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MEETING**

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Chairman: Mr. Frederick H. BOLAND (Ireland).

AGENDA ITEM 13

**Report of the Trusteeship Council (A/3822) (*continued*)
HEARING OF PETITIONERS**

At the invitation of the Chairman, Mr. Félix Roland Moumié, representative of the Union des populations du Cameroun, Mr. Ndeh Ntumazah, representative of One Kamerun, and Mr. Michel Dookingue and Mr. Iban Ngounga, representatives of the Union nationale des étudiants camerounais, took places at the Committee table.

1. Mr. MOUMIE (Union des populations du Cameroun), speaking on behalf of the Union des populations du Cameroun (UPC) and the Jeunesse démocratique du Cameroun, (JDC), which had authorized him to represent them, thanked the Committee for having granted him a hearing. He reserved the right to comment later on the very important statement the French representative had made at the previous meeting, when he had been able to study it carefully. He would content himself with describing the situation as it existed in the Cameroons — a situation which was not altered by that statement — and the methods which he advocated to ensure respect for the Charter in that country. The hearing granted to him by the Committee was an indication that the United Nations was setting its face against serving the interests of any Power whatsoever and intended to ensure the triumph of law, justice and peace in every part of the world.

2. He recalled General Assembly resolution 1211 (XII) and the series of measures that had been advocated during the discussion which had preceded its adoption. He declared that, although the representatives of France and the United Kingdom had voted in favour of that resolution, their Governments had carried out a policy which was totally opposed to it. On 16 October 1958, before the United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in West Africa, 1958, had left New York, he had handed it a memorandum in which he had listed a number of acts committed by the Administering Authorities in the Cameroons which violated the spirit and letter of the resolution in question.

3. Instead of the full and complete amnesty urged by all the petitioners and recommended by the United Nations, France had merely decreed a *grâce amnistiante*, (remission of sentence by way of amnesty). The

French delegation had done its utmost to prove to the Trusteeship Council that the application of the measures of clemency had been restricted because of the existence of so-called terrorists or common criminals. He referred to instances in which patriots had been condemned to death on the mere evidence of paid informers and had been deprived of their defence, since their French counsel had been deported from the Territory. In April 1958, of the 364 political prisoners in Dschang prison, 324, among them some young children, had been officially charged with terrorism. The proportion was similar in other prisons. The charge of terrorism was constantly used. The conditions required for the application of the *grâce amnistiante* were designed to prevent the so-called undesirables from taking advantage of it. In his opinion, that constituted proof of a firm determination to get rid of the UPC.

4. The total military strength had risen from 30,000 in November 1957 to 60,000, and additional reinforcements had been sent, equipped with modern weapons, in order to ensure the success of the campaign of genocide which had been organized with the object of making the Cameroons a politically reliable area.

5. Since 1957, the United Kingdom authorities had been repeatedly violating both their own laws and the United Nations Charter. He mentioned cases of arrests and summary executions carried out with the object of winning over patriots from the UPC.

6. More than 50,000 persons, including women, old men and children, lived in wretched conditions in the concentration camps.

7. The French administration had not succeeded in depriving the UPC of its status as a genuine spokesman and the measures adopted to that end had been a total failure. The Franco-Cameroonian Government had fiercely opposed a motion calling for independence for the Territory in 1959, because it thought early independence would prevent the total elimination of the "undesirables". It had decided to advocate independence in January 1960. That was a demagogic statement, but it was the invincible will of the Cameroonian people to achieve its national unity and independence that had brought about such a development, which was contrary to the position the French delegation had taken at the twelfth session of the General Assembly. He hoped that France would go further and take a step towards the establishment of true harmony.

8. He hoped that the trusteeship would not be terminated before independence had been obtained, and not until certain preliminaries had been recommended by the United Nations and carried out by the Administering Authorities, until harmony had been restored and citizens had been assured of their freedoms, and until independence had been firmly established by a democratic transfer of powers.

