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Chair: Mr. Bowler (Malawi)

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The meeting was called to order at 3 p.m.

Agenda item 57: Comprehensive review of special political missions (*continued*) (A/70/95-S/2015/446, A/70/357-S/2015/682 and A/70/400)

1. **Mr. Feltman** (Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs), introducing the report of the Secretary-General on overall policy matters pertaining to special political missions (A/70/400), said that he looked forward to a productive exchange with the Committee on how best to prepare special political missions to face contemporary challenges.

2. The global peace and security landscape had continued to deteriorate with no sign of abatement. The number of major wars had tripled since 2008, numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons were the highest in decades, and humanitarian needs were setting new records. Almost 90 per cent of special political mission personnel were working in peace operations in countries with high-intensity conflicts.

3. Truly fulfilling the Organization's founding purpose of saving succeeding generations from the scourge of war required an urgent global effort to respond to the proliferating crises, but also to prevent them from emerging or relapsing. Special political missions were a crucial part of that effort. They remained at the forefront of the United Nations response to conflict, and had become indispensable instruments for conflict prevention, peacemaking and peacebuilding.

4. In Libya, Yemen and Syria, the Secretary-General's special envoys and representatives continued to work tirelessly to lay out a path for a peaceful solution to conflicts that had generated regional instability, violent extremism and unspeakable human suffering. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) worked closely in the field with the African Union-led Military Observer Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to help the Somali Government and people to capitalize on the country's best chance for peace in a generation. In West Africa, Central Africa, Central Asia, the Sahel and the Great Lakes Region, regional offices and envoys were working with Member States, regional organizations and civil society to enhance regional and subregional capacities for conflict prevention and to address transnational challenges such as water and energy scarcity, drug trafficking and transnational organized crime.

5. Special political missions varied significantly in terms of mandates, size and structure. They were tailored to provide the best possible United Nations response to a specific situation. Flexibility was one of their greatest assets, but they all focused on preventing and resolving conflict. Such missions therefore embodied Chapter VI of the Charter, the pursuit of negotiated solutions and the pacific settlement of disputes. They were based on national consent, and used mediation and facilitation to defuse tensions, help countries step back from the brink of conflict and support national and regional efforts to build and sustain peace.

6. The seventieth Anniversary of the United Nations had provided a unique opportunity to review the functioning of all peace operations. The General Assembly and the Committee had both seriously considered the report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (A/70/95-S/2015/446) and the report of the Secretary-General entitled "The future of United Nations peace operations: implementation of the recommendations of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations" (A/70/357-S/2015/682). The report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture (A/69/968-S/2015/490) was in its intergovernmental phase, and the recently-concluded and independently-published global study on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) had given new impetus to efforts to promote the women, peace and security agenda.

7. The Secretary-General's report on overall policy matters (A/70/400) reflected on some of the key themes from those reviews that were relevant to special political missions and to the broader mandate of the Department of Political Affairs. First, the reviews had called for an urgent emphasis on conflict prevention and mediation that had been long overdue. The multiplicity of current threats required a sharper focus on sustained efforts to stop crises before they escalated into violence.

8. Mechanisms that had improved the ability of the United Nations to prevent conflict in the past decade included stronger partnerships with regional and subregional actors and closer cooperation within the wider United Nations family, including country teams and the creation of rapidly deployable mediation expertise to support peace processes. The report of the Secretary-General entitled "The United Nations and

conflict prevention: a collective recommitment” (S/2015/730) had addressed those mechanisms in detail. Special political missions were a core tool for prevention, mediation and discharge of the Secretary-General’s good offices. The reviews had also highlighted the role of regional offices as forward platforms for preventive diplomacy that should be further enhanced. Targeted, smart investment in conflict prevention was required to turn rhetoric into action, while support from Member States was crucial as prevention was mainly their responsibility. That ongoing discussion with Member States was expected to achieve real change in the Organization’s ability to prevent conflict.

9. Secondly, strong partnerships with regional and subregional organizations remained critical under Chapter VIII of the Charter. The United Nations and regional organizations produced a multiplier effect by drawing on their respective strengths and comparative advantages. Such partnerships were a reality in all missions. In West Africa, for instance, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Office for West Africa worked with the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States.

10. The Secretary-General’s report on cooperation between the United Nations and regional and other organizations (A/69/228–S/2014/560) had included recommendations on how to make cooperation even more effective. At the United Nations, the Group of Friends of Mediation continued usefully to bring the topic to the attention of other Member States.

11. Thirdly, the role of special political missions in peacebuilding had also been recognized in the reviews. In three of the six countries on the agenda of the Peacebuilding Commission, special political missions were either on the ground, in Burundi and Guinea-Bissau, or providing remote support, in Guinea. The United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone had successfully concluded its mandate in 2014 following significant progress by that country in consolidating peace. As other countries hosting United Nations operations continued their peace consolidation processes, the peacebuilding role of special political missions would remain relevant.

12. The reviews had recognized that peacebuilding was a non-linear, complex and long-term political process requiring sustained international backing.

Special political missions could be tailored to help national authorities and local stakeholders with the transitions from conflict to peace by mobilizing international political attention and financial assistance.

13. Fourthly, the reviews had given increased momentum to the women, peace and security agenda, and Security Council resolution 2242 (2015) would further strengthen the Organization’s work in that area. According to an internal assessment carried out by the Department of Political Affairs in connection with the global study on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), steady progress had been made in fulfilling the 15 commitments the Department had undertaken in that area. It had increased the number of women in United Nations-led or co-led mediation processes; mainstreamed gender into policy documents and new training for staff, including senior management and envoys; and increased the number of gender-related provisions in the ceasefires and peace agreements it facilitated. Additionally, all the Secretary-General’s recent reports to the Security Council on special political missions had included references to issues related to women, peace and security. Although already on the right track, his Department was committed to continue working on that challenging agenda.

14. The Secretary-General’s report on overall policy matters (A/70/400) discussed in detail issues relating to special political missions set out in General Assembly resolution 69/95 that were important to Member States. The Secretary-General outlined the significant steps taken by the Secretariat to improve mission transparency and accountability. That was a key commitment of both the Secretary-General and his Department. It would require continued briefings to Member States, discussions with regional groups and individual States, consultations with regional partners and regular interaction with the press and civil society at large.

