft resolution (E/L.868) to that effect. It contained the basic principles set forth in the USSR draft resolution but recommended postponement of the discussion of the problem of the economic and social aspects of disarmament.

46. Mr. SCHWEITZER (Chile) said that he had little to add to the statement made by the Venezuelan representative. Chile loved peace but was not influential enough to make any really significant contribution to the solution of the disarmament problem. It suffered nevertheless as a consequence of the failure to find a solution to that problem because funds which would be available for the development of the under-developed countries if it were solved were going instead into the purchase of armaments. Despite the fact that the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee was now considering all the various proposals put forward by States in an endeavour to solve the disarmament problem, he did not think the situation warranted hopes of immediate concrete results.

47. As the President of Chile had stated in 1959 in a speech which had subsequently been circulated to the Members of the General Assembly, it was not enough to speak of disarmament; what was required was to find a practical way of making it a reality. Even a small country like Chile had in present circumstances to devote funds which were urgently needed for development purposes to the purchase of armaments. The Organization of American States was now considering ways and means of giving practical expression to the views which the President of Chile had expressed in 1959 but although there was wide-spread support for such measures in Latin America it did not follow that they would be put into practice. It was only when success had been achieved in that direction that a study of the economic and social aspects of disarmament could usefully be undertaken. If the Council were to devote its attention to the subject at the present time, it would be doing so at the expense of practical work that could be done in other fields. No one knew when disarmament would be achieved or by what means it would be achieved. It was therefore wrong to link disarmament with aid to the under-developed countries. The circumstances were entirely different from those that had existed in the transition period after the end of the Second World War. Then the world had been confronted with a clear-cut problem which had had to be solved.

48. He thought the Council would be well advised to turn its attention to realities and postpone considering the economic and social aspects of disarmament until some real progress had been made in the field of disarmament.

The meeting rose at 6 p.m.