9. He recalled that in February 1958 the assembly of the Western Cameroons had asked for independence by 1959 and that, in April 1958, the assembly of traditional chiefs of the Western Cameroons had decided almost unanimously in favour of separation at all costs from Nigeria. At about the same time, the Union nationale des associations traditionnelles du Kamerun, which considered unity and independence to be prerequisites of its non-political programme, had reiterated its adherence to the national programme. In August 1958, the Union nationale des étudiants camerounais, including students from both parts of the Cameroons, had signed a resolution denouncing any action designed to perpetuate the existing partition of the country, as also the statements of those who professed to be in favour of unification without seeking to achieve it. The resolution further demanded that a meeting should be held to consider the procedure for effecting unification and it appealed to the United Nations to make arrangements for a referendum on unification to be held in the first quarter of 1959; it asked that both zones of the Cameroons should be granted independence before the referendum, that the repression in the Cameroons under French administration should cease and that life should be restored before any consultation of the people was held.

10. Mr. Ahidjo, the head of the so-called Government in the Eastern Cameroons, professed to be in favour of unification and independence. His predecessor, Mr. M'bida, had also called recently for independence and the termination of trusteeship, because he had noticed that France had no specific programme for the full emancipation and the complete and real independence of the Cameroons, which, he said, was treated like a foreign State, and because other countries which had developed along the same lines as the Cameroons had already become independent; Nigeria would soon be independent, and many French colonies would be granted internal self-government after the constitutional referendum. Mr. Mida had gone on to say that independence seemed the best way of maintaining friendly relations with France, since some Frenchmen could not discard their colonialist habits. He felt that Mr. Mida's change of position testified to the strength of the popular trend in favour of independence. The Nigeria Constitutional Conference held in London in September 1958 had manifested the truth of that observation.

11. In addition to his statement on the situation and the reactions of the Cameroonian people, he wished to give some account of the economic possibilities of the Cameroons which would explain why France was more than ever determined to retain that territory, in order to draw from it the wealth which it had lost in Guinea. In the Eastern Cameroons the arable land represented 25 per cent of the total area. In addition to food crops, it produced an abundance of export crops which gave the Cameroons a prominent place among African producers of cocoa, coffee, bananas, palm oil, cotton, tobacco for cigar wrappers, rubber and tea. Animal husbandry was on a scale which made the export of meat possible. Forests covered 33 per cent of the land area in the Eastern Cameroons and yielded a variety of valuable woods. From 1959 onwards the hydroelectric power station at Edéa would be able to produce more electricity than the total amount at present consumed in Morocco and Algeria. There were considerable possibilities of development

in the future and generating costs were very low. From the beginning of 1959 the Cameroons would be in a position to produce one-third of French aluminium requirements. Although little prospecting had been done, the sub-soil was very rich in various kinds of minerals, in particular bauxite, iron and other ores, petroleum and coal. The population, although unevenly distributed, was full of vitality and endurance and able to adapt itself to modern techniques. Without political stability, however, capital investment could not but be a risky matter.

12. In August 1958, through the Swiss Embassy in Cairo, the UPC had sent General de Gaulle offers to negotiate, which reflected its concern to spare the lives of the Cameroonian people and to live in peace. Those offers had been preceded by letters, to which the French authorities had vouchsafed no reply other than the murder of Mr. Um Nyobé, the General Secretary of the UPC. In addressing themselves to General de Gaulle, the UPC had hoped that he would break with the traditional degrading policy of his predecessors. He would be all the more able to do so in that he was not responsible for the existing state of affairs in the Cameroons, that there were legal arguments which made it possible to reconsider the dissolution of the UPC, the power and representative character of which was no longer questioned, and that he had declared that he would grant independence to the territories which asked for it. By accepting the offers made by the UPC, General de Gaulle would be expressing his gratitude to those who had helped him to rebuild an army in the dark hours of Hitlerism. Independence would in no way entail the severance of economic and cultural ties with either France or the United Kingdom but would inaugurate a relationship based on co-operation, equality and mutual respect. It was even possible that future relations would be established on the basis of the new French Constitution. He hoped that, in view of the wide powers conferred on him under article 92 of the new French Constitution, General de Gaulle would not disappoint the hopes that the Cameroonians placed in him.