15. The Secretary-General’s report on implementing the recommendations of the High-level Panel (A/70/357-S/2015/682) had outlined a number of proposals for empowering the field and providing more agile field support by aligning authority and accountability with responsibilities, and working to develop strong accountability frameworks. The report had also addressed efforts to enhance geographical representation and women’s participation in special

political missions. The Department of Political Affairs intended to collaborate with Member States in that important area.

16. The Secretariat was also committed to holding regular interactive dialogues with Member States on overall policy matters pertaining to special political missions. The latest one, held in April 2015, had led to a productive discussion on the review of peace operations, and the Department looked forward to working closely with the Bureau of the Fourth Committee to plan topics for future dialogues.

17. He paid homage to the special representatives and special envoys of the Secretary-General and to the United Nations staff serving in special political missions to promote peace and security, often with great personal sacrifice.

18. **Mr. Khare** (Under-Secretary-General for Field Support) said that special political missions had been an effective and flexible tool to maintain peace and security, and in the last few years alone they had been as varied as the joint mission of the United Nations and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to eliminate Syria's chemical weapons, the regionally-mandated Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region, and the United Nations Electoral Observation Mission in Burundi (MENUB). Such missions had added to the rich set of peace and security mechanisms available to Member States. Moreover, the major reviews launched by the Secretary-General would lead to further improvements in both mechanisms and performance.

19. The Department of Field Support was committed to working rapidly, effectively, efficiently and responsibly as a strategic enabler of special political mission mandate delivery. While the overall number of special political missions had remained constant, the complexity of the tasks and the level of risk had significantly increased. Out of the 4,200 personnel authorized for deployment in such missions, nearly 90 per cent were working in countries with high-intensity conflicts, such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, Syria, Somalia and Libya. As a result, almost 40 per cent of deployed personnel were dedicated to security, compared to just 30 per cent three years previously.

20. The Department worked with 36 field-based missions, of which half were special political missions. The latter accounted for 3 per cent of all deployed personnel and 5 per cent of the Department's financial

resources, yet a disproportionate effort was required to provide effective support for the relatively small special political missions. There were many reasons for that.

21. First, the great majority of special political missions lacked the administrative and logistical support structures characteristic of peacekeeping operations, which meant that greater assistance was required from regional or global service centres or Headquarters. Secondly, the nature of the support required in a special political mission placed a higher premium on rapid, nimble, tailored responses. Examples included rapid good-offices responses to a constitutional crisis, as in Burundi, or long-term but temporary operations from outside the country, as in Libya, or working under significant time constraints to organize flights between Yemen and Geneva, and between the Republic of the Congo and Gabon.

22. Field support for special political missions needed to benefit from economies of scale, as well as being rapid and fit for purpose in its responses. Striking the right balance was not always easy, but he was proud of progress made. Globally, that had included a steady reduction in the proportion of personnel in special political missions dedicated to support functions, down to 29 per cent from 39 per cent in 2013. Over 70 per cent of mission personnel received transactional support from remote locations, as in the case of the Kuwait Joint Support Office working with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), the UNSOM Regional Service Centre Entebbe working with UNSOM, and the United Nations Global Service Centre working with the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL). Those arrangements had realized efficiencies and significantly reduced the mission-support footprint in volatile, high-cost locations, making it possible to maximize presence in non-permissive environments.

23. The Department was overseeing the roll-out of the Umoja enterprise resource planning system in the special political missions. The first stage had been deployed in March 2014, while the second stage of four, known as Umoja Extension 1, was about to be applied to field staff administration, payroll and travel functionalities. National staff functionality would become operational in early 2016, followed by supply

chain management, budget formulation and programme management in 2017.

24. The same five issues were critical for field support of both peacekeeping and special political missions: cooperation; focusing on performance; aligning authority and responsibility; building stronger partnerships; and pursuing immediate support priorities.

25. It was essential to invest more in technology and innovation. In defeating remoteness, ensuring safety and security, and responding to dynamic operating scenarios, many needs in the field were relatively unique. While the final report of the Expert Panel on Technology and Innovation in United Nations Peacekeeping, independently published in 2015, had focused on peacekeeping operations, the Department of Field Support would pursue the technological improvements recommended just as robustly in the special political missions, especially when it came to safety and security.

26. More must also be done to overcome the misalignment among authority, responsibilities and resources for field operations. The women and men in the field responding to extraordinarily difficult scenarios must be given powers commensurate with such heavy responsibilities.

27. Special political missions were sometimes handicapped by the fact that the biennial programme budget was not an optimal funding vehicle for their start-up, expansion and backstopping support. Decisions and procedures in that context could be driven by the funding stream, rather than programmatic priorities. The Fifth Committee was reconsidering the Secretary-General's report on the review of arrangements for funding and backstopping special political missions (A/66/340), and the Department looked forward to a positive outcome.

28. While efficiency gains had indeed been made, the main cost driver for special political missions was staffing. That accounted for some 60 per cent of all costs, compared to 21 per cent for peacekeeping operations. A natural limit had been reached, and further cuts would tip the balance between efficiency and effectiveness of programme delivery. It was also important to ensure that resourcing requirements responded to changing conditions, including limits on what could be achieved and the capacity to protect personnel.

29. He paid tribute to the courage, dedication and sacrifice of colleagues serving in special political missions and the dedication of those who supported them at Headquarters. Despite the challenges both in the field and administratively, he remained committed to expanding support to special political missions under the guidance of Member States.

30. **The Chair** opened the floor for questions and comments from Committee members.

31. **Mr. Maleki** (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that in the section on geographical representation and gender participation of the Secretary-General's report on overall policy matters (A/70/400), there were few substantive paragraphs and a mere overview of his intentions. In the interest of transparency, percentages would have shown the increase in the number of women compared to the previous year; information on geographical representation was insufficient as well, which made the need for figures even more pressing. He asked whether future reports could provide Member States with sufficient data to make their necessary assessments.

32. **Ms. Stener** (Norway), welcoming the opportunity for an interactive dialogue between the Secretariat and Member States, said that more investment was needed in preventing emerging crises before they became costly for all sides. Special political missions played a crucial role in that regard, and Norway strongly supported the recommendations of the High-level Independent Panel (A/70/95-S/2015/446), the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture (A/69/968-S/2015/490), and the Secretary-General's own recommendations on funding and backstopping special political missions (A/66/340).

33. Special political mission funding and backstopping had been blocked in the Fifth Committee for more than four years. There was hope that 2015 would be the year for change, and her delegation would work towards that in the Fifth Committee. Pending such a solution, she asked which short-term administrative and organizational changes could be made to improve the backstopping of special political missions, and what Member States could do to facilitate the necessary adjustments.

34. **Mr. Feltman** (Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs), responding to the question from the representative of Iran, said that he, his Department and

the Secretary-General attached considerable importance to geographical representation. Special political missions needed to represent the broad membership of the Organization, and there was unquestionably room for improvement. The considerable fluctuations in representation were due to personnel changes in the limited posts in the field at the senior level. One man or woman assuming such a post would change the numbers dramatically, owing to limited spaces and rotation. His Department would be guided by the draft resolution to be adopted under the agenda item by the Committee.

35. Thanking Norway for its leadership on funding and backstopping, he noted that the issue affected other Secretariat departments supporting special political missions, such as the Department of Management and the Department of Safety and Security. Small fixes were under discussion with delegations from the Fifth Committee. Options mentioned in the High-level Independent Panel's report (A/70/95-S/2015/446) and that of the Secretary-General on implementation of the Panel's recommendations (A/70/357-S/2015/682) included allowing the Department to draw on the Support Account when activities contributed to peacekeeping operations, which would enable other resources to go further.

36. **Mr. Khare** (Under-Secretary-General for Field Support) said that the representation of women in top leadership positions in peacekeeping and political affairs was indeed limited, having stagnated at around 20 per cent. Initiatives to tackle the issue included a women's senior talent pipeline, which involved asking countries to suggest names of people to be interviewed and then receive training and mentoring. He was pleased to report that one of the four people recommended had been appointed to a senior peacekeeping position, while the other three were expected to be appointed in the near future. The Organization needed names of candidates from Member States. Outreach meetings for recruitment were also being organized, although more should be done.

37. Another department affected was the Office of Legal Affairs. Proper arrangements for the backstopping of special political missions would increase not only efficiency but also transparency. While special political missions represented 5 per cent of the financial portfolio that covered also

peacekeeping operations, 50 per cent of his time was spent on special political missions.

38. Thanking Norway for its efforts, he noted that backstopping mechanisms were built into the budgets of the missions themselves, a fact which should be recognized and supported by Member States. He asked States to show willingness to approve programme budget adjustments in line with the fluctuating requirements of special political missions, which did not lend themselves to a two-year cycle. He also called for a simplification and improvement of the administrative rules and regulations governing field work. Proposals from the Department of Management and his Department would be presented to Member States by the Secretary-General by late 2016.

39. **Mr. Isnomo** (Indonesia) said that his Government wanted to know what assurances could be given about duplication of mandates or reporting in the case of special political missions and human rights bodies in the United Nations.

40. **Mr. Feltman** (Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs) said that the human rights mandate of special political missions had been handed down by the Security Council with two purposes in mind: upholding the ideals of the United Nations and advancing prevention efforts. A surge in human rights violations was an early warning sign of crisis. A benefit of special political missions was having United Nations professionals on the ground who could build local credibility and partnerships that were more difficult to achieve from Headquarters. Although the Department of Political Affairs had a global mandate to monitor international issues and assist with 50 elections a year, it could not have the same leverage, insight and analysis on the ground without special political missions.

41. Regarding effective informal coordination, he spoke with the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights twice a week so that they could understand each other's activities and share analyses. There were also regular coordination mechanisms with the other parts of the United Nations system in the form of regular meetings on specific countries. He would defer to Member States as to how mandates should be drafted to address concerns about overlap, duplication or contradiction.

42. **The Chair** invited the Committee to make general statements under agenda item 57.

43. **Mr. Hilale** (Morocco), speaking on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, noted the Secretary-General's report on overall policy matters (A/70/400) and acknowledged the need for coherence, synergies and complementarities among ongoing reviews of the United Nations peace and security architecture.

44. Draft resolution A/70/L.6 mandated the Fourth Committee to give further consideration to recommendations related to special political missions in the report of the High-level Independent Panel (A/70/95-S/2015/446) and the Secretary-General's report on implementing the Panel's recommendations (A/70/357-S/2015/682). The Movement was ready to engage with partners on that important matter.

45. Reemphasizing its commitment to effective special political missions, the Movement stressed the importance of consensus among Member States in developing policies related to such missions, and of ensuring that only ideas and approaches adopted collectively by Member States would be implemented. It also stressed the primary role of the General Assembly as the most representative body to discuss the overall policy matters on special political missions.

46. The Security Council and the General Assembly should draft clear and achievable mandates for field-based missions, based on objective assessments, and without rushing to adopt mandates lacking a political basis or sufficient resources or that were not practically achievable. Integrated planning and consistent linkage between policy formulation and implementation on the ground were paramount for success in that regard.

47. The Movement called upon the Secretary-General to give further consideration to transparency, balanced geographical representation, and women's representation when making appointments to senior leadership positions, particularly his special representatives and envoys, as well as members of expert groups on sanctions.

48. It was essential to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all States. The Movement recalled the primary role of the United Nations and the roles of the General Assembly and the Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security, in accordance with the Charter, while reaffirming the principles of impartiality, consent of parties, national ownership and national responsibility.

49. The Movement asked the Secretary-General to hold interactive dialogues on overall policy matters related to special political missions, following prior consultations with Member States. That would ensure maximum and meaningful participation, as previous experience had shown that limited consultations hindered the success of initiatives. For example, such dialogues could address issues of major concern to Member States such as sexual exploitation and abuse, regional offices, guard units, and procedures for mandating special political missions. The Secretary-General was also encouraged to include the main points discussed during the interactive dialogue in his report on overall policy matters related to special political missions to be submitted at the seventy-first session of the General Assembly.

50. The Movement noted the exponential increase in the financial requirements and complexity of special political missions over the past decade, as well as the fact that they did not follow the regular budget cycle of the United Nations despite being funded by its budget. In order to enhance efficiency and transparency of the budgetary process of the Organization, and considering the approval, functioning, scope and mandate of those activities, the Movement insisted that the financing criteria, methodology and mechanisms of peacekeeping operations should be applied to special political missions, including the establishment of a separate account. The Movement thus endorsed the recommendations of the report of the High-level Independent Panel (A/70/95-S/2015/446) on the arrangements for funding and backstopping of such missions.