13. Referring to the Visiting Mission which had left New York on 18 October 1958 for the Cameroons, he expressed the view that the United Nations Visiting Mission to the Trust Territories of the Cameroons under British Administration and the Cameroons under French Administration, 1955, had made some serious mistakes. The conclusions it had reached had been severely criticized by a considerable section of world opinion and by the Cameroonian people. On 25 February 1958 the International League for the Rights of Man had asked the Trusteeship Council to revise its attitude towards the UPC. The Administering Authorities were endeavouring to abolish the right of petition by contending that the United Nations should no longer take into account views expressed by parties which had been dissolved, however arbitrarily. The decisions of the General Assembly prevailed over those of the Trusteeship Council and, in view of the events which had occurred, he was of the opinion that the General Assembly should go further than did Trusteeship Council resolution 1907 (XXII) which set out the terms of reference of the present Visiting Mission.

14. Since both France and the Nigeria Constitutional Conference had recommended independence in 1960, the transfer of powers should take place not later

than September 1959, so that at its fourteenth session the General Assembly could confirm the choice of the Cameroonians and subsequently terminate the trusteeship over the territory. He would request the General Assembly to send a commission to consult the Cameroonians by means of a referendum on the question of unification and independence, in accordance with Article 76 b of the Charter, and to organize elections to a constituent assembly which would appoint a Government competent to negotiate. Order should be restored either by the withdrawal of foreign troops or by the dispatch of an international police force which would remain until the results of the referendum were made known. All political freedoms should be restored and emergency decrees and regulations should be rescinded. Journalists from States Members of the United Nations should be free to move about as they wished. The referendum for or against immediate reunification and independence should be organized by the commission appointed by the General Assembly, the membership of which should properly reflect the various shades of opinion to be found within the United Nations.

15. By terminating the trusteeship, the United Nations would save a considerable sum of money and would greatly enhance its prestige in Africa South of the Sahara. If the French and United Kingdom Governments were really resolved to respect the Charter and the right of peoples to self-determination, they should do their utmost to facilitate the organization of the referendum, which the Cameroonians had been requesting since 1953.

16. In conclusion, he thanked the Committee for having granted him a hearing and said that he was prepared to speak again at a later stage of the discussion. Events in the Cameroons were arousing increasing anxiety in the world, and the United Nations, the basic objectives of which were to ensure peace everywhere and to safeguard the right of every people to independence, should immediately take whatever steps might be necessary to put an end to that state of affairs.

17. Mr. NTUMAZAH (One Kamerun) reviewed briefly the history of the Cameroons since it had first come into contact with the outside world. Its people had been carried away into slavery; its soil had been made a battleground in the First World War, a struggle to which it had not been a party; its territory had been divided without regard for the affinities between the peoples of the two parts or for the viability of either; and its young men had been called upon to give their lives for the cause of freedom in the Second World War. The hopes for its own freedom which it had placed in the United Nations had been betrayed by the Administering Authorities as they sought to impose new forms of colonialism in place of the old and misinformed the United Nations concerning the true wishes of the Cameroonians.

18. Both Administering Authorities had tried to destroy the national identity of the Cameroons and to suppress the political consciousness of the people. During the past year France, instead of heeding the General Assembly's resolutions calling upon it to end bloodshed in the Territory and to establish target dates for the attainment of independence, had tortured and exiled the advocates of unification and independence, had banned the movements led by them and had

extended to the whole of the South-Eastern Cameroons the concentration of troops which during the previous four years had been limited to Sanaga-Maritime and Baham. Those troops, on orders from the French Government, had killed defenceless Cameroonian men, women and children by burning, electrocution and drowning. The French Press and radio had announced with satisfaction the murder of the political leader, Mr. Ruben Um Nyobé. The United Kingdom, instead of denouncing the French atrocities as the Cameroonians had expected it to do, was co-operating with the French by arresting the advocates of unification in the Territory under its administration and delivering them to the French for execution. In March 1958 ten such persons had been delivered to the French from Bamenda and had been slaughtered in the open markets of Baham and Bafoussam; others had recently been delivered from Kumba and had likewise been murdered.