51. **Mr. Bamrunghong** (Thailand), speaking on behalf of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, reiterated the importance of transparency, accountability, geographical representation, expertise and effectiveness for the legitimacy and credibility of special political missions, whose planning, use and assessment should be more inclusive, accountable and transparent. The Association appreciated the useful recommendations in the report of the High-level Independent Panel (A/70/95-S/2015/446), and thanked the Secretary-General for his report on implementing the Panel's recommendations (A/70/357-S/2015/682). Member States must fulfil the responsibility entailed in General Assembly resolution 70/6 mandating the Fourth Committee to further consider the recommendations in those reports.

52. The Association endorsed calls from the Panel (A/70/95-S/2015/446) and the Secretary-General (A/70/357-S/2015/682) for strengthening United Nations conflict prevention and mediation capacity, and encouraged special political missions to focus more on both elements. That required political backing from Member States and regional partners to build a collective commitment to successful conflict prevention.

53. The role of host countries was extremely important to the Association. A primary objective of special political missions should be to strengthen national capacities, especially in the areas of security, State institutions and socio-economic development, taking into account local context and needs. Genuine national ownership was needed for missions to succeed and peace to be sustained. The Association therefore stressed the importance of the inclusive participation of relevant national stakeholders, in particular host Governments, from the early stages of such missions onward.

54. To ensure greater transparency and accountability, there must be closer consultation among the Security Council, the Secretariat and Member States. The Association supported regular, inclusive and interactive dialogues on overall policy matters on special political missions. The Association also underlined the need for the Secretariat to reach out to Member States in a timely manner prior to such dialogues, as well to provide relevant and detailed information. Views expressed during the dialogue should be duly taken into consideration by the Security Council and the Secretariat when mandating or reviewing special political missions.

55. The women, peace and security agenda could not be seen as an afterthought to special political missions, but must rather be an integral part of all stages of the peace process. The Association welcomed the recent adoption of Security Council resolution 2242 (2015), reaffirming the resolve to mainstream that agenda into the peace and security architecture, and backed the Secretary-General's intention to promote more women to senior leadership positions, particularly as special representatives and envoys.

56. The proliferation of special political missions had serious implications for funding and backstopping arrangements, hindering their ability to deliver their mandates and distorting the regular budget. The

Association fully endorsed the High-Level Independent Panel's call (A/70/95-S/2015/446) for the General Assembly to immediately adopt the recommendations in the 2011 report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (A/66/7) on the review of arrangements for funding and backstopping special political missions, especially the creation of a special and separate account for their funding.

57. The Association was committed to enhancing the effectiveness, transparency and accountability of special political missions. It would work closely with partners in the Fourth Committee to give due consideration to the recommendations on such missions as proposed by the Panel (A/70/95-S/2015/446) and the Secretary-General (A/70/357-S/2015/682).

58. **Mr. Lal Kataria** (India), taking note of the Secretary-General's report on overall policy matters (A/70/400), said that it was vital for special political missions to show accountability in general, as well as transparency in the appointment of their personnel, as the current process was opaque and lacked credibility.

59. It was essential to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all States where special political missions were operating. The principles of impartiality, consent of parties, national ownership and national responsibility should be borne in mind during the implementation of special political missions. His Government also stressed the importance of clarity in mandates for such missions, to avoid any blurring of mandates or disconnects between the mandate and the political situation of a particular region. His delegation expected more consultation with Member States on policy formulation for special political missions to minimize the chances of such a disconnect.

60. His Government called for more consultations by the Security Council on issues related to special political missions. Communication among the Security Council, General Assembly and the Secretariat regarding those missions should be free-flowing and should involve Member States in a substantial manner, as policy formulation for special political missions currently lacked transparency. Moreover, caution should be exercised when expanding into areas within the domain of treaty bodies or the mandate of other United Nations institutions. If the Security Council expanded the mandate of special political missions,

there would need to be well-established mechanisms to ensure proper accountability.

61. His delegation took note of the reports of the High-level Independent Panel (A/70/95-S/2015/446) and of the Secretary-General on implementing the Panel's recommendations (A/70/357-S/2015/682). Both reports emphasized the importance of politics, and his delegation was in favour of giving the political process its due place, rather than resorting to potentially ill-suited peacekeeping operations. While special political missions had a role in such settings, they should be designed with consideration for national ownership of the political process. His Government agreed with the Secretary-General that changes in operational peace operations were the collective responsibility of the entire membership. There could be no responsibility without authority, and the missing link was greater involvement of the general membership in special political missions, including their mandate formulation and renewal.

62. His Government expected the Department of Political Affairs to increase the number of interactive briefings organized for Member States by the heads of special political missions to enable Member States to put forward queries and suggestions, thereby improving the effectiveness of missions and providing input for changing course.

63. It was necessary to establish a separate new account for special political missions. As such missions did not follow regular budget cycles, they should be financed using the criteria, methodology and accountability applied to peacekeeping operations. The High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations had endorsed (A/70/95-S/2015/446) the recommendation of the 2011 report of the Advisory Committee (A/66/7) to further enhance the budgetary transparency of special political missions by establishing a special and separate account for their funding, to be budgeted and reported upon annually, with a financial period of 1 July to 30 June.

64. Given the important role of special political missions in maintaining international peace and security, his delegation urged action on its suggestions relating to participation of Member States and the transparency and accountability of such missions.

65. **Mr. Isnomo** (Indonesia) commended the work of the Special Representatives, political envoys and staff on the ground, while also calling for the United

Nations system and the international community to put significantly greater emphasis on the peaceful settlement of disputes.

66. It was important and heartening that the primacy of mediation, political dialogue and diplomacy had been highlighted in the reports of the High-level Independent Panel (A/70/95-S/2015/446) and the Secretary-General (A/70/357-S/2015/682). Indonesia had experienced the advantages of peaceful political process in the province of Aceh.

67. His Government welcomed draft resolution A/70/L.6, and looked forward to participating in the inter-governmental deliberations on the reports of the Panel (A/70/95-S/2015/446) and the Secretary-General (A/70/357-S/2015/682). As those reports rightly emphasized a comprehensive and coherent approach, discussions on them in the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and the Fifth Committee would also be vital. His delegation encouraged the Economic and Social Council, the Peacebuilding Commission and other United Nations entities to examine the reports and consider ways to harness respective expertise and strengths to synergize efforts to improve special political missions.

68. His Government requested more information from the Department of Political Affairs on the geographical basis for the composition of special political missions. There was tremendous value in using more peacemakers, mediators and other civilian capacity-building expertise from developing countries, especially those that had undertaken their own successful transition away from conflict to democracy, stability and peace. In that regard, his delegation urged greater interaction with relevant regional organizations, including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

69. Even the best special political missions would fail without the necessary regional and international backing, and his Government therefore stressed the importance of regular, open and interactive dialogue between the Member States and the Secretariat, and the Department of Political Affairs in particular, regarding such missions. The General Assembly was perfectly situated to review and guide those missions in their complex political assignments. With the growing cost and number of special political missions, his delegation supported a separate and dedicated account for their financing. Lessons should be learned from the successful and less successful special political mission

mandates, and best practices should be shared more systematically among stakeholders. His Government was prepared to further contribute to United Nations peacemaking to help advance effective approaches to special political missions.

70. **Mr. Antonio de Aguiar Patriota** (Brazil) said that special political missions went to the heart of the role of the United Nations in terms of good offices, conflict prevention, peacemaking, and peacebuilding. His delegation thanked the Secretary-General for convening the Panel on peace operations, and expressed appreciation for the Panel's useful suggestions regarding the financing and backstopping of such missions (A/70/95-S/2015/446).

71. The Security Council organized most special political missions, yet with the exception of UNAMA, they were financed from, and therefore created a major distortion in, the regular budget of the United Nations. Special political missions accounted for over 20 per cent of the regular budget, encroaching on other activities of the Organization. As they were bound by the structure of the regular budget, adjusting such missions to the dynamic demands of their operating environments was even more challenging. His Government was pleased that the Panel's report (A/70/95-S/2015/446) concurred with the recommendations of the Advisory Committee in its 2011 report (A/66/7) to establish a special account for special political missions, separate from the regular budget, that would be funded and reported upon annually. To improve the efficiency and transparency of the Organization's management of special political missions, his delegation urged all Member States to discuss the suggested reforms in the Fourth and Fifth Committees.

72. Of the 38 special political missions currently deployed, only four had been created by the General Assembly. With their growing complexity, field-based special political missions increasingly resembled lightweight peacekeeping operations. A thorough discussion of their nature and relationship with peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts was therefore crucial. Clearer distinction between peacekeeping operations and special political missions would increase the transparency of the latter.

73. The limitations inherent in the current backstopping arrangements for special political missions should be addressed by considering the

budgetary process in a more rational and equitable way. Given the complexity of such missions, support from Member States remained critical. Stronger engagement by the broad membership would be easier to achieve if there was greater fairness in the decisions on the mandate and budget of such missions.

74. **Mr. Alday González** (Mexico) said that special political missions remained a priority for his delegation, as they were one of the Organization's main mechanisms for preventing conflict and tackling threats to international peace and security. He reiterated his Government's gratitude for the work of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations.

75. He expressed concern regarding the Security Council's growing recourse to special political missions involving increasingly volatile situations and ambitious mandates but without the resources needed to achieve their objectives effectively. His Government welcomed the High-level Independent Panel's emphasis on the financial aspects of special political missions (A/70/95-S/2015/446), particularly the creation of a special account separate from the regular budget, as that would relieve budgetary pressure on such other key areas of the Organization as human rights and development, and increase efficiency.

76. His Government regretted that the Secretary-General's report on implementing the Panel's recommendations (A/70/357) had not given more emphasis to the special and separate account that had garnered so much support among Member States. The future of special political missions could not depend on an unpredictable allocation of resources. His delegation strongly endorsed the Panel's clear recommendation in that regard, and reiterated its willingness to continue to lead the relevant discussions in the Fifth Committee.

77. It was essential to recognize the growing importance of regional and sub-regional organizations in conflict resolution, as well as the importance attached by the Panel and the Secretary-General to prevention, mediation and, above all, the primacy of political over military solutions. That had been a mainstay of his Government's foreign policy.

78. His delegation had worked with that of Finland to facilitate a draft resolution on special political missions, and he thanked Members for their broad support. The draft resolution reiterated calls for the Secretariat to organize interactive dialogues to discuss

all aspects of special political missions. His Government urged the Secretariat to consult with Member States and arrange those dialogues with the level of content and participation that they deserved. The draft resolution also asked the Secretary-General to submit a timely report on all aspects of special political missions to the seventy-first session. His delegation called for the 2016 report to include quality analysis and information befitting the level of importance that the Secretary-General had placed on special political missions in the introduction to his most recent report (A/70/400), while remaining true to his call to modernize the Organization's tools for current realities. Mexico would continue taking part in constructive discussions on the review processes under way by building on lessons learned and positive experiences to date.

79. **Ms. Rodríguez Pineda** (Guatemala) said that it was unfortunate that the Secretary-General's report on overall policy matters (A/70/400) had been published so late, as that had significantly affected the opportunity for an open and far-reaching debate. Given that the report was key for improving transparency, accountability and effectiveness of such missions, prompt drafting and dissemination to Member States should be a priority for the Department of Political Affairs.

80. Given the global need for flexible and varied ways of promoting peace and security, her Government welcomed the attention given to special political missions in the independent reviews carried out in 2015. The recommendations in the reports of the High-level Independent Panel (A/70/95-S/2015/446) and the Secretary-General on their implementation (A/70/357-S/2015/682) would help to improve the transparency and accountability mechanisms for special political missions, and that the changes to be made were the collective responsibility of all Member States.

81. In resolution 69/95, the General Assembly had requested the Secretary-General "to hold regular, inclusive and interactive dialogue on the overall policy matters pertaining to special political missions". However, only one such dialogue, involving the Panel, had been held in 2015. On that occasion, delegations had expressed an interest in transparency, accountability and need for greater conceptual clarity regarding special political missions, but that had not been followed up and the Secretariat had not organized another interactive dialogue.

82. Her Government seriously questioned whether that complied with the mandate of the General Assembly. The many overall policy matters relating to special political missions needed discussion, and regular interactive dialogue was a first step in that direction. Her delegation insisted on the need to discuss the security situation in many areas of deployment and the mechanisms used by the Department of Political Affairs to increase security and protection for field personnel, as well as the mechanisms established to avoid sexual abuse and exploitation in special political missions. Access to such information was the best way for Member States to make informed policy decisions when analysing the future of such missions. Her delegation remained hopeful that the mandate would be fulfilled the following year, and that an in-depth discussion of the recommendations contained in the aforementioned reviews would take place.