19. Now that Nigeria was about to become independent the United Kingdom Government was determined that the Cameroons under its administration should be integrated with that new nation rather than reunified with the Cameroons under French administration. The French Government for its part had said that it would not grant independence to the Cameroons until the Trusteeship Agreement had been terminated. That statement could have but one meaning: that the French intended to incorporate the Territory into the French Community. In the circumstances it was the duty of the United Nations to conduct a referendum in both Trust Territories to determine whether the people wanted unification and independence. The fact that it was considering a consultation in the Cameroons under British administration alone on the issue of integration with Nigeria was disturbing. There was nothing in the United Nations Charter to suggest that integration might be a means of terminating trusteeship agreements. The Cameroons had been one country when the United Kingdom and France had been made responsible for its administration and it should be allowed to accede to independence as a single entity. He drew attention in that connexion to the joint statement signed on 29 June 1954 by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the President of the United States of America in which it was stated that in the case of nations divided against their will the United Kingdom and United States Governments would continue to seek to achieve unity through free elections supervised by the United Nations. The question of union with other African countries was purely an internal matter for African nations to decide after they had attained their independence. Attempts by Administering Authorities to influence the people of Trust Territories in favour of integration with other countries before independence had been attained represented a new form of imperialism.

20. The United Kingdom authorities were at present doing everything in their power to persuade the people of the Cameroons under their administration to choose integration with Nigeria. In December 1958, on the pretext of celebrating the Victoria anniversary, a party consisting of the Prime Minister and Governor-General of Nigeria and members of the royal family was to visit the Territory to urge support for the integrationist parties in the Southern Cameroons election scheduled for January 1959, which the Secretary of State for the Colonies had said would decide the future of that part of the

country. In the meantime the police were intimidating those who favoured secession from Nigeria and had arrested a number of them, beginning with the treasurer of One Kamerun.

21. An election would not be a fair means of ascertaining the will of the people, for the United Kingdom authorities had established the electoral districts in such a way as to make it easier for the integrationists to win. For example, Victoria Division, from which the integrationist leaders came, had only 70,000 inhabitants yet it was divided into four constituencies with one representative each in the Southern Cameroons House of Assembly, whereas the South-Eastern Native Authority in Bamenda, representing a population of more than 130,000 covered only three constituencies. The Minorities Commission dispatched to Nigeria by the Secretary of State for the Colonies had rejected elections as a means of settling national issues. If that was true of Nigeria, it was certainly true of the Cameroons. Hence if the United Nations should fail to oppose the Administering Authority's intention to hold a consultation on the issue of integration with Nigeria, his party would prefer a plebiscite to an election as a means of settling the matter, provided the following assurances were given: that the United Kingdom authorities should remain aloof from the contest, making no further releases in favour of integration and cancelling their plans to send representatives to the Territory to influence the voters; that the government vehicles now at the disposal of the integrationist parties should be withdrawn six months before the plebiscite to ensure that they did not give those parties an unfair advantage in putting their case before the voters; that freedom of movement, freedom of speech and freedom of public meetings should be guaranteed to all parties; that an international police force should proceed to the Territory not less than six months before the plebiscite; that non-Cameroonians should not be allowed to participate in the plebiscite—an essential provision if Nigerians were to be prevented from entering the Territory and casting votes in favour of integration; that a United Nations commission should consider the procedure for the immediate transfer to the Cameroons of the powers at present held by the Federation of Nigeria in the event of the voters choosing secession and should work out a unification plan; that the ban on certain political parties should be lifted and the deported leaders, who favoured secession, allowed unconditionally to return.