83. It was also regrettable that the Secretary-General's report on overall policy matters (A/70/400), mandated under General Assembly resolution 69/95, described the Secretariat's efforts and measures in relation to special political missions so briefly. Her Government reiterated that the resolution's call for relevant, detailed information was aimed at improving transparency and accountability in the work of the Organization, and that such a call could not be ignored by the Secretariat.

84. The inclusion of detailed information on the various special political missions in the updated website of the Department of Political Affairs was an important step in improving transparency, and it was a matter of urgency for the website to be made available in the six official languages to comply with the principle of linguistic parity.

85. United Nations staff should be representative of the Organization's global membership and presence. However, there remained a significant gap in geographical representation among senior positions in special political missions particularly with regard to the composition of teams and groups of experts tasked with monitoring the application of sanctions and high-level envoys of the Secretary-General, whose report on overall policy matters (A/70/400) would have been more valuable had it included more precise information on that matter and the mechanisms for addressing the problem.

86. Her delegation noted the efforts made to improve the representation and participation of women in special political missions, and encouraged work to continue in that direction.

87. Changes in the budget structure in the past decade justified having separate categories for regular operations, peacekeeping operations and special political missions, each with its own scale of assessments. The regular budget was not the ideal source of funding for special political missions, particularly when most such missions were arranged by the Security Council. Such missions increasingly resembled peacekeeping operations, but their current financing substantially restricted the flexibility they needed to rise to challenges on the ground, as well as during their creation, expansion or transition.

88. Her Government agreed with the recommendation of the High-level Independent Panel (A/70/95-S/2015/446) to establish a special and separate account for special political missions to be budgeted, funded and reported upon annually, in accordance with the recommendations of the 2011 report of the Advisory Committee (A/66/7). It was unfortunate that the Secretary-General's report on implementing those recommendations (A/70/357-S/2015/682) had not given more attention to that topic. Establishing such an account was the only way to improve efficiency, transparency and accountability in the budget process of the Organization and the sustainability of Member State contributions.

89. Her Government was fully willing to work constructively within the Committee and the Fifth Committee to make progress on the issue of special political missions, while expecting the next interactive dialogues on overall policy matters relating to such missions to be arranged and held in such a way as to build confidence between Member States and the Department of Political Affairs.

90. **Ms. Butts** (United States of America) said that special political missions were indispensable for peace and mediation. For example, UNAMA, in conjunction with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), had established international best practices for the conduct of future elections. In Cyprus, leaders had used the support of the United Nations and the international community to bring reunification within reach. In Burkina Faso, the Special Representative from the United Nations Office for West Africa

(UNOWA) had engaged in swift preventive diplomacy. Her delegation welcomed the focus on special political missions and ways to build on their success, along with the recommendations of the High-level Independent Panel (A/70/95-S/2015/446) and the Secretary-General's report on implementing those recommendations (A/70/357-S/2015/682), including treating special political missions as an important part of peacekeeping while bringing conflict prevention and mediation to the fore. At the Summit on Peacekeeping in September 2015, President Obama had called for increased backing for such United Nations conflict-prevention tools as mediation and envoys. A new presidential policy memorandum on United States support to United Nations peacekeeping operations underscored that position.

91. Her Government echoed the Panel's call for high-level country teams to have conflict-prevention skills, experience and capacity, and to be coherently supported by Headquarters when required. It was essential for special political missions to prevent and respond to violence against civilians. Her delegation would welcome further engagement on that and other areas in which countries could work together to help the United Nations better prevent conflict.

92. Her Government expected the draft resolution to respect the clear and separate prerogatives established for different United Nations bodies in the Charter, including the Security Council's primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, while also continuing to avoid overlapping consideration of administrative and budgetary issues that were the responsibility of the Fifth Committee.

93. **Mr. Andanje** (Kenya), welcoming the Secretary-General's report on overall policy matters (A/70/400), said that his delegation attached great importance to conflict prevention and mediation at the sub-regional, regional and global levels, and to the role of special political missions in such contexts.

94. Considering the increase in conflicts over the last eight years, the work of special political missions was more significant than ever. His delegation agreed with the reports of the High-level Independent Panel (A/70/95-S/2015/446) and the Secretary-General (A/70/357-S/2015/682). It would be necessary to change the way peace operations were planned and conducted to make them more responsive on the ground in view of the complex new realities.

95. His Government welcomed the renewed emphasis on conflict prevention and mediation from the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture (A/69/968-S/2015/490). In the context of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, peace would only be achieved with collective backing for preventive diplomacy in the form of mediation, negotiation, good offices and special political missions. His delegation applauded the Organization's ongoing efforts to strengthen partnerships between special political missions and regional and sub-regional organizations.

96. The proposal to strengthen the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM was a welcome one, as was the proposal to redefine the Support Office's clients to include UNSOM and the Somali National Army.

97. His delegation fully endorsed the inclusion of women in the peace and security agenda, and especially in the work of special political missions. Their participation in all aspects of peace and security should be enhanced. His Government also backed improved transparency, accountability, geographical representation and gender participation. Special political missions were a viable means of preventing conflict, and enhanced efforts were needed if sustainable peace was to be achieved. Without predictable and sustained financing for preventive action, however, all such efforts would be in vain.

98. **Mr. Mminele** (South Africa) said that his delegation welcomed the report of the High-level Independent Panel (A/70/95-S/2015/446), along with the review of the United Nations peacebuilding architecture and the high-level review of the implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security.

99. Although his Government had always advocated peacebuilding and conflict prevention, political issues were at the heart of conflict and political solutions were therefore required for sustainable peace. His delegation welcomed the establishment of special political missions by the Security Council and the General Assembly to assist countries in laying the foundations for durable peace. The three main issues worthy of attention were mandates; resource mobilization; and women, peace and security.

100. Regarding mandates, his Government agreed with the Secretary-General's report on estimates in respect

of special political missions (A/69/363) that special political missions played a critical role in the overall efforts of the United Nations to prevent conflict. Improved cooperation between special political missions and peacekeeping operations involving sub-regional and regional actors was a welcome development. Mandates for special political missions should incorporate robust mediation efforts, knowledge management and increased use of modern technologies. However, special political missions needed appropriate resources. His delegation was aware of the lack of funding needed to effectively maintain the Secretary-General's good offices.