22. With those guarantees his party would agree to a plebiscite. Nevertheless, it would prefer that a United Nations commission should conduct a referendum in both Trust Territories simultaneously on the issue of unification. Such a referendum should take place before January 1960, for the Cameroons under French administration was scheduled to become independent at that time whereas Nigeria would not accede to independence until October 1960. Should the majority vote in favour of reunification the same commission could then proceed to conduct a general election to establish the Government of a unified sovereign Cameroonian State, which would take office in January 1960. If such a referendum was to be carried out it was essential that normal conditions should first be restored in both Territories, that the police and military forces of the Administering Authorities should be withdrawn and replaced by an

impartial police force made up of men from the non-colonial nations and that the decrees outlawing certain parties should be abrogated. The present Visiting Mission might be asked to include in its agenda the question of a consultation on unification, bearing in mind the motion for unification voted by the Legislative Assembly of the Cameroons under French administration and the many demands for unification expressed in the Cameroons under British administration, as noted by the 1955 Visiting Mission in its report (T/1226).

23. The Cameroonians recognized that they owed much to the Powers which had ruled them and the bonds linking them with the peoples of France and the United Kingdom would be strengthened once independence had been attained. All that they were asking for was the right to choose their own government and rule themselves in accordance with their own customs and traditions. To integrate a part of the Cameroons with Nigeria against the will of the people would only embitter future relations between Nigerians and Cameroonians. It was a credit to the United Kingdom that it had enabled divided groups among the Nigerians to unite with each other; surely it should do no less for the people of the Cameroons.

24. Mr. DOOKINGUE (Union nationale des étudiants camerounais) recalled a declaration made by the chairman of his association to the effect that the loi cadre of 23 June 1956 and the institutions which it had created had not solved the Cameroonian problem. The population as a whole continued to demand the immediate reunification and independence of the Cameroons. The rift, which was becoming deeper day by day, between the people and the new institutions imposed by force was evidence of the situation; and as a result of that rift, the Government of the Cameroons was obliged to resort more and more to anti-democratic methods. Cameroonian students had their share of responsibility in the solution of their country's problems; it was in fulfilment of that responsibility that the Union des étudiants camerounais had sent a spokesman to the Fourth Committee during the eleventh session of the General Assembly and it was for that reason that representatives of that association were speaking before the Committee at the current session. They would not have needed to do so had it not been for the fact that the tragic and painful situation that had prevailed in the Cameroons for the last three years had undergone no change.

25. The statement made by the French delegation at the previous meeting could not contradict the facts or furnish any guarantee that a just solution would be found for the problems arising from the present state of affairs. In resolution 1067 (XI) the General Assembly had expressed the hope that the Administering Authority would restore political activity to normal conditions and would bring to an end the tension which had characterized the political life of the Cameroons under French administration. Despite that recommendation, the General Assembly had been obliged to recognize ten months later, in resolution 1211 (XII), that there were continued tensions and disturbances in a certain area of the Cameroons under French administration and that the amnesty law had not been promulgated; it had gone on to express the hope that it would be possible to achieve conditions conducive to the early restoration of a normal situation in the disturbed area and to the furtherance of democratic progress in the Territory.

26. Prior to the adoption of the last-mentioned resolution, the UPC had made proposals for easing the political and moral tension in the Territory—proposals which had been fully endorsed by the Cameroonian students. On 13 July 1957 Mr. Um Nyobé, the General Secretary of the UPC, had sent a letter, enclosing three documents, to Mr. Mbida, the Prime Minister of the Cameroons. The first of those documents had been an article by Mr. Tchungi which had appeared on 6 May 1957 in the newspaper *Opinion du Cameroun* and in which he had stated that it was desirable that the Administration should endeavour to bring about an easing of the political situation, in particular by allowing Mr. Um Nyobé to stand as a candidate at the Sanaga-Maritime elections to the Legislative Assembly of the Cameroons. The second document enclosed with the letter had been Mr. Um Nyobé's reply, in which he had written that the Cameroonian crisis could be overcome by the adoption of certain measures: first, a full and complete amnesty, in which case the UPC would offer a guarantee that it would combat any policy of vengeance, whatever its source, and would be prepared to consider other guarantees provided that they were compatible with the principles for which it was fighting; secondly political measures, which would comprise the repeal or suspension of the Decree of 13 July 1955 in order to do away with the political void—and in that connexion the UPC would offer a guarantee that it would co-operate with the authorities in the maintenance of public order in its true sense—a solemn declaration by the French Government recognizing the independence and sovereignty of the Cameroons, and the replacement of the idea of a Trust State by that of a sovereign State, without making the departure of the trustees a prior condition for the accession of the Cameroons to independence; thirdly, a moral amnesty, a campaign of national reconciliation which would be based upon genuine mutual forbearance, would be non-political in character and could be directed by a committee representing a wide range of opinions, on which the authorities, all faiths, all sectors of public opinion and all branches of activity would be represented. The third document accompanying Mr. Um Nyobé's letter had been a memorandum for the attention of the French Government which he had sent to Mr. Messmer, High Commissioner of the French Republic in the Cameroons, and which set forth the UPC's proposals for easing political and moral tension and requested the French Government to state what action it intended to take on those proposals.

27. Even before the UPC had made its proposals known, the French Administration had decided on the policy it would adopt with regard to that organization. As *Le Monde* had said in its issue of 18 February 1958, two methods were open: either to suppress the movement and liquidate it, or to make political overtures which would give its leaders the chance to indicate whether they agreed or refused to play the democratic game. It was, however, the former of those methods that was selected. Mr. Mbida was a believer in strong measures and he had declared that anyone who tried to fight him would be crushed in a merciless struggle. It could thus be seen that the response of the French Government and of Mr. Mbida himself, when he became Prime Minister, to the UPC's constructive proposals was to treat them

with contempt and to continue, and indeed to intensify, the policy of repression. That was what had led a member of the Legislative Assembly of the Cameroons to say, on 24 October 1957, that the alarming situation in the Cameroons had been deliberately maintained by the Government.

28. The Cameroonian Government, supported by the High Commissioner, had tried to secure a more strict administration of justice under French law in the Cameroons. A mission entrusted with the task of urging magistrates to apply strong and speedy measures had been sent to the country. It had reached the conclusion that it was necessary to review some of the methods used in the administration of justice under French law in the Cameroons, in order that wrongdoers and persons of evil intent should cease disturbing the country. At the same time, the authorities had decided to expel from the Cameroons those lawyers who had remonstrated about the lack of evidence in support of the charges at the political trials and had requested that judgements based solely on the alleged intentions of those convicted should be set aside. Cameroonians suspected of nationalist feelings had been subjected to criminal proceedings or persecuted. Traditional chiefs like the traditional chief of Baham, in the Bamileké Region, had been deposed because of their political opinions. Serious disturbances had resulted, for which the Administration had blamed the UPC but which had in fact been due to the discontent of the people upon whom a new chief had been foisted. In the Legislative Assembly the real responsibility for the disturbances in the Bamileké Region had been laid at Mr. Mbida's door. Arbitrary measures had also been taken against ministers of religion and officials, whether black or white, who opposed Mr. Mbida's policy. Many Cameroonian students had found themselves deprived of their scholarships, and house searches had been made at the homes of several of them. Mr. Mbida, the Prime Minister, had tried to bring pressure to bear on the students' association and to induce it to make a public declaration that it recognized the Government which had resulted from the elections of 23 December 1956—elections whose validity the association questioned. The association had however maintained its stand more firmly than ever and at its congress held in September 1957 it had adopted a resolution reaffirming its previous position. As a result, in December 1957 the association had been ordered to vacate the premises which it occupied. Having succeeded in preventing the police from ejecting it from those premises, it had been brought before the French courts, but the fall of Mr. Mbida's Government had put an end to the proceedings.

29. Mr. NGOUNGA (Union nationale des étudiants camerounais), continuing the statement begun by Mr. Dookingue, said that in November 1957 the Mbida Government had sent Monsignor Mongo, the Bishop of Douala, to appeal to Mr. Um Nyobé to co-operate by standing as a candidate in the Sanaga-Maritime partial elections. The General Secretary of the UPC had rejected that proposal but had agreed to negotiate with Monsignor Mongo; the negotiations had resulted in the following compromise: the abolition of the "self-defence groups", whose task it was to kill all persons suspected of belonging to the dissolved organizations or to denounce those they suspected of

sympathizing with them; the withdrawal of military forces from occupied areas; the cessation of legal proceedings; an amnesty; negotiations between the French Government and the Cameroonian nationalists for a settlement of political problems. A few days later, Mr. Mbida had exhorted the "rebels" to abandon violent methods, promising them the Government's clemency. As that ultimatum had met with no response, Mr. Mbida had gone to Paris in December 1957 to ask for reinforcements in order to strike at the "agitators". Those measures had only served to increase the popular discontent, and the daily newspaper *Le Monde* had written on 18 February 1958 that the Mbida method had not led to any conclusive results and had asked whether there would now be an attempt to make political overtures.