101. Turning to women, peace and security, his delegation encouraged the special political missions to step up efforts to address violations of international law and the normative framework associated with Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), including reduced impunity for violations against women and children. Moreover, it was vital for special political missions to exchange information on lessons learned.

102. **Mr. Forés Rodríguez** (Cuba) said that special political missions needed to adhere strictly to the principles of the Charter, particularly those relating to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of States and non-intervention in their internal affairs. It was also the Organization's duty to provide each special political mission with a clear, achievable and realistic mandate, concrete objectives and the material and financial resources required by the situation on the ground.

103. The adoption of new missions should not affect the regular budget, and the General Assembly should therefore carry out a genuine, transparent and democratic analysis to identify a separate funding mechanism. The Movement of Non-Aligned Countries had proposed that the criteria, methodology and mechanisms used to finance peacekeeping operations should be applied to special political missions, including the establishment of a separate account.

104. Taking note of the reports of the High-level Independent Panel (A/70/95-S/2015/446) and of the Secretary-General on implementing the Panel's recommendations (A/70/357-S/2015/682), he said that special political missions should be governed by policies developed collectively by Member States in the General Assembly. Any initiative aimed at regulating or reforming such missions came under the

remit of the General Assembly, including the recommendations from the aforementioned reports. The General Assembly should play a key role in adopting, implementing and monitoring those missions.

105. His Government considered it appropriate for the Secretary-General to submit annual reports on issues relating to special political missions where the matter would be tackled comprehensively, thereby ensuring transparency and accountability. He reiterated his delegation's willingness to work within the General Assembly to ensure that special political missions fulfilled the noble objective underlying their creation.

106. **Mr. Mahdi** (Iraq) said that his delegation took note of the mention of UNAMI in the Secretary-General's previous report on overall policy matters pertaining to special political missions (A/69/325), and underscored the specificity of each such mission, according to its mandate and discussions between the United Nations and national Governments on ownership and sovereignty, and to the United Nations norms regarding the maintenance of international peace and security. It was important to respect the independence and sovereignty of Member States to ensure that missions did not exceed their Security Council mandates. National Governments were best placed to address the needs of their countries.

107. The excellent coordination and support relationship between his Government and UNAMI had strengthened political dialogue and contributed to elections that in turn had led to reconciliation, human rights protection and reform. Humanitarian assistance was also being provided to Iraqi and Syrian refugees. Security Council resolution 2233 (2015) had extended the mandate of UNAMI to 13 July 2016. His Government backed the Secretary-General's recommendation on priorities after discussion with Iraq on how to improve United Nations efforts politically and in humanitarian work.

108. **Mr. Alemu** (Ethiopia) said that his delegation viewed the report of the High-level Independent Panel (A/70/95-S/2015/446) as particularly significant, as it had underscored the need to bring politics back to the fore in special political missions. Using peacekeeping missions to address complex security challenges was no longer politically or financially viable. It was therefore critical to address the root causes of conflict and strengthen early-warning, prevention and

mediation mechanisms. Special political missions were extremely important political means of handling conflict.

109. The general membership of the United Nations should have a say in the establishment of special political missions; missions lacking the analytical capability to avert conflicts would be suboptimal, and the United Nations needed to develop that capacity. His delegation welcomed the High-level Independent Panel's recommendations (A/70/95-S/2015/446) regarding improved analysis and strategy, sharper assessment and planning. The capacity of the Department of Political Affairs to provide serious analysis should be further strengthened, so as to ensure the successful deployment of special political missions. A Department limited by insufficient resources risked delivering unreliable analyses and recommendations that could exacerbate delicate conflict situations. There were enough examples of that kind to warrant concern.

110. One Panel recommendation that was very welcome in Africa was to strengthen regional and global partnerships, and particularly to boost the strategic partnership between the United Nations and the African Union based on consultative decision-making and division of labour, in accordance with their respective comparative advantages. It was essential for the two organizations to cooperate closely in jointly analysing, planning, monitoring and evaluating special political missions, and in integrated response to conflicts including prevention. The Department of Political Affairs must be able to provide analysis of conflict situations that was robust enough to provide a basis for effective special political missions.

111. **Ms. Haile** (Eritrea), noting the Secretary-General's previous report on overall policy matters pertaining to special political missions (A/69/325), reiterated the critical role of the General Assembly in maintaining international peace and security, partly by providing the Secretariat with guidance on policy relating to special political missions. Her delegation therefore supported efforts to enhance the engagement of the Assembly through regular dialogue with the Secretariat.

112. Although the backing of the general membership of the United Nations was indispensable for the success of special political missions, the Committee's resolutions had achieved limited success in increasing the level of that commitment. Her Government called

for establishing inclusive, structured, focused and result-oriented dialogue during the present session of the General Assembly. Prior consultation between Member States and the Secretariat, as well as a timetable for interactive dialogues, would contribute to productive exchanges. Her delegation looked forward to more comprehensive reporting on measures taken by the Secretariat to enhance effectiveness, transparency and equitable geographic representation. Her Government would continue actively to contribute to discussions on how to enhance the effectiveness of special political missions.

113. **Mr. Zahir** (Maldives), welcoming the Secretary-General's report on special political missions (A/70/400), said that although his Government recognized the international importance of special political missions, they needed to have well-defined, transparent and objective methodologies to avoid any inconsistency with their intended purpose. Such missions should not be used to promote politically-driven agendas, to apply pressure on behalf of segments of the international community or in a way that contravened the principles of the Charter. As recommended by the Secretary-General, special political missions required a robust, consistent and transparent governing mechanism, and should involve inclusive and transparent consultations with the host State and all relevant stakeholders, have a previously approved mandate, and work within those parameters.

114. As the personnel deployed for such missions were under the authority of the Secretary-General, it was essential for them to uphold the integrity of the United Nations. Moreover, absolute impartiality and objectivity must be exercised at all times to avoid undermining faith in the process and the Organization. Moreover, the operations, reporting and recommendations relating to missions should take into account the specific requirements, limitations and capacities of the host State. Their guiding principles and purposes, based on United Nations ideals, needed to be the same in every country. Missions should promote harmony rather than widen divisions. Special political missions depended on Member State support, which could only be relied upon if those principles were consistently maintained.