30. The fact that Mr. Messmer, advocate of the policy of force, was replaced as High Commissioner by Mr. Ramadier, who was more liberally inclined, and that Mr. Ahidjo was appointed to the office of Prime Minister as Mr. Mbida's successor, had given ground for thinking that such overtures might be made. Indeed, Mr. Ramadier had stated, on 10 February 1958, that he would make it his business to remove all traces of colonialism and that, with the help of the Cameroonian people, he would make the Cameroons a reality, whose national status and independence would then be recognized. For his part, Mr. Ahidjo had secured the participation in the new Government of the Groupe d'action nationale, which had constituted the opposition under the Mbida Government, on the understanding that Mr. Ahidjo would take account of the national demands of the UPC. In his inaugural address Mr. Ahidjo had called for reunification of the two Cameroons, independence within a reasonable time, unity of the Cameroonians, which would imply an amnesty restoration of legal rights to the movements which had been dissolved and withdrawal of French troops. The statements of both Mr. Ramadier and Mr. Ahidjo had been well received by the Cameroonian people, who had regarded them as first steps towards a real easing of tension.

31. The Executive Committee of the Union Nationale des étudiants camerounais had told Mr. Ahidjo that it had noted with satisfaction the new Government's promises of greater leniency and had assured him of the Union's support if those promises were kept. The new Government had assured the Executive Committee that the scholarships withdrawn by the preceding Government for political reasons would be restored and that students would not be persecuted for their political opinions.

32. The hope roused by those measures had quickly been dashed. Towards the end of February Mr.

Ramadier had been recalled to Paris and replaced by Mr. Torre. The new High Commissioner's policy had proved to be both demagogic and brutal. While pretending to consider the Cameroonian national demands just and to be doing everything to satisfy them, Mr. Torre had tried to cut the UPC off from the popular masses by representing it as an intolerant movement which tried to monopolize nationalism and to liquidate its political opponents by means of terrorism. It had been ironical to hear Mr. Torre say that all Cameroonians were nationalists and that, with the exception of the members of the UPC, they all advocated free discussion. Mr. Torre's statement that the members of the UPC had deliberately placed themselves beyond the pale of society was a flagrant untruth, for everyone knew that they had been forced to take to the maquis because of the stubborn refusal of the French authorities to take account of those aspirations of the Cameroonian people presented by the UPC, and because of the persecutions of all kinds to which the movement had been subjected.

33. Mr. Torre's policy had also involved the intensified "combing out" of disturbed areas, which meant the encirclement of large areas by patrols, which then gradually closed in and machine-gunned all those found within the area which had been declared prohibited. It had been during one such operation that Mr. Um Nyobé had been struck down, in September 1958. It had also been part of Mr. Torre's policy to order his henchmen to commit crimes against the civil population and to blame them on the members of the UPC in order to justify all the arbitrary measures taken against them. In that connexion he quoted a report given to his association by Mr. Kaldor, a member of the Paris Bar, who had visited the Cameroons in August 1958 to defend some Cameroonians threatened with the death penalty; the report stated that the French Government was attempting to give the nationalist movement the reputation of being a terrorist or criminal organization.

34. The campaign of judicial repression was increasing; in order to facilitate it the French authorities were refusing entry visas to the Cameroons to French lawyers appointed to defend Cameroonian patriots and expelling from the Cameroons those who denounced the political machinations which underlay the prosecutions and the weakness of the evidence on which those prosecutions were based.

35. The CHAIRMAN suggested that Mr. Ngounga should conclude his statement at the following meeting.

The meeting rose at 6 p.m.