115. As enshrined in Goal 16 of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, conflict prevention, peace and security and sustainable development were intrinsically linked. His Government was therefore

willing to work with the United Nations to prevent conflict, sustain peace and security, assist countries with development, and transform the future for a better world.

116. **Mr. Erciyas** (Turkey) thanked the Secretary-General and the High-Level Independent Panel for their reports in the context of the urgent and compelling need for reform of the United Nations system. His Government acknowledged the need for additional resources to address the expanding humanitarian operations of the United Nations. The Panel's report (A/70/95-S/2015/446) described the desperate conditions of 60 million displaced people around the world and their humanitarian needs requiring USD 20 billion for 2015 alone, and Member States had a collective responsibility to mobilize more resources to meet such needs. However, given the scale of a full conflict cycle and the renewed emphasis on political solutions, no peacekeeping operation could replace a sustainable political solution.

117. Special political missions were at the heart of the aims of the United Nations. Given their high-risk environments, clear and achievable mandates were vital to increase the efficiency of such missions. Enhanced cooperation between special political missions and peacekeeping operations, especially during transition phases, was key to success. Maintaining geographical representation and gender balance, as well as prioritizing expertise and merit, were other important criteria for increasing the performance of such missions.

118. Insufficient resources in the Organization's bi-annual regular budget had made it almost impossible to meet the financial requirements of special political missions. The current formula was no longer sustainable, and financial adjustments or new financial mechanisms should be considered. His delegation believed that a separate budget for special political missions could be useful. The underlying rationale for such an adjustment was that the efficiency of such missions depended on their rapid response capabilities, which required more predictable financial resources. The strong endorsement for conflict prevention and mediation in the Secretary-General's and Panel's reports called for financial resources to be allocated to mediation as a core activity from the regular budget of the United Nations.

119. As a Co-Chair of the Group of Friends of Mediation, his delegation firmly believed in the usefulness of mediation throughout the conflict cycle; as a tool for conflict prevention, conflict management and resolution; and in the implementation phase of peace and political agreements. His Government had supported United Nations mediation efforts with a voluntary contribution and would continue to do so. However, even Member States' extra-budgetary contributions would fail in the absence of a viable solution to the financial impasse of special political missions.

120. **Mr. Morihiro** (Japan) said that the significance of special political missions had increased since the reports of the High-level Independent Panel (A/70/95-S/2015/446) and the Secretary-General (A/70/357-S/2015/682), which had emphasized the primacy of politics. Further collective efforts were required to face the challenges entailed by a significant growth in the number, scale and complexity of special political missions.

121. The toolbox for promoting international peace and security contained various instruments, including peacekeeping operations, special political missions and country teams, as well as regional and bilateral support. Consistent monitoring was vital to check whether the adopted combination of tools remained the most effective arrangement for sustainable peace.

122. Transparency should also be enhanced. As decisions on special political missions were made by the Security Council, Member States outside the Council found the process, rationale and criteria involved to be somewhat unclear, even when compared to peacekeeping operations. Clarity in the decision-making process was key for garnering broad support, and his Government was committed to enhancing transparency.

123. The special role of the Security Council in authorizing the establishment of such missions and their mandates also carried with it a responsibility. The Council should further ensure clear mandates, sound operations and a well-defined timeline for each mission. Japan continued to explore possible improvements in that regard, and would work to advance the effectiveness and transparency of special political missions as part of its commitment to international peace and security.

124. **Mr. Vaverka** (Sweden) said that people were fleeing from war and persecution in staggering numbers, creating high levels of asylum seekers in his and other countries. It was imperative to prevent conflicts from breaking out in the first place by redoubling efforts in diplomacy, good offices, and political solutions. Special political missions were key in that regard. His delegation fully endorsed the reports of the High-level Independent Panel (A/70/95-S/2015/446), and of the Secretary-General on overall policy matters (A/70/400) and on implementing the Panel's recommendations (A/70/357-S/2015/682), which had all made a compelling case for developing special political missions.

125. Special political missions shared the women, peace and security agenda's increasing focus on women's participation in peace processes. A core message of the three peace and security reviews was the need for an integrated approach to build and sustain peace. Special political missions were part of the continuum that characterized a holistic approach, in part by strengthening local and regional perspectives. His delegation called for further backing for the draft resolution, as well as the political will to agree on the long-overdue improved funding and backstopping of special political missions.

126. **Ms. Karhu** (Finland) said that her delegation welcomed the Secretary-General's report on overall policy matters (A/70/400) as a contribution to increased transparency regarding such missions and called for further analysis of overall matters and current trends pertaining to such missions in the future.

127. Her delegation appreciated the use of special political missions to uphold peace and save lives in a flexible and integral way, and urged that they should be developed further. It welcomed the commitment to continue the interactive dialogue, and would value the presence of more women in senior positions within missions.

128. Her Government endorsed the High-level Independent Panel's recommendations (A/70/95-S/2015/446) and the need for renewed focus on conflict prevention and mediation, as well as the ongoing need to explore ways of strengthening beneficial partnerships. Her delegation backed the intention to ensure that the Organization's activities in the field had the required expertise, and called for more focus on the field. Activities also needed to be

tailored to the needs of each situation. Her delegation hoped that deliberations in various intergovernmental fora would lead to decisions enabling special political missions to fulfil their full potential. As outlined in the Panel's report, that should include financing and backstopping arrangements. Thanking Members for backing the draft resolution, she called on more countries to lend their support.

129. **Mr. Elmodir** (Libya), taking note of the Secretary-General's report on overall policy matters (A/70/400), said that special political missions should be aware of national ownership, the connection between security and socioeconomic development, and the capacity of States to undertake the main task of protecting citizens. The tasks of special political missions must be clearly defined on the basis of assignments and mandates.

130. His Government had hosted the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) as it had been an expression of the international community's support for the Libyan people's choice to establish a State and rule of law. However, the previous year's conflict and armed militia control of Tripoli had forced UNSMIL to move to Tunisia and carry out its tasks from there. Its mandate was focused on a dialogue with partners to find common ground. Libya appreciated the key role of UNSMIL, as it had contributed to an agreement urging all political parties to back a national-accord government as a way out of crisis and a path for people to rebuild their lives. His delegation applauded the efforts of the outgoing Special Envoy to bring parties to such an advanced stage of dialogue, and expressed its backing for his successor.

The meeting rose at 5.36 p.